Unconventional weapons in the Middle East Israel and Iran.

Abstract The Middle-East is unstable and continuously on the verge of eruption of violent conflicts. The states, in order to maintain their fortitude are involved in an unconventional weapon race. The sources of these weapons are legal and illegal ones and self-developed. International treaties have failed to decrease the arm-race. Therefore in the near future every diplomatic move will be affected by the existence of non-conventional weapons in each state. Two states Iran and Israel are involved in an unconventional weapon race that fuels the endless international involvement in the area. This paper compares the unconventional weapons of both side and its conclusion is that both sides are more interested in deterrence than in unconventional war. ut if diplomacy fails, Israel and Iran are prepared for doomsday war. !eywords" #nconventional weapon $ontamination of environment Missiles and missile development $hemical warfare %uclear arms iological arms The unique problems of the unconventional weapons. &s the international arena is deeply concerned with the Iranian nuclear program, the non-nuclear unconventional weapons pose nonetheless great dangers to the safety of the Middle-East. &lmost each state in the Middle-East owns various types of unconventional non-nuclear weapons, and few develop nuclear programs. '

(eth $arus observes that approximately )* distinct sub-national actors +individuals and groups, have shown concerted interest in biological agents. Eight of these )* are -nown to have ac.uired or developed biological weapons.' /nly five of the eight are commonly believed to have employed them, and only two have caused significant harm. The fall )00' anthrax-by-mail attac-s should, of course, be added to this list. 1et the biological challenge is far greater than mere sub-national actors armed with biological weapons. Terrorism is arguably the lesser-included case. 2hile Milton 3eitenberg4s assessment that 5terrorist use of a 2 + iological 2arfare, agent is best characteri6ed as an event of extremely low probability which might . . . produce high mortality7 is arguable, his observation that the national debate on the biological threat 5is characteri6ed by gross exaggeration, hype, and abstract vulnerability assessments instead of valid threat analysis7 is a valid criticism.) &lthough the international forum has created a -ind of defense shield against unconventional weapons and its use, in other words - the international treaties li-e the %8T +%uclear 8roliferation Treaty,, the $T T +The $omprehensive Test an Treaty,, which opened for signature in '99:, is intended to prohibit all nuclear weapon test explosions. The $T T has achieved near universal adherence, however, &rticle ;I< of the Treaty re.uires ratification by == named states, before the Treaty can enter into force. The $2$ +$hemical 2eapons $onvention,, etc., are not enough to ban the danger of thee. &s the ratification of these treaties is not complete, and even though some states have signed it, the success of the process depends on the states4 goodwill to reali6e the treaties. >urthermore, these treaties relate to states only and not to guerrilla or terrorists groups. ?uerilla groups and freedom fighters that are not recogni6ed by the international community as legal bodies, have not even signed those treaties. %evertheless, they rarely use unconventional weapons as they are aware to of the )

negative public opinion this action will cause. There is a possibility that states that possess non-conventional weapons will turn it over to terrorists groups in order to enhance the strength of them and of the state. ut this is merely a speculation as no evidence exists. The uni.ue problems that unconventional weapon causes are" a/ Contamination of the environment &vner $ohen, a nuclear specialist and a participant in the comprehensive nuclear test ban committee held in '99@, said that there is a need for inspection in the Middle-East as a nuclear clash between Ira. and Israel will create a regional catastrophe, as it will destroy the fauna and flora and contaminate the scarce water reservoirs. b/ The knowled e misused Aichard ?otrey, a genetic scientist claimed that mapping the human genomes will lead to a double trac- route the positive one will open new hori6ons for efficient medicine and drugs but the negative one can be used by terrorists by exploiting ethnic uni.ueness thus achieving ethnic cleansing. Bis comments were delivered after the El-!aida attempt to obtain and buy biological weapons. &dvances in biotechnology thus create the potential for the misuse of peptide Cchemicals made up of short strings of amino-acidsD bioregulators in offensive 2

programs. &dvances in the use of viral and bacterial vectors enhance the possibility for direct delivery of a toxin or bioregulator to the human target or they could be used to transfer the toxin or bioregulator genes to the target.E !agan discussed the potential advantages to terrorists of use of such substances-for example, that they are not usually on anyoneFs threat list, are difficult to diagnose, cannot be vaccinated against, and can cause massive effects over large areas via unusual routes of dispersion.= Gilin-as hypothesi6ed that the wor- of (oviet and &um-(hirin-yo would be li-ely to E

serve as precedents for other nations or groups that would attempt to apply advanced biotechnology in research to perfect agents for use in biological weapons but would depend on classical technologies.* %evertheless, Gilin-as is aware that mapping the human genome is maybe the first step in developing ethnic 2. c/ The le al liabilit! of use and distribution of unconventional means to terror and uerilla roups The international community avoided a serious discussion and decisions how to stop the spreading of non-conventional weapons as it ignored the possibilities to stop the funding, assistance and responsibility for unconventional terrorism +Hoseph I. Iouglass, Hr. Iecember ):, )00),. In his boo-, Bush at War, +)00),, 2oodward cited Tennet, the head of the $I& +who resigned during )00: due to the Ira. war, who admitted that in his opinion, a special state is responsible for distributing unconventional terror, but he is not sure whether its Aussia or Ira.. (cooter 3ibby, $heneysF top aide, was s-eptic in the wisdom of connecting terror groups to states, as long as the #.( cannot interfere. >urthermore, he commented that various states use unconventional means in order to achieve political aims. The list is long and includes states li-e $uba, 8A$ +8eople4s Aepublic of $hina,, Aussia and even Israel. d/ "ack of appropriate answer to unconventional weapon - chemical and biological weapons are very effective and countermeasures are very secretive and not really tested for their efficiency. The &merican alleged practice and conclusions in Ira. during the first and second ?ulf 2ar is not public -nowledge, so nobody can tell for sure whether there are effective means to combat unconventional terror. e/ The stora e and development due to heavy storage expenses and heavy costs of the research ands development, mainly states possess unconventional means. (elling these weapons is problematic, as no state is willing to expose its unconventional abilities. =

f/ #rms race third world states are developing or buying unconventional weapons in order to stand up against the nuclear ability of the great states. The biological and chemical weapons are some -ind of response, designed to retaliate and deter stronger states. Even though those states that have signed the treaty banning unconventional weapons till )0'), I am doubtful, they will fulfill their commitment as no better and cheaper deterrence exists. The future poses new dangers" Technical problems a/ The development of biotechnology and genetics can produce a new -inds of toxins, hard to detect therefore hard to ta-e countermeasures.. b/ $ombination of biological and chemical compounds will ma-e it difficult to develop anti-dot and antibody. c/ The progress in technologies and the powers to launch strategic cruise missiles with unconventional war-heads is great. $olitical and international problems a/ (tates under embargo and sanctions, li-e Iran will try to be in possession of -nowledge and depend less on import. b/ (tates will pledge to international treaties meanwhile convert the chemical and biological industry into military needs. c/ The brain lea- from the former (oviet #nion, %orth !orea and 8a-istan will continue. d/ (tates will reali6e the undeveloped potential in granting unconventional weapons to terrorists groups.

The international trend in missiles development

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The efficiency on the unconventional weapons depends more on the method of dispersing and launching than on the weapon itself. (tates concluded that in order to increase the capacity, the chemical or biological substance ought to be launched by a missile. Missile range categories are short-range ballistic missiles +(A M,Jless than ',000-mK medium-range ballistic missile +MA M,J',000-E,000-mK intermediaterange ballistic missile +IA M,JE,000-*,*00-mK and intercontinental ballistic missile +I$ M, J greater than *,*00-m. The international community is trying to curb the missile development and to supervise missiles productive states. ut till )00) only )) states signed and ratified

the MT$A treaty +Missile Technology $ontrol Aegime,. (ince then, 90 more states Loined the pact, including Israel and 8A$. The situation in the international arena is a mixed one" y '9@=, %orth !orea was building its own (cud- s and developed two new versions, the (cud-$ and (cud-I. It has since developed a medium-range missile, the %odong, and a long-range missile based on (cud technology, the Taepodong. The %odong could deliver conventional and 2MI warheads throughout most of Hapan +including several #.(. military bases,. Bowever, given the missile4s relative inaccuracy, the %odong is more useful as a 5terror weapon7 against population centers than as a significant military systemJunless it is armed with a nuclear warhead. The %odong is estimated to have a circular error probable +$E8, of )-= -ilometers +-m,, which means half of the %odongs fired would fall outside a circle of that radius.: In Huly )00: it test-fired a modification to the Taepodong, called the Taepodong-), which experts say could have a range of up to :,000-m +E,*00 miles,. The missile failed shortly after launch.M

(ince '999 %orth !orea halted the long range missile tests, after achieving *000 -m range. It even agreed to stop the missile plans in return for western aid for its satellite plans. &fter long negotiations with the #.(, in )00M %orth !orea abandoned its nuclear program in exchange for western and &merican aid. Middle East and (outh &sian thin-ing about MI + allistic Missile Iefense, also is preliminary because for all intents and purposes, ballistic missiles today remain invulnerable to local defenses. The defensive systems that do existJsuch as the &merican 8atriot and the Aussian (&-E00 air defense system touted by Moscow to have anti-ballistic missile capabilitiesJare not readily available and their effectiveness is debatable. The 8atriot missile system was hailed for its effectiveness in countering Ira.i ballistic missiles in the midst of the ?ulf 2ar, but post-war analysis has called into .uestion the 8atriot4s battlefield performanceK assessments of the 8atriot4s success rate range from =0 to @0 percent.@ The intended point of interception is another way of distinguishing MI. There are

generally three intercept pointsK in initial boost-phase, in midcourse, and the terminal or end of the missile4s traLectory. The ush administration is leaning toward on the

deployment of an %MI system to destroy enemy warheads in the midcourse phase, the point after an Intercontinental allistic Missile +I$ M, has burned its fuel and

released the warheads but before the warhead reenters the atmosphere. Intercepting ballistic missiles in the earlier and powered phase of traLectory has several advantages over the midcourse intercept, however. Interception in the boost-phase would destroy the entire missile payload including submunitions, decoys, and warheads and be easier to detect because the burning missile is brighter, larger, slower-moving, and more fragile than the warhead. & boost-phase defense, furthermore, could cover a much larger area than a midcourse defense.9 M

$ruise missiles pose a significant security threat, both alone and in conLunction with ballistic missiles. ?ormley attributed the recent proliferation of cruise missile programs to three factors" #ccess to speciali%ed knowled e. Most of the emerging programs are being carried out with the help of outsiders, such as technicians from Aussia with -nowledge of systems engineering and systems integration. IranFs cruise missile programs depend on foreign-trained engineers who developed their s-ills in >rance, ?ermany, Aussia, $hina, and %orth !orea. # shift in the narrative on the reasons for acquirin the missiles. (tates have come to the conclusion that cruise missiles can penetrate an enemyFs defenses more easily than ballistic missiles +which have more predictable traLectories and, in theory, are more vulnerable to interception,. Iuring the Ira. war in )00E, five crude Ira.i cruise missiles managed to evade #.(. 8atriot missile defenses. >ormer 8a-istani 8resident 8erve6 Musharraf touted his countryFs new cruise missiles as incapable of being intercepted. # chan e in the norms of state behavior re ardin missile proliferation. Iespite some recent attempts to strengthen legal conventions regarding cruise missile proliferation, many nations do not regard the issue with the same sense of urgency as ballistic missile proliferation, ?ormley said. (tates such as India, (outh !orea, and Hapan have expressed a right to use cruise missiles in preemptive Nfirst stri-eN attac-s against foes. The #nited (tates has allowed allies such as (outh !orea and Taiwan to develop cruise missile programs, and Taiwanese military analysts, too, have been tal-ing about the right to Npreventive self-defenseN using cruise missiles. ?ormley said the increasing tendency to lin- land-attac- cruise missiles to preemptive stri-e doctrines has been fueling regional arms races and promoting instability in @

areas such as (outh &sia, where both India and 8a-istan have been developing cruise missiles that could be used in a war over the disputed !ashmir region. 3oo-ing to the future, ?ormley argues that it is time to end the second-class treatment of cruise missiles in nonproliferation policies. Be cites the Bague $ode of $onduct &gainst allistic Missile 8roliferation, adopted in )00) and subscribed to by ')@

nations so far. The $ode does not discuss cruise missiles. ?ormley also calls for more emphasis under the Missile Technology $ontrol Aegime on monitoring illicit activities by s-illed engineers who can transfer invaluable -nowledge to those see-ing to ac.uire cruise missiles. Ta-ing a more evenhanded approach to spending on ballistic and cruise missile defense programs also would help alleviate the secondclass treatment of the cruise missile threat.'0 The #.( and Israel reached a mutual understanding that the #.( will assist Israel in a case of long range missile attac-. The two states agreed upon technological cooperation in missiles research and development. Even though, during )00M-@ Israel has developed the HerichoE missile, about the range of =000 -m, in order to retaliate against Iran. The #.(, Israel and Taiwan cooperated in defense missiles testing. %orth !orea -eeps selling missile technology and (cuds to Iran, 8a-istan Egypt, (yria, <ietnam and 3ibya. Iran and 8a-istan further developed the !orean weapons and prolonged its range. (outh !orea with &merican help built in '999 a E00 -m range missile and continues to develop launching abilities. India declared its intention to develop missile ranging )000-E000 -m. Aussia and $hina continuously sell missiles to Iran, (yria, 8a-istan and 3ibya. ahrain is purchasing missiles from European companies.

The Middle&East re ion and the unconventional weapon

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>our states that are subLect to unconventional wars are examined in this paper Israel, Iran, (yria and Egypt.'' Each of these states was involved or threatened by unconventional warfare. #nconventional weapons exist in this area since 22II, rarely used but handy. The following examples prove the swiftness of using unconventional weapons" Iuring the civil war in 1emen, '9:E-'9:M, Egypt used chemical weapons against the royalists. The Egyptian used mustard gas, phosgene, and tear gas. Egypt used Aussian made bombs !B& )00, &/!h-)*, A* and abandoned ritish weapons that were left on Egyptian territory during 22II. &fter the 5: Iay 2ar7 in '9:M, reports claimed that Israel captured in the (inai arsenals of mustard gas, phosgene, and tear gas. /fficial denial was issued by Egypt.') 8ost the 51om !ippur7 war in '9ME, Egypt transferred a small amount of chemical weapons to (yria, but no official evidence was shown, even though in an article that was published in the 3ebanese Lournal 5(trategy7 in '99E, the author claimed that in '9M), Egypt sold to (yria mustard gas and sarin bombs worth : million dollars.'E Iuring the Iran-Ira. 2ar +'9@0-'9@@,, in (eptember '9@0, an Iranian plane tried to damage the Ira.i nuclear reactor without any success. In Hune '9@' Israel bombed the same reactor and destroyed it using conventional bombs. The Ira.is tried to bomb the Iranian reactor in ushar in '9@=, and again a year later. oth attempts failed. In the same war, Ira. used chemical weapons against the Iran soldiers. In '9@E Iran filed a complaint against Ira. to the (ecurity $ouncil. &s no actions were ta-en against Ira., Iran used chemical weapons against Ira. during '9@=-'9@*.'= 3ater on, after the ceasefire between Iran and Ira., Ira. bombed the !urdish minority in Balabche using nerve gas and mustard gas, in order to prevent !urdish upheaval. &bout *000 !urds were -illed. y Iecember '99@, #%($/M +#nited %ations '0

(pecial $ommission,, inspectors had destroyed E@,*EM filled and unfilled chemical munitions, :90 metric tons of $2 agents, more than E,)M* metric tons of precursor chemicals, over =)* pieces of -ey production e.uipment and ')* pieces of analytical instruments.'* In %ovember )00), following a period of escalating pressure on Ira., #%M/<I$ +#nited %ations Monitoring, <erification and Inspection $ommission,, inspection teams were finally allowed access to Ira.. etween )M %ovember )00) and '@ March )00E, #%M/<I$ conducted ME' inspections covering ='' sites, @@ of which had not been inspected previously. The #%M/<I$ inspections were able to verify the destruction of between E0 and E9 per cent of Ira.Fs declared stoc-pile of '.* metric tons of <; +a neurotoxic chemical warfare agent,. They also identified a small number of $2 munitions that appeared to have been produced prior to '990. #%M/<I$ concluded that it had not found evidence of the continuation or resumption of 2MI programs.': In '9@M, the 3ibyans used chemical bombs made in Iran against the $had revolutionaries. &llegedly, Israel4s air attac- on Syria in (eptember )00M was directed against a site that Israeli and &merican intelligence analysts Ludged was a partly constructed nuclear reactor, apparently modeled on one %orth !orea has used to create its stoc-pile of nuclear weapons fuel, according to &merican and foreign officials with access to the intelligence reports.'M

Israel Unconventional weapons and policy

There are a few reasons why Israel has allegedly armed itself with unconventional weapons"

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a/ The memory of the holocaust secured the policy of 5never again7 and en-?urionFs policy of an isolated state between hostile neighbors. b/ The hostile neighborhood that declined for years to negotiate with Israel and initiated wars, conflicts and hostility. c/ The continuously changing rules of the game in an overwhelmingly &rab coalition re.uired a doomsday weapon. &llegedly, to Aussian reports, Israel has nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. 'uclear Israel has the most advanced nuclear weapons program in the Middle East. Iavid en ?urion, IsraelFs first prime minister, clandestinely established the agenda in the late '9*0s to meet the perceived existential threat to the nascent state. '@ The program allegedly is centered at the %egev %uclear Aesearch $enter, outside of Iimona. ased on estimates of the plutonium production capacity of the Iimona reactor, Israel has approximately '00-)00 nuclear explosive devices.'9 /fficially, Israel has declared that it will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons in the Middle EastK however, it has not signed the Treaty on the %on-8roliferation of %uclear 2eapons +%8T,. IsraelFs possession of nuclear weapons and its policy of declaratory ambiguity have led to increase tensions in current Middle East peace discussions and arms control negotiations. The Israeli policy has not changed ever - during the first ?ulf 2ar, Ira. used conventional warheads assembled on its (cuds against Israel, after a cost-effective series of battles against Iran. Israel did not react, in order not to disassemble the &merican led coalition against Ira.. &s Thomas Mc%augher pointed out, the missile stri-es had great impact on the Iranian moral, and the use of these missiles led to the conclusion of the Iran-Ira. war, as Iran agreed to sign the #% $ease->ire Aesolution %o. *9@.)0 ')

In Huly )00=, however, Israel accepted a visit from International &tomic Energy &gency director Mohamed El- aradei. Israeli officials continue to assert that they will address disarmament only after a comprehensive Middle Eastern peace is obtained, and to deny international inspection of the Iimona nuclear complex. Mordechai <anunu,)' the nuclear bomb spy, refuted the Israeli ambiguousness regarding the official policy. (till, Israel remained decisive in its declarations that it will not be the first state in the Middle East to nuclear the region. Meanwhile, it refuses to commit to the T8%- Treaty on the %on 8roliferation of %uclear 2eapons. Even though El- aradei visited Israel in )00:, Israel did not open up the nuclear reactor before him. In >ebruary )00M, /lmert, the Israeli prime-minister, declared that Israel has an answer in case of unconventional attac-s against it. The estimation is that Israel has '00-)00 executive nuclear bombs. (iolo ical IsraelFs neighboring states allege that Israel has an offensive biological weapon + 2, program, but there are no reliable sources on specific biological agents the Israelis may possess.)) Aeportedly, Israeli speciali6ed military-units sabotaged water wells with typhoid and dysentery bacteria in &cre +near Baifa,, 8alestine during the '9=@ war, but evidence of such events is fragmentary. (peculation that the production is located at the Israel Institute of iological Aesearch +II A, in %ess Giona has raised both international and domestic concerns.)E &ctivists within the Israeli community have recently protested the expansion of the Institute due to reports, denied by Israeli officials, of multiple inLuries and deaths within the facility and one near-evacuation of the surrounding area. Israel is not a signatory to the iological and Toxin 2eapons

$onvention + 2$,. In )00', IsraelFs foreign and defense ministries reassessed policy with regard to the 2$, but no change in approach has yet been made public. 'E

Chemical 2hile there are allegations that Israel has an advanced chemical weapons +$2, program, no confirmed evidence of production or stoc-piling exists. (ome reports have suggested an offensive $2 program is located at the Israel Institute for iological Aesearch in %es Giona. )= In /ctober '99), an El &l airliner carrying a cargo of approximately *0 gallons of dimethyl methylphosphonate +a widely used stimulant for defensive research but also a possible precursor of sarin nerve agent, destined for the Institute crashed in &msterdam. )* Israel stated that this material was being imported to test gas mas-s. Israel has signed but not ratified the $hemical 2eapons $onvention +$2$,.): Missile IsraelFs missile program began in the '9:0s. Israel has a varied missile industry, having developed ballistic and cruise missiles, as well as missile defense systems and unmanned aerial vehicles +#&<s,.)M The Hericho ballistic missiles series was initiated in the '9:0s with >rench assistance, beginning with the short-range ballistic missile +(A M, Hericho-' with a *00 -m range. In the '9M0s, Israel developed the intermediate-range ballistic missile +IA M, Hericho-), a two-stage, solid-fueled missile with a range of ',*00 to E,*00 -m. )@ There are some unconfirmed reports that suggest the existence of a =,@00 -m-range Hericho-E missile that may stem from IsraelFs space launch vehicle, the (havit. Israel has also developed, with #.(. financial assistance, the &rrow defense missile, which has become one of the only functioning missile defense systems in the earth. In addition to these systems, Israel has become a leading exporter of #&<s. Israel is not a member of the Missile Technology $ontrol Aegime +MT$A,, though it has pledged to abide by the MT$A ?uidelines. Israel has recently reported to have successfully tested the &rrow-) anti-ballistic missile system, as well as new long-range guided missiles. '=

Iran Unconventional weapons and policy

IranFs chemical weapons and ballistic missiles, and possibly its nuclear weapon program and biological warfare capabilities, are meant to deter opponents and to increase influence in the 8ersian ?ulf and $aspian (ea regions. Iran under the &yatollah regime aims to achieve regional supremacy and the leadership of the Muslim 2orld. /n the other hand, the ac.uisition and creation of these various weapon systems can also be seen as a response to IranFs own experience as a victim of chemical and missile attac-s during the Iran-Ira. 2ar. 'uclear y early Hune )00*, the E#-E +>rance, ?reat ritain, and ?ermany, had not yet

submitted their plan to Iran outlining future nuclear negotiations. The E#-E re.uested a postponement in dialogues, but Tehran reLected the delay and publicly announced it would resume peaceful nuclear research activities.)9 &t issue was IranFs insistence that right to peaceful nuclear research be included in any proposal, a position the #( adamantly opposed. &ttempts were made to persuade Iran to give up its fuel cycle ambitions and accept nuclear fuel from abroad, but Tehran made it clear that any proposal that did not guarantee IranFs access to peaceful nuclear technology would lead to the brea- of all nuclear related negotiations with the E#-E. In addition, members of the Iranian MaLlis, scientists, scholars, and students were protesting and holding rallies to support the administration to lift the moratorium on uranium enrichment and to not succumb to foreign +#.(., pressure. /ne wee- later, Iran once again agreed to temporarily free6e its nuclear program until the end of Huly when the E# agreed it would put forward an offer for the next round of discussions. In Hune, I&E& Ieputy Iirector, 8ierre ?oldschmidt, stated that Iran admitted to providing incorrect information about past experiments involving plutonium. Tehran '*

claimed all such researches ceased in '99E, but results from recent tests showed that experiments too- a place as late as '99* and '99@. E0 In early Huly, Iran as-ed the I&E& if it could brea- #% seals and test nuclear-related e.uipment, stating the testing would not violate TehranFs voluntary suspension of nuclear activities. &t the end of Huly, an official letter was submitted to the I&E& stating that the seals at the Isfahan #ranium $onversion >acility +#$>, would be removed. The I&E& re.uested that it be yielded '0 days to install the necessary surveillance e.uipment. /n ' &ugust, Iran reminded the E#-E that E &ugust would be the last opportunity for a recommendation to be presented to continue discussions. & few days later, the European #nion submitted the >ramewor- for a Long-term Agreement proposal to Iran.E' The proposal specifically called on Iran to exclude fuel-cycle related activity. Tehran immediately reLected the suggestion as a negation of its inalienable rights. /n @ &ugust, nuclear activities resumed at the Isfahan #$> and two days later, I&E& seals were removed from the remaining parts of the system lines with I&E& inspectors present. In the days leading up to IranFs resumption of nuclear activities, several countries called on Iran to cooperate with the I&E& and to re-establish full suspension of all enrichments4 related activities. &dditionally, some European countries and the #nited (tates threatened to refer Iran to the #% (ecurity $ouncil. /nce again, Iran reLected any proposal related to the suspension of conversion activities, but stated they were ready to continue negotiations. Tehran did not believe there was any legal basis for referral to the #% (ecurity council and believed it was only a political move. Iran also threatened to stop all negotiations, prevent any further inspections at all its nuclear facilities, suspend the application of the &dditional 8rotocol, and withdraw from the %uclear %onproliferation Treaty +%8T,, if it was referred to the #% (ecurity $ouncil.E) ':

In &ugust )00*, the I&E& announced that most of the highly enriched uranium +BE#, particle contamination traced at various locations in Iran was found to be of foreign origin. The I&E& concluded much of the BE# found on centrifuge parts were from imported 8a-istani e.uipment, rather than from any enrichment activities conducted by Iran. In late &ugust, Iran began announcing it would be resuming nuclear activities in %atan6 and that Tehran would be willing to negotiate as long as there were no conditions. In &ugust, Iran refused to comply with a resolution from the I&E& to halt its nuclear program, stating that ma-ing nuclear fuel was its right as a member of the %8T. The European #nion believed that although Iran did have a right to nuclear energy under &rticle = of the %8T, it had lost that right because it violated &rticle ) of the %8T - Nnot to see- or receive any help in the manufacture of nuclear related weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.N /n )= (eptember )00*, the I&E& found Iran in non-compliance of the %8T. The ruling passed with )' votes of agreement, ') abstentions, and one opposing vote. Aussia and $hina were among those that abstained from voting and <ene6uela was the only country to vote against the decision. The resolution stated IranFs non-compliance due to Nmany failures and breachesN over nuclear safeguards of the %8T were grounds for referral to the #% (ecurity $ouncil. The resolution passed on )= (eptember )00*, leaving the door open for future referral of Iran to the (ecurity $ouncil was finally adopted in >ebruary, )00:. /n = >ebruary, the E*-nation board of the I&E& voted to 5report7 Iran to the (ecurity $ouncil over its finding published in Hanuary, to restart nuclear research. Iran has reLected the above resolution calling it, 5illegal, illogical and politically motivated7 and has decided to scrap the 5containment and surveillance measures7 as defined under the '99M &dditional 8rotocol. Iran has also resumed small scale enrichment activities at its 'M

%atan6 facility as of ': >ebruary. In a parallel diplomatic process Aussia continues to pursue negotiations with Iran that would allow Aussia to host IranFs uranium enrichment program leaving only the uranium conversion to be carried out on Iranian soil. The international community is still trying to avoid the end of the Iranian nuclear enrichment program.
&s of 'Mth %ovember )00@, 99*: -g of #>: had been fed into the cascades since >ebruary )00M, and a total of @E9 -g of low enriched #>: had been produced. The results also showed that the enrichment level of this low enriched #> : product verified by the &gency was E.=9O #-)E*. Iran has estimated that, between '@ %ovember )00@ and E' Hanuary )009, it produced an additional 'M' -g of low enriched #>:. The nuclear material at >E8 +including the feed, product and tails,, as well as all installed cascades, remain under &gency containment and surveillance. /n )9 (eptember )00@, the &gency conducted a 8I< at the 8ilot >uel Enrichment 8lant +8>E8,, the results of which confirm the physical inventory as declared by Iran, within the measurement uncertainties normally associated with such a facility. etween )9 /ctober )00@ and '* Hanuary )009, Iran fed a total of approximately *0 -g of #> : into the )0-machine IA-' cascade, the '0-machine IA-) cascade and the single IA-', IA-) and IA-E centrifuges. The nuclear material at 8>E8, as well as the cascade area, remains under &gency containment and surveillance. Iran has transferred a few -ilograms of low enriched #> : produced at 8>E8 to the Habr Ibn Bayan Multipurpose 3aboratories at the Tehran %uclear Aesearch $entre for research and development purposes.EE &ccording to I&E& report dated =th March )009, that contrary to the decisions of the (ecurity $ouncil, Iran has not suspended its enrichment related activities or its wor- on heavy waterrelated proLects, including the construction of the heavy water moderated research reactor, IA=0, and the production of fuel for that reactor. E=

'@

/n 'st >ebruary )009, E9E: centrifuges were being fed with #>:K '=M: centrifuges were installed and under vacuum, and an additional ')* centrifuges were installed but not under vacuum.E* In the beginning of the /bama 8residency, in )009, the #.( adopted the two edged diplomacy - to start negotiating with Iran in order to halt the nuclear program or otherwise #.( will impose sanctions on her. Iranian intentions to achieve nuclear ability are not contained to Iran only, as Iran is more than willing to assist each state that would alter the fragile nuclear balance. Its assistance to &lger can be viewed as a strategy to threat the E# but also as a resort to continue its nuclear plant outside Iran, in a case that Israel or the #( will attac- its nuclear plants. /n %ovember )*, )00:, &lgerian Minister of Energy and Mineral Aesources (ha-ib !halil announced that &lgeria would launch a nuclear energy program in order to exploit the country4s substantial uranium deposits.E: Three days later on %ovember )@, !halil visited Tehran, where Iranian 8resident Mahmoud &hmadineLad offered to provide assistance to &lgeria4s new nuclear underta-ing, stating that Iran was willing 5to share its expertise in different fields with &lgeria, including peaceful nuclear technology.7EM !halil was .uoted as replying that &lgeria 5is very interested in Iranian expertise in various fields, especially in oil, gas, and nuclear energy7 and that it 5is prepared to establish relations with Iran based on common interests.7E@ $oncerns about &lgerian intentions could be heightened by the suspicions &lgeria raised in the early '990s, before it Loined the nuclear %onproliferation Treaty +%8T,, that it was see-ing the capability to produce nuclear arms. In discussions with the International &tomic Energy &gency +I&E&, several wee-s prior to the %ovember )* announcement of &lgeria4s new nuclear plans, !halil stated that &lgeria4s goal was the 5integrated development of the entire nuclear sector and its '9

applications" seawater desalini6ation, industry, agriculture, medicine, the environment and, in particular, electricity.7E9 In the late '990s, &lgeria4s exploitable deposits of uranium were thought to be limited and to pose an obstacle to the country4s development of a self-sufficient nuclear energy program. &lgeria abstained in two -ey votes at the I&E&, which, respectively, found Tehran to be in noncompliance with its I&E& inspection agreement and referred the Iran case to the #% for further action.=0 $lose nuclear ties between &lgeria and Iran could complicate international nonproliferation efforts in a number of ways. /f particular concern is that Iran might clandestinely assist &lgeria in developing a uranium enrichment capability. =' Even if &lgeria were to claim it had developed this capability indigenously and placed it under I&E& safeguards, however, the result would still be the emergence of an additional state possessing at least the latent capability to manufacture nuclear weapons and -nown to have regional leadership ambitions. &t a time when the #nited (tates and many other nations are see-ing to slow the further spread of this sensitive technology, such a development would be a setbac- to international nonproliferation efforts, even if &lgeria never misused this capability. =) $oncerns about the potential for misuse, however, could arise given &lgeria4s nuclear history. In '99', prior to Loining the %8T, &lgeria secretly ac.uired a '*-megawatt research reactor from $hina, raising suspicions about the possible development of nuclear weapons.=E These suspicions were significantly eased when &lgeria agreed to place the reactor under I&E& inspections and, in '99*, Loined the %8T. %onetheless, as recently as )00=, rumors circulated that &lgeria was engaged in nuclear activities with military overtones.== In the meantime, some analysts have suggested that &hmadineLad is see-ing &lgeria4s aid in serving as a mediator with the 2est on the Iranian nuclear controversy. They )0

speculate that &hmadineLad sees &lgiers, having recently built closer ties with 2ashington, as an intermediary that both sides trust.=* 2ith the #% (ecurity $ouncil having imposed sanctions on Iran and &hmadineLad refusing to slow Iran4s uranium enrichment and plutonium production activities, it remains to be seen whether &lgeria will step into this role and what it might accomplish, if it does so. (iolo ical There is very little publicly available information to determine whether Iran is pursuing a biological weapon program. &lthough Iran acceded to the ?eneva 8rotocol in '9)9 and ratified the iological and Toxin 2eapons $onvention + 2$, in '9ME, the #.(. government believes Iran began biological weapon efforts in the early to mid-'9@0s, and that it continues to pursue an offensive biological weapon program lin-ed to its civilian biotechnology activities.=: The #nited (tates alleges that Iran may have started to develop small .uantities of agent, possibly including mycotoxins, ricin, and the smallpox virus.=M Iran strongly denies ac.uiring or producing biological weapons.=@ $hemical Iran suffered severe losses from the use of Ira.i chemical weapons over the period '9@) to '9@@. &s a conse.uence Iran has a great deal of experiences of the effects of chemical warfare +$2,. Iran has continued to maintain a significant defensive $2 capability since the end of the ?ulf 2ar in '9@@. The most important incentive for this effort was probably a concern that Ira. continued to possess chemical weapons. Iran ratified the $hemical 2eapons $onvention +$2$, in %ovember '99M and has been an active participant in the wor- of the /rgani6ation for the 8rohibition of $hemical 2eapons +/8$2,. Iran has publicly ac-nowledged the existence of a chemical weapons program enhanced during the latter stages of the '9@0-'9@@ war with Ira..=9 /n ratifying the $2$ Iran opened its facilities to international inspection and claimed that all offensive $2 activities had been )'

terminated and the facilities destroyed. %evertheless, the #nited (tates has continued to claim that Iran continues an active program of promotion and production of chemical weapons. This production reportedly includes the production of sarin, mustard, phosgene, and hydrocyanic acid. The #.(. government estimates that Iran can manufacture ',000 metric tons of agents per year and may have a stoc-pile of at least several thousand metric tons of weaponi6ed and bul- agent. /pen-sources do not provide unambiguous support to these accusations. Iran strongly denies producing or possessing chemical weapons. To date the #nited (tates has not pursued possibilities available to it under international law to convincingly demonstrate Iranian noncompliance with the $2$.*0 Iran is committed to the development of its civilian and military industries and this has involved an ongoing process of moderni6ation and expansion in the chemical industry aimed at reducing dependence on foreign suppliers of materials and technology. Iue to #.(. claims of ongoing chemical weapons production Iran encounters regular difficulties with chemical industry related imports that are restricted by members of the &ustralia ?roup. Missile Iran possesses one of the largest missile inventories in the Middle East and has ac.uired complete missile systems and developed an infrastructure to build missiles indigenously. It has purchased %orth !orean (cud- s, (cud-$s, and %odong ballistic missiles. Meanwhile, Iran has also developed short-range artillery roc-ets and is producing the (cud- and the (cud-$Jcalled the (hehab-'*' and (hehab-), respectively. Iran recently flight-tested the ',E00 -m-range (hehab-E, which is based on the %orth !orean %odong. The (hehab-E is capable of reaching Israel. >ollowing ))

this most recent flight-test, the (hehab-E was placed in service and revolutionary guard units were officially armed with the missiles.*) There are conflicting reports about the development of even longer-ranged missiles, such as the (hehab-= and the !osar intercontinental ballistic missile +I$ M,. #( intelligence agencies assess that barring ac.uisition of a complete system or maLor subsystem from %orth !orea, Iran is unli-ely to launch an I$ M or satellite launch vehicle +(3<, before mid-decade. &t present, IranFs capabilities in missile production have -ept in line with its doctrine of protection from regional threats. Iran has developed new missiles including the AaFad and !osar and continues to test its %odong based, (hehab-E missile. /n /ctober )0, )00=, Iranian Iefense Minister &li (ham-hani confirmed the latest successful test of IranFs (hehab-E with a ),000--ilometer range in front of observers.
Iran has openly declared its capacity to mass produce the (hehab-E medium-range missile. Intelligence reports regarding IranFs expansion of capabilities and persistent interest in ac.uiring new technologies have led the #( to see- other options in dealing with Iran as a regional threat.

Summary
The arms race in the Middle-East includes all types and methods of warfare. The states are not interested in changing the international order, but to maintain a sustainable level of deterring.

The unconventional weapons and -nowledge, even if hard to obtain legally, is sold by states li-e 8a-istan, %orth !orea and 8A$, in order to increase their powerful influence and prestige in the international arena. The E#, Aussia and the #.( also provide chemical ingredients used for element weapons to various states that can transfer it to third party which can be a terror group. This is not yet the case-as, weFve observed terror groups rarely use unconventional weapons. This privilege is the statesF.

The effort to control unconventional weapons by a string of international treaties has failed even if a state pledges itself to the pact, the treaties lac- punishing abilities therefore their capacity is very limited.

)E

The states in the Middle-East invest huge amounts of resources in order to develop, produce and maintain the unconventional deterrence, as the area is in an arm race. The contradicting religions, ideologies and heterogeneity of the states, together with inferiority feelings ma-e peace process almost impossible.

The international treaties lac- ability to prevent unconventional weaponi6ation either by states or guerilla groups. The lac- of international definition of 5Terror (tate7 prevents any possibility of international resistance and action. Therefore, the only remaining solution is local activity against states armed with unconventional weapons.

)=

#ppendi)
#l iers E !pt Iran Iraq Israel "ib!a *audi #rabia *!ria Turke! +emen 'uclear research research development feasibleP feasible research -P research research (iolo ic research developmentP development feasibleP production developmentP developmentP Chemical developmentP >easible +'9:E, '9:M, feasible '9@9, feasible '9@M-'9@@, production feasible -P production -P +'9@=+'9@E,

)*

):

'

Toward a National Biodefense Strategy Challenges and Opportunities &pril )00E, $enter for $ounterproliferation

Aesearch, %ational Iefense #niversity, >ort 3esley H. Mc%air 2ashington, I$. 2. (eth $arus, Bioterrorism and Biocrimes The !llicit "se of Biological Agents Since #$%%, wor-ing paper +2ashington, I$" $enter for $ounterproliferation Aesearch, %ational Iefense #niversity, >ebruary )00',. (ee also Honathan . Tuc-er, ed., To&ic Terror Assessing Terrorist "se of Chemical and Biological Weapons' +$ambridge, M&" MIT 8ress, )000,K Hoshua 3ederberg, ed., Biological Weapons Limiting the Threat +$ambridge, M&" MIT 8ress, '999,.
)

Milton 3eitenberg, 5&n &ssessment of the iological 2eapons Threat to the #nited (tates,7 The

(ournal of )omeland Security, Hanuary )00'.

Malcolm Iando, N(cientific and technological change and the future of the $2$" the problem of non-lethal weapons,N, *isarmament +orum, <olume =, p.EE-=E, )00).

Elliott Kagan,. "Bioregulators as Prototypic Nontraditional Threat Agents." Clin Lab Med

2006, 26 !2"#!$.
*

Aaymond &. Gilins-as +'999,. Biological Warfare' 3ynne Aienner 8ub. pp. )=M-)*0. Iavid $. 2right, 5&n &nalysis of the %orth !orean Missile 8rogram,7 Aoundtable 8aper, &ppendix III, Commission

toAssess the Ballistic ,issile Threat to the "nited States -.umsfeld Commission .eport/ , Huly '*, '99@, http"QQwww.fas.orgQirpQthreatQmissileQrumsfeldQpt)Rwright.htmK Iavid $. 2right and Timur !adyshev, 5&n &nalysis of the %orth !orean %odong Missile,7 Science and 0lobal Security, <olume =, '99=, http"QQwww.princeton.eduQSglobsecQpublicationsQpdfQ=R)wright.pdf .
M

%orth !orea has a variety of short-range missiles. The !%-0) is thought to be the most accurate, but its range - around

'00 -m - is the shortest. The (cud- and $ have ranges of E00 and *00 -m respectively, while the (cud-I is believed to have a range of M00 -m. It is thought that these missiles could deliver conventional warheads. The (cud- , $ and I have all been tested and deployed. These missiles would enable %orth !orea to stri-e any area in (outh !orea. The !%-0) missile, currently in the testing stage, could be aimed at -ey targets in (outh !orea such as military installations south of the border. The Taepodong-' is a two-stage missile comprising %odong and (cud parts and can reach a distance of ),)00-m, but it is said to be even less accurate than the %odong.

%orth !orea tested a Taepodong-' in &ugust '99@, firing a missile over northern Hapan. It brings #( bases on /-inawa within %orth !oreaFs reach. ut the missile must be fired from a fixed location and has a long preparation time, meaning that potential launches could be detected. & land-based missile, the Taepodong-;, is also said to be under development but has not yet been tested. ased on a (oviet submarine-launched ballistic missile, it is thought to have a range of up to =,000 -m, reaching #( bases on ?uam. #nli-e the Taepodong-', it could be fired from mobile launch systems hidden from view. The Taepodong-) long-range missile is estimated to have a range of between *,000 and :,000 -m, putting &las-a, Bawaii and parts of the west coast of the #( within range. ut the first launch of the missile, in Huly )00:, appeared to be a failure after it crashed within seconds of launch - according to #( sources. If the missile was successfully launched, it is not thought to be particularly accurate or to be able to carry a large warhead. 3i-e the Taepodong-', it re.uires a fixed launch site. The Taepodong-) test too- place from the Musudan-ri complex on the East coast of the !orean peninsula. &nalysis of satellite images of the area appears to show a range of missile fabrication, fuelling, testing and control facilities. http"QQnews.bbc.co.u-Q)QhiQasia-pacificQ)*:=)='.stm
8

&laa Issa, 5The Irivers ehind Missile 8roliferation,7 $enter for %onproliferation (tudies, Monterey Institute of

International (tudies and Mountbatten $enter for International (tudies, #niversity of (outhampton, /ccasional 8aper %o. M, ,issile 1roliferation and *efenses 1roblems and 1rospects, May )00', p. =. The controversial article at the vanguard of studies calling into .uestion the 8atriot4s performance during the ?ulf 2ar is Theodore &. 8ostol, 53essons of the ?ulf 2ar Experience with 8atriot,7 !nternational Security, Winter '99'9), pp. ''9'M'.
9

$harles 3. ?laser and (teve >etter, 5%ational Missile Iefense and the >uture of #.(. %uclear 2eapons 8olicy,7

!nternational Security, (ummer )00', pp. =9, *)*E.

'0

Iennis M. ?ormley +)00@,. ,issile contagion Cruise missile proliferation and the threat to international security . %.1"

8raeger.
''

%TI.org +%uclear Threat Initiative, founded in the #(& by Turner and (enator %unn in )00'. Iany (hoham,NThe Evolution of $hemical and iological 2eapons in Egypt,N &$8A 8olicy 8aper %o. =:,

')

http"QQwww.acpr.org.ilQpublicationsQpolicy-papersQpp0=:-xs.html, '99@K 2olume # The .ise of CB Weapons The 1roblem of Chemical and Biological Warfare3 (toc-holm International 8eace Aesearch Institute, +(toc-holm" &lm.vist T 2is-ell,

'9M',, p. ':0.
'E

!bid, p.=9' ?regory >. ?iles, !ranian Approaches to Chemical Warfare, '* Iecember '99M, p. *K &nthony $ordesman, N$reating

'=

2eapons of Mass Iestruction, Armed +orces (ournal !nternational #45 +>ebruary '9@9,, p. *=. &ccording to the Mosta6afan and Hanba6an +<eterans, >oundation of Iran, over '00,000 were exposed to chemical agents. (ee also <oice of the Islamic Aepublic of Iran, ) Huly )000. http"QQwww.nti.orgQeRresearchQprofilesQIranQ$hemicalQindex.html .
'*

Thirteenth .uarterly report on the activities of the #nited %ations Monitoring, <erification and Inspection $ommission in

accordance with paragraph ') of (ecurity $ouncil resolution ')@=, (Q)00EQ*@0, E0 May )00E, #nited %ations (ecurity $ouncil, p. =0.
':

Thirteenth .uarterly report on the activities of the #nited %ations Monitoring, <erification and Inspection $ommission in

accordance with paragraph ') of (ecurity $ouncil resolution ')@=, (Q)00EQ*@0, E0 May )00E, #nited %ations (ecurity $ouncil, p. *.
'M

New 6or7 Times3 '=th (eptember )00M, p. '. (himon 8eres, +'99*, Battling for Peace: A Memoir. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, p. 132. ased on &vner $ohen +'99@,. !srael and the Bomb' %.1" $olumbia #niv. 8ress. Bedric- (mith, N#.(. &ssumes the Israelis Bave &- omb or its 8arts,N New York Times, 18 July
1970.

'@

'9

)0

Thomas Mc%augher N allistic Missiles and $hemical 2eapons" The 3egacy of the Iran-Ira. 2ar-, !nternational

Security, <ol. '*, %o. ) +&utumn, '990,, pp. *-E=.

)'

This was the first, and only, time in which an insider from the Israeli nuclear program divulged information on the

program. Those revelations implied that IsraelFs nuclear program is more sophisticated and advanced than it had been commonly estimated until then. (ome analysts interpreted the information <anunu provided and concluded that IsraelFs nuclear arsenal may be at the level of '00 to )00 weapons, possibly even some thermonuclear weapons.

))

en-?urionFs letter to &vriel, dated March =, '9=@, is cited in Michael !eren , Ben-Gurion and the ntellectuals (Sdeh
en$%u"ion &ese'"ch (en)e" *"ess, 1988 +in ,e-"e./0, p. 32.

o!e": #he

&vner $ohen, NIsrael and $hemicalQ iological 2eapons" Bistory, Ieterrence, and &rms $ontrol,N The Non!roliferation
"e#iew 8 (1'll$Win)e" 20010, pp. 29$30.
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(ara 3eibovit6-Iar, NBayda-im esherut BamedinahN CMicrobes in (tate (erviceD, $adashot, 2u3us) 13, 1993, pp. 4$

10.

)=

Ephraim !at6ir, NThe eginning of Iefense Aesearch" en ?urion and the BEMEIN +in Bebrew,, in %a#id Ben-Gurion

and the %e#elo!ment of &cience in srael (Je"us'le5: 6s"'el N')ion'l 2c'de5y of Science, 19890, p. 37. 7uny' 7'"do", "A'A() (#el 28i8: 7inis)"y of 9efense *u-lic')ion, 19810, pp. :3$44, 78$79, 10;$04.
)*

&t that time, it was not illegal for states to develop such capabilitiesK establishing national $ 2 programs was not at odds

with international norms. &ll three maLor 2estern +and %&T/, powersJthe #nited (tates, the #nited !ingdom, and >ranceJhad significant $ 2 programs. ergmann was well aware of the activities of those programs. 2hile the ?eneva protocol of '9)* prohibited first use of $ 2, it said nothing about developing, producing, or even using of those weapons in strict retaliatory fashion.
):

NIsraeli (ee $hemical /ption &gainst Ira.,N New 6or7 Times, 28 July 1990.

1u")he" "e'din3s: %e"'ld S)ein-e"3, <6s"'eli *olicy on )he (W(,< *P+, &-nthesis, No8e5-e" 2000, pp. 9$13.

(teve Aodan, N itter $hoices" IsraelFs $hemical Iilemma,N .erusalem Post, 1: 2u3us) 1997, p. 10=
7'!o8s!y, <6s"'el 7us) &')ify (he5ic'l #"e')y,< $a/aret0, J'nu'"y 8, 1998= 2luf (on8en)ion: 6s"'el>s 9ecision #i5e,<

9'8id

enn, <(he5ic'l We'pons

ulle)in of )he 2)o5ic Scien)is)s :7 (7'"ch$2p"il 20010, pp. 22$2;.

GeFev (chiff, N&n interview with 1it6ha- Mordechai,N $a/aret0, 14 2p"il 1998, p. 10.
)M

NIassault 3ifts the 3id /n The Hericho Missile (tory +Iassault 3Uve 3e <oile (ur 3e Missile Hericho,,N Air 8

Cosmos9A:iation !nternational, : Iecember '99:, p. E:.

)@

N#.(. Miffed at Hericho Missile Test,N (erusalem 1ost, E May )000. This article reports the test-flight of a Hericho-I

missile. & -nowledgeable source interviewed by $%( reports that the Hericho I was not operational at the time of the '9ME war. Iouglas >rant6, NIsrael &dds >uel to %uclear >ire,N Los Angeles Times3 ') /ctober )00E, http"QQwww.iai.co.ilQsiteQenQiai.aspPpiV)E0=@TdocRidV):MM@. /n the Hericho IIIQHericho-E, see N& must read about IsraelFs military machine,N (erusalem 1ost, 9 &ugust '99: and Encyclopedia &stronautica, NHericho ),N http"QQwww.astronautix.comQlvsQLericho).htm.
)9

&s of /ctober )00E, according to Aussian Ministry of &tomic Energy officials, the ushehr reactor is set to go online in

)00*, postponed a year from )00= because of the need to replace certain e.uipment.
E0

&-bar Etemad, NIran,N in A ;uropean Non-1roliferation 1olicy, edited by Barald Muller, +/xford" $larendon 8ress,

'9@M,, p. )').
E'

NImplementation of the %8T (afeguards &greement in the Islamic Aepublic of Iran,N Aeport by the Iirector-?eneral,

!nternational Atomic ;nergy Agency, ?/<Q)00EQ=0, '9 Hune )00E, http"QQwww.iaea.orgQworldatomQIocumentsQ oardQ)00EQgov)00E-=0.pdf.

&dditional 8rotocol is a voluntary agreement signed by each country with the I&E&, which allows for more intrusive inspections to be conducted by the I&E& inspectors. The inspectors may re.uest and the state must grant access to any place on a nuclear site or to any other facility, declared or not, where the I&E& suspects a nuclear activity. ?lobal (ecurity %ewswire, NIran (igns &dditional 8rotocol,N '@ Iecember )00E, http"QQwww.nti.orgQdRnewswireQissuesQ)00ER')R'@.htmlW$@E:&M@:. NIran (igns &dditional 8rotocol on %uclear (afeguards,N I&E&, '@ Iecember )00E, http"QQwww.iaea.orgQ. NImplementation of the %8T (afeguards &greement in the Islamic Aepublic of Iran, Aesolution adopted by the oard on '@ Hune )00=,N I&E&, '@ Hune )00=, http"QQwww.iaea.orgQ8ublicationsQIocumentsQ oardQ)00=Qgov)00=-=9.pdfQ. NImplementation of the %8T (afeguards &greement in the Islamic Aepublic of Iran, Aeport by the Iirector ?eneral,N I&E&, ' Hune )00=, http"QQwww.iaea.orgQ8ublicationsQIocumentsQ oardQ)00=Qgov)00=-E=.pdfQ.
32

3ouis $harbonneau, NEl

aradei wary of ta-ing Iran to (ecurity $ouncil,N Aeuters, @ Huly )00=,

http"QQwww.iranexpert.comQ. N(anctions against Iran FunacceptableF, Aussian minister,N &>8, 'M %ovember )00E, http"QQwww.iranexpert.comQK &rnaud de orchgrave, NIran in bombsightsPN Washington Times, * Huly )00=.
EE

I&E& report, ?/<Q)00EQ=0, paras M and '@K ?/<Q)00=Q@E, paras '= and MEM=. Implementation of the %8T (afeguards &greement and relevant provisions of (ecurity

E=

$ouncil resolutions 'MEM +)00:,, 'M=M +)00M,, '@0E +)00@, and '@E* +)00@, in the Islamic Aepublic of Iran. Aeport by the Iirector ?eneral.
E*

>or more detail on the configuration of >E8, see ?/<Q)00@QE@, para. ). B. (oulayman, 5Iran taEridu -hibrataha limousaEadat &l La6aaer,7 CIran /ffers Its Expertise to Belp &lgeriaD, el-7habar,

E:

%ovember )9, )00:.

EM

5Iran taEridu Ela al6aLaa4r ta.asum -hebratiha fi al maLal annawawi,7 CIran /ffers to (hare Its %uclear Expertise with

&lgeriaD, al-shar<, %ovember )9, )00:.

E@

$ Monitoring in >irst ?lobal (elect, Iecember ):, )00:, 5Iran /ffers &lgeria Its %uclear Expertise" ?ratitude or

8loyP,7 http"QQwww.firstglobalselect.comQscriptsQcgiip.wscQglobaloneQhtmQnewsRarticle.rPvcnews-idV=EM9M).
E9

$ Monitoring in >irst ?lobal (elect, 5&lgeria Bolds 8reliminary Iiscussions with I&E& on %uclear 8ower,7

%ovember ):, )00:, original source" Le (eune !ndependant website, &lgiers, in >rench, %ovember :, )00:, http"QQwww.firstglobalselect.comQscriptsQcgiip.wscQglobaloneQhtmQnewsRarticle.rPvcnews-idV=')9'9.

=0

(ee 5%on-&ligned Aealigning to $onfront Iran,7 W,* !nsights, March )00: issue,

http"QQwww.wmdinsights.comQIEQ?)R?lobalRIran.htm.
='

/vert Iranian assistance in this area would not be feasible, because, under (ecurity $ouncil Aesolution 'MEM, all #%

member states are currently prohibited from procuring enrichment technology from Iran. (ee #% (ecurity $ouncil Aesolution 'MEM, http"QQwww.un.orgQ%ewsQ8ressQdocsQ)00:Qsc@9)@.doc.htm.
=)

The 2hite Bouse, 58resident &nnounces %ew Measures to $ounter the Threat of 2MI,7 >ebruary '', )00=,

http"QQwww.whitehouse.govQnewsQreleasesQ)00=Q0)Q)00=0)''-=.html.
=E

>ederation of &merican (cientists, 5&lgeria (pecial 2eapons 8rogram,7 /ctober )*, )00:,

http"QQwww.fas.orgQnewsQalgeriaK Ianiel 8in-ston, 5&lgeria (ee-s %uclear $ooperation with (outh !orea as (eoul 8repares %ew %uclear 8lans,7 W,* !nsights, Hune )00:, http"QQwww.wmdinsights.comQI:QI:R&>)R&lgeria(ee-s.htm.

==

$ Monitoring Middle East - 8olitical March M, )00=, 5&lgeria" #.(. 8ressure /ver $ountry4s %uclear $apabilities,7

Libert= website, &lgiers, in >rench March M, )00=, http"QQwww.globalsecurity.orgQorgQnewsQ)00=Q0=0E0M-algerianuclear.htm. >or additional bac-ground, see M. ?on6ale6 and H.M. 3arraya, 5(panish Intelligence 2arns of &lgerian %uclear 8otential,7 ;l 1ais, &ugust )E, '99@, in >ederation of &merican (cientists, http"QQwww.fas.orgQnewsQalgeriaQfbistac-9@-)E*.htmK Iavid &lbright and $orey Binderstein, 5&lgeria" ig Ieal in the IesertP7 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists +MayQHune )00', Chttp"QQwww.thebulletin.orgQarticle.phpPartRofnVmL0'albrightD.
=*

!halid Bilal, N&lgeria announces plans for expanded nuclear energy programK Iran offers to help.N

WMD Insights, February, 2007, Monterey Institute Center for Nonproliferation Studies , http"QQwww.wmdinsights.comQI')QI')R&>'RIran&lgeria/ffer.htm .
=:

N$urrent and 8roLected %ational (ecurity Threats to the #nited (tates and its Interests &broad,N $entral Intelligence

&gency, written responses to .uestions before the (elect $ommittee on Intelligence of the #nited (tates (enate, Bearing '0=-*'0, h))p:??....f's.o"3?i"p?con3"ess?1994@h"?s940222c.h)5. ?regory >. ?iles +)000,, NThe Islamic Aepublic of Iran and %uclear, iological, and $hemical 2eapons,N in 8eter A. 3avoy, (cott I. (agan, and Hames H. 2irt6, eds., Planning The 1nthinka2le: $ow New Powers ,ill 1se Nuclear,
Biological, and +hemical ,ea!ons. 6)h'c': (o"nell Ani8e"si)y *"ess, p. 8;.
=M

&nthony $ordesman, N2eapons of Mass Iestruction in Iran, $(I(,

h))p:??....csis.o"3?5ide's)?"epo")s?W79in6"'n;$28$98.h)5l. < iolo3ic'l W'"f'"e: #he *oo" 7'n>s

2)o5ic o5-$6"'n,< .ane/s ntelligence "e#iew, 1 7'"ch 1999.

arbara (tarr, NIran Bas <ast (toc-piles of $2 &gents, (ays $I&, N .ane/s %efense ,eekl-, 1; 2u3us) 1994, p. 3.
=@

The Sunday Times citing a $I& report" NIran uilds iological &rsenal,N The &unda- Times, 11 2u3us) 1994= 2n)hony

(o"des5'n, <We'pons of 7'ss 9es)"uc)ion in 6"'n, (S6S,

h))p:??....csis.o"3?5ide's)?"epo")s?W79in6"'n;$28$98.h)5l.
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?regory >. ?iles, ranian A!!roaches to +hemical ,arfare, 1: 9ece5-e" 1997, p. := 2n)hony (o"des5'n,

<("e')in3 We'pons of 7'ss 9es)"uc)ion, Armed 'orces .ournal nternational 345 (1e-"u'"y 19890, p. :;. 2cco"din3 )o )he 7os)'B'f'n 'nd J'n-'B'n (Ce)e"'ns0 1ound')ion of 6"'n, o8e" 100,000 .e"e eDposed )o che5ic'l '3en)s. See 'lso Coice of )he 6sl'5ic &epu-lic of 6"'n, 2 July 2000.

NEnvoy to #% interviewed on $hemical 2eapons Issuese,N Tehran Iomestic (ervice in 8ersian, )) &pril '9@M, translated in > I(-(&(-@M-0M@, )E &pril '9@M, p. ''. #.(. Iepartment of Iefense, Proliferation: Threat and "es!onse, 2: No8e5-e" 1997,
h))p:??....defenselin!.5il?pu-s?p"olif97?5e'f"ic'.h)5lE5iddle.
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2eapons of Mass Iestruction in the Middle East, $enter for %onproliferation (tudies, Monterey Institute of International

(tudies, http"QQwww.cns.miis.eduQresearchQwmdmeQiran.htmK >ederation of &merican (cientists, http"QQwww.fas.orgQnu-eQguideQiranQcwQindex.htmlK &ndrew Aathmell, NIranFs 2eapons of Mass Iestruction,N .ane/s
ntelligence "e#iew F Speci'l &epo") No. 4, June 199:, p. 14.

ill ?ert6, N$hina &ided Iran $hemical &rms,N ,ashington Times, 30 Gc)o-e" 1997, p. 1= H"ic ("oddy .i)h John ,'")
'nd (l'"iss' *e"eB$2l5end'"iB, +hemical and Biological ,arfare: A +om!rehensi#e &ur#e- for the +oncerned +iti0en, (Ne. Io"!: (ope"nicus oo!s0, p. ;2= 1ede"')ion of 25e"ic'n Scien)is)s,

h))p:??....f's.o"3?nu!e?3uide?i"'n?c.?indeD.h)5l.

arbara (tarr, NIran Bas <ast (toc-piles of $2 &gents, (ays $I&, N .ane/s %efense ,eekl-, 1; 2u3us) 1994, p. 3. ill ?ert6, N$hina &ided Iran $hemical &rms,N ,ashington Times, 30 Gc)o-e" 1997, p. 1= 2nd"e. &')h5ell, <6"'n>s
We'pons of 7'ss 9es)"uc)ion,< .ane/s ntelligence "e#iew F Speci'l &epo") No. 4, June 199:, p. 17.
*'

(hehab meteor in Iranian. 8ress reports during the late '9@0s suggesting that Iran was manufacturing the 8A$ versions of the >A/? or (cud- are

*)

incorrect. ates ?ill, N$hinese &rms Exports to IranN ,eria (ournal, <ol. ), %umber ), March '99@K ill ?ert6, N$hina Hoins >orces 2ith Iran on (hort-range Missile,N Washington Times, 'M Hune '99M, p. &EK NIsraeli Aeport on %uclear Targeting 8riorities,N *a:ar, 'E Hanuary '99*, p. '*, as cited in H8A(K Iouglas Hehl, NIran is Aeported &c.uiring Missiles,N New 6or7 Times, @ &pril '99E, p. &9K &rnold eichman, NIranFs /ngoing &rms-buying inge,N Washington Times, = Hune '99), p. ?EK 3ally 2eymouth, NIran Aesurgent,N Washington 1ost, '0 &pril '99)K Hohn 2 3ewis, Ii Bua, and 3itai ;ue,

N eiLingFs Iefense Establishment" (olving the &rms-Export Enigma,N !nternational Security, (pring '99', pp. @M-'09. The I>-'*QM-9 was reported to have first been tested during Hune '9@@, and was expected to begin production the summer of '990. (ee Iavid . /ttaway, N$hina (ale Aeport $oncerns #.(.,N Washington 1ost, )E Hune '9@@, p. &EEK and Michael A. ?ordon, N eiLing &voids %ew Missile (ales &ssurances,N New 6or7 Times, E0 March '990, p. &M. The (hahab-= has variously been reported as being as having a range of ),000-),=00-m with a ',000-g warhead and being a derivative of the I8A!Fs %odong or AussiaFs A-') +((-= (&%I&3,. This later reference comes from sources that state that the (hahab-= is powered by the AI-)'= engine, which was originally used in the A-'). These engines were supplied by the Energomash (cience and 8roduction &ssociation in !him-y, Aussia. (teve Aodan, NIsrael Iiffers 2ith $I& on Iran Missiles,N ,iddle ;ast Newsline, )) Iecember )000K N$I& Aeport on Iran <iewed as $onfirming Israeli $oncern,N 1ediFot &haronot, '@ Hanuary )000, p. 9K ill ?ert6, NIran (old (cud Missiles to $ongolese,N Washington Times, '' %ovember '999, p. &'K &rieh /F(ullivan, N(yrian (uper (cud Aeady (oon - (ource,N (erusalem 1ost, '* (eptember '999K NIran F&rmed and (afeF )0 1ears &fter Aevolution,N .euters, M >ebruary '999K NIran Ielayed Missile Test Iue to 8roblem,N Aeuters, )0 Hanuary '999K N8art II of IranFs Missile 8rogram &rticle,N !>:estiya, )) /ctober '99@, p. *, as cited in > I(K Martin (ieff, NIranFs 3ong-range Missile 8lans 2orry %etanyahu,N Washington Times, ' /ctober '99@K ill ?ert6, N3onger Aange on Iranian Missile (hehab-= $ould Bit $entral Europe,N Washington Times, )9 Huly '99@, p. &')K ?ideon &lon, N(yria, Iran X(toc-ing #p &rmsF,N )a?aret>, )E Hune '99@K ill ?ert6, NAussia, $hina and IranFs missile program,N Washington Times, '0 (eptember '99M, p. &'K and ill ?ert6, NAussia (ells Iran Missile Metals $ontract $ontrary to /fficial Ienials,N Washington Times, )0 /ctober '99M, p. &'. 9:*' 2ords in the article, including endnotes.