Republic v.

Cagandahan FACTS: On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, of Siniloan, Laguna; such that, her name be changed to Jeff and her gender to male. She was born in January 13, 1981, and was registered as female, having the name Jennifer Cagandahan. While growing up, she was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperpplasia (CAH), a condition where the person thus afflicted possesses both male and female characteristics. She was also diagnosed to have clitoral hypertrophy, small ovaries, no breast, and menstrual development. She alleged that for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become a male person. ISSUE: WON the correction of entries in her birth certificate be granted. HELD: Yes. The court considered the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial. The Court views that where a person is biologically or naturally intersex, the determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, having reached the age of maturity, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. The respondent here thinks of himself as a male considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones. There is preponderant biological support for considering him as a male. US v. Windsor Oral argument: March 27, 2013 Court below: United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Edith Windsor and Thea Spyer married in Toronto in 2007 where same-sex marriages were legal. At the time of Spyers death, the state of New York recognized the couples marriage. However, the IRS denied Windsor use of a spousal estate tax exception on the ground that, under the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), the federal government did not recognize same-sex marriages for the purpose of federal benefits. The Supreme Court is now being asked to decide DOMAs Constitutionality. The Obama Administration is not

defending DOMA, so a Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (BLAG) from the House of Representatives is doing so, arguing that DOMA is rationally related to the legitimate government objective of providing a uniform definition of marriage for federal benefits purposes. The Obama administration counters that the use of sexual orientation to decide who gets benefits is a suspect classification that deserves higher scrutiny. Under that level of higher scrutiny, the Obama administration argues that DOMA is impermissible. This case can affect what role the federal government can play in defining marriage and who in the federal government can defend the governments laws. Not only could this case provide large tax savings to Ms. Windsor herself, but it can also make federal benefits available to other same-sex couples who are legally married under the laws of their state. QUESTIONS AS FRAMED FOR THE COURT BY THE PARTIES: Section 3 of DOMA defines the term marriage for all purposes under federal law, including the provision of federal benefits, as only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife. 1 U.S.C. 7. It similarly defines the term spouse as a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife. Ibid. The question presented is: Whether Section 3 of DOMA violates the Fifth Amendments guarantee of equal protectionof the laws as applied to persons of the same sex who are legally married under the laws of their state. In addition to the question presented by the petition, the parties are directed to brief and argue the following questions: whether the executive branchs agreement with the court below that DOMA is unconstitutional deprives this court of jurisdiction to decide this case; and whether the BLAG has Article III standing in this case. ISSUE The substantive issue is whether Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act violates the right to equal protection of same-sex couples who are legally married under state law. The procedural issue is whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this case in light of the executive branchs refusal to defend the law in court.

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FACTS Edith Windsor and Thea Clara Spyer first met in New York City in 1963. Having been in a committed long-term relationship, they registered as domestic partners in New York in 1993, the year such partnership status became available. In light of Spyers long-term suffering caused by multiple sclerosis and a heart condition, the couple decided to formally wed in Canada in 2007. Spyer passed away in February 2009, leaving Windsor as her widow and sole executor of the estate. Their marriage was recognized by New York state law but, upon Spyers death, Windsor was denied a spousal deduction for her federal estate taxes under a federal law. This provision allows such a deduction when property passes from the decedent to the surviving spouse. However, DOMAs Section 3 states that for the purposes of federal law the words marriage and spouse refer only to legal unions between one man and one woman. , Because of this definition, when Spyer left her estate to Windsor, the federal government imposed $363,053 in taxes on Spyers estate. Had the government recognized their marriage, the estate would have qualified for the spousal exemption and Windsor would not have had to pay any taxes. Windsor commenced this suit seeking a full refund of the federal estate tax and a declaration that DOMAs Section 3 is unconstitutional under the equal protection clause of the Fifth Amendment. At that time, the governments position was that DOMA must be defended. However, the President and the Attorney General eventually changed positions and announced that they would no longer defend DOMA in court. Accordingly, under the direction of House Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio), BLAG has taken up defense of DOMA. After the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York ruled in favor of Windsor on summary judgment, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. DISCUSSION The Obama Administration argues Section 3, which defines marriage as between one man and one woman, is unconstitutional under

the equal protection clause and advocates for heightened scrutiny of laws discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation. BLAG argues that the Court should apply the lowest level of scrutiny, rational basis review, because the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) community is not a protected class. . Since all parties agree the Supreme Court has jurisdiction, the Court appointed an amica curiae to argue against jurisdiction. The amica curiae argues there is no injury to Congress if DOMA is overturned, that BLAG violates the separation of powers, and that noArticle III controversy exists. DOMAS EFFECTS ON THE ECONOMY DOMA supporters claim the law will save the federal government money by limiting tax savings and avoiding Social Security and other payments to same-sex spouses. According to BLAG,upholding DOMA is in the best financial interests of the government because recognizing same-sex marriages would have a negative net impact on the federal budget.BLAG argues that while the negative effects cannot accurately be calculated, the uncertain economic effects of overturning DOMA are worrisome enough. 278 businesses are opposed to DOMA and argue the law is another form of government regulation burdening businesses, inevitably leading to the waste of resources. Businesses are required to treat employees with same-sex spouses as legally married under state law, but as single persons under federal laws, which creates a burden for employers by forcing them to discriminate against same-sex couples when administering healthcare plans and other benefits. The companies also argue that forced discrimination causes strained employer-employee relationships to the detriment of their businesses. THE SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF DOMA BLAG argues DOMA serves a federal interest by preserving traditional marriage to encourage responsible procreation. Proponents of DOMA believe marriage is about bringing together men and women so children can have mothers and fathers parents with differentiated roles that are not interchangeable. BLAG

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claims responsible procreation is at the heart of societys interest in regulating marriage because of the inextricable link between marriage and children. Those opposed to DOMA argue it is bad social policy and claim that all Americansregardless of their sexual orientationdeserve the rights afforded to their peers because all are contributing members of society. They also argue that burdens placed on members of the LGBT community are based on harmful stereotypes with no basis in the individuals abilities. FEDERALISM CONCERNS Proponents of DOMA claim the law protects states sovereignty and neither creates a federalism problem nor hinders state autonomy. DOMA ensures states can independently decide to refuse same-sex marriages because DOMA allows each state to define marriage for itself under state law, and does not allow any states definition to eclipse anothers. Those opposed to DOMA claim Congress disregarded federalism concerns, even as legislators in Congress championed states rights. Although the policy was born from conservative states concern that they might be forced to recognize same-sex marriages from other states, opponents argue DOMA interferes with states rights by hampering some states decisions to treat all of their citizens equally. State sovereignty, they argue, is impeded by the federal governments definition of marriage, instead of leaving the definition up to the individual states. JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES If the Court rules that it does not have jurisdiction because of the Obama administrations decision not to defend DOMA, the Second Circuits ruling would remain in place andDOMA would be considered unconstitutional and unenforceable in the states within the Second Circuit. DOMA would remain in force in circuits which have not ruled it unconstitutional, which would allow a future case to be appealed to the Supreme Court for which there is jurisdiction. If

the Court holds that there is a lack of jurisdiction, then it will not decide the constitutionality of DOMA. ANALYSIS LEVEL OF SCRUTINY The Obama administration, arguing on behalf of the United States, takes the position that DOMAs Section 3 is unconstitutional. The United States advocates for applying heightened scrutiny, which requires a more rigorous justification for laws that use suspect or semi-suspect classifications including race or gender. The United States is arguing that classifications based on sexual orientation should also be subject to heightened scrutiny, which requires the government to show that the classification is substantially related to an important government objective. According to the United States and Windsor, classifications based on sexual orientation fit all four of the factors the Court has identified to trigger heightened scrutiny. First, the United States points out gay and lesbian people have been subject to a history of discrimination, including a history of criminal prosecutions for the private and consensual sexual conduct, and other discrimination in employment, immigration, hate crimes, child custody, police enforcement, and voter referenda. Windsor notes that much of this discrimination has come from the government itself. Second, sexual orientation is not related to the ability of people to perform or contribute to society, so the government cannot legitimately take sexual orientation into account for classification purposes. Third, sexual orientation is a discernible characteristic that distinguishes gay and lesbian people as a discrete minority group. The United States contends the distinguishing characteristic need not be immutable or obvious if the characteristic is a distinguishing characteristic. The United States and Windsor point to scientific consensus that sexual orientation is not a voluntary choice for the vast majority of people. Fourth, the United States contends that gay and lesbian people are both a minority and politically powerless. While the United States does mention success for same-sex marriage initiatives in three states

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this past November, the United States argues it is more appropriate to look at the longer history of same-sex marriage initiatives where voters have barred same-sex marriage through amendments to state constitutions. . Windsor also asserts he political power of gay and lesbian people today is less than that of women when they were granted status as a semi-suspect class. BLAG argues that the Court should apply rational basis review to DOMA. . BLAG points out that the Court will apply one of three levels of scrutiny to equal protection cases ranging from heightened scrutiny to rational basis, which requires the government to provide a rational justification for using a particular classification in a law. When considering issues where sexual orientation was used as a classification in the past, the Court has not specified the level of scrutiny but appeared to apply rational basis review. BLAG contends the lower court was wrong to apply heightened scrutiny to DOMA In BLAGs view, none of the four factors that would qualify a class for suspect treatment are adequate in this case. Instead, BLAG sees gay and lesbian people as having political power, including the support on the issue of same-sex marriage from the President, Vice-President, and the Democratic Party. Additionally, popular support for same-sex marriage has increased dramatically enjoying support from 53% of Americans, which has resulted in successful ballot measures, and in BLAGs view undercutting the argument that heightened scrutiny is necessary. . BLAG also notes that it has been over 40 years since the Court has decided a new group should be considered a suspect or semi-suspect class, demonstrating the Court is weary of adding to the very limited list of groups that trigger higher levels of scrutiny. WHETHER DOMA SHOULD SURVIVE REVIEW ON THE MERITS Under the rational basis standard of review, the government needs to demonstrate a legitimate purpose for using the suspect classification, which in this case would be classifying same-sex marriage differently from traditional opposite-sex marriage. BLAG argues that the legitimate purpose Congress advanced is a uniform national definition of marriage to ensure couples in different states will be

treated the same. Allowing different definitions of marriage would, according to BLAG, allow for the possibility that a same-sex couples federal benefits status would change if they moved from one state to another. BLAG also points to the historical prevalence of marriage being defined as between a man and a woman as a reason why DOMAs definition is rational. Furthermore, BLAG asserts the fact that states have been able to define marriage for the purposes of defining federal benefits in the past does not mean that the Constitution forbids Congress from defining marriage for the purposes of federal benefits. BLAG argues that DOMA merely preserves the ability of each sovereign, including each state and the federal government, to define marriage as the sovereign sees fit. Additionally, BLAG says DOMA was an attempt to prevent the federal definition of marriage from changing over time. A single, consistent definition of marriage would prevent more expansive definitions of marriage that could increase the costs of implementing federal benefits based on marital status. Finally, BLAG argues it was rational to pick a traditional definition of marriage because Congress believed there could be uncertain social consequences if it allowed a definition of marriage that had not been tested in many societies. On the other side, the United States argues that DOMA is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The United States contends DOMAs Section 3 requires that same-sex couples who are married under their states law be treated differently from a similarly situated opposite-sex couple and lead to inequality. To demonstrate this inequality, the United States points to a variety of situations where federal benefits can be denied to same-sex spouses including certain Social Security and pension benefits, military service benefits for spouses, and particularly the $363,000 estate tax reduction that is denied to a same-sex spouse at issue in the case presently before the court. Next, the United States does not believe tradition alone can justify discrimination.Furthermore, DOMA does not prevent states from allowing same-sex marriage, which provides a weak connection

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between the stated goal of preserving traditional marriage and what DOMA actually achieves. Additionally, the United States dismisses the justification of supporting Congress general interest in defending the institution of traditional marriage as lacking a sound basis. The legislative record does not contain evidence that denying federal benefits to same-sex couples would encourage responsible procreation or childrearing. The United States also rejects the sovereigns choice argument because sovereigns choice does not allow the federal government to violate Equal Protection. Finally, the United States refutes fiscal savings as a justification for DOMA because the federal government cannot single out a group for exclusion to save money. If the Court does not apply a heightened standard of review, the United States would not challenge DOMAs Constitutionality under a deferential form of rational review. The government does reference past Supreme Court decisions Romer v. Evans and Lawrence v. Texas which suggested a more searching version of rational review could invalidate laws involving discrimination based on sexual orientation, but a more searching rational review would make DOMA unconstitutional for the same reasons as under heightened security. Unlike the United States, Windsor argues that Congress did not act rationally or carefully when enacting DOMA. DOMA is very sweeping, affecting thousands of federal benefits rather than carefully addressing a specific problem. Also, DOMA departs from the traditional understanding of how the federal government treats a state recognized marriage. ROLE OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IN DEFINING MARRIAGE The Court could place special importance on the fact that this is a federal law about marriage, an issue that has traditionally been left to the states, as both the United States and Windsor argue. BLAG contends that Congress was acting within its sovereign authority and other groups support DOMA as being allowed under the Necessary and Proper clause, which is an expansive provision of the Constitution allowing the government an un-enumerated power so

long as that power is necessary and proper to an enumerated power, which in this case is the federal governments power to tax. Federal Scholars argue that DOMA is not necessary and proper for Congress to carry out any enumerated power as DOMA affects many different kinds of benefits, not just benefits related to the power of the purse. DOMA could therefore be found to be improper as a new, sweeping expansion of Congressional power without requiring the Court to decide whether classifications based on sexual orientation were suspect. WHETHER JURISDICTIONAL CONCERNS SHOULD PREVENT THE COURT FROM A DECISION ON THE MERITS Before reaching a decision on the merits, the court could decide that this case is not properly before the Court and remand it for further proceedings because the Obama administration has chosen to enforce, but not defend, DOMA. Members of the House of Repetitive have chosen to defend DOMA on behalf of the government as BLAG. BLAG, the Obama administration, and Windsor all agree that with BLAG defending DOMA and the executive branch enforcing DOMA, there is still a live controversy for the Supreme Court to decide. Windsor has a cause of action against the United States government for the recovery of the tax refund. While Windsor admits she may not have a separate claim against BLAG, BLAGs participation ensures that the issues are fully argued and the issues are sharpened for the Court. In order to get the alternative view, the Court appointed an amica curiae to argue against the Courts jurisdiction over Windsors case because of the procedural posture. The amica curiae argues that BLAG lacks standing because there is no injury to Congress if DOMA is overturned; members of Congress do not have a personal stake in this litigation. Also, one house of Congress, or in this case a subsection of one house, cannot assert an injury for Congress as a whole. The amica curiae also contends that in defending DOMA, BLAG would be performing an executive act that violates separation of power principles. Theamica curiae further argues that the Executive Branchs appeal to the judgment of the Second Circuit does not create a case

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or controversy required under Article III for the Supreme Court to decide an issue. CONCLUSION In this case, the Supreme Court will determine the Constitutionality of Section 3 of DOMA. Windsor argues that DOMA is unconstitutional as it tramples on her right to equal protection under the Fifth Amendment. BLAG argues that DOMA is constitutional and the law should undergo minimal scrutiny under a rational basis test because sexual orientation is not a historically protected class. The Courts decision may uphold the federal governments definition of marriage as between one man and one woman, which would continue to allow for each state to decide for itself whether to recognize same-sex unions in its own state and those from other states. Alternatively, the Court may go so far as to fully overturn DOMA and require that each state legally recognize same-sex marriages, which would allow for spouses of same-sex partners to receive a plethora of federal benefits they are currently denied. QUIAO V. QUIAO G.R. No 176556, [July 04, 2012] FACTS: Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal separation against petitioner Brigido B. Quiao (Brigido). RTC rendered a decision declaring the legal separation thereby awarding the custody of their 3 minor children in favor of Rita and all remaining properties shall be divided equally between the spouses subject to the respective legitimes of the children and the payment of the unpaid conjugal liabilities. Brigidos share, however, of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children because Brigido is the offending spouse. Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration and appeal within the period 270 days later or after more than nine months from the promulgation of the Decision, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Clarification, asking the RTC to define the term Net Profits Earned.

RTC held that the phrase NET PROFIT EARNED denotes the remainder of the properties of the parties after deducting the separate properties of each [of the] spouse and the debts. It further held that after determining the remainder of the properties, it shall be forfeited in favor of the common children because the offending spouse does not have any right to any share of the net profits earned, pursuant to Articles 63, No. (2) and 43, No. (2) of the Family Code. The petitioner claims that the court a quo is wrong when it applied Article 129 of the Family Code, instead of Article 102. He confusingly argues that Article 102 applies because there is no other provision under the Family Code which defines net profits earned subject of forfeiture as a result of legal separation. ISSUES: 1. Whether Art 102 on dissolution of absolute community or Art 129 on dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains is applicable in this case. Art 129 will govern. 2. Whether the offending spouse acquired vested rights overof the properties in the conjugal partnership NO. 3. Is the computation of net profits earned in the conjugal partnership of gains the same with the computation of net profits earned in the absolute community? NO. RATIO: 1. First, since the spouses were married prior to the promulgation of the current family code, the default rule is that In the absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall govern the property relations between husband and wife. Second, since at the time of the dissolution of the spouses marriage the operative law is already the Family Code, the same applies in the instant case and the applicable law in so far as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets and liabilities is concerned is Article 129 of the Family Code in relation to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. 2. The petitioner is saying that since the property relations between the spouses is governed by the regime of Conjugal Partnership of Gains under the Civil Code, the petitioner acquired vested rights over

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half of the properties of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains, pursuant to Article 143 of the Civil Code, which provides: All property of the conjugal partnership of gains is owned in common by the husband and wife. While one may not be deprived of his vested right, he may lose the same if there is due process and such deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence. In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to due process. First, he was well-aware that the respondent prayed in her complaint that all of the conjugal properties be awarded to her. In fact, in his Answer, the petitioner prayed that the trial court divide the community assets between the petitioner and the respondent as circumstances and evidence warrant after the accounting and inventory of all the community properties of the parties. Second, when the decision for legal separation was promulgated, the petitioner never questioned the trial courts ruling forfeiting what the trial court termed as net profits, pursuant to Article 129(7) of the Family Code. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim being deprived of his right to due process. 3. When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the husband and the wife become joint owners of all the properties of the marriage. Whatever property each spouse brings into the marriage, and those acquired during the marriage (except those excluded under Article 92 of the Family Code) form the common mass of the couples properties. And when the couples marriage or community is dissolved, that common mass is divided between the spouses, or their respective heirs, equally or in the proportion the parties have established, irrespective of the value each one may have originally owned. In this case, assuming arguendo that Art 102 is applicable, since it has been established that the spouses have no separate properties, what will be divided equally between them is simply the net profits. And since the legal separationshare decision of Brigido states that the in the net profits shall be awarded to the children, Brigido will still be left with nothing.

On the other hand, when a couple enters into a regime of conjugal partnership of gains under Article142 of the Civil Code, the husband and the wife place in common fund the fruits of their separate property and income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage. From the foregoing provision, each of the couple has his and her own property and debts. The law does not intend to effect a mixture or merger of those debts or properties between the spouses. Rather, it establishes a complete separation of capitals. In the instant case, since it was already established by the trial court that the spouses have no separate properties, there is nothing to return to any of them. The listed properties above are considered part of the conjugal partnership. Thus, ordinarily, what remains in the above-listed properties should be divided equally between the spouses and/or their respective heirs. However, since the trial court found the petitioner the guilty party, his share from the net profits of the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. Again, lest we be confused, like in the absolute community regime, nothing will be returned to the guilty party in the conjugal partnership regime, because there is no separate property which may be accounted for in the guilty partys favor. Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. BPI Employees Union-Davao Chapter-Federation of Unions in BPI Unibank, G.R. No. 164301. October 19, 2011. FACTS: On March 23, 2000, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas approved the Articles of Merger executed on January 20, 2000 by and between BPI, herein petitioner, and FEBTC.[ This Article and Plan of Merger was approved by the Securities and Exchange Commission on April 7, 2000.Pursuant to the Article and Plan of Merger, all the assets and liabilities of FEBTC were transferred to and absorbed by BPI as the surviving corporation. FEBTC employees, including those in its different branches across the country, were hired by petitioner as its

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own employees, with their status and tenure recognized and salaries and benefits maintained. Respondent BPI Employees Union-Davao Chapter - Federation of Unions in BPI Unibank is the exclusive bargaining agent of BPIs rank and file employees in Davao City. The former FEBTC rank-and-file employees in Davao City did not belong to any labor union at the time of the merger. Prior to the effectivity of the merger, or on March 31, 2000, respondent Union invited said FEBTC employees to a meeting regarding the Union Shop Clause of the existing CBA between petitioner BPI and respondent Union After the meeting called by the Union, some of the former FEBTC employees joined the Union, while others refused. Later, however, some of those who initially joined retracted their membership. Respondent Union then sent notices to the former FEBTC employees who refused to join, as well as those who retracted their membership, and called them to a hearing regarding the matter. When these former FEBTC employees refused to attend the hearing, the president of the Union requested BPI to implement the Union Shop Clause of the CBA and to terminate their employment pursuant thereto. After two months of management inaction on the request, respondent Union informed petitioner BPI of its decision to refer the issue of the implementation of the Union Shop Clause of the CBA to the Grievance Committee. However, the issue remained unresolved at this level and so it was subsequently submitted for voluntary arbitration by the parties. ISSUE: Whether or not the former FEBTC employees that were absorbed by petitioner upon the merger between FEBTC and BPI should be covered by the Union Shop Clause found in the existing CBA between petitioner and respondent Union. HELD: All employees in the bargaining unit covered by a Union Shop Clause in their CBA with management are subject to its terms. However, under law and jurisprudence, the following kinds of employees are exempted from its coverage, namely, employees who at the time the union shop agreement takes effect are bona fide members of a religious organization which prohibits its members

from joining labor unions on religious grounds; employees already in the service and already members of a union other than the majority at the time the union shop agreement took effect; confidential employees who are excluded from the rank and file bargaining unit; and employees excluded from the union shop by express terms of the agreement. BSB Group Inc. vs. Sally Go G.R. No. 168644 February 16, 2010 Peralta, J.: FACTS: Petitioner, the BSB Group, Inc., is a duly organized domestic corporation presidedby its herein representative, Ricardo Bangayan (Bangayan). Respondent Sally Go,alternatively referred to as Sally Sia Go and Sally Go-Bangayan, is Bangayan's wife, who wasemployed in the company as a cashier, and was engaged, among others, to receive andaccount for the payments made by the various customers of the company.In 2002, Bangayan filed with the Manila Prosecutor's Office a complaint forestafaand/or qualified theft against respondent, alleging that several checks representingthe aggregate amount of P1,534,135.50 issued by the company's customers in payment of their obligation were, instead of being turned over to the company's coffers, indorsed byrespondent who deposited the same to her personal banking account maintained at Security Bank and Trust Company (Security Bank) in Divisoria, Manila Branch. Upon afinding that the evidence adduced was uncontroverted, the assistant city prosecutorrecommended the filing of the Information for qualified theft against respondent.Accordingly, respondent was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Shewas found guilty; that in the commission of the said offense, said accused acted with graveabuse of confidence, being then employed as cashier by said complainant at the time of thecommission of the said offense and as such she was entrusted with the said amount of money.Respondent entered a negative plea when arraigned. The trial ensued. On thepremise that respondent had allegedly encashed the subject checks and deposited thecorresponding amounts thereof to her personal banking account.Petitioner, opposing respondent's move, argued for the relevancy of the Metrobank account on the ground that the complaint-affidavit showed that there were two checkswhich respondent allegedly deposited in an account with the said bank. To this, respondent filed a supplemental motion to quash, invoking the absolutely confidential nature of theMetrobank account under the provisions of Republic Act(R.A.) No. 1405. The trial court didnot sustain respondent; hence, it denied the motion to quash for lack of merit.Meanwhile, the

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prosecution was able to present in court the testimony of ElenitaMarasigan (Marasigan), the representative of Security Bank. In a nutshell ,Marasigan'stestimony sought to prove that between 1988 and 1989, respondent ,while engaged ascashier at the BSB Group, Inc., was able to run away with the checks issued to the companyby its customers, endorse the same, and credit the corresponding amounts to her personaldeposit account with Security Bank. In the course of the testimony, the subject checkswere presented to Marasigan for identification and marking as the same checks received byrespondent, endorsed, and then deposited in her personal account with Security Bank. CA affirmed RTCs decision. ISSUE: Whether or not there is no difference between cash and check for purposesof prosecuting respondent for theft of cash HELD: In theft, the act of unlawful taking connotes deprivation of personal property of oneby another with intent to gain, and it is immaterial that the offender is able or unable tofreely dispose of the property stolen because the deprivation relative to the offended partyhas already ensued from such act of execution. The allegation of theft of money, hence,necessitates that evidence presented must have a tendency to prove that the offender hasunlawfully taken money belonging to another. Interestingly, petitioner has taken painsin attempting to draw a connection between the evidence subject of the instant review, andthe allegation of theft in the Information by claiming that respondent had fraudulentlydeposited the checks in her own name. But this line of argument works more prejudicethan favor, because it in effect, seeks to establish the commission, not of theft, but rather of some other crime probably estafa.Moreover, that there is no difference between cash and check is true in otherinstances. In estafa by conversion, for instance, whether the thing converted is cash orcheck, is immaterial in relation to the formal allegation in an information for that offense; acheck, after all, while not regarded as legal tender, is normally accepted under commercialusage as a substitute for cash, and the credit it represents instated monetary value isproperly capable of appropriation. And it is in this respect that what the offender does withthe check subsequent to the act of

unlawfully taking it becomes material inasmuch as thisoffense is a continuing one. In other words, in pursuing a case for this offense, theprosecution may establish its cause by the presentation of the checks involved. Thesechecks would then constitute the best evidence to establish their contents and to provethe elemental act of conversion in support of the proposition that the offender hasindeed indorsed the same in his own name. FIRST DIVISION ANONYMOUS, Complainant, A.M. No. P-07-2333 (formerly OCA IPI No. 07-2510-P) Present: PUNO, C.J., Chairperson, SANDOVALGUTIERREZ, CORONA, AZCUNA and LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.

-versus -

MA. VICTORIA P. RADAM, Utility Worker, Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court of Alaminos City, Pangasinan, Respondent.

Promulgated: December 19, 2007

x---- ----------------------------------------------x RESOLUTION CORONA, J.: In an anonymous letter-complaint dated September 30, [1] 2005, respondent Ma. Victoria Radam, utility worker in the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Alaminos City in

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Pangasinan, was charged with immorality. The unnamed complainant alleged that respondent was unmarried but got pregnant and gave birth sometime in October 2005.[2] The complainant claimed that respondents behavior tainted the image of the judiciary. In connection with the complaint, Judge Elpidio N. Abella[3] conducted a discreet investigation to verify the allegations against respondent. In his report dated March 8, 2006,[4] Judge Abella made the following findings: On March 1, 2006, respondent submitted a letter addressed to the Honorable Court Administrator, thru the undersigned, duly subscribed and sworn to before the Clerk of Court VI of the Court, alleging among others, the following: 1) She admitted that she is single/unmarried, and indeed she was pregnant and actually gave birth to a baby boy named Christian Jeon Radam on 03 November 2005 at the Western Pangasinan District Hospital, Alaminos City; 2) The reason why she did not yet marry the father of her child Christian Jeon was that she and the childs father have pending application[s] [to migrate to Canada] as in fact they have [a] mutual plan to remain unmarried [and] 3) Nevertheless, she expressed her remorse and promised not to commit the same mistake and indiscretion in the future. Further investigation reveal[ed] the following: Page 10 of 37

1) That respondent was appointed as Utility Worker on September 4, 2000; 2) The father of Christian Jeon Radam is unknown, as shown by the childs Certificate of Live Birth, hereto attached;[5] 3) It was verbally admitted by the respondent that she had given birth to two (2) other children before Christian Jeon, but they were conceived and born while respondent was working abroad and before she was employed in the [Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of] Alaminos City.[6]

In this connection, Judge Abella made the following recommendation: Since respondent admitted that she is single and that she got pregnant and gave birth to a baby boy without being married to the father of the child, albeit she advanced the reason for her remaining unmarried, it being that she and her boyfriend had a mutual plan to migrate to Canada, this Investigating Judge considers that such conduct of the respondent fell short of the strict standards of Court personnel and contrary to the Code of Judicial Ethics and the Civil Service Rules. A place in the judiciary demands upright men and women who must carry on with dignity, hence respondent is guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct which cannot be countenanced by the Court. Certainly, the image of the Judiciary has been affected by such conduct of the respondent.

Premises considered, it is hereby respectfully recommended that respondent MA. VICTORIA RADAM be accordingly found GUILTY of IMMORAL CONDUCT or ACT UNBECOMING A COURT EMPLOYEE. A suspension of one (1) month or a fine of Php5,000.00 is respectfully recommended, with warning that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely.[7] After reviewing the findings and recommendation of Judge Abella, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended that, in accordance with Villanueva v. Milan,[8] respondent be absolved of the charge of immorality because her alleged misconduct (that is, giving birth out of wedlock) did not affect the character and nature of her position as a utility worker.[9] It observed: [T]here is no indication that the relationship of respondent to her alleged boyfriend has caused prejudice to any person or has adversely affected the performance of her function as utility worker to the detriment of the public service. However, it proposed that she be held liable for conduct unbecoming a court employee and imposed a fine of P5,000 for stating in the birth certificate of her child Christian Jeon that the father was unknown to her.[10] The OCA correctly exonerated respondent from the charge of immorality. However, its recommendation to hold her liable for a charge of which she was not previously informed was wrong. For purposes of determining administrative responsibility, giving birth out of wedlock is not per se immoral under civil service laws. For such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must be grossly immoral, that is, it must be so corrupt and false as to

constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree.[11] In Estrada v. Escritor,[12] we emphasized that in determining whether the acts complained of constitute disgraceful and immoral behavior under civil service laws, the distinction between public and secular morality on the one hand, and religious morality, on the other should be kept in mind.[13] The distinction between public and secular morality as expressed albeit not exclusively in the law, on the one hand, and religious morality, on the other, is important because the jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality.[14] Thus, government action, including its proscription of immorality as expressed in criminal law like adultery or concubinage, must have a secular purpose.[15] For a particular conduct to constitute disgraceful and immoral behavior under civil service laws, it must be regulated on account of the concerns of public and secular morality. It cannot be judged based on personal bias, specifically those colored by particular mores. Nor should it be grounded on cultural values not convincingly demonstrated to have been recognized in the realm of public policy expressed in the Constitution and the laws.[16] At the same time, the constitutionally guaranteed rights (such as the right to privacy) should be observed to the extent that they protect behavior that may be frowned upon by the majority.[17] Under these tests, two things may be concluded from the fact that an unmarried woman gives birth out of wedlock: (1) if the father of the child is himself unmarried, the woman is not ordinarily administratively liable for disgraceful and immoral conduct.[18] It may be a notso-ideal situation and may cause complications for both mother and child but it does not give cause for administrative sanction. There is no law which penalizes an unmarried mother under those circumstances by reason of her sexual conduct or

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(2)

proscribes the consensual sexual activity between two unmarried persons. Neither does the situation contravene any fundamental state policy as expressed in the Constitution, a document that accommodates various belief systems irrespective of dogmatic origins.[19] if the father of the child born out of wedlock is himself married to a woman other than the mother, then there is a cause for administrative sanction against either the father or the mother.[20] In such a case, the disgraceful and immoral conduct consists of having extramarital relations with a married person.[21] The sanctity of marriage is constitutionally recognized[22] and likewise affirmed by our statutes as a special contract of permanent union.[23] Accordingly, judicial employees have been sanctioned for their dalliances with married persons or for their own betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity.

The essence of due process in an administrative proceeding is the opportunity to explain ones side, whether written or verbal.[24] This presupposes that one has been previously apprised of the accusation against him or her. Here, respondent was deprived of both with regard to her alleged unbecoming conduct in relation to a certain statement in the birth certificate of her child. An employee must be informed of the charges proferred against him, and the normal way by which the employee is so informed is by furnishing him with a copy of the charges against him. This is a basic procedural requirement that cannot [be] dispense[d] with and still remain consistent with the constitutional provision on due process. The second minimum requirement is that the employee charged with some misfeasance or malfeasance must have a reasonable opportunity to present his side of the matter, that is to say, his defenses against the charges levelled against him and to present evidence in support of his defense(s).[25] Ones employment is not merely a specie of property rights. It is also the means by which he and those who depend on him live.[26] It is therefore protected by the guarantee of security of tenure. And in the civil service, this means that no government employee may be removed, suspended or disciplined unless for cause provided by law[27]and after due process. Unless the constitutional guarantee of due process is a mere platitude, it is the Courts duty to insist on its observance in all cases involving a deprivation, denigration or dilution of ones right to life, liberty and property. WHEREFORE, the administrative complaint against respondent Ma. Victoria P. Radam is hereby DISMISSED. She is, however, strongly advised to be more circumspect in her personal and official actuations in the future. SO ORDERED.

In this case, it was not disputed that, like respondent, the father of her child was unmarried. Therefore, respondent cannot be held liable for disgraceful and immoral conduct simply because she gave birth to the child Christian Jeon out of wedlock. Respondent was indicted only for alleged immorality for giving birth out of wedlock. It was the only charge of which she was informed. Judge Abellas investigation focused solely on that matter. Thus, the recommendation of the OCA that she be held administratively liable in connection with an entry in the birth certificate of Christian Jeon came like a thief in the night. It was unwarranted. Respondent was neither confronted with it nor given the chance to explain it. To hold her liable for a totally different charge of which she was totally unaware will violate her right to due process.

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THIRD DIVISION MARGIE CORPUS MACIAS, Complainant, - versus MARIANO JOAQUIN S. MACIAS, Presiding Judge, Branch 28, Regional Trial Court, Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte, Respondent. September 29, 2009 A.M. No. RTJ-01-1650 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 01-1195-RTJ) x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x DECISION NACHURA, J.: This involves an administrative complaint[1] filed by complainant Margie C. Macias charging her husband, Mariano Joaquin S. Macias (Judge Macias), with immorality and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The complaint was filed on March 7, 2001, when respondent was still sitting as the presiding judge of Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte. Complainant alleged that sometime in 1998, respondent engaged in an illicit liaison and immoral relationship with a certain Judilyn Seranillos (Seranillos), single and in her early 20s. The relationship continued until the time of the filing of the complaint. Complainant enumerated some of the abuses committed by respondent, to wit: (a) [Respondent] has been using court personnel, namely, Emmanuel Botiong Tenefrancia, process server, as constant escort of his paramour in going to their appointed trysts or in escorting back said woman to the place where she is staying, and as errand boy seeing to their needs when respondent and his mistress are together; (b) Respondent has been using another court employee in the person of Camilo Bandivas, court sheriff, as contact person to his

young lover and in summoning and bringing complainants witnesses to respondent to be harassed and threatened; (c) Said Judilyn Seranillos, respondents lover, has been brought many times by respondent to his court in Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte, thereby scandalizing court personnel and lawyers, who sometimes must wait for the session to start because respondent and his mistress are not yet through with each other; That the scandalous relations of respondent with his mistress is an open secret among lawyers, court personnel and litigants [in] Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte; (d) Respondent has not been calendaring (sic) cases nor holding court sessions nor court hearings on Mondays and Fridays so that he can have an extended date with his paramour, to the great prejudice of public service; (e) Respondent and his paramour had often met at the house of Zoosima (sic) Ojano Carangan, aunt of respondents paramour, [in] Taway, Ipil, Zamboanga del Sur, and the people of Taway know that respondent judge, who usually arrives in his car, has been shamelessly and immorally carrying on an illicit affair with said Judilyn Seranillos. Some inquisitive people usually go out of their houses upon seeing respondents car parked at the house of the aunt of respondents young mistress, and these barrio folks often watch respondent come and go; [and] (f) Respondent has one or two other women lovers whom he shamelessly cavorts even in the presence of court personnel.[2]

Complainant attached the affidavits of Shem Tabotabo,[3] Zacarias Cordova,[4] Zosima Carangan,[5] Danny Layogue and Consolacion S. Layogue,[6] her son Marictibert Corpus Macias,[7] Ruben Perater,[8] Roel Mutia,[9] and Aniceto Zozobrado.[10] However, five of them

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Tabotabo,[11] Cordova,[12] Carangan,[13] Danny Layogue,[14] and Marictibert Macias[15] later recanted their affidavits. On August 20, 2001, this Court issued a Resolution[16] referring the complaint to Court of Appeals Associate Justice Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr. for investigation, report and recommendation. On October 29, 2001, Justice Rosario issued an Order[17] setting the initial hearing on November 27, 28 and 29, 2001 and requiring the parties to submit a list of their respective witnesses and documentary evidence. The hearing was, however, reset to January 28, 29, 30, and 31, 2002 upon motion of complainant. On January 28, 2002, the parties informed the Investigating Justice that they were exerting all efforts for a possible reconciliation. Upon motion by both parties, the hearing was again reset to March 11, 12, 13, and 14, 2002. On March 11, 2002, the parties again informed the Investigating Justice of their desire to confer in a last effort to settle. The request was again granted with an order that both parties should be ready the following day if no settlement was reached. The following day, March 12, 2002, the scheduled hearing proceeded after the parties failed to reach any amicable settlement. From a list of seven (7) witnesses, complainant manifested that only four (4) witnesses shall be presented. The first witness, Roel Mutia, testified that he was hired by complainants son, Marquinjo Macias, to tail Judge Macias after suspecting that his father was having an illicit affair. In summary, Mutia testified that he saw Judge Macias and Seranillos enter a house in Dipolog City on the afternoon of October 17, 1999, and that both dined and spent the night there together inside one bedroom.[18] He said that he accompanied Marquinjo and complainant the next day to the said house and that he saw complainant pull Seranillos outside the house creating a commotion within the neighborhood.[19] On cross-examination, Mutia admitted that he was not sure if Seranillos did spend the night inside the said house, or whether she left that night and just returned the following morning. Counsel for respondent also pointed to Mutia that the spot

where he positioned himself, while observing Judge Macias, was blocked by leaves and tall trees.[20] The next witness for complainant was Aniceto Zozobrado. He testified that he was hired by Seranillos to drive a motorcycle which, according to her, was a gift from Judge Macias. He said that he saw Judge Macias visit Seranillos on three (3) occasions; that he ran errands for both Judge Macias and Seranillos; and that he was slapped once by Judge Macias for allegedly peeping at Seranillos.[21] On cross-examination, Zozobrado admitted that he was not really sure if the motorcycle he saw was actually owned by Seranillos, and that his statement was based merely on presumption.[22] He also admitted that he had been residing with complainants counsel since the date he executed his affidavit against Judge Macias.[23] The third witness, Engracio Dialo, Jr., was not allowed to testify after respondents counsel objected because the intended testimony would cover an event that took place after the filing of the complaint, and Dialos affidavit narrated matters that were not covered by the allegations in the complaint.[24] Complainant manifested her intention to file a motion to amend the complaint.[25] The Investigating Justice ordered the direct examination of the fourth witness, complainant Margie Macias, without prejudice to her presenting Dialo after the motion to amend the complaint shall have been resolved. Complainant, however, refused, saying that she would testify only after Dialo had testified.[26] The Investigating Justice warned complainant that her refusal to testify shall be taken as a waiver of her right to present further witnesses and evidence.[27] Despite the warning, complainant refused to proceed with her direct testimony. The Investigating Justice ordered complainant to rest her case, but she again refused. The witness for respondent was Judge Macias himself. He denied the allegations of Mutia and Zozobrado. He said that complainant also filed a complaint for concubinage against him, but the same was dismissed by the Regional State Prosecutor for lack of sufficient

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evidence. He believed that complainants accusations were brought about by her psychiatric condition characterized as severe paranoia.[28] On April 25, 2002, the Investigating Justice submitted his Report and Recommendation[29] to this Court. He recommended the dismissal of the complaint against Judge Macias. The Investigating Justice reasoned that complainant failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that respondent committed acts of immorality, or that his conduct was prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The Investigating Justice, however, recommended that Judge Macias be reprimanded for failing to exercise great care and circumspection in his actions.[30] The case now comes before this Court for final resolution. There are two basic questions that must be resolved. First, considering the finding of the Investigating Justice, we ask: is it really necessary that administrative complaints against members of the judiciary be disposed of only after adducing evidence that will prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt? And second, do the acts complained of warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanction on respondent judge? I. In several cases,[31] this Court has ruled that if what is imputed to a respondent judge connotes a misconduct that, if proven, would result in dismissal from the bench, then the quantum of proof necessary to support the administrative charges or to establish grounds for the removal of a judicial officer should be more than substantial. The first case involving an administrative complaint filed against a judge in this jurisdiction was decided in 1922 in In re Impeachment of Horrilleno.[32] There, Justice Malcolm explained: The procedure for the impeachment of judges of first instance has heretofore not been well defined. The Supreme Court has not yet

adopted rules of procedure, as it is authorized to do by law. In practice, it is usual for the court to require that charges made against a judge of first instance shall be presented in due form and sworn to; thereafter, to give the respondent judge an opportunity to answer; thereafter, if the explanation of the respondent be deemed satisfactory, to file (sic) the charges without further annoyance for the judge; while if the charges establish a prima facie case, they are referred to the Attorney-General who acts for the court in conducting an inquiry into the conduct of the respondent judge. On the conclusion of the Attorney-Generals investigation, a hearing is had before the court en banc and it sits in judgment to determine if sufficient cause exists involving the serious misconduct or inefficiency of the respondent judge as warrants the court in recommending his removal to the Governor-General. Impeachment proceedings before courts have been said, in other jurisdictions, to be in their nature highly penal in character and to be governed by the rules of law applicable to criminal cases. The charges must, therefore, be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.[33]

With Horilleno, it became necessary for every complainant to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt despite the fact that the case will only involve an administrative, and not a criminal, complaint. The reason is explained, albeit scarcely, in Alcuizar v. Carpio:[34] While substantial evidence would ordinarily suffice to support a finding of guilt, the rule is a bit different where the proceedings involve judges charged with grave offense. Administrative proceedings against judges are, by nature, highly penal in character and are to be governed by the rules applicable to criminal cases.[35]

In more recent rulings, however, the Court applied substantial evidence as the normative quantum of proof necessary in resolving administrative complaints against judges. In order to diffuse

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confusion, a clarification has to be made. First, the pronouncements in Horilleno and Alcuizar may be said to have been superseded by the Courts recent rulings in Gutierrez v. Belen,[36] Reyes v. Paderanga,[37] and Naval v. Panday.[38] Second, members of the judiciary are not a class of their own, sui generis, in the field of public service as to require a higher degree of proof for the administrative cases filed against them other than, perhaps, the fact that because of the nature of the responsibility judges have, they are required to live up to a higher standard of integrity, probity and morality. When we dismiss a public officer or employee from his position or office for the commission of a grave offense in connection with his office, we merely require that the complainant prove substantial evidence. When we disbar a disgraceful lawyer, we require that complainant merely prove a clear preponderance of evidence to establish liability.[39] There appears no compelling reason to require a higher degree of proof when we deal with cases filed against judges. Judges play a vital role in the dispensation of justice. In this jurisdiction, the integrity demanded of a judge does not commence only when he dons the habiliments of a magistrate or ends when he sheds off his judicial robe. The nature of the position requires nothing less than a 24-hour daily obeisance to this mandate of integrity. Any judge who cannot live up to this exacting requirement has no business sitting on the bench. Considering the proliferation of complaints of abuses and immorality committed by judges, it is only proper that the Court be ever vigilant in requiring impeccable conduct from the members of its bench. II. However, in this case, we are not convinced that complainant was able to prove, by substantial evidence, that respondent committed the acts complained of. Basic is the rule that in administrative

proceedings, complainant bears the onus of establishing the averments of her complaint.[40] If complainant fails to discharge this burden, respondent cannot be held liable for the charge.[41] Under Sections 8 and 11 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, a judge found guilty of immorality can be dismissed from the service, if still in the active service, or may forfeit all or part of his retirement benefits, if already retired, and disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to any public office including government-owned or controlled corporations.[42] We have already ruled that if a judge is to be disciplined for a grave offense, the evidence against him should be competent and derived from direct knowledge.[43] This quantum of evidence, complainant failed to satisfy. The testimonies of Mutia and Zozobrado are specious and insufficient to convincingly prove that respondent committed disreputable conduct. This considered, complainant should not have refused to testify during the hearing. More than anyone else, it was complainant who had a direct interest in making sure that the evidence adduced met the necessary burden of proof, considering that the allegations in her complaint involved charges that cannot be lightly dealt with. She should have been more zealous in prosecuting her complaint. Nevertheless, we agree with the findings of the Investigating Justice that although the charges of immorality and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service were not satisfactorily proven by complainant, respondent cannot be completely exonerated.[44] Mutias testimony that he saw Judge Macias having dinner with Seranillos and entering a bedroom with her may not satisfactorily prove the charge of immorality, but this act certainly suggested an appearance of impropriety, Judge Macias being a married man. Such behavior undeniably constituted unbecoming conduct, a light offense punishable by a fine not less than P1,000.00 but not more than P10,000.00.[45] In light of the circumstances affecting not only the reputation of Judge Macias himself but the image and reputation of

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the whole judiciary as well, we find it reasonable to impose upon him the maximum fine of P10,000.00. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the administrative complaint for immorality and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service against respondent Judge Mariano Joaquin S. Macias of RTC, Branch 28, of Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte is DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence. However, respondent is held administratively liable for UNBECOMING CONDUCT and FINED in the amount of P10,000.00 to be deducted from his retirement benefits. SO ORDERED. CASE NO. 2 - (MACIAS vs. MACIAS, A.M RTJ- 01-1650, SEPTEMBER 29, 2009. 601 SCRA 203) FACTS: This is an administrative complaint filed against a Judge (Judge J Matias) by his ownwife (Gina ) for Immorality and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service becauseof his illicit and immoral relationship with a certain 20-year old single woman (Lani) and of usingcourt personnel as contact person and escort of her paramour as well as failing to hold courtsessions because of his extended date with his paramour.Complainant attached to her complaint , affidavits of nine witnesses but five of themrecanted their affidavit. The hearing of the complaint was set for more than ten times but waspostponed because the parties was supposedly exerting all efforts for a possible reconciliation.On March 11, 2002, the hearing was again postponed after the parties informed theInvestigating Justice of the last ditch effort to settle. But since no settlement was reached, thehearing proceeded the following day, March 121, 2002.From a list of seven witnesses, Gina manifested that only four would testify.a. The first witness(Rudy ) testified that he saw Judge JM and Lani enter a house in theafternoon ofOctober 17, 1999 after being hired by Gina s son to tail Judge JM; and thatboth dined and spent the night inside one bedroom. He said he accompanied Gina andher son the

next day and he saw Gina pull Lani outside the house creating commotionwithin the neighborhood. On cross-examination, Rudy admitted that he was not sure if Lani spent the night in the house or whether she left that night and returned thefollowing ; and that the spot where he positioned himself while observing Judge JM wasblocked by leaves and tall trees.b. The next witness (Tony) testified that he was hired by Lani to drive a motorcycle thatwas given by Judge JM to ran errands for both her and Judge JM. He said he saw JudgeJM visit Lani on three occasions and that he was once slapped by the judge for allegedlypeeping at Lani. On cross-examination , /tony admnitted that he was not sure if themotorcycle was actually owned by Lani and that he just presumed it. He also admittedthat he had been residing with Gina s counsel since the day he executed the affidavit.c. The third witness (Dencio) was not presented because the intended testimony wouldcover an event that took place after the filling of the complaint and did not covers thematter alleged therein. Gina manifested her intention to amend the same so Denciocan testify. Nevertheless the investigator required here to testify first in the directexamination without prejudice to Dencio testifying later on. Gina however refused toproceed with her direct testimony and insisted that she would testify only after Denciohad testified. Despite the investigator s warning, that refusal might be considered as waiver for her right to present further witnesses, Gina refused. So the investigatorordered her to rest her case but she again refused.Judge JM himself testified in his defense. He denied the allegations of bothRudy and Tony . He said that Gina also filed also filed a complaint forconcubinage against him but the same was dismissed by the Prosecutor for lackof sufficient evidence. He believed that Gina s accusations were brought aboutby her psychiatric condition characterized as severe paronia.However, in this case, Gina was not able to prove by substantial evidencethat Judge JM committed the acts complained of. If a judged is to be disciplinedfor a grave offense like immorality which is punishable by dismissal, the evidenceagainst

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him must be competent and derived from direct knowledge. Thetestimonies of Rudy and Tony are specious and insufficient to convincingly provethat Judge JM commited disreputable conduct. Gina should not have refused totestify. More than any one else, she has direct interest in making sure that theevidence adduced met the necessary burden of proof. She should have beenmore zealous in prosecuting her complaint.Nevertheless, although the charges against Judge JM were notsatisfactorily proven, he cannot be completely exonerated. Rudy s testimonythat he saw him having dinner with Lani and entering a bedroom with her maynot satisfactory prove the charge of immorality, but the act certainly suggestedthe appearance of impropriety, he being a married man. Such behaviorundeniably constituted unbecoming conduct, a light offense punishable by afine. So Judge JM should be fined P10,000.00. EN BANC [A.M. No. RTJ-10-2232 : April 10, 2012] OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE CADER P. INDAR, PRESIDING JUDGE AND ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 14, COTABATO CITY AND BRANCH 15, SHARIFF AGUAK, MAGUINDANAO, RESPECTIVELY, RESPONDENT. DECISION PER CURIAM: This is an administrative complaint for gross misconduct and dishonesty against respondent Judge Cader P. Indar, Al Haj (Judge Indar), Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 14, Cotabato City and Acting Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch 15, Shariff Aguak, Maguindanao.cralaw This case originated from reports by the Local Civil Registrars of Manila and Quezon City to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) that they have received an alarming number of decisions, resolutions, and orders on annulment of marriage cases allegedly issued by Judge Indar.

To verify the allegations against Judge Indar, the OCA conducted a judicial audit in RTC-Shariff Aguak, Branch 15, where the Audit Team found that the list of cases submitted by the Local Civil Registrars of Manila and Quezon City do not appear in the records of cases received, pending or disposed by RTC-Shariff Aguak, Branch 15. Likewise, the annulment decisions did not exist in the records of RTC-Cotabato, Branch 14. The Audit Team further observed that the case numbers in the list submitted by the Local Civil Registrars are not within the series of case numbers recorded in the docket books of either RTC-Shariff Aguak or RTC-Cotabato. At the same time, the Audit Team followed-up Judge Indars compliance with Deputy Court Administrator (DCA) Jesus Edwin A. Villasors 1st Indorsement, dated 15 February 2010, relative to the letter[1] of Ms. Miren Galloway, Manager-Permanent Entry Unit, Australian Embassy, Manila (Australian Embassy letter), asking confirmation on the authenticity of Judge Indars decision, dated 23 May 2007, in Spec. Proc. No. 06-581, entitled Chona Chanco Aguiling v. Alan V. Aguiling, for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage. As regards this case, the Audit Team found that Spec. Proc. No. 06-584 does not exist in the records of cases filed, pending or disposed by RTC-Shariff Aguak. Subsequently, the Audit Team made the following conclusions: 1. The list in Annexes A; A-1; A-2 and A-3 are not found in the list of cases filed, pending or decided in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, Shariff Aguak [Maguindanao] which is based in Cotabato City, nor in the records of the Office of the Clerk of Court of Regional Trial Court, Cotabato City; 2. There are apparently decisions of cases which are spurious, as these did not pass through the regular process such as filing, payment of docket fees, trial, etc. which are now circulating and being registered in Local Civil Registrars throughout the country, the extent of which is any bodys guess;

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3. The authenticity of the signatures appearing thereon could only be validated by handwriting experts of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI); 4. The participation of any lower court officials and/or employees could not be ascertained except probably through a more thorough discreet investigation and or entrapment; [and] 5. There is a possibility that more of this (sic) spurious documents may appear and cause damage to the Courts Integrity.[2] Meanwhile, in compliance with DCA Villasors Indorsement and in response to the Australian Embassy letter, Judge Indar explained, in a Letter dated 10 March 2010, that this court is a Court of General Jurisdiction and can therefore act even on cases involving Family Relations. Hence, the subject decision rendered by this Court annulling the marriage of your client is VALID and she is free to marry.[3] In a Memorandum dated 26 April 2010, the OCA recommended that (1) the matter be docketed as a regular administrative matter; (2) the matter be assigned to a Court of Appeals Justice for Investigation, Report, and Recommendation; and (3) Judge Indar be preventively suspended, pending investigation. In a Resolution dated 4 May 2010, the Court En Banc (1) docketed this administrative matter as A.M. No. RTJ-10-2232,[4] and (2) preventively suspended Judge Indar pending investigation of this case. The case was initially raffled to Justice Rodil V. Zalameda of the Court of Appeals, Manila for investigation. The case was re-raffled to Justice Angelita A. Gacutan (Justice Gacutan) of the Court of Appeals, Cagayan de Oro due to its proximity to the Regional Trial Courts involved.

Justice Gacutan set the case for hearing on several dates and sent the corresponding notices of hearing to Judge Indar at his known addresses, namely, his official stations in RTC-Cotabato and RTCShariff Aguak and residence address. The first notice of hearing dated 21 June 2010, which was sent via registered mail and private courier LBC, scheduled the hearings on 14, 15, and 16 July 2010 and directed Judge Indar to submit in affidavit form his explanation. The LBC records show that this notice, which was delivered to Judge Indars official stations, was received by one Mustapha Randang on 28 June 2010. The scheduled hearing was postponed and reset to 20, 21 and 22 July 2010. The notice of postponement was sent to Judge Indar via registered mail on 6 July 2010 to his official stations and was received again by Mustapha Randang on 8 July 2010. Judge Indar failed to attend the hearing as rescheduled and to submit the affidavit as required. Thus, in an Order of 23 July 2010, Justice Gacutan directed Judge Indar to explain his non-appearance, and reset the hearing to 10 and 11 August 2010. The Order was sent to his residence address in M. Tan Subdivision, Gonzalo Javier St., Rosary Heights, Cotabato City. The LBC report indicated that the Order was received by a certain Mrs. Asok. Justice Gacutan also sent a letter dated 23 July 2010 addressed to Atty. Umaima L. Silongan (Atty. Silongan), Acting Clerk of Court of RTCCotabato, directing her to serve the notice of hearing scheduled on 10 and 11 August 2010 to Judge Indar and to report the steps taken to effect service of the same. Atty. Silongan submitted a Return of Service, informing that the notices sent to Judge Indar had remained unserved, as the latter left Cotabato City in April 2010 and his location since then was unknown. In a Resolution of 28 September 2010, this Court directed Justice Gacutan to conduct further investigation to determine the

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authenticity of the questioned decisions allegedly rendered by Judge Indar annulling certain marriages. The Court required Justice Gacutan to ascertain whether the cases were properly filed in court, and who are the parties responsible for the issuance of the questioned decisions, and to submit a report thereon within 60 days from receipt of the Resolution. In compliance with the Courts Resolution, Justice Gacutan directed the Local Civil Registrars of Manila and Quezon City and Atty. Silongan to submit certified true copies of the questioned decisions and to testify thereon. Only the Civil Registrars were present during the hearings on 4 and 5 November 2010. Their testimonies are summarized as follows: Testimonies of Ma. Josefina Encarnacion A. Ocampo, City Civil Registrar of Manila TSN, November 4, 2010

changing status of persons (annexes A-1 and A-2) which all came from a court in Cotabato. All the cases listed in A-2 have already been confirmed or annotated in the records of the Manila Civil Registry. She affirmed that the said cases in the list were certified true by the clerk of court. As their duty to annotate the said decrees to their records are merely ministerial, they do not question the decrees however peculiar they may seem. The cases listed in the document marked as Annex A-2 were also cases that came from Cotabato City for their annotation. Although these cases have been certified true by the Clerk of Court, their annotation and confirmation were held in abeyance due to the ongoing investigation of Judge Indar. Testimony of Salvador Cario, Chief of Records Division, City Civil Registrar of Quezon City TSN, November 4, 2010 He generally supervises the retrieval of all the records or documents in their office. He also signs certified true copies of birth, marriage contract, death certificate and certified true copies of Courts decisions furnished to them by different courts. With regards the decisions issued by the Court in provinces, once the Judge issued the decision regarding the annulment, the parties concern should first register the decision to the Local Civil Registrar where the court is situated. After they receive the decision from the Administrative Division, they would call or write the concerned Local Civil Registrar to authenticate or verify the records. He identified the cases coming from a Cotabato court that were submitted to them for annotation. The subject decisions listed in the annexes which were decided by a court in Cotabato City were already annotated and verified. However he could not ascertain who from the court verified the authenticity or existence of such decisions as he was not the one who personally

As City Civil Registrar, she is mandated to receive all registered documents that will affect the status of the person like the birth, death and marriage contract, court decrees regarding annulment, adoption, legitimization, the affidavit using the surname of the father, naturalization, the selection of citizenship, etc. The documents are forwarded to their office after they are being registered by the concerned parties. In the case of annulment of marriage, a copy of the decision is submitted to the Civil Registrar by the one who had his marriage annulled. Per administrative order, it is the duty of the Clerk of Court to furnish them a copy of the Decision. After the copies of decisions are submitted to them, they are mandated to verify the authenticity of the decision by writing a verification letter to the Clerk of Court before making the annotation or changing the parties status. She identified the list of cases of annulment of marriages and petitions

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called to verify and authenticate them from the court where the listed Decisions/Orders originate.[5] The Civil Registrar of Manila submitted copies of Decisions, Orders and Resolutions, all signed by Judge Indar, in forty three (43) cases for annulment of marriage, correction of entry and other similar cases from RTC-Cotabato City, Branch 15. All the decisions were accompanied by the corresponding Letter of Atty. Silongan, affirming each of the decisions as true and authentic based on the records, while thirty six (36) of such decisions are accompanied by Atty. Silongans certification affirming the genuineness of Judge Indars signature affixed on the Decisions.[6] On the other hand, the Civil Registrar of Quezon City submitted twenty five (25) Decisions, Orders, and Resolutions issued by RTCCotabato City, Branch 15, which were transmitted to the Registrars office for annotation and recording. All the Decisions were signed by Judge Indar, and accompanied by Certificates of Finality affirming the genuineness of Judge Indars signature appearing above the name of Judge Cader P. Indar. The Certificates of Finality were issued by Atty. Silongan and in one case, by Abie Amilil, the OIC-Branch Clerk of Court.[7] Meanwhile, Atty. Silongan, despite notice, failed to attend the hearing. She explained in a Manifestation of 8 November 2010 that she received the Notice only on 8 November 2010 because she was on leave from 1 October 1 to 30 November 2010. Thus, the hearing was reset to 11 and 12 January 2011. However, on the scheduled hearing, Atty. Silongan still failed to appear. Justice Gacutan sought the assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to locate the whereabouts of Judge Indar, as well as of Atty. Silongan. After several exchanges of correspondence, the NBI, in a Letter dated 22 March 2011, provided the residence addresses of both Judge Indar and Atty. Silongan.

Meanwhile, Judge George C. Jabido (Judge Jabido), Acting Presiding Judge of RTC-Shariff Aguak, Branch 15, was directed to verify the authenticity of the records of the subject Decisions and to appear at the hearing on 29 March 2011. The hearing was canceled due to the judicial reorganization in the Court of Appeals. This administrative matter was re-raffled to Justice Abraham B. Borreta (Justice Borreta) since Justice Gacutan was reassigned to Manila effective 11 April 2011. Justice Borreta set the hearing on 27 to 29 June 2011. Notices of hearing were sent to Judge Indar and Atty. Silongan at the addresses provided by the NBI and at their previous mailing addresses. The registered mails addressed to Judge Indar were returned for the following reasons: (1) addressee out of town, move to another place and (2) addressee unknown. The Notice sent to Atty. Silongan was also returned and per LBC report, the consignee has moved to an unknown address. Judge Jabido, who was notified of the hearing, testified that: In compliance with the directive of the Investigating Justice to verify the authenticity of the records of the listed decisions, judgments and orders, he issued memos to the officers of the Court, the Branch Clerk of Court, the docket clerk, directing them to produce and secure copies of the minutes and other documents related therein. He personally checked the records of the RTC. The Records of the RTC are bereft of evidence to show that regular and true proceedings were had on these cases. There is no showing that a docket fee has been paid for each corresponding cases. There is also no showing that the parties were notified of a scheduled hearing as calendared. There is also no record that a hearing was conducted. No stenographic notes of the actual proceedings were also made. He could not also determine when the said cases were submitted for decision as it was not calendared for that purpose.[8] Judge Jabido also submitted a report, portions of which read: The undersigned took extra efforts to locate any record of the cases involving the parties as enumerated in the list. The undersigned even

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issued Memorandum to the Branch Clerk of Court, the docket clerk and other responsible officers of the Court to produce and secure copies of any pleading/documents related to these cases enumerated in the list but his efforts proved futile, hence: a) to this Court, there is no record on file of all the enumerated cases contained in the list. b) to this Court, it is bereft of any evidence on whether the Hon. Judge Indar conducted a hearing in these cases. x x x x

Buenaventura Mojica (Apl. Proc. No. 08-1931), Marie Christine N. Florendo (Civil Case No. 519), Jesse Yamson Faune, Jr. (Special Civil Case 08-2366), Rosemarie Tongson Ramos (Special Case No. 08-1871) and Melissa Sangan-Demafelis (Spl. Proc. 07-2262) to determine whether they filed the petitions for annulment of marriage and whether proceedings were actually had before Judge Indars sala in relation to their cases. All the subpoenas were returned to the Court of Appeals. In his Report dated 2 September 2011, Justice Borreta first determined whether the requirements of due process had been complied with since there was no proof that Judge Indar personally and actually received any of the notices sent to him in the course of the investigation. Justice Borreta differentiated administrative due process with judicial due process. He stated that while a day in court is a matter of right in judicial proceedings, it is otherwise in administrative proceedings since they rest upon different principles. Justice Borreta noted that all possible means to locate Judge Indar and to personally serve the court notices to him were resorted to. The notices of hearing were sent to Judge Indars known addresses, namely, his sala in RTC-Cotabato Branch 14 and RTC-Shariff Aguak Branch 15, and at his residence address. However, none of the notices appeared to have been personally received by Judge Indar. Notwithstanding, Justice Borreta concluded that the requirements of due process have been complied with. Justice Borreta stated that Judge Indar was aware of a pending administrative case against him. The notice of this Courts Resolution of 4 May 2010, preventively suspending Judge Indar, was mailed and sent to him at his sala in RTC-Shariff Aguak, Branch 15. Justice Borreta proceeded to determine Judge Indars administrative liability, and found the latter guilty of serious misconduct and

There is absence of any record showing compliance of the same. It is hereby submitted that the manner upon which the questioned annulment and correction cases, as contained herein in the attached list, allegedly decided by the Hon. Judge Indar were commenced are clearly doubtful. Firstly, there is no showing of compliance on the rules prescribed. x x x x

There is no showing that a verified Petition was officially filed in writing and giving (sic) an opportunity for the Respondents to be heard by himself or by counsel. x x x[9] To support his findings, Judge Jabido submitted: (1) copies of the Letters and Memoranda mentioned in the report; (2) the Calendar of Cases in RTC-Cotabato, Branch 15, on various dates from the period starting April 2007 to 20 October 2009; and (3) the Docket Inventory in Civil Cases, Criminal Cases and Other Cases for the period of January to December 2009 in RTC-Cotabato, Branch 15. Subpoenas were sent to some of the parties in the questioned decisions, namely: Grace Elizarde Reyes (Special Case No. 1049),

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dishonesty. According to Justice Borreta, Judge Indars act of issuing decisions on annulment of marriage cases without complying with the stringent procedural and substantive requirements of the Rules of Court for such cases clearly violates the Code of Judicial Conduct. Judge Indar made it appear that the annulment cases underwent trial, when the records show no judicial proceedings occurred. Moreover, Judge Indars act of affirming in writing before the Australian Embassy the validity of a decision he allegedly rendered, when in fact that case does not appear in the courts records, constitutes dishonesty. Justice Borreta recommended the dismissal of Judge Indar from service, and the investigation of Atty. Silongan, who is not included as respondent in this case, on her participation in the certification of the authenticity of the spurious Decisions. The sole issue in this case is whether Judge Indar is guilty of gross misconduct and dishonesty. We agree with the findings of the Investigating Justice. In Cornejo v. Gabriel,[10] the Court held that notice and hearing are not indispensable in administrative investigations, thus: The fact should not be lost sight of that we are dealing with an administrative proceeding and not with a judicial proceeding. As Judge Cooley, the leading American writer on constitutional Law, has well said, due process of law is not necessarily judicial process; much of the process by means of which the Government is carried on, and the order of society maintained, is purely executive or administrative, which is as much due process of law, as is judicial process. While a day in court is a matter of right in judicial proceedings, in administrative proceedings it is otherwise since they rest upon different principles. In certain proceedings, therefore, of an administrative character, it may be stated, without fear of contradiction, that the right to a notice and hearing are not essential to due process of law. x x x[11] (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted) It is settled that technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied to administrative proceedings. Thus, administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense.[12] It is enough that the party is given the chance to be heard before the case against him is decided.[13] Otherwise stated, in the application of the principle of due process, what is sought to be safeguarded is not lack of previous notice but the denial of the opportunity to be heard.[14] The Court emphasized in Cornejo[15] the Constitutional precept that public office is a public trust,[16]which is the underlying principle for the relaxation of the requirements of due process of law in administrative proceedings, thus: Again, for this petition to come under the due process of law prohibition, it would be necessary to consider an office as property. It is, however, well settled in the United States, that a public office is not property within the sense of the constitutional guaranties of due process of law, but is a public trust or agency.[17] (Emphasis supplied)

The Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, which govern the conduct of disciplinary and non-disciplinary proceedings in administrative cases, clearly provide that technical rules of procedure and evidence do not strictly apply to administrative proceedings. Section 3, Rule I of the Uniform Rules states: Section 3. Technical Rules in Administrative Investigations. Administrative investigations shall be conducted without necessarily adhering strictly to the technical rules of procedure and evidence applicable to judicial proceedings.

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In this case, Judge Indar was given ample opportunity to controvert the charges against him. While there is no proof that Judge Indar personally received the notices of hearing issued by the Investigating Justices, the first two notices of hearing were received by one Mustapha Randang of the Clerk of Court, RTC-Cotabato, while one of the notices was received by a certain Mrs. Asok, who were presumably authorized and capable to receive notices on behalf of Judge Indar. Further, Judge Indar cannot feign ignorance of the administrative investigation against him because aside from the fact that the Courts Resolution suspending him was mailed to him, his preventive suspension was reported in major national newspapers.[18] Moreover, Judge Indar was repeatedly sent notices of hearings to his known addresses. Thus, there was due notice on Judge Indar of the charges against him. However, Judge Indar still failed to file his explanation and appear at the scheduled hearings. Consequently, the investigation proceeded ex parte in accordance with Section 4, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.[19] Public office is a public trust.[20] This constitutional principle requires a judge, like any other public servant and more so because of his exalted position in the Judiciary, to exhibit at all times the highest degree of honesty and integrity.[21] As the visible representation of the law tasked with dispensing justice, a judge should conduct himself at all times in a manner that would merit the respect and confidence of the people.[22] Judge Indar miserably failed to live up to these exacting standards. In Office of the Court Administrator v. Lopez,[23] the Court explained the difference between simple misconduct and grave misconduct, thus: The Court defines misconduct as a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. The misconduct is grave if it

involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or to disregard established rules, which must be established by substantial evidence. As distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest in a charge of grave misconduct. In this case, Judge Indar issued decisions on numerous annulment of marriage cases which do not exist in the records of RTC-Shariff Aguak, Branch 15 or the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Cotabato City. There is nothing to show that (1) proceedings were had on the questioned cases; (2) docket fees had been paid; (3) the parties were notified of a scheduled hearing as calendared; (4) hearings had been conducted; or (5) the cases were submitted for decision. As found by the Audit Team, the list of case titles submitted by the Local Civil Registrars of Manila and Quezon City are not found in the list of cases filed, pending or decided in RTC, Branch 15, Shariff Aguak, nor in the records of the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Cotabato City. In other words, Judge Indar, who had sworn to faithfully uphold the law, issued decisions on the questioned annulment of marriage cases, without any showing that such cases underwent trial and complied with the statutory and jurisprudential requisites for voiding marriages. Such act undoubtedly constitutes gross misconduct. The Court condemns Judge Indars reprehensible act of issuing Decisions that voided marital unions, without conducting any judicial proceedings. Such malfeasance not only makes a mockery of marriage and its life-changing consequences but likewise grossly violates the basic norms of truth, justice, and due process. Not only that, Judge Indars gross misconduct greatly undermines the peoples faith in the judiciary and betrays public trust and confidence in the courts. Judge Indars utter lack of moral fitness has no place in the Judiciary. Judge Indar deserves nothing less than dismissal from the service. The Court defines dishonesty as:

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x x x a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray.[24] In this case, Judge Indar issued Decisions on numerous annulment of marriage cases when in fact he did not conduct any judicial proceedings on the cases. Not even the filing of the petitions occurred. Judge Indar made it appear in his Decisions that the annulment cases complied with the stringent requirements of the Rules of Court and the strict statutory and jurisprudential conditions for voiding marriages, when quite the contrary is true, violating Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which mandates that a judge perform official duties honestly. As found by the Audit Team, the list of cases submitted by the Local Civil Registrars of Manila and Quezon City do not appear in the records of cases received, pending, or disposed by RTC-Shariff Aguak, Branch 15, which Judge Indar presided. The cases do not likewise exist in the docket books of the Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC-Cotabato. The Audit Team also noted that the case numbers in the list are not within the series of case numbers recorded in the docket books of either RTC-Shariff Aguak or RTC-Cotabato. Moreover, Judge Jabido, Acting Presiding Judge of RTC-Shariff Aguak, Branch 15, verified the records of the trial court and found nothing to show that proceedings were had on the questioned annulment cases. There was nothing in the records to show that (1) petitions were filed; (2) docket fees were paid; (3) the parties were notified of hearings; (4) hearings were calendared and actually held; (5) stenographic notes of the proceedings were taken; and (6) the cases were submitted for decision. Among the questioned annulment decrees is Judge Indars Decision dated 23 May 2007, in Spec. Proc. No. 06-581, entitled Chona Chanco Aguiling v. Alan V. Aguiling. Despite the fact that no proceedings

were conducted in the case, Judge Indar declared categorically, in response to the Australian Embassy letter, that the Decision annulling the marriage is valid and that petitioner is free to marry. In effect, Judge Indar confirms the truthfulness of the contents of the annulment decree, highlighting Judge Indars appalling dishonesty. The Court notes that this is not Judge Indars first offense. In A.M. No. RTJ-05-1953,[25] the Court imposed on him a fine of P10,000 for violating Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, when he issued a preliminary injunction without any hearing and prior notice to the parties. In another case,A.M. No. RTJ-07-2069,[26] the Court found him guilty of gross misconduct for committing violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct and accordingly fined him P25,000. Since this is Judge Indars third offense, showing the depravity of his character and aggravating[27]the serious offenses of gross misconduct and dishonesty,[28] the Court imposes on Judge Indar the ultimate penalty of dismissal from the service, with its accessory penalties, pursuant to Section 11, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.[29] This administrative case against Judge Indar shall also be considered as a disciplinary proceeding against him as a member of the Bar, in accordance with AM. No. 02-9-02-SC.[30] This Resolution entitled Re: Automatic Conversion of Some Administrative Cases Against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; Judges of Regular and Special Courts; and Court Officials Who are Lawyers as Disciplinary Proceedings Against Them Both as Such Officials and as Members of the Philippine Bar, provides: Some administrative cases against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; judges of regular and special courts; and the court officials who are lawyers are based on grounds which are likewise grounds for the disciplinary action of members of the Bar for violation of the Lawyers Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics, or for such other forms of breaches of conduct that have been traditionally recognized as grounds for the discipline of lawyers.

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In any of the foregoing instances, the administrative case shall also be considered a disciplinary action against the respondent justice, judge or court official concerned as a member of the Bar. The respondent may forthwith be required to comment on the complaint and show cause why he should not also be suspended, disbarred or otherwise disciplinary sanctioned as a member of the Bar.Judgment in both respects may be incorporated in one decision or resolution. (Emphasis supplied) Indisputably, Judge Indars gross misconduct and dishonesty likewise constitute a breach of the following Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility: CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR LEGAL PROCESSES. Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful act. CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION. In addition, Judge Indars dishonest act of issuing decisions making it appear that the annulment cases underwent trial and complied with the Rules of Court, laws, and established jurisprudence violates the lawyers oath to do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court. Such violation is also a ground for disbarment. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides: SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. - A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of

any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis supplied) In Samson v. Caballero,[31] where the Court automatically disbarred the respondent judge, pursuant to the provisions of AM. No. 02-9-02SC, the Court held: Under the same rule, a respondent may forthwith be required to comment on the complaint and show cause why he should not also be suspended, disbarred or otherwise disciplinary sanctioned as member of the Bar. The rule does not make it mandatory, before respondent may be held liable as a member of the bar, that respondent be required to comment on and show cause why he should not be disciplinary sanctioned as a lawyer separately from the order for him to comment on why he should not be held administratively liable as a member of the bench. In other words, an order to comment on the complaint is an order to give an explanation on why he should not be held administratively liable not only as a member of the bench but also as a member of the bar. This is the fair and reasonable meaning of automatic conversion of administrative cases against justices and judges to disciplinary proceedings against them as lawyers. This will also serve the purpose of A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC to avoid the duplication or unnecessary replication of actions by treating an administrative complaint filed against a member of the bench also as a disciplinary proceeding against him as a lawyer by mere operation of the rule. Thus, a disciplinary proceeding as a member of the bar is impliedly instituted with the filing of an administrative case against a justice of the Sandiganbayan, Court of Appeals and Court of Tax Appeals or a judge of a first- or second-level court. It cannot be denied that respondents dishonesty did not only affect the image of the judiciary, it also put his moral character in serious doubt and rendered him unfit to continue in the practice of law. Possession of good moral character is not only a prerequisite to

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admission to the bar but also a continuing requirement to the practice of law. If the practice of law is to remain an honorable profession and attain its basic ideals, those counted within its ranks should not only master its tenets and principles but should also accord continuing fidelity to them. The requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as far as the general public is concerned, than the possession of legal learning. (Emphasis supplied) Considering that Judge Indar is guilty of gross misconduct and dishonesty, constituting violations of the Lawyers Oath, and Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Judge Indar deserves disbarment. In so far as Atty. Silongan, is concerned, we adopt Justice Borretas recommendation to conduct an investigation on her alleged participation in the authentication of the questioned Decisions.cralaw WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Cader P. Indar, Al Haj, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch 14, Cotabato City and Acting Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch 15, Shariff Aguak, Maguindanao, guilty of Gross Misconduct and Dishonesty for which he is DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all benefits due him, except accrued leave benefits, if any, with prejudice to reemployment in any branch of the government, including governmentowned or controlled corporations. Judge Indar is likewise DISBARRED for violation of Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and his name ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered into Judge Indars record as a member of the bar and notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country. The Office of the Court Administrator is ORDERED to investigate

Atty. Umaima L. Silongan, Acting Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Cotabato City, on her alleged participation in the authentication of the questioned Decisions on the annulment of marriage cases issued by Judge Indar. Let copies of this Decision be forwarded to the Local Civil Registrars of the City of Manila and Quezon City, the same to form part of the records of Decisions of Judge Indar on the annulment of marriages filed with their offices. This Decision is immediately executory. SO ORDERED. BAGUIO CITY, PhilippinesThe Supreme Court has started to clean house by dismissing last week two judges in separate rulings for gross misconduct and incompetence. One of these judges drew the courts ire for annulling marriages without undergoing court procedures. In decisions promulgated on April 10, the court dismissed Judge Cader Indar, who is presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court Branch 14 in Cotabato City, and acting presiding judge of the RTC Branch 15 in Shariff Aguak, Maguindanao; and Judge James Go, presiding judge of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities Branch 2 in Butuan City. Affirming the recommendations of the Office of the Court Administrator, the court also disbarred Indar and ordered his name stricken out of the roster of lawyers for violating the Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility. According to the decision, Indars case stemmed from an administrative complaint for gross misconduct and dishonesty because he issued decisions on numerous annulment-of-marriage cases which do not exist in the records of RTC Shariff Aguak Branch 15 or the Office of the Clerk of Court of the RTC, Cotabato City. The court condemns Judge Indars reprehensible act of issuing decisions that voided marital unions, without conducting any judicial proceedings. Such malfeasance not only makes a mockery of marriage

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and its life-changing consequences but likewise grossly violates the basic norms of truth, justice and due process, the court said. Not only that, Judge Indars gross misconduct greatly undermines the peoples faith in the judiciary and betrays public trust and confidence in the courts, it said. Indar was dismissed from service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch, agency, or instrumentality of the government including government-owned or controlled corporations. The court also directed the OCA to investigate lawyer Umaima Silongan, acting clerk of court of RTC Cotabato City, on her alleged participation in the authentication of the questioned decisions on the annulment of marriage cases that Indar issued. In a separate ruling, the court dismissed Go for inefficiency after the court audit team discovered that he had failed to immediately arraign the accused in 632 criminal cases, to archive 140 criminal cases, to act on summons issued in 477 criminal cases, to act on 13 cases which had not been acted upon for a considerable length of time, to take further action on 32 civil cases, and to resolve motions or incidents in 88 civil cases. The audit team also noted the reports of some court officials and employees that Judge Go would always leave the court in the morning after finishing all hearings scheduled for the day and would return only on the following day, it said. Go said he needed to rest because he had previously suffered a stroke, but this failed to persuade the high court. Like Indar, Go was dismissed and all of his retirement benefits were forfeited. Associate Justice Presbitero Velasco Jr. took no part in the deliberations over Gos case, indicating in the ruling that he had a relationship with one of the parties in the case. Associate Justice Jose Perez also inhibited from Gos case because he acted on the matter as court administrator. http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/179381/scdismisses-2-mindanao-judges

Go, and Minor Emerson Chester Kim B. Go vsColegio De San Juan De Letran et al. Brion, J.:This case is regarding a petition for review on certiorari assailing thedecision of Court of Appeals. Facts: On October 2001, an incident report was given to the Head of Letrans Auxiliary Services Department- Mr. George Isleta, regarding six students injured due to a hazing rite. During the investigation, Kim, a fourth year high school student, was positively identified by the neophytes as a senior member of the fraternity. At the Parents-Teachers Conference, Mr. Rosada, the Assistant Prefect for Discipline, informed Kims mother of the incident. Thereafter, a written statement was provided denying the allegations. A notice was given to Kims parent to attend a conference on January 8, 2002 regarding the issue. Both Gos did not attend. During another conference on January 15, 2002, Mr.Rosada conveyed to the Gos the decision to suspend Kim from January 16, 2002 to February 18,2002. On even date, Mrs. Go submitted a request for the deferment of Kims suspension to January 21, 2002 so that he could take a previously scheduled examination. The request was granted. The respondents then proposed that the students and their parents sign a pro-forma agreement to signify their conformity with suspension. Spouses Go refused to sign. They also refused accept the respondents finding that Kim was a fraternity member. They likewise insisted that due process had not been observed. A complaint for damages was filed before the RTC of Caloocan for unlawfully dismissing Kim. They also sought for business opportunity losses suffered while personally attending to Kims disciplinary case. RTC ruled in their favor stating respondents failed to observe the basic requirement of due process and that there was utterly insufficient evidence to prove Kim was a fraternity member. It awarded petitioners moral and exemplary damages. It also held that Mr. Go was entitled to actual damages after finding that he had neglected his manufacturing business when he personally attended his sons disciplinary case. CA reversed and set aside the decision, hence this petition. Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in setting aside the decision of RTC. Ruling: The Court denied the petition and affirmed the CA decision. The Court put to emphasize that the disciplinary sanction imposed on Kim was a suspension and not a dismissal as the petitioners insist in their complaint. It agrees with the CA that the petitioners were well aware of this fact

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since Mrs. Go specifically wrote to the school to defer Kims suspension. That this request was granted and that Kim was allowed to take the examination further supporting the conclusion he was not dismissed. On the issue of due process, the Court made mention of the case Guzman v National University where it laid down the minimum standards in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic institutions. It stressed out that due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings. The minimum standards which must be met areas follow: (1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2) they shall have the right answer the charges against them; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case. In the case at bar, records show that the Gos were made aware of accusation through notices sent to them. They were even asked to attend conference to address the issue- though both failed to without any explanation. Mr. Rosada also personally informed Mrs. Go of the charges thus the petitioners fully knew the nature of the evidence that stood against Kim. As to the argument that the written notice rule was not observed, the Court held that its purpose is to inform the student of the disciplinary charge. Records show that it was already made plain to the petitioners that the subject matter of the case against Kim was his alleged fraternity membership even before Kim gave his written explanation. Thus, he cannot claim that he was denied of his opportunity to be heard. He also cannot claim that he was denied to the right to adduce evidence in his behalf since several opportunities were already given to them. The Court further recognized that the evidence presented by the respondents, neophytes written statements and security officers incident report, is substantial. The Court also affirmed the decision of CA that there was no basis for the award of moral, exemplary and actual damages. The testimony that clients had cancelled purchases which affected loss in their business was obviously hearsay and speculative since no confirmation was made. Actual damages cannot be based on speculation. CASE DIGEST: RAMON B. FORMANTES PHARMACEUTICAL, PHILS., INC. VS. DUNCAN

FACTS:Ramon B. Formantes, the Acting District Manager of respondent for the Ilocos District, filed a case for illegal suspension and constructive dismissal against respondent company after the company excludes him from any meetings and activities of the company, withheld his salary, and directed one of its district managers to take over his position and functions without prior notice to him. The company did the foregoing upon a complaint of one of its medical representative, Cynthia Magat, on the attempt by Ramon Formantes to sexually force himself upon his subordinate. The Labor Arbiter rendered decision finding the dismissal of Ramon Formantes valid for an attempt to sexually abuse Cynthia Magat but imposing a penalty on respondent for its failure to give formal notice and conduct the necessary investigation before dismissing petitioner. Dissatisfied, Petitioner appeal to the NLRC. NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Not contented, petitioner went to the Court of Appeals. The CA affirmed the NLRCs decision with modification of the penalty imposed against the respondent from P1,000.00 to P5,000.00. Hence, this petition. ISSUE:Whether or not the dismissal of petitioner on the ground of sexual abuse is proper when the charge against him, stated in the termination letter, was insubordination. HELD: In Rubberworld (Phils.), Inc. v. NLRC, the Supreme Court held that: It is now axiomatic that if just cause for termination of employment actually exists and is established by substantial evidence in the course of the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter, the fact that the employer failed, prior to such termination, to accord to the discharged employee the right of formal notice of the charge or charges against him and a right to ventilate his side with respect thereto, will not operate to eradicate said just cause so as to impose on the employer the obligation of reinstating the employee and otherwise granting him such other concomitant relief as is appropriate in the premises. x x x Although petitioner was dismissed from work by the respondent on the ground of insubordination, this Court cannot close

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its eyes to the fact that the ground of sexual abuse committed against petitioner's subordinate actually exists and was established by substantial evidence before the LA. The LA would be rendered inutile if she would just seal her lips after finding that a just cause for dismissal exists merely because the said ground was not stated in the notice of termination. Thus, we hold the dismissal as valid, but we find that there was non-compliance with the twin procedural requirements of notice and hearing for a lawful dismissal. Since the dismissal, although for a valid cause, was done without due process of law, the employer should indemnify the employee with nominal damages. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the sanction imposed on respondent for non-compliance with statutory due process is increased from P5,000.00 to P30,000.00. Flordeliza Maria Reyes-Rayel vs. Philippine Luen Thai Holdings Corp./L&T International Group Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 174893, July 11, 2012 Labor case digest ON SEPT. 12, 2001, petitioner Flordeliza Maria Reyes-Rayel, a c corporate human resources (CHR) director, was dismissed from the service by respondents Philippine Luen Thai Holdings Corp. and L&T International Group Philippines, Inc. for loss of confidence in her ability to promote their interests. She filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, praying for separation pay, 13th month pay, moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees. The petitioner claimed, among others, that her dismissal was effected without the observance of due process since she was not afforded a hearing. Does this claim find merit? Ruling: No. The following are the guiding principles in connection with the hearing requirement in dismissal cases: (a) ample opportunity to be heard means any meaningful opportunity (verbal or written) given to the employee to answer the charges against him and submit evidence in support of his defense,

whether in a hearing, conference or some other fair, just and reasonable way. (b) a formal hearing or conference becomes mandatory only when requested by the employee in writing or substantial evidentiary disputes exist or a company rule or practice requires it, or when similar circumstances justify it. (c) the ample opportunity to be heard standard in the Labor Code prevails over the hearing or conference requirement in the implementing rules and regulations. In this case, petitioners written response to the Prerequisite Notice provided her with an avenue to explain and defend her side and thus served the purpose of due process. That there was no hearing, investigation or right to appeal, which petitioner opined to be violation of company policies, is of no moment since the records are bereft of any showing that there is an existing company policy that requires these procedures with respect to the termination of a CHR Director like petitioner or that company practice calls for the same. There was also no request for a formal hearing on the part of petitioner. As she was served with a notice apprising her of the charges against her and also a subsequent notice informing her of the managements decision to terminate her services after respondents found her written response to the first notice unsatisfactory, petitioner was clearly afforded her right to due process. (Flordeliza Maria Reyes-Rayel vs. Philippine Luen Thai Holdings Corp./L&T International Group Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 174893, July 11, 2012 citing Perez v. Philippine Telgraph and Telephone Company, G.R. No. 152048, April 7, 2009, 584, SCRA 110). Due process requirement is met when there is simply an opportunity to be heard and to explain ones side even if no hearing is conducted. An employee may be afforded ample opportunity to be heard by means of any method, verbal or written, whether in a hearing, conference or some other fair, just and reasonable way. After receiving the first notice apprising him of the charges against him, the employee may submit a written explanation (which may be in the form of a letter, memorandum, affidavit or position paper) and offer

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evidence in support thereof, like relevant company records and the sworn statements of his witnesses. For this purpose, he may prepare his explanation personally or with the assistance of a representative or counsel. He may also ask the employer to provide him copy of records material to his defense. His written explanation may also include a request that a formal hearing or conference be held. In such a case, the conduct of a formal hearing or conference becomes mandatory, just as it is where there exist substantial evidentiary disputes or where company rules or practice requires an actual hearing as part of employment pre-termination procedure. Petitioners written response to the prerequisite notice provided her with an avenue to explain and defend her side and thus served the purpose of due process. That there was no hearing, investigation or right to appeal, which petitioner opined to be a violation of company policies, is of no moment since the record is bereft of any showing that there is an existing company policy that requires these procedures with respect to the termination of a CHR Director like petitioner or that company practice calls for the same. There was also no request for a formal hearing on the part of petitioner. As she was served with a notice apprising her of the charges against her and also a subsequent notice informing her of the managements decision to terminate her services after respondents found her written response to the first notice unsatisfactory, petitioner was clearly afforded her right to due process. Flordeliza Maria Reyes-Rayel vs. Philippine Luen Thai Holdings Corporation, et al. G.R. No. 174893, July 11, 2012. December 19, 2007 (541 SCRA 22) Petitioners: De La Salle University, Inc., et. al. Respondents: Court of Appeals, CHED, et. al. Facts: - Mr. James Yap, while eating alone at Manangs Restaurant, overheard the conversation of the two men from Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity bad-mouthing at Domino Lux (his fraternity).

- When he came home, he informed his brod about what happened and the latter came back to Manangs to confront the two men from Tau Gamma Phi. - After this incident, a meeting was conducted between the two heads of the fraternity through the intercession of the Student Council. - Then, 5 members of the Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity went to the tambayan of the Domino Lux Fraternity in the campus to look for Mr. Yap (based on their descriptions.) - March 29, 1995: Mr. Yap was attacked and mauled by respondents Bungubung, Valdes, Reverente and Lee. Mr. Pascual, brod of Mr. Yap, informed Domino Lux about what happened but the latter decided not to do anything. Mr. Pascual, together with Mr. Cano and Perez, was mauled again by the respondents. - The mauling incidents were a result of a fraternity war. The victims, namely: petitioner James Yap and Dennis Pascual, Ericson Cano, and Michael Perez, are members of the Domino Lux Fraternity, while the alleged assailants, private respondents Alvin Aguilar, James Paul Bungubung, Richard Reverente and Roberto Valdes, Jr. are members of Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity, a rival fraternity. - Petitioners filed a complaint to the Disciplinary Board against respondents. - As it appeared that students from DLSU and CSB were involved in the mauling incidents, a joint DLSU-CSB Discipline Board was formed to investigate the incidents. - On May 3, 1995, the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board issued a Resolution finding private respondents guilty. They were meted the supreme penalty of automatic expulsion, pursuant to CHED Order No. 4. - Private respondents separately moved for reconsideration before the Office of the Senior Vice-President for Internal Operations of DLSU. The motions were all denied in a Letter-Resolution. - On June 5, 1995, private respondent Aguilar filed with the RTC, Manila, against petitioners a petition for certiorari and injunction with prayer for temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction.

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- The following day, June 6, 1995, respondent Judge issued a TRO24 directing DLSU, its subordinates, agents, representatives and/or other persons acting for and in its behalf to refrain and desist from implementing Resolution dated May 3, 1995 and Letter-Resolution dated June 1, 1995 and to immediately desist from barring the enrollment of Aguilar for the second term of school year (SY) 1995. - Other respondents filed for petitions for intervention. The petitioners, except James Yap, filed a petition to dismiss the petitionsin-intervention. - Respondent-Judge granted the petitions for intervention and denied the petition to dismiss by the petitioners (in this case). - Despite the said order, private respondent Aguilar was refused enrollment by petitioner DLSU when he attempted to enroll on September 22, 1995 for the second term of SY 1995-1996. Thus, on September 25, 1995, Aguilar filed with respondent Judge an urgent motion to cite petitioners (respondents there) in contempt of court. - On October 16, 1995, petitioner DLSU filed with the CA a petition for certiorari with prayer for a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement of respondent Judges order and writ of preliminary injuction. - On April 12, 1996, the CA granted petitioners prayer for preliminary injunction. - On May 14, 1996, the CHED issued its questioned Resolution No. 181-96, summarily disapproving the penalty of expulsion for all private respondents. As for Aguilar, he was to be reinstated, while other private respondents were to be excluded. - DLSU still prevent Mr. Aguilar from enrolling and attending his classes which prompted the latters lawyer to send several demand letters. - The Court of Appeals said in its decision that the resolution of CHED is immediately executory in character. -On March 27, 2006, private respondent Aguilar filed his manifestation stating that he has long completed his course at petitioner DLSU. He finished and passed all his enrolled subjects but despite having completed all the academic requirements for his

course, DLSU has not issued a certificate of completion/graduation in his favor. Issues: 1. Whether it is the DECS or the CHED which has legal authority to review decisions of institutions of higher learning that impose disciplinary action on their students found violating disciplinary rules. 2. Whether or not petitioner DLSU is within its rights in expelling private respondents. 2.a Were private respondents accorded due process of law? 2.b Can petitioner DLSU invoke its right to academic freedom? 2.c Was the guilt of private respondents proven by substantial evidence? 3. Whether or not the penalty imposed by DLSU on private respondents is proportionate to their misdeed. Ruling: Petitioner DLSU is now faced with the spectacle of having two different directives from the CHED and the respondent Judge CHED ordering the exclusion of private respondents Bungubung, Reverente, and Valdes, Jr., and the Judge ordering petitioner DLSU to allow them to enroll and complete their degree courses until their graduation. According to the SC, This is the reason why we opt to decide the whole case on the merits, brushing aside technicalities, in order to settle the substantial issues involved. This Court has the power to take cognizance of the petition at bar due to compelling reasons, and the nature and importance of the issues raised warrant the immediate exercise of our jurisdiction.

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1. It is the CHED, not DECS, which has the power of supervision and review over disciplinary cases decided by institutions of higher learning. 2a. Private respondents were accorded due process of law. The Due Process Clause in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution embodies a system of rights based on moral principles so deeply imbedded in the traditions and feelings of our people as to be deemed fundamental to a civilized society as conceived by our entire history. The constitutional behest that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law is solemn and inflexible. In administrative cases, such as investigations of students found violating school discipline, [t]here are withal minimum standards which must be met before to satisfy the demands of procedural due process and these are: that (1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against them and with the assistance if counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Private respondents were duly informed in writing of the charges against them by the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board through petitioner Sales. They were given the opportunity to answer the charges against them as they, in fact, submitted their respective answers. They were also informed of the evidence presented against

them as they attended all the hearings before the Board. Moreover, private respondents were given the right to adduce evidence on their behalf and they did. Lastly, the Discipline Board considered all the pieces of evidence submitted to it by all the parties before rendering its resolution in Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121. 2b. Petitioner DLSU, as an institution of higher learning, possesses academic freedom which includes determination of who to admit for study. Section 5(2), Article XIV of the Constitution guaranties all institutions of higher learning academic freedom. This institutional academic freedom includes the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to attain them free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public interest calls for some restraint. Petitioner DLSU, therefore, can very well exercise its academic freedom, which includes its free choice of students for admission to its school. 2c. The guilt of private respondents Bungubung, Reverente and Valdes, Jr. was proven by substantial evidence. Courts reject alibi when there are credible eyewitnesses to the crime who can positively identify the accused. Alibi is an inherently weak defense and courts must receive it with caution because one can easily fabricate an alibi. The required proof in administrative cases, such as in student discipline cases, is neither proof beyond reasonable doubt nor preponderance of evidence but only substantial evidence. According to Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, it means such reasonable evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Respondents were unable to show convincingly that they were not at

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the scene of the crime on March 29, 1995 and that it was impossible for them to have been there. Moreover, their alibi cannot prevail over their positive identification by the victims. The alibi of Aguilar was supported by a certification signed by an authority. Therefore, alibi assumes commensurate strength. This is but consistent with the presumption of innocence in favor of accused. 3. The penalty of expulsion imposed by DLSU on private respondents is disproportionate to their misdeed. It is true that schools have the power to instill discipline in their students as subsumed in their academic freedom and that the establishment of rules governing university-student relations, particularly those pertaining to student discipline, may be regarded as vital, not merely to the smooth and efficient operation of the institution, but to its very survival. This power, however, does not give them the untrammeled discretion to impose a penalty which is not commensurate with the gravity of the misdeed. If the concept of proportionality between the offense committed and the sanction imposed is not followed, an element of arbitrariness intrudes. That would give rise to a due process question. The petition is partially granted. The Court of Appeals Resolutions dated July 30, 1996 and dated October 15, 1996, and Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 36, Order dated January 7, 1997 are ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE, while CHED Resolution 181-96 dated May 14, 1996 is AFFIRMED. Final: Petitioner DLSU is ordered to issue a certificate of completion/graduation in favor of private respondent Aguilar. On the other hand, it may exclude or drop the names of private respondents Bungubung, Reverente, and Valdes, Jr. from its rolls, and their transfer credentials immediately issued. Under Due Process in General

Facts: Elena Dycaico seeks to reverse the Decision of the Court of Appeals that affirmed the decision of Social Security Commission denying her claim for survivors pension which accrues from the death of her husband, Bonifacio Dycaico. Bonifacio Dycaico became a member of SSS and designated Elena Dycaico and their eight children as beneficiaries therein. At that time, Bonifacio and Elena lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. Nine years after, Bonifacio was considered retired and began receiving his monthly pension from the SSS. He continued to receive the monthly pension until he passed away. A few months prior to his death, however, Bonifacio married the petitioner Shortly after Bonifacios death, the petitioner filed with the SSS an application for survivors pension. Her application, however, was denied on the ground that they were not living under the benefit of marriage when Bonifacio became a member of SSS. The basis was Section 12-B(d) of Republic Act (Rep. Act) No. 8282 which reads: Sec. 12-B. Retirement Benefits. (d) Upon the death of the retired member, his primary beneficiaries as of the date of his retirement shall be entitled to receive the monthly pension. An appeal was made to the Court of Appeals but it was, likewise, denied. The same Court ruled that that since the petitioner was merely the common-law wife of Bonifacio at the time of his retirement, his designation of the petitioner as one of his beneficiaries is void. The petitioner claims that there is no merit to the decision of Court of Appeals as the SSS law does is silent denying the beneficiarys claim for survivor pension. Issue: Whether or not there is a violation to equal protection clause of the Constitution. Held:

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The Supreme Court ruled in the positive. There is a violation of due process and equal protection. The Court holds that the proviso as of the date of his retirement in Section 12-B(d) of Rep. Act No. 8282, which qualifies the term primary beneficiaries, is unconstitutional for it violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. If the said provision will be sustained, there will be an outright confiscation of benefits due to the surviving spouse without giving her opportunity to be heard. There is, therefore, a violation of due process. There is also a violation of equal protection of the Constitution. A statute, to be valid and reasonable, must satisfy the following requirements: must satisfy the following requirements: (1) it must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all members of the same class. Classifying dependent spouses and determining their entitlement to survivors pension based on whether the marriage was contracted before or after the retirement of the other spouse bears no relation to the achievement of the policy objective of the law Indeed, the SC does not find substantial distinction between spouses whose assignment as a beneficiary was made after the marriage and spouses whose assignment as a beneficiary was made before the marriage. The statute violates equal protection clause when it grants surviving pensions only to the spouses belonging to the former case and not to than the latter. Petitioner: Enrique Betoy Respondent: The Board of Directors, National Power Corporation Facts: - June 8, 2001: the EPIRA was enacted by Congress with the goal of restructuring the electric power industry and privatization of the assets of the National Power Corporation (NPC). - A new National Power Board of Directors (NPB) was created and the Secretary of the Department of Energy promulgated the IRR. - Section 63 of the EPIRA provides for separation benefits to officials

and employees who would be affected by the restructuring of the electric power industry and the privatization of the assets of the NPC. - November 18, 2002: pursuant to Section 63 of the EPIRA and Rule 33 of the IRR, the NPB passed NPB Resolution No. 2002-124 which resolved that all NPC personnel shall be legally terminated on January 31, 2003 and shall be entitled to separation benefits. On the same day, the NPB passed NPB Resolution No. 2002-125 which created a transition team to manage and implement the separation program. - As a result of the foregoing NPB Resolutions, petitioner Enrique U. Betoy, together with thousands of his co-employees from the NPC were terminated. - Betoy filed a complaint against the BoD of NPC (assailing the Board resolutions, as well as Sections 11, 34, 38, 48, 52 and 63 of RA 9136 Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA) and Rule 33 of the IRR of EPIRA) and prayed for reinstatement. Issues: 1. WON it was proper for Betoy to directly question the constitutionality of the EPIRA with the Supreme Court. 2. WON NPB Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-125 are valid. 3. Sections 11, 34, 38, 48, 52 and 63 of RA 9136 and Rule 33 of the IRR are valid. Held: 1. NO. Section 5(1) and (2), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that: SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: 1. Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. 2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in: (a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question. The determination of whether the assailed law and its implementing rules and regulations contravene the Constitution is within the

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jurisdiction of regular courts. It has long been established that this Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and call for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction. Thus, herein petition should already be dismissed at the outset; however, since similar petitions have already been resolved by this Court tackling the validity of NPB Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-125, as well as the constitutionality of certain provisions of the EPIRA, this Court shall disregard the procedural defect. 2. In NPC Drivers and Mechanics Association (NPC DAMA) v. National Power Corporation (NPC), this Court had already ruled that NPB Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-125 are void and of no legal effect. Ruling in favor of petitioners therein, this Court ruled that NPB Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-125 are void and of no legal effect for failure to comply with Section 48 of the EPIRA. Based on the foregoing, this Court concluded that the computation of the amounts due the employees who were terminated and/or separated as a result of, or pursuant to, the nullified NPB Board Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-125 shall be from their date of illegal termination up to September 14, 2007 when NPB Resolution No. 2007-55 was issued. Thus, the resolution of the validity of NPB Board Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-125 is, therefore, moot and academic in view of the Courts pronouncements in NPC Drivers. 3. Anent the question of the constitutionality of Section 63 of RA 9136, as well as Rule 33 of the IRR, this Court finds that the same is without merit. It is undisputed that NPC was in financial distress and the solution found by Congress was to pursue a policy towards its privatization. The privatization of NPC necessarily demanded the restructuring of its operations. To carry out the purpose, there was a need to terminate employees and re-hire some depending on the manpower requirements of the privatized companies. The privatization and restructuring of the NPC was, therefore, done in good faith as its primary purpose was for economy and to make the bureaucracy more efficient.

The court agrees with the Solicitor Generals finding that petitioner has not shown any circumstance to prove that the restructuring of NPC was done in bad faith. Petitioner argues that Sections 11,[27] 48,[28] and 52[29] of the EPIRA are unconstitutional for violating Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides: Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office. The designation of the members of the Cabinet to form the NPB does not violate the prohibition contained in our Constitution as the privatization and restructuring of the electric power industry involves the close coordination and policy determination of various government agencies. Section 2 of the EPIRA clearly shows that the policy toward privatization would involve financial, budgetary and environmental concerns as well as coordination with local government units. The production and supply of energy is undoubtedly one of national interest and is a basic commodity expected by the people. This Court, therefore, finds the designation of the respective members of the Cabinet, as ex-officio members of the NPB, valid. This Court is not unmindful, however, that Section 48 of the EPIRA is not categorical in proclaiming that the concerned Cabinet secretaries compose the NPB Board only in an ex-officio capacity. It is only in Section 52 creating the Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM) that they are so designated in an ex-officio capacity. Nonetheless, this Court agrees with the contention of the Solicitor General that the constitutional prohibition was not violated,

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considering that the concerned Cabinet secretaries were merely imposed additional duties and their posts in the NPB do not constitute any other office within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition. The delegation of the said official to the respective Board of Directors were designation by Congress of additional functions and duties to the officials concerned, i.e., they were designated as members of the Board of Directors. Designation connotes an imposition of additional duties, usually by law, upon a person already in the public service by virtue of an earlier appointment. Designation does not entail payment of additional benefits or grant upon the person so designated the right to claim the salary attached to the position. Without an appointment, a designation does not entitle the officer to receive the salary of the position. The legal basis of an employees right to claim the salary attached thereto is a duly issued and approved appointment to the position, and not a mere designation. Conclusion: While we commend petitioners attempt to argue against the privatization of the NPC, it is not the proper subject of herein petition. Petitioner belabored on alleging facts to prove his point which, however, go into policy decisions which this Court must not delve into less we violate separation of powers. The wisdom of the privatization of the NPC cannot be looked into by this Court as it would certainly violate this guarded principle. The wisdom and propriety of legislation is not for this Court to pass upon. Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, and not one that is doubtful, speculative or argumentative. Petition dismissed. Attorney; neglect. Complainant filed a disbarment complaint against Atty. Gacott who allegedly deceived the complainant and her husband into signing a preparatory Deed of Sale that respondent converted into a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of his relatives.

The respondent is reminded that his duty under Canon 16 is to hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession. Allowing a party to take the original TCTs of properties owned by another an act that could result in damage should merit a finding of legal malpractice. While it was his legal staff who allowed the complainant to borrow the TCTs and it does not appear that the respondent was aware or present when the complainant borrowed the TCTs, the court still held the respondent liable, as the TCTs were entrusted to his care and custody; he failed to exercise due diligence in caring for his clients properties that were in his custody.

Moreover, Canon 18, Rule 18.03 requires that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. What amounts to carelessness or negligence in a lawyers discharge of his duty to his client is incapable of an exact formulation, but the Court has consistently held that the mere failure of a lawyer to perform the obligations due his client is per se a violation. In Canoy v. Ortiz, the court held that a lawyers failure to file a position paper was per se a violation of Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Similar to Canoy, the respondent clearly failed in his duty to his client when, without any explanation, he failed to file the Motion for Leave to Intervene on behalf of the spouses Ylaya. Fe A. Ylaya vs. Atty. Glenn Carlos Gacott. A.C. No. 6475. January 30, 2013

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