FIRST DIVISION [G.R. No. 33592. March 31, 1931.] Estate of the deceased Victorina Villaranda.

EUSEBIA LIM, petitioner-appellant, vs. JULIANA CHINCO, oppositor-appellee.

Perfecto Gabriel and Eusebio Orense for appellant. Camus & Delgado for appellee.
SYLLABUS 1.WILLS; LACK OF TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY; COMA RESULTING FROM CEREBRAL HEMORRHAGE. The alleged testatrix, a woman of about 80 years of age, was stricken with apoplexy, incident to cerebral hemorrhage, and was kept prostrate in bed, in a state of coma, for three days, at the end of which she was removed to a hospital where she died four days later. Just before her removal to the hospital a will was made for her by an attorney, who also signed her name thereto, purportedly at her request. At the time the will was made the proof showed that the testatrix was in a comatose condition and devoid of the power of articulate speech. Held, that testamentary capacity was lacking and that the purported will was not valid.

DECISION

STREET, J p: This is a contest over the probable of a paper writing purporting to be the will of Victorina Villaranda y Diaz, a former resident of the municipality of Meycauayan, Province of Bulacan, who died in the Hospital of San Juan de Dios, in the City of Manila, on June 9, 1929. The deceased left no descendants or ascendants, and the document produced as her will purports to leave her estate, consisting of properties valued at P50,000, more or less, chiefly to three collateral relatives, Eusebia, Crispina, and Maria, of the surname of Lim. This instrument was offered for probate by Eusebia Lim, named in the instrument as executrix. Opposition was made by Juliana Chinco, a full sister of the deceased. Upon hearing the cause the trial court sustained the opposition and disallowed the will on the ground that the testatrix did not have testamentary capacity at the time the instrument purports to have been executed by her. From this judgment the proponent of the will appealed. The deceased was a resident of Meycauayan, Province of Bulacan, and was about 80 years of age at the time of her death. On the morning of June 2, 1929, she was stricken with apoplexy, incident to cerebral hemorrhage, and was taken in an unconscious condition, seated in a chair, to her room. Doctor Geronimo Z. Gaanan, a local physician of Meycauayan, visited the old lady, with whom he was well acquainted, three or four times, the first visit having occurred between 6 and 7 p.m. of June 3d. Upon examining the patient, he found her insensible and incapable of talking or controlling her movements. On the same day the parish priest called for the purpose of administering the last rites of the church, and being unable to take her confession, he limited himself to performing the office of extreme unction. Doctor Isidoro Lim, of Manila, was also called upon to visit the patient and he came to see her two or three times. With his approval, it was decided to take the woman to the hospital of San Juan de Dios in Manila, and on the morning of June 5, 1929, the ambulance from this hospital arrived, in charge of Doctor Guillermo Lopez del Castillo, a resident physician of the hospital. At about 11 o'clock a.m. on that day she was embarked on the ambulance and taken to the hospital, where she died four days later. The purported will, which is the subject of this proceeding, was prepared by Perfecto Gabriel, a practicing attorney of Manila, whose wife appears to be related to the chief beneficiaries named in the will. This gentleman arrived upon the scene at 9 or 10 o'clock on the forenoon of June 5, 1929. After informing himself of the condition of the testatrix, he went into a room adjacent to that occupied by the patient and, taking a sheet from an exercise book,

wrote the instrument in question. He then took it into the sick room for execution. With this end in view Gabriel suggested to Doctor Lopez del Castillo that he would be pleased to have Doctor Castillo sign as a witness, but the latter excused himself for the reason that he considered the old lady to be lacking in testamentary capacity. Another person present was Marcos Ira, a first cousin of the deceased and attorney Gabriel asked him also whether or not he was willing to sign as one of the witnesses. Ira replied in a discouraging tone, and the attorney turned away without pressing the matter. In the end three persons served as witnesses, and two relatives of his wife. The intended testatrix was not able to affix her signature to the document, and it was signed for her by the attorney. The vital question in the case is whether the supposed testatrix had testamentary capacity at the time the paper referred to was signed. Upon this point we are of the opinion, as was the trial judge, that she had not. The proof shows by a marked preponderance that the deceased, on the morning of June 5, 1929, was in a comatose condition and incapable of performing any conscious and valid act. The testimony of Doctor Gaanan and Doctor Lopez del Castillo is sufficient upon this point, and this testimony is well corroborated by Paciana Diaz and Irene Ahorro. The first of these witnesses was the one who chiefly cared for the deceased during her last illness in Meycauayan until she was carried away to the hospital in Manila; and the second was a neighbor, who was called in when the stroke of apoplexy first occurred and who visited the patient daily until she was removed from Meycauayan. The testimony of these witnesses is convincing to the effect that the patient was in a continuous state of coma during the entire period of her stay in Meycauayan, subsequent to the attack, and that on the forenoon of June 5, 1929, she did not have sufficient command of her faculties to enable her to do any valid act. Doctor Lim, the physician from Manila, testified for the proponent of the will. His testimony tends to show that the patient was not suffering from cerebral hemorrhage but from uraemic trouble, and that, after the first attack, the patient was much relieved and her mind so far cleared up that she might have made a will on the morning of June 5th. The attorney testified that he was able to communicate with the deceased when the will was made, and that he read the instrument over to her clause by clause and asked her whether it expressed her wishes. He says that she made signs that enabled him to understand that she concurred in what was written. But it is clear, even upon the statement of this witness, that the patient was unable to utter intelligent speech. Upon the authority of Perry vs. Elio (29 Phil., 134), the paper offered for probate was properly disallowed. The judgment appealed from will therefore be affirmed, and it is so ordered, with costs against the appellant.

Avancea, C. J., Johnson, Villamor and Villa-Real, JJ., concur. Malcolm and Johns, JJ., concurred, but being absent at the date of the promulgation of the opinion, their names do not appear signed thereto. AVANCEA, C. J.
Separate Opinions ROMUALDEZ, J., dissenting: I am of opinion that the will in question is genuine and that it was drawn up and signed with all the legal requisites; therefore, I vote for its allowance, and the consequent reversal of the judgment appealed from.

EN BANC [G.R. No. L-5263. February 17, 1954.] 1. WILLS; PROBATE; SIGNING IN THE PRESENCE OF TESTATOR AND AGUSTIN BARRERA, ET AL., proponents-appellants, vs. JOSE TAMPOCO, ET AL., oppositors-appellees.

Jesus G. Barrera for appellants. Filemon Cajator for appellees.

SYLLABUS 1.WILLS; PROBATE; SIGNING IN THE PRESENCE OF TESTATOR AND ATTESTING WITNESSES; CONFLICT IN TESTIMONY OF ATTESTING WITNESSES. Two attesting witnesses testified that the will was signed by the testatrix and by the three attesting witnesses in the presence of each other, while the other attesting witness testified to the contrary. The court gave weight to the testimony of the first two one of whom is an attorney and justice of the peace who drafted the will, the court also considering the fact that the witness who testified against the due execution of the will, signed the attestation clause stating that the will was signed by the testatrix and the witnesses in the presence of each other. 2.ID.; ID.; ID.; RELATIVES OF BENEFICIARIES AS ATTESTING WITNESSES. The fact that the witnesses to the execution of the will are related to some of the beneficiaries thereunder, is not sufficient to make them biased witnesses. 3.ID.; ID.; ID.; READING OF WILL NOT NECESSARY. It is not necessary that the will be read upon its signing and in the presence of the witnesses. 4.ID.; ID.; ID.; OMISSION OF SOME RELATIVES AS BENEFICIARIES DOES NOT AFFECT DUE EXECUTION OF WILL. The court did not attempt to discover the motives of the testatrix in leaving her properties to the person named in the will and admitting therefrom the oppositors. As the will was found to have been executed free from falsification, fraud, trickery or undue influence, with the testatrix having testamentary capacity, the court was compelled to give expression thereto.

DECISION

PARAS, J p: Oliva Villapaa died in Tarlac, Tarlac, on December 13, 1948. On December 31, 1948, a petition was filed by Agustin Parrera in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac for the probate of the will executed by Oliva Villapaa on July 17, 1948, and for the appointment of the petitioner as executor. According to the petition the properties left by the testatrix are worth P94,852.96, and the heirs instituted are nephews and nieces and grandchildren in the collateral line. Jose Tampoco and Victoriano Tampoco, alleged grandchildren of the testatrix in the direct line, filed an opposition, claiming that the will was not executed and attested in accordance with law, that the testratrix lacked testamentary capacity, that there was undue influence and pressure in its execution, that the signature of Oliva Villapaa was obtained by fraud and trickery, and that the testamentary provisions are illegal. Consorcia Lintang, Nemesio Villapaa, Marcos Villapaa, Jesus Villapaa, Vicente Villapaa, Ursulo Villapaa, Avelina Villapaa and Rosario Villapaa, alleged nephews and nieces, also filed an opposition on substantially the same grounds on which the opposition of Jose and Victoriano Tampoco was based. After protracted trial, and more than a year after the submission of the case, a decision was rendered by the Court of First Instance of Tarlac on August 11, 1951, disallowing the will. The court found that Oliva Villapaa had testamentary capacity, that there was no forgery, fraud, trickery or undue influence in the execution of the will, and that preterition of forced heirs is not a ground for denying probate; but the will was disallowed because it was not the personal last will and testament of the deceased and it was not based on the finding that Oliva Villapaa did not furnish the names of the persons instituted as heirs and that

the will was not read to her before she signed it. The second ground is premised on the conclusion that attesting witness Laureano Antonio was not present when Oliva Villapaa and attesting witness Honorio Lacson signed the will; that Antonio only partially saw the signing by attesting witness Modesto Puno; and that Oliva Villapaa saw Antonio sign only two or three times. From this decision the petitioner has appealed. According to appellant's evidence, two or three days before July 10, 1948, Pilar Taedo called on Modesto Puno, a lawyer and justice of the peace of Concepcion, Tarlac, and requested the latter to come to Manila for a conference with Oliva Villapaa, aunt of Pilar. On July 10, 1948, Atty. Puno, complying with this request, went to the house of Pilar Taedo in Singalong Street where Oliva was staying. The latter, after preliminary greetings and courtesies, informed Atty. Puno that she wanted him to prepare her will, giving the names of the heirs and the properties to be left. Oliva Villapaa asked Atty. Puno to get the description of the properties from the herein appellant, Agustin Barrera, husband of Pilar Taedo. Atty. Puno noted the wishes of Oliva, and, as there was then no available typewriter, he informed the old woman that he would prepare the will in his office in Concepcion and come back with it on the following Saturday. As promised, on or July 17, 1948, Atty. Puno returned to the house of Oliva Villapaa in Singalong, carrying with him one original and three copies, in typewritten form, of the will he drafted in accordance with the instructions of Oliva Villapaa. Atty. Puno arrived at about noon. He read the will to Oliva to find out whether it conformed to her wishes, and she indicated that it was all right. After lunch Atty. Puno manifested that two other witnesses were necessary, whereupon Pilar Taedo requested Honorio Lacson and Laureano Antonio, who were then living in the first floor of the house, to come up. Lacson and Antonio did as requested. Asked by Oliva Villapaa if they could act as attesting witnesses to her will, both agreed. Oliva Villapaa, Atty. Puno, Lacson and Antonio were then seated around a small rectangular table in the sala, and at this juncture Atty. Puno gave a copy of the will to Oliva, Lacson and Antonio, while he retained one. The attorney again read the will aloud, advising the rest to check their respective copies. As Oliva Villapaa agreed to the will, she proceeded to sign all the four copies, on the lines previously placed by Atty. Puno, followed successively by Lacson, Atty. Puno and Antonio, all in the presence of each other. After the signing, Atty. Puno gave the original and a copv to Oliva, and retained the other two copies. Atty. Puno, Lacson and Antonio stayed for a while and even ate merienda prepared by the sisters Pilar and Beatriz Taedo. Oliva Villapaa delivered her will to Agustin Barrera for safekeeping on October 17, 1948 when she was taken to the U. S. T. Hospital where she remained until November 7, 1948. On this date her doctors lost all hope for her recovery and Oliva Villapaa was brought to Tarlac, Tarlac, her home town, where, as already stated, she died on December 13, 1948. According to the evidence for the oppositors-appellees, the will presented in court by the petitioner was not executed in accordance with law, in that attesting witness Laureano Antonio did not see the testatrix and attesting witness Lacson sign the will or any of its copies, that he saw Atty. Puno when the latter was already half thru signing the document, and that the testatrix did not see Antonio sign all the copies. After a thorough study of the record and mature reflection on the conflicting evidence, we are constrained to conclude that the trial court erred in denying probate of the will. Of the three attesting witnesses, namely, Atty. Modesto Puno, Honorio Lacson and Laureano Antonio, the first two testified positively that the will was signed by the testatrix and the three witnesses in the presence of each other, and that it was read to the testratrix before being signed. In view of the opposition filed by the two sets of oppositors, the third attesting witness, Laureano Antonio, had to be presented by the petitioner but, contrary to expectations, Antonio testified that he arrived at the scene of the execution of the will after the testatrix and Honorio Lacson had already signed and after Atty. Puno was half through affixing his signatures, and that the testatrix left before Antonio finished signing all the copies. By numerical superiority alone, the weight of the testimony of Atty. Puno and Honorio Lacson out-balances the probative value of the testimony of Laureano Antonio. Intrinsically, we cannot state that Laureano Antonio spoke the truth on the witness stand, since, in the first place, the attestation clause signed by him contradicts his pretense and, in the second place, there is enough evidence on the record to show that in his conferences with Atty. Barrera before taking the witness stand, Antonio never gave the slightest indication that he was not present when the testatrix and the other witnesses signed the will or that the testatrix left before Antonio finished signing. Modesto Puno is a lawyer and at the time a justice of the peace, and it is improbable that he would unnecessarily risk his honor and reputation. Indeed, the trial court gave the impression that Atty. Puno was anxious to strictly meet the requirements of the law and in the absence, as in the case at bar, of any reason for a hasty completion, we do not believe that Atty. Puno would have allowed the signing of the will to be proceeded with unless three attesting witnesses were already present. On the other hand, we can fairly state that there was in fact no hurry on the part of any of the participants in the will, because the testatrix Oliva Villapaa was not dying (she died some five months after the execution of the will) and the parties could therefore take all the time that they wanted. Indeed, none of the three witnesses, left the house of Oliva Villapaa and they even stayed therein until after merienda time.

The fact that Atty. Puno is the brother of Jose Puno who is the husband of Carmen Taedo, one of the beneficiaries of the will, and that Honorio Lacson is the husband of Bibiana Lacson who is a first cousin of Agustin Barrera, herein petitioner and husband of Pilar Taedo, is not sufficient to make them biased witnesses. If Atty. Puno had any material interest, this fact should have caused him to be more careful in seeing to it that the formalities of the law were strictly complied with, and this should be true with respect to Honorio Lacson. In deciding against the probate of the will, the trial court believed the testimony of Laureano Antonio to the effect that he arrived at the place of the signing at about 2:30 in the afternoon, and thereby found that a greater part of the proceeding was finished, because Atty. Puno declared in one place that "the signing of the testament commenced around between one o'clock and two o'clock" and in another place that the signing took place "around between two and three o'clock;" and Honorio Lacson declared that he was called by Pilar Taedo to act as witness at around two o'clock or two thirty. From the testimony of Atty. Puno and Honorio Lacson the court concluded that the signing actually commenced between one and two o'clock. We are of the opinion that the specification of the time of the signing refers to an immaterial or unimportant detail which, in view of the lapse of time, might have been a mistake by one or the other participant in the execution of Oliva's will. What is important and decisive and this should be impressed in the mind of an attorney preparing and taking charge of the signing of will, is that the testatrix and each of the three attesting witnesses must affix their signatures in the presence of one another. In the case before us, Atty. Puno and Honorio Lacson both attesting witnesses, categorically affirmed that this procedure was followed. At any rate, even under the testimony of Atty. Puno and Honorio Lacson, the signing could have taken place at about or after two thirty, since the former declared that it took place between two and three o'clock and Honorio Lacson stated that the time was two or two thirty. Another point invoked by the trial court against the probate of the will is the circumstance that, while Atty. Puno testified that he placed the lines on which the testatrix and the witnesses were to sign before he read the document to the testatrix to whom he gave the original, witness Lacson testified that Atty. Puno read the original after giving a copy to the testatrix, and after reading Atty. Puno placed the lines for signatures. This discrepancy again refers to a minor detail which is not sufficient to negative the truthfulness of Atty. Puno and Honorio Lacson on the main and important fact that the will was signed by the testatrix and the three attesting witnesses in the presence of each other. Oppositors-appellees presented in corroboration of the testimony of Laureano Antonio, Joaquin Villapaa and Consolacion del Mundo. Joaquin Villapaa, a painter, allegedly painted the house of Agustin Barrera in July, 1948 and saw the execution of the will. Consolacion del Mundo allegedly was then the maid of Oliva Villapaa. Apart from the fact that there is evidence to show that both Joaquin Villapaa and Consolacion del Mundo were not yet employed in the house of Oliva when the latter's will was executed, there is little or no reason for their version to prevail over the positive testimony of Atty. Puno and Honorio Lacson, considering that the latter's testimony is even corroborated by two other witnesses, Bibiana Lacson and Beatriz Taedo. Certainly the story of Joaquin Villapaa and Consolacion del Mundo can have no greater weight than that of Laureano Antonio. In holding that the will was not that of Oliva Villapaa, the trial court found that it was not read to her; and this finding was premised on the alleged contradiction of Atty. Puno and Honorio Lacson regarding the sequence of the reading of the will and the placing of lines for signatures, and regarding the question whether a copy or the original was handed to the testatrix. As we have already observed, the discrepancy relates to an insignificant matter which cannot vitally detract from the credibility of Atty. Puno to the effect that upon arrival at the house of Oliva Villapaa at about noon, he read the will to her with a view to finding whether she was agreeable thereto. It is not necessary that said will be read upon its signing and in the presence of the witnesses. The trial court also concluded that the testatrix could not have furnished the names of the heirs instituted under the will, because (1) Salvador Taedo, one of such heirs, was long dead and (2) Marcelo Villapaa, another instituted heir, was non-existent, since Oliva Villapaa did not have a grandson by such name. It is true that Salvador Taedo was already dead and the testatrix knew about it, but it is not uncommon for a woman of old age, confused by the big number of her relatives, to commit the mistake of unwittingly mentioning a dead one. With respect to the instituted heir, Marcelo Villapaa, while it appears that Oliva did not have a grandson answering to that name, there is evidence tending to show that Pioquinto Villapaa, a child of Ruperta Pineda, must have been referred to, because Oliva, who was the child's god-mother, originally wanted said child to be baptized as Marcelo, after his father. Moreover, if Atty. Puno had supplied the names instituted as heirs, he would have consulted all the interested parties and would be sure that no mistake of the kind was made. As a closing observation, it is not for us to discover the motives of Oliva Villapaa in leaving her properties to the person named in the will, and omitting therefrom the oppositors-appellees. Suffice it to state that the trial court

itself found the will to have been executed free from falsification, fraud, trickery or undue influence, with Oliva having testamentary capacity; and in such a situation it becomes our duty to give expression to her will. Wherefore, the appealed order is reversed and the will executed by Oliva Villapaa on July 17, 1948, is hereby allowed. So ordered without costs.

Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista Angelo and Labrador, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION [G.R. No. 106720. September 15, 1994.] SPOUSES ROBERTO AND THELMA AJERO, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND CLEMENTE SAND, respondents.

DECISION

PUNO, J p: This is an appeal by certiorari from the Decision of the Court of Appeals 1 in CA-G.R. CV No. 22840, dated March 30, 1992, the dispositive portion of which reads: "PREMISES CONSIDERED, the questioned decision of November 19, 1988 of the trial court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the petition for probate is hereby DISMISSED. No costs." The earlier Decision was rendered by the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 94, 2 in Sp. Proc. No. Q-37171, and the instrument submitted for probate is the holographic will of the late Annie Sand, who died on November 25, 1982. In the will, decedent named as devisees, the following: petitioners Roberto and Thelma Ajero, private respondent Clemente Sand, Meriam S. Arong, Leah Sand, Lilia Sand, Edgar Sand, Fe Sand, Lisa S. Sand, and Dr. Jose Ajero, Sr., and their children. prLL On January 20, 1983, petitioners instituted Sp. Proc. No. Q-37171, for allowance of decedent's holographic will. They alleged that at the time of its execution, she was of sound and disposing mind, not acting under duress, fraud or undue influence, and was in every respect capacitated to dispose of her estate by will. Private respondent opposed the petition on the grounds that: neither the testament's body nor the signature therein was in decedent's handwriting; it contained alterations and corrections which were not duly signed by decedent; and, the will was procured by petitioners through improper pressure and undue influence. The petition was likewise opposed by Dr. Jose Ajero. He contested the disposition in the will of a house and lot located in Cabadbaran, Agusan Del Norte. He claimed that said property could not be conveyed by decedent in its entirety, as she was not its sole owner. Notwithstanding the oppositions, the trial court admitted the decedent's holographic will to probate. It found, inter alia: "Considering then that the probate proceedings herein must decide only the question of identity of the will, its due execution and the testamentary capacity of the testatrix, this probate court finds no reason at all for the disallowance of the will for its failure to comply with the formalities prescribed by law nor for lack of testamentary capacity of the testatrix. "For one, no evidence was presented to show that the will in question is different from the will actually executed by the testatrix. The only objections raised by the oppositors . . . are that the will was not written in the handwriting of the testatrix which properly refers to the question of its due execution, and not to the question of identity of will. No other will was alleged to have been executed by the testatrix other than the will herein presented. Hence, in the light of the evidence adduced, the identity of the will presented for probate must be accepted, i.e., the will submitted in Court must be deemed to be the will actually executed by the testatrix. "xxx xxx xxx "While the fact that it was entirely written, dated and signed in the handwriting of the testatrix has been disputed, the petitioners, however, have satisfactorily shown in Court that the holographic will in

question was indeed written entirely, dated and signed in the handwriting of the testatrix. Three (3) witnesses who have convincingly shown knowledge of the handwriting of the testatrix have been presented and have explicitly and categorically identified the handwriting with which the holographic will in question was written to be the genuine handwriting and signature of the testatrix. Given then the aforesaid evidence, the requirement of the law that the holographic will be entirely written, dated and signed in the handwriting of the testatrix has been complied with. "xxx xxx xxx "As to the question of the testamentary capacity of the testatrix, (private respondent) Clemente Sand himself has testified in Court that the testatrix was completely in her sound mind when he visited her during her birthday celebration in 1981, at or around which time the holographic will in question was executed by the testatrix. To be of sound mind, it is sufficient that the testatrix, at the time of making the will, knew the value of the estate to be disposed of, the proper object of her bounty, and the character of the testamentary act . . . The will itself shows that the testatrix even had detailed knowledge of the nature of her estate. She even identified the lot number and square meters of the lots she had conveyed by will. The objects of her bounty were likewise identified explicitly. And considering that she had even written a nursing book which contained the law and jurisprudence on will and succession, there is more than sufficient showing that she knows the character of the testamentary act. "In this wise, the question of identity of the will, its due execution and the testamentary capacity of the testatrix has to be resolved in favor of the allowance of probate of the will submitted herein. "Likewise, no evidence was presented to show sufficient reason for the disallowance of herein holographic will. While it was alleged that the said will was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiary or of some other person, the evidence adduced have not shown any instance where improper pressure or influence was exerted on the testatrix. (Private respondent) Clemente Sand has testified that the testatrix was still alert at the time of the execution of the will, i.e., at or around the time of her birth anniversary celebration in 1981. It was also established that she is a very intelligent person and has a mind of her own. Her independence of character and to some extent, her sense of superiority, which has been testified to in Court, all show the unlikelihood of her being unduly influenced or improperly pressured to make the aforesaid will. It must be noted that the undue influence or improper pressure in question herein only refer to the making of a will and not as to the specific testamentary provisions therein which is the proper subject of another proceeding. Hence, under the circumstances, this Court cannot find convincing reason for the disallowance of the will herein. "Considering then that it is a well-established doctrine in the law on succession that in case of doubt, testate succession should be preferred over intestate succession, and the fact that no convincing grounds were presented and proven for the disallowance of the holographic will of the late Annie Sand, the aforesaid will submitted herein must be admitted to probate." 3 (Emphasis omitted.) On appeal, said Decision was reversed, and the petition for probate of decedent's will was dismissed. The Court of Appeals found that, "the holographic will fails to meet the requirements for its validity." 4 It held that the decedent did not comply with Articles 813 and 814 of the New Civil Code, which read, as follows: "Article 813: When a number of dispositions appearing in a holographic will are signed without being dated, and the last disposition has a signature and date, such date validates the dispositions preceding it, whatever be the time of prior dispositions." "Article 814: In case of insertion, cancellation, erasure or alteration in a holographic will, the testator must authenticate the same by his full signature." It alluded to certain dispositions in the will which were either unsigned and undated, or signed but not dated. It also found that the erasures, alterations and cancellations made thereon had not been authenticated by decedent. llcd Thus, this appeal which is impressed with merit.

Section 9, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court provides that wills shall be disallowed in any of the following cases: "(a)If not executed and attested as required by law; (b)If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable to make a will, at the time of its execution; (c)If it was executed under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats; (d)If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of the beneficiary, or of some other person for his benefit; (e)If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or trick, and he did not intend that the instrument should be his will at the time of fixing his signature thereto." In the same vein, Article 839 of the New Civil Code reads: "Article 839: The will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases: (1)If the formalities required by law have not been complied with; (2If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable of making a will, at the time of its execution; (3)If it was executed through force or under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats; (4)If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of the beneficiary or of some other person; (5)If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud; (6) If the testator acted by mistake or did not intend that the instrument he signed should be his will at the time of affixing his signature thereto." These lists are exclusive; no other grounds can serve to disallow a will. 5 Thus, in a petition to admit a holographic will to probate, the only issues to be resolved are: (1) whether the instrument submitted is, indeed, the decedent's last will and testament; (2) whether said will was executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law; (3) whether the decedent had the necessary testamentary capacity at the time the will was executed; and, (4) whether the execution of the will and its signing were the voluntary acts of the decedents. 6 In the case at bench, respondent court held that the holographic will of Anne Sand was not executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. It held that Articles 813 and 814 of the New Civil Code, ante, were not complied with, hence, it disallowed the probate of said will. This is erroneous. cdrep

We reiterate what we held in Abangan vs. Abangan, 40 Phil. 476, 479 (1919), that: "The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore, the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an interpretation already given assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the testator's last will, must be disregarded."

For purposes of probating non-holographic wills, these formal solemnities include the subscription, attestation, and acknowledgment requirements under Articles 805 and 806 of the New Civil Code. In the case of holographic wills, on the other hand, what assures authenticity is the requirement that they be totally autographic or handwritten by the testator himself, 7 as provided under Article 810 of the New Civil Code, thus: "A person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed." (Emphasis supplied.) Failure to strictly observe other formalities will not result in the disallowance of a holographic will that is unquestionably handwritten by the testator. A reading of Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows that its requirement affects the validity of the dispositions contained in the holographic will, but not its probate. If the testator fails to sign and date some of the dispositions, the result is that these dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such failure, however, does not render the whole testament void. Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate, notwithstanding non-compliance with the provisions of Article 814. In the case of Kalaw vs. Relova, 132 SCRA 237, 242 (1984), this Court held: cdrep "Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations made by the testator in a holographic Will have not been noted under his signature, . . . the Will is not thereby invalidated as a whole, but at most only as respects the particular words erased, corrected or interlined. Manresa gave an identical commentary when he said 'la omision de la salvedad no anula el testamento, segun la regla de jurisprudencia establecida en la sentencia de 4 de Abril de 1895.'" 8 (Emphasis omitted.) Thus, unless the unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were made on the date of the holographic will or on testator's signature, 9 their presence does not invalidate the will itself. 10 The lack of authentication will only result in disallowance of such changes. It is also proper to note that the requirements of authentication of changes and signing and dating of dispositions appear in provisions (Articles 813 and 814) separate from that which provides for the necessary conditions for the validity of the holographic will (Article 810). The distinction can be traced to Articles 678 and 688 of the Spanish Civil Code, from which the present provisions covering holographic wills are taken. They read as follows: "Article 678: A will is called holographic when the testator writes it himself in the form and with the requisites required in Article 688. "Article 688: Holographic wills may be executed only by persons of full age. "In order that the will be valid it must be drawn on stamped paper corresponding to the year of its execution, written in its entirety by the testator and signed by him, and must contain a statement of the year, month and day of its execution. "If it should contain any erased, corrected, or interlined words, the testator must identify them over his signature. "Foreigners may execute holographic wills in their own language." This separation and distinction adds support to the interpretation that only the requirements of Article 810 of the New Civil Code and not those found in Articles 813 and 814 of the same Code are essential to the probate of a holographic will. The Court of Appeals further held that decedent Annie Sand could not validly dispose of the house and lot located in Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte, in its entirety. This is correct and must be affirmed. LexLib

As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to pass only upon the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated. However, in exceptional instances, courts are not powerless to do what the situation constrains them to do, and pass upon certain provisions of the will. 11 In the case at bench, decedent herself indubitably stated in her holographic will that the Cabadbaran property is in the name of her late father, John H. Sand (which led oppositor Dr. Jose Ajero to question her conveyance of the same in its entirety.). Thus, as correctly held by respondent court, she cannot validly dispose of the whole property, which she shares with her father's other heirs. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 22840, dated March 30, 1992, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, except with respect to the invalidity of the disposition of the entire house and lot in Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 94 in Sp. Proc. No. Q-37171, dated November 19, 1988, admitting to probate the holographic will of decedent Annie Sand, is hereby REINSTATED, with the above qualification as regards the Cabadbaran property. No costs. LexLib SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION [G.R. Nos. L-11483-84. February 14, 1958.] In the matter of the Testate Estate of the deceased Edward E. Christensen, ADOLFO CRUZ AZNAR, petitioner. MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY and ADOLFO CRUZ AZNAR, petitioners-appellants, vs. MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA and BERNARDA CAMPOREDONDO, oppositor-appellees. BERNARDA CAMPOREDONDO, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ADOLFO CRUZ AZNAR, as Executor of the Deceased EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, defendant-appellant.

M. R. Sotelo for appellants. Leopoldo M. Abellera and Amado A. Munda for appellee Maria Helen Christensen Garcia. Pedro P. Suarez and Oscar Breva for appellee Bernarda Camporedondo.
SYLLABUS 1.NATIONAL CHILDREN; ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF; FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING THE STATUS OF THE CHILD. Where, as in the recent case, the child had established that she had been in continuous possession of the status of natural child of the deceased, the latter's act in disavowing his paternity to the child cannot be made the criterion in determining whether the child was his or not, for human frailty and parental arrogance sometimes may draw a person to adopt unnatural or harsh measures against an erring child or one who displeases him just so the weight of his authority could be felt. In the consideration of a claim that one is a natural child, the attitude or direct acts of the person against them whom such motion is directed or that of his family before the controversy arose or during his lifetime if he predeceases the claimant, and not at a single opportunity or on isolated occasions but as a whole, must be taken into account. The possession of such status is one of the cases that gives rise to the right in favor of the child of compulsory recognition. (Art. 2833, Civil Code). 2.ID.; ID.; ID.; EFFECT OF COURT'S DECLARATION THAT THE CHILD HAS ACQUIRED STATUS OF NATURAL CHILD. In cases of compulsory recognition, as in the case at bar, it would be sufficient that a competent court, after taking into account all the evidence on record, would declare that under any of the circumstances specified by Article 283 of the Civil ode, a child has acquired the status of a natural child of the presumptive parent and as such is entitled to all the rights granted to it by law, for such declaration is by itself already a judicial recognition of the paternity of the parent concerned which the heirs of the latter against whom the action is directed, are bound to respect. 3.INFORMAL CIVIL PARTNERSHIP; REQUISITE BEFORE A PARTY MAY BE ENTITLED TO SHARE IN THE PROPERTIES ACQUIRED DURING THE COHABITATION; CASE AT BAR. Before Republic Act No. 386 (Civil Code of the Philippines) went into operation on August 30, 1950, this court had already that where a man and a woman, not suffering from any impediment to contract marriage, live together as husband and wife, an informal civil partnership exists, and each of them has an equal interest in the properties acquired during said union and is entitled to participate therein if said properties were the product of their JOINT effort (Marata vs. Diono G.R. No. 24449, December 31, 1925; Lecasa vs. Felix Vda. de Lesaca, 91 Phil., 135; Flores vs. Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, 94 Phil., 451, 50 Off. Gaz. 1029). In the case at bar, aside from the observation of the trial court that appellee was an illiterate woman, there appears no evidence to prove appellee's contribution or participation in the acquisition of the properties involved; therefore, following the aforecited ruling of this Court, appellee's claim for 1/2 of the properties cannot be granted. Even assuming for the sake of argument that this case falls under the provisions of Article 144 of the Civil Code which recognizes the parties as co-owners of the properties acquires during the union, the law would be applicable only as far as properties acquired after the Act are concerned and to no other, for such law cannot be given retroactive effect to govern those already possessed before August 30, 1950.

DECISION

FELIX, J p: From the records of the above-entitled cases, it appears that as of 1913, Edward E. Christensen, an American citizen, was already residing in Davao and on the following year became the manager of the Mindanao Estates located in the municipality of Padada of the same province. At a certain time, which the lower court placed at 1917, a group of laborers recruited from Argao, Cebu, arrived to work in the said plantation. Among the group was a young girl, Bernarda Camporedondo, who became an assistant to the cook. Thereafter, this girl and Edward E. Christensen, who was also unmarried started living together as husband and wife and although the records failed to establish the exact date when such relationship commenced, the lower court found the same to have been continuous for over 30 years until the death of Christensen occurred on April 30, 1953. Out of said relations, 2 children, Lucy and Helen Christensen, were allegedly born.

G. R. No. L-11484.
Upon the demise of the American, who had left a considerable amount of properties, his will naming Adolfo Cruz Aznar as executor was duly presented for probate in court and became the subject of Special Proceedings No. 622 of the Court of First Instance of Davao. Said will contains, among others, the following provisions: xxx xxx xxx "3.I declare . . that I have but one (1) child named MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs. Bernard Daney) who was born in the Philippines about twenty-eight years ago, and who is now residing at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. "4.I further declare that I now have no living ascendants and no descendants except my above named daughter MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY. xxx xxx xxx "7.I give devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN, now married to Eduardo Garcia about eighteen years of age and who notwithstanding the fact that she was baptized Christensen, is not in any way related to me, nor has she been at any time adopted by me, and who, from all information I have now resides in Egpit, Digos, Davao, Philippines, the sum of THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P3,600) Philippine Currency, the same to be deposited in trust for the said Maria Helen Christensen with the Davao Branch of the Philippine National Bank, and paid to her at the rate of One Hundred Pesos (P100), Philippine Currency per month until the principal thereof as well as any interest which may have accrued thereon, is exhausted. "8.I give, devise and bequeath unto BERNARDA CAMPOREDONDO, now residing in Padada, Davao, Philippines, the sum of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000), Philippine Currency. xxx xxx xxx "12.I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-beloved daughter, the said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs. Bernard Daney), now residing as aforesaid at No. 665 Rodger Young Village Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., all the income from the rest, remainder, and residue of my property and estate, real, personal and/or mixed, of whatsoever kind or character, and wheresoever situated, of which I may be possessed at my death and which may have come to me from any source whatsoever, during her lifetime, Provided, however, that should the said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY at any time prior to her decease having living issue, then, and in that event, the life interest herein given shall terminate, and if so terminatad, then I give, devise, and bequeath to my said daughter, the said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY, the rest, remainder and residue of my property, with the same force and effect as if I had originally so given, devised and bequeathed it to her; and provided, further, that should the said Maria Lucy Christensen Daney die without living issue, then, and in that event, I give, devise and bequeath all the rest, remainder and residue of my property, one-half (1/2) to my well-beloved sister, Mrs. CARRIE LOUISE C. BORTON, now residing at No. 2124 Twentieth Street, Bakersfield, California, U.S.A., and one-half (1/2) to the children of my deceased brother, JOSEPH C. CHRISTENSEN, . . .. "13.I hereby nominate and appoint Mr. Adolfo Cruz Aznar, of Davao City, Philippines, my executor, and the executor of this, my last will and testament. xxx xxx xxx

(Exh. A) Oppositions to the probate of this will were separately filed by Maria Helen Christensen Garcia and Bernarda Camporedondo, the first contending that the will lacked the formalities required by law; that granting that it had, the dispositions made therein were illegal because although she and Lucy Christensen were both children had by the deceased with Bernarda Camporedondo, yet she was given only a meager sum of P3,600 out of an estate valued at $485,000 while Lucy would get the rest of the properties; and that the petitioner Adolfo Cruz Aznar was not qualified to be appointed as administrator of the estate because he had an interest adverse to that of the estate. It was therefore prayed by this oppositor that the application for probate be denied and the will disallowed; that the proceeding be declared intestate and that another disinterested person be appointed as administrator. Bernarda Camporedondo, on the other hand, claimed ownership over one-half of the entire estate in virtue of her relationship with the deceased, it being alleged that she and the testator having lived together as husband and wife continuously for a period of over 30 years, the properties acquired during such cohabitation should be governed by the rules on co-ownership. This opposition was dismissed by the probate court on the ground that she had no right to intervene in said proceeding, for as such common-law wife she had no successional right that might be affected by the probate of the will, and likewise, she could not be allowed to establish her title and co- ownership over the properties therein for such questions must be ventilated in a court of general jurisdiction. In view of this ruling of the Court and in order to attain the purpose sought by her overruled opposition Bernarda Camporedondo had to institute, as she did institute Civil Case No. 1076 of the Court of First Instance of Davao (G. R. No. L-11483) which we will consider and discuss hereinafter. In the meantime, Adolfo Cruz Aznar was appointed special administrator of the estate after filing a bond for P5,000 pending the appointment of a regular one, and letters of special administration were correspondingly issued to him on May 21, 1953. The records further show that subsequent to her original opposition, Helen Christensen Garcia filed a supplemental opposition and motion to declare her an acknowledged natural child of Edward E. Christensen, alleging that she was conceived during the time when her mother Bernarda Camporedondo was living with the deceased as his common-law wife; that she had been in continuous possession of the status of a natural child of the deceased; that she had in her favor evidence and/or proof that Edward Christensen was her father; and that she and Lucy had the same civil status as children of the decedent and Bernarda Camporedondo. This motion was opposed jointly by the executor and Maria Lucy Christensen Daney asserting that before, during and after the conception and birth of Helen Christensen Garcia, her mother was generally known to be carrying relations with 3 different men; that during the lifetime of the decedent and even years before his death, Edward Christensen verbally as well as in writing disavowed relationship with said oppositor, that oppositor appropriated and used the surname Christensen illegally and without permission from the deceased. Thus they prayed the Court that the will be allowed; that Maria Helen Christensen Garcia be declared not in any way related to the deceased; and that the motion of said oppositor be denied. After due hearing, the lower court in a decision dated February 28, 1953, found that oppositor Maria Helen Christensen had been in continuous possession of the status of a natural child of the deceased Edward Christensen notwithstanding the fact that she was disowned by him in his will, for such action must have been brought about by the latter's disapproval of said oppositor's marriage to a man he did not like. But taking into consideration that such possession of the status of a natural child did not of itself constitute acknowledgment but may only be availed of to compel acknowledgment, the lower Court directed Maria Lucy Christensen Daney to acknowledge the oppositor as a natural child of Edward E. Christensen. The will was, however, allowed and letters testamentary consequently issued to Adolfo Cruz Aznar, the executor named therein. From the portion of the decision requiring Lucy Christensen to acknowledge Helen as a natural child of the testator, the former and the executor interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA-G. R. No 13421-R), but the appellate tribunal elevated the same to Us on the ground that the case involves an estate the value of which far exceeds P50,000.00 and thus falls within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of this Court pursuant to Section 17 (5), Republic Act No. 296. The principal issue in this litigation is whether the lower Court erred in finding that the oppositor Maria Helen Christensen Garcia had been in continuous possession of the status of a natural child of the deceased Edward E. Christensen and in directing Maria Lucy Christensen Daney, recognized daughter and instituted heir of the decedent, to acknowledge the former as such natural child. Maria Lucy Christensen was born on April 25, 1922, and Maria Helen Christensen on July 2, 1934, of the same mother, Bernarda Camporedondo, during the period when the latter was publicly known to have been living as common-law wife of Edward E. Christensen. From the facts of the case there can be no question as to Lucy's parentage, but controversy arose when Edward Christensen, in making his last will and testament, disavowed such

paternity to Helen and gave her only a legacy of P3,600. In the course of the proceeding for the probate of the will (Exh. A), Helen introduced documentary and testimonial evidence to support her claim that she, like Lucy, was a natural child of the deceased and, therefore, entitled to the hereditary share corresponding to such descendant. Several witnesses testified in her favor, including her mother Bernarda Camporedondo, her former teachers and other residents of the community, tending to prove that she was known in the locality as a child of the testator and was introduced by the latter to the circle of his friends and acquaintances as his daughter. Family portraits, greeting cards and letters were likewise presented to bolster her assertion that she had always been treated by the deceased and by Lucy herself as a member of the family. Lucy Christensen and Adolfo Cruz Aznar, as executor, tried to repudiate her claim by introducing evidence to prove that on or about the period when she was conceived and born, her mother was carrying an affair with another man, Zosimo Silva, a former laborer in her Paligue plantation. Silva executed an affidavit and even took the witness stand to testify to this effect. Appellants also strived to show that the decedent's solicitations for Helen's welfare and the help extended to her merely sprang out of generosity and hammered on the fact that on several occasions, the deceased disclaimed any relationship with her (Exh. O-Daney, Exh. Q-Daney, Exh. Z-Daney, Exh. 8-Helen). Going over the evidence adduced during the trial, It appears indubitable that on or about the period when Helen was born, Bernarda Camporedondo had established residence at her plantation at Paligue, Davao, and that although Edward Christensen stayed in Davao City to manage his merchandising business, he spent the weekends with the former and their child Lucy in the Christensen plantation. Even granting that Zosimo Silva at this stage fitted himself into the picture, it cannot be denied that Helen's mother and the deceased were generally and publicly known to be living together as husband and wife. This must have been the reason why Christensen from Helen's birth in 1934 provided for her maintenance; shouldered the expenses for her education to the extent that she was even enrolled as an intern in an exclusive college for girls in Manila; tolerated or allowed her carrying the surname "Christensen", and in effect gave her the attention and care that a father would only do to his offspring. We should take note that nothing appears on record to show that Christensen ever entertained any doubt or disputed Helen's paternity. His repudiations of her relationship with him came about only after he and Bernarda Camporedondo parted ways in March, 1950, and apparently after Helen took sides with her mother. Furthermore, it seems that despite the decedent's desire that she continue her studies, Helen ignored the same and got married to a man for whom Christensen held no high esteem. We may state at this juncture that while it is true that herein appellants introduced witnesses to disprove oppositor's claim, the lower Court that had the opportunity to observe the conduct of the witnesses while testifying and could better gauge their credibility and impartiality in the case, arrived at the conclusion that Maria Helen Christensen had established that she had been in continuous possession of the status of a natural child of the deceased. Considering the preponderant evidence on record, We see no reason to reverse said ruling. The testator's last acts cannot be made the criterion in determining whether oppositor was his child or not, for human frailty and parental arrogance sometimes may draw a person to adopt unnatural or harsh measures against an erring child or one who displeases him just so the weight of his authority could be felt. In the consideration of a claim that one is a natural child, the attitude or direct acts of the person against whom such action is directed or that of his family before the controversy arose or during his lifetime if he predeceases the claimant, and not at a single opportunity or on isolated occasions but as a whole, must be taken into account. The possession of such status is one of the cases that gives rise to the right, in favor of the child, of compulsory recognition. (Art. 283, Civil Code). The lower Court, however, after making its finding directed Maria Lucy Christensen Daney, an heir of the decedent, to recognize oppositor as a natural child of the deceased. This seems improper. The Civil Code provides for 2 kinds of acknowledgment of a natural child: voluntary and compulsory. In the first instance, which may be effected in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or in an authentic writing (Art. 278, Civil Code), court intervention is very nil if not altogether wanting, whereas in the second, judicial pronouncement is essential, and while it is true that the effect of a voluntary and a compulsory acknowledgment on the rights of the child so recognized is the same, to maintain the view of the lower Court would eliminate the distinction between voluntary acts and those brought about by judicial dicta. And if We consider that in the case where the presumed parent dies ahead of the child and action for compulsory recognition is brought against the heirs of the deceased, as in the instant case, the situation would take an absurd turn for, the heirs would be compelled to recognize such child as a natural child of the deceased without a proper provision of the law, for as it now stands, the Civil Code only requires a declaration by the court of the child's status as a natural child of the parent who, if living, would be compelled to recognize his offspring as such. Therefore, We hold that in cases of compulsory recognition, as in the case at bar, it would be sufficient that a competent court, after taking into account all the evidence on record, would declare that under any of the circumstances specified by Article 283 of the Civil Code, a child has acquired the status of a natural child of the presumptive parent and such is entitled to all rights granted to it by law, for such declaration is by itself already a judicial recognition of the paternity of the parent concerned which is hers against whom the action is directed, are bound to respect.

G.R. No. L-11483

Coming now to Civil Case No. 1076 of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Bernarda Camporedondo claimed in her complaint of the properties of the deceased as co-owner thereof in virtue of her relations with the deceased. She alleged as basis for her action that she and the deceased Edward E. Christensen had lived and cohabited as husband and wife, continuously and openly for a period of more than 30 years; that within said period, plaintiff and the deceased acquired real and personal properties through their common effort and industry; and that in virtue of such relationship, she was a co-owner of said properties. As the executor refused to account for and deliver the share allegedly belonging to her despite her repeated demands, she prayed the court that said executor be ordered to submit an inventory and render an accounting. of the entire estate of the deceased; to divide the same into 2 equal parts and declare that one of them lawfully belonged to plaintiff; and for such other reliefs as may be seemed just and equitable in the premises. In his answer, the executor denied the averments of the complaint, contending that the decedent was the sole owner of the properties left by him as they were acquired through his own efforts; that plaintiff had never been a co-owner of any property acquired or possessed by the late Edward Christensen during his lifetime; that the personal relationship between plaintiff and the deceased was purely clandestine because the former habitually lived in her plantation at Paligue, Davao, from the time she acquired the same in 1928; that she also maintained relations with 2 other men; and that the claim of plaintiff would violate the provisions of Article 2253 of the Civil Code as the vested rights of the compulsory heirs of the deceased would be impaired. Defendant thus prayed for the dismissal of the complaint and as counterclaim demanded the sum of P70,000.00 representing actual, moral and exemplary damages. Due hearing was conducted thereon and after the parties had submitted their respective memoranda, the lower Court on August 25, 1954, rendered judgment finding that the deceased Edward Christensen and Bernarda Camporedondo, not otherwise suffering from any impediment to contract marriage, lived together as husband and wife without marital ties continuously for over 30 years until the former's death in 1953; that out of such relations 2 children were born; and that the properties in controversy were acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry. Relying on Section 144 of the Civil Code which said court considered to have created another mode of acquiring ownership, plaintiff was held to be entitled to one-half of said properties as co-owner thereof in view of her relationship with the deceased and ordered the executor to account for and deliver the same to her. From this decision, defendant Aznar, as Executor of the will, perfected an appeal to the Court of Appeals, but as the property involved in the litigation exceeds P50,000.00, said tribunal elevated the case to its for consideration. It is not controverted that at the time of his death, Edward Christensen was the owner of certain properties, including shares of stock in the plantation bearing his name and a general merchandising store in Davao City. It is also undeniable that the deceased and appellee, both capacitated to enter into the married state, maintained relations as husband and wife, continuously and publicly for a considerable number of years which the lower Court declared to be until the death of Christensen in 1953. While as a general rule appellate courts do not usually disturb the lower court's findings of fact, unless said finding is not supported by or totally devoid of or inconsistent with the evidence on record, such finding must of necessity be modified to conform with the evidence if the reviewing tribunal were to arrive at the proper and just solution of the controversy. In the instant case, the court a quo overlooked or failed to consider the testimonies of both Lucy and Helen Christensen to the effect that the deceased and their mother Bernarda Camporedondo had some sort of quarrel or misunderstanding and parted ways as of March, 1950, a fact which appellee was not able to overcome. Taking into account the circumstances of this case as found by the trial court, with the modification that the cohabitation should appear as continuous from the early 20's until March, 1950, the question left for our determination is whether Bernarda Camporedondo, by reason of such relationship, may be considered as a co-owner of the properties acquired by the deceased during said period and thus entitled to one- half thereof after the latter's death. Presumably taking judicial notice of the existence in our society of a certain kind of relationship brought about by couples living together as husbands and wives without the benefit of marriage, acquiring and bringing properties unto said union, and probably realizing that while same may not be acceptable from the moral point of view they are as much entitled to the protection of the laws as any other property owners, the lawmakers incorporated Article 144 in Republic Act No. 386 (Civil Code of the Philippines) to govern their property relations. Said article read as follows: Art. 114.When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on coownership.

It must be noted that such form of co-ownership requires that the man and the woman thus living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage and that the properties realized during their cohabitation be acquired through the work, industry, employment or occupation of both or either of them. And the same thing may be said of those whose marriages are by provision of law declared void ab initio. While it is true that these requisites are fully met and satisfied in the case at bar, We must remember that the deceased and herein appellee were already estranged as of March, 1950. There being no provision of law governing the cessation of such informal civil partnership, if it ever existed, same may be considered terminated upon their separation or desistance to continue said relations. The Spanish Civil Code which was then in force contains to counterpart of Article 144 and as the records in the instant case failed to show that a subsequent reconciliation ever took place and considering that Republic Act No. 386 which recognized such form of co-ownership went into operation only on August 30, 1950, evidently, this later enactment cannot be invoked as basis for appellee's claim. In determining the question poised by this action We may look upon the jurisprudence then obtaining on the matter. As early as 1925, this Court already declared that where a man and a woman, not suffering from any impediment to: contract marriage, live together as husband and wife, an informal civil partnership exists and made the pronouncement that each of them has an interest in the properties acquired during said union and is entitled to participate therein if said properties were the product of their JOINT efforts (Marata vs. Dionio G. R. No. 24449, Dec. 31, 1925). In another case, this Court similarly held that although there is no technical marital partnership between persons living maritally without being lawfully married, nevertheless there is between them an informal civil partnership, and the parties would be entitled to an equal interest where the property is acquired through their JOINT efforts (Lesaca vs. Felix Vda. de Lesaca, 91 Phil., 135). Appellee, claiming that the properties in controversy were the product of their joint industry apparently in her desire to tread on the doctrine laid down in the aforementioned cases, would lead Us to believe that her help was solicited or she took a hand in the management and/or acquisition of the same. But such assertion appears incredible if We consider that she was observed by the trial Court as an illiterate woman who cannot even remember simple things as the date when she arrived at the Mindanao Estate, when she commenced relationship with the deceased, not even her approximate age or that of her children. And considering that aside from her own declaration, which We find to be highly improbable, there appears no evidence to prove her alleged contribution or participation in the acquisition of the properties involved therein, and that in view of the holding of this Court that for a claim to one-half of such property to be allowed it must be proved that same was acquired through their jointefforts and labor (Flores vs. Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, * 50 Off. Gaz. 1029), We have no recourse but reverse the holding of the lower Court and deny the claim of Bernarda Camporedondo. We may further state that, even granting, for the sake of argument, that this case falls under the provisions of Article 144 of the Civil Code, same would be applicable only as far as properties acquired after the effectivity of Republic Act 386 are concerned and to no other, for such law cannot be given retroactive effect to govern those already possessed before August 30, 1950. It may be argued, however, that being a newly created right, the provisions of Section 144 should be made to retroact if only to enforce such right. Article 2252 of the same Code is explicit in this respect when it states: SEC. 2252.Changes made and new provisions and rules laid down by this Code which may prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the old legislation, shall have no retroactive effect. xxx xxx xxx As it cannot be denied that the rights and legitimes of the compulsory heirs of the deceased Edward Christensen would be impaired or diminished if the claim of herein appellee would succeed, the answer to such argument would be simply obvious. With regard to appellant Aznar's contention that the lower Court erred in admitting the testimony of appellee Bernarda Camporedondo dealing with facts that transpired before the death of Edward Christensen on the ground that it is prohibited by Section 26-(c), Rule 123 of the Rules of Court, We deem it unnecessary to delve on the same because even admitting that the court a quo committed the error assigned, yet it will not affect anymore the outcome of the case in view of the conclusion We have already arrived at on the main issue. On the strength of the foregoing considerations, We affirm the decision of the lower Court in case G. R. No. L-11484, with the modification that Maria Lucy Christensen Deney need not be compelled to acknowledge her sister Maria Helen Christensen Garcia as a natural child of her father Edward E. Christensen, the declaration of the Court in this respect being sufficient to enable her to all the rights inherent to such status. The decision appealed from in case G. R. No. L-11483 is hereby reversed and another one rendered, dismissing plaintiff's complaint.

Costs are taxed against appellants in G. R. No. L-11484 and against appellee Bernarda Camporedondo in G. R. No. L-11483. It is so ordered.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L. and Endencia, JJ., concur.

EN BANC [G.R. No. L-23678. June 6, 1967.] TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased, PEOPLE'S BANK & TRUST COMPANY, executor, MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositorsappellants, vs. EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.

Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors-appellant. Paredes, Poblador, Cruz & Nazareno for heirs-appellees E.A. Bellis, et al. Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al. J .R. Balonkita for appellees People's Bank & Trust Company. Ozaeta, Gibbs & Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.
SYLLABUS 1.PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW; LAW APPLICABLE WITH REFERENCE TO THE INTESTATE AND TESTAMENTARY SUCCESSION OF AN ALIEN; SCOPE OF ARTS. 16 (2) AND 1039, CIVIL CODE. Article 16, par. 2, and Article 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (c) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. 2.ID.; LEGITIMATES; FOREIGN NATIONALS. It is evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of legitimates, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For its has chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones. 3.ID.; ID.; ID.; FOREIGNER'S WILL; CASE AT BAR. Appellants point out that the decedent executed two wills one to govern his Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the decedent's intention in executing a separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as this Court ruled in the Miciano vs. Brimo (50 Phil., 867) case, a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void for his national law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 now Article 16 of the Civil Code states said national law should govern. The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimates. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.

DECISION

BENGZON, J.P., J p: This is a direct appeal to us, upon a question purely of law, from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila dated April 30, 1964, approving the project of partition filed by the executor in Civil Case No. 37089 therein. The facts of the case are as follows:

Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States." By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis. On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, and Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis, and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares. Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died, a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958. The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests therein including the amount of $240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, various amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of their respective legacies, or a total of P120,000.00, which it released from time to time according as the lower court approved and allowed the various motions or petitions filed by the latter three requesting partial advances on account of their respective legacies. On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its "Executor's Final Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition" wherein it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E. Mallen by the delivery to her of shares of stock amounting to $240,000.00, and the legacies of AmosBellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis in the amount of P40,000.00 each or a total of P120.000.00. In the project of partition, the executor pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will and Testament divided the residuary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the testator's seven legitimate children by his first and second marriages. On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased. Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of service of which is evidenced by the registry receipt submitted on April 27, 1964 by the executor. 1 After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent pleadings, the lower court, on April 30, 1964, issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving the executor's final account, report and administration and project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes. Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower court on June 11, 1964, oppositorsappellants appealed to this Court to raise the issue of which law must apply Texas law or Philippine law. In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the doctrine of renvoi, applied by this Court in Aznar vs. Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963. Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one country, and a domicile of another. In the present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his death. 2 So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern, the same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflict of law rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different from ours. 3 Appellants' position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their arguments. Rather, they argue

that their case falls under the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code. Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (c) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. They provide that "Art 16.Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated. "However", intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found." "Art. 1039.Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent." Appellants would however counter that Article 17, paragraph three, of the Civil Code, stating that "Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws, or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country." prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code aforequoted. This is not correct. Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next preceding article" when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing without substantial change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been their purpose to make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate successions. As further indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the decedent.

It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national Law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones. Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills one to govern his Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the decedent's intention in executing a separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as this Court ruled in Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 now Article 16 of the Civil Code states said national law should govern. The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis. Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs against appellant. So ordered.

Concepcion, C .J ., Reyes, J .B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION [G.R. No. 108581. December 8, 1999.] LOURDES L. DOROTHEO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, NILDA D. QUINTANA, for Herself and as Attorney-in-Fact of VICENTE DOROTHEOand JOSE DOROTHEO, respondents.

Midpantao L. Adil for petitioner. Carag, Esparagoza & Associates for private respondents.
SYNOPSIS Private respondents were the legitimate children of Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes. Aniceta died in 1969 without her estate being settled. After Alejandro's death, petitioner, who claims to have taken care of Alejandro before he died, filed a special proceeding for the probate of the latter's will and testament. The probate court admitted the will to probate. Private respondents did not appeal from said order. In 1983, they filed a "Motion to Declare The Will Intrinsically Void." The trial court granted the motion. Petitioner moved for reconsideration. Upon denial of her motion for reconsideration, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals but the same was dismissed for failure to file appellant's brief within the extended period granted. The dismissal become final and executory and a corresponding entry of judgment was forthwith issued by the Court of Appeals. The lower court, to implement the final and executory order, issued a writ of execution. Judge Zain B. Angas set aside the Order directing the issuance of the writ of execution, on the ground that the order was merely "interlocutory", hence, not final in character. Private respondents filed a petition before the Court of Appeals which nullified the assailed Orders of Judge Zain. Hence, the present petition. Petitioner contended that in issuing the assailed orders, Judge Angas cannot be said to have no jurisdiction because he was particularly designated to hear the case. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition. The Court ruled that a final decision or order can no longer be disturbed or reopened no matter how erroneous it may be. In setting aside the Order that had attained finality, the trial court in effect nullified the entry of judgment made by the Court of Appeals. The Court stressed that a lower court cannot reverse or set aside decisions or orders of a superior court, for to do so would be to negate the hierarchy of the courts and nullify the essence of review. The Court also reiterated the rule that a judgment on a probated will, albeit erroneous, is binding on the whole world. With respect to the last will and testament, the Court upheld the trial court in holding that the rules of intestacy shall apply. According to the Court, although the will is extrinsically valid, its provisions however are not in accordance with the laws of succession rendering it intrinsically void, hence, the law mandates that the rules of intestacy shall apply. SYLLABUS 1.REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; JUDGMENTS; A FINAL AND EXECUTORY DECISION OR ORDER CAN NO LONGER BE DISTURBED OR REOPENED NO MATTER HOW ERRONEOUS IT MAY BE. A final and executory decision or order can no longer be disturbed or reopened no matter how erroneous it may be. In setting aside the January 30, 1986 Order that has attained finality, the trial court in effect nullified the entry of judgment made by the Court of Appeals. It is well settled that a lower court cannot reverse or set aside decisions or orders of a superior court, for to do so would be to negate the hierarchy of courts and nullify the essence of review. It has been ruled that a final judgment on probated will, albeit erroneous, is binding on the whole world. It has been consistently held that if no appeal is taken in due time from a judgment or order of the trial court, the same attains finality by mere lapse of time. Thus, the order allowing the will became final and the question determined by the court in such order can no longer be raised anew, either in the same proceedings or in a different motion. The matters of due execution of the will and the capacity of the testator acquired the character of res judicata and cannot again be brought into question, all juridical questions in connection therewith being for once and forever closed. Such final order makes the will conclusive against the whole world as to its extrinsic validity and due execution. DACcIH

2.ID.; ID.; ID.; RAISING ISSUES PREVIOUSLY LITIGATED BY OTHER COURTS WOULD AMOUNT TO FORUM SHOPPING; FORUM SHOPPING ALSO OCCURS WHEN THE SAME ISSUE HAD ALREADY BEEN RESOLVED ADVERSELY BY SOME OTHER COURT. The only instance where a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence, which circumstances do not concur herein. Petitioner was privy to the suit calling for the declaration of the intrinsic invalidity of the will, as she precisely appealed from an unfavorable order therefrom. Although the final and executory Order of January 30, 1986 wherein private respondents were declared as the only heirs do not bind those who are not parties thereto such as the alleged illegitimate son of the testator, the same constitutes res judicata with respect to those who were parties to the probate proceedings. Petitioner cannot again raise those matters anew for relitigation otherwise that would amount to forum-shopping. It should be remembered that forum shopping also occurs when the same issue had already been resolved adversely by some other court. It is clear from the executory order that the estates of Alejandro and his spouse should be distributed according to the laws of intestate succession. 3.CIVIL LAW; SUCCESSION; EVEN IF A WILL WAS VALIDLY EXECUTED, IF THE TESTATOR PROVIDES FOR DISPOSITIONS THAT DEPRIVES OR IMPAIRS THE LAWFUL HEIRS OF THEIR LEGITIME OR RIGHTFUL INHERITANCE ACCORDING TO THE LAWS ON SUCCESSION, THE UNLAWFUL PROVISION/DISPOSITIONS THEREOF CANNOT BE GIVEN EFFECT. Under the Civil Code, due execution includes a determination of whether the testator was of sound and disposing mind at the time of its execution, that he had freely executed the will and was not acting under duress, fraud, menace or undue influence and that the will is genuine and not a forgery, that he was of the proper testamentary age and that he is a person not expressly prohibited by law from making a will. The intrinsic validity is another matter and questions regarding the same may still be raised even after the will has been authenticated. Thus, it does not necessarily follow that an extrinsically valid last will and testament is always intrinsically valid. Even if the will was validly executed, if the testator provides for dispositions that deprives or impairs the lawful heirs of their legitime or rightful inheritance according to the laws on succession, the unlawful provisions/dispositions thereof cannot be given effect. This is specially so when the courts had already determined in a final and executory decision that the will is intrinsically void. Such determination having attained that character of finality is binding on this Court which will no longer be disturbed. Not that this Court finds the will to be intrinsically valid, but that a final and executory decision of which the party had the opportunity to challenge before the higher tribunals must stand and should no longer be reevaluated. Failure to avail of the remedies provided by law constitutes waiver. And if the party does not avail of other remedies despite its belief that it was aggrieved by a decision or court action, then it is deemed to have fully agreed and is satisfied with the decision or order. 4.CIVIL LAW; SUCCESSION; THE RULES OF INTESTACY SHALL APPLY IN CASES WHERE A WILL IS EXTRINSICALLY VALID BUT THE INTRINSIC PROVISIONS THEREOF ARE VOID; CASE AT BAR. It can be clearly inferred from Article 960 of the Civil Code, on the law of successional rights that testacy is preferred to intestacy. But before there could be testate distribution, the will must pass the scrutinizing test and safeguards provided by law considering that the deceased testator is no longer available to prove the voluntariness of his actions, aside from the fact that the transfer of the estate is usually onerous in nature and that no one is presumed to give Nemo praesumitur donare. No intestate distribution of the estate can be done until and unless the will had failed to pass both its extrinsic and intrinsic validity. If the will is extrinsically void, the rules of intestacy apply regardless of the intrinsic validity thereof. If it is extrinsically valid, the next test is to determine its intrinsic validity that is whether the provisions of the will are valid according to the laws of succession. In this case, the court had ruled that the will of Alejandro was extrinsically valid but the intrinsic provisions thereof were void. Thus, the rules of intestacy apply as correctly held by the trial court. 5.ID.; ID.; TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITIONS OF PROPERTIES NOT BELONGING EXCLUSIVELY TO THE TESTATOR OR PROPERTIES WHICH ARE PART OF THE CONJUGAL REGIME CANNOT BE GIVEN EFFECT. Alejandro's disposition in his will of the alleged share in the conjugal properties of his late spouse, whom he described as his "only beloved wife," is not a valid reason to reverse a final and executory order. Testamentary dispositions of properties not belonging exclusively to the testator or properties which are part of the conjugal regime cannot be given effect. Matters with respect to who owns the properties that were disposed of by Alejandro in the void will may still be properly ventilated and determined in the intestate proceedings for the settlement of his and that of his late spouse's estate.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:

May a last will and testament admitted to probate but declared intrinsically void in an order that has become final and executory still be given effect? This is the issue that arose from the following antecedents: llcd Private respondents were the legitimate children of Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes. The latter died in 1969 without her estate being settled. Alejandro died thereafter. Sometime in 1977, after Alejandro's death, petitioner, who claims to have taken care of Alejandro before he died, filed a special proceeding for the probate of the latter's last will and testament. In 1981, the court issued an order admitting Alejandro's will to probate. Private respondents did not appeal from said order. In 1983, they filed a "Motion To Declare The Will Intrinsically Void." The trial court granted the motion and issued an order, the dispositive portion of which reads:

"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Order is hereby issued declaring Lourdes Legaspi not the wife of the late Alejandro Dorotheo, the provisions of the last will and testament of Alejandro Dorotheo as intrinsically void, and declaring the oppositors Vicente Dorotheo, Jose Dorotheo and Nilda Dorotheo Quintana as the only heirs of the late spouses Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes, whose respective estates shall be liquidated and distributed according to the laws on intestacy upon payment of estate and other taxes due to the government." 1 Petitioner moved for reconsideration arguing that she is entitled to some compensation since she took care of Alejandro prior to his death although she admitted that they were not married to each other. Upon denial of her motion for reconsideration, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the same was dismissed for failure to file appellant's brief within the extended period granted. 2 This dismissal became final and executory on February 3, 1989 and a corresponding entry of judgment was forthwith issued by the Court of Appeals on May 16, 1989. A writ of execution was issued by the lower court to implement the final and executory Order. Consequently, private respondents filed several motions including a motion to compel petitioner to surrender to them the Transfer Certificates of Titles (TCT) covering the properties of the late Alejandro. When petitioner refused to surrender the TCT's, private respondents filed a motion for cancellation of said titles and for issuance of new titles in their names. Petitioner opposed the motion. LLjur An Order was issued on November 29, 1990 by Judge Zain B. Angas setting aside the final and executory Order dated January 30, 1986, as well as the Order directing the issuance of the writ of execution, on the ground that the order was merely "interlocutory", hence not final in character. The court added that the dispositive portion of the said Order even directs the distribution of the estate of the deceased spouses. Private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in an Order dated February 1, 1991. Thus, private respondents filed a petition before the Court of Appeals, which nullified the two assailed Orders dated November 29, 1990 and February 1, 1991. Aggrieved, petitioner instituted a petition for review arguing that the case filed by private respondents before the Court of Appeals was a petition under Rule 65 on the ground of grave abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner contends that in issuing the two assailed orders, Judge Angas cannot be said to have no jurisdiction because he was particularly designated to hear the case. Petitioner likewise assails the Order of the Court of Appeals upholding the validity of the January 30, 1986 Order which declared the intrinsic invalidity of Alejandro's will that was earlier admitted to probate. Petitioner also filed a motion to reinstate her as executrix of the estate of the late Alejandro and to maintain the status quo or lease of the premises thereon to third parties. 3Private respondents opposed the motion on the ground that petitioner has no interest in the estate since she is not the lawful wife of the late Alejandro. The petition is without merit. A final and executory decision or order can no longer be disturbed or reopened no matter how erroneous it may be. In setting aside the January 30, 1986 Order that has attained finality, the trial court in effect nullified the entry of judgment made by the Court of Appeals. It is well settled that a lower court cannot reverse or set aside decisions or orders of a superior court, for to do so would be to negate the hierarchy of courts and nullify the essence of review. It has been ruled that a final judgment on probated will, albeit erroneous, is binding on the whole world. 4 It has been consistently held that if no appeal is taken in due time from a judgment or order of the trial court, the same attains finality by mere lapse of time. Thus, the order allowing the will became final and the question determined by the court in such order can no longer be raised anew, either in the same proceedings or in a different motion. The matters of due execution of the will and the capacity of the testator acquired the character of res judicata and cannot again be

brought into question, all juridical questions in connection therewith being for once and forever closed. 5 Such final order makes the will conclusive against the whole world as to its extrinsic validity and due execution. 6 It should be noted that probate proceedings deals generally with the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated, 7 particularly on three aspects: cdtai whether the will submitted is indeed, the decedent's last will and testament; compliance with the prescribed formalities for the execution of wills; the testamentary capacity of the testator; 8 and the due execution of the last will and testament. 9 Under the Civil Code, due execution includes a determination of whether the testator was of sound and disposing mind at the time of its execution, that he had freely executed the will and was not acting under duress, fraud, menace or undue influence and that the will is genuine and not a forgery, 10 that he was of the proper testamentary age and that he is a person not expressly prohibited by law from making a will. 11 The intrinsic validity is another matter and questions regarding the same may still be raised even after the will has been authenticated. 12 Thus, it does not necessarily follow that an extrinsically valid last will and testament is always intrinsically valid. Even if the will was validly executed, if the testator provides for dispositions that deprives or impairs the lawful heirs of their legitime or rightful inheritance according to the laws on succession, 13 the unlawful provisions/dispositions thereof cannot be given effect. This is specially so when the courts had already determined in a final and executory decision that the will is intrinsically void. Such determination having attained that character of finality is binding on this Court which will no longer be disturbed. Not that this Court finds the will to be intrinsically valid, but that a final and executory decision of which the party had the opportunity to challenge before the higher tribunals must stand and should no longer be reevaluated. Failure to avail of the remedies provided by law constitutes waiver. And if the party does not avail of other remedies despite its belief that it was aggrieved by a decision or court action, then it is deemed to have fully agreed and is satisfied with the decision or order. As early as 1918, it has been declared that public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts must at some point of time fixed by law 14 become final otherwise there will be no end to litigation. Interes rei publicae ut finis sit litium the very object of which the courts were constituted was to put an end to controversies. 15 To fulfill this purpose and to do so speedily, certain time limits, more or less arbitrary, have to be set up to spur on the slothful. 16 The only instance where a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence, 17 which circumstances do not concur herein. Petitioner was privy to the suit calling for the declaration of the intrinsic invalidity of the will, as she precisely appealed from an unfavorable order therefrom. Although the final and executory Order of January 30, 1986 wherein private respondents were declared as the only heirs do not bind those who are not parties thereto such as the alleged illegitimate son of the testator, the same constitutes res judicata with respect to those who were parties to the probate proceedings. Petitioner cannot again raise those matters anew for relitigation otherwise that would amount to forum-shopping. It should be remembered that forum shopping also occurs when the same issue had already been resolved adversely by some other court. 18 It is clear from the executory order that the estates of Alejandro and his spouse should be distributed according to the laws of intestate succession. Petitioner posits that the January 30, 1986 Order is merely interlocutory, hence it can still be set aside by the trial court. In support thereof, petitioner argues that "an order merely declaring who are heirs and the shares to which set of heirs is entitled cannot be the basis of execution to require delivery of shares from one person to another particularly when no project of partition has been filed." 19 The trial court declared in the January 30, 1986 Order that petitioner is not the legal wife of Alejandro, whose only heirs are his three legitimate children (petitioners herein), and at the same time it nullified the will. But it should be noted that in the same Order, the trial court also said that the estate of the late spouses be distributed according to the laws of intestacy. Accordingly, it has no option but to implement that order of intestate distribution and not to reopen and again re-examine the intrinsic provisions of the same will. cdtai It can be clearly inferred from Article 960 of the Civil Code, on the law of successional rights that testacy is preferred to intestacy. 20 But before there could be testate distribution, the will must pass the scrutinizing test and safeguards

provided by law considering that the deceased testator is no longer available to prove the voluntariness of his actions, aside from the fact that the transfer of the estate is usually onerous in nature and that no one is presumed to give Nemo praesumitur donare. 21 No intestate distribution of the estate can be done until and unless the will had failed to pass both its extrinsic and intrinsic validity. If the will is extrinsically void, the rules of intestacy apply regardless of the intrinsic validity thereof. If it is extrinsically valid, the next test is to determine its intrinsic validity that is whether the provisions of the will are valid according to the laws of succession. In this case, the court had ruled that the will of Alejandro was extrinsically valid but the intrinsic provisions thereof were void. Thus, the rules of intestacy apply as correctly held by the trial court.

Furthermore, Alejandro's disposition in his will of the alleged share in the conjugal properties of his late spouse, whom he described as his "only beloved wife", is not a valid reason to reverse a final and executory order. Testamentary dispositions of properties not belonging exclusively to the testator or properties which are part of the conjugal regime cannot be given effect. Matters with respect to who owns the properties that were disposed of by Alejandro in the void will may still be properly ventilated and determined in the intestate proceedings for the settlement of his and that of his late spouse's estate. Petitioner's motion for appointment as administratrix is rendered moot considering that she was not married to the late Alejandro and, therefore, is not an heir. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. cda

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Kapunan and Pardo, JJ., concur.

THIRD DIVISION [G.R. No. 122880. April 12, 2006.] FELIX AZUELA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, GERALDA AIDA CASTILLO substituted by ERNESTO G. CASTILLO, respondents.

DECISION

TINGA, J p: The core of this petition is a highly defective notarial will, purportedly executed by Eugenia E. Igsolo (decedent), who died on 16 December 1982 at the age of 80. In refusing to give legal recognition to the due execution of this document, the Court is provided the opportunity to assert a few important doctrinal rules in the execution of notarial wills, all selfevident in view of Articles 805 and 806 of the Civil Code. A will whose attestation clause does not contain the number of pages on which the will is written is fatally defective. A will whose attestation clause is not signed by the instrumental witnesses is fatally defective. And perhaps most importantly, a will which does not contain an acknowledgment, but a mere jurat, is fatally defective. Any one of these defects is sufficient to deny probate. A notarial will with all three defects is just aching for judicial rejection. There is a distinct and consequential reason the Civil Code provides a comprehensive catalog of imperatives for the proper execution of a notarial will. Full and faithful compliance with all the detailed requisites under Article 805 of the Code leave little room for doubt as to the validity in the due execution of the notarial will. Article 806 likewise imposes another safeguard to the validity of notarial wills that they be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. A notarial will executed with indifference to these two codal provisions opens itself to nagging questions as to its legitimacy. The case stems from a petition for probate filed on 10 April 1984 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. The petition filed by petitioner Felix Azuela sought to admit to probate the notarial will of Eugenia E. Igsolo, which was notarized on 10 June 1981. Petitioner is the son of the cousin of the decedent. The will, consisting of two (2) pages and written in the vernacular Pilipino, read in full: HULING HABILIN NI EUGENIA E. IGSOLO SA NGALAN NG MAYKAPAL, AMEN: AKO, si EUGENIA E. IGSOLO, nakatira sa 500 San Diego St., Sampaloc, Manila, pitongput siyam (79) na gulang, nasa hustong pagi-isip, pag-unawa at memoria ay nag-hahayag na ito na ang aking huling habilin at testamento, at binabali wala ko lahat ang naunang ginawang habilin o testamento: Una-Hinihiling ko na ako ay mailibing sa Sementerio del Norte, La Loma sang-ayong sa kaugalian at patakaran ng simbahang katoliko at ang taga-pag-ingat (Executor) ng habiling ito ay magtatayo ng bantayog upang silbing ala-ala sa akin ng aking pamilya at kaibigan; Pangalawa-Aking ipinagkakaloob at isinasalin ang lahat ng karapatan sa aking pamangkin na si Felix Azuela, na siyang nag-alaga sa akin sa mahabang panahon, yaong mga bahay na nakatirik sa lote numero 28, Block 24 at nakapangalan sa Pechaten Korporasyon, ganoon din ibinibigay ko ang lahat ng karapatan sa bahay na nakatirik sa inoopahan kong lote, numero 43, Block 24 na pag-aari ng Pechaten Corporation. Ipinagkakaloob kong buong buo ang lahat ng karapatan sa bahay at lupa na nasa 500 San

Diego St., Lot 42, Block 24, Sampaloc, Manila kay Felix Azuela at ang pagkakaloob kong ito ay walang pasubali't at kondiciones; Pangatlo- Na ninunumbrahan ko si VART PAGUE na siyang nagpapatupad ng huling habiling ito at kagustuhan ko rin na hindi na kailanman siyang mag-lagak ng piyansiya. Aking nilagdaan ang Huling Habilin na ito dito sa Maynila ika 10 ng Hunyo, 1981. TcDHSI (Sgd.) EUGENIA E. IGSOLO (Tagapagmana) PATUNAY NG MGA SAKSI Ang kasulatang ito, na binubuo ng _____ dahon pati ang huling dahong ito, na ipinahayag sa amin ni Eugenia E. Igsolo, tagapagmana na siya niyang Huling Habilin, ngayon ika-10 ng Hunyo 1981, ay nilagdaan ng nasabing tagapagmana sa ilalim ng kasulatang nabanggit at sa kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawa't dahon, sa harap ng lahat at bawa't sa amin, at kami namang mga saksi ay lumagda sa harap ng nasabing tagapagmana at sa harap ng lahat at bawa't isa sa amin, sa ilalim ng nasabing kasulatan at sa kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawa't dahon ng kasulatan ito. EUGENIA E. IGSOLO address: 500 San Diego St. Sampaloc, Manila Res. Cert. No. A-7717-37 Issued at Manila on March 10, 1981. QUIRINO AGRAVA address: 1228-Int. 3, Kahilum Pandacan, Manila Res. Cert. No. A-458365 Issued at Manila on Jan. 21, 1981 LAMBERTO C. LEAO address: Avenue 2, Blcok 7, Lot 61, San Gabriel, G.MA., Cavite Res. Cert. No. A-768277 issued at Carmona, Cavite on Feb. 7, 1981 JUANITO ESTRERA address: City Court Compound, City of Manila Res. Cert. No. A574829 Issued at Manila on March 2, 1981. Nilagdaan ko at ninotario ko ngayong 10 ng Hunyo 10, 1981 dito sa Lungsod ng Maynila. (Sgd.) PETRONIO Y. BAUTISTA NOTARIO PUBLIKO Until Dec. 31, 1981 PTR-152041-1/2/81-Manila TAN # 1437-977-8 1 Doc. No. 1232; Page No. 86; Book No. 43; Series of 1981

The three named witnesses to the will affixed their signatures on the left-hand margin of both pages of the will, but not at the bottom of the attestation clause. The probate petition adverted to only two (2) heirs, legatees and devisees of the decedent, namely: petitioner himself, and one Irene Lynn Igsolo, who was alleged to have resided abroad. Petitioner prayed that the will be allowed, and that letters testamentary be issued to the designated executor, Vart Prague. The petition was opposed by Geralda Aida Castillo (Geralda Castillo), who represented herself as the attorney-in-fact of "the 12 legitimate heirs" of the decedent. 2 Geralda Castillo claimed that the will is a forgery, and that the true purpose of its emergence was so it could be utilized as a defense in several court cases filed by oppositor against petitioner, particularly for forcible entry and usurpation of real property, all centering on petitioner's right to occupy the properties of the decedent. 3 It also asserted that contrary to the representations of petitioner, the decedent was actually survived by 12 legitimate heirs, namely her grandchildren, who were then residing abroad. Per records, it was subsequently alleged that decedent was the widow of Bonifacio Igsolo, who died in 1965, 4 and the mother of a legitimate child, Asuncion E. Igsolo, who predeceased her mother by three (3) months. 5 Oppositor Geralda Castillo also argued that the will was not executed and attested to in accordance with law. She pointed out that decedent's signature did not appear on the second page of the will, and the will was not properly acknowledged. These twin arguments are among the central matters to this petition. After due trial, the RTC admitted the will to probate, in an Order dated 10 August 1992. 6 The RTC favorably took into account the testimony of the three (3) witnesses to the will, Quirino Agrava, Lamberto Leano, and Juanito Estrada. The RTC also called to fore "the modern tendency in respect to the formalities in the execution of a will . . . with the end in view of giving the testator more freedom in expressing his last wishes;" 7 and from this perspective, rebutted oppositor's arguments that the will was not properly executed and attested to in accordance with law. After a careful examination of the will and consideration of the testimonies of the subscribing and attesting witnesses, and having in mind the modern tendency in respect to the formalities in the execution of a will, i.e., the liberalization of the interpretation of the law on the formal requirements of a will with the end in view of giving the testator more freedom in expressing his last wishes, this Court is persuaded to rule that the will in question is authentic and had been executed by the testatrix in accordance with law. On the issue of lack of acknowledgement, this Court has noted that at the end of the will after the signature of the testatrix, the following statement is made under the sub-title, "Patunay Ng Mga Saksi": "Ang kasulatang ito, na binubuo ng _____ dahon pati ang huling dahong ito, na ipinahayag sa amin ni Eugenia N. Igsolo, tagapagmana na siya niyang Huling Habilin, ngayong ika-10 ng Hunyo 1981, ay nilagdaan ng nasabing tagapagmana sa ilalim ng kasulatang nabanggit at sa kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawa't dahon, sa harap ng lahat at bawa't sa amin, at kami namang mga saksi ay lumagda sa harap ng nasabing tagapagmana at sa harap ng lahat at bawa't isa sa amin, sa ilalim ng nasabing kasulatan at sa kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawa't dahon ng kasulatan ito." The aforequoted declaration comprises the attestation clause and the acknowledgement and is considered by this Court as a substantial compliance with the requirements of the law. On the oppositor's contention that the attestation clause was not signed by the subscribing witnesses at the bottom thereof, this Court is of the view that the signing by the subscribing witnesses on the left margin of the second page of the will containing the attestation clause and acknowledgment, instead of at the bottom thereof, substantially satisfies the purpose of identification and attestation of the will. With regard to the oppositor's argument that the will was not numbered correlatively in letters placed on upper part of each page and that the attestation did not state the number of pages thereof, it is worthy to note that the will is composed of only two pages. The first page contains the entire text of the testamentary dispositions, and the second page contains the last portion of the attestation clause and acknowledgement. Such being so, the defects are not of a serious nature as to invalidate the will. For the same reason, the failure of the testatrix to affix her signature on the left margin of the second

page, which contains only the last portion of the attestation clause and acknowledgment is not a fatal defect. As regards the oppositor's assertion that the signature of the testatrix on the will is a forgery, the testimonies of the three subscribing witnesses to the will are convincing enough to establish the genuineness of the signature of the testatrix and the due execution of the will. 8

The Order was appealed to the Court of Appeals by Ernesto Castillo, who had substituted his since deceased mother-inlaw, Geralda Castillo. In a Decision dated 17 August 1995, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and ordered the dismissal of the petition for probate. 9 The Court of Appeals noted that the attestation clause failed to state the number of pages used in the will, thus rendering the will void and undeserving of probate. 10 Hence, the present petition. Petitioner argues that the requirement under Article 805 of the Civil Code that "the number of pages used in a notarial will be stated in the attestation clause" is merely directory, rather than mandatory, and thus susceptible to what he termed as "the substantial compliance rule." 11 The solution to this case calls for the application of Articles 805 and 806 of the Civil Code, which we replicate in full. Art. 805.Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another. The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page. The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another. If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them. Art. 806.Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with the office of the Clerk of Court. The appellate court, in its Decision, considered only one defect, the failure of the attestation clause to state the number of pages of the will. But an examination of the will itself reveals several more deficiencies. As admitted by petitioner himself, the attestation clause fails to state the number of pages of the will. 12 There was an incomplete attempt to comply with this requisite, a space having been allotted for the insertion of the number of pages in the attestation clause. Yet the blank was never filled in; hence, the requisite was left uncomplied with. The Court of Appeals pounced on this defect in reversing the trial court, citing in the process Uy Coque v. Navas L. Sioca 13 and In re: Will of Andrada. 14 In Uy Coque, the Court noted that among the defects of the will in question was the failure of the attestation clause to state the number of pages contained in the will. 15 In ruling that the will could not be admitted to probate, the Court made the following consideration which remains highly relevant to this day: "The purpose of requiring the number of sheets to be stated in the attestation clause is obvious; the document might easily be so prepared that the removal of a sheet would completely change the testamentary dispositions of the will and in the absence of a statement of the total number of sheets such removal might be effected by taking out the sheet and changing the numbers at the top of the following sheets or pages. If, on the other

hand, the total number of sheets is stated in the attestation clause the falsification of the document will involve the inserting of new pages and the forging of the signatures of the testator and witnesses in the margin, a matter attended with much greater difficulty." 16 The case of In re Will of Andrada concerned a will the attestation clause of which failed to state the number of sheets or pages used. This consideration alone was sufficient for the Court to declare "unanim[ity] upon the point that the defect pointed out in the attesting clause is fatal." 17 It was further observed that "it cannot be denied that the . . . requirement affords additional security against the danger that the will may be tampered with; and as the Legislature has seen fit to prescribe this requirement, it must be considered material." 18 Against these cited cases, petitioner cites Singson v. Florentino 19 and Taboada v. Hon. Rosal, 20 wherein the Court allowed probate to the wills concerned therein despite the fact that the attestation clause did not state the number of pages of the will. Yet the appellate court itself considered the import of these two cases, and made the following distinction which petitioner is unable to rebut, and which we adopt with approval: Even a cursory examination of the Will (Exhibit "D"), will readily show that the attestation does not state the number of pages used upon which the will is written. Hence, the Will is void and undeserving of probate. We are not impervious of the Decisions of the Supreme Court in "Manuel Singson versus Emilia Florentino, et al., 92 Phil. 161 and Apolonio [Taboada] versus Hon. Avelino Rosal, et al., 118 SCRA 195," to the effect that a will may still be valid even if the attestation does not contain the number of pages used upon which the Will is written. However, the Decisions of the Supreme Court are not applicable in the aforementioned appeal at bench. This is so because, in the case of "Manuel Singson versus Emilia Florentino, et al., supra," although the attestation in the subject Will did not state the number of pages used in the will, however, the same was found in the last part of the body of the Will: "xxx xxx xxx The law referred to is article 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645, which requires that the attestation clause shall state the number of pages or sheets upon which the will is written, which requirement has been held to be mandatory as an effective safeguard against the possibility of interpolation or omission of some of the pages of the will to the prejudice of the heirs to whom the property is intended to be bequeathed (In re Will of Andrada, 42 Phil. 180;Uy Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca, 43 Phil., 405; Gumban vs. Gorcho, 50 Phil. 30; Quinto vs. Morata, 54 Phil. 481; Echevarria vs. Sarmiento, 66 Phil. 611). The ratio decidendi of these cases seems to be that the attestation clause must contain a statement of the number of sheets or pages composing the will and that if this is missing or is omitted, it will have the effect of invalidating the will if the deficiency cannot be supplied, not by evidence aliunde, but by a consideration or examination of the will itself. But here the situation is different. While the attestation clause does not state the number of sheets or pages upon which the will is written, however, the last part of the body of the will contains a statement that it is composed of eight pages, which circumstance in our opinion takes this case out of the rigid rule of construction and places it within the realm of similar cases where a broad and more liberal view has been adopted to prevent the will of the testator from being defeated by purely technical considerations." (page 165-165, supra) (Underscoring supplied) In "Apolonio Tabaoda versus Hon. Avelino Rosal, et al." supra, the notarial acknowledgement in the Will states the number of pages used in the: "xxx xxx xxx We have examined the will in question and noticed that the attestation clause failed to state the number of pages used in writing the will. This would have been a fatal defect were it not for the fact that, in this case, it is discernible from the entire will that it is really and actually composed of only two pages duly signed by the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses. As earlier stated, the first page which contains the entirety of the testamentary dispositions is signed by the testatrix at the end or at the bottom while the instrumental witnesses signed at

the left margin. The other page which is marked as "Pagina dos" comprises the attestation clause and the acknowledgment. The acknowledgment itself states that "this Last Will and Testament consists of two pages including this page" (pages 200-201, supra) (Underscoring supplied). However, in the appeal at bench, the number of pages used in the will is not stated in any part of the Will. The will does not even contain any notarial acknowledgment wherein the number of pages of the will should be stated. 21 Both Uy Coque and Andrada were decided prior to the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950, at a time when the statutory provision governing the formal requirement of wills was Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 22 Reliance on these cases remains apropos, considering that the requirement that the attestation state the number of pages of the will is extant from Section 618. 23 However, the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950 did put in force a rule of interpretation of the requirements of wills, at least insofar as the attestation clause is concerned, that may vary from the philosophy that governed these two cases. Article 809 of the Civil Code states: "In the absence of bad faith, forgery, or fraud, or undue and improper pressure and influence, defects and imperfections in the form of attestation or in the language used therein shall not render the will invalid if it is proved that the will was in fact executed and attested in substantial compliance with all the requirements of article 805." In the same vein, petitioner cites the report of the Civil Code Commission, which stated that "the underlying and fundamental objective permeating the provisions on the [law] on [wills] in this project consists in the [liberalization] of the manner of their execution with the end in view of giving the testator more [freedom] in [expressing] his last wishes. This objective is in accord with the [modern tendency] in respect to the formalities in the execution of wills." 24 However, petitioner conveniently omits the qualification offered by the Code Commission in the very same paragraph he cites from their report, that such liberalization be "but with sufficient safeguards and restrictions to prevent the commission of fraud and the exercise of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the testator." 25

Caneda v. Court of Appeals 26 features an extensive discussion made by Justice Regalado, speaking for the Court on the

conflicting views on the manner of interpretation of the legal formalities required in the execution of the attestation clause in wills. 27 Uy Coque and Andrada are cited therein, along with several other cases, as examples of the application of the rule of strict construction. 28 However, the Code Commission opted to recommend a more liberal construction through the "substantial compliance rule" under Article 809. A cautionary note was struck though by Justice J.B.L. Reyes as to how Article 809 should be applied: . . . The rule must be limited to disregarding those defects that can be supplied by an examination of the will itself: whether all the pages are consecutively numbered; whether the signatures appear in each and every page; whether the subscribing witnesses are three or the will was notarized. All these are facts that the will itself can reveal, and defects or even omissions concerning them in the attestation clause can be safely disregarded. But the total number of pages, and whether all persons required to sign did so in the presence of each other must substantially appear in the attestation clause, being the only check against perjury in the probate proceedings. 29 (Emphasis supplied.) The Court of Appeals did cite these comments by Justice J.B.L. Reyes in its assailed decision, considering that the failure to state the number of pages of the will in the attestation clause is one of the defects which cannot be simply disregarded. In Caneda itself, the Court refused to allow the probate of a will whose attestation clause failed to state that the witnesses subscribed their respective signatures to the will in the presence of the testator and of each other, 30 the other omission cited by Justice J.B.L. Reyes which to his estimation cannot be lightly disregarded.

Caneda suggested: "[I]t may thus be stated that the rule, as it now stands, is that omission which can be supplied by an

examination of the will itself, without the need of resorting to extrinsic evidence, will not be fatal and, correspondingly, would not obstruct the allowance to probate of the will being assailed. However, those omissions which cannot be supplied except by evidence aliunde would result in the invalidation of the attestation clause and ultimately, of the will itself." 31 Thus, a failure by the attestation clause to state that the testator signed every page can be liberally construed, since that fact can be checked by a visual examination; while a failure by the attestation clause to state that the

witnesses signed in one another's presence should be considered a fatal flaw since the attestation is the only textual guarantee of compliance. 32 The failure of the attestation clause to state the number of pages on which the will was written remains a fatal flaw, despite Article 809. The purpose of the law in requiring the clause to state the number of pages on which the will is written is to safeguard against possible interpolation or omission of one or some of its pages and to prevent any increase or decrease in the pages. 33 The failure to state the number of pages equates with the absence of an averment on the part of the instrumental witnesses as to how many pages consisted the will, the execution of which they had ostensibly just witnessed and subscribed to. Following Caneda, there is substantial compliance with this requirement if the will states elsewhere in it how many pages it is comprised of, as was the situation in Singson and Taboada. However, in this case, there could have been no substantial compliance with the requirements under Article 805 since there is no statement in the attestation clause or anywhere in the will itself as to the number of pages which comprise the will. At the same time, Article 809 should not deviate from the need to comply with the formal requirements as enumerated under Article 805. Whatever the inclinations of the members of the Code Commission in incorporating Article 805, the fact remains that they saw fit to prescribe substantially the same formal requisites as enumerated in Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, convinced that these remained effective safeguards against the forgery or intercalation of notarial wills. 34 Compliance with these requirements, however picayune in impression, affords the public a high degree of comfort that the testator himself or herself had decided to convey property post mortem in the manner established in the will. 35 The transcendent legislative intent, even as expressed in the cited comments of the Code Commission, is for the fruition of the testator's incontestable desires, and not for the indulgent admission of wills to probate. The Court could thus end here and affirm the Court of Appeals. However, an examination of the will itself reveals a couple of even more critical defects that should necessarily lead to its rejection. For one, the attestation clause was not signed by the instrumental witnesses . While the signatures of the instrumental witnesses appear on the left-hand margin of the will, they do not appear at the bottom of the attestation clause which after all consists of their averments before the notary public.

Cagro v. Cagro 36 is material on this point. As in this case, "the signatures of the three witnesses to the will do not

appear at the bottom of the attestation clause, although the page containing the same is signed by the witnesses on the left-hand margin." 37 While three (3) Justices 38 considered the signature requirement had been substantially complied with, a majority of six (6), speaking through Chief Justice Paras, ruled that the attestation clause had not been duly signed, rendering the will fatally defective. There is no question that the signatures of the three witnesses to the will do not appear at the bottom of the attestation clause, although the page containing the same is signed by the witnesses on the lefthand margin. We are of the opinion that the position taken by the appellant is correct. The attestation clause is "a memorandum of the facts attending the execution of the will" required by law to be made by the attesting witnesses, and it must necessarily bear their signatures. An unsigned attestation clause cannot be considered as an act of the witnesses, since the omission of their signatures at the bottom thereof negatives their participation. The petitioner and appellee contends that signatures of the three witnesses on the left-hand margin conform substantially to the law and may be deemed as their signatures to the attestation clause. This is untenable, because said signatures are in compliance with the legal mandate that the will be signed on the left-hand margin of all its pages. If an attestation clause not signed by the three witnesses at the bottom thereof, be admitted as sufficient, it would be easy to add such clause to a will on a subsequent occasion and in the absence of the testator and any or all of the witnesses. 39 The Court today reiterates the continued efficacy of Cagro. Article 805 particularly segregates the requirement that the instrumental witnesses sign each page of the will, from the requisite that the will be "attested and subscribed by [the instrumental witnesses]." The respective intents behind these two classes of signature are distinct from each other. The signatures on the left-hand corner of every page signify, among others, that the witnesses are aware that the page they are signing forms part of the will. On the other hand, the signatures to the attestation clause establish that the witnesses

are referring to the statements contained in the attestation clause itself. Indeed, the attestation clause is separate and apart from the disposition of the will. An unsigned attestation clause results in an unattested will. Even if the instrumental witnesses signed the left-hand margin of the page containing the unsigned attestation clause, such signatures cannot demonstrate these witnesses' undertakings in the clause, since the signatures that do appear on the page were directed towards a wholly different avowal. SHcDAI The Court may be more charitably disposed had the witnesses in this case signed the attestation clause itself, but not the left-hand margin of the page containing such clause. Without diminishing the value of the instrumental witnesses' signatures on each and every page, the fact must be noted that it is the attestation clause which contains the utterances reduced into writing of the testamentary witnesses themselves. It is the witnesses, and not the testator, who are required under Article 805 to state the number of pages used upon which the will is written; the fact that the testator had signed the will and every page thereof; and that they witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another. The only proof in the will that the witnesses have stated these elemental facts would be their signatures on the attestation clause. Thus, the subject will cannot be considered to have been validly attested to by the instrumental witnesses, as they failed to sign the attestation clause. Yet, there is another fatal defect to the will on which the denial of this petition should also hinge. The requirement under Article 806 that "every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses" has also not been complied with. The importance of this requirement is highlighted by the fact that it had been segregated from the other requirements under Article 805 and entrusted into a separate provision, Article 806. The non-observance of Article 806 in this case is equally as critical as the other cited flaws in compliance with Article 805, and should be treated as of equivalent import.

In lieu of an acknowledgment, the notary public, Petronio Y. Bautista, wrote "Nilagdaan ko at ninotario ko ngayong 10 ng Hunyo 10 (sic), 1981 dito sa Lungsod ng Maynila." 40By no manner of contemplation can those words be construed as an acknowledgment. An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some competent officer or court and declaring it to be his act or deed. 41 It involves an extra step undertaken whereby the signor actually declares to the notary that the executor of a document has attested to the notary that the same is his/her own free act and deed. It might be possible to construe the averment as a jurat, even though it does not hew to the usual language thereof. A jurat is that part of an affidavit where the notary certifies that before him/her, the document was subscribed and sworn to by the executor. 42 Ordinarily, the language of the jurat should avow that the document was subscribed and sworn before the notary public, while in this case, the notary public averred that he himself "signed and notarized" the document. Possibly though, the word "ninotario" or "notarized" encompasses the signing of and swearing in of the executors of the document, which in this case would involve the decedent and the instrumental witnesses. Yet even if we consider what was affixed by the notary public as a jurat, the will would nonetheless remain invalid, as the express requirement of Article 806 is that the will be "acknowledged", and not merely subscribed and sworn to. The will does not present any textual proof, much less one under oath, that the decedent and the instrumental witnesses executed or signed the will as their own free act or deed. The acknowledgment made in a will provides for another allimportant legal safeguard against spurious wills or those made beyond the free consent of the testator. An acknowledgement is not an empty meaningless act. 43 The acknowledgment coerces the testator and the instrumental witnesses to declare before an officer of the law that they had executed and subscribed to the will as their own free act or deed. Such declaration is under oath and under pain of perjury, thus allowing for the criminal prosecution of persons who participate in the execution of spurious wills, or those executed without the free consent of the testator. It also provides a further degree of assurance that the testator is of certain mindset in making the testamentary dispositions to those persons he/she had designated in the will. It may not have been said before, but we can assert the rule, self-evident as it is under Article 806. A notarial will that is not acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses is fatally defective, even if it is subscribed and sworn to before a notary public.

There are two other requirements under Article 805 which were not fully satisfied by the will in question. We need not discuss them at length, as they are no longer material to the disposition of this case. The provision requires that the testator and the instrumental witnesses sign each and every page of the will on the left margin, except the last; and that all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page. In this case, the decedent, unlike the witnesses, failed to sign both pages of the will on the left margin, her only signature appearing at the so-called "logical end" 44 of the will on its first page. Also, the will itself is not numbered correlatively in letters on each page, but instead numbered with Arabic numerals. There is a line of thought that has disabused the notion that these two requirements be construed as mandatory. 45Taken in isolation, these omissions, by themselves, may not be sufficient to deny probate to a will. Yet even as these omissions are not decisive to the adjudication of this case, they need not be dwelt on, though indicative as they may be of a general lack of due regard for the requirements under Article 805 by whoever executed the will. All told, the string of mortal defects which the will in question suffers from makes the probate denial inexorable. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner. ESHAcI SO ORDERED.

Quisumbing, Carpio and Carpio Morales, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION [G.R. No. 74695. September 14, 1993.] In the Matter of the Probate of the Last Will and Testament of the Deceased Brigido Alvarado, CESAR ALVARADO, petitioner, vs. HON. RAMON G. GAVIOLA, JR., Presiding Justice, HON. MA. ROSARIO QUETULIO LOSA and HON. LEONOR INES LUCIANO, Associate Justices, Intermediate Appellate Court, First Division (Civil Cases), and BAYANI MA. RINO, respondents.

Vicente R. Redor for petitioner. Bayani Ma. Rino for and in his own behalf.
SYLLABUS 1.CIVIL LAW; PROBATE OF WILL; ART. 808, NEW CIVIL CODE; SCOPE OF THE TERM "BLINDNESS". The following pronouncement in Garcia vs. Vasquez provides an insight into the scope of the term "blindness" as used in Art. 808, to wit: "The rationale behind the requirement of reading the will to the testator if he is blind or incapable of reading the will himself (as when he is illiterate), is to make the provisions thereof known to him, so that he may be able to object if they are not in accordance with his wishes . . ." Clear from the foregoing is that Art. 808 applies not only to blind testators but also to those who, for one reason or another, are "incapable of reading the(ir) will(s)." SinceBrigido Alvarado was incapable of reading the final drafts of his will and codicil on the separate occasions of their execution due to his "poor," "defective," or "blurred" vision, there can be no other course for us but to conclude that Brigido Alvarado comes within the scope of the term "blind" as it is used in Art. 808. Unless the contents were read to him, he had no way of ascertaining whether or not the lawyer who drafted the will and codicil did so conformably with his instructions. 2.ID.; ID.; ID.; WILL MUST BE READ TWICE; PURPOSE. Article 808 requires that in case of testators like Brigido Alvarado, the will shall be read twice; once, by one of the instrumental witnesses and, again, by the notary public before whom the will was acknowledged. The purpose is to make known to the incapacitated testator the contents of the document before signing and to give him an opportunity to object if anything is contrary to his instructions. 3.ID.; ID.; ID.; SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE THEREWITH, ACCEPTABLE; REASON. This Court has held in a number of occasions that substantial compliance is acceptable where the purpose of the law has been satisfied, the reason being that the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills are intended to protect the testator from all kinds of fraud and trickery but are never intended to be so rigid and inflexible as to destroy the testamentary privilege. The spirit behind the law was served though the letter was not. Although there should be strict compliance with the substantial requirements of the law in order to insure the authenticity of the will, the formal imperfections should be brushed aside when they do not affect its purpose and which, when taken into account, may only defeat the testator's will. 4.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. In the case at bar, private respondent read the testator's will and codicil aloud in the presence of the testator, his three instrumental witnesses, and the notary public. Prior and subsequent thereto, the testator affirmed, upon being asked, that the contents read corresponded with his instructions. Only then did the signing and acknowledgement take place. There is no evidence, and petitioner does not so allege, that the contents of the will and codicil were not sufficiently made known and communicated to the testator. On the contrary, with respect to the "Huling Habilin," the day of the execution was not the first time that Brigido had affirmed the truth and authenticity of the contents of the draft. The uncontradicted testimony of Atty. Rino is that Brigido Alvarado already acknowledged that the will was drafted in accordance with his expressed wishes even prior to 5 November 1977 when Atty. Rino went to the testator's residence precisely for the purpose of securing his conformity to the draft.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J p: Before us is an appeal from the Decision dated 11 April 1986 1 of the First Civil Cases Division of the then Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Order dated 27 June 1983 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna, admitting to probate the last will and testament 3 with codicil 4 of the late Brigido Alvarado. On 5 November 1977, the 79-year old Brigido Alvarado executed a notarial will entitled "Huling Habilin" wherein he disinherited an illegitimate son (petitioner) and expressly revoked a previously executed holographic will at the time awaiting probate before Branch 4 of the Regional Trial Court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. As testified to by the three instrumental witnesses, the notary public and by private respondent who were present at the execution, the testator did not read the final draft of the will himself. Instead, private respondent, as the lawyer who drafted the eight-paged document, read the same aloud in the presence of the testator, the three instrumental witnesses and the notary public. The latter four followed the reading with their own respective copies previously furnished them. Meanwhile, Brigido's holographic will was subsequently admitted to probate on 9 December 1977. On the 29th day of the same month, a codicil entitled "Kasulatan ng Pagbabago sa Ilang Pagpapasiya na Nasasaad sa Huling Habilin na May Petsa Nobiembre 5, 1977 ni Brigido Alvarado" was executed changing some dispositions in the notarial will to generate cash for the testator's eye operation. Brigido was then suffering from glaucoma. But the disinheritance and revocatory clauses were unchanged. As in the case of the notarial will, the testator did not personally read the final draft of the codicil. Instead, it was private respondent who read it aloud in his presence and in the presence of the three instrumental witnesses (same as those of the notarial will) and the notary public who followed the reading using their own copies. A petition for the probate of the notarial will and codicil was filed upon the testator's death on 3 January 1979 by private respondent as executor with the Court of First Instance, now Regional Trial Court, of Siniloan, Laguna. 5 Petitioner, in turn, filed an Opposition on the following grounds: that the will sought to be probated was not executed and attested as required by law; that the testator was insane or otherwise mentally incapacitated to make a will at the time of its execution due to senility and old age; that the will was executed under duress, or influence of fear or threats; that it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiary who stands to get the lion's share of the testator's estate; and lastly, that the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or trick. When the oppositor (petitioner) failed to substantiate the grounds relied upon in the Opposition, a Probate Order was issued on 27 June 1983 from which an appeal was made to respondent court. The main thrust of the appeal was that the deceased was blind within the meaning of the law at the time his "Huling Habilin" and the codicil attached thereto were executed; that since the reading required by Art. 808 of the Civil Code was admittedly not complied with, probate of the deceased's last will and codicil should have been denied. On 11 April 1986, the Court of Appeals rendered the decision under review with the following findings: that Brigido Alvarado was not blind at the time his last will and codicil were executed; that assuming his blindness, the reading requirement of Art. 808 was substantially complied with when both documents were read aloud to the testator with each of the three instrumental witnesses and the notary public following the reading with their respective copies of the instruments. The appellate court then concluded that although Art. 808 was not followed to the letter, there was substantial compliance since its purpose of making known to the testator the contents of the drafted will was served. The issues now before us can be stated thus: Was Brigido Alvarado blind for purposes of Art. 808 at the time his "Huling Habilin" and its codicil were executed? If so, was the double-reading requirement of said article complied with? Regarding the first issue, there is no dispute on the following facts: Brigido Alvarado was not totally blind at the time the will and codicil were executed. However, his vision on both eyes was only of "counting fingers at three (3) feet" by reason of the glaucoma which he had been suffering from for several years and even prior to his first consultation with an eye specialist on 14 December 1977. The point of dispute is whether the foregoing circumstances would qualify Brigido as a "blind" testator under Art. 808 which reads: "Art. 808.If the testator is blind, the will shall be read to him twice; once, by one of the subscribing, witnesses, and again, by the notary public before whom the will is acknowledged."

Petitioner contends that although his father was not totally blind when the will and codicil were executed, he can be so considered within the scope of the term as it is used in Art. 808. To support his stand, petitioner presented before the trial court a medical certificate issued by Dr. Salvador R. Salceda, Director of the Institute of Ophthalmology (Philippine Eye Research Institute), 6 the contents of which were interpreted in layman's terms by Dr. Ruperto Roasa, whose expertise was admitted by private respondent. 7Dr. Roasa explained that although the testator could visualize fingers at three (3) feet, he could no longer read either printed or handwritten matters as of 14 December 1977, the day of his first consultation. 8 On the other hand, the Court of Appeals, contrary to the medical testimony, held that the testator could still read on the day the will and the codicil were executed but chose not to do so because of "poor eyesight." 9 Since the testator was still capable of reading at that time, the court a quo concluded that Art. 808 need not be complied with.

We agree with petitioner in this respect. Regardless of respondent's staunch contention that the testator was still capable of reading at the time his will and codicil were prepared, the fact remains and this was testified to by his witnesses, that Brigido did not do so because of his "poor," 10 "defective, " 11 or "blurred" 12 vision making it necessary for private respondent to do the actual reading for him. The following pronouncement in Garcia vs. Vasquez 13 provides an insight into the scope of the term "blindness" as used in Art. 808, to wit: "The rationale behind the requirement of reading the will to the testator if he is blind or incapable of reading the will himself (as when he is illiterate), is to make the provisions thereof known to him, so that he may be able to object if they are not in accordance with his wishes . . ." Clear from the foregoing is that Art. 808 applies not only to blind testators but also to those who, for one reason or another, are "incapable of reading the(ir) will(s)." SinceBrigido Alvarado was incapable of reading the final drafts of his will and codicil on the separate occasions of their execution due to his "poor," "defective," or "blurred" vision, there can be no other course for us but to conclude that Brigido Alvarado comes within the scope of the term "blind" as it is used in Art. 808. Unless the contents were read to him, he had no way of ascertaining whether or not the lawyer who drafted the will and codicil did so conformably with his instructions. Hence, to consider his will as validly executed and entitled to probate, it is essential that we ascertain whether Art. 808 had been complied with. Article 808 requires that in case of testators like Brigido Alvarado, the will shall be read twice; once, by one of the instrumental witnesses and, again, by the notary public before whom the will was acknowledged. The purpose is to make known to the incapacitated testator the contents of the document before signing and to give him an opportunity to object if anything is contrary to his instructions. That Art. 808 was not followed strictly is beyond cavil. Instead of the notary public and an instrumental witness, it was the lawyer (private respondent) who drafted the eight-paged will and the five-paged codicil who read the same aloud to the testator, and read them only once, not twice as Art. 808 requires. Private respondent however insists that there was substantial compliance and that the single reading suffices for purposes of the law. On the other hand, petitioner maintains that the only valid compliance is a strict compliance or compliance to the letter and since it is admitted that neither the notary public nor an instrumental witness read the contents of the will and codicil to Brigido, probate of the latter's will and codicil should have been disallowed. We sustain private respondent's stand and necessarily, the petition must be denied. This Court has held in a number of occasions that substantial compliance is acceptable where the purpose of the law has been satisfied, the reason being that the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills are intended to protect the testator from all kinds of fraud and trickery but are never intended to be so rigid and inflexible as to destroy the testamentary privilege. 14

In the case at bar, private respondent read the testator's will and codicil aloud in the presence of the testator, his three instrumental witnesses, and the notary public. Prior and subsequent thereto, the testator affirmed, upon being asked, that the contents read corresponded with his instructions. Only then did the signing and acknowledgement take place. There is no evidence, and petitioner does not so allege, that the contents of the will and codicil were not sufficiently made known and communicated to the testator. On the contrary, with respect to the "Huling Habilin," the day of the execution was not the first time that Brigido had affirmed the truth and authenticity of the contents of the draft. The uncontradicted testimony of Atty. Rino is that Brigido Alvarado already acknowledged that the will was drafted in accordance with his expressed wishes even prior to 5 November 1977 when Atty. Rino went to the testator's residence precisely for the purpose of securing his conformity to the draft. 15 Moreover, it was not only Atty. Rino who read the documents on 5 November and 29 December 1977. The notary public and the three instrumental witnesses likewise read the will and codicil, albeit silently. Afterwards, Atty. Nonia de la Pena (the notary public) and Dr. Crescente O. Evidente (one of the three instrumental witnesses and the testator's physician) asked the testator whether the contents of the documents were of his own free will. Brigido answered in the affirmative. 16 With four persons following the reading word for word with their own copies, it can be safely concluded that the testator was reasonably assured that what was read to him (those which he affirmed were in accordance with his instructions), were the terms actually appearing on the typewritten documents. This is especially true when we consider the fact that the three instrumental witnesses were persons known to the testator, one being his physician (Dr. Evidente) and another (Potenciano C. Ranieses) being known to him since childhood. The spirit behind the law was served though the letter was not. Although there should be strict compliance with the substantial requirements of the law in order to insure the authenticity of the will, the formal imperfections should be brushed aside when they do not affect its purpose and which, when taken into account, may only defeat the testator's will. 17 As a final word to convince petitioner of the propriety of the trial court's Probate Order and its affirmance by the Court of Appeals, we quote the following pronouncement inAbangan v. Abangan, 18 to wit: "The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid the substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore the laws on the subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object

of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an interpretation already given assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the testator's will, must be disregarded"
(emphasis supplied). Brigido Alvarado had expressed his last wishes in clear and unmistakable terms in his "Huling Habilin" and the codicil attached thereto. We are unwilling to cast these aside for the mere reason that a legal requirement intended for his protection was not followed strictly when such compliance had been rendered unnecessary by the fact that the purpose of the law, i.e., to make known to the incapacitated testator the contents of the draft of his will, had already been accomplished. To reiterate, substantial compliance suffices where the purpose has been served. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of respondent Court of Appeals dated 11 April 1986 is AFFIRMED. Considering the length of time that this case has remained pending, this decision is immediately executory. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Grio-Aquino, Davide, Jr. and Quiason, JJ ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION [G.R. No. 76714. June 2, 1994.] SALUD TEODORO VDA.. DE PEREZ, petitioner, vs. HON. ZOTICO A. TOLETE in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 18, RTC Bulacan,respondent. SYLLABUS 1.REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; SETTLEMENT OF DECEDENT'S ESTATE; ALLOWANCE OF WILLS PROBATED ABROAD; EVIDENCE NECESSARY THEREFOR; CASE AT BAR. The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were American citizens, will only be effective in this country upon compliance with the following provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines. . . . Thus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities prescribed by New York laws or by Philippine laws is imperative. The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which have been probated outside of the Philippines are as follows: (1) the due execution of the will in accordance with the foreign laws; (2) the testator has his domicile in the foreign country and not in the Philippines; (3) the will has been admitted to probate in such country; (4) the fact that the foreign tribunal is a probate court, and (5) the laws of a foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills. Except for the first and last requirements, the petitioner submitted all the needed evidence. 2.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOTICE OF TESTATOR'S KNOWN HEIRS, LEGATEES, AND DEVISEES, A PRE-REQUISITE THEREFOR; CASE AT BAR. This petition cannot be completely resolved without touching on a very glaring fact petitioner has always considered herself the sole heir of Dr. Evelyn Perez Cunanan and because she does not consider herself an heir of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, she noticeably failed to notify his heirs of the filing of the proceedings. Thus, even in the instant petition, she only impleaded respondent Judge, forgetting that a judge whose order is being assailed is merely a nominal or formal party. The rule that the court having jurisdiction over the reprobate of a will shall "cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an original will presented for allowance" (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 27, Section 2) means that with regard to notices, the will probated abroad should be treated as if it were an "original will" or a will that is presented for probate for the first time. Accordingly, compliance with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76, which require publication and notice by mail or personally to the "known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines" and to the executor, if he is not the petitioner, are required. The brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, contrary to petitioner's claim are entitled to notices of the time and place for proving the wills. Under Section 4 of Rule 76 of the Revised Rules of Court, the "court shall also cause copies of the notice of the time and place fixed for proving the will to be addressed to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator, . . ." 3.ID.; ID.; ID.; JOINT PROBATE OF SEPARATE WILLS PROPER IN CASE AT BAR; REASON. In the case at bench, the Cunanan spouses executed separate wills. Since the two wills contain essentially the same provisions and pertain to property which in all probability are conjugal in nature, practical considerations dictate their joint probate. As this Court has held a number of times, it will always strive to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation. Respondent Judge's view that the Rules on allowance of wills is couched in singular terms and therefore should be interpreted to mean that there should be separate probate proceedings for the wills of the Cunanan spouses is too literal and simplistic an approach. Such view overlooks the provisions of Section 2, Rule 1 of the Revised Rules of Court, which advise that the rules shall be "liberally construed in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding." A literal application of the Rules should be avoided if they would only result in the delay in the administration of justice.

DECISION

QUIASON, J p:

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to set aside the Order dated November 19, 1986 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Bulacan presided by respondent Judge Zotico A. Tolete, in Special Proceedings No. 1793-M. We grant the petition. I Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, who became American citizens, established a successful medical practice in New York, U.S.A. The Cunanans lived at No. 2896 Citation Drive, Pompey, Syracuse, New York, with their children, Jocelyn, 18; Jacqueline, 16; and Josephine, 14. On August 23, 1979, Dr. Cunanan executed a last will and testament, bequeathing to his wife "all the remainder" of his real and personal property at the time of his death "wheresoever situated" (Rollo, p. 35). In the event he would survive his wife, he bequeathed all his property to his children and grandchildren with Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as trustee. He appointed his wife as executrix of his last will and testament and Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as substitute executor. Article VIII of his will states: "If my wife, EVELYN PEREZ-CUNANAN, and I shall die under such circumstances that there is not sufficient evidence to determine the order of our deaths, then it shall be presumed that I predeceased her, and my estate shall be administered and distributed, in all respects, in accordance with such presumption" (Rollo, p. 41). LibLex Four days later, on August 27, Dr. Evelyn P. Cunanan executed her own last will and testament containing the same provisions as that of the will of her husband. Article VIII of her will estates: "If my husband, JOSE F. CUNANAN, and I shall die under such circumstances that there is not sufficient evidence to determine the order of our deaths, then it shall be presumed that he predeceased me, and my estate shall be administered and distributed in all respects, in accordance with such presumption" (Rollo, p. 31.) On January 9, 1982, Dr. Cunanan and his entire family perished when they were trapped by fire that gutted their home. Thereafter, Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Jr. as trustee and substitute executor of the two wills, filed separate proceedings for the probate thereof with the Surrogate Court of the County of Onondaga, New York. On April 7, these two wills were admitted to probate and letters testamentary were issued in his favor. On February 21, 1983, Salud Teodoro Perez, the mother of Dr. Evelyn P. Cunanan, and petitioner herein, filed with the Regional Trial Court, Malolos, Bulacan a petition for the reprobate of the two wills ancillary to the probate proceedings in New York. She also asked that she be appointed the special administratrix of the estate of the deceased couple consisting primarily of a farm land in San Miguel, Bulacan. On March 9, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Malolos, Bulacan, presided by Judge Gualberto J. de la Llana, issued an order, directing the issuance of letters of special administration in favor of petitioner upon her filing of a P10,000.00 bond. The following day, petitioner posted the bond and took her oath as special administratrix. As her first act of administration, petitioner filed a motion, praying that the Philippine Life Insurance Company be directed to deliver the proceeds in the amount of P50,000.00 of the life insurance policy taken by Dr. Jose F. Cunanan with Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan and their daughter Jocelyn as beneficiaries. The trial Court granted the motion. cdrep Counsel for the Philippine American Life Insurance Company then filed a manifestation, stating that said company had delivered to petitioner the amount of P49,765.85, representing the proceeds of the life insurance policy of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan. In a motion dated May 19, 1983, petitioner asked that Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr. be ordered to deliver to her a Philippine Trust Company passbook with P25,594.00 in savings deposit, and the Family Savings Bank time deposit certificates in the total amount of P12,412.52.

On May 31, Atty. Federico Alday filed a notice of appearance as counsel for the heirs of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, namely, Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr., Priscilla Cunanan Bautista, Lydia Cunanan Ignacio, Felipe F. Cunanan and Loreto Cunanan Concepcion (Cunanan heirs). He also manifested that before receiving petitioner's motion of May 19, 1983, his clients were unaware of the filing of the testate estate case and therefore, "in the interest of simple fair play," they should be notified of the proceedings (Records, p. 110). He prayed for deferment of the hearing on the motion of May 19, 1983. Petitioner then filed a counter manifestation dated June 13, 1983, asserting: (1) that the "Cunanan collaterals are neither heirs nor creditors of the late Dr. Jose F. Cunanan" and therefore, they had "no legal or proprietary interests to protect" and "no right to intervene"; (2) that the wills of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, being American citizens, were executed in accordance with the solemnities and formalities of New York laws, and produced "effects in this jurisdiction in accordance with Art. 16 in relation to Art. 816 of the Civil Code"; (3) that under Article VIII of the two wills, it was presumed that the husband predeceased the wife; and (4) that "the Cunanan collaterals are neither distributees, legatees or beneficiaries, much less, heirs as heirship is only by institution" under a will or by operation of the law of New York (Records, pp. 112-113). On June 23, the probate court granted petitioner's motion of May 19, 1983. However, on July 21, the Cunanan heirs filed a motion to nullify the proceedings and to set aside the appointment of, or to disqualify, petitioner as special administratrix of the estates of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan. The motion stated: (1) that being the "brothers and sisters and the legal and surviving heirs" of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, they had been "deliberately excluded" in the petition for the probate of the separate wills of the Cunanan spouses thereby misleading the Bulacan court to believe that petitioner was the sole heir of the spouses; that such "misrepresentation" deprived them of their right to "due process in violation of Section 4, Rule 76 of the Revised Rules of Court; (2) that Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr., the executor of the estate of the Cunanan spouses, was likewise not notified of the hearings in the Bulacan court; (3) that the "misrepresentation and concealment committed by" petitioner rendered her unfit to be a special administratrix; (4) that Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. had, by virtue of a verified power of attorney, authorized his father, Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr., to be his attorney-in-fact; and (5) that Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr. is qualified to be a regular administrator "as practically all of the subject estate in the Philippines belongs to their brother, Dr. Jose F. Cunanan" (Records, pp. 118-122). Hence, they prayed: (1) that the proceedings in the case be declared null and void; (2) that the appointment of petitioner as special administratrix be set aside; and (3) that Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr. be appointed the regular administrator of the estate of the deceased spouses. prLL

Thereafter, the Cunanan heirs filed a motion requiring petitioner to submit an inventory or accounting of all monies received by her in trust for the estate. In her opposition, petitioner asserted: (1) that she was the "sole and only heir" of her daughter, Dr. Evelyn PerezCunanan to the exclusion of the "Cunanan collaterals"; hence they were complete strangers to the proceedings and were not entitled to notice; (2) that she could not have "concealed" the name and address of Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. because his name was prominently mentioned not only in the two wills but also in the decrees of the American surrogate court; (3) that the rule applicable to the case is Rule 77, not Rule 76, because it involved the allowance of wills proved outside of the Philippines and that nowhere in Section 2 of Rule 77 is there a mention of notice being given to the executor who, by the same provision, should himself file the necessary ancillary proceedings in this country; (4) that even if the Bulacan estate came from the "capital" of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, he had willed all his wordly goods to his wife and nothing to his brothers and sisters; and (5) that Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. had unlawfully disbursed $215,000.00 to the Cunanan heirs, misappropriated $15,000.00 for himself and irregularly assigned assets of the estates to his American lawyer (Records, pp. 151-160). In their reply, the Cunanan heirs stressed that on November 24, 1982, petitioner and the Cunanan heirs had entered into an agreement in the United States "to settle and divide equally the estates," and that under Section 2 of Rule 77 the "court shall fix a time and place for the hearing and cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an original will presented for allowance" (Records, pp. 184-185). LLphil Petitioner asked that Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. be cited for contempt of court for failure to comply with the Order of June 23, 1983 and for appropriating money of the estate for his own benefit. She also alleged that she had impugned the agreement of November 24, 1982 before the Surrogate Court of Onondaga, New York which rendered a decision on April

13, 1983, finding that "all assets are payable to Dr. Evelyn P. Cunanan's executor to be then distributed pursuant to EPTL4-1.1 subd [a] par [4]" (Rollo, p. 52). On their part, the Cunanan heirs replied that petitioner was estopped from claiming that they were heirs by the agreement to divide equally the estates. They asserted that by virtue of Section 2 of Rule 77 of the Rules of Court, the provision of Sections 3, 4 and 5 of Rule 76 on the requirement of notice to all heirs, executors, devisees and legatees must be complied with. They reiterated their prayer: (1) that the proceedings in the case be nullified; (2) that petitioner be disqualified as special administratrix: (3) that she be ordered to submit an inventory of all goods, chattels and monies which she had received and to surrender the same to the court; and (4) that Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr. be appointed the regular administrator. Petitioner filed a rejoinder, stating that in violation of the April 13, 1983 decision of the American court Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. made "unauthorized disbursements from the estates as early as July 7, 1982" (Records, p. 231). Thereafter, petitioner moved for the suspension of the proceedings as she had "to attend to the settlement proceedings" of the estate of the Cunanan spouses in New York (Records, p. 242). The Cunanans heirs opposed this motion and filed a manifestation, stating that petitioner had received $215,000.00 "from the Surrogate's Court as part of legacy" based on the aforesaid agreement of November 24, 1982 (Records, p. 248). On February 21, 1984, Judge de la Llana issued an order, disallowing the reprobate of the two wills, recalling the appointment of petitioner as special administratrix, requiring the submission of petitioner of an inventory of the property received by her as special administratrix and declaring all pending incidents moot and academic. Judge de la Llana reasoned out that petitioner failed to prove the law of New York on procedure and allowance of wills and the court had no way of telling whether the wills were executed in accordance with the law of New York. In the absence of such evidence, the presumption is that the law of succession of the foreign country is the same as the law of the Philippines. However, he noted, that there were only two witnesses to the wills of the Cunanan spouses and the Philippine law requires three witnesses and that the wills were not signed on each and every page, a requirement of the Philippine law. cdphil On August 27, 1985, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order dated February 21, 1984, where she had sufficiently proven the applicable laws of New York governing the execution of last wills and testaments. On the same day, Judge de la Llana issued another order, denying the motion of petitioner for the suspension of the proceedings but gave her 15 days upon arrival in the country within which to act on the other order issued that same day. Contending that the second portion of the second order left its finality to the discretion of counsel for petitioner, the Cunanans filed a motion for the reconsideration of the objectionable portion of the said order so that it would conform with the pertinent provisions of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 and the Interim Rules of Court. On April 30, 1985, the respondent Judge of Branch 18 of the Regional Trial Court, Malolos, to which the reprobate case was reassigned, issued an order stating that "(W)hen the last will and testament . . . was denied probate," the case was terminated and therefore all orders theretofore issued should be given finality. The same Order amended the February 21, 1984 Order by requiring petitioner to turn over to the estate the inventoried property. It considered the proceedings for all intents and purposes, closed (Records, p. 302). On August 12, petitioner filed a motion to resume proceedings on account of the final settlement and termination of the probate cases in New York. Three days later, petitioner filed a motion praying for the reconsideration of the Order of April 30, 1985 on the strength of the February 21, 1984 Order granting her a period of 15 days upon arrival in the country within which to act on the denial of probate of the wills of the Cunanan spouses. On August 19, respondent Judge granted the motion and reconsidered the Order of April 30, 1985. LLphil On August 29, counsel for petitioner, who happens to be her daughter, Natividad, filed a motion praying that since petitioner was ailing in Fort Lee, New Jersey, U.S.A. and therefore incapacitated to act as special administratrix, she (the counsel) should be named substitute special administratrix. She also filed a motion for the reconsideration of the Order of February 21, 1984, denying probate to the wills of the Cunanan spouses, alleging that respondent Judge "failed to appreciate the significant probative value of the exhibits . . . which all refer to the offer and admission to probate of the last wills of the Cunanan spouses including all procedures undertaken and decrees issued in connection with the said probate" (Records, pp. 313-323).

Thereafter, the Cunanans heirs filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order of August 19, 1985, alleging lack of notice to their counsel. On March 31, 1986, respondent Judge to which the case was reassigned denied the motion for reconsideration holding that the documents submitted by petitioner proved "that the wills of the testator domiciled abroad were properly executed, genuine and sufficient to possess real and personal property; that letters testamentary were issued; and that proceedings were held on a foreign tribunal and proofs taken by a competent judge who inquired into all the facts and circumstances and being satisfied with his findings issued a decree admitting to probate the wills in question. "However, respondent Judge said that the documents did not establish the law of New York on the procedure and allowance of wills (Records, p. 381). LLjur On April 9, 1986, petitioner filed a motion to allow her to present further evidence on the foreign law. After the hearing of the motion on April 25, 1986, respondent Judge issued an order wherein he conceded that insufficiency of evidence to prove the foreign law was not a fatal defect and was curable by adducing additional evidence. He granted petitioner 45 days to submit the evidence to that effect. However, without waiting for petitioner to adduce the additional evidence, respondent Judge ruled in his order dated June 20, 1986 that he found "no compelling reason to disturb its ruling of March 31, 1986" but allowed petitioner to "file anew the appropriate probate proceedings for each of the testator" (Records, p. 391). The Order dated June 20, 1986 prompted petitioner to file a second for reconsideration stating that she was "ready to submit further evidence on the law obtaining in the State of New York" and praying that she be granted "the opportunity to present evidence on what the law of the State of New York has on the probate and allowance of wills" (Records, p. 393). On July 18, respondent Judge denied the motion holding that to allow the probate of two wills in a single proceeding "would be a departure from the typical and established mode of probate where one petition takes care of one will." He pointed out that even in New York "where the wills in question were first submitted for probate, they were dealt with in separate proceedings" (Records, p. 395). On August 13, 1986, petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of the Order of July 18, 1986, citing Section 3, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, which provides that no party may institute more than one suit for a single cause of action. She pointed out that separate proceedings for the wills of the spouses which contain basically the same provisions as they even named each other as a beneficiary in their respective wills, would go against "the grain of inexpensive, just and speedy determination of the proceedings" (Records, pp. 405-407). LexLib

On September 11, 1986, petitioner filed a supplement to the motion for reconsideration, citing Benigno v. De La Pea, 57 Phil. 305 (1932) (Records, p. 411), but respondent Judge found that this pleading had been filed out of time and that the adverse party had not been furnished with a copy thereof. In her compliance, petitioner stated that she had furnished a copy of the motion to the counsel of the Cunanan heirs and reiterated her motion for a "final ruling on her supplemental motion" (Records, p. 421). On November 19, respondent Judge issued an order, denying the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner on the grounds that "the probate of separate wills of two or more different persons even if they are husband and wife cannot be undertaken in a single petition" (Records, pp. 376-378). Hence, petitioner instituted the instant petition, arguing that the evidence offered at the hearing of April 11, 1983 sufficiently proved the laws of the State of New York on the allowance of wills, and that the separate wills of the Cunanan spouses need not be probated in separate proceedings. II Petitioner contends that the following pieces of evidence she had submitted before respondent Judge are sufficient to warrant the allowance of the wills:

(a)two certificates of authentication of the respective wills of Evelyn and Jose by the Consulate General of the Philippines (Exhs. "F" and "G"); (b)two certifications from the Secretary of State of New York and Custodian of the Great Seal on the facts that Judge Bernard L. Reagan is the Surrogate of the County of Onondaga which is a court of record, that his signature and seal of office are genuine, and that the Surrogate is duly authorized to grant copy of the respective wills of Evelyn and Jose (Exhs. "F-1" and "G-1"); (c)two certificates of Judge Reagan and Chief Clerk Donald E. Moore stating that they have in their records and files the said wills which were recorded on April 7, 1982 (Exhs. "F-2" and "G-2"); (d)the respective wills of Evelyn and Jose (Exhs. "F-3", "F-6" and Exh. "G-3" "G-6"); (e)certificates of Judge Reagan and the Chief Clerk certifying to the genuineness and authenticity of the exemplified copies of the two wills (Exhs. "F-7" and "F-7"); prcd (f)two certificates of authentication from the Consulate General of the Philippines in New York (Exh. "H" and "F"); (g)certifications from the Secretary of State that Judge Reagan is duly authorized to grant exemplified copies of the decree of probate, letters testamentary and all proceedings had and proofs duly taken (Exhs. "H-1" and "I-1"); (h)certificates of Judge Reagan and the Chief Clerk that letters testamentary were issued to Rafael G. Cunanan (Exhs. "H-2" and "I-2"); (i)certification to the effect that it was during the term of Judge Reagan that a decree admitting the wills to probate had been issued and appointing Rafael G. Cunanan as alternate executor (Exhs. "H-3" and "I-10"); j)the decrees on probate of the two wills specifying that proceedings were held and proofs duly taken (Exhs. "H-4" and "I-5"); (k)decrees on probate of the two wills stating that they properly executed, genuine and valid and that the said instruments were admitted to probate and established as wills valid to pass real and personal property (Exhs. "H-5" and "I-5"); and (l)certificates of Judge Reagan and the Chief Clerk on the genuineness and authenticity of each other's signatures in the exemplified copies of the decrees of probate, letters testamentary and proceedings held in their court (Exhs. "H-6" and "I-6")" (Rollo, pp. 13-16). Petitioner adds that the wills had been admitted to probate in the Surrogate Court's Decision of April 13, 1983 and that the proceedings were terminated on November 29, 1984. The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were American citizens, will only be effective in this country upon compliance with the following provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines: "Art. 816.The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country, or in conformity with those which this Code prescribes." Thus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities prescribed by New York laws or by Philippine laws is imperative. The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which have been probated outside of the Philippines are as follows: (1) the due execution of the will in accordance with the foreign laws; (2) the testator has his domicile in the foreign country and not in the Philippines; (3) the will has been admitted to probate in such country; (4) the fact that the

foreign tribunal is a probate court, and (5) the laws of a foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills (III Moran Commentaries on the Rules of Court, 1970 ed., pp. 419-429; Suntay v. Suntay, 95 Phil. 500 [1954]; Fluemer v. Hix, 54 Phil. 610 [1930]. Except for the first and last requirements, the petitioner submitted all the needed evidence. cdphil The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon which the probate in the foreign country is based is impelled by the fact that our courts cannot take judicial notice of them (Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank v. Escolin, 56 SCRA 266 [1974]). Petitioner must have perceived this omission as in fact she moved for more time to submit the pertinent procedural and substantive New York laws but which request respondent Judge just glossed over. While the probate of a will is a special proceeding wherein courts should relax the rules on evidence, the goal is to receive the best evidence of which the matter is susceptible before a purported will is probated or denied probate (Vda. de Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 81 SCRA 393 [1978]). There is merit in petitioner's insistence that the separate wills of the Cunanan spouses should be probated jointly. Respondent Judge's view that the Rules on allowance of wills is couched in singular terms and therefore should be interpreted to mean that there should be separate probate proceedings for the wills of the Cunanan spouses is too literal and simplistic an approach. Such view overlooks the provisions of Section 2, Rule 1 of the Revised Rules of Court, which advise that the rules shall be "liberally construed in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding." llcd A literal application of the Rules should be avoided if they would only result in the delay in the administration of justice (Acain v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 155 SCRA 100 [1987]; Roberts v. Leonidas, 129 SCRA 33 [1984]). What the law expressly prohibits is the making of joint wills either for the testators' reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third person (Civil Code of the Philippines, Article 818). In the case at bench, the Cunanan spouses executed separate wills. Since the two wills contain essentially the same provisions and pertain to property which in all probability are conjugal in nature, practical considerations dictate their joint probate. As this Court has held a number of times, it will always strive to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation (Motoomull v. Dela Paz, 187 SCRA 743 [1990]). This petition cannot be completely resolved without touching on a very glaring fact petitioner has always considered herself the sole heir of Dr. Evelyn Perez Cunanan and because she does not consider herself an heir of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, she noticeably failed to notify his heirs of the filing of the proceedings. Thus, even in the instant petition, she only impleaded respondent Judge, forgetting that a judge whose order is being assailed is merely a nominal or formal party (Calderon v. Solicitor General, 215 SCRA 876 [1992]). The rule that the court having jurisdiction over the reprobate of a will shall "cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an original will presented for allowance" (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 27, Section 2) means that with regard to notices, the will probated abroad should be treated as if it were an "original will" or a will that is presented for probate for the first time. Accordingly, compliance with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76, which require publication and notice by mail or personally to the "known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines" and to the executor, if he is not the petitioner, are required. LexLib The brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, contrary to petitioner's claim are entitled to notices of the time and place for proving the wills. Under Section 4 of Rule 76 of the Revised Rules of Court, the "court shall also cause copies of the notice of the time and place fixed for proving the will to be addressed to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator, . . .". WHEREFORE, the questioned Order is SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge shall allow petitioner reasonable time within which to submit evidence needed for the joint probate of the wills of the Cunanan spouses and see to it that the brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan are given all notices and copies of all pleadings pertinent to the probate proceedings. SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

Cruz, J., is on leave.