Williams V BET American Gangster Copyright

Case 2:13-cv-01459-JS-WDW Document 57 Filed 02/14/14 Page 1 of 32 PageID #: 298
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ----------------------------------------X CHARLES WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, -againstBLACK ENTERTAINMENT TELEVISION, INC.; A&E TELELVISION NETWORKS; APPLE COMPUTER INC.; NETFLIX CORPORATE; A. SMITH & CO. PRODUCTIONS; and BEST BUY, Defendants. ----------------------------------------X APPEARANCES For Plaintiff: Charles Williams, pro se 4 Naomi Court Melville, NY 11747 For Defendants: Danilo J. Buzzetta, Esq. John Joseph Elliott, Esq. Greenberg Traurig LLP 200 Park Avenue New York, NY 10166 Frank E. Merideth, Jr., Esq. Greenberg Traurig LLP 1840 Century Park East, Suite 1900 Los Angeles, CA 90067 SEYBERT, District Judge: Pro commenced Viacom, s/h/a this Inc. BET se plaintiff on Charles 18, Williams 2013 (Plaintiff) defendants LLC LLC MEMORANDUM & ORDER 13-CV-1459(JS)(WDW)
action
March Black
against
(Viacom);
Entertainment A&E Television
Television Networks,
Networks
(BET);
(A&E); Apple, Inc. s/h/a I Tunes Corporate/Apple Computer Inc. (Apple); Netflix, Inc. s/h/a Netflix Corporate (Netflix);
Amazon Corporate (Amazon); and A. Smith & Co. Properties, Inc. s/h/a A. Smith & Co. Productions (A. Smith and collectively, Defendants). document considers he a On May 3, 2013, Plaintiff filed with the Court a entitled motion to Amended amend Complaint, Complaint. which the Court the
the
Currently,
following motions are pending before the Court: (1) A. Smith, BET, and Apples motion to dismiss the Complaint (Docket Entry 7); (2) Netflixs motion to dismiss the Complaint (Docket Entry 13); (3) A&Es motion to dismiss the Complaint (Docket Entry 25); (4) Viacoms motion to dismiss the Complaint (Docket Entry 27); (5) Plaintiffs motion to amend the Complaint (Docket Entry 23); and (6) Defendants Entry motion 31). to dismiss the the Amended reasons,
Complaint
(Docket
For
following
Defendants respective motions to dismiss the original Complaint are GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, Plaintiffs motion to amend the Complaint is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, and Defendants motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint is DENIED as moot. BACKGROUND I. Original Complaint Plaintiff alleges that he has registered copyrights with the Library of Congress, essentially copyrighting his life story, under numbers PAu002378203 and TXu001032384. (Compl.
2
III.)
These works have also been registered with the Writers (Compl. III.)
Guild of America East.
On November 21, 2007, BET aired an American Gangster story, season 2, episode 8 entitled Chaz Williams Armed & Dangerous featuring a bio-documentary detailing Plaintiffs life story. (Compl. III.) The documentary includes
Plaintiffs life experiences as a bank robber and was produced by defendant A. Smith. (Compl. III.) Plaintiffs story also
aired on A&E and is available on the Biography Channel website, which is controlled by A&E. (Compl. III.) It is further
available on Netflix, I Tunes, and Amazon. Plaintiff alleges that [a]ll
(Compl. III.) Defendants . . .
committed . . . infringement with the knowledge that the program they were and are displaying and making available to the public is subject to copyright restrictions, and they are enjoying the benefits of Plaintiffs story without paying for it. III.) II. Proposed Amended Complaint1 Plaintiffs Proposed Amended Complaint (PAC) (Compl.
essentially adds to, and expounds upon, the factual allegations in the original Complaint. However, there are some distinctions
that are particularly relevant.

For the reasons discussed below, the Court considers the document in question to be a Proposed Amended Complaint.
1
3
First, Entertainment defendants, as
Plaintiff a
purports John as a
to Doe
add and
Black Best Buy
Hand as in
plaintiff, Viacom
and
deletes
defendant.
Second,
adding Black Hand Entertainment, Plaintiff now maintains that he and Black Hand Entertainment jointly own the copyrights at
issue.
Third, the PAC includes allegations that Chaz Williams
Armed & Dangerous is a documentary and a story, as told by Defendants. (PAC III, 1.) The PAC goes on to allege that
Defendants A. Smith & Co. and Black Entertainment Television copied fictional portions of Plaintiff[]s copyright material into the narrative script for the Chaz Williams Armed &
Dangerous episode of American Gangster, including, the order of details, fictional details, the number of bank robberies, the number and circumstances of the shoot outs, the details of the prison escape, the Canadian court and prison scene, and other details of Plaintiffs juvenile period. DISCUSSION The Court will first address the applicable legal (PAC III, 5.)
standards before turning to the parties arguments specifically. I. Legal Standards A. Rule 12(b)(1) A case is properly dismissed for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) when the district court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it. 4
Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000). resolving a motion the to Court the dismiss may for lack of subject and
In
matter other
jurisdiction, materials questions.
consider to
affidavits resolve
beyond
pleadings
jurisdictional
See Morrison v. Natl Australia Bank, Ltd., 547 F.3d The court must accept as true the
167, 170 (2d Cir. 2008).
factual allegations contained in the complaint, but it will not draw argumentative inferences in favor of plaintiffs because See
subject matter jurisdiction must be shown affirmatively.
id.; Atlanta Mut. Ins. Co. v. Balfour Maclaine Intl Ltd., 968 F.2d 196, 198 (2d Cir. 1992); Shipping Fin. Servs. Corp. v. Drakos, 140 F.3d 129, 131 (2d Cir. 1998). A plaintiff
asserting subject matter jurisdiction has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it exists. 201 F.3d at 113. B. Rule 12(b)(5) Before jurisdiction service Servs., of L.P. over a a federal defendant, must be court the may exercise personal of Makarova,
procedural
requirement
summons v.
satisfied. 451 F.3d 89, 94
Dynegy (2d
Midstream Cir. 2005)
Trammochem,
(quoting Omni Capital Intl, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 104, 108 S. Ct. 404, 98 L. Ed. 2d 415 (1987)). When a
defendant moves to dismiss the Complaint under Rule 12(b)(5), the motion must assert more than 5
general
statement
that
service was inadequate.
See Herzner v. U.S. Postal Serv., No.
05-CV-2371, 2007 WL 869585, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2007). However, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing proper service. See id.
C. Rule 12(b)(6) In Court applies deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, is guided the by
plausibility
standard,
which
[t]wo working principles.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009); accord Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 71-72 (2d Cir. 2009). Court must accept to all allegations as First, although the this tenet is
true,
inapplicable
legal
conclusions;
thus,
[t]hreadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice. accord Harris, 572 F.3d at 72. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678;
Second, only complaints that
state a plausible claim for relief can survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Determining whether
a complaint does so is a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and
common sense.
Id.; accord Harris, 572 F.3d at 72. Plaintiff is litigating pro se, the Court
Because
reads his Complaint liberally, see, e.g., Mancuso v. Hynes, 379 F. Appx 60, 61 (2d Cir. 2010), and interprets his papers to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest, Corcoran v. 6
N.Y. Power Auth., 202 F.3d 530, 536 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting McPherson v. Coombe, 174 F.3d 276, 280 (2d Cir. 1999)). Furthermore, in deciding a motion to dismiss, the
Court is confined to the allegations contained within the four corners of [the] complaint. Shield, 152 F.3d broadly any by 67, to 71 (2d Pani v. Empire Blue Cross Blue Cir. any 1998). document This has to in been the the
interpreted Complaint, Complaint
include or
attached
statements
documents on
incorporated which the
reference,
any
document
Complaint
heavily relies, and anything of which judicial notice may be taken. See Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152-53
(2d Cir. 2002) (citations omitted); Kramer v. Time Warner Inc., 937 F.2d 767, 773 (2d Cir. 1991). D. Rule 12(d) Consideration of materials beyond those just
enumerated requires conversion of the 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss to one for summary judgment. converting a motion to See Kramer, 937 F.2d at 773. into a motion for In
dismiss
summary
judgment, the Court must ensure that Plaintiff had sufficient notice, Groden v. Random House, Inc., 61 F.3d 1045, 1052 (2d Cir. 1995), and a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion, FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d), before deciding the motion.
7
E. Rule 15 Courts should grant leave to amend when justice so requires. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2). Leave to amend should be
granted unless there is evidence of undue delay, bad faith, undue prejudice to the non-movant, or futility. RustOleum Corp., 244 F.3d 104, 110 (2d See Milanese v. 2001). To
Cir.
determine whether an amended claim is futile, courts analyze whether the proposed pleading would withstand a motion to See
dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
Dougherty v. Town of N. Hempstead Bd. of Zoning Appeal, 282 F.3d 83, 88 (2d Cir. 2002). II. Plaintiffs Amended Complaint & Timeliness Before the Court may address the merits of Defendants motions, the Court must first consider which Complaint is the operative document. In their motion to dismiss the Amended
Complaint, Defendants assert that Plaintiffs Amended Complaint is untimely and that the Court should therefore address their motions to dismiss Amended the original a Complaint and consider amendment.
Plaintiffs
Complaint
motion
requesting
(Defs. Br. to Dismiss Am. Compl., Docket Entry 32, at 7-9.) The Court agrees with Defendants. As mentioned earlier, Plaintiff commenced this action on March 18, 2013. A. Smith, BET, and Apple filed a motion to (See Docket Entry 7.) 8
dismiss on April 8, 2013.
On April 15,
2013, Netflix filed its motion to dismiss (see Docket Entry 13) and on May 16, 2013, A&E and Viacom filed their respective
motions to dismiss (see Docket Entries 25, 27).
Plaintiff filed (See Docket
the purported Amended Complaint on May 3, 2013. Entry 23.) Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of
Civil
Procedure
governs the amendment of pleadings.
Specifically, Rule 15(a)(1)
provides that a party may amend its complaint once as a matter of course within: (A) 21 days after serving it, or (B) if the pleading is one to which a responsive pleading is required, 21 days after service of a responsive pleading or 21 days after service of a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is earlier. All other amendments require either written consent FED. R. CIV. P.
from the other parties or the Courts leave. 15(a)(2). Plaintiff maintains that his
purported
Amended
Complaint was timely filed as a matter of course because [t]he dates as calculated by Plaintiff would be calculated from the final dismissal motion by Defendants . . . . (Pl.s Opp. to Plaintiff,
Mot. to Dismiss Am. Compl., Docket Entry 40, at 1.) however, is mistaken.
Following the 2009 amendments to Rule 15,
it is apparent that the Rule 15(a)(1)(B) . . . period run[s] from the earlier action by defendants . . . . Brown v. W.
Valley Envtl. Servs., LLC, No. 10-CV-0210, 2010 WL 3369604, at 9

*9
(W.D.N.Y.
Aug.
24,
2010).
Thus,
Rule
15(a)(1)
is
not
intended to be cumulative.
Trujillo v. City of Newton, No. 12-
CV-2380, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18516, at *3 (D. Kan. Feb. 12, 2013) (citing the begins v. FED. R. CIV. P. twenty-one on the of day 15 advisory to committees as a note). of
Rather, course
period of the
amend
matter
date
earliest No.
defense
action. 2013 U.S.
Schneider
Cnty.
Sacramento,
12-CV-2457,
Dist. LEXIS 97295, at *2 (E.D. Ca. July 10, 2013).
As the
earliest defense action was A. Smith, BET, and Apples motion to dismiss filed on April 8, 2013, the time to amend as a matter of course ended on April 29, 2013. Plaintiff, though, did not file
the purported Amended Complaint until May 5, 2013--after the deadline. Accordingly, Amended Complaint as the a Court In will construe the Plaintiffs additional
PAC.
conducting
analyses, the Court will first consider the original Complaint before turning to issues regarding the PAC. feasible the Court will provide a singular However, where discussion of
overlapping issues. III. Service In their motions to dismiss the original Complaint, BET, A. Smith, Apple, and Netflix asserted that the Complaint should be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
10
12(b)(5) service.
due
to
Plaintiffs
failure
to
properly
effectuate
The Court disagrees. BET, A. Smith, and Apple filed their motion to dismiss
on April 8, 2013, arguing, in part, that Plaintiffs attempted service through the United States Postal Service (USPS) was improper and that none of the three defendants received a copy of the Summons. On April 15, 2013, Netflix filed its motion to
dismiss, also claiming that it had not received the Summons and that Plaintiffs attempted service via USPS was not proper. In between the filing of these two motions, however, the Court issued a Memorandum and Order granting Plaintiffs motion to proceed in forma pauperis and directing service of the Summons and Complaint on Defendants through the United States Marshal Service. (See Docket Entry 11.) On April 25, 2013, the
Clerk of the Court forwarded the appropriate documents to the United States Marshal for service. dated April 25, 2013.) (Court Only Docket Entry
As the United States Marshal effectuated
proper service within the 120-day deadline set by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, BET, A. Smith, Apple, and Netflixs motions to dismiss the Complaint for failure to properly serve is DENIED. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(m).2
The Court notes, however, that the docket reflects executed summonses for only some Defendants. (See Docket Entries 37-38, 44-45, 54.) Nonetheless, even if service was at all untimely, the Court may extend the time to effectuate proper service for
2
11
IV. Failure to State a Copyright Claim A. Historical Facts Defendants respective motions to dismiss the original Complaint assert that Plaintiff has failed to properly allege a claim for copyright infringement that because not the works to at issue
present
historical
facts
are
entitled
copyright
protection.
The Court disagrees. establish a prima facie case of copyright
To
infringement, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work that are original. TufAmerica, Inc. v. Diamond, --- F.
Supp. 2d ----, 2013 WL 4830954, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2013)

good cause. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(m); see also Sciotti v. Saint Gobain Containers, No. 06-CV-6422, 2007 WL 4180737, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 2007). In determining whether a plaintiff has shown good cause, courts generally consider two factors: (1) the reasonableness and diligence of Plaintiffs efforts to serve, and (2) the prejudice to the Moving Defendants from the delay. Jordan v. Forfeiture Support Assocs., 928 F. Supp. 2d 588, 597 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Courts in this Circuit have consistently held that a pro se litigant proceeding in forma pauperis is entitled to rely upon the Marshal Service and that any delay by the Marshal constitutes good cause. See, e.g., Romandette v. Weetabix Co., 807 F.2d 309, 311 (2d Cir. 1986); Husowitz v. Am. Postal Workers Union, 190 F.R.D. 53, 57 (E.D.N.Y. 1999). Additionally, the Court can see no prejudice to any Defendants in extending the time as each have actively litigated the case from its early stages. Moreover, to the extent that Defendants seek dismissal of the Amended Complaint for improper service, any such motion is DENIED AS MOOT as the Court has deemed the relevant document to be a PAC, not an Amended Complaint. 12
(quoting Warner Bros. Entmt, Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513, 533 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)). Defendants maintain that Plaintiff
has not properly alleged ownership of a valid copyright because Plaintiff describes the program as a bio-documentary
detailing Plaintiffs life story including Plaintiffs life experiences as a bank robber. (A. Smith, BET, and Apples Br.
to Dismiss, Docket Entry 8, at 8; Netflixs Br. to Dismiss, Docket Entry 14, at 8; A&Es Br. to Dismiss, Docket Entry 26, at 6; Viacoms Br. to Dismiss, Docket Entry 28, at 6.) In
opposition, Plaintiff maintains that [t]he copyright material and the episode are not all facts, opposed to what Defendants allege is history, and share those identical points of fiction. The fiction was created by Plaintiff. Dismiss, Docket Entry 17, 63.) Defendants are correct that historical fact is not copyrightable. Robinson v. Random House, Inc., 877 F. Supp. (Pl.s Opp. to Mot. to
830, 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), modified by 1995 WL 502525 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 1995). Moreover, because the retelling of history
necessarily proceeds in a certain chronological order, an author cannot hold a copyright in the sequence of the storys
Although Plaintiffs opposition brief was filed before A&E and Viacoms motions, his additional opposition at Docket Entry 39 reiterates prior arguments and Defendants respective motions are similar, if not identical. Accordingly, where Defendants arguments overlap, the Court will refer only to A. Smith, BET, and Apples brief for ease of reference.
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13
elements.
Id.
However, an authors expression of historical Id. (emphasis in
facts is protected by the Copyright Act. original).
Thus, Plaintiffs allegations that the show is a
bio-documentary and recounts Plaintiffs life experiences as a bank robber do not necessarily preclude a copyright
infringement claim.
(Compl. III.)
Notably, Plaintiff also
alleges that the story treatment is copyrighted and has been infringed. (Compl. III.) Additionally, Plaintiffs opposition asserts that the copyright material contains points of fiction created by
Plaintiff--theoretically embellishments of his true life story-which Defendants included in the program. to Dismiss 6.) Certainly, Plaintiff (Pl.s Opp. to Mot. faces significant
challenges in actually proving such a claim.
For example, the
District Court for the Southern District of New York noted that [w]hen a book presents itself as an account of factual
events, this representation renders proof of infringement more difficult, because copyright protection in this circuit does not extend to facts or to true events . . . . Effie Film, LLC v.
Pomerance, 909 F. Supp. 2d 273, 297 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting Friedman v. ITC Intl Television Corp., 644 F. Supp. 46, 48 (E.D.N.Y. 1986)). that because work Nonetheless, the Court went on to explain imagination a historical 14
adding . . .
to
fact
can
result
in
a on
protected
romance,
albeit
based
actual personages, is still protected against copying of the fictitious devices added by the narrator. Id. (quoting 1-2 Thus, at claim for
Nimmer on Copyright 2.11 (alteration in original)). this stage, Plaintiff has plausibly asserted a
copyright infringement in this regard. Accordingly, Defendants respective motions to dismiss the original Complaint because it is based on historical fact are DENIED. B. Amending the Complaint - Historical Facts The PAC expounds upon Plaintiffs initial assertions regarding fictional portions of the copyrighted material. PAC alleges Defendants A. Smith & Co. and Black Entertainment Television copied fictional portions of Plaintiff[]s copyright material into the narrative script for the Chaz Williams Armed & Dangerous episode of American Gangster. Specifically, the order of details, fictional details, the number of bank robberies, the number and circumstances of the shoot outs, the details of the prison escape, the Canadian court and prison scene, and other details of Plaintiffs juvenile period. (PAC III, 5.) As this portion of the PAC merely fleshes out The
allegations that the Court has already found sufficient, the Court finds that Plaintiff should be permitted to amend his Complaint in this regard.
15
Defendants, reject these
however,
argue
that they
the
Court
should
allegations
because
flatly
contradict
Plaintiffs allegations in the original Complaint that his story is a bio-documentary and relays true events. The Court
disagrees. There is authority supporting the notion that a court may disregard amended pleadings when they directly contradict facts that have been alleged in prior pleadings. Kilkenny v.
Law Office of Cushner & Garvey, L.L.P., No. 08-CV-0588, 2012 WL 1638326, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 8, 2012) (collecting cases). Thus,
[w]here a plaintiff blatantly changes his statement of the facts in order to respond to the defendant[s] motion to dismiss . . . [and] directly contradicts the facts set forth in his original complaint, a court is authorized to accept the facts described in the original complaint as true. Colliton v.
Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP, No. 08-CV-0400, 2008 WL 4386764, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2008) (quoting Wallace v. N.Y.C. Dept of Corr., No. 95-CV-4404, 1996 WL 586797, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 1996) (alterations in original)). Particularly relevant, here, though, is that precedent supports rejection where the amended pleading includes blatant and flatly contradictory allegations. The Amended Complaint
still includes language referring to the copyrighted works as a documentary and the shift from a bio-documentary including 16
the story of Plaintiffs life experiences (Compl. III) to a documentary telling Plaintiffs story (PAC III, 1) is not such a blatant reversal in allegations as Defendants
suggest.
See Kermanshah v. Kermanshah, 580 F. Supp. 2d 247, 266
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (The changes between the complaint and amended complaint are, when taken as a whole, not blatant or directly contradict[ory], and can be described as clarifying but, at most, as inconsistent. (alterations in original)). Therefore, Plaintiffs motion to amend in this regard is GRANTED. C. Copying Defendants motions to dismiss also assert that
Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for copyright infringement because he has not sufficiently alleged the copying of
constituent elements of the work that are original. Court disagrees.
Again, the
To satisfy the second prong [of a prima facie case of infringement--i.e., copying of constituent elements of the work that are original], a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) the defendant has actually copied the plaintiffs work; and (2) the copying is illegal because a substantial similarity exists
between the defendants work and the protectable elements of plaintiffs. TufAmerica, Inc., 2013 WL 4830954, at *3
(quoting Hamil Am., Inc. v. GFI, 193 F.3d 92, 99 (2d Cir. 1999) 17
(emphasis in original).
In moving to dismiss the Complaint,
Defendants here make two interrelated arguments. First, they argue that Plaintiff has not alleged any actual copying. at 9.) detail. (See A. Smith, BET, and Apples Br. to Dismiss
Defendants are correct in that the Complaint lacks some However, courts have specifically noted that direct
evidence of copying is rarely possible and therefore copying is generally established by showing (a) that the defendant had access to the of copyrighted work and (b) in the the substantial two works.
similarity
protectible
[sic]
material
Effie Film, LLC, 909 F. Supp. 2d at 291 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, Defendants argue, second, that there is no substantial similarity between the alleged copyrighted works and the alleged infringing work. (See A. Smith, BET, and
Apples Br. to Dismiss at 9.)
In other words, because the only
similarities are unprotected elements such as plot structure, scenes or settings, and reflections of historical fact,
Defendants maintain that Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege a claim of copyright infringement. Apples Br. to Dismiss at 9.) As stated in connection with the analysis regarding historical fact, Plaintiffs allegations are minimal. However, (A. Smith, BET, and
given his pro se status, the Court finds that his allegations 18
that
Defendants
have
incorporated
Plaintiffs
artistic
expression of his life story cross the threshold--even if only slightly--to sufficiently overcome a motion to dismiss. Here,
Plaintiff has alleged the particular, original copyrighted works and that Defendants have committed acts of infringement through creation, airing, or otherwise making available the Chaz
Willaims Armed & Dangerous program.
See Broughel v. Battery
Conservancy, No. 07-CV-7755, 2009 WL 928280, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2009) (noting that although a plaintiff cannot rest on conclusory allegations, a plaintiff must identify, with
specificity, the original works that are the subject of her copyright claim and which acts committed by defendants
constitute infringement of her rights.); Maverick Recording, Co. v. Goldshteyn, No. 05-CV-4523, 2006 WL 2166870, at *3
(E.D.N.Y. July 31, 2006) ([T]he specificity required of the complaint description is of not the great. A plaintiff instances need or not exact provide times a of
individual
infringement.). The Court is mindful that [t]he question of
substantial similarity is by no means exclusively reserved for resolution by a jury and that in certain circumstances, it is entirely question appropriate at the for a to district dismiss court stage. to resolve F. that Gaito
motion
Peter
Architecture, LLC v. Simone Dev. Corp., 602 F.3d 57, 63-64 (2d 19
Cir. 2010).
In considering the issue of substantial similarity
at the motion to dismiss stage, the district court may consider the facts as asserted within the four corners of the complaint together with the documents attached to the complaint as
exhibits, and any documents incorporated in the complaint by reference. omitted). Id. at 64 (internal quotation marks and citation Thus, the Court may consider the copyrighted works
and the allegedly infringing works, keeping in mind that the documents supersede the parties allegations, Id. the Court without
necessarily requiring any additional discovery. Here, though, neither party has
provided
with the copyrighted works.
At most, the Court has a portion of
Inside Out: Film Project Summary (see Pl.s Opp. to Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. 4) and a DVD of Chaz Williams Armed & Dangerous (Buzzetta Decl., Docket Entry 9, Ex. 1).4 Courts that have
conducted the substantial similarity analysis at the motion to dismiss stage have noted that it is appropriate where the
Complaint attaches the copyrighted works or have otherwise been made available. Gaito, 602 F.3d at 64 ([W]here, as here, the
works in question are attached to a plaintiffs complaint, it is entirely appropriate for the district court to consider the
similarity between those works in connection with a motion to

As Defendants correctly aver, and as Plaintiff apparently concedes, interspersed throughout the program are portions of an interview with Plaintiff.
4
20
dismiss, because the court has before it all that is necessary in order to make such an evaluation.); accord TufAmerica, Inc., 2013 WL 4830954, at *4. Accordingly, Defendants motions to dismiss the
Complaint for failure to properly allege copying are DENIED.5 Additionally, as the PAC has expounded upon these
allegations, is it GRANTED in this regard.
Specifically, the
PAC alleges that others in the industry were negotiating for the rights to Plaintiffs story, presumably going to Plaintiffs
assertion that Defendants had access to the story through the industry, and that Defendants copied fictional portions of
Plaintiff[]s copyright material into the narrative script for the program. (PAC III 3, 5.)
D. General Release and Conversion to Summary Judgment Defendants further move to dismiss the Complaint
because a General Release signed by Plaintiff exonerates them with respect to all of Plaintiffs claims. The Court, however,
will not address the General Release at this stage. As Defendants correctly note, the General Release is a document outside of the pleadings, and therefore would require
At least one treatise has warned that [w]here a federal judge perceives (correctly or not) that a plaintiff attempted to conceal a weak case by failing to attach sample copyrighted material and infringing material, the plaintiff may be severely prejudiced moving forward. RAYMOND J. DOWD, Copyright Litigation Handbook 9.9 (2d ed. 2013).
5
21
conversion judgment.
of
their The
motions
to
dismiss has
to broad
one
for
summary in
Court,
though,
discretion
determining whether conversion is appropriate.
See Stephens v.
Bayview Nursing & Rehab. Ctr., No. 07-CV-0596, 2008 WL 728896, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2009) (collecting cases); accord
Kouakou v. Fedeliscare N.Y., 920 F. Supp. 2d 391, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). Here, Plaintiff has acknowledged the General Release,
but has also raised some issues regarding ambiguity in that contract--namely that the General Release pertains to acting
royalties, but is not a release regarding copyrights and the program itself. such an Without determining the potential viability of the Court notes that the exercise of
argument,
discretion in converting to a motion for summary judgment is particularly appropriate where it is likely to facilitate the disposition of the action. Stephens, 2008 WL 728896, at *2
(quoting Carione v. United States, 368 F. Supp. 2d 186, 191 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)). Accordingly, the Court declines to convert to summary judgment, and Defendants motions to dismiss--as well as any arguments in opposition to amendment--based upon the General
Release are DENIED. V. Plaintiffs State Law Claims Defendants also move to dismiss Plaintiffs state law claims--which they characterize 22
as
being
claims
for
unfair
business practices, exploitation, and harassment--for failure to state a claim. The Court also liberally reads the Complaint to Nonetheless, the Court
assert a claim for unjust enrichment.
agrees with Defendants that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for any of the aforementioned state law causes of action.6 The Complaint alleges that Defendants by their
actions individually and in concert have participated in unfair business practices, exploitation III.) and without It compensation, alleges and that of
infringement. Plaintiff has
(Compl. been
further on
approached
harassed,
hundreds
occasions, in public after being recognized due to Defendants [sic] action. (Compl. III.) Plaintiffs claims fail for a
number of reasons. First, as to any claim for harassment, New York does not recognize such an independent tort. See Goldstein v. Tabb,
177 A.D.2d 470, 471, 575 N.Y.S.2d 902 (2d Dept 1991) (New York does not recognize a cause of action to recover damages for
In their motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint, Defendants also assert that this Court does not have jurisdiction over Plaintiffs state law claims. The Court disagrees. As Defendants state: The exercise of supplemental jurisdiction is appropriate where the facts underlying the federal and state claims substantially overlap or where presentation of the federal claim necessarily brings the facts underlying the state claim before the court. (Defs. Br. to Dismiss Am. Compl. at 18-19 (quoting Sampson v. City of N.Y., No. 07-CV-2836, 2009 WL 3364218, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2009).) The Court finds that there is enough overlap in Plaintiffs state and federal claims that this Court is not necessarily deprived of subject matter jurisdiction.
6
23
harassment.); accord Jacobs v. 200 E. 36th Owners Corp., 281 A.D.2d 281, 281, 722 N.Y.S.2d 137 (1st Dept 2001). Second, as
to any potential claim for exploitation, Plaintiff presumably intends to assert a claim for commercial exploitation of
Plaintiffs likeness.
However, Plaintiff himself acknowledges
that he is not arguing that Defendants violated his rights by portraying him in the documentary. (Pl.s Opp. to Mot. to
Dismiss 7 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).) Thus, Plaintiffs own assertions belie any potential claim in this regard. Third, as to unfair business practices,
Plaintiff arguably intends to assert a claim pursuant to New York General Business Law Section 349. That law, however,
requires, as a prerequisite to liability, that the plaintiff establish injury to the public generally as distinguished from injury to the plaintiff alone. Cas. & Sur. Co., 834 F. Tinlee Enters., Inc. v. Aetna 605, 608 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
Supp.
Plaintiff has alleged no such consumer-oriented act or injury. Fourth, as to any potential claim for unjust
enrichment, such a claim is preempted by the Copyright Act. Section 301 of the Copyright Act preempts a state law claim when (i) the work at issue come[s] within the subject matter of copyright and (ii) the right being asserted is equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of
copyright.
Faktor v. Yahoo! Inc., No. 12-CV-5220, 2013 WL 24
1641180,
at
*4
(S.D.N.Y.
Apr.
16,
2013)
(quoting
17
U.S.C.
301(b)); accord Orange Cnty. Choppers, Inc. v. Olaes Enters., Inc., 497 F. Supp. 2d 541, 554-55 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). prong of this test, the subject matter The first is
requirement,
satisfied if the claim applies to a work of authorship fixed in a tangible medium of expression and falling within the ambit of one of the categories of copyrightable works. Choppers, Inc., 497 F. Supp. 2d at 555. example, motion pictures and other Orange Cnty.
Such works include, for audiovisual works, and
therefore this prong is satisfied.
17 U.S.C. 102(a)(5).
The second prong--the general scope requirement--is satisfied only when the state-created right may be abridged by an act that would, by itself, infringe one of the exclusive rights provided by federal copyright law. Orange Cnty.
Choppers, Inc., 497 F. Supp. 2d at 555 (quoting Briaripatch Ltd., L.P. v. Phoenix Pictures, Inc., 373 F.3d 296, 305 (2d Cir. 2004)). Here, the very same acts that Plaintiff alleges
constitute copyright infringement also form the foundation of his unjust enrichment claim. He has not alleged any extra
elements or asserted any allegations that would make this claim qualitatively different from a copyright infringement claim. Id. (quoting Briarpatch, 373 F.3d at 305).
25
Accordingly,
Defendants
motions
to
dismiss
Plaintiffs state law claims are GRANTED and such claims are DISMISSED. As the PAC reiterates these claims without any
additional allegations or support rectifying the aforementioned deficiencies, his motion to amend as to state law claims for unfair business practices, unjust enrichment, harassment, and exploitation is DENIED. Given that these claims are either
preempted or unrecognized claims, and that Plaintiff has not been able to properly allege them despite attempted amendment, the claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. VI. Additional Issues Regarding Amendment A. Black Hand Entertainment Plaintiff moves to amend the Complaint to include
Black Hand Entertainment, a corporation.
However, a non-lawyer See United
cannot represent the interests of an entity pro se.
States v. Twenty Miljam-350 IED Jammers, 669 F.3d 78, 91 (2d Cir. 2011) ([A] corporation is not allowed to appear in federal court except by a licensed attorney, and [a pro se litigant] as a non-attorney is not allowed, in federal court, to represent anyone other than himself. (citations omitted)). Accordingly,
Plaintiffs motion to amend in this regard is DENIED.
26
B. State Law Breach of Contract Plaintiff also seeks to include a state law claim for breach of contract based upon an agreement between BET and Black Hand Entertainment. Plaintiff asserts that Defendants have
violated that agreement by not fairly compensating Plaintiff and by not giving Plaintiff equal treatment as every other
producer.
(Pl.s Opp. to Mot. to Dismiss 7.) Plaintiff, however, is not a signatory to the
contract. but, as
The relevant signatory is Black Hand Entertainment, previously stated, Plaintiffs motion to amend to
include Black Hand Entertainment as a Plaintiff has been denied. Accordingly, Plaintiff does not have standing to bring such a claim. See McCall v. Chesapeake Energy Corp., 817 F. Supp. 2d
307, 313 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). Thus, Plaintiffs motion to amend to add a claim for breach of contract is DENIED. C. Statute of Limitations and Ownership Insofar as Plaintiff seeks to amend his Complaint to assert additional allegations regarding copyright infringement, Defendants oppose such amendment because Plaintiffs claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations and because
Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged his ownership (as opposed
27
to Black Hand Entertainments ownership) of the copyright at issue.7 The Court will address each of these in turn. 1. Statute of Limitations Claims for copyright infringement are governed by a three-year statute of limitations. Control Sys., Inc., 935 F. Supp. Architectronics, Inc. v. 425, 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(citing 17 U.S.C. 507(b)).
Although there is somewhat of a
split in this Circuit regarding when such a claim accrues--i.e., from the date of discovery or from the date of injury, see Urbont v. Sony Music Entmt, 863 F. Supp. 2d 279, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)--Defendants correctly note that Plaintiffs claims
primarily relate to events in 2007.
Accordingly, any claims
pertaining to infringement prior to 2010 are time-barred. However, [e]ach act of infringement is a distinct Stone v. Therefore,
harm giving rise to an independent claim for relief. Williams, 970 F.2d 1043, 1049 (2d Cir. 1992).
Plaintiff has also plausibly alleged claims that are not timebarred. See Architectronics, Inc., 935 F. Supp. at 433 (holding
Defendants also asserted these arguments in connection with their motions to dismiss the original Complaint. However, they did not raise them until their reply brief. (See Defs. Reply Br. to Dismiss.) See Fairfield Fin. Mort. Grp., Inc. v. Luca, 584 F. Supp. 2d 479, 485 n.2 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (declining to address defendants arguments raised for the first time in the reply papers); Vilkhu v. City of N.Y., No. 06-CV-2095, 2008 WL 1991099, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. May 5, 2008) (Because defendants have raised this argument for the first time in their reply papers, I decline to consider it on this motion.).
7
28
that the plaintiffs claims were not all time-barred because much of the damages plaintiff claims arise from sales of copies of GT FLEXICON beginning in June 1990); see also Williams v. Curinton, 662 F. Supp. 2d 33, 39 (D.D.C. 2009) (However, any copyright infringement claims arising from individual sales of this song within three years of the filing of the complaint are timely.). 2. Ownership In their reply in further support of the motion to dismiss the original Complaint, Defendants maintained that Black Hand Entertainment may be the true owner of the copyrights. (Defs. Reply Br. to Dismiss at 2.) The PAC now alleges that
Plaintiff and Black Hand Entertainment own the copyrights. Defendants seem to assert that Plaintiffs claims of ownership However, are as contradictory and must therefore in be rejected. context
already
discussed,
contradictory
this
means something more than somewhat inconsistent. 16-17.
See supra pp.
Although Plaintiff initially asserted that he is the
sole owner of the copyrights, and now claims that he and Black Hand Entertainment are the owners, the inconsistencies seem to arise from the fact that Plaintiff is a pro se litigant who has confused the legal identities of himself and the company that he has created. cause of In any event, [t]he right to prosecute an accrued for infringement 29
action
is
an
incident
of
copyright ownership and it is a right that may be exercised independently of co-owners. (2d Cir. 2007); see also Davis v. Blige, 505 F.3d 90, 99 Copyright.net Music Pub. LLC v.
MP3.com, 256 F. Supp. 2d 214, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) ([T]here was simply no legal basis for requiring plaintiffs to join all coowners of the compositions at issue.). Accordingly, claim of copyright Plaintiffs motion is to amend but to only assert those
infringement
GRANTED,
claims that are not time-barred remain actionable. D. Parties Finally, Plaintiff seeks to add John Doe and Best Buy as defendants.8 As Plaintiffs claims against Best Buy are
similar to those as the other Defendants, and for all of the reasons articulated above, his motion in this regard is GRANTED. (See PAC III, 1 (Defendants, Best Buy, Apple via ITunes and Amazon have Plaintiffs story on their websites for sale.).)
Plaintiff has also dropped Viacom as a defendant, whose termination has already been noted on the docket. Although Plaintiffs opposition notes that he inadvertently left Viacom out of the Amended Complaint (Pl.s Opp. to Mot. to Dismiss Am. Compl. at 2), the PAC does not mention Viacom at all or assert any claims against it. Moreover, Plaintiff cannot amend his pleadings through an opposition brief. See Fadem v. Ford Motor Co., 352 F. Supp. 2d 501, 516 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (It is longstanding precedent in this circuit that parties cannot amend their pleadings through issues raised solely in their briefs.); OBrien Natl Prop. Analysts Partners, 719 F. Supp. 222, 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) ([I]t is axiomatic that the Complaint cannot be amended by the briefs in opposition to a motion to dismiss.).
8
30
As to John Doe, however, Plaintiff merely asserts that John Doe provided Defendants with information which
Defendants then incorporated into the program. 4.)
(PAC III,
These allegations are conclusory and unsupported by any Accordingly, his motion in this regard is
factual allegations. DENIED.
CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Defendants respective
motions to dismiss the original Complaint are GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. They are DENIED insofar as they are based
upon arguments regarding improper service, the general release, and failure to state a claim for copyright infringement.
However, they are GRANTED as to Plaintiffs state law claims, which are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Plaintiffs GRANTED IN PART and motion DENIED to IN amend PART. the It Complaint is is also as to but
GRANTED
Plaintiffs
allegations
regarding
copyright
infringement,
only insofar as such claims are timely. Plaintiffs amendments regarding state
It is DENIED as to law claims and the
additions of Black Hand Entertainment and John Doe. Complaint govern Order. shall be the as operative consistent document, with
The Amended it will and
although
only
insofar
this
Memorandum
31
Defendants motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint is DENIED AS MOOT. The Clerk of the Court is directed to forward to the United States Marshal for the Eastern District of New York
copies of Plaintiffs Amended Complaint and Amended Summons for service upon Defendants without prepayment of the fees.
Furthermore, the Clerk of the Court is directed to mail a copy of this Memorandum and Order to Plaintiff.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ JOANNA SEYBERT______ Joanna Seybert, U.S.D.J. Dated: February 14 , 2014 Central Islip, NY
32

Williams V BET American Gangster Copyright

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Case 2:13-cv-01459-JS-WDW Document 57 Filed 02/14/14 Page 1 of 32 PageID #: 298

Entertainment A&E Television

Case 2:13-cv-01459-JS-WDW Document 57 Filed 02/14/14 Page 2 of 32 PageID #: 299

Case 2:13-cv-01459-JS-WDW Document 57 Filed 02/14/14 Page 3 of 32 PageID #: 300

Guild of America East.

available on Netflix, I Tunes, and Amazon. Plaintiff alleges that [a]ll

(Compl. III.) Defendants . . .

that are particularly relevant.

Case 2:13-cv-01459-JS-WDW Document 57 Filed 02/14/14 Page 4 of 32 PageID #: 301

First, Entertainment defendants, as

Black Best Buy

Third, the PAC includes allegations that Chaz Williams

Case 2:13-cv-01459-JS-WDW Document 57 Filed 02/14/14 Page 5 of 32 PageID #: 302

jurisdiction, materials questions.

167, 170 (2d Cir. 2008).

subject matter jurisdiction must be shown affirmatively.

satisfied. 451 F.3d 89, 94

Midstream Cir. 2005)

Case 2:13-cv-01459-JS-WDW Document 57 Filed 02/14/14 Page 6 of 32 PageID #: 303

service was inadequate.

See Herzner v. U.S. Postal Serv., No.

[t]wo working principles.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

Second, only complaints that

Case 2:13-cv-01459-JS-WDW Document 57 Filed 02/14/14 Page 7 of 32 PageID #: 304

interpreted Complaint, Complaint

incorporated which the

Case 2:13-cv-01459-JS-WDW Document 57 Filed 02/14/14 Page 8 of 32 PageID #: 305

dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

dismiss on April 8, 2013.

Case 2:13-cv-01459-JS-WDW Document 57 Filed 02/14/14 Page 9 of 32 PageID #: 306

motions to dismiss (see Docket Entries 25, 27).

Plaintiff filed (See Docket

governs the amendment of pleadings.

Specifically, Rule 15(a)(1)

Following the 2009 amendments to Rule 15,

Valley Envtl. Servs., LLC, No. 10-CV-0210, 2010 WL 3369604, at 9

Case 2:13-cv-01459-JS-WDW Document 57 Filed 02/14/14 Page 10 of 32 PageID #: 307

Trujillo v. City of Newton, No. 12-

action. 2013 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 97295, at *2 (E.D. Ca. July 10, 2013).

Case 2:13-cv-01459-JS-WDW Document 57 Filed 02/14/14 Page 11 of 32 PageID #: 308

As the United States Marshal effectuated

Case 2:13-cv-01459-JS-WDW Document 57 Filed 02/14/14 Page 12 of 32 PageID #: 309

The Court disagrees. establish a prima facie case of copyright

Supp. 2d ----, 2013 WL 4830954, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2013)

Case 2:13-cv-01459-JS-WDW Document 57 Filed 02/14/14 Page 13 of 32 PageID #: 310

Case 2:13-cv-01459-JS-WDW Document 57 Filed 02/14/14 Page 14 of 32 PageID #: 311

However, an authors expression of historical Id. (emphasis in

facts is protected by the Copyright Act. original).

Thus, Plaintiffs allegations that the show is a

Notably, Plaintiff also

challenges in actually proving such a claim.

For example, the

Case 2:13-cv-01459-JS-WDW Document 57 Filed 02/14/14 Page 15 of 32 PageID #: 312

Case 2:13-cv-01459-JS-WDW Document 57 Filed 02/14/14 Page 16 of 32 PageID #: 313

Defendants, reject these

Case 2:13-cv-01459-JS-WDW Document 57 Filed 02/14/14 Page 17 of 32 PageID #: 314

See Kermanshah v. Kermanshah, 580 F. Supp. 2d 247, 266

constituent elements of the work that are original. Court disagrees.

Case 2:13-cv-01459-JS-WDW Document 57 Filed 02/14/14 Page 18 of 32 PageID #: 315

In moving to dismiss the Complaint,

Apples Br. to Dismiss at 9.)