Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
Compiled by: Clint M. Maratas based on the syllabus of Atty. Chezie K. Demegillo
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modes of settlement li(e negotiations and arbitration0 reprisals and even war Derived from suc% sources as international customs0 international conventions and general principles of law. :pplies to relations states inter se and ot%er international persons Infractions are usuall& collective in t%e sense t%at it attac%es directl& to t%e state and not to its nationals. administrative and 5udicial process.
8. /ource
=. /ub5ect
Regulates t%e relations of individuals w%et%er of t%e same nationalit& or not ?enerall&0 entails onl& individual responsibilit&.
!. (i"torical De elo)&ent of International Law :ncient IL governed e<c%ange of diplomatic emissaries0 peace treaties0 etc. in world of ancient Romans and earlier. 3%e progressive rule of jus gentium0 seen as a law )common to all man0* became t%e law of t%e vast Roman ;mpire. odern IL began wit% t%e birt% of nation7states in t%e edieval :ge. ?overning principles were derived from Roman Law or 4anon Law w%ic% drew from natural law. Hugo ?rotius considered fat%er of modern IL. @%at %e called )law of t%e nations* was later given t%e name )IL* b& +erem& Bent%am. 3%e positivist approac% reinterpreted IL not on basis of concepts derived from reason but rat%er on basis of w%at actuall& %appened in t%e conflict between states. @it% emergence of notion of sovereignt& came t%e view of law as commands bac(ed up b& t%reats of sanction. In t%is view0 IL not law bec not from command of sovereign. Significant milestones in de elopment of !": ,.A Peace of @estp%alia Bending 8C &rs warA establis%ed a treat& based framewor( for peace cooperation. Bit was at t%is time t%at pacta sunt ser anda arose.A 2.A 4ongress of Dienna Bending Napoleonic warsA created a s&stem of multilateral pol and econ cooperation.
2. /ettlement of Dispute
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Po"iti i"t -c$ool 1 agreement of sovereign states to be bound b& it Be<press in conventional law0 implied in customar& law0 and presumed in general principlesA. 8. *roatians or (clectics 1 :ccepts t%e doctrine of natural law0 but maintained t%at /tates were accountable onl& to t%eir own conscience for t%e observance of t%e duties imposed b& natural law0 unless t%e& %ad agreed to be bound to treat t%ose duties as part of positive law. 6;meric% von Dattel9 iddle ground Eclectic or .roatian -c$ool 1 a compromise between t%e first 2 sc%ools and submits t%at international law is binding partl& because it is good and rig%t and partl& because states agreed to be bound b& it. Di i"ion" of International Law ,. Laws of Peace 1 normal relations between states in t%e absence of war. 2. Laws of War 1 relations between %ostile or belligerent states during wartime. 8. Laws of Neutrality 1 relations between a non7 participant state and a participant state during wartime. 3%is also refers to t%e relations among non7 participating states.
d.
8.A 4ovenant of t%e League of Nations Bincl. 3reat& of Dersailles ending @@IA created t%e Permanent 4ourt of International +ustice. =.A !ounding of EN in aftermat% of @@II. /%ift of power awa& from ;urope and beginning of trul& universal institution. Eniversali'ation advanced b& decoloni'ation w%ic% resulted in e<pansion of members%ip of EN. New states0 carr&ing a legac& of bitterness against colonial powers0 became members. >.A 4old @ar period succeeded in maintaining peace t%roug% balancing of 2 super powers. F.A Dissolution of /oviet Enion resulting in end of 4old @ar wit% re7emergence of intGl relations based on multiple sources of power and not mainl& ideolog&. Pu!lic and Pri ate International Law Distinction s%ould be made between t%e twoH Pu!lic IL+ sometimes referred to onl& as IL0 governs relations%ips bet and among states and also t%eir relations wit% international orgs and individual persons. Pri ate IL+ more commonl& called conflict of laws0 is reall& domestic law. It deals wit% cases w%ere foreign law intrudes in t%e domestic sp%ere w%ere t%ere are Iuestions of applicabilit& of foreign law or t%e role of foreign courts. c. Ba"i" of International Law , -c$ool" of T$ou#$t" [#hy are
binding%]
,. Naturalist 1 PIL is a branc% of t%e great law of nature 1 t%e sum of t%ose principles w%ic% oug%t to control %uman conduct0 being founded on t%e ver& nature of man as a rational and social being. 6Hugo ?rotius9 PIL is binding upon /tates Law of Nature -c$ool 1 based on rules of conduct discoverable b& ever& individual in %is own conscience and t%roug% application of rig%t reasons. 2. &ositi ist 1 Basis is to be found in t%e consent and conduct of /tates. 'acit consent in t%e case of customar& international law. ()press in conventional law. &resumed in t%e general law of nations. 64ornelius van B&n(ers%oe(9
%ro& t$e View)oint of Doctrine ,. Dualists 1 International Law and unicipal Law are two completel& separate realms. See distinctions Nos. +,- ./. , International Law is a law of coordination0 being t%e result of agreement among t%e eIual states forming t%e famil& of nationsJ /unici)al law is a law of subordination0 being a command issued b& a political superior to t%ose sub5ect to its aut%orit&. International Law regulates t%e relation of states and ot%er international personsJ /unici)al law regulates t%e relations of individuals among t%emselves or wit% t%eir state. International Law is derived principall& from treaties0 international customs0 and general principles of lawJ /unici)al law consists mainl& of statutor& enactments0 and to a lesser e<tent orders and 5udicial pronouncements. International law is enforced0 generall&
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spea(ing0 b& t%e sub5ect t%emselves t%roug% met%ods of self7%elp Bthe use of one0s o$n efforts
and resources to achie e things $ithout relying on others.AJ /unici)al law is enforced b& a regular
>
and pre7e<isting mac%iner& for t%e administration of 5ustice. International Law usuall& entails collective responsibilit&J /unici)al law entails individual responsibilit&. unicipal Law are
2.
In bot% laws0 it is t%e individual persons w%o in t%e ultimate anal&sis are regulated b& t%e law. 3%at bot% laws are far from being essentiall& different and must be regarded as parts of t%e same 5uristic conception. !or t%em t%ere is oneness or unit& of all laws. PIL is superior to municipal lawK international law0 being t%e one w%ic% determines t%e 5urisdictional limits of t%e personal and territorial competence of /tates. %ro& t$e View)oint of Practice 1. International Tri!unal" PIL superior to unicipal Law :rt. 2-0 Dienna 4onvention in t%e law of 3reaties 1 : state )ma& not invo(e t%e provisions of its internal law as 5ustification for its failure to perform a treat&* /tate legall& bound to observe its treat& obligations0 once signed and ratified 2. unicipal /p%ere 1 depends on w%at doctrine is followedH Doctrine of Incor)oration 0 Rules of international law form part of t%e law of t%e land and no furt%er legislative action is needed to ma(e suc% rules applicable in t%e domestic sp%ere. 1Sec. of 2ustice . "antion *3N +-4/56, 2an. +7, 8999: 3%is is followed in t%e P%ilippinesH :rt. II0 /ec. 2 1 ) The Philippinesadopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land However, no pri acy is i plied! 1+ W$at are t$e"e #enerall2 acce)ted )rinci)le" A+ Pacta sunt servanda0 sovereign eIualit& among states0 principle of state immunit&J rig%t of states to self7defense
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ma(e in its legislations suc% modifications as ma& be necessar& to ensure t%e fulfillment of t%e obligations. B& t%eir in%erent nature0 treaties reall& limit or restrict t%e absoluteness of sovereignt&. B& t%eir voluntar& act0 nations ma& surrender some aspects of t%eir state power in e<c%ange for greater benefits granted b& or derived from a convention or pact. :fter all0 states0 li(e individuals0 live wit% coeIuals0 and in pursuit of mutuall& covenanted ob5ectives and benefits0 t%e& also commonl& agree to limit t%e e<ercise of t%eir ot%erwise absolute rig%ts. 3%us0 treaties %ave been used to record agreements between /tates concerning suc% widel& diverse matters as0 for e<ample0 t%e lease of naval bases0 t%e sale or cession of territor&0 t%e termination of war0 t%e regulation of conduct of %ostilities0 t%e formation of alliances0 t%e regulation of commercial relations0 t%e settling of claims0 t%e la&ing down of rules governing conduct in peace and t%e establis%ment of international organi'ations. 3%e sovereignt& of a state t%erefore cannot in fact and in realit& be considered absolute. 4ertain restrictions enter into t%e pictureH B,A limitations imposed b& t%e ver& nature of members%ip in t%e famil& of nations and B2A limitations imposed b& treat& stipulations. ;'anada . Angara, 8<8 SC3A +7, May 8, +44< 1&anganiban:= Doctrine of Tran"for&ation ?Legislative action is reIuired to ma(e t%e treat& enforceable in t%e municipal sp%ere. ?enerall& accepted rules of international law are not per se binding upon t%e state but must first be embodied in legislation enacted b& t%e lawma(ing bod& and so transformed into municipal law. 3%is doctrine runs counter :rt. II0 /ec. 20 of t%e ,9.- 4onstitution. : reading of t%e case of Muroda v +alandoni0 6?RN L7 2FF2 arc% 2F0 ,9=990 one ma& sa& t%at /upreme 4ourt e<pressl& ruled out t%e Doctrine of 3ransformation w%en t%e& declared t%at generall& accepted principles of international law form a part of t%e law of our nation even if t%e P%ilippines was not a signator& to t%e convention embod&ing t%em0 for our 4onstitution %as been deliberatel& general and e<tensive in its scope and is not confined to t%e recognition of rules and principles of international law as contained in treaties to w%ic% our government ma& %ave been or s%all be a signator&. Pacta -unt -er anda International agreements must be performed in ?ood !ait%. : treat& engagement is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legall& binding obligation on t%e parties. : state w%ic% %as contracted a valid international obligation is bound to ma(e in its legislation suc% modifications as ma& be necessar& to
1+ W$at i" t$e doctrine of incor)oration> (ow i" it a))lied !2 local court"> (eld+ Ender t%e doctrine of incorporation0 rules of international law form part of t%e law of t%e land and no furt%er legislative action is needed to ma(e suc% rules applicable in t%e domestic sp%ere. 3%e doctrine of incorporation is applied w%enever municipal tribunals Bor local courtsA are confronted wit% situations in w%ic% t%ere appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and t%e provisions of t%e 4onstitution or statute of t%e local state. ;fforts s%ould first be e<erted to %armoni'e t%em0 so as to give effect to bot% since it is to be presumed t%at municipal law was enacted wit% proper regard for t%e generall& accepted principles of international law in observance of t%e Incorporation 4lause in /ection 20 :rticle II of t%e 4onstitution. In a situation %owever0 w%ere t%e conflict is irreconcilable and a c%oice %as to be made between a rule of international law and municipal law0 5urisprudence dictates t%at municipal law s%ould be up%eld b& t%e municipal courts for t%e reason t%at suc% courts are organs of municipal law and are accordingl& bound b& it in all circumstances. 3%e fact t%at international law %as been made part of t%e law of t%e land does not pertain to or impl& t%e primac& of international law over national or municipal law in t%e municipal sp%ere. 3%e doctrine of incorporation0 as applied in most countries0 decrees t%at rules of international law are given eIual standing wit%0 but are not superior to0 national legislative enactments. :ccordingl&0 t%e principle of le< posterior derogat priori ta(es effect 1 a treat& ma& repeal a statute and a statute ma& repeal a treat&. In states w%ere t%e 4onstitution is t%e %ig%est law of t%e land0 suc% as t%e Republic of t%e P%ilippines0 bot% statutes and treaties ma& be invalidated if t%e& are in conflict wit% t%e 4onstitution. B/ecretar& of +ustice v. Hon. Ralp% 4. Lantion0 ?.R. No. ,89=F>0 +an. ,.0 2CCC0 ;n Banc 6 elo9A 1+ I" "o erei#nt2 reall2 a!"olute and all0 enco&)a""in#> If not: w$at are it" re"triction" and li&itation"> (eld+ @%ile sovereignt& %as traditionall& been deemed absolute and all7encompassing on t%e domestic level0 it is %owever sub5ect to restrictions and limitations voluntaril& agreed to b& t%e P%ilippines0 e<pressl& or impliedl&0 as a member of t%e famil& of nations. B& t%e doctrine of incorporation0 t%e countr& is bound b& generall& accepted principles of international law0 w%ic% are considered to be automaticall& part of our own laws. 2ne of t%e oldest and most fundamental rules in international law is pacta sunt servanda 1 international agreements must be performed in good fait%. : state w%ic% %as contracted valid international obligations is bound to
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b. /econdar&
ensure t%e fulfillment of t%e obligations underta(en. Ta@ada ". An#ara .RN 11;*69 /a2 *: 166A
@%ile sovereignt& %as traditionall& been deemed absolute and all encompassing on t%e domestic level0 it is ho$e er subject to restrictions and limitations voluntaril& agreed to b& t%e P%ilippines0 e<pressl& or impliedl& as a member of t%e famil& of nations. 3%e 4onstitution does not envision a %ermit t&pe isolation of t%e countr& from t%e rest of t%e world. B& t%e doctrine of incorporation0 t%e countr& is bound b& generall& accepted principles of international law0 w%ic% are considered to be automaticall& part of our own laws. 3%e constitutional polic& of a Nself7reliant and independent national econom&N does not necessaril& rule out t%e entr& of foreign investments0 goods and services. It contemplates neit%er )economic seclusionN nor Nmendicanc& in t%e international communit&.N
#rticle $% of the &tatute of the 'nternational (ourt of )ustice *'()+ directs t%at t%e following be considered before deciding a caseH #! Pri ary I. 3reaties or International 4onventions II. International 4ustom III. ?eneral Principles of Law Recogni'ed b& 4ivili'ed Nations ,! &econdary ID. +udicial Decisions D. 3eac%ings of aut%oritative publicists a. a. Pri&ar2 Treat2'international con ention" 7 ?enerall&0 a treat& onl& binds t%e parties. However0 treaties ma& be considered a direct source of International law w%en concluded b& a si'able number of /tates0 and is reflective of t%e will of t%e famil& of nations Bin w%ic% case0 a treat& is evidence of customA. * BIND-+ ,. 4ontract 3reaties 6'raite>Contrat9 1 Bilateral arrangements concerning matters of particular or special interest to t%e contracting parties /ource of )Particular International Law* BE3H a& become primar& sources of international law w%en different contract treaties are of t%e same nature0 containing practicall& uniform provisions0 and are concluded b& a substantial number of /tates ;O.H ;<tradition 3reaties 2. Law7 a(ing 3reat& 6'raite>"oi9 1 4oncluded b& a large number of /tates for purposes ofH ,. Declaring0 confirming0 or defining t%eir understanding of w%at t%e law is on a particular sub5ectJ 2. /tipulating or la&ing down new general rules for future international conductJ 8. 4reating new international Institution b. Cu"to& 1 ?eneral and consistent practice of states followed b& t%em from a sense of legal obligation.
Conce)t of -o erei#nt2 a" Autoli&itation @%en t%e P%ilippines 5oined t%e Enited Nations as one of its >, c%arter members0 it consented to restrict its sovereign rig%ts under t%e Nconcept of sovereignt& as autolimitation. 1+ A treat2 wa" concurred !etween RP and C$ina. Later: a law wa" )a""ed w$ic$ $a" conflictin# )ro i"ion" wit$ t$e treat2. Rule. A+ : treat& is part of t%e law of t%e land. But as internal law0 it would not be superior to a legislative act0 rat%er it would be in t%e same class as t%e latter. 3%us0 t%e latter law would be considered as amendator& of t%e treat&0 being a subseIuent law under t%e principle le) posterior derogat priori. B:bbas vs. 42 ;L;4A
e.
%unction" of International Law ,. promote international peace and securit&J 2. foster friendl& relations among nations and discourage use of force in resolution of difference among t%emJ 8. provide for orderl& regulation of conduct of states in t%eir mutual dealingsJ and =. ensure international cooperation in pursuit of certain common purposes of economic0 social0 cultural0 or %umanitarian c%aracter.
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Be.g.0 determining w%at rules of customar& International Law e<istA t%at is acceptable so long as t%e& correctl& interpret and appl& international law. 3%e doctrine of stare decisis is not applicable in international law per :rt.>9 of t%e I4+ w%ic% states t%at )3%e decision of t%e 4ourt %as no binding force e<cept between t%e parties and in respect to t%at particular case.* 3%is means t%at t%ese decisions are not a direct source0 but t%e& do e<ercise considerable influence as an impartial and well7considered statement of t%e law b& 5urists made in t%e lig%t of actual problems w%ic% arise before t%em0 and t%us0 accorded wit% great respect. 3%is includes decisions of national courts0 alt%oug% t%e& are not a source of law0 t%e cumulative effect of uniform decisions of t%e courts of t%e most important /tates is to afford evidence of international custom. NOTE+ ;ven decisions of national courts0 w%en appl&ing international law0 are acceptable. ()ample: Principles on diplomatic immunit& %ave been developed b& 5udgments of national courts. b. Teac$in#" of t$e /o"t (i#$l2 1ualified Pu!lici"t" 7 3%e word PPublicistP means Plearned writer.P Learned writings0 li(e 5udicial decisions0 can be evidence of customar& law0 and can also pla& a subsidiar& role in developing new rules of law. /uc% wor(s are resorted to b& 5udicial tribunals not for t%e speculation of t%eir aut%ors concerning w%at t%e law oug%t to be0 but for trustwort%& evidence of w%at t%e law reall& is. 6 r. +ustice ?ra& in PaIuete Habana case0 ,-> E./. F--.9 ReCui"ite" for (i#$l2 1ualified Pu!lici"t ,. !air and impartial representation of law. 2. B& an ac(nowledged aut%orit& in t%e field. 1+ -tate 2our #eneral under"tandin# of t$e )ri&ar2 "ource" and "u!"idiar2 "ource" of international law: #i in# an illu"tration of eac$. D*<<, BarE A+ Ender :rticle 8. of t%e /tatute of International 4ourt of +ustice0 t%e primar& sources of international law are t%e following+ ,. International conventions0 e.g. Dienna 4onvention on t%e Law of 3reaties. 2. International customs0 e.g. cabotage0 t%e pro%ibition against slaver&0 and t%e pro%ibition against torture. 8. ?eneral principles of law recogni'ed b& civili'ed nations0 e.g. prescription0 res 5udicata0 and due
* Ele&ent"+ i. -tate Practice 1 a consistent and uniform e<ternal conduct of /tates. ?enerall&0 bot% w%at states say and w%at t%e& do are considered state practice. ii. O)inio 3uri" 7 /tate practice must be accompanied wit% t%e conviction t%at t%e /tate is legally obligated to do so b& intPl law0 and not t%roug% mere courtes& or comit&0 or because of %umanitarian considerations. It e<ists w%en a clear and continuous %abit of doing certain t%ings develops under t%e 42NDI43I2N t%at it is obligator& and rig%t. 3%is conviction is called )O)inio 3uri"* @%en t%ereGs no conviction t%at it is obligator& and rig%t0 t%ereGs onl& a U"a#e. Esage is also a usual course of conduct0 a long7establis%ed wa& of doing t%ings b& /tates. 3o elevate a mere usage into one of a customar& rule of international law0 t%ere must be a degree of constant and uniform repetition over a period of time coupled wit% opinio juris. c. .eneral Princi)le" of Law 7 Principles common to most national s&stems of lawJ rules based on natural 5ustice. ()amplesH good fait%0 estoppel0 e<%austion of local remedies /alonga opines t%at resort is ta(en from general principles of law w%enever no custom or treat& provision is applicable. 3%e idea of )civili'ed nations* was intended to restrict t%e scope of t%e provision to ;uropean /tates0 %owever0 at present t%e term no longer %ave suc% connotation0 t%us t%e term s%ould include all nations. ;<amples of general principles areH estoppel, pacta sunt ser anda, consent, res judicata and prescription? including t%e principles of 5ustice0 eIuit& and peace. !. a. -econdar2 3udicial Deci"ion" 7 a subsidiar& means for t%e determination of rules of law
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,. Per"onalitie" under Law a. /tates b. International 2rgani'ations c. Individuals and 4orporations International
process. 3%e subsidiar& sources of international law are 5udicial decisions0 sub5ect to t%e provisions of :rticle >90 e.g.0 t%e decision in t%e :nglo7Norwegian !is%eries 4ase and Nicaragua v. E/0 and teac%ings of t%e most %ig%l& Iualified publicists of various nations0 e.g.0 Human Rig%ts in International Law b& Lauterpac%t and International Law b& 2ppen%eim7Lauterpac%t. Alternati e A+ Reflecting general international law0 :rticle 8.B,A of t%e /tatute of International 4ourt of +ustice is understood as providing for international convention0 international custom0 and general principles of law as primar& sources of international law0 w%ile indicating t%at 5udicial decisions and teac%ings of t%e most %ig%l& Iualified publicists as )subsidiar& means for t%e determination of t%e rules of law.* 3%e primar& sources ma& be considered as formal sources in t%at t%e& are considered met%ods b& w%ic% norms of international law are created and recogni'ed. : conventional or treat& norm and a customar& norm is t%e product of t%e formation of general practice accepted as law. B& wa& of illustrating international 4onvention as a source of law0 we ma& refer to t%e principle embodied in :rticle F of t%e Dienna 4onvention on t%e Law on 3reaties w%ic% readsH );ver& /tate possesses capacit& to conclude treaties.* It tells us w%at t%e law is and t%e process or met%od b& w%ic% it cam into being. International 4ustom ma& be concretel& illustrated b& pacta sunt ser anda0 a customar& or general norm w%ic% came about t%roug% e<tensive and consistent practice b& a great number of states recogni'ing it as obligator&. 3%e subsidiar& means serves as evidence of law. : decision of t%e International 4ourt of +ustice0 for e<ample0 ma& serve as material evidence confirming or s%owing t%at t%e pro%ibition against t%e use of force is a customar& norm0 as t%e decision of t%e 4ourt %as demonstrated in t%e Nicaragua 4ase. 3%e status of a principle as a norm of international law ma& find evidence in t%e wor(s of %ig%l& Iualified publicists in international law0 suc% as cNair0 Melsen or 2ppen%eim. -. What is /'N&T#NT/ (0&T123 AH 4ustomar& law ma& emerge even wit%in a relati el2 "$ort )eriod of ti&e0 if wit%in t%at period0 /tate Practice %as been uniform and e<tensive. It comes about as a ")ontaneou" acti it2 of a #reat nu&!er of "tate" "u))ortin# a ")ecific line of action.
7entit& t%at %as rig%ts and responsibilities under international law and %aving capacit& to maintain its rig%ts b& bringing international claims0 includesH ,. /tates0 independent and dependentJ 2. 4olonies and dependenciesJ 8. andates and trust territoriesJ =. 3%e DaticanJ >. 3%e Enited NationsJ F. Belligerent 4ommunitiesJ -. International administrative BodiesJ and .. Individuals0 to a certain e<tent. 1. W$o are t$e "u!Fect" of International Law> :. /ub5ects of international law are t%ose recogni'ed as capable of possessing rig%ts and duties and of bringing international claims. ?enerall&0 onl& /tates are recogni'ed to be sub5ects of international law because ofH B,A it possessing rig%ts anc%ored on /tate responsibilit&J and B2A its abilit& to bring fort% claims against ot%er /tates. However0 as will be s%own0 ot%er entities suc% as corporations0 international organi'ations0 and individuals now %ave certain mec%anisms b& w%ic% t%eir claims ma& be broug%t fort% international tribunals or courts. A. -TATE-
1+ W$at i" a "tate> (ow are "tate" cla""ified a" "u!Fect" of international law> A+ : state is a group of people0 more or less numerous0 permanentl& living in a definite territor&0 under an independent government organi'ed for political ends and capable of entering into legal relations wit% ot%er states. 1. W$at i" a -tate> :. :ccording to :rt. , of t%e ontevideo 4onvention0 a state is one wit% t%e following IualificationsH BaA a permanent populationJ BbA defined territor&J BcA governmentJ and BdA capacit& to enter into relations. 1. W$at are t$e "tandard" for eac$ reCui"ite of -tate$ood> BaA Population. no numerical reIuirementJ so long as t%e& are capable of maintaining and governing t%emselves0 a population ma& be %ad. BbA 4efined territory: t%ere is no minimum amount of territor& reIuiredJ so long as t%ere is a place w%ere t%e population could occup& and function in0 a defined territor& is present BcA 5overn ent: t%ere is no specified (ind or t&pe of government reIuiredJ so long as it e<ercises sovereignt& and supremac& wit%in0 a
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ot%er nation %as not e<plicitl& or implicitl& protested certain c%arges. : person w%o %as been broug%t wit%in t%e 5urisdiction of t%e court b& virtue of proceedings under an e<tradition treat&0 can onl& be tried for one of t%e offences described in t%at treat&0 and for t%e offence wit% w%ic% %e is c%arged in t%e proceedings for %is e<tradition0 until a reasonable time and opportunit& %ave been given %im0 after %is release or trial upon suc% c%arge0 to return to t%e countr& from w%ose as&lum %e %ad been forcibl& ta(en under t%ose proceedings. 6Enited /tates v. Rausc%er0 ,,9 E./. =C- BE./. ,..FA9
government is present BdA (apacity to enter into relations: power and rig%t to enter into foreign relations wit%out restraint from anot%er entit&. B. INTERNATIONAL OR.ANIGATION-
1. (ow are International Or#ani4ation" "u!Fect" of international law> :. /ome international organi'ations %ave t%e abilit& to ma(e claims under international law. However0 suc% abilit& is limited b& t%e organi'ationGs c%arter. !or e<ample0 t%e E.N.0 in 3eparations for !njuries Suffered in the Ser ice of the @nited Nations 0 was able to sue for damages caused to an agent t%roug% an international claim. @%ile it does not %ave t%e same rig%ts and duties as /tates0 it %as t%e legal capacit& to do )w%at is necessar&* in t%e e<ercise of its functions and fulfilment of its purposes. B:rt. ,C=0 EN 4%arterA !nternational Arganization ;!A=: :n organi'ation t%at is set up b& treat& among 2 or more states. (stablishment: 3%e constituent document of I2s is a treat&. !or t%is reason0 onl& states are members of I2s. 3%e ob5ect of t%e treat& is to create new sub5ects of law endowed wit% a certain autonom&0 to w%ic% t%e parties entrust t%e tas( of reali'ing common goals. !nternational &ersonality: I2s are %eld to possess international personalit& 13eparations Case:. 3%e c%arter itself mig%t specificall& endow it wit% international personalit&. If it does not0 it ma& be implied b& t%e functions of t%e org. &o$ers and pri ileges: not t%e same as states. 3%e& are limited to t%e constituent instrument t%at created t%em. 3%e& do not li(e states possess a general competence. 3%e& are governed b& t%e 6principle of specialty: t%e& are invested b& t%e /tates w%ic% create t%em wit% powers0 t%e limits of w%ic% are a function of t%e common interests w%ose promotion t%ose /tates entrust to t%em. 3%e powers conferred ma& be b& an e<press statement in t%e constituent instrument or implied from t%at needed to ac%ieve t%eir ob5ectives 1Ad isory Apinion on the @se of Nuclear #eapons:.
Doctrine of /pecialt& is a principle of International law t%at is included in most e<tradition treaties0 w%ereb& a person w%o is e<tradited to a countr& to stand trial for certain criminal offenses ma& be tried onl& for t%ose offenses and not for an& ot%er pre7e<tradition offenses. 2nce t%e as&lum state e<tradites an individual to t%e reIuesting state under t%e terms of an e<tradition treat&0 t%at person can be prosecuted onl& for crimes specified in t%e e<tradition reIuest. 3%is doctrine allows a nation to reIuire t%e reIuesting nation to limit prosecution to declared offenses. E/ courts %ave been divided on allowing standing to assert t%e doctrine w%en t%e
C.
CORPORATION-
1. (ow are Cor)oration" "u!Fect" of international law> :. 4orporations0 in certain instances0 now %ave t%e abilit& to ma(e international claims before tribunals. 3%is is t%e case w%en w%at is entered into is an internationalized contract. @%en suc% contracts are entered into b& corporations0 it acIuires a limited capacit&0 b& invo(ing t%e rig%ts derived from t%e contract. Esuall&0 t%e medium b& w%ic% t%ese corporations ma& enforce t%eir rig%ts is arbitration. D. INDIVIDUAL-
1. (ow do indi idual" !eco&e "u!Fect" of international law> ,. @%ile t%e classical rule states t%at %umans are mere objects of international la$ Bbeneficiaries of rig%ts provided b& instruments suc% as international %uman rig%ts treatiesA0 t%e& are now considered as subjects0 alt%oug% in a limited wa&. :s a sub5ect0 not onl& ma& one bring claims0 %eLs%e also ma& be %eld accountable under international law. In t%e I440 for e<ample0 individuals ma& be tried for t%e commission of t%e core crimes0 w%ic% areH ;a= genocide? ;b= crimes against humanity? ;c= $ar crimes? and ;d= crimes of aggression. Belli#erent Co&&unit2 1 group of rebels under an organi'ed civil government w%o %ave ta(en up arms against legitimate government. @%en recogni'ed0 considered as a separate state for purposes of conflict and entitled to all rig%ts and sub5ected to all obligations of a full7pledged belligerent under laws of war. United Nation" 1 international organi'ation created at /an !rancisco 4onference %eld in t%e E/ from :pril 2> to +une 2F0 ,9=>. EN succeeded t%e League of Nations and is governed b& a c%arter t%at came into force on 2ctober 2=0 ,9=>. 7. -tate a" H"u!Fect"I of International Law a. 4%aracteristics of a /tate b. 4reation and ;<tinction of a /tate c. 4lassifications of /tates
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,. Rig%t to /overeignt& and IndependenceJ 2. Rig%t to Propert& and +urisdictionJ 8. Rig%t to ;<istence and /elf7Defense =. Rig%t to ;Iualit& >. Rig%t to Diplomatic Intercourse -u!Fect Defined : /ub5ect is an entit& t%at %as an international personalit&. :n entit& %as an international personalit& if it can directl& enforce its rig%ts and duties under international law. @%ere t%ere is no direct enforcement of accountabilit& and an intermediate agenc& is needed0 t%e entit& is merel& an ob5ect not a sub5ect of international law. 1+ W$en doe" an entit2 acCuire international )er"onalit2> A+ @%en it %as rig%t and duties under international lawJ can directl& enforce its rig%tsJ and ma& be %eld directl& accountable for its obligations. O!Fect" Defined :n 2b5ect is a person or t%ing in respect of w%ic% rig%ts are %eld and obligations assumed b& t%e /ub5ect. 3%us0 it is not directl& governed b& t%e rules of international law. 3%ere is no direct enforcement and accountabilit&. :n intermediate agenc&Kt%e /ub5ectK is reIuired for t%e en5o&ment of its rig%ts and for t%e disc%arge of its obligations. Di"tinction !etween a "u!Fect and o!Fect of international law ,. -u!Fect 0 :n entit& t%at %as rig%ts and responsibilities under international lawJ it can be a proper part& in transactions involving t%e application of international law among members of t%e international communit&. 2. O!Fect 7 : person or t%ing in respect of w%ic% rig%ts are %eld and obligations assumed b& t%e sub5ectJ it is not directl& governed b& t%e rules of international lawJ its rig%ts are received0 and its responsibilities imposed0 indirectl& t%roug% t%e instrumentalit& of an international agenc&.
NOTE+ ?iven t%e trend in International Law toda&0 wit% t%e birt% of t%e I44 and :rbitration 4ourts0 t%e line between a /ub5ect and 2b5ect of International Law is increasingl& being blurred.
d. Recognition of /tates e. !undamental Rig%ts of a /tate /ub5ect Defined 2b5ect Defined TwoD*E Conce)t" of -u!Fect" of International Law , 3raditional 4oncept 2 4ontemporar& 4oncept -tate a" -u!Fect" of International Law a. C$aracteri"tic"'Ele&ent" of a -tate +.&eople 8.'erritory -.*o ernment aE * Jind" B,ADe +ure B2ADe !acto 1 8 (inds !E * function" B,A4onstituent B2A inistrant cE Effect" of c$an#e in #o ern&ent /. So ereignty aA Minds bA 4%aracteristics cA ;ffects of c%ange in sovereignt& !. Creation and EKtinction of a -tate Principle of /tate 4ontinuit& c. Cla""ification of -tate" d. Reco#nition Level of Recognition A. Reco#nition of -tate 0 * -c$ool" of T$ou#$t a. 4onstitutive /c%ool b. Declarator& /c%ool B.Reco#nition of .o ern&ent a. 4riteria for Recognition ,. 2b5ective 3est 1 2./ub5ective 3est BaA3obarL@ilson Doctrine BbA;strada Doctrine b. Minds of Recognition ,.De +ure 2.De !acto c. 4onseIuences of Recognition of ?overnment C. Reco#nition of Belli#erenc2 a. Belligerenc& b. 2 /enses of Belligerenc& c. ReIuisites of Belligerenc& d. 4onseIuences of Recognition of Belligerents e. !orms of Recognition e. %unda&ental Ri#$t" of -tate"
-UB3ECT- O% INTERNATIONAL LAW Two D*E Conce)t"+ 1. Traditional conce)t 2nl& /tates are considered sub5ects of international law.
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government to ta(e up wit% t%e Hol& /ee t%e validit& of its claims. 2f course0 t%e !oreign 2ffice s%all first ma(e a determination of t%e impact of its espousal on t%e relations between t%e P%ilippine government and t%e Hol& /ee. 2nce t%e P%ilippine government decides to espouse t%e claim0 t%e latter ceases to be a private cause. :ccording to t%e Permanent 4ourt of International +ustice0 t%e forerunner of t%e International 4ourt of +usticeH )B& ta(ing up t%e case of one of its sub5ects and b& resorting to diplomatic action or international NotesH 5udicial proceedings on %is be%alf0 a /tate is in realit& asserting its own rig%ts 1 its rig%t to ensure0 in t%e person of its sub5ects0 respect for t%e rules of international law.* B3%e avrommatis Palestine 4oncessions0 , Hudson0 @orld 4ourt Reports 2980 8C2 6,92=9A BHol& /ee0 3%e v. Rosario0 +r.0 28. /4R: >2=0 >887>8=0 Dec. ,0 ,99=0 ;n Banc 6Quiason9A
*. Conte&)orar2 conce)t Individuals and international organi'ations are also sub5ects because t%e& %ave rig%ts and duties under international law. BLiang vs. People0 ?RN ,2>.F> 62F arc% 2CC,9A T$e -TATE a" "u!Fect of International Law /tate is a communit& of persons more or less numerous0 permanentl& occup&ing a definite portion of territor&0 independent of e<ternal control0 and possessing an organi'ed government to w%ic% t%e great bod& of in%abitants render %abitual obedience. 1+ 3%e +apanese government confirmed t%at during t%e /econd @orld @ar0 !ilipinas were among t%ose conscripted as )comfort women* BprostitutesA for +apanese troops in various parts of :sia. 3%e +apanese government %as accordingl& launc%ed a goodwill campaign and offered t%e P%ilippine government substantial assistance for a program t%at will promote t%roug% government and non7 governmental organi'ation womenGs rig%ts0 c%ild welfare0 nutrition and famil& %ealt% care. :n e<ecutive agreement is about to be signed for t%at purpose. 3%e agreement includes a clause w%ereb& t%e P%ilippine government ac(nowledges t%at an& liabilit& to t%e comfort women or t%eir descendants are deemed covered b& t%e reparations agreements signed and implemented immediatel& after t%e /econd @orld @ar. +ulian Iglesias0 descendant of now deceased comfort woman0 see(s &ou advise on t%e validit& of t%e agreement. :dvise %im. B,992 BarA A+ 3%e agreement is valid. 3%e comfort woman and t%eir descendant cannot assert individual claims against +apan. :s stated in Paris oore v. Reagan0 =>8 E/ F>=0 t%e sovereign aut%orit& of t%e state to settle claims of its nationals against foreign countries %as repeatedl& been recogni'ed. 3%is ma& be made wit%out t%e consent of t%e nationals or even wit%out consultation wit% t%em. /ince t%e continued amit& between t%e /tate and ot%er countries ma& reIuire a satisfactor& compromise of mutual claims0 t%e necessar& power to ma(e suc% compromise %as been recogni'ed. 3%e settlement of suc% claims ma& be made b& e<ecutive agreement. 1+ W$at &u"t a )er"on w$o feel" a##rie ed !2 t$e act" of a forei#n "o erei#n do to e")ou"e $i" cau"e>
HeldH Ender bot% Public International Law and 3ransnational Law0 a person w%o feels aggrieved b& t%e acts of a foreign sovereign can as( %is own government to espouse %is cause t%roug% diplomatic c%annels. Private respondent can as( t%e P%ilippine government0 t%roug% t%e !oreign 2ffice0 to espouse its claims against t%e Hol& /ee. Its first tas( is to persuade t%e P%ilippine
1+ W$at i" t$e "tatu" of an indi idual under )u!lic international law> D16;1 BarE A+ :ccording to Han(s Melson0 )w%ile as a general rule0 international law %as as its sub5ects states and obliges onl& immediatel&0 it e<ceptionall& applies to individuals because it is to man t%at t%e norms of international law appl&0 it is to man w%om t%e& restrain0 it is to man w%o0 international law t%rusts t%e responsibilities of law and order.* 1+ I" t$e Vatican Cit2 a "tate> A+ R;/S (ol2 -ee v. Ro"ario 5.R 1<1676: <1 Dec. 1667=
3%e Lateran 3reat& establis%ed t%e /3:3;H22D of t%e Datican 4it& )for t%e purpose of assuring to t%e Hol& /ee absolute and visible independence and of guaranteeing to it indisputable sovereignt& also in t%e field of international relations*. !rom t%e wordings of t%e Lateran 3reat&0 it is difficult to determine w%et%er t%e state%ood is vested in t%e Hol& /ee or in t%e Datican 4it&. 3%e Datican 4it& fits into none of t%e establis%ed categories of states0 and t%e attribution to it of )sovereignt&* must be made in a sense different from t%at in w%ic% it is applied to ot%er states. 3%e Datican 4it& represents an entit& organi'ed not for political but for ecclesiastical purposes and international ob5ects. Despite its si'e and ob5ect0 it %as an independent government of its own0 wit% t%e Pope0 w%o is also %ead of t%e Roman 4at%olic 4%urc%0 as t%e Hol& /ee or Head of /tate0 in conformit& wit% its traditions0 and t%e demands of its mission. Indeed0 its world7wide interests and activities are suc% as to
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ma(e it in a sense an )international state*. It was noted t%at t%e recognition of t%e Datican 4it& as a state %as significant implication 1 t%at it is possible for an& entit& pursuing ob5ects essentiall& different from t%ose pursued b& states to be invested wit% international personalit&. /ince t%e Pope prefers to conduct foreign relations and enter into transactions as t%e Hol& /ee and not in t%e name of t%e Datican 4it&0 one can conclude t%at in t%e PopePs own view0 it is t%e Hol& /ee t%at is t%e international person. 3%e P%ilippines %as accorded t%e Hol& /ee t%e status of a foreign sovereign. 3%e Hol& /ee0 t%roug% its :mbassador0 t%e Papal Nuncio0 %as %ad diplomatic representations wit% t%e P%ilippine government since ,9>-. 3%is appears to be 2ne aut%orit& wrote t%at t%e recognition of t%e Datican 4it& as a state %as significant implication 7 t%at it is possible for an& entit& pursuing ob5ects essentiall& different from t%ose pursued b& states to be invested wit% international personalit&. Inasmuc% as t%e Pope prefers to conduct foreign relations and enter into transactions as t%e Hol& /ee and not in t%e name of t%e Datican 4it&0 one can conclude t%at in t%e PopePs own view0 it is t%e Hol& /ee t%at is t%e international person. 3%e Republic of t%e P%ilippines %as accorded t%e Hol& /ee t%e status of a foreign sovereign. 3%e Hol& /ee0 t%roug% its :mbassador0 t%e Papal Nuncio0 %as %ad diplomatic representations wit% t%e P%ilippine government since ,9>-. 3%is appears to be t%e universal practice in international relations. BHol& /ee0 3%e v. Rosario0 +r.0 28. /4R: >2=0 >887>8=0 Dec. ,0 ,99=0 ;n Banc 6Quiason9A
1+ W$at i" a "tate> (ow are "tate" cla""ified a" "u!Fect" of international law> A+ : state is a group of people0 more or less numerous0 permanentl& living in a definite territor&0 under an independent government organi'ed for political ends and capable of entering into legal relations wit% ot%er states. "#$#" a. C$aracteri"tic of a -tate ,. Po)ulation ;a permanent population= people7refers to t%e %uman beings living wit% in its territor& 7s%ould be of bot% se<es and sufficient in number to maintain and perpetuate t%emselves 2. Territor2 ;a defined territory= territor&7fi<ed portion of t%e surface of t%e eart% in w%ic% t%e people of t%e state reside 7nomadic tribes and moving states do not possess t%is element 8. .o ern&ent 7 t%e agenc& t%roug% w%ic% t%e will of t%e state is formulated0 e<pressed and reali'ed necessar& in international law because t%e state must %ave an entit& to represent it in its relations wit% ot%er states 7t%e form of government does not matter provided it is able to maintain order wit%in t%e realm and compl& wit% its responsibilities under t%e law of nations. =. -o erei#nt2 7power of t%e state to direct its own e<ternal affairs wit%out interference or dictation from ot%er states
In view of t%e wordings of t%e Lateran 3reat&0 it is difficult to determine w%et%er t%e state%ood is vested in t%e Hol& /ee or in t%e Datican 4it&. /ome writers even suggested t%at t%e treat& created two international persons 7 t%e Hol& /ee and Datican 4it&. 3%e Datican 4it& fits into none of t%e establis%ed categories of states0 and t%e attribution to it of )sovereignt&* must be made in a sense different from t%at in w%ic% it is applied to ot%er states. In a communit& of national states0 t%e Datican 4it& represents an entit& organi'ed not for political but for ecclesiastical purposes and international ob5ects. Despite its si'e and ob5ect0 t%e Datican 4it& %as an independent government of its own0 wit% t%e Pope0 w%o is also %ead of t%e Roman 4at%olic 4%urc%0 as t%e Hol& /ee or Head of /tate0 in conformit& wit% its traditions0 and t%e demands of its mission in t%e world. Indeed0 t%e world7wide interests and activities of t%e Datican 4it& are suc% as to ma(e it in a sense an )international state.*
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a. protectorate7alwa&s retains a greater measure of control over its e<ternal affairs t%an su'eraint& b. -u4eraint27 a nation t%at controls
independence7 is onl& t%e e<ternal manifestation of sovereignt&0 w%ic% also embraces power over internal matters.
7t%e power of t%e state to administer its e<ternal affairs wit%out direction or interference from anot%er state. !. Creation and EKtinction of a -tate
Creation of a -tate 3%e generall& accepted met%ods b& w%ic% t%is status is acIuired areH ,. revolution7 e<. E./. 2. unification7 e<. Ital& 8. secession7 e<. Banglades% =. assertion of independence7 e<. P%ils. >. agreement7 e<. Mingdom of Net%erlands0 Poland F. attainment of civili'ation7 e<. +apan EKtinction of t$e -tate7 possible for it to be e<tinguis%ed or )die* in a legal sense e<ampleH a. Population ma& be completel& wiped out b& an epidemic or a t%ermonuclear e<plosion b. state ma& be merge wit% anot%er state c. territor& is lost because volcanic eruption or ot%er similar disaster. d. ore usual are t%e artificial means0 w%ic% includeH
i. ii. iii. :narc%& 7a state of disorder due to absence or non7 recognition of aut%orit& or ot%er controlling s&stems. ass immigration of t%e population :nne<ation7 If &ouPre a big powerful countr& and &ou want to ta(e over a smaller countr&0 or a piece of it0 &ou can simpl& occup& it wit% &our arm&0 a process (nown as anne)ation. erger or unification Dismemberment Dissolution of a federal union vii. Partial loss of independence0 as in t%e case of su'eraint& and t%e protectorate.
iv. v. vi.
e. %unda&ental Ri#$t" of a -tate" ,. Rig%t of Independence7capacit& of a state to provide for its own well7being and development free from t%e domination of ot%er states0 provided it does not violate t%eir legitimate rig%ts 2. Rig%t of ;Iualit&7refers to eIualit& of legal rig%ts irrespective of t%e si'e or power of t%e states 8. Rig%t of ;<istence and /elf7Defense7t%e most important rig%t and considered t%e most compre%ensive of t%e attributes of t%e state because all its ot%er rig%ts are supposed to flow or be derived from it.
c. Cla""ification of -tate" ,. Inde)endent "tate"7a state w%ic% is not sub5ect to dictation from ot%ers a. "i&)le "tate"7one w%ic% is placed under a single and centrali'ed govt. e<ercising power over bot% its internal and e<ternal affairs li(e P%ils. and Net%erlands b. co&)o"ite "tate"7 consist of 2 or more states0 eac% wit% its own separate govt. but bound under a central aut%orit& e<ercising0 to a greater or less degree0 control over t%eir e<ternal relations 2. De)endent "tate" 3wo B2A ?eneral 4ategoriesH
9. TREATIEa. ReIuisites of a valid treat& b. 4onclusion and ;ntr& into !orce of 3reaties c. Reservations d. 2bservance0 :pplication and Interpretation of 3reaties e. Invalidit&0 3ermination and /uspension of 3reaties
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created b& t%e treat& can %ave t%e effect of creating a universal law in muc% t%e same wa& t%at general practice suffices to create customar& law. a. ReCui"ite" of a alid treat2 ,. Be entered into b& parties wit% t%e treat& ma(ing capacit& 2. 3%roug% t%eir aut%ori'ed representatives 8. @it%out t%e attendance of fraud0 duress0 mista(e or ot%er vice of consent =. 2n an& lawful sub5ect matter >. In accordance wit% t%eir respective constitutional processes !. Conclu"ion and Entr2 into %orce of Treatie" ,. Negotiation 2. /ignature 8. Ratification =. ;<c%ange of t%e Instrument for Ratification :s a rule0 a treat& is onl& binding onl& on t%e contracting parties0 including not onl& t%e original signatories but also t%e ot%er states w%ic% alt%oug% t%e& ma& not %ave participated in t%e negotiation of t%e agreement 0 %ave been allowed b& its terms to sign it later b& a process (nown as accession. Non7parties are usuall& not bound under t%e ma<im pacta nec nocent prosunt. c. Re"er ation" ,. eans a unilateral statement0 %owever p%rased or named0 made b& a /tate0 w%en 2. signing0 ratif&ing0 accepting0 approving or acceding to a treat&0 w%ereb& it purports to e<clude or to modif& t%e legal effect of certain provisions of t%e treat& in t%eir application to t%at /tateJ 8. 3o avoid total re5ection of a treat& t%e ratification is Iualified or conditional =. In w%ic% event t%e same must be accepted b& t%e ot%er part& if t%ese would constitute a modification of t%e original agreement d. O!"er ance: A))lication and Inter)retation of Treatie" Pacta "unt "er anda 1 international agreements must be performed in good fait% : treat& is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legall& binding obligations on t%e parties Re!u" "ic "tanti!u" 1 t%e doctrine constitutes an attempt to formulate a legal principle w%ic% would 5ustif& non7performance of a treat& obligation if t%e condition wit% t%e relation to o
1. W$at are treatie"> :. :rticle 2B,ABaA of t%e ,9F9 Dienna 4onvention on t%e Law of 3reaties provides t%at a treat& is an international agreement conducted between states in written form and governed b& international law0 w%et%er embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and w%atever particular designation t%e& ma& be given. 1+ W$at are t$e function" of treatie"> :. 3%e& are sources of international law0 t%e& serve as t%e c%arter of international organi'ations0 t%e& are used to transfer territor&0 regulate commercial relations0 settle disputes0 protect %uman rig%ts0 guarantee investments0 etc. But a treat& is not t%e onl& means b& w%ic% a state can enter into a legal obligation. 1. W$at are t$e Jind" of treatie"> :. D1E /ultilateral treatie" are t%ose t%at are open to all states of t%e world. 3%e& create norms w%ic% are t%e basis for a general rule of law. 3%e& are eit%er codification treaties or )law7ma(ing treaties* or t%e& ma& %ave t%e c%aracter of bot%. B2A :not%er categor& includes treatie" t$at create a colla!orati e &ec$ani"&. 3%ese can be of universal scope or regional. 3%e& operate t%roug% t%e organs of different states. B8A 3%e largest categor& of treaties are !ilateral treatie". an& of t%ese are in t%e nature of contractual agreements w%ic% create s%ared e<pectations suc% as trade agreements of various forms. 3%e& are sometimes called )contract treaties*. 1. W$at are law0&aJin# treatie"> ,. Law7ma(ing treaties create legal obligations t%e observance of w%ic% does not dissolve t%e treat& obligation. :ccording to cNair0 suc% treaties are in principle binding onl& on parties0 but t%e number of parties0 t%e e<plicit acceptance of rules of law0 and in some cases0 t%e declarator& nature of t%e provisions produce a strong law7creating effect at least as great as t%e general practice considered sufficient to support a customar& rule. 1. W$at i" t$e funda&ental )rinci)le of treat2 law> :. 3reaties are binding upon t%e parties to t%em and must be performed in good fait% 1 pacta sunt ser anda. 3%is principle was reaffirmed in article 2F of t%e D4L3. 1. Do treatie" #i e ri"e to cu"to&ar2 international law> :. It can. @%ile treaties are generall& binding onl& on t%e parties0 t%e number of t%e contracting parties and t%e generalit& of t%e acceptance of specific rules
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4onvention0 a peremptor& norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recogni'ed b& t%e international communit& of /tates as a w%ole as a norm from w%ic% no derogation is permitted and w%ic% can be modified onl& b& a subseIuent norm of general international law %aving t%e same c%aracter. .round" for in alidation of treatie"+ ,.A error of factJ 2.A fraudJ 8.A corruptionJ =.A duressJ >.A violation of jus cogens Btreaties conflicting wit% a peremptor& norm of general international lawA : state can lose t%e rig%t to assert t%e invalidit& of t%e treat& t%ru estoppel0 i.e. if after becoming aware of t%e ground for invalidationH ,.A it e<pressl& agreed t%at t%e treat& is valid0 remains in force or continues in operationJ 2.A b& reason of its conduct0 it ma& be considered as %aving acIuiesced t%e validit& of t%e treat&. : state ma& not plead its municipal law as a ground for invalidating a treat& t%at %as been entered unless t%e violation is manifest Bob5ectivel& evident to an& /tate conducting itself in t%e matter in accordance wit% normal practice and in good fait%A and concerns a rule of its internal law of fundamental importance. TER/INATION 3%e termination of a treat& or t%e wit%drawal of a part& ma& ta(e placeH BaA in conformit& wit% t%e provisions of t%e treat&J or BbA at an& time b& consent of all t%e parties after consultation wit% t%e ot%er contracting /tates. N.B Enless t%e treat& ot%erwise provides0 a multilateral treat& does not terminate b& reason onl& of t%e fact t%at t%e number of t%e parties falls below t%e number necessar& for its entr& into force. : treat& w%ic% contains no provision regarding its termination and w%ic% does not provide for denunciation or wit%drawal is not sub5ect to denunciation or wit%drawal unlessH BaA it is establis%ed t%at t%e parties intended to admit t%e possibilit& of denunciation or wit%drawalJ or BbA a rig%t of denunciation or wit%drawal ma& be implied b& t%e nature of t%e treat&. : part& s%all give not less t%an twelve mont%Gs treat& or is ot%erwise establis%ed t%at suc% was t%e notice of its intention to denounce or wit%draw from a treat&. Ter&ination of Treatie"
w%ic% t%e parties contracted %ave c%anged so materiall& and so e<pectedl& as to create a situation in w%ic% t%e e<action of performance would be unreasonable
3%e basic rule in t%e interpretation of treaties is to give effect to t%e intention of t%e parties 3%e usual canons of statutor& construction are emplo&ed in t%e interpretation of treaties.
;<amplesH
/pecific provisions must be read in t%e lig%t of t%e w%ole instrument and especiall& t%e purposes of t%e treat& @ords are to be given t%eir natural meaning unless a tec%nical sense was intended 0 and0 w%en t%e& %ave different meanings in t%e contracting states0 s%ould be interpreted in accordance wit% t%e usage if t%e state w%ere t%e& are supposed to effect doubts s%ould be resolved against t%e imposition of obligations and in favor of t%e freedom and sovereignt& of t%e contracting parties travau< preparatories
e. In alidit2: Treatie"
Ter&ination
and -u")en"ion
of
INVALIDITL : /tate ma& invo(e an error in a treat& as invalidating its consent to be bound b& t%e treat& if t%e error relates to a fact or situation w%ic% was assumed b& t%at /tate to e<ist at t%e time w%en t%e treat& was concluded and formed an essential basis of its consent to be bound b& t%e treat& If a /tate %as been induced to conclude a treat& b& t%e fraudulent conduct of anot%er negotiating /tate0 t%e /tate ma& invo(e t%e fraud as invalidating its consent to be bound b& t%e treat&. If t%e e<pression of a /tateGs consent to be bound b& a treat& %as been procured t%roug% t%e corruption of its representative directl& or indirectl& b& anot%er negotiating /tate0 t%e /tate ma& invo(e suc% corruption as invalidating its consent to be bound b& t%e treat&. 3%e e<pression of a /tateGs consent to be bound b& a treat& w%ic% %as been procured b& t%e coercion of its representative t%roug% acts or t%reats directed against %im s%all be wit%out an& legal effect. : treat& is void if its conclusion %as been procured b& t%e t%reat or use of force in violation of t%e principles of international law embodied in t%e 4%arter of t%e Enited Nations. : treat& is void if0 at t%e time of its conclusion0 it conflicts wit% a peremptor& norm of general international law. !or t%e purposes of t%e present
Page 19 of 29
was illegal. It as(ed t%e I4+ for an advisor& opinion on t%e legal conseIuences of t%is. (eld+ 2nl& a material breac% Beit%erH ,. a repudiation of t%e treat& not sanctioned b& t%e present 4onventionJ or 2. t%e violation of a provision essential to t%e accomplis%ment of t%e ob5ect and purpose of t%e treat&A 5ustifies termination. Here0 bot% forms of material breac% %ad occurred. 3%e& are e<ercising t%e rig%t to terminate a relations%ip in case of a deliberate and persistent violation of obligations w%ic% destro&s t%e ver& ob5ect and purpose of t%at relations%ip. 3%e silence of a treat& as to t%e e<istence of suc% rig%t cannot be interpreted as impl&ing t%e e<clusion t%ereof. 3o sa& t%at t%e power of revocation to t%e andate could not %ave been e<ercised unilaterall& but onl& in cooperation wit% /out% :frica would postulate an impossibilit&. !or obvious reasons0 t%e consent of t%e wrongdoers to suc% a form of termination cannot be reIuired.
: treat& ma& be terminated or suspended accdg to t%e terms of t%e treat& or wit% t%e consent of t%e parties. : treat& wit% a definite period ma& also e<pire. It ma& also end w%en t%e purpose of t%e treat& %as alread& been ac%ieved. But a mere c%ange of government or severance of diplomatic relations does not terminate or suspend a treat&. 3%ree ot%er impt modes of terminating a treat&H ,.A Material breachJ a.A a repudiation of t%e treat& not sanctioned b& t%e present 4onventionJ b.A violation of a provision essential to t%e accomplis%ment of t%e ob5ect or purpose of t%e treat&. 8.= Super ening impossibility of performance 1 if t%e impossibilit& results from t%e permanent disappearance or destruction of an ob5ect indispensable for t%e e<ecution of t%e treat& Bif merel& temporar&0 can onl& suspendA. 3%is canGt be invo(ed if t%e impossibilit& arises as a result of a breac% b& t%at part&. 8.A Change of fundamental conditions not foreseen ;rebus sic stantibus= ifH a.A 3%e e<istence of t%ose circumstances constituted an essential basis of t%e consent of t%e parties to be bound b& t%e treat&J and b.A 3%e effect of t%e c%ange if radicall& to transform t%e e<tent of obligations still to be performed under t%e treat&. 3%is canGt be invo(ed in boundar& treaties. Plus0 t%e c%anges must %ave increased t%e burden of t%e obligations to t%e e<tent of rendering performance somet%ing essentiall& diff from t%e orig intention 1Cisheries 2urisdiction Case.: 7isheries )urisdiction (ase *08 v! 'celand+
Iceland claims t%at its agreement wit% t%e EM not to e<tend its fis%eries 5urisdiction was no longer binding due to fundamental c%ange of circumstances. (eld+ !or t%is to be a ground for invo(ing t%e termination of a treat&0 it s%ould %ave resulted in a radical transformation of t%e e<tent of t%e obligations still to be performed. 'he change must ha e increased the burden of the obligations to be e)ecuted to the e)tent of rendering the performance something essentially different from that originally undertaDen. 3%is is not t%e case %ere0 Iceland cannot validl& invo(e rebus sic stantibus in claiming t%e termination of t%e treat&.
4anu9e 4a
Hungar& and 4'ec%oslova(ia entered into a treat& to facilitate t%e construction of dams on t%e Danube. Hungar& later suspended wor(s due to environmental concerns in response to w%ic% 4'ec%oslova(ia carried out unilateral measures. Hungar& claims t%e rig%t to terminate t%e treat& since 4'ec%oslova(ia violated t%e 3reat& b& underta(ing unilateral measures. (eld+ /tate of necessit& not a ground for termination. It can onl& be invo(ed to e<onerate. Impossibilit& of performance cannot be invo(ed eit%er since t%is was due to Hungar&Gs non7performance of certain responsibilities and impossibilit& cannot be invo(ed w%en it results from t%at part&Gs own breac% of an obligation flowing from t%at treat&.
!undamental c%ange of circumstances cannot be invo(ed eit%er because t%e& were not of suc% nature t%at t%eir effect would radicall& transform t%e e<tent of t%e obligations still to be performed. : fundamental c%ange in circumstances must %ave been unforeseenJ t%e e<istence of t%e circumstances must %ave constituted an essential basis of t%e consent of t%e parties to be bound b& t%e treat&. It is onl& a material breac% of t%e treat& itself0 and not of ot%er treat& rules or rules of general international law0 w%ic% is a ground for termination. 4'ec%oslova(ia did not act unlawfull&. 3%e notification of termination b& Hungar& was premature. &rocedure for the 'ermination of 'reaties ,.A Notif& ot%er parties Bin writing and signed b& one wit% full powersA of claim0 measure proposed and reasons t%erefor.
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treaty i plied 9y conclusion of a later treaty ,. : treat& s%all be considered as terminated if all t%e parties to it conclude a later treat& relating to t%e same sub5ect matter andH a. it appears from t%e later treat& or is ot%erwise establis%ed t%at t%e parties intended t%at t%e matter s%ould be governed b& t%at treat&J or b. t%e provisions of t%e later treat& are so far incompatible wit% t%ose of t%e earlier one t%at t%e two treaties are not capable of being applied at t%e same time. 2. 3%e earlier treat& s%all be considered as onl& suspended in operation if it appears from t%e later intention of t%e parties. Ter ination or suspension of the operation of a treaty as a conse;uence of its 9reach ,. : material breac% of a bilateral treat& b& one of t%e parties entitles t%e ot%er to invo(e t%e breac% as a ground for terminating t%e treat& or suspending its operation in w%ole or in part. 2. : material breac% of a multilateral treat& b& one of t%e parties entitlesH a. t%e ot%er parties b& unanimous agreement to suspend t%e operation of t%e treat& in w%ole or in part or to terminate it eit%erH i. in t%e relations between t%emselves and t%e defaulting /tateJ or ii. as between all t%e partiesJ b. a part& speciall& affected b& t%e breac% to invo(e it as a ground for suspending t%e operation of t%e treat& in w%ole or in part in t%e relations between itself and t%e defaulting /tateJ c. an& part& ot%er t%an t%e defaulting /tate to invo(e t%e breac% as a ground for suspending t%e operation of t%e treat& in w%ole or in part wit% respect to itself if t%e treat& is of suc% a c%aracter t%at a material breac% of its provisions b& one part& radicall& c%anges t%e position of ever& part& wit% respect to t%e furt%er performance of its obligations under t%e treat&. 8. : material breac% of a treat&0 for t%e purposes of t%is article0 consists inH BaA a repudiation of t%e treat& not sanctioned b& t%e present 4onventionJ or BbA t%e violation of a provision essential to t%e accomplis%ment of t%e ob5ect or purpose of t%e treat&. =. 3%e foregoing paragrap%s are wit%out pre5udice to an& provision in t%e treat& applicable in t%e event of a breac%. >. Paragrap%s , to 8 do not appl& to provisions relating to t%e protection of t%e %uman person contained in treaties of a %umanitarian c%aracter0 in
2.A If no ob5ection %ad been raised wit%in t%e period Bnot less t%an 8 mont%sA0 t%e& ma& carr& out t%e measures proposed. 8.A If ob5ection %as been raised0 t%e& s%all see( a solution. =.A If no solution %as been reac%ed wit%in ,2 mont%sH a.A submit to I4+0 b.A submit to arbitration0 or c.A reIuest /ec ?en of t%e EN for procedure specified in :nne< of 4onvention. T notification can be revo(ed an& time before it ta(es effect. #uthority to Ter inate Logicall&0 aut%orit& to terminate s%ould also belong to t%e one w%o %as t%e aut%orit& to enter into t%e treat&. However0 in t%e P%ils.0 t%e aut%orit& to conclude treaties is s%ared between t%e /enate and t%e President. -ucce""ion to Treatie" @%en one state ceases to e<ist and is succeeded b& anot%er on t%e same territor&0 t%e Eclean slateF rule applies and t%e new state is not bound b& t%e commitments of t%e predecessor unless t%e& agree to be bound t%ereto. 3%e clean slate rule does not appl& to treaties affecting boundar& regimes or ot%er territor& regimes. -U-PEN-ION 3%e operation of a treat& in regard to all t%e parties or to a particular part& ma& be suspendedH BaA in conformit& wit% t%e provisions of t%e treat&J or BbA at an& time b& consent of all t%e parties after consultation wit% t%e ot%er contracting /tates. Two or ore parties to a ultilateral treaty ay conclude an agree ent to suspend the operation of provisions of the treaty, te porarily and as 9etween the selves alone, if. BaA t%e possibilit& of suc% a suspension is provided for b& t%e treat&J or BbA t%e suspension in Iuestion is not pro%ibited b& t%e treat& andH BiA does not affect t%e en5o&ment b& t%e ot%er parties of t%eir rig%ts under t%e treat& or t%e performance of t%eir obligationsJ BiiA is not incompatible wit% t%e ob5ect and purpose of t%e treat& Enless in a case falling under BaA0 t%e treat& ot%erwise provides0 t%e parties in Iuestion s%all notif& t%e ot%er parties of t%eir intention to conclude t%e agreement and of t%ose provisions of t%e treat& t%e operation of w%ic% t%e& intend to suspend. Ter ination or suspension of the operation of a
Page 1A of 29
:n act relating to t%e conclusion of a treat& b& one w%o %as no proper aut%ori'ation %as no legal effect unless confirmed b& %is state. Negotiation is usually done by someone already in the foreign country ;in the &hil. (mbassy= due to lacD of funds to send. 'he DCA designates $ho the rep. is going to be. : person is considered to be representing t%e /tate w%enH ,.A He produces appropriate full powersJ or 2.A It appears from t%e practice of t%e /tates concerned or from ot%er circumstances t%at t%eir intention was to consider t%at person as representing t%e /tate for suc% purposes and to dispense wit% full powers. 3%ese ma& be t%e followingH ,.A Heads of /tate0 Heads of ?ovt and inisters for !oreign :ffairsJ 2.A Heads of diplomatic missionsJ 8.A Representatives accredited b& /tates. Authentication of 'e)t Negotiations conclude wit% t%e signing of t%e document. 3%e signatures serve as aut%entication of t%e document. :doption of t%e te<t ta(es place wit% t%e consent of all t%e /tates or0 in t%e case of international conferences0 b& t%e vote of 2L8 of t%e /tates present and voting0 unless b& 2L8 vote0 t%e& decide on anot%er rule. Consent to be Hound 2nce t%e document %as been signed0 t%ere are stages w%ic% follow w%ic% culminate in ma(ing t%e document binding. 3%e most important step is t%e consent to be bound. 3%e manner of ratification differs from state to state. Between signature and ratification a state is reIuired not to engage in acts w%ic% can defeat t%e purpose of t%e treat&. Ratification is ne<t followed b& eit%er e<c%ange of ratification0 in bilateral treaties0 or in multilateral treaties0 deposit of ratification. !f there is no deposit $ith the Affice of the @N Sec*en, it cannot be in oDed in case of contro ersy bet$een the parties. Accession to a 'reaty /tates w%ic% did not participate in t%e initial negotiation ma& also e<press t%eir consent to be bound b& )accession.*
particular to provisions pro%ibiting an& form of reprisals against persons protected b& suc% treaties. CONTINUATION O% TREATIE- %RO/ REVIEWERI :n international agreement concluded between states in written form and governed b& international law w%et%er embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments BGienna Con ention on the "a$ of 'reaties, ,9F9A ReCui"ite"+ B-CRADE ,. ;ntered into b& parties %aving treat&7ma(ing capacit&J 2. 3%roug% t%eir aut%ori'ed organs or representativesJ 8. @it%out attendance of duress0 fraud0 mista(e or ot%er vices of consentJ =. Lawful "ub5ect matter and ob5ectJ and >. Ratification in accordance wit% t%eir respective constitutional processes. Effect of Unwritten Treat2 ,. %as legal forceJ 2. convention rules on matters governed b& international law independentl& of convention s%all appl&J and 8. convention rules appl& to t%e relations of states as between t%emselves under international agreement wit% ot%er sub5ects as parties. -te)" in Treat20&aJin# Proce"". ,. NegotiationJ 2. /ignatureJ 8. RatificationJ =. ;<c%ange of instruments of ratificationJ and >. Registration wit% EN. T$e /aJin# of Treatie" Steps: ,.A NegotiationJ 2.A :doption of te<t BconsentL2L8 voteAJ 8.A :ut%entication of te<t BsigningAJ =.A 4onsent to be bound Be.g. ratificationAJ >.A ;<c%ange or depositJ F.A ;ntr& into force of treaties. Negotiation +.= Hilateral I Multilateral among small J: originate from t%e foreign ministries 8.= "arge Multilateral: negotiated in diplomatic conferences w%ic% are run li(e a legislative bod&. &o$er to Negotiate
Page 1; of 29
: treat& is binding upon eac% part& in respect of its entire territor& unless a different intention appears. !nterpretation of 'reaties 3%e interpretation of treaties combines several approac%esH ,.A 2b5ective approac%H interpretation accdg to t%e ordinar& meaning of t%e wordsJ 2.A 3eleological approac%H interpretation accdg to t%e purpose of t%e treat&J and 8.A /ub5ective approac%H %onors special meaning given b& t%e parties. @%ere t%ere are ambiguities in t%e meaning of a treat&0 resort ma& be made as to supplementar& sources0 e.g.H ,.A preparator& wor(J 2.A circumstances of its conclusion. @%en t%e interpretation of treaties is in 2 or more languages and t%ere is a conflict among official te<tsH ,.A t%e language t%at is agreed upon b& t%e parties s%all prevailJ if none 2.A eac% is eIuall& aut%oritative and w%en compared to eac% ot%er0 t%e meaning w%ic% best reconciles t%e te<ts in lig%t of t%e ob5ect or purpose of t%e treat& s%all be adopted. Doctrine of UneCual Treatie" 1 treaties w%ic% %ave been imposed in an uneIual c%aracter0 are void. )us (ogens 1 customar& international law t%at %as attained t%e status of a peremptor& norm0 accepted and recogni'ed b& t%e international communit& of states as a rule from w%ic% no derogation is permitted and can be modified onl& b& a subseIuent norm %aving t%e same c%aracter. e.g customs out7lawing slave trade0 genocide0 terrorism0 etc. Concordat 1 a treat& or agreement between ecclesiastical and civil powers to regulate t%e relations between t%e c%urc% and t%e state in t%ose matters w%ic%0 in some respect are under t%e 5urisdiction of bot%. Pacta &unt &ervanda 1 );ver& treat& in force is binding upon t%e parties to it and must be performed b& t%em in good fait%.* B Art. 85, Gienna Con ention on the "a$ of 'reaties=. <e9us &ic &tanti9us 1 legal principle w%ic% would 5ustif& non7performance of treat& obligations w%ere an unforeseen or substantial c%anges occur w%ic% would render one of t%e parties t%ereto unable to underta(e treat& obligations as stipulated t%erein. /o"t %a ored Nation Clau"e 1 pledge made b& a contracting part& to a treat& to grant to ot%er part&
3eser ations: )a unilateral statement0 %owever p%rased or named0 made b& a /tate0 w%en signing0 ratif&ing0 accepting0 approving or acceding to a treat&0 w%ereb& it purports to e)clude or modify t%e legal effect of certain provisions of t%e treat& in t%eir application to t%at /tate.* 3%e& are different from )interpretative declarations* w%ic% are not meant to be a derogation from t%e treat& but an e<pression of %ow a state understands its adoption of a treat&. 3%ese are allowed in deference to t%e sovereignt& of states e<cept in t%e ff casesH ,.A 3reat& pro%ibits itJ 2.A 3reat& provides onl& for certain specified reservations to w%ic% it is not includedJ 8.A Reservation is incompatible wit% t%e ob5ect and purpose of t%e treat&. : proliferation of reservations in multilateral treaties can defeat t%e purpose of a treat&. In bilateral treaties0 a reservation b& one part& means a re5ection of t%e treat& and necessitates renegotiation. 3eser ations, therefore, are meant only for multilateral treaties. : reservation need not be consented b& all parties for it to be effective. : state can be regarded as a part& if t%e reservation is not incompatible wit% t%e ob5ect and purpose of t%e 4onvention and t%e I4+ %as %eld t%at compatibilit& could be decided b& states individuall& since if a part& ob5ects0 t%e& can consider t%e state as not a part& to t%e 4onvention. 3%us0 it is possible for different legal relations%ips to arise among parties to t%e same treat&. (ntry into Corce of 'reaties 3reaties enter into force on t%e date agreed upon b& t%e parties. @%ere no date is indicated0 t%e treat& enters into force once consent %as been given. ultilateral treaties generall& contain a provision w%ic% sa&s %ow man& states %ave to accept t%e treat& before it can come into force. 3reaties can also be put into effect provisionall&.
Application of 'reaties ;ver& treat& in force is binding upon t%e parties to it and must be performed b& t%em in good fait% under t%e fundamental rule of pacta sunt ser anda. : part& ma& not invo(e a provision of its internal law as 5ustification for its failure to perform a treat&.
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provisions of t%e 4onvention ma& be regarded as reflective of customar& international law0 suc% as t%e rules on interpretation0 material breac% and fundamental c%ange of circumstances. 2t%ers ma& not be so regarded0 and constitute principles binding onl& upon state parties. 1. W$at are t$e "te)" in t$e creation of treatie"> :. Negotiation0 aut%entication of te<t0 consent to be bound0 entr& into force. 1. W$at do ne#otiation" in ol e> :. Negotiation is done t%roug% foreign ministries. Larger multilateral treaties are negotiated in diplomatic conferences. Negotiators must possess powers to negotiate. :n act relating to t%e conclusion of a treat& b& one w%o %as no proper aut%ori'ation %as no legal effect unless confirmed b& %is state. 1. W$o $a" )ower" to ne#otiate> :. : person is considered as a representative of a /tate if %e BaA produces appropriate full powers or BbA it appears from t%e practice of t%e /tates concerned or from ot%er circumstances t%at t%eir intention was to consider t%at person as representing t%e /tate. B:rticle -A. 1. W$o are con"idered a" re)re"entati e" of a -tate> :. 3%e following are considered as representing t%eir /tate0 wit%out %aving to produce full powersH BaA Heads of /tate0 Heads of ?overnment and inisters for !oreign :ffairs0 for t%e purpose of performing all acts relating to t%e conclusion of a treat&J BbA %eads of diplomatic missions0 for t%e purpose of adopting t%e te<t of a treat& between t%e accrediting /tate and t%e /tate to w%ic% t%e& are accreditedJ BcA representatives accredited b& /tate to an international conference or to an international organi'ation or one of its organs0 for t%e purpose of adopting t%e te<t of a treat& in t%at conference0 organi'ation or organ. 1. W$en do ne#otiation" end> :. It concludes wit% t%e signing of t%e document. :rticle 9 provides t%at t%e adoption of t%e te<t of a treat& at an international conference ta(es place b& t%e vote of two7t%irds of t%e /tates present and voting0 unless b& t%e same ma5orit& t%e& s%all decided to appl& a different rule. 3%e signatures can serve as aut%entication of t%e document. 1. (ow doe" a -tate eK)re"" it" con"ent to !e !ound> :. :rticle ,, provides t%e various wa&s b& w%ic% consent to be bound is e<pressed. 3%ese areH b& signature0 e<c%ange of instruments constituting a treat&0 ratification0 acceptance0 approval or accession0 or b& an& ot%er means if so agreed.
treatment not less favorable t%an t%at w%ic% %ad been given or ma& be granted to t%e most favored among parties. Inter)retation of Treatie" ,. !ounding !at%er 3estJ 2. Literal or te<tualJ 8. )3eleological aims and ob5ects* sc%ool .round" for Ter&ination of Treat2 DNEW DEVIL BmadeA VITALE ACCO/PLI-(/ENT ,. e<piration of termJ 2. accomplis%ment of purposeJ 8. impossibilit& of performanceJ =. loss of sub5ect matterJ >. novationJ F. desistance of partiesJ -. e<tinction of one of parties0 if treat& is bipartiteJ .. occurrence of ital c%ange of circumstanceJ 9. outbrea( of warJ and ,C. oidance of treat&. Protocol de cloture ? an instrument w%ic% records t%e winding up of t%e proceedings of a diplomatic conference and usuall& includes a reproduction of t%e te<ts of treaties0 conventions0 recommendations and ot%er acts agreed upon and signed b& t%e plenipotentiaries attending t%e conference. It is not t%e treat& itself and does not reIuire t%e concurrence of t%e /enate. B'aKada . Angara, 2-2 /4R: ,.A. A. VIENNA LAW O% TREATIECONVENTION ON T(E
W$at i" t$e "co)e of t$e VCLT> It covers treaties between and among states. It e<cludes agreements involving international organi'ations. It also does not cover agreements between states w%ic% are to be governed b& municipal law. 1. Do oral treatie" co&e under t$e )ro i"ion" of t$e Vienna Con ention on t$e Law of treatie"> :. No. @%ile no particular form is prescribed0 t%e definition found in :rticle 2 of t%e 4onvention e<plicitl& states t%at a treat& is an agreement in written from. 3%ere are no specific reIuirements of form in international law for t%e e<istence of a treat&0 alt%oug% it is essential t%at t%e parties intend to create legal relations as between t%emselves b& means of t%eir agreement. 1. Doe" t$e 1686 VCLT con"titute cu"to&ar2 law> :. 3%e ,9F9 Dienna 4onvention on t%e Law of 3reaties partl& reflects customar& law. 4ertain
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treat&.
1. (ow doe" t$e P$ili))ine" ratif2 a treat2> :. :rticle DII0 /ection 2, of t%e 4onstitution provides t%at no treat& or international agreement s%all be valid and effective unless concurred in b& at least 2L8 of all t%e embers of t%e /enate. 1. W$at are re"er ation"> :. :rticle 2 defines reservations as a unilateral statement0 %owever p%rased or named0 made b& a /tate0 w%en signing0 ratif&ing0 accepting0 approving or acceding to a treat&0 w%ereb& it purports to e<clude or to modif& t%e legal effect of certain provisions of t%e treat& in t%eir application to t%at /tate. 1. /u"t a re"er ation !e con"ented to !2 all )artie" for it to !e effecti e> :. Reservations to t%e ?enocide 4onvention BI4+ Reports ,9>,A states t%at a state w%ic% %as made and maintained a reservation w%ic% %as been ob5ected to b& one or more parties to t%e 4onvention but not b& ot%ers0 can be regarded as a part& to t%e 4onvention if t%e reservation is compatible wit% t%e ob5ect and purpose of t%e 4onvention. 3%e 4ourt added t%at compatibilit& could be decided b& states individuall& since if a part& to t%e 4onvention ob5ects to a reservation w%ic% it considers incompatible wit% t%e ob5ect and purpose of t%e 4onvention0 it can consider t%at t%e reserving state is not a part& to t%e 4onvention. Ender t%is view0 it is possible for different legal relations%ips to arise among parties to t%e same treat&. 1. W$en do treatie" enter into force> :. 3reaties enter into force on t%e date agreed upon b& t%e parties. @%ere no date is indicated0 t%e treat& enters into force once consent %as been given. ultilteral treaties generall& contain a provision w%ic% sa&s %ow man& states %ave to accept t%e treat& before it can come into force. 1. (ow are treatie" inter)reted> Q. 3reaties are interpreted according to t%e ordinar& meaning of t%e words. @%ere t%ere are ambiguities in t%e meaning of a treat&0 resort ma& be made to supplementar& sources. B:rt 8,A 3%us0 t%e purpose of t%e treat&0 and t%e special meaning given b& t%e parties ma& be appreciated. In case t%ere is conflict among )official te<ts*0 t%e language t%at is agreed b& t%e parties as aut%oritative is followed. 1. W$at are t$e #round" t$at would &aJe a treat2 in alid> :. ;rror of fact0 fraud0 corruption of a representative of a /tate0 coercion of a /tate b& t%e t%reat or use of force. oreover0 a violation of jus cogens invalidates a
1. W$at i" t$e difference !etween a&end&ent and &odification of treatie"> :. :mendment is a formal revision done wit% t%e participation0 at least in its initial stage0 b& all t%e parties to t%e treat&. odification involves onl& some of t%e parties. 1. (ow are treatie" ter&inated> :. 3%e following are wa&s in w%ic% a treat& ma& be terminatedH B,A e<piration of a period B2A consent of all parties B8A accomplis%ment of t%e purpose B=A material breac% Brepudiation not sancioned b& t%e present 4onventionA B>A impossibilit& of performance Brebus sic stantibusA. 1. W$en one "tate cea"e" to eKi"t and i" "ucceeded !2 anot$er on t$e "a&e territor2: i" t$e new "tate !ound !2 t$e co&&it&ent" &ade !2 it" )redece""or> :. :rticle ,F of t%e ,9-. Dienna 4onvention on t%e /uccession of /tates wit% Respect to 3reaties 1 : newl& independent /tate is not bound to maintain in force0 or to become a part& to0 an& treat& b& reason onl& of t%e fact t%at at t%e date of t%e succession of /tates t%e treat& was in force in respect of t%e of t%e territor& to w%ic% t%e succession of /tates relates. Validit2 of t$e BaliJatan EKerci"e"
7 3%e D!: permits Enited /tates personnel to engage0 on an impermanent basis0 in Nactivities0N t%e e<act meaning of w%ic% was left undefined. 3%e e<pression is ambiguous0 permitting a wide scope of underta(ings sub5ect onl& to t%e approval of t%e P%ilippine government. :fter studied reflection0 it appeared farfetc%ed t%at t%e ambiguit& surrounding t%e meaning of t%e word NactivitiesN arose from accident. In our view0 it was deliberatel& made t%at wa& to give bot% parties a certain leewa& in negotiation. In t%is manner0 visiting E/ forces ma& so5ourn in P%ilippine territor& for purposes ot%er t%an militar&. :s conceived0 t%e 5oint e<ercises ma& include training on new tec%niIues of patrol and surveillance to protect t%e nationPs marine resources0 sea searc%7and7 rescue operations to assist vessels in distress0 disaster relief operations0 civic action pro5ects suc% as t%e building of sc%ool%ouses0 medical and %umanitarian missions0 and t%e li(e BLim vs. Honorable ;<ecutive /ecretar&0 ?.R. No. ,>,==>0 :pril ,,0 2CC2A. TREATL Basic political issuesJ c%anges of national policies 2. Permanent International :greements ,. A.REE/ENT ,. :d5ustment of details carr&ing out establis%ed national policies 2. 3emporar& :rrangements
8. T(E UNITED NATIONa. Historical Bac(ground b. Purpose and Principles :dvocated c. embers%ip d. Principal 2rgans
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e. Privileges and Immunities f. Role of EN in International Peace and /ecurit& "#$#" a. (i"torical BacJ#round It is an international organi'ation created at t%e /an !rancisco 4onference w%ic% was %eld in t%e Enited /tates from :pril 2> to +une 2F0 ,9=>. 3%e E.N.0 as it is commonl& called0 succeeded t%e League of Nations and is governed b& a 4%arter w%ic% came into force on 2ctober 2=0 ,9=>. composed originall& of onl& >, members0 t%e EN %as grown rapidl& to include most of t%e states in t%e world. W$o wa" t$e ad ocate of for&in# t$e UN> In %is famous !ourteen Points for t%e peace settlement0 @oodrow @ilson called for t%e establis%ment of a )general association of nations for world peace under specific covenants for mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrit& to large and small /tates ali(e.* :nd so0 t%e League of Nations was formed. W$o coined t$e na&e UN> It was President Roosevelt w%o suggested earl& in ,9=2 t%e name EN for t%e group of countries w%ic% were fig%ting t%e :<is powers. !. Pur)o"e and Princi)le" Ad ocated W$at are t$e )rinci)al )ur)o"e" of t$e UN> ,. 3o maintain international peace and securit& 2. 3o develop friendl& relations among nations 8. 3o ac%ieve international cooperation in solving international economic0 social0 cultural and %umanitarian problems =. 3o promote respect for %uman rig%ts >. 3o be a center of %armoni'ing t%e actions of nations towards t%ose common goals. W$at are t$e )rinci)le" of t$e UN> ,. :ll its members are eIual and all are committed to fulfill in good fait% t%eir obligations under t%e 4%arter 2. 3o settle t%eir disputes wit% eac% ot%er b& peaceful means 8. 3o refrain form t%e t%reat or use of force in t%eir international relations =. 3o refrain from assisting an& /tate against w%ic% t%e EN is ta(ing preventive or enforcement action. c. /e&!er"$i) * Bind" of /e&!er"$i) a. 2riginal b. ;lective 1 t%ose subseIuentl& admitted upon t%e recommendation of t%e EN /ecurit& 4ouncil.
1ualification" for /e&!er"$i) a. ust be /tate b. ust be Peace7loving c. ust accept t%e obligations as member d. In t%e 5udgment of t%e 2rgani'ation0 be able and willing to carr& out suc% obligation. (ow i" Ad&i""ion conducted> ,. Recommendation of a Iualified ma5orit& in t%e /ecurit& 4ouncil 7 3%e affirmative vote of at least 9 members including t%e Big >. 2. :pproval of t%e ?eneral :ssembl& B?:A b& a vote of at least 2L8 of t%ose present and voting. NoteH Bot% /4 and ?: votes must be complied wit%. -u")en"ion of /e&!er"$i) /uspension ma& occur w%en a preventive or enforcement action %as been ta(en b& t%e /4. 3%e /4 ma&0 b& a Iualified ma5orit&0 recommend suspension to t%e ?: w%o s%all in turn concur wit% a 2L8 vote of t%ose present and voting. Discipline does not suspend t%e memberGs obligations but onl& t%e e<ercise of its rig%ts and privileges as a member. 2nl& t%e /4 ma& lift t%e suspension b& a Iualified ma5orit&. EK)ul"ion of a /e&!er 3%e penalt& of e<pulsion ma& be imposed upon a member w%ic% %as persistentl& violated t%e principles in t%e EN 4%arter. /ame voting reIuirement as to suspension. @it%drawal of embers%ip 1 Indonesia 4ase
3%e 4%arter is silent regarding wit%drawal of members%ip. In ,9.>0 Indonesia wit%drew its members%ip from t%e EN and it was not compelled to remain. /ubseIuentl&0 upon President /u(arnoGs overt%row0 Indonesia resumed its members%ip0 w%ic% was accepted b& t%e EN. d. T$e Princi)al Or#an" ,. ?eneral :ssembl& B?:A 2. /ecurit& 4ouncil B/4A 8. ;conomic and /ocial 4ouncil B;/4A =. 3rustees%ip 4ouncil B34A >. International 4ourt of +ustice BI4+A F. /ecretariat
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concerningH i. 3%e interpretation of a treat&J ii. :n& Iuestion of international law iii. ;<istence of an& fact w%ic%0 if establis%ed0 would constitute breac% of international obligationJ and iv. Nature or e<tent of reparation to be made for breac% of international obligation. b. 3%e I4+ ma& give ad i"or2 o)inion on an& legal Iuestion at t%e reIuest of w%atever bod& ma& be aut%ori'ed b& or in accordance wit% t%e 4%arter of t%e Enited Nations to ma(e suc% a reIuest. c. -tare Deci"i" does not appl& to t%e I4+. Ender t%e statute of t%e 4ourt0 previous decisions %ave no binding forceJ in practice0 %owever0 t%e 4ourt alwa&s ta(es past decisions into account. -. What does it ean to decide a case >? #>-01 >T ,1N13 :H It is to rule in 5ustice and fairness0 eIuit& overrides all ot%er rules of law. 3%e I4+ %as no power to decide a case e) aeBuo et bono0 unless all parties agree t%ereto 6art. 8.B2A0 I4+ /tatute9. -. Who has standing 9efore the '()3 #H 2nl& /tates ma& be parties in contentious proceedings before t%e I4+ Bart 8=0 I4+ /tatuteA. I&&unit2 of t$e United Nation" is spelled out b& :rt. ,C> of t%e EN 4%arter and supplemented b& t%e ?eneral 4onvention on t%e Privileges and Immunities of t%e Enited Nations and t%e 4onvention and Privileges of /peciali'ed :gencies. I&&unit2 of international or#ani4ation" comes from t%e conventional instrument creating t%em a clear e<ample of t%e grant of immunit& creating t%em. 3%eir immunit& is not based on sovereignt& but on t%e need for t%e effective e<ercise of t%eir functions. -u!"idiar2 Or#an" 1 t%ose w%ic% was created b& t%e 4%arter itself or w%ic% it allows to be created w%enever necessar& b& t%e /4 or ?:. ,. Little :ssembl& 1 Interim 4ommittee0 created in ,9=- for a term of one e&ar and re7establis%ed in ,9=9 for an indefinite term. 4omposed of one delegate for eac% member7state0 it meets w%en t%e ?eneral :ssembl& is in recess and assists t%is bod& in t%e performance of its functions. 2. ilitar& /taff 4ommittee 8. Human Rig%ts 4ommission
a.
.eneral A""e&!l2 i. Composition: :ll members of t%e EN Bas of ,99FH ,.> member /tatesA ii. Cunction. 3%e ?: ma& discuss an& Iuestion or matter wit%in t%e scope of t%e 4%arter or relating to t%e powers and functions of an& ot%er organ. It is also vested wit% 5urisdiction over matters concerning internal mac%iner& and operations of t%e EN. -ecurit2 Council i. Composition: ,> membersH > Permanent embers B4%ina0 !rance0 EM0 E/0 RussiaA ,C non7permanentH elected for 2 &ear terms b& t%e ?eneral :ssembl& ii. Cunction. t%e maintenance of international peace and securit&.
!.
-. What is the =dou9le veto=3 #. In all non>procedural matters0 eac% permanent member is given a P etoP 7 a /ecurit& 4ouncil decision is ineffective if even one permanent member votes against it. 3%e veto does not ordinaril& appl& to procedural matters. However0 a permanent member ma& e<ercise a Pdouble etoP w%en it vetoes an& attempt to treat a Iuestion as procedural0 and t%en proceed to veto an& draft resolution dealing wit% t%at Iuestion. c. -ecretariat 1 4%ief :dministrative 2rgan of t%e Enited Nations. d. Econo&ic and -ocial Council 7 organ c%arged wit% promoting social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom. e. Tru"tee"$i) Council 7 organ c%arged wit% administration of International 3rustees%ip /&stem. f. International Court of 3u"tice 7 5udicial organ of t%e EN. T(E INTERNATIONAL COURT O% 3U-TICE a. MO)tional Clau"eM and Contentiou" 3uri"diction :s a rule0 t%e I4+ can operate onl& on t%e basis of t%e consent of /tates to its 5urisdiction. /uc% ma& ta(e t%e form of a special agree ent between /tates to submit an e"isting dispute before t%e 4ourt Bi.e.0 compromisA. However0 under t%e No)tional clau"eN Bart. 8FB2A0 I4+ /tatuteA0 a /tate ma& declare in advance t%at t%e& recogni'e t%e 5urisdiction of t%e 4ourt as compulsor& ipso facto and wit%out need of special agreement0 in relation to an& ot%er /tate accepting t%e same obligation0 in all legal disputes
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,. Deli!erati e 1 discuss principles regarding maintenance of international peace and securit& and ma& ta(e appropriate measures toward t%is end. 2. -u)er i"or2 1 receives and considers reports from t%e ot%er organs of t%e EN. 8. Electi e 1 important voting functions are also vested in t%e ?:0 suc% as t%e election of t%e non7 permanent members of t%e /40 some members of t%e 34 and all t%e members of t%e ;/40 and wit% t%e /4 selects t%e 5udges of t%e I4+J also participates in t%e amendment of t%e 4%arter. =. Budgetar& 1 controls t%e finances of t%e EN >. 4onstituent 1 amendment of t%e c%arter. .A Votin# Rule" ;ac% member or delegation %as , vote in t%e ?:. Important Questions are decided b& 2L8 ma5orit& of t%ose present and voting. :ll ot%er matters0 including t%e determination of w%et%er a Iuestion is important or not0 are decided b& simple ma5orit&. I&)ortant 1ue"tion" include+ aA peace and securit& bA members%ip cA election dA trustees%ip s&stem eA budget .A /ain Co&&ittee" ost Iuestions are t%en discussed in its si< main committeesH U ,st 4ommittee 7Disarmament V International /ecurit& U 2nd 7 ;conomic V !inancial U 8rd 7 /ocial0 Humanitarian V 4ultural U =t% 7 /pecial Political V Decoloni'ation U >t% 7 :dministrative V Budgetar& U Ft% 7 Legal /ome issues are considered onl& in plenar& meetings0 w%ile ot%ers are allocated to one of t%e si< main committees. :ll issues are voted on t%roug% resolutions passed in plenar& meetings0 usuall& towards t%e end of t%e regular session0after t%e committees %ave completed t%eir consideration of t%em and submitted draft resolutions to t%e plenar& :ssembl&. Doting in 4ommittees is b& a simple ma5orit&. In plenar& meetings0 resolutions ma& be adopted b& acclamation0 wit%out ob5ection or wit%out a vote0 or t%e vote ma& be recorded or ta(en b& roll7call.
-)eciali4ed A#encie" 1 not part of t%e EN0 but %ave been broug%t into close contact wit% it because of t%eir purposes and functions0 suc% asH ,. @orld Healt% 2rgani'ation 2. International onetar& !und 8. 3ec%nical :ssistance Board Pro)o"al" for A&end&ent" to t$e UN C$arter and Ratification * wa2" of ado)tin# )ro)o"al"+ a. directl&0 b& 2L8 votes of all ?: members b. b& 2L8 of a general conference called for t%is purpose b& 2L8 of t%e ?: and an& 9 members of t%e /4. :n& amendment t%us proposed s%all be sub5ect to ratification b& at least 2L8 of t%e ?:0 including t%e permanent members of t%e /4. "#$#" UN .eneral A""e&!l2 3%is is t%e central organ of t%e EN. 3%e principal deliberative bod& of t%e organi'ation and is vested wit% 5urisdiction over matters concerning t%e internal mac%iner& and operations of t%e EN. .A Co&)o"ition 4onsists of all t%e members of t%e EN. ;ac% member is entitled to send no more t%an > delegates and > alternates and as man& tec%nical and ot%er personnel as it ma& need. 3%e reason for t%is s&stem of multiple delegates is to enable t%e members to attend of several meetings t%at ma& be ta(ing place at t%e same time in t%e different organs or committees of t%e 2rgani'ation. However0 eac% delegation is entitled onl& to one vote in t%e decisions to be made b& t%e ?:.
.A -e""ion" ,. Re#ular "e""ion" 1 ever& &ear beginning t%e t%ird 3uesda& of /eptember. 2. -)ecial "e""ion" 1 ma& be called at t%e reIuest of t%e /40 a ma5orit& of t%e member states0 or one member wit% t%e concurrence of t%e ma5orit&. 8. E&er#enc2 ")ecial "e""ion 1 ma& be called wit%in 2= %ours at t%e reIuest of t%e /4 b& vote of an& 9 members or b& a ma5orit& of t%e members of t%e EN. -o&e I&)ortant %unction" of t$e .A
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4omposed of ,> members0 > of w%ic% are permanent. 3%e so7 called Big !ive are 4%ina0 !rance0 t%e ;uropean Enion0 t%e Enited Mingdom0 and t%e Enited /tates. 3%e ot%er ten members are elected for 27&ear terms b& t%e ?:0 > from t%e :frican and :sian states0 , from ;astern ;uropean states0 2 from Latin :merican states0 and 2 from @estern ;uropean and ot%er states. 3%eir terms %ave been so staggered as to provide for t%e retirement of W of t%em ever& &ear. 3%ese members are not eligible for immediate re7 election. 4%airmans%ip of t%e /4 is rotated mont%l& on t%e basis of t%e ;nglis% alp%abetical order of t%e names of t%e members. -C -e""ion" 3%e /4 is reIuired to function continuousl& and to %old itself in readiness in case of t%reat to or actual breac% of international peace. !or t%is purpose0 all members s%ould be represented at all times at t%e seat of t%e 2rgani'ation. -C Votin# Rule" ;ac% member of t%e /4 %as , vote0 but distinction is made between t%e permanent and t%e non7 permanent members in t%e decision of substantive Iuestions. Lalta Votin# %or&ula a. Procedural matters 1 9 votes of an& of /4 members b. /ubstantive matters 1 9 votes including > permanent votes. No member0 permanent or not0 is allowed to vote on Iuestions concerning t%e pacific settlement of a dispute to w%ic% it is a part&. <ule of 5reat@Power 0nani ityH a negative vote b& an& permanent member on a non7procedural matter0 often referred to as )veto*0 means re5ection of t%e draft resolution or proposal0 even if it %as received 9 affirmative votes. 7 :bstention or absence of a member is not regarded as veto Procedural and Di"tin#ui"$ed -u!"tanti e /atter"
@%ile t%e decisions of t%e :ssembl& %ave no legall& binding force for governments0 t%e& carr& t%e weig%t of world opinion0 as well as t%e moral aut%orit& of t%e world communit&. 3%e wor( of t%e EN &ear7round derives largel& from t%e decisions of t%e ?eneral :ssembl& 7 t%at is to sa&0 t%e will of t%e ma5orit& of t%e members as e<pressed in resolutions adopted b& t%e :ssembl&. 3%at wor( is carried outH a. b& committees and ot%er bodies establis%ed b& t%e :ssembl& to stud& and report on specific issues0 suc% as disarmament0 peace(eeping0 development and %uman rig%tsJ b. in international conferences called for b& t%e :ssembl&J and c. b& t%e /ecretariat of t%e EN 7 t%e /ecretar&7 ?eneral and %is staff of international civil servants. "#$#" UN -ecurit2 Council :n organ of t%e EN primaril& responsible for t%e maintenance of international peace and securit&. 3%eir responsibilit& ma(es t%e /4 a (e& influence in t%e direction of t%e affairs not onl& of t%e 2rgani'ation but of t%e entire international communit& as well. -C %unction" and Power"+ a. to maintain international peace and securit& in accordance wit% t%e principles and purposes of t%e ENJ b. to investigate an& dispute or situation w%ic% mig%t lead to international frictionJ c. to recommend met%ods of ad5usting suc% disputes or t%e terms of settlementJ d. to formulate plans for t%e establis%ment of a s&stem to regulate armamentsJ e. to determine t%e e<istence of a t%reat to t%e peace or act of aggression and to recommend w%at action s%ould be ta(enJ f. to call on embers to appl& economic sanctions and ot%er measures not involving t%e use of force to prevent or stop aggressionJ g. to ta(e militar& action against an aggressorJ %. to recommend t%e admission of new embersJ i. to e<ercise t%e trustees%ip functions of t%e EN in Nstrategic areasNJ and ,C. to recommend to t%e ?eneral :ssembl& t%e appointment of t%e /ecretar&7?eneral and0 toget%er wit% t%e :ssembl&0 to elect t%e +udges of t%e International 4ourt of +ustice. -C Co&)o"ition
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e. Role of UN in International Peace and -ecurit2 /aving succeeding generations from t%e scourge of war was t%e main motivation for creating t%e Enited Nations0 w%ose founders lived t%roug% t%e devastation of two world wars. /ince its creation0 t%e EN %as often been called upon to prevent disputes from escalating into war0 or to %elp restore peace w%en armed conflict does brea( out0 and to promote lasting peace in societies emerging from wars. 3%e /ecurit& 4ouncil0 t%e ?eneral :ssembl& and t%e /ecretar&7?eneral all pla& ma5or0 complementar& roles in fostering peace and securit&. 2ver t%e decades0 t%e EN %as %elped to end numerous conflicts0 often t%roug% actions of t%e /ecurit& 4ouncil 7 t%e organ wit% primar& responsibilit&0 under t%e Enited Nations 4%arter0 for t%e maintenance of international peace and securit&. 3%reats to peace are discussed in t%e /ecurit& 4ouncil and it can issue ceasefire directives to prevent wider %ostilities. It ma& appoint special representatives or reIuest t%e /ecretar&7 ?eneral to do so or to use %is good offices. 3%e /ecurit& 4ouncil also deplo&s Enited Nations peace(eeping operations to %elp reduce tensions in troubled areas0 (eep opposing forces apart and create conditions for sustainable peace after settlements %ave been reac%ed. 3%e 4ouncil ma& decide on enforcement measures0 economic sanctions Bsuc% as trade embargoesA or collective militar& action. Conflict Pre ention 4onflict prevention remains one of t%e %ig%est ob5ectives of t%e Enited Nations. In toda&Ps world0 preventive action e<tends well be&ond traditional preventive diplomac& to involve a broad constellation of EN entities wor(ing across a wide range of disciplines 7 povert& eradication and development0 %uman rig%ts and t%e rule of law0 elections and t%e building of democratic institutions and t%e control of small arms0 to name 5ust a few. PeaceJee)in# 3%e first EN peace(eeping mission was establis%ed in ,9=.0 w%en t%e /ecurit& 4ouncil aut%ori'ed t%e deplo&ment of t%e Enited Nations 3ruce /upervision 2rgani'ation BEN3/2A to t%e iddle ;ast to monitor t%e :rmistice :greement between Israel and its :rab neig%bours. /ince t%en0 t%ere %ave been a total of F= EN peace(eeping operations around t%e world. 2ver t%e &ears EN peace(eeping %as evolved to meet t%e demands of different conflicts and a c%anging political landscape. Born at t%e time w%en t%e 4old
a. Iuestions relating to t%e organi'ation and meetings of t%e 4ouncilJ b. t%e establis%ment of subsidiar& organsJ and c. t%e participation of states parties to a dispute in t%e discussion of t%e /4. /ubstantial matters include t%ose t%at ma& reIuire t%e /4 under its responsibilit& of maintaining or restoring world peace to invo(e measures of enforcement. W$at i" t$e role of a /e&!er of t$e UN !ut not a &e&!er of t$e -ecurit2 Council> :lt%oug% not a member of t%e /40 it ma& participate Bwit%out voteA in t%e discussion of an& Iuestion before t%e 4ouncil w%enever t%e latter feels t%at t%e interests of t%at member are speciall& affected. /uc% member is li(ewise tobe invited b& t%e 4ouncil to participate Bwit%out voteAin t%e discussion of an& dispute to w%ic% t%e ember is a part&. 1+ Loola)aloo4a conducted ille#al in a"ion and conCue"t a#ain"t /oooKaKa. T$e UN -ecurit2 Council called for enforce&ent action a#ain"t Loola)aloo4a. Doe" enforce&ent action include "endin# of fi#$tin# troo)"> :H N2. 4ompliance wit% t%e resolution calling for enforcement action does not necessaril& call for t%e sending of fig%ting troops. 3%ere must be a special agreement wit% t%e /4 before sending of fig%ting troops ma& be %ad and suc% agreement s%all govern t%e numbers and t&pes of forces0 t%eir degree of readiness and general locations0 and t%e nature of t%e facilities and assistance to be supplied b& EN members. d. Pri ile#e" and I&&unitie" I&&unitie" Because t%e& en5o& international personalit&0 t%e& can also be given t%e immunities and privileges of international persons. Hasis for immunity: Not sovereignt& but t%e need for t%e effective e<ercise of t%eir functions. 3%ere is no common law doctrine recogni'ing t%e immunit& of I2s. 3%eir immunities come from t%e conventional instrument creating t%em. 3%e P%il. 4ourt0 in several cases0 %as affirmed t%is immunit&. However0 it was %eld t%at t%eir immunit& is not absolute. It is limited to acts performed in an official capacit&.
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participation at all levels of decision7ma(ing on conflict resolution and peacebuilding. Di"ar&a&ent In 2C,C0 world militar& e<penditures e<ceeded some ,.> trillion E/ dollars. 3%e need for a culture of peace and for significant arms reduction worldwide %as never been greater. :nd t%is applies to all classes of weapons from nuclear weapons to conventional firearms and landmines. /ince t%e birt% of t%e Enited Nations0 t%e goals of multilateral disarmament and arms limitation %ave been deemed central to t%e maintenance of international peace and securit&. 3%ese goals range from reducing and eventuall& eliminating nuclear weapons0 destro&ing c%emical weapons and strengt%ening t%e pro%ibition against biological weapons0 to %alting t%e proliferation of landmines0 small arms and lig%t weapons. 3%ese efforts are supported b& a number of (e& EN instruments. 3%e 3reat& on t%e Non7Proliferation of Nuclear @eapons BNP3A0 t%e most universal of all multilateral disarmament treaties0 came into force in ,9-C. 3%e 4%emical @eapons 4onvention entered into force in ,99-0 t%e Biological @eapons 4onvention in ,9->. 3%e 4ompre%ensive Nuclear73est7Ban 3reat& was adopted in ,99F0 %owever it %as not &et entered into force. 3%e ,99- ine7Ban 4onvention came into force in ,999. UN Action to Counter Terrori"& 4ountering t%e scourge of terrorism is in t%e interest of all nations and t%e issue %as been on t%e agenda of t%e Enited Nations for decades. :lmost no wee( goes b& wit%out an act of terrorism ta(ing place somew%ere in t%e world0 indiscriminatel& affecting innocent people w%o 5ust %appened to be in t%e wrong place at t%e wrong time. ;ig%teen universal instruments Bfourteen instruments and four amendmentsA against international terrorism %ave been elaborated wit%in t%e framewor( of t%e Enited Nations s&stem relating to specific terrorist activities. : global strateg& to counter terrorism was agreed in /eptember 2CCF w%ic% mar(s t%e first time t%at all ember /tates of t%e Enited Nations %ave agreed to a common strategic and operational framewor( to fig%t terrorism. 3%e /trateg& forms a basis for a concrete plan of actionH to address t%e conditions conducive to t%e spread of terrorismJ to prevent and combat terrorismJ to ta(e measures to build state capacit& to fig%t terrorismJ to strengt%en t%e role of t%e Enited Nations in combating terrorismJ and to ensure t%e respect of %uman rig%ts w%ile countering terrorism. Or#ani4ed Cri&e
@ar rivalries freIuentl& paral&'ed t%e /ecurit& 4ouncil0 EN peace(eeping goals were primaril& limited to maintaining ceasefires and stabili'ing situations on t%e ground0 so t%at efforts could be made at t%e political level to resolve t%e conflict b& peaceful means. EN peacema(ing e<panded in t%e ,99Cs0 as t%e end of t%e 4old @ar created new opportunities to end civil wars t%roug% negotiated peace settlements. : large number of conflicts were broug%t to an end0 eit%er t%roug% direct EN mediation or b& t%e efforts of ot%ers acting wit% EN support. 4ountries assisted included ;l /alvador0 ?uatemala0 Namibia0 4ambodia0 o'ambiIue0 3a5i(istan0 /ierra Leone0 and Burundi. :s t%e decade drew to a close0 continuing crises led to new operations in t%e Democratic Republic of t%e 4ongo0 t%e 4entral :frican Republic0 3imor Leste0 /ierra Leone and Mosovo. 3%e nature of conflict %as also c%anged over t%e &ears. 2riginall& developed as a means of dealing wit% inter7 /tate conflict0 EN peace(eeping %as been increasingl& applied to intra7/tate conflicts and civil wars. :lt%oug% t%e militar& remain t%e bac(bone of most peace(eeping operations0 toda&Ps peace(eepers underta(e a wide variet& of comple< tas(s0 from %elping to build sustainable institutions of governance0 t%roug% %uman rig%ts monitoring and securit& sector reform0 to t%e disarmament0 demobili'ation and reintegration of former combatants0 and demining. Peace!uildin# 3%e e<perience of recent &ears %as also led t%e Enited Nations to focus as never before on peacebuilding 7 efforts to reduce a countr&Ps ris( of lapsing or relapsing into conflict b& strengt%ening national capacities for conflict management0 and to la& t%e foundations for sustainable peace and development. Building lasting peace in war7torn societies is among t%e most daunting of c%allenges for global peace and securit&. 3%e Enited Nations establis%ed t%e Peacebuilding 4ommission in 2CC> to better anticipate and respond to t%e c%allenges of peacebuilding. Wo&en: )eace and "ecurit2 @%ile women remain a minorit& of combatants and perpetrators of war0 t%e& increasingl& suffer t%e greatest %arm. 3%e EN /ecurit& 4ouncil recogni'ed t%at including women and gender perspectives in decision7ma(ing can strengt%en prospects for sustainable peace wit% t%e unanimous adoption of resolution ,82> on women0 peace and securit&. 3%e landmar( resolution specificall& addresses t%e situation of women in armed conflict and calls for t%eir
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2rgani'ed crime t%reatens peace and %uman securit&0 violates %uman rig%ts and undermines economic0 social0 cultural0 political and civil development of societies around t%e world. 3ransnational organi'ed crime manifests in man& forms0 including as traffic(ing in drugs0 firearms and even people. :t t%e same time0 organi'ed crime groups e<ploit %uman mobilit& to smuggle migrants and undermine financial s&stems t%roug% mone& laundering. 3%e vast sums of mone& involved can compromise legitimate economies and directl& impact public processes b& Pbu&ingP elections t%roug% corruption. 2rgani'ed crime %as diversified0 gone global and reac%ed macro7economic proportionsH illicit goods ma& be sourced from one continent0 traffic(ed across anot%er0 and mar(eted in a t%ird. 3ransnational organi'ed crime can permeate government agencies and institutions0 fuelling corruption0 infiltrating business and politics0 and %indering economic and social development. :nd it is undermining governance and democrac& b& empowering t%ose w%o operate outside t%e law. 3%e transnational nature of organi'ed crime means t%at criminal networ(s forge bonds across borders and adapt as new crimes emerge. In s%ort0 transnational organi'ed crime transcends cultural0 social0 linguistic and geograp%ical borders and must be met wit% a concerted response. 3%e Enited Nations 2ffice on Drugs and 4rime BEN2D4A wor(s to combat transnational organi'ed crime and is t%e guardian of t%e Enited Nations 4onvention against 3ransnational 2rgani'ed 4rime B2rgani'ed 4rime 4onventionA and t%e t%ree supplementar& Protocols 7on 3raffic(ing in Persons0 /muggling of igrants and 3raffic(ing of !irearms.
A. DIPLO/ATIC AND CON-ULAR LAW a. Diplomatic Law b. 4onsular Law c. /pecial issions d. Prevention and Punis%ment of 4rimes against Diplomatic :gents "#$#" a. Di)lo&atic Law ,. Rig%t of diplomatic intercourse 2. Rig%t of t%e state to send and receive
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,. Deat%. 2.A Resignation. 8.A Removal. =.A ;<tinction of t%e state. >.A @ar. F.A :bolition of office. -.A Recall. ..A Dismissal. b. c. d. 4onsular Law /pecial issions Prevention and Punis%ment of 4rimes against Diplomatic :gents
diplomatic missions wLc enables state to carr& on friendl& intercourse 8. ?overned b& t%e Dienna 4onvention on Diplomatic Relations B,9F,A a. :ctive rig%t of legation 1 send diplomatic representatives b. Passive rig%t of legation 1 receive diplomatic representatives %unction" of Di)lo&atic /i""ion"+ ,. representing sending state in receiving stateJ 2. protecting in receiving state interests of sending state and its nationalsJ 8. negotiating wit% government of receiving stateJ =. promoting friendl& relations between sending and receiving states and developing t%eir economic0 cultural and scientific relationsJ >. ascertaining b& all lawful means conditions and developments in receiving state and reporting t%ereon to government of sending stateJ and F. in some cases0 representing friendl& governments at t%eir reIuest. a. A#reation 1 process in appointment of diplomatic envo&. @%ere states resort to an informal inIuir& BenIuir&A as to t%e acceptabilit& of a particular envo&0 to w%ic% t%e receiving state responds wit% an informal conformit& BagrementA. b. Letre de CreanceDLetter of CredenceA 1 wit% t%e name0 ran( and general c%aracter of %is mission0 and a reIuest for favorable reception and full credence. A#ent" of Di)lo&atic intercour"e ,. Head of state 2. !oreign secretar& or ministr& 8. embers of t%e diplomatic service =. /pecial diplomatic agents appointed b& t%e %eads of state >. ;nvo& ceremonial
Minds of 4onsuls ,. consules missi 1 professional or career consuls w%o are nationals of sending state and are reIuired to devote t%eir full7 time to disc%arge t%eir dutiesJ and 2. consules electi 1 ma& or not be nationals of sending state and perform consular functions onl& in addition to t%eir regular callings. 1. RanJ"+ 2. consul7general 1 %eads several consular districts0 or one e<ceptionall& large consular districtJ 8. consul 1 ta(es c%arge of a small district or town =. or portJ >. vice7consul 1 assists t%e consulJ and F. consular agent 1 usuall& entrusted wit% t%e performance of cerain functions b& t%e consul. -. DutiesH .. Protection of t%e interest of t%e sending state 9. Promotion of t%e commercial economic0 cultural V scientific relations of t%e sending V receiving state. ,C. 2bservations of condition V developments in t%e receiving state V report t%ereof to t%e sending state. ,,. Issuance of passport V ot%er travel to nationals of t%e sending state V visas or appropriate documents to persons wis%ing to travel to t%e sending state. ,2. /upervision V inspection of vessels and aircraft to t%e sending state. A))oint&ent ? * or &ore docu&ent" are nece""ar2 !efore t$e a""u&)tion of con"ular function+ ,. Letters patent7 letter of appointment or commission wLc is transmitted b& t%e sending state to t%e secretar& of foreign affairs of t%e countr& w%ere t%e consul is to serve. 2. ;<eIuator7 t%e aut%ori'ation given to t%e consul b& t%e sovereign of t%e receiving state0 allowing %im to e<ercise %is function wit%in t%e territor&.
Diplomatic 4orps 7: bod& consisting of all diplomatic envo&s accredited to t%e same local or receiving state :ppointment of :mbassador ,. In t%e P%ilippines it is t%e president w%o appoints B/ec.,F0 :rt.- of t%e constitutionA send V instructs t%e diplomatic consular representatives V %is prerogative to determine t%e assignments of t%e countr&Gs diplomatic representatives caanot be Iuestioned. B?R no. 9=C-CA Ter&ination of t$e di)lo&atic &i""ion+
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Bpersonal0 real0 national0 regional0 municipalA e<cept aA indirect ta<es bA duesLta<es on private real propert& in receiving state unless being %eld on be%alf of sending state for t%e purpose of t%e mission cA estate0 in%eritance0 succession dA ta<es on private income and source from receiving state and capital ta<es on investments in commercial ventures in receiving state eA c%arges levied for specific services fA registration0 court or record fees0 mortgage dues0 stamp dut& wit% respect to immovable -.A ;<emption from customs dutiesLta<es aA articles for use of mission bA personal use of envo& or famil& B%ouse%oldA cA baggage and effects entitled to free entr& and normall& wit%out e<amination dA :rticles addressed to ambassadors0 ministers0 c%arges de affairs0 e<empt from customs inspection eA :rticles addressed to representatives ot%er t%an c%iefs of mission 7 usual customs treatment
Ter&ination of con"ular &i""ion+ ,. @it%drawal of t%e e<eIuaturJ 2.A e<tinction of t%e stateJ 8.A @arJ =.A usual wa&s of terminating an official relations%ip. Pri ile#e" and i&&unitie"+ ,. Inviolabilit& of t%eir correspondence0 arc%ives0 V ot%er documents. 2. !reedom of movement V travel 8. Immunit& from 5urisdiction for acts performed in official capacit& =. ;<emption from certain ta<es V duties. >. /pecial ission 1 Bnot foundA F. Prevention and punis%ment of crime against t%e diplomatic agents
1.
R.:. -> penali'es a person w%o assaults0 stri(es0 wounds0 offers violence to t%e person of an ambassador Bin addition to RP4 penalties and sub5ect to t%e rules of reciprocit&A - e<cept self7defense - reasonable p%&sical restraint In iola!ilit2 of )re&i"e" and arc$i e" - premises occupied b& t%e mission receiving state ma& not enter wLo - private residence of diplomatic agent t%e consent of t%e envo& e<cept e<treme necessit& 8. Rig%t of official communication 7 no interference wit% t%e rig%t to communicate to sending state or ot%er envo&s in receiving state b& an& means =.A Immunit& from local 5urisdiction 7 BcriminalA w%et%er for official or private acts. Remed& is to as( for recall. Immunit& from civilLadministrative 5urisdictions not absolute. ;<ceptions areH BaA real action relating to private immovable found in receiving state BbA action relating to succession 7 diplomat is e<ecutor0 administrator0 %eirLlegatee BcA action relating to professionalLcommercial activit& in t%e receiving state outside of official functions. easures of e<ecution ma& be ta(en against envo& provided t%at it will be done wit%out infringing t%e inviolabilit& of %is person or residence. >.A ;<emption from subpoena 7 Diplomats cannot be compelled to testif& B5udicial or administrativeA wit%out t%e consent of t%eir governments. Not even b& deposition. F.A ;<emption from 3a<ation 7 :ll duesLta<es *.
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