BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1996) 19, 677-758

Printed in the United States of America

Second language acquisition: Theoretical and experimental issues in contemporary research

Samuel David Epstein
Linguistics Department, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138 Electronic mail: epstein@fas.harvard.edu

Suzanne Flynn
Foreign Languages and Literatures, Linguistics and Philosophy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139 Electronic mail: sflynn@MIT.edu

Gita Martohardjono
Department of Linguistics, Queens College/CUNY, Flushing, NY 11367

Abstract: To what extent, if any, does Universal Grammar (UG) constrain second language (L2) acquisition? This is not only an empirical question, but one which is currently investigable. In this context, L2 acquisition is emerging as an important new domain of psycholinguistic research. Three logical possibilities have been articulated regarding the role of UG in L2 acquisition: The first is the "no access" hypothesis that claims that no aspect of UG is available to the L2 learner. The second is the "partial access" hypothesis that claims that only LI instantiated principles and LI instantiated parameter-values of UG are available to the learner. The third, called the "full access" hypothesis, asserts that UG in its entirety constrains L2 acquisition. In this paper we argue that there is no compelling evidence to support either of the first two hypotheses. Moreover, we provide evidence concerning functional categories in L2 acquisition consistent with the claim that UG is fully available to the L2 learner (see also Flynn 1987; Li 1993; Martohardjono 1992; Schwartz & Sprouse 1991; Thomas 1991; White 1989). In addition, we will attempt to clarify some of currently unclear theoretical issues that arise with respect to positing UG as an explanatory theory of L2 acquisition. We will also investigate in some detail certain crucial methodological questions involved in experimentally testing the role of UG in L2 acquisition and finally, we will present a set of experimental results of our own supporting the "Full Access" hypothesis. Keywords: competence vs. performance; critical periods; functional categories; innateness; language acquisition; morphology; parameter setting; problem solving; psycholinguistics; second language learning; stages; universal grammar

Introduction There is an emerging awareness among linguistic theorists and psycholinguists that the study of adult second language (L2) acquisition is rapidly developing into one of the most dynamic and promising areas of inquiry in cognitive science. Traditionally, these language scientists have paid little attention to the issues surrounding L2 acquisition; yet mastering an L2 (or L3, L4, . . . , Ln) constitutes both a major and a commonplace achievement for most of the world's population. Until recently, however, this process was not well understood. In large part this was because traditional approaches to the study of L2 learning were inextricably linked to language pedagogy alone (see review in Newmeyer 1983; Newmeyer & Weinberger 1988). However, recent theoretical and empirical advances have convinced a growing number of scholars that careful investigation of the L2 acquisition process is likely to be a very fruitful endeavor in understanding the cognitive processes specific to language learning or the biological endowment for language, namely, Universal Grammar (UG). A central, implicit argument of this target article is that
1996 Cambridge University Press

understanding how L2 acquisition occurs will provide a unique and fundamentally important perspective on the mental processes involved in language learning and use. In particular, it provides an important context for investigating the interaction of general cognitive and specifically linguistic processes. This perspective is different from and complementary to that provided by the study of first language (LI) acquisition in children..L2 learners, specifically adult learners, bring capacities to bear on the languagelearning process that are both similar to and different from the capacities of children. The differences can be attributed to the fact that limitations due to general developmental deficits are typically irrelevant in adult language acquisition. Therefore, the study of L2 acquisition provides a unique context in which to examine language development independent of maturational issues. It also permits an examination of the interaction of various cognitive capacities that are not fully developed in children. Furthermore, by contrasting adult L2 acquisition and child LI performance, researchers may be able to identify the role played by experience in general, as well as by the existence or absence of an already functioning LI, in the types of

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Epstein et al.: Second language acquisition processes that language learners at different ages might rely on. On the other hand, L2 acquisition research has pointed to striking similarities between child and adult language acquisition, a fact that can be explained if we view these two cognitive processes as fundamentally similar in nature. At this level, then, the study of how individuals acquire an L2 is essential for the development of theories of language. If linguistic theory is to provide an empirically accurate and comprehensive characterization of language capacity and learning, it must accommodate the facts of L2 acquisition. A theoretical or empirical account that is responsive to the facts of children's LI learning alone is almost certain to be incomplete and may be fundamentally misguided in its conclusions. In short, L2 acquisition is a critical issue for the study of language and the mind. It represents a central domain of inquiry that is essential for the development of an understanding of language and language learning and their relationships to other cognitive processes. In this target article we will attempt to demonstrate how investigations in this field can provide, and in some cases have already provided, important insights into broader issues of language learning. Thus, a central question is, to what extent, if any, is adult L2 acquisition constrained by the linguistic principles that determine LI acquisition?1 We adopt the Principles and Parameters framework of Universal Grammar and examine three logical possibilities that have been articulated regarding the role of UG in second language acquisition. The first is the no-access hypothesis, according to which no aspect of UG is available to the L2 learner. The second is the partialaccess hypothesis, according to which only Ll-instantiated principles and Ll-instantiated parameter-values of UG are available to the learner. The third, called the full-access hypothesis, is that UG in its entirety constrains L2 acquisition. We argue that there is no compelling evidence to support either of the first two hypotheses, but that evidence does exist that is consistent with the third. In addition, we attempt to (1) clarify some of the theoretical issues that arise with respect to positing UG as an explanatory theory of second language acquisition, (2) investigate certain crucial methodological questions involved in experimentally testing the role of UG in second language acquisition, and (3) present experimental results of our own. The paper is organized as follows. In section 1 we briefly outline the theory of UG as the biological construct characterizing the human language faculty and sketch several ways in which the relationship between UG and the process of language acquisition can be conceptualized. In section 2 we consider the no-access hypothesis as typified by Clahsen and Muysken (1986), Clahsen (1988), and Bley-Vroman (1989). This hypothesis is "that child first language and adult second language acquisition are guided by distinct cognitive principles" (Clahsen 1988, p. 47). According to this view, child LI acquisition is constrained by principles of UG, whereas L2 learners use only "general learning strategies" - UG-independent principles - to guide their construction of L2 grammar. We show that such proposals are both conceptually and empirically problematic, to the extent that they fail to distinguish an L2er's knowledge of language (as represented in a grammar) from the manner in which such knowledge is purported to be acquired (e.g., by "general learning strategies"). Since the no-access hypoth678
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esis often appeals to Lenneberg's Critical Period Hypothesis for language acquisition, we discuss it briefly as well. In section 3 we consider the partial-access hypothesis as developed by Schachter (1989), according to which "UG in its entirety will not be available as a knowledge source for the adult acquisition of a second language. Only a languagespecific instantiation of it will be (Schachter 1989, p. 13)." Although at first glance this hypothesis may seem less extreme and therefore more attractive than the no-access hypothesis, we will argue that it is nonetheless untenable. 2 Section 3.3 contains the central focus of our paper: a case study of a particular version of the partial-access hypothesis, namely, the Weak Continuity Hypothesis. This approach has been developed to account for the acquisition of functional categories for both LI (e.g., Radford 1990) and L2 acquisition (Vainikka & Young-Scholten 1991; 1992). It hypothesizes that although LI and L2 learners have access to certain principles of UG, their early grammars are incomplete in that they lack functional categories (syntactic categories that are involved in such grammatical phenomena as verb tense, agreement, and question formation, etc.) 3 In addition, according to the L2 Weak Continuity Hypothesis, L2 acquisition differs from LI acquisition in the way in which functional categories are eventually incorporated in learners' grammars. Using Vainikka and YoungScholten s work as representative of the Weak Continuity Hypothesis for L2 acquisition, we examine their data in some detail and argue that serious theoretical and methodological difficulties undermine the purported support for such a model of L2 acquisition. In section 4 we propose an alternative analysis of certain data presented by Vainikka and Young-Scholten using the model of full access to UG, in which both lexical and functional categories are fully available to the L2 learner at all stages of acquisition. In section 5 we present experimental results from our own study of the acquisition of functional categories by child and adult native speakers of Japanese learning English. These results, we argue, support the full-access hypothesis, but neither of its competitors. In section 6 we present our conclusions and discussion. 1. UG theory and language acquisition 1.1. Brief outline of UG theory In the theory of Universal Grammar (UG), principles and parameters are hypothesized to constitute the innate cognitive faculty that makes language acquisition humanly possible. An important tenet of this theory is that this faculty is autonomous; in other words, it is an independent cognitive module that may interact with, but does not derive from other cognitive faculties.4 Chomsky (1980, p. 38) has summarized the mechanisms of UG and their role in language acquisition as follows: "UG consists of a highly structured and restrictive system of principles with certain open parameters, to be fixed by experience. As these parameters are fixed, a grammar is determined, what we may call a 'core grammar'." In this theory, the role of principles (i.e., the cross-linguistically invariant [universal] properties ofsyntax common to all languages) is to facilitate acquisition by constraining learners' grammars, that is, by reducing the learners hypothesis space from an infinite number of logical possibilities to the

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Parameter setting-

>

Core Grammar (all principles and particular parametric values specified)

Core grammar LI

L2 grammar

Figure 1. Diagram illustrating components involved in the process of core grammar construction in first language acquisition.

set of possible human languages. The role of parameters (which express the highly restricted respects in which languages can differ syntactically) is to account for crosslinguistic syntactic variation. That is, UG principles admit of a limited number of ways in which they can be instantiated, namely, those allowed by the parameters specifying "possible variation." The linguistic evidence available to the child during acquisition allows him to determine which parameter setting characterizes his language. Parameter setting eventually leads to the construction of a core grammar, where all relevant UG principles are instantiated. This process is schematized in Figure 1.
1.2. Relationship between UG and the course of acquisition

Figure 3. Consequence for L2 acquisition of the model in Figure 2. UG in its initial state is inaccessible. The relationship between UG and the grammar or L2 is indirect, mediated by the core grammar LI.

(1), Japanese "heads" go at the end of phrases and English "heads" appear at the beginning.
(1) Example of parameterized principle (from Cook 1988)6 a. Principle of head direction: A language has its head on the same side in all its phrases. This parameter has two settings: head-first and head-final. b. English is head-first. (i) liked the man (ii) in the bank c. Japanese is head-last. (i) nihon-m (prepositional phrase) Japan-in 'in Japan' (ii) Watahshi-wa nihonjin desu. (verb phrase) I-topic Japanese am 'I am Japanese.'

Whether UG is accessible in L2 acquisition depends largely on how one understands the relationship between UG and core grammars.5 In principle, at least two relationships are possible. The first is shown in Figure 2. Here, as parameters are fixed during LI acquisition, UG itself becomes the core grammar. From this perspective, parameter setting changes the initial form of UG. Subsequent relations between UG and the grammar of the L2 are necessarily indirect, mediated by the core grammar of the LI (see Figure 3.) Another possibility, illustrated in Figure 4, is that UG and core grammars are distinct but related constructs. Thus, one could conceive of UG as the cognitive module that constrains grammar construction during acquisition but itself remains constant during this process. In this latter view, parameter setting does not entail changing the basic form of UG but instead consists of incorporating into each stage of the grammar the particular UG option that accords with the primary language data (the utterances to which the language-learning child is exposed). An argument for the latter model comes from bilingual child language acquisition (see related discussion in Flynn & Martohardjono 1994). Here the learner is potentially faced with the task of constructing core grammars requiring different parameter settings for the same principle. In this situation it is difficult to maintain the hypothesis that parameter setting fundamentally alters the options provided by UG, making nonselected parameter settings unavailable. For example, consider the situation of the child learning both English and Japanese, who must set a parameter for head direction in two different ways. As shown in

For example, the head of a prepositional phrase is the preposition; the head of a verb phrase is the verb. Maintaining that UG changes after parameter setting would force us to conclude that for the bilingual Japanese-English child, knowledge about the grammatical principle of head direction derives from UG for only one of the languages being acquired, presumably the one for which evidence has set the parameter first. The parametric value determining head direction in the other language could then not be learned. Rather, the knowledge acquired would have to be explicitly specified (i.e., what is it, if not a parametric value?), and it would presumably be assumed that, whatever it is, it is not determined by the language faculty but by some other cognitive faculty/faculties. However, this directly conflicts with the claim that the language faculty is autonomous, from these other faculties (whatever they may be), and there is, in our view, abundant evidence for such autonomy. Moreover, the alternative is highly inexplicit - if the bilingual has not acquired two different parametric values for the same parameter, then what has he acquired, and what exact cognitive capacity facilitates acquisition of this knowledge? To maintain an explicit empirical hypothesis, we seem to need a model where the form of UG is not altered by parameter setting but where uninstantiated settings instead remain available, at least for child language acquisition. If we accept this model for LI language acquisition, it could in principle be true for L2 accjuisition as well - and indeed, we will argue that this is the case.

Figure 2. One view of the relationship between UG and language-particular grammars. In this view, as parameters are set, UG itself becomes the core grammar.
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Epstein et al.: Second language acquisition of such a substrate at birth. Moreover, the evidence suggests that there is neither an optimal age at which the language function operates, nor that this age precedes puberty. In a well-known reanalysis of the data that formed the basis for Lennebergs claim, Krashen concluded that lateralization is established around age 5 (1972, p. 65). Similarly, Whitaker et al. (1981) have shown that if lateralization is to be linked to brain maturation, as postulated by Lenneberg, then puberty is an unlikely time for lateralization to be completed because the language area of the brain takes on most of its adult characteristics by age 5. As noted by Snow & Hoefnagel-Hohle (1978), "relying on brain growth as the biological process that times the critical period would predict a critical period ending at 5. This is not an age at which any sharp discontinuities in language acquisition can be observed however (p. 188)." The observation that the language function can be transferred to the right hemisphere after left hemispherectomy was also seriously questioned by Dennis, who found permanent linguistic deficits even in children who were thought to have recovered their language fully after left hemispherectomy (cf. Dennis 1980; Dennis & Kohn 1975). As a result of the evidence that seriously challenges the CPH, and in particular the claim that there is increasing hemispheric specialization of the language function that culminates at puberty, some researchers maintain that there is no evidence against LI and L2 being subserved by the same neural stratum (e.g., Kinsboume 1981). Today, researchers investigating the link between behavior and brain maturation tend to speak of "sensitive" rather than "critical" periods (see Bornstein 1987; Oyama 1987). This shift in terminology reflects the growing sentiment in the field that whatever biological determinants there are of behaviors/capacities, they are unlikely to become totally unavailable after a certain age. Rather, evidence suggests that during certain periods of development, certain organisms tend to have heightened sensitivity to certain environmental stimuli, thereby enjoying an optimal situation for a given behavior/capacity to develop. It is possible that something not unlike this holds for language acquisition as well. Furthermore, although there are clearly differences between child and adult language learning, these differences need not reside in accessibility or inaccessibility of universal linguistic principles themselves, as proposed in the noaccess hypothesis. Instead, they could well derive from differential ways of instantiating such principles according to the particular demands of a language. For example, Johnson (1988); Johnson and Newport (1991) report an age effect on the acquisition of certain aspects of grammar. In their study, speakers who acquired L2 English after the age of 7;00 show a steady decline in the acquisition of rules such as third-person singular s-affixation or progressive ing-affixation. These, however, are language-particular morphological aspects of English, related to but still different from the principles and parameters of UG themselves. It might thus be the case that the acquisition of languageparticular aspects of grammar is age-sensitive. It is important to note that the full-access hypothesis does not deny the existence of differences between LI and L2 acquisition, nor is it incompatible with the existence of linguistic development through time. Within this framework, however, the source of these differences is not a lack of access to UG in L2 acquisition. Instead, it is hypothesized

Figure 4. Alternative view of the relationship between UG and language-particular grammars. UG constrains core grammar construction during LI acquisition but remains constant itself, thereby remaining accessible during the L2 acquisition process.

2. The no-access hypothesis Three hypotheses have been formulated with respect to the role of UG in adult L2 acquisition. In essence, the first of these - the no-access hypothesis - claims that child LI acquisition and adult L2 acquisition are fundamentally different cognitive processes, the former deriving from the language faculty, the latter determined by nonlinguistic processes. Proponents of this position (and of the partialaccess position discussed in sect. 3) often appeal to Lennebergs Critical Period Hypothesis (CPH) (1967) for language acquisition. In this section, we will briefly summarize the proposal for a neurologically based critical period for language acquisition, as well as some of the evidence challenging it, as this is central to understanding the arguments advanced in support of both the no-access and the partial-access hypotheses.
2.1. Critical period hypothesis

To our knowledge, the first proponents of the CPH were Penfield (1953; Penfield & Roberts 1959), who assumed that language learning increases in difficulty with age and who linked this difficulty to decreasing cerebral plasticity. Lenneberg (1967) fleshed out a more detailed theory of a critical period for language acquisition. Based on his analysis of existing clinical literature on unilateral brain damage and hemispherectomies, Lenneberg concluded that there is progressive lateralization of the language function to the left hemisphere, a process that is complete by puberty. He linked this putative phenomenon to what he believed to be a dramatic decrease in the ability to acquire language. Lenneberg's hypothesis of complete lateralization by puberty was based on two observations: (1) that aphasia as a result of right hemisphere lesions is more likely to occur in children as opposed to adults and (2) after left hemispherectomies, children but not adults are able to transfer the language function to the right hemisphere. Both observations suggest equipotentiality for language in children but not in adults. This position has been challenged by much subsequent research. Since Lennebergs initial formulation of the CPH, increasing evidence has suggested that the notion of progressive lateralization of the language function culminating at puberty is incorrect. Although the evidence supports a biological substrate for language, it points to the presence 680
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Epstein et al.: Second language acquisition that they follow, for example, from the differences involved in assignment of parameter values in LI acquisition versus assignment of additional parametric values in L2 acquisition or, for example, from differences in the way children and adults acquire the lexicon and integrate UG with grammar-external performance systems. If this is correct, the consequences of any one of these processes could lead to what appear to be "major" differences between LI and L2 acquisition, but differences that are in fact not central to arguments concerning the role of the domain-specific faculty for language, namely, UG (see discussion in Flynn & Manuel 1991; Flynn & Martohardjono 1991).
2.2. L2 acquisition as a nonlinguistic phenomenon

of course (explicitly or implicitly) attribute to L2 learners knowledge that is empirically equivalent to that provided by UG in this domain. However, if one accepts the empirically equivalent perspective, then one has in effect abandoned the no-access hypothesis. We will discuss this and other related issues in much more detail in section 2.4 when we consider Bley-Woman's (1989) specific version of the noaccess hypothesis, the Fundamental Difference Hypothesis.
2.3. L2 acquisition as an astructural problem-solving process

Clahsen and Muysken (1986), Clahsen (1988), and BleyVroman (1989) offer the most radical formulations of the position that L2 acquisition is fundamentally different from LI acquisition. The basic claim is that L2 acquisition is governed by cognitive faculties that are separate and distinct from the domain-specific language faculty, UG. Clahsen, for example, suggests that processes similar to Slobins (1973) Operating Principles can account for L2 learning. Bley-Vroman suggests that L2 learning strategiesderive from Piaget's Formal Operating Principles; these include the capacity for "distributional analysis, analogy, hypothesis formation and testing" (Bley-Vroman 1989, p. 54). We will argue that although these no-access models claim that they explain L2 acquisition and present themselves as empirically viable alternatives to a UG-based theory of L2 acquisition, they fail to address the central issues confronting any L2 acquisition theory: (1) what exactly does (can) the L2 learner know and (2) how does the L2 learner come to know what he knows? Neither model provides adequate descriptions (i.e., explicit specification of the forma] properties) of the grammars L2 learners internalize, that is, the knowledge-states L2 learners are in. Moreover, although both models implicitly assume that the L2 learner eventually attains a natural-language grammar, neither model shows how such grammars can be acquired by employing the nonlinguistic principles they claim to be central to L2 acquisition. Both proposals suggest that general learning processes are central; however, insofar as such analytical skills are merely learning strategies (i.e., "tools") with which L2 learners construct grammars, they tell us nothing about the actual content of the end-state grammar (knowledge) represented in the learners mind/brain. And this is of course precisely where the explanatory power of a UGbased theory lies. The hypothesis that L2 learning is not constrained by the language faculty is empirically inadequate given what is known about the L2 learner's linguistic knowledge as represented in a grammar. For example, the capacity to distinguish between speech and other noises is provided by the language faculty, in particular, universal phonetics (see, e.g., review in Eimas 1975). Positing total inaccessibility to the language facility would fail to explain how adults even distinguish primary L2 data from nonlinguistic acoustic disturbances ("noise"). Similarly, total inaccessibility would seem to entail that learners do not approach the L2 learning task knowing (for example) that, like all human languages, the target language has lexical items ("words"), a construct specified in UG (Chomsky 1980).7 To account for the facts regarding L2 acquisition without appeal to UG, one could

To account for the core linguistic knowledge that L2 learners have, Bley-Vroman (1989) appeals to the ability to analogize from the LI to the L2. Appealing to analogy as a central process in L2 acquisition is problematic because it fails to distinguish between what the L2 learner knows (content of grammar) and how he attains this grammar (process). Furthermore, it entails a fundamental difference between the nature of LI and L2 acquisition and thereby fails to account for the significant similarities between them, neither of which can be explained by analogy. First, appealing to analogy (however it is to be defined) as a central process by which grammar is "built" leaves the result of the process - the content of the grammar (= that which is known) - wholly unspecified and therefore certainly unexplained. That is, what the L2 learner knows is not even addressed. Clearly, whether or not "analogy" plays a role in acquisition, it cannot be part of the content of the grammar; that is, it is not part of what the L2 learner knows. For example, to say "Person P's grammar of German has/contains analogy" is anomalous (cf. "Person P's grammar of German has this subject-verb agreement rule, this word order specification, this lexicon, etc."). In sum, appealing to analogy as a central process by which grammar is built fails to specify (hence fails to explain) knowledge of language, that is, the content of the grammar. These hypotheses thus exhibit the questionable property that they make claims about how an object, X, is constructed without even minimally specifying the properties X has. Second, if analogy were central in L2 acquisition, knowledge of language (hence, (un)grammaticality) would remain unexplained. We know that analogy cannot explain certain types of knowledge attained in LI acquisition. For example, native speakers of English do not accept as grammatical a string such as *Who did you see John and? "on analogy with" the sentence Who did you see John with? Clearly, as syntactic research has shown, such contrasts are not isolated but are in fact infinitely varied; knowing a language entails knowing precisely such facts regarding grammaticality. The entirely empirical question here is: What does one know when one knows English? It is incumbent upon the proponents of analogy theories to define this notion explicitly enough to subject such theories to empirical tests. L2 research has shown that knowledge of L2 (un)grammaticality is similar to that found in LI acquisition (White 1989; Munnich et al. 1991; 1994). Furthermore, this is the case when even the LI cannot be the knowledge source (Li 1993; Martohardjono 1991; 1992; Martohardjono & Gair 1993; Uziel 1991). These studies show that L2 learners do not assume surface string grammaticality properties to be the same or even similar in the LI and the L2, indicating
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Epstein et al.: Second language acquisition that L2 learners do not "analogize grammaticality" from the LI to the L2. Martohardjono (1991) investigated knowledge of constraints on movement of wh -words (what, who, why, where, etc.) in L2 English by two groups of learners whose Lls do not instantiate overt u;/i-movement, namely, speakers of Chinese and Indonesian. The constructions tested were tufo-questions (questions involving movement of a wh-word) that violate a particular constraint on movement in English. Specifically, in English an argument such as the object of a preposition (2) or of a verb (3) embedded in a relative clause (2) or an adjunct clause (3) cannot be extracted (moved from the position marked by " " to the front of the sentence) to form a question: ? (2) *What did Sue read a book that talked about (3) *Who did this letter arrive after Sue called ? It is important to note that in the corresponding, perfectly grammatical Chinese and Indonesian u;fo-questions, the wh-word is not moved. For example, the Indonesian (4) expresses the same question as does (2). (4) Siti baca buku yang menceritakan apa? Siti read book RELATIVE ACT -tell-BEN what (Literally) 'Siti read the book that talked about what?' The same situation obtains in Chinese, where an unmoved wh-word (i.e., occupying the " " position) in a relative clause (5), an indirect question (6), a sentential subject (7), or a reason adverbial clause (8) is licit (cf. Huang 1982), unlike the ungrammatical u)/i-movement analogs in English: (5) Relative Clause: Ni zui xihuan shei xie de shu You most like who write REL book 'Who do you like the books that wrote?' (6) Indirect Question: Ni xiang-zhidao shei lai-bu-lai? You wonder who come-not-come "'Who do you wonder whether will come?' (7) Sentential Subject: Lisi vnai shenme zui hao Lisi buy what most good? "'What is that Lisi buys best?' (8) Reason Adverbial Clause: ni [yinwei wo shuo-le shenme] er bu gaoxing? you because I said what then not happy ?' "'What are you unhappy because I said Where there is a mismatch in surface-string grammaticality between the LI and the L2, a possible hypothesis involving analogy is that learners "analogize grammaticality" from the LI "onto" the L2. That is, if L2 acquisition diverged from LI acquisition in that analogy were the determining factor in establishing knowledge of grammaticality (as BleyVroman s proposal seems to imply), one would expect L2 learners to judge uj/j-question types that are grammatical in their LI as also being grammatical in the L2. However, Martohardjono's results indicate that this is not the case. Both the Chinese and the Indonesian subjects rejected English tu/i-questions exhibiting extraction out of relative clauses, adjunct clauses and sentential subjects as ungrammatical. This suggests, contra Bley-Vroman, that "analogy" (however this inexplicit term is to be defined) is not central in L2 acquisition, and can therefore not be what critically distinguishes L2 acquisition from LI acquisition.8 On the other hand, it also appears to be the case that many patterns of acquisition match for both LI and L2 acquisition, suggesting that similar processes underlie these two types of acquisition.9 These patterns do not derive from knowledge of the LI; nor do they result by analogy to some other forms in the L2 input. This conclusion is well documented in early literature, most notably in works that focused on the acquisition of certain functor morphemes in English, such as articles, past-tense endings, and possessives. Results of extensive study indicated parallels in orders of relative difficulty for child L2 learners (Dulay & Burt 1974a; 1974b) and adult L2 learners (Bailey et al. 1974) for the acquisition of these functors; moreover, these patterns paralleled those isolated for LI acquisition of English. There is a highly consistent order of relative difficulty in the use of functors across different language backgrounds, indicating that learners are experiencing intra-language difficulties. . . . Children and adults use common strategies and process linguistic data in fundamentally similar ways. (Bailey et al. 1974, p. 235) Other work (e.g., Cook 1973) isolated common patterns of errors among both child LI learners and adult L2 learners
in their elicited imitation and comprehension of relative

clauses in English. To sum up, both groups [LI and L2 learners] seemed to have tackled the tasks of imitation and comprehension of relative clauses in much the same manner. The similarities are: (i) the low proportion of word perfect imitations; (ii) the omission of 'that' even when required grammatically; (iii) the replacement of'that' by grammatical alternatives; (iv) the addition of relative pronouns to sentences where grammatically possible; (v) the tendency tofindclauses qualifying the 'object' more difficult to imitate than those qualifying the 'subject;' (vi) the fact that neither group showed a markedly different pattern of imitation with sentences differing in case grammar; (vii) the 'encoding' of syntactic structure was found in both groups; (viii) the low proportion of correct answers to comprehension questions in both groups. (Cook 1973, p. 27) Similar results can be found in the early work of, for example, d'Anglejan and Tucker (1975) and Cooper et al. (1979). We will return to a discussion of these data as well as more recent work in section 3.2.4. The same arguments hold with respect to structure dependency in general. Several studies have shown that L2 knowledge, like child LI knowledge, is indeed structuredependent; that is, L2ers have knowledge of, that is, have acquired the L2 rules generating, the hierarchical syntactic structures associated with linear word-strings. As noted by Zobl (1983), Jenkins (1988), Flynn (1983), Flynn andO'Neil (1988a; 1994), Felix (1988), Thomas (1991), Flynn and Martohardjono (1991), Uziel (1991), and Martohardjono (1993), an infinite number of structure-independent error types are never made by L2 learners.' For example, Jenkins argues that L2 learners do not utter strings such as *Is the dog which in the corner is hungry, and they presumably judge them ungrammatical. If language learners were simply choosing a structure-independent rule that scans the string of words looking for the first occurrence of is in the linear word-string, and then preposes it to form a question, on an analogy with the formation of simpler questions in English (e.g., John is here => Is John here?), we might expect from L2 learners utterances of the form *Is the clog which in the corner is hungry? The absence of such errors strongly suggests that L2 learners have structuredependent knowledge, specifically, knowledge of the "Head Movement Constraint": a restriction on the movement of certain structurally defined categories, for example, verbs such as is, disallowing *Is [the dog which in the corner]

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Epstein et al.: Second language acquisition is hungry? but allowing Is [the dog which is in the corner] hungry? (see also Chomsky 1975, Ch. 1 and Crain & Nakayama 1987) Similarly, the Head Movement Constraint blocks *Have John will breakfast? but allows Will John have breakfast? (see Crain 1992; Freidin 1992b; Travis 1984 for more extensive discussion of this constraint). L2 learners also exhibit the creative aspect of language use. Like children, adults are not limited to mimicry of what they have heard (Felix 1988; Flynn & O'Neil 1988a; White 1988). L2 learners from all Lls thus far investigated achieve mental states for the L2 that go well beyond available data and beyond any explicit teaching; they can understand and produce utterances they have not seen or heard before.11 In sum, the data elicited from L2 learners cannot feasibly be accounted for in terms of inductive learning procedures for language that are implicit in models that reject UG.
2.4. A case study: Bley-Vroman's version of the no-access hypothesis, the Fundamental Difference Hypothesis

foreign language learner merely by observing (not necessarily consciously) the most obvious large-scale characteristics of the native language - no deep analyses are necessary and by making the very conservative assumption that the foreign language is not an utterly different sort of thing from the native language, (p. 52) These qualifications modify rather drastically the original and most fundamental claim that knowledge given uniquely by the language faculty is unavailable to the L2 learner. First, it is not clear that knowledge of phonemes, syntax, morphology, and so on - the most fundamental concepts provided by UG, which moreover are domain-specific in the sense that they are pertinent only to language - can be attributed to the L2 by the learner without "deep analysis" of the L2. Second, for the learner to assume that the architecture of the L2 is "not utterly different" from the architecture of the LI is tantamount to saying that the learner is able to identify and presumably treat the L2 as an object that falls under the domain of the language faculty.13 This in turn amounts to an admission that the L2 learner is in large part approaching the task of L2 acquisition with the same domain-specific knowledge that underlies LI acquisition. The significance of this is intended to be weakened by the statement that this knowledge comes to the learner "via the LI." It is not at all clear, however, whether and how the claim that domain-specific linguistic knowledge applied to the L2 "comes from the LI" can be empirically distinguished from the claim that it "comes from" the language faculty itself, since it is this very faculty that specifies universally determined knowledge of the LI in the first place. This is particularly relevant when the knowledge is identical in the LI and L2, as we will indicate below. Given that the ideas expressed in (9) are widely entertained and fundamentally alter the original claim of nonaccessibility expressed by the FDH, let us consider (9) in more detail, beginning with the first sentence: "[T]he learner will have reason to expect that the language to be learned will be capable of generating an infinite number of sentences; a language of finite cardinality will not be expected [our emphasis]." Here (and elsewhere) there seems to be a confusion between "language" and "grammar." A standard - and, we believe, necessary - assumption is that the learner is in fact acquiring a grammar (in standard theory, a grammar is a rule system that generates sentences; in current theory, a set of universal principles with parameter values determined; in theory-neutral terms, a particular set of linguistic laws (e.g., "The subject precedes the verb"; "The verb agrees with the subject"). Crucially, the learner is not "learning a language"; that is, he is not learning some infinite set of sentences (e.g., S EngIjsh = {Bill left, Sue leaves, a man is leaving, a tall woman has left, . . . } ) . The grammar is the knowledge-state rule system, the generator capable of generating an infinite number of sentences; the language is the infinite set that is generated. Thus, B-V uses the term language to mean these two crucially different things, and the first assertion in the quotation must therefore be restated as "[T]he learner will have reason to expect that the grammar to be learned will be capable of generating an infinite number of sentences."14 Our first question then is this: Why/how is it that upon exposure to (among other data) some finite (therefore, proper) subset of the foreign language (i.e., foreign primary linguistic data), human (and presumably only human) foreign-language learners expect (know) that - like all
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An often-cited version of the no-access hypothesis is BleyVroman's (1989) Fundamental Difference Hypothesis (FDH), which states that the difference between LI and L2 acquisition is "internal, linguistic and qualitative" (p. 50). It is internal, because it is "caused by differences in the internal cognitive state of adults vs. children, not by some external factor or factors . . . such as insufficient input, for example" (p. 50). Furthermore, "it is linguistic, in that it is caused by a change in the language faculty specifically, not by some general change in learning ability" (p. 50). Finally, it is qualitative, not just quantitative, in that in L2 acquisition "the domain-specific acquisition system is not just attenuated, it is unavailable." These differences in the knowledge sources for the child LI learner and the L2 learner are schematized in the following table from BleyVroman (B-V) (1989, p. 51): 12 Child language Adult foreign language development learning A. UG A. Native-language knowledge B. Domain-specific learning B. General problem-solving procedure systems When we consider the details of the FDH, certain inconsistencies will appear, and it will turn out that its most central claim, that the mental representations of the LI and L2 grammars are fundamentally different, is substantially weakened. We will show that the FDH does not in fact deny domain-specific linguistic knowledge in the L2 learner. At the same time, it paradoxically argues that the domainspecific language faculty is inaccessible to L2 learners. To resolve the paradox and account for the domain-specific linguistic knowledge that L2ers acquire, the FDH ends up according native-language knowledge a privileged role in L2 acquisition. B-V writes: (9) [T]he learner will have reason to expect that the language to be learned will be capable of generating an infinite number of sentences; a language of finite cardinality will not be expected. The learner will expect that the foreign language will have a syntax, a semantics, a lexicon which recognizes parts of speech, a morphology which provides systematic ways of modifying the shapes of words, a phonology which provides afiniteset of phonemes, and syllables, feet, phonological phrases, etc. Universals of this sort are available to the

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Epstein et al.: Second language acquisition natural-language grammars - the L2 grammar has infinite generative capacity and that the L2 grammar has other universal and very fundamental properties including a multicomponentiai internal structure "exhibiting a syntax, a semantics, a lexicon, . . . a morphology, . . . a phonology, . . . etc."? In other words, Why/how is it that under the FDH, the L2 learner "expects" (knows) that the L2 consists of precisely those subcomponents that all natural-language grammars display, as specified by UG? 15 As seems reasonable, we argue that this "expectation" comes to the learner via the language faculty itself. Note, in this regard, that the FDH implies something much stronger than the (very weak) assertion that the L2er expects the L2 to have for example, "a syntax" (see again [9]). There are an infinite number of possible "syntactic systems" (means of concatenating symbols), including systems such as "Freely concatenate any symbols in any order." Presumably, what is intended is not that the L2er expects the L2 to have "a" (i.e., any) syntax. In fact, B-V explicitly claims that the L2er expects a syntax with infinite generative capacity, hence an infinite number of possible syntactic systems; namely, all those having finite generative capacity, are not "expected" by the L2er. It appears then that the intended meaning is: The learner will expect that the foreign language [i.e., the L2 grammar] will have a NATURAL LANGUAGE syntax (as defined by UG), a NATURAL LANGUAGE semantics (as defined by UG), a NATURAL LANGUAGE morphology (as defined by UG), etc. The same arguments hold with respect to the claims in 2(9) made about the learner's L2 phonology and morphology. Thus, B-V proposes that the L2 learner expects very specific component-internal atomic-category and phrasalcategory inventories, for example, "a finite set of phonemes, and syllables, feet, phonological phrases, etc." Here again, the theoretical constructs B-V specifically mentions are precisely UG-specified sets of phonological constructs common to all natural language grammars.16 How/Why does the L2er know ("expect") such UG-specified constructs? B-V also proposes that the L2 learner expects componentinternal structure-building (symbol-concatenating) operations (or rules), for example, "a morphology which provides systematic ways of modifying the shapes of words." This statement in fact imputes far more specific knowledge to the L2 learner than the phrase "a systematic morphology" conveys. Clearly the claim is not that the learner merely "expects" any morphology that systematically modifies the shapes of words, such as a morphology incorporating rules like the following (found in no human grammar to date): (i) Form plurals by adding the suffix -s to all and only those nouns that refer to an object weighing less than 40 tons. We believe L2ers do not ever hypothesize (perfectly systematic) morphological rules such as (i) (even though they are entirely consistent with, i.e., correctly generate, primary linguistic data such as cat/cats, dog/dogs, stick/sticks, etc.). Again, we presume that the intended meaning is that the learner expects a natural-language morphology as defined by UG - in other words, a morphology that excludes an infinite number of systematic rules like (i). Again, why/how is it that the learner "expects" (knows) that such UGspecified constraints characterize the L2? This has been the recurrent question throughout our discussion of (9). The FDH claims that second grammar acquisition is not constrained by UG; that is, although no empirical evidence is given against access to UG, the FDH claims that UG need not be assumed to account for the L2 learner's knowledge, because the same knowledge is available elsewhere, from a purported UG-external source namely, from observation of the LI. Nonetheless, we have argued, under the FDH the L2 acquirer has knowledge that is in fact specified in UG; that is each property of the L2 that the L2 learner is claimed to "expect" is in fact a property of grammar specified by UG, a property common to all natural-language grammars. Thus, we claim that the FDH attributes UG-specified knowledge to the L2 learner after all, albeit in the form of the L2 learners "expectations" about the nature of the second "language." Notice, at this juncture, that any empirical distinctions between an account that attributes to L2ers "UG-specified knowledge" and one that attributes "UG-specified knowledge via the LI" are extremely subtle, since in the cases discussed the knowledge attributed to the L2er is identical in the two accounts (e.g., knowledge of "phonological phrase"). The difference is the source of the knowledge: UG versus UG-via-Ll. 17 Since much of the argument regarding UG accessibility rests on this distinction, let us consider it more closely. Recall that the FDH makes the following claim: Universals of this sort are available to the foreign language learner merely by observing (not necessarily consciously) the most obvious large-scale characteristics of the native language no deep analyses are necessary - and by making the very conservative assumption that the foreign language is not an utterly different sort of thing from the native language. (BleyVroman 1989, pp. 51-52) As discussed earlier, "universals of this sort" are universal properties of grammars (not languages) as specified by UG: they have infinite generative capacity, a finite set of autonomous computational subsystems (e.g., "a" syntactic component), component-internal categorial inventories (e.g., phonemes, each a bundle of UG-specified feature specifications), and so on. The question is, how are these acquired by "mere observation"? Specifically, what is an observable, obvious, large-scale characteristic of the native language requiring no "deep" analysis? One might imagine the following type of response: "An observable, obvious, largescale characteristic requiring no deep analysis is, for example, that the native language has words." But of course "observing the large-scale characteristic 'word'" is equivalent to "analyzing the primary lihguistic data in terms of the abstract construct 'word,'" a construct provided by UG and common to all natural-language grammars. Thus, humans can "observe" "words" and find this "large-scale characteristic" of the continuous acoustic speech stream "obvious" only because the construct "word" is biologically provided (by UG). That is, organisms not genetically equipped to analyze human speech in terms of the UG-specified abstract construct "word" will be unable to "observe this obvious, large-scale characteristic" of the acoustic disturbances that humans, by virtue of our biological constitution, recognize as speech. Surely, then, such universal properties of grammar, are not "available by mere observation" of the LI. If in B-V's view no "deep" analysis is necessary, are "shallow" analyses sufficient and, if so, what exactly is the shallow analysis and why is it that only humans can posit it? Under the FDH, once the L2er completes his "mere observation of the most obvious large-scale characteristics of the native language," he then makes the assumption that

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IP:
the foreign language is not an utterly different sort of thing from the native language. Leaving aside the unclarity of the phrase "not utterly different," the crucial question is, where does this assumption come from? Clearly, the L2er is not told or taught to make the assumption. Rather, it seems to be a property of the L2er himself; that is, it seems to be a property of humans that upon exposure to primary linguistic data from a new language, they just "[assume] that the foreign language is not an utterly different sort of thing from the native language." In fact, it does not seem to be the case that the L2er "assumes" the L2 and the LI are "not utterly different." Rather, the L2er appears to analyze an L2 as fundamentally the same as an LI, and we argue that this is the case precisely because UG is still available to him to make this analysis possible. For example, even under the FDH, exposure to finite, fragmentary, and "degenerate" primary linguistic data from the L2 results in the internalization of an L2 grammar that, just like the LI grammar, is constrained by what are in fact posited principles of UG. 18 But how is this possible without UG? In other words, if not by virtue of UG, how is it that the L2 is "assumed" to be not utterly different from the LI? Here again, the FDH analysis appears to appeal directly to UG-constrained L2 acquisition. In summary, we hope to have established the following points concerning this representative version of the noaccess hypothesis. First, it involves a fundamental and hence serious confusion between "language" and "grammar." Second, it attributes not only fundamental but also highly specific knowledge of linguistic universals to the L2er. Therefore, the empirical distinction between the FDH and a UG-constrained theory of L2 formation is highly subtle, since they both attribute what seems to be the same (UG-specified) knowledge to the L2er (again depending on B-V's implicit assumptions in [9] - e.g., what is "a syntax," "a semantics"? - What is meant by "etc."? What is the finite set of phonemes, syllables, feet, phonological phrases? - What explicit definitions of these terms are being assumed, but not provided?). Where they differ is in the source of the UG-specified knowledge. We believe the L2er has UG-specified knowledge by virtue of "having" UG. By contrast, B-V asserts that the L2er obtains this very same UG-specified knowledge from purported UGexternal sources, namely (1) mere observation of the native language, and (2) the assumption that the foreign language is not "utterly different" from the native language. We have argued, however, that these assumptions are highly inexplicit and that once they are rendered explicit, each in fact appeals directly to UG. Thus, the no-access hypothesis would seem to entail access after all.
2.5. Clahsen and Muysken's version of the no-access hypothesis

Epstein et al.: Second language acquisition sition strategies used by adults in L2 development may be defined in terms of principles of information processing and general problem solving. (1988, p. 22) The claim that adult L2 grammars are not constrained by UG is based on evidence concerning differences in the developmental sequences observed in LI and L2 acquisition of German word order. The authors claim that the observed differences follow from the assumption that only children have access to UG. Of course, these (like all other such) conclusions crucially depend on the particular analysis, in this case, the analysis of German, that is assumed. Alternative explanations of these acquisition data have been proposed by several researchers, who have argued that a different (and arguably empirically preferable) linguistic analysis of German syntax reveals evidence for the role of UG principles in the L2 acquisition of German word order (e.g., duPlessis et al. 1989; Tomaselli & Schwartz 1990). To illustrate briefly, any analysis of German must account for the fact that in main clauses the tensed verb is found in second position after the subject or a topicalized element, as in (10) (duPlessis et al., p. 58). (10) a. Die Kinder haben das Brot gegessen. the children have the bread eaten 'The children have eaten the bread.' b. Das Brot haben die Kinder gegessen. the bread have the children eaten c. Gestern haben die Kinder das Brot gegessen. yesterday have the children the bread eaten In embedded clauses, in contrast, the finite verb is found in final position, as in (11) (Du Plessis et al. p. 58). (11) Ich glaube dass die Kinder das Brot gegessen haben. I believe that the children the bread eaten have. In brief, Clahsen and Muysken account for these facts by adopting an analysis of German that assumes that the verbsecond effects can be accounted for if the underlying order of German is TOPIC COMP(lementizer, e.g., daB) SUBJECT) O(BJECT) V(ERB) and if two obligatory movement rules apply in main clauses. The first rule moves the inflected verb (in [10], haben) to the COMP position and the second moves some phrasal category into the TOPIC position immediately preceding the inflected verb. That the verb does not move to second position in embedded clauses "is accounted for by the fact that the complementizer has filled the position to which the inflected verb would normally move, thereby preventing this movement" (duPlessis et al. 1989, p. 58). 19 Assuming this analysis of German, Clahsen and Muysken review various empirical studies of the development of verb position in German LI and L2 acquisition. As a result of this review, they postulate two different stage grammars: one for LI learners of German and one for L2 learners of German. They argue that the observed differences between LI and L2 acquisition of German word order are due to the L2er's internalization of "unnatural" rules proscribed by UG. More specifically, they argue that, at a certain stage of development, German adult L2 learners, but not child LI learners, move elements "such as particles, participles, and infinitives" to sentence-final position. Because such movement is prohibited under the particular analysis of German that Clahsen and Muysken assume, they conclude that adult L2 acquisition of German is not constrained by UG. This conclusion regarding the role of UG in adult L2 acquisition can be challenged in several ways (see more detailed discussion in Flynn & O'Neil 1988a).20 DuPlessis
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it

Another formulation of the no-access hypothesis, which confronts potential difficulties different from those facing the FDH, is found in the work of Clahsen and Muysken (1986) and Clahsen (1988), who compare the development of word order in the LI and L2 acquisition of German. They claim that although child grammars are constrained by UG, adult grammars are not. Clahsen states: the observed differences between LI and L2 learning can be explained by assuming that child LI acquisition falls under the parameter theory of language development, whereas the acqui-

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Epstein et al.: Second language acquisition et al., for example, demonstrate that the adult L2 German results can be accounted for by a UG-consistent analysis by assuming a different independently motivated analysis of German, that of Travis (1984). This account of German also posits a verb movement rule; however, the verb may appear in three positions, namely, in V(erb), in Infl(ection), and in COMP(lementizer). 21 Verb movement in embedded clauses is not absolutely prohibited as in Clahsen and Muysken's account because there is an available landing site for it, namely Infl.
2.6. Conclusion

In sum, we know of no version of the no-access hypothesis that displays even descriptive adequacy, since invariably these analyses fail to even specify the liter's knowledge of language as represented in a grammar. Furthermore, the various versions of this hypothesis remain speculative and arguably contradictory, since in order to account for the knowledge L2 learners patently have, such hypotheses are forced to retreat (often implicitly) from the fundamental claim that only "nonlinguistic principles" (whatever they may be) govern L2 acquisition. Thus, in the end, such hypotheses characteristically attribute domain-specific linguistic knowledge to the learner - the very knowledge they presume to be unavailable in L2 acquisition. 3. The partial-access hypothesis
3.1. Overview

it will be. . . . If, however, it turns out that in the acquisition of the target some instantiation of principle P is necessary and P is not incorporated into the learners LI, the learner will have no language-internal knowledge to guide him/her in the development of P. Therefore, completeness with regard to the acquisition of the target language will not be possible. (Schachter 1989, pp. 13-14) According to the proposal in (12), UG as it is available to a child LI learner does not constrain the L2 learner's hypotheses. Grammar construction by the L2 learner is constrained not by principles and parameters of UG but by principles of UG and the immutably set parameters of the particular LI grammar. Thus, this theory predicts that L2 grammar construction will differ significantly from LI grammar construction. Further, completeness in L2 acquisition is predicted to be impossible in a wide variety of cases, namely, whenever one or more parametric values do not match or whenever certain LI principles are not instantiated in the L2. 22 A similar proposal is made by Strozer (1992), who argues that only the invariant principles of UG are available to the L2 learner and that parameter setting is impossible in adult L2 acquisition. Although this approach might seem to provide an appealing account of L2 acquisition, we argue that this position can be seriously challenged in at least two ways: first, by demonstrating that L2 learners are able to construct grammars incorporating parameter settings not instantiated in the LI, and, second, by demonstrating that other nonparametric grammatical options not instantiated in the LI are available to the L2 learner.
3.2. Evidence against the partial-access hypothesis

, \ y <' .(:

In contrast to no-access hypotheses, according to partialaccess hypotheses, UG knowledge is not totally unavailable, but it is limited in very specific ways that vary according to the particular version of the hypothesis. One representative proposal argues that only an Ll-instantiated UG remains available to the adult (cf. Figs. 2 and 3). This would mean that only the invariant principles of UG, that is, those that characterize grammars of all languages would remain accessible to the L2 learner. Under this proposal, the child LI learner has available the entire range of options provided by UG, namely, all invariant principles and all parameterized principles with settings still available. However, the L2 learner has direct access only to the invariant principles of UG (those that characterize the grammars of all languages). With respect to the parameterized principles for which values were set during the learner's LI acquisition, only the parametric values instantiated in LI are available to the learner during L2 acquisition. Where the LI and the L2 differ in a particular parametric value, the L2 learner having immutably set the LI value during LI acquisition is hypothesized to be incapable of assigning a new value to this parameter to coincide with the target grammar; or, if a particular value of a parameter is necessary for the acquisition of the L2 but this value is not realized in the L2 learner's LI, then the L2 learner will not be able to acquire this value. One particular version of this proposal, the Window-Of-Opportunity Hypothesis (Schachter 1989) is outlined in (12). (12) Window-Of-Opportunity Hypothesis [A]ll that remains as part of the knowledge state of an adult native speaker of a language is a language-specific instantiation of UG, that of thefirstlanguage. UG in its entirety will not be available as a knowledge source for the acquisition of a second language. Only a language-specific instantiation of

3.2.1. New parameter settings. 23 The partial-access hypothesis entails that UG fails to constrain those aspects of L2 acquisition where there is a mismatch between the LI and L2 grammars. This claim amounts to the hypothesis that an L2 learner has a type of hybrid grammar: one part UG-constrained and one part not.24 If, on the other hand, the L2 learner has continuous (full) access to UG, we expect that regardless of the match or mismatch between LI and L2 language specific principles, the L2 grammar will be constrained by principles and parameters of UG. More specifically, we expect that the L2 grammar will, for example, obey certain universal constraints on the movement of certain elements, such as wh-words in questions. We also expect that an L2 learner will be able to assign a new (i.e., non-Ll) value to a given parameter. Results from several empirical studies of Japanese speakers' acquisition of English support the hypothesis that L2 learners are able to assign new parametric values in the construction of the L2 grammar when there is a mismatch between the LI and the L2 (e.g., Flynn 1983; 1987; 1991; 1993; Flynn & Martohardjono 1992; 1994). Importantly, these learners do so in a manner consistent with predictions made by the theory of UG. Let us consider evidence regarding the head-direction parameter mentioned in section 1.2. The particular formulation we focus on concerns a functional category head, a C, as the head of a CP (complementizer phrase) and the adjunction direction that correlates with it: Left-headed C correlates with right-branching adjunction and rightheaded C with left-branching adjunction (see Lust 1992 for detailed discussion). Given this formulation, results of several empirical studies (e.g., Flynn 1983; 1984; 1987)

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Epstein et al.: Second language acquisition investigating the role of this parameter in adult L2 acquisition of anaphora indicate that from early stages of acquisition, Japanese speakers learning English as a second language (ESL) are able to acquire the English value of the parameter. (Recall that Japanese is a head-final language in that the head of a phrase comes at the end, and that English is head-first in that the head of a phrase comes first.) Extensive cross-linguistic LI acquisition studies have demonstrated that young children establish the headdirection order for their Lls at early stages of acquisition (see review in Lust 1986). It has been argued that children use this knowledge to constrain their hypotheses about other aspects of the language-particular grammar they are constructing, one such aspect being anaphora direction, that is, the relative linear ordering of a pronoun and its antecedent. In an elicited imitation and comprehension study, Flynn (1983; 1987; Flynn & Lust 1990) investigated the acquisition of the head-direction parameter by 21 Japanese speakers learning ESL (mean age: 30;00 years; ESL placement: High score 42 [range 0-50]) (for more detailed discussion see Flynn 1983; 1987). They were tested on such structures as those shown in (13) and (14). Pre- and postposed subordinate adverbial clauses (13) PREPOSED: [[compiementizerWhen] [the actor finished the book, [the woman called the professor]]]. (14) POSTPOSED: [The worker called the owner [[colllI)ienle,1. tizor\vhen] [the engineer finished the plans]]]. These structures varied in terms of the pre- and postposing of the subordinate clause in relation to the main clause. The preposed left-branching structure in (13) correlates with a right-headed C; the postposed, right-branching structure in (14) correlates with a left-headed C. We hypothesized that if L2 learners had access to their LI parameter values alone, then the Japanese speakers tested in this study would have access only to a head-final parameter value. If this were so, we would expect to find no evidence that these learners were able to identify and assign a new value to the head-direction parameter for the L2, English, in a manner observed for child LI acquisition. We might even expect that those structures that follow from the LI parameter setting would be more accessible to the Japanese learner than those that follow from the L2 parameter setting; that is, they might show a preference for preposed sentence structures rather than postposed structures. Results of these studies and other related experiments reveal two very important overarching findings. First, at early stages of acquisition, Japanese adult L2 learners of English do not find preposed sentence structures significantly easier either to imitate or to comprehend. That is, they treat both of the sentence structures in (13) and (14) similarly in production and comprehension, suggesting that they "know" that English and Japanese differ in head direction and are working out the consequences of a new parameter setting for English. Second, later in acquisition (at the highest proficiency level tested), the Japanese speakers snowed a significant preference for postposed sentence structures (sentence [14]) over preposed ones (sentence [13]). This finding is consistent with that for LI learners of English and suggests that these L2 learners had assigned a value to the head-direction parameter in conformity with the English value. These results suggest that UG remains available to the L2 leamer. They have been replicated with other sentence structures and with other Ianguage groups, specifically, Chinese and Spanish speakers learning ESL (e.g., Flynn & Espinal 1985).25 3.2.2. Differentially instantiated UG principles. Another empirical test of the partial-access hypothesis investigates nonparametric variation. For example, if in the LI, a UG principle applies vacuously to a certain construction, the partial-access hypothesis predicts that the learner will not be able to apply this principle nonvacuously to the corresponding construction in the L2. Several studies have investigated this version of the partial-access hypothesis by testing L2 learners' knowledge of principles constraining syntactic movement. The effects of such principles on the acquisition of u;/i-questions has been of particular interest to researchers because in some languages the u)/j-phrase moves in the formation of questions and in others it does not (as briefly discussed above in sect. 2.3). Furthermore, when syntactic movement of the u;/i-phrase occurs, certain UG principles, generally known as "movement constraints," are applicable. Consider, for example, question formation in English from a declarative containing a relative clause (RC), as in (15a). Although it is possible to extract a u;/i-phrase across the relative clause (indicated by the square brackets), as in (15b), extraction out of the relative clause results in ungrammaticality, as seen in (15c). (15) a. The girl [RC who bought the book] introduced the boy to the clerk b. Who did the girl, [RC who bought the book] introduce to the clerk? c. *What did the girl [who bought ] introduce the boy to the clerk? This is known as a "subjacency effect," since it is subjacency, a constraint on syntactic movement, that is violated in (15c). In languages without syntactic movement, that is, where question-formation occurs without fronting the whword (e.g., Japanese, Chinese, Indonesian), movement constraints like subjacency are not applicable, and in those languages, the sentence synonymous with (15c) is grammatical. L2 researchers investigating movement constraints have been interested in whether or not speakers of languages lacking syntactic movement attain knowledge of the ungrammaticality of sentences such as (15c) in a target language like English. Movement constraints are of particular interest to L2 researchers because the knowledge tested involves rather esoteric sentence-types that are assumed to be unavailable in the (L2) input. For LI acquisition, it is similarly assumed that knowledge of the illicitness of such sentences is not determinable from the input: first, it is generally assumed that speakers of the LI, who provide the primary linguistic data for the LI learner, simply do not utter such sentences. In addition, if sentences like (15c) were available, as for example in speech errors, this would complicate matters even more for the language learner, since he would by hypothesis not be given any indication of the ungrammaticality of this sentence. Critically, negative evidence is required to determine ungrammaticality from the input alone. Since negative evidence of this type is not generally made available to the learner, knowledge of subjacency and other negative constraints is hypothesized to be biologically determined, that is, given by UG. 26 This argument concerning underdetermination of the data (or poverty of the stimulus) can also be shown to hold in L2 acquisition. While in L2 acquisition, especially in the
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Epstein et al.: Second language acquisition case of classroom learning, negative evidence is arguably more readily available than in LI acquisition, it is highly unlikely that negative evidence concerning these particular structure types (i.e., ungrammaticality resulting from illicit u>/i-extractions) is ever explicitly or implicitly given (cf. Cook 1988; White 1985). Furthermore, knowledge of this type of ungrammaticality is not a function of amount of input, that is, no matter how long learners have been exposed to the L2, they, like the native speakers, are unlikely to come across these types of sentences, and are furthermore unlikely to be told of their grammatical status. With regard to knowledge of movement constraints, several researchers have shown that L2 learners of English from various LI backgrounds accept violations like (15c) to a significantly higher degree than do native speakers of English. For one group of learners in one study (Schachter 1989), their ability to correctly judge subjacency violations as ungrammatical only barely surpassed 50%, or what is considered chance level. On the basis of results such as these, it has been argued that UG is not available to the L2 learner in the same way that it is to the child LI learner. In a recent study, Martohardjono (1993) proposes a different approach to evaluating L2 learners' knowledge of UG principles governing syntactic movement. She argues that percentages of rejection of sentences constituting violations might not be the best indicator of learners' competence, since, in general, L2 learners perform at lower success rates across tasks, when compared to native speakers. Thus, their performance on judging grammatical sentences, which are often used as controls in their studies, is also typically lower than that of native speakers. Instead of comparing absolute rates of rejection of individual whconstructions between native and non-native speakers, Martohardjono tested whether L2 learners' judgments of violations conform to grammatical systems allowed by Universal Grammar. That is, although L2 learners may lag behind native speakers with regard to accuracy rates, their judgments of uj/i-structures may still derive from their knowledge of UG principles and conform to a pattern predicted by UG. The relevant principles were movement constraints, in particular subjacency and the empty category principle (ECP). These principles restrict movement out of certain subordinate clauses, such as relative clauses and u)/i-islands (so-called because they constitute clauses headed by a tuft-word/phrase, such as "whether," "why," etc.). Martohardjono included several types of movement violations predicted by UG to vary in relative strength. Extractions of u;ft-phrases out of relative clauses, adjuncts, and sentential subjects, for example, are predicted to be strong subjacency violations, when compared to extractions out of clauses headed by "whether" or noun-complement clauses, which constitute weak subjacency violations. The gradience in acceptability is exemplified in (16a-b):27 (16) a. ??Which book did John hear [NP a minor [CP that you had read ? b. *Which book did John meet [NP a child [CP who read Similarly, certain subject extractions result in strong violations when compared to object extractions, because typically subject extractions involve the effects of violating two movement constraints, subjacency and the ECP, while object extractions involve only subjacency. This is exemplified below: (17) Subject Extraction, violates Subjacency and ECP (STRONG): *Which neighbor did John spread [NP the minor [ cp that stole a car? (18) Object Extraction, violates Subjacency (WEAK): ??Which car did John spread [NP the minor [CP that the neighbor stole ? Evaluating L2 learners' relative rates of rejection across these various constructions, Martohardjono found that the same pattern emerged across all L2 groups tested, regardless of whether their Lls instantiated u;/i-questions with or without movement. For example, she found that strong violations, such as u>/i-extraction out of relative clauses and adjunct clauses, were rejected at a higher rate than weak violations involving u;/j-islands and noun complements. Similarly, subject extractions involving the violation of two principles were in general rejected at a higher rate than object extractions involving the violation of only one principle. Importantly, the patterns that arose bore striking similarity to the patterns that the native speaker control group showed for these constructions. Finally, and most significantly, the patterns that arose for both L2 learner groups as well as the native English control group were precisely the ones predicted by UG in terms of relative strength of the violation.28 Crucially, for two of the L2 groups (native speakers of Chinese and Indonesian) the LI could not have been the knowledge source, either for the ungrammaticality of the sentences or for the particular pattern which arose, since the corresponding constructions in the LI (displaying u;/i-in-situ within relative clauses, sentential subjects, etc.) are grammatical. Since knowledge of ungrammaticality could not possibly have been derived from the LI grammar, Martohardjono concluded that UG principles constraining syntactic u;ft-movement must still be available to these learners. The subjects for this experiment are described in (19). Examples of stimulus sentences are provided in (20). (19) Subjects:
No. of LI Sentences ESL placement level 16 .advanced Chinese 17 Indonesian advanced Italian 11 advanced English Control 10 Examples of stimulus sentences: a. Extraction out of " relative clause (strong violation) Subject: **Which man Hirl Tom fix the rlonr that had broken? Object: *Which mayor did Mary read the book that prnkprl ? b. Extraction out of adjunct clause (strong violation) Subject: **Which waiter did the man leave the table after spilled the soup? Object: *Which soup did the man leave the table after the waiter spilled ? c. Extraction out of ty/i-island (weak violation) Subject: **Which sister did Pat know where had hidden the candy? Object: *Which patient did Max explain how the poison killed ? d. Extraction out of noun complements (weak violation) Subject: **Which neighbor did John spread the rumor that stole a car? Object: *Which car did John spread the minor that the neighbor stole ?

(20)

As shown in (21), which gives the overall results, L2 learners from these LI backgrounds are, in general, quite

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Epstein et al.: Second language acquisition able to correctly identify ungrammatical wh-questions involving these different syntactic domains. (21) Overall results
Mean percentage correct

Chinese 65 Indonesian 74 Italian 82 English 92 The interlanguage variability in these results can be explained if we assume that the LI plays a role in L2 acquisition. In particular, the languages differ in the way the principles under examination are instantiated. In Chinese and Indonesian, for example, tu/i-questions are not generated by syntactic movement, resulting in the nonapplication of principles like subjacency and the ECP. Italian, on the other hand, is similar to English in that u>h-questions are generated by syntactic movement, triggering both subjacency and the ECP. This cross-linguistic LI difference is predictably reflected in the groups' L2 accuracy rates. While it is clear from these figures that all groups were able to recognize movement violations in English, the two groups with an LI that does not instantiate the principles under examination (Chinese, Indonesian) show a lower accuracy rate than the two groups with an LI that does instantiate these principles (Italian, English). This type of interlanguage variability is expected, and indeed predicted by a parameter-setting theory of L2 acquisition (see Flynn .1987). Of greater importance in this study, however, are the strikingly similar patterns that arise across all the language groups as seen in Figure 5. As discussed above, extractions out of those domains that are predicted by UG to result in strong violations were rejected at a higher rate than extractions predicted to result in weak violations. An ANOVA showed this differential treatment of strong versus weak violations to be significant for all groups at p = .0001. The Indonesian subjects in this particular study provide a striking example of UG-specified knowledge independent of grammaticality status in the LI. In addition to being able to recognize violations of movement constraints in general,

they evidence a more subtle knowledge of degree of unacceptability in the L2 that is independent of their knowledge of the LI. As noted earlier, Indonesian questions do not involve overt syntactic movement, and therefore no movement violations occur in these structures. However, questions involving u>h-islands and NP complements in this language turn out to be unacceptable or highly marginal for other reasons.29 Examples of these constructions are shown in (22). (22) a. W/i-islands *Siti ingin tahu dimana Adik menyembunikan apa? Siti want know where Adik ACT-hide what? 'What does Siti wonder where Adik hid ?' b. NP complement ?*Siti dapat kabar bahwa saudaranya pergi kemana? Siti receive news that relative-POSS go where? 'Where did Siti receive the news that her relative went In other words, the acceptability status of the corresponding sentences in Indonesian is precisely the reverse of the weak/strong effects for English. Questions involving adjuncts and relative clauses, which in English constitute strong violations, are perfectly acceptable in Indonesian, since in this language the wh-phra.se does not move in these sentence-types and hence does not violate movement constraints. In contrast, questions involvingu>h-islands and NP complements, which in English constitute only weak violations, are highly marginal, if not unacceptable in Indonesian. These facts, however, do not seem to affect the L2 learners' ability to differentiate correctly between the two types of violations when learning English. As the results in (23) indicate, their judgments of these sentences pattern in the same way as those of native speakers. That is, they weakly reject NP complements and w/i-island violations, and they strongly reject extractions out of relative clauses and adjuncts. (23) Mean percentage correct Strong Weak Indonesian 88 46 . English 99.0 78.0 We argue that this pattern is not a coincidence30 but results from the speakers' knowledge (both those for whom English is the LI and those for whom it is the L2) of the differential effects of movement constraints on sentences generated by syntactic movement.31 3.2.3. Error data from adult L2 acquisition. A third piece of compelling evidence against the partial-access hypothesis emerges from error data collected from the same set of Japanese speakers who were tested on pre- and postposed sentence structures (see sect. 3.2.1). Elicited imitation of sentences such as (24) was extremely difficult for these learners of English, as shown in Figure 6. (24) When the doctor received the results, he called the gentleman. Sentence (24) displays a preposed, left-branching adverbial adjunct clause as well as forward pronoun anaphora. In forward pronoun anaphora structures such as (25) below, the antecedent (Taroo) precedes the null pronoun form (interpreted as "he" in this sentence). Sentences such as these do not involve a surface contrast in the relative order of: (1) the antecedents and the proform and (2) the subordinate and matrix clauses. These sentences are in accord with Japanese as a head-final (or right-headed CP) language.
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Figure 5. Chart illustrating results for Chinese, Indonesian, and Italian speakers learning English as a second language as well as native English speaker controls in terms of their grammaticality judgments of sentences with strong and weak subagency violations. Chinese; 8 Indonesian; Italian; English.

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Epstein et al.: Second language acquisition 3.0(26a) has been widely studied (e.g., C. Chomsky 1969; Maratsos 1974; McDaniels & Cairns 1990; Sherman 1983; Sherman & Lust 1993; Tavakolian 1978). The results from these and other studies indicate that: (1) in comprehension, LI learners of English interpret all control verbs as if they were object control verbs and (2) in both production and comprehension, LI learners of English show a general overall preference for the infinitive structures exemplified in (26a) below when compared to their tensed counterparts illustrated in (26b). Similarly, early L2 acquisition studies focusing on the comprehension of the structures in (26a) indicate a developmental pattern in which adult L2 learners interpreted subject control verbs as if they were object control verbs at early stages of acquisition (Cooper et al. 1979; d'Anglejan & Tucker 1975). In addition, these comprehension studies found no evidence that the L2ers attempted to "translate" or to "map" their native language structures onto those of the L2 even when the LI would have provided a correct response for the English structures tested. Given the comparable patterns of acquisition that LI and L2 learners of English showed in comprehension of control verb structures, the next question asked was whether their patterns would also match for production. To test this, 21 adult speakers of Spanish learning ESL were tested in their production of the structures exemplified in (26a and b). 33 The Spanish speakers tested were at either an Intermediate (n = 9) or an Advanced (n = 12) level of competence as measured by the standardized placement test from the University of Michigan. As exemplified in (27a and b), Spanish clearly has both infinitives and tensed clauses. Spanish infinitivals also involve a null pronoun as in English (PRO) (27a[i]); however, the tensed counterparts involve a pronominal form (pro) (27b[i-iii]) not allowed in (subject) position in an English tensed clause. All three control verbs tested in this study (promise, remind, and tell) can occur in Spanish tensed clauses, as in English. However, infinitives are not allowed with tell or remind in Spanish; that is, Spanish does not have counterparts to (26a[ii-iii]). The method used in this study was an elicited imitation task, in which subjects were asked to repeat sentences verbatim as given by the experimenter. The sentences administered are illustrated in (26).
(26) a. Infinitives i. John promises Henry PRO to go to the store. ii. John reminds Henry PRO to go to the store, iii. John tells Henry PRO to go to the store, b. Tensed finite i. John promises Henry that he will go to the store. ii. John reminds Henry that he will go to the store, iii. John tells Henry that he will go to the store. a. Infinitives i. Juan le promete a Henry PRO ir a la tienda Juan him promises to Henry PRO to go to the store 'Juan promises Henry PRO will go to the store.' b. Tensed finite i. Juan le promete a Henry que PRO ird a la tienda. Juan him promises to Henry that PRO will go to the store Juan promises Henry that he will go to the store.' ii. Juan le dice a Henry que PRO vaya a la tienda. Juan him tells to Henry that PRO go to the store 'Juan tells Henry to go to the store.' iii. Juan le recuerda a Henry que PRO irii a la tienda. Juan him reminds to Henry that PRO will go to the store 'Juan reminds Henry that he will go to the store.'

LOW

MID

HIGH

Figure 6. Results for amount correct in Japanese ESL learners' elicited information of sentence involving pre-posed subordinate adverbial clauses and forward pronoun anaphora.

(25)

Taroo wa nyuusi no kekka o kiita toki Taroo-topic entrance exam-possessive result-accusative heard when 0 hahaoya ni denwa sita pro mother-dative telephone did. 'When Taroo heard (found out) the results of the entrance exam, (he) called his mother.'

The extremely high error rate on these sentences is expected, given a UG parameter setting model of grammar acquisition. As noted earlier, the Japanese speaker learning English must assign a new parameter setting for head direction. In LI acquisition, the setting for this parameter has been argued to involve a correlation between the resultant configuration (head-initial or headfinal) and anaphora directionality. When headcomplement order is principally head-initial, forward directionality (i.e., antecedent precedes pronoun) is productively licensed. If the Japanese L2 acquisition of English is constrained by the same parameter as is child LI acquisition, and if the L2 learner draws the same empirical consequences as the LI learner, then the Japanese L2 learners' difficulty with sentences such as (24) can be explained in the following way: Sentence (24) is not only inconsistent with the new parameter setting (to head-initial direction) of English as a head-initial language, but it also violates the empirical consequence regarding anaphora direction that correlates with this parameter setting. In this case, forward anaphora correlates with head-initiality. Results such as these are left unaccounted for within a model disallowing access to principles and parametric values independent of the LI grammar. 3.2.4. Nontransfer of language-specific aspects. Results of a study investigating the L2 acquisition of the English "control" verbs promise, remind, and tell by adult Spanish speakers also suggest that the L2 learner is constrained by UG rather than by the LI alone (see Flynn et al. 1991).32 LI acquisition of the control structures exemplified in 690
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(27)

Epstein et al.: Second language acquisition

2 .01.51.0-

O
c
3 O

peii
That-Complements

orr

E
c <a

Hill
0.5^
00 Spanish

Infinitives

Figure 7. Results for amount correct for Spanish ESL learners' elicited imitation of sentences with definitival subordinate clauses and finite subordinate "that-compliments." that-compliments; D infinitives

As shown in Figure 7, Spanish speakers significantly preferred infinitives over finite that-clauses for the verbs tested {promise, remind, and tell) when they were asked to repeat both types of sentence in an elicited imitation test. Importantly, these results replicate those for LI acquisition of- English (see review in Sherman & Lust 1993). Given the results in Figure 7, we reason that if only the learner's LI, and not UG, constrained L2 acquisition, we would expect only Ll-instantiated lexical properties to be available to the L2er. That is, at the very minimum, we would expect the Spanish speakers to have found remind and tell sentences with finite that -clauses to be significantly easier to acquire than the infinitive structures for these verbs. However, these results indicate that this is not the case. These results, along with: (1) those from Japanese and Chinese speakers - which match those for the Spanish speakers - and (2) those from earlier comprehension studies that indicate that L2 learners, like Li learners, interpret both subject and object control verbs as object control verbs, have been used to argue that a general principle of locality plays a role in the L2 acquisition of English. (See Sherman & Lust 1993 for details of a similar proposal in LI acquisition.) Briefly, we argue that regardless of their Lls, L2 learners prefer object-controlled, infinitive structures because in these structures an object antecedent minimally c-commands PRO; that is, the nearest c-commanding element that appears in these structures controls PRO. 34 In the infinitive structures in English, there is a control domain within which the object is the minimal c-commander of the proform, PRO. In the finite t/iat-clauses (under their analysis), neither the subject nor the object minimally c-commands the subject pronoun in the subordinate clause. Both LI and L2 learners of English seem to rely on this locality principle at early stages of acquisition. Consequently, adults need to learn to override this linguistic principle (and it appears that they do), in order to learn the lexical language-specific subject control properties of, for example, promise. Again, the important result is that the patterns of acquisition isolated for the Spanish, Japanese, and Chinese speakers seem inexplicable in terms of "transfer from the LI," but can be accommo-

dated if one assumes that UG remains available to the adult L2 learner. 3.2.5. Summary. In conclusion, the empirical results we have reviewed in this section do not support the partialaccess hypothesis. L2 learners do seem to construct a grammar of the new target language under the constraints imposed by UG; the principles and parameters of UG carefully investigated thus far indicate that both those not instantiated in the LI and those that apply vacuously in the LI but are operative in the L2 can be acquired by the L2 learner.35 3.3. The L2 acquisition of functional categories: A case study We now turn to a detailed consideration of a particular version of the partial-access hypothesis, one concerning the acquisition of syntactic categories - namely, the Weak Continuity Hypothesis proposed by Vainikka and Young-Scholten (VYS) (1991) (see also Eubank 1988; in press; Kaplan 1993; Lakshmanov 1993; Liceras & Zohl 1993; Schwartz 1993 for related discussion).36 On the basis of data collected from several types of production tasks, VYS claim that certain syntactic categories (namely, functional categories; see below) are initially absent from the grammars of L2 learners and that these categories progressively emerge in discrete stages.37 Because VYS's proposal provides interesting arguments in support of the partial-access hypothesis, we focus on the theoretical (syntactic), empirical, and methodological (experimental) issues that it raises. In section 4 we will discuss possible alternative analyses of VYS's data. 3.3.1. Methodology. A. Experimental tasks: VYS's version of the Weak Continuity Hypothesis posits L2er knowledge of only those syntactic categories that are represented by a certain percentage of phonetically correct forms in their subjects' speech, collected from five elicited production tasks,
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Epstein et al.: Second language acquisition each involving descriptive narration on the part of the subject. In two of the tasks the test subjects were asked to "tell the stories in comic strips which contained minimal or no text" (1991, p. 9). In the other tasks they were required to describe a picture, to describe an action that the experimenter had carried out, and to use the present and the present perfect tenses to describe a particular process. First, to rely on the data collected from these particular production tasks alone is in our view problematic. Although inferences concerning linguistic knowledge must be based on performance data of some sort, the type of production data elicited in VYS's experiments do not provide a very reliable indication of learners' knowledge of grammatical categories. Production tasks of this kind make increased performance demands as compared to other tasks, given the lack of experimental controls. Thus, it is highly likely that the absence or incorrect instantiation of certain syntactic categories in these "naturalistic" types of production tasks is due to a deficiency in production or performance, rather than to a knowledge deficit. To take one example, contra VYS, it is not at all clear to us that failure to produce (complex) sentence embedding necessarily indicates the absence of the syntactic category characteristically employed in the analysis of embedded sentences (as we will discuss in more detail below). Moreover, even if a deficiency in the grammar (i.e., a linguistic-knowledge deficit) is in fact responsible for this particular performance/production failure, it is by no means clear that the deficiency resides in the syntactic component. Such deficiencies could, for example, be lexical. A learner may simply have not yet correctly associated the appropriate lexical item with its grammatical category. It is altogether possible that the absence of the German complementizer dali ("that") in some of the utterances of the L2 learners in VYS's data (which VYS interpret as critical evidence for the absence of the syntactic category COMP(LEMENTIZER)) is instead due simply to the L2 learners' failure to acquire this particular lexical entry (word). Similarly, the observed deficiencies may in principle be phonological. For example, to attest the presence or absence of tense in English, one would presumably monitor L2 learners' production of verb-final /-s/ or /-d[-ed]/. However, if absent, the absence of these morphemes (suffixes) could in fact be due to a reduction of unstressed phonemes or clusters in certain morphological environments - in this case, word final position. In order to eliminate this as a possibility, one would have to monitor the environments in which these morphemes were present or absent, as has been proposed for LI acquisition (see Demuth 1992). In addition, these types of naturalistic production tasks do not incorporate the controlled manipulation of target structures relevant to the factors being investigated. Critically, the experimenters had to wait for the appearance of target structures in the speech stream. Testing grammatical knowledge in this manner is not always efficacious or ultimately reliable and yields data that are arguably inconclusive. It is also potentially problematic to employ an experimental task in which subjects must narrate in a particular tense (e.g., present, as in VYS's study). First, the subject might have difficulty with that particular tense, resulting in high error rates throughout. Second, the present tense in English, for example, provides an infelicitous (or inaccurate) characterization of a given event (e.g., a single event depicted in a comic strip), since present tense expresses habitual action in English. Thus, showing a subject a picture of, say, a boy walking to school and asking the subject to narrate in the English present tense ("A/The boy walks to school") arguably forces the subject to make infelicitous (or perhaps false) statements (as noted in Hamburger & Crain 1982, p. 256). In German, present tense is ambiguous between habitual and present action. Finally, presenting subjects with comic strips containing "minimal or no text" (VYS, p. 9) is potentially problematic: Which comic strips had which texts? Which comics had no text? How do the text-comic pairings differ? How do these differences in the (very complex pictorial and orthographic) stimuli presented influence or affect the subjects' linguistic performance in the quite different elicited production (descriptive narration) tasks? B. Use of percentage correct as an indication of grammatical knowledge: An additional point, although one that is not unique to this study, concerns the sole use of percentage correct in the context of natural-speech data to substantiate the (non)existence of knowledge of syntactic categories. VYS set > 60% correct usage of a particular form as a criterion that it has been acquired. We argue that this inferential method is, for several reasons, unsound. First, as we have already suggested, the tasks used to evaluate grammatical knowledge in these studies do not lend themselves to frequent occurrence of the target structures. Second, even if a structure is isolated by such a method, in our view the likelihood of its being correct is low, given the performance demands inherent in the tasks themselves, which might well mitigate against their correct use. Third, it is simply not clear whether there is a correlation between any percentage of correct usage of a particular aspect of grammar and knowledge of that aspect. Thus, it is conceivable that a learner may in fact know the target language (i.e., the learner's grammar generates all the target structures) but the learner never uses certain structures, or uses them incorrectly, for performance reasons. As Chomsky (1991b, p. 19) notes, this is certainly true for native LI speakers. An infinite number of grammatical sentences in any language are not usable - for example, all grammatical sentences (of which there is an infinite number) exhibiting three or more center-embedded relative clauses. To illustrate, 28(a-c) are all grammatical. However, (28a) and (28b) are both usable (parsable), but (28c) (containing a triply center embedded relative clause) is not. (28) a. The rat died. b. The rat the cat chased died. c. The rat the cat the dog bit chased died, (meaning: "The rat which was chased by the cat (which was, in turn, bitten by the dog) died.") Given this crucial distinction between grammaticality and usability (a particular subcase of the crucial competence [knowledge] vs. performance [behavior] distinction), it is particularly problematic to attribute a knowledge deficit to a subject merely because he fails to use a particular construction, especially in naturalistic production tasks not specifically designed to elicit the particular structures under investigation (such as the tasks employed by VYS). As

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Epstein et al.: Second language acquisition Poeppel and Wexler (1993) succinctly put it: "Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence." Of course, it is an empirical issue whether a particular subject in a particular experimental study is omitting (or less frequently using) a given construction for performance reasons. If the omission is due to performance, and not to a knowledge deficit, then decreasing experimental taskdemands should result in increased occurrence rates (see sect. 5 below) - an unexpected correlation if a knowledge deficit is involved. Needless to say, it is an empirical issue which, if any, performance factors are in fact implicated (and in what way they are implicated) in any given experimental result (see Lust et al. 1987). C. Use of correct morphology: A final point in the context of methodology involves reliance on correct morphology as evidence of syntactic knowledge (regardless of thepercentage correct assumed to be criterial for acquisition). For example, the correct use of subject-verb agreement suffixes requires special morphological knowledge, not just knowledge of the syntax, an issue to which we will return (see also related discussion in Hyams & Safir 1991). Suppose, for purposes of illustration, that an L2 learner of English had the agreement morphology (i.e., suffixal) analysis of English present tense "completely backwards"; that is, suppose the learner thought that third-person singular agreement in the present tense displayed no overt agreement suffix (e.g., He eat ) and that all other forms exhibited the -s verbal agreement suffix (e.g., They eats). In such a case, the subject would never use agreement morphology/suffixes correctly, as in (29a) and (29b). (29) a. He/She/It like the boy. b. I/We/You/They likes the boy. Although strongly suggesting a morphological (suffixal) misanalysis, such 100% incorrect use (which we will show was not the case for VYS's subjects) does not necessarily reflect incompetence regarding the syntax of subject-verb agreement. 38 Notice first that our hypothetical learner, although having the morphology mixed up, does seem to know that the grammar of English incorporates a rule of subject-verb agreement - that is, the learner has not posited any of a number of possible but non-English rules such as objectverb or object-preposition agreement. Given such knowledge and given that "subject" (a relational syntactic notion, i.e., "subject of a sentence") and "verb" (a syntactic category of a particular type, distinct from, say, noun or sentence) are purely syntactic notions, it is clear from this alone that ignorance of the morphology (i.e., ignorance of correct verbal agreement suffixes) does not entail (total) ignorance of the syntactic analysis. Thus, requiring correct morphology (correct verbal agreement suffixes) is a highly questionable criterion to employ in assessing the learners syntactic knowledge. Moreover, notice that our hypothetical learner, who has the morphology wrong 100% of the time, could also have more detailed native syntactic knowledge beyond the syntactic knowledge of the English rule/law that the syntactic subject agrees with a particular type of syntactic category, namely, the verb. First, our hypothetical learner could also know that subject-verb agreement is in a certain sense "local"; that is, the subject agrees not with just any verb in the sentence, but with a/the local (nearby) one. (30) a. "He say they likes Bob b. He says they like Bob. Second, our hypothetical learner could possess the syntactic knowledge that subject-verb agreement is blocked whenever sentential negation (not) appears, exactly as is the case in the target grammar English. (31) a. He likes the boy
3s 3s

b. "He not like+s the boy (Direct subject-verb agreement is blocked) 3s 3s c. He does not like the boy 3s 3~s agreement That is, our "morphologically backward" learner could nevertheless evince the target grammar knowledge that (1) the syntactic (transformational) rule of rfo-insertion (Chomsky 1965) is obligatory whenever sentential negation appears, (2) do is inserted after the subject but before negation, not (a syntactic [i.e., word order] fact), and (3) it is do, not the main verb, that bears the agreement suffix (a morphologically incorrect agreement suffix for our hypothetical subject). (32) Incorrect morphology, correct syntax a. Incorrectly, 3s = no suffix; correctly, do required with negation He/She/It do_ not like the boy 3s 3s
(not: He/She/It not like_ the boy)

b. Incorrectly, 3pl = -s suffix; correctly, do required with negation I/We/You/They does not like the boy 3pl 3pl (but not: "I/We/You/They not likes the boy)

Thus, even though displaying the wrong morphology (verbal agreement suffixes) 100% of the time, the learner would seem to have the following native-speaker syntactic knowledge - specifically, knowledge:
(33) a. of a distinct set of syntactic categories including the category verb, which displays agreement morphology, as distinct from, say, prepositions, which do not; b. that English is a subject- (not, e.g., object-) agreement language; c. that English exhibits the syntactic order Subject-((/oNeg-)Verb-Object; d. that subject-verb agreement is "local"; e. that f/o-insertion is obligatory when sentential negation appears and do is a verb inserted into a position preceding negation but following the subject (a word order, syntactic fact); f. that when cfo-insertion applies, it is do and not the main verb that bears the verbal agreement suffix, in the present tense; g. in the present tense, there is one verbal suffix for 3s and one for all other person, number (and gender) forms.
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Epstein et al.: Second language acquisition One way of providing a unified syntactic analysis of such knowledge regarding the varying distribution (syntax) of the agreement suffix (the knowledge that in some cases the subject agreement verbal suffix appears on the main verb (like in [29]) but in other cases it appears separate from the main verb, on do (as in [32]), is to postulate that all cases derive from a single type of underlying (abstract) D-structure (DS) representation of the sentence, in which the agreement suffix invariably appears separate from the main verb (Chomsky 1965; 1991c).39 (34) a. DS[Sentenc.e[SubjHe][Agreement-S][verblike][theboy]] 3s 3s
DS [ Sentence [Svhj H e ] [ A g r e e m e n t -s] not [veri) like][the boy]] 3s 3s

This unifying abstract type of representation clearly does not undergo "rules of pronunciation"; that is, it is not an accurate representation of the pronounced order of elements. Rather, D-structure undergoes transformational rule application (i.e., application of rules that move, delete, or insert syntactic categories (e.g., NP and V), yielding what is called "an S-structure representation" that (for our purpose) does undergo pronunciation. In the S-structure representation, the third-person singular agreement suffix -s must become affixed to a verb (Lasnik 1981). Thus, neither D-structure representation in (34) can "survive" as a wellformed S-structure (pronounced) representation, since both contain the unaffixed affix -s, an ill-formed object with respect to pronunciation. In order to generate the desired S-structure (pronounced) forms, transformational rules (in particular movement rules) must apply to the D-structure representation and attach the affix to a verb. In (34a), the rule of "affix-hopping" (Chomsky 1965) can apply, moving the affix -s over, and attaching it to, the immediate right of the verb like. The result is the following S-structure representation containing the complex verb likes, consisting of the uninflected verb like plus the third-person singular agreement suffix -s.
(35) 3s 3s

In (36), the interesting appearance of not prevents the application of affix-hopping.

(36) SS [ S c n l e n c l ! [ ^ He] [Agrccmcnl 3s ] not [verb Uke]+[ Agreemcnt -s] [the boy]] 3s

Given that affix-hopping is blocked whenever sentential negation not appears, in order to meet the S-structure requirement that the verbal agreement affix -s appear affixed to a verb, the so-called dummy auxiliary verb do is inserted by a transformational rule to "support" the "stranded" affix, yielding the (pronounced) S-structure representation (37).
subject-verb agreement

I
(37) SS %c^ncc

[ ^ He][ Aux do] [Agrccmc.nl -s][Negot,,,n not][ verb like][the boy]] 3s A 3s

Transformational insertion of do

Given that our "morphologically backward" hypothetical learner could indeed know all these (as well as other) relevant (and quite complex) syntactic facts regarding English agreement, while at the same time having the incorrect pairing of subjects with suffixes, we would attribute the target grammar (English) syntactic analysis of subject-verb agreement to him, while at the same time hypothesizing that his morphological analysis was indeed incorrect. The methodological point, we hope, is clear. Use of nontarget morphology (e.g., incorrect agreement suffixes), even incorrect use 100% of the time, by no means entails a nontarget analysis of the syntax of agreement. In fact, we will strongly suggest that such a distinction between morphological and syntactic knowledge is not restricted to our hypothetical learner, but may well accurately characterize certain subjects in VYS's study. We will argue that experimental data VYS interpreted as indicative of a nontarget syntactic analysis are more readily inteqDretable as evidence of target-grammar syntactic analysis cooccurring with a misanalysis of the morphological facts. Thus, VYS's reliance on correct morphology as an indicator of syntactic competence may well result in a significant underestimation of their subjects' acquisition of the target syntacticanalysis. That is, VYS's results may simply indicate that their subjects have not yet mastered the morphology of verbal agreement. It is important to note that such a result would be unsurprising, if not expected, because agreement morphology is cross-linguistically idiosyncratic; in other words, it is not a universal, invariant property of human language but a property of particular languages and therefore must be "learned" (by LI learners as well). We agree with VYS that the subjects investigated in their study have not acquired "the full agreement paradigm." Crucially, though, we take this to mean only that they do not know the following idiosyncratic, nonuniversal, morphological facts about verbal agreement suffixes in German: (38) -e = Is -o = Is (colloquial) -st = 2s -t = 3s and 2pl -n = lpl and 3pl There is one final methodological point to be made in this context: VYS's studies indicate a high occurrence of -n in their data; they suggest that it represents only the infinitive ending and therefore argue that its appearance is consistent with their hypothesis that these subjects' grammars lack agreement. We do not agree with this conclusion. As (38) indicates, -n is indeed an agreement suffix in German, in addition to being the infinitive suffix. Since it serves this dual function, it may well have the highest distribution of the suffixes and would therefore constitute the "best guess" by a subject who has not mastered the paradigm in (38). A learner might well know that an agreement suffix is needed, but not know which one, and therefore pick -n - another case where the learner knows the underlying morphosyntax but not the surface morpho-phonetics. The methodological questions we have raised significantly weaken the theoretical claims made in the Weak Continuity Hypothesis studies. Nevertheless, we will consider several of the (methodologically independent) theoretical arguments developed in VYS 1991. We will consider these arguments in terms of each of the nontarget syntactic stages postulated by VYS in their account of the acquisition of German as an L2.

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Epstein et al.: Second language acquisition We first outline what we tentatively assume constitutes the target syntactic analysis of German. Having done this, we can then isolate more precisely the formal differences between the target syntactic analysis and the nontarget misanalyses that VYS attribute to their subjects learning German as an L2. This approach is necessary (though, unfortunately, not ubiquitous) in all acquisition research. That is, before one can ask "How is this (aspect of) grammar (e.g., the syntax of subject-verb agreement) acquired?" one must first (tentatively) adopt an explicit analysis (e.g., the affix-hopping analysis outlined above) of what this (aspect of) grammar is. (Readers unfamiliar with X' theory and the hypothesized class of syntactic categories and projections may wish to read the Appendix before turning to the next section concerning those aspects of the analysis of German relevant to our discussion of VYS.) 3.3.2. The target analysis of German. German displays the following word orders, among others (from Haegeman 1991, sect. 11.2, p. 524):40 (39) a. ... das Hans das Buch kauf + t Complementizer Subj. Obj. verb + inflection ... that Hans the book buy + s '... that Hans buys the book" b. Kauf + t Hans das Buch? buy + s Hans the book 'Does Hans buy the book?' c. Das Buch kauf + t Hans, the book buy + s Hans 'Hans buys the book' In an embedded declarative clause introduced by the complementizer daB (39a), the inflected verb occurs sentence-finally. In an unembedded yes-no question (39b), the inflected verb is sentence-initial. In an unembedded declarative clause (39c), the verb is in so-called "second position"; that is, it appears immediately after a sentence initial phrase, here the noun phrase das Buch. This is known as the "verb-second" or "V2" phenomenon. All three word orders can receive a unified analysis by virtue of being derived from one and the same type of underlying (D-structure) representation in which (unlike English), V is final in V and Agr is final in Agr'. That is, we will assume here that German has underlying CompSubject-Object-Verb-Inflection order, as represented in (40), conforming to the X' theory of phrase structure. 4142
(40)

Thus, it is hypothesized that in German, unlike in English: (1) the direct object precedes the verb and (2) Agr follows the VP. As noted earlier, in connection with Japanese, although the hierarchical (dominance) relations imposed by X' theory are assumed to be universal (e.g., each head projects to a single-bar and to a phrasal projection, with specifier and complement optional), the order of the head and its complement is not universal, but instead varies cross-linguistically. The S-structure representation of the embedded clause in (39a) is derived from the D-structure representation in (40) by applying head-to-head movement; that is, the verb kauf, a head, is moved to the inflectional suffix -t, which occupies the head position Agr, so that the suffix is properly affixed to the verb as is required in the S-structure representation. Example (39b) is derived by applying the same movement transformation, yielding [kauf + t], but then [kauf + t] undergoes additional head-to-head movement from Agr to the Comp position (which is empty in this case, dafi being absent), yielding the verb-initial word order. Example (39c) is derived by applying the same two (head) movement transformations, plus (phrase) movement of the direct object NP das Buch into Spec CP (a phrasal position). Applying these three movements (as indicated by the arrows) to the D-structure representation (40) produces the S-structure representation of (39c) shown in (41) (adapted from Haegeinan's [16e], 1991, p. 529). (41)

a. = V-movement into Agr (= head-to-head movement):t becomes a suffix to [v kauf] b. = [V + Agr] (= kauf + t) movement into C (= head-to-head movement) c. = direct object movement into Spec CP (= phrasal movement) Thus, cases of V2 like (39c) are analyzed by positing V-movement first to Agr and then to (the "second position") Comp, with a phrase (here the direct object NP das Buch) moving into the preceding "first position," Spec CP. Unification is achieved to the extent that all the different surface word orders are derived from a single (invariant) type of X'-consistent (unpronounced) D-structure representation like (40), by application of independently motivated movement rules. This movement analysis of V2, which hypothesizes that the verb's appearance in second position is derived from a unitary D-structure representation by movement ofV into an unoccupied Comp position, additionally makes the empirical prediction that V2 is blocked when the Comp
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Epstein et al.: Second language acquisition position is filled (by, e.g., the complementizer dafi). The prediction is confirmed by the obligatory appearance of non-V2 (and instead V-final) order in embedded clauses like (39a), introduced by dafi.
3.3.3. The evidence for stages: Theoretical assumptions.

In this section we consider the existence of the stages (i.e., grammars) proposed by VYS (1991) in the L2 acquisition of German. We argue that even if one completely accepts their methodology (reviewed in detail in sect. 3.3.1 above), their results still fail to provide compelling support for the existence of the stages of acquisition that they postulate. VYS argue that there exist at least the following three discrete and ordered stages of syntactic development in the acquisition of German as an L2: (42) a. Stage 1: The VP-stage analysis. The grammar lacks the functional heads C, I, Agr, and their corresponding single-bar and phrasal projections. Consequently sentences are analyzed as:
VP

gorial inventory (not, e.g., some imaginable performance effect), that accounts for the purported VP-analysis of German sentences by L2ers in this stage. VYS's hypothesis that a given subject is at the VP-stage entails that such a subject has no knowledge of the functional syntactic category Agr. Then, because all syntactic operations concerning subject-verb agreement (e.g., English affix-hopping or German V-movement to Agr, discussed earlier) crucially refer to the syntactic category Agr, one empirical prediction is that such a subject has no knowledge regarding the syntax of subject-verb agreement. Clearly, this prediction is a very strong one that, if incorrect, should, in principle, be readily falsifiable. 3.3.4. The VP-stage. As noted, at the VP-stage the grammar is assumed to lack functional categories, and sentences are analyzed as VPs (as in [42a]). VYS assign three of their seventeen subjects to the VP-stage: Aysel, Memduh, and Changsu.44 We argue that the evidence VYS present does not support their claim that the L2 German grammar of these speakers altogether lacks functional categories. To support the existence of such a grammatical stage, one would minimally have to find a speaker whose utterances in the corpus consistently lack evidence of an IP.45 However, as VYS themselves point out, none of the speakers they assign to the VP-stage fits this description. Instead, all three speakers produce some sentences, albeit few in number, that by VYS's own criteria must be analyzed as containing an IP. For Aysel (see VYS, p. 22 and table 4), 12% of his sentences display a word order that in VYS's view is amenable to an analysis in which these sentences "represent the subsequent stage, with verb raising [to Infl] being the first indication of this." With respect to the sentences that Memduh produced, VYS note that "6% involve an agreement form of the copula or a modal, presumably in Infl" [one of the categories the VP-stage is presumed to lack] (our emphasis). For Changsu, the proportion of sentences indicating the existence of Infl was 16%. VYS do not discount these data; nor do they claim that these subjects are in the next (IP-) stage (if they did, there would be no evidence supporting the existence of the VPstage). Rather, to account for these sentences, VYS suggest that they are "precursors of the next stage of acquisition" (p. 23; see also p. 24) and state that "we find some indication . . . that these speakers might be in the process of entering the next stage, with a higher functional projection" (p. 22). What does it mean to claim that these VP-stage speakers might be in the process of entering the IP-stage? If stages are simply grammars (i.e., "at the VP-stage" means "has a grammar the categorial inventory of which lacks functional categories"), what can it mean when a VP-stage speaker (whose grammar by definition lacks functional categories) is "in the process of entering" the IP-stage (the grammar of which has at least one functional category, Infl)? This suggests that such a speaker is in some (unspecified) intermediate stage equivalent to neither the previous nor the following stage. But in the case at hand, if Aysel, Memduh, and Changsu are neither in the VP-stage nor in the IPstage, they cannot provide evidence for a VP-stage (because they are not in it). Hence, all the evidence for such a stage becomes questionable. Similarly, trying to account for particular data by suggesting that they are "precursors of the next stage" fails to address the empirical, linguistically significant question re-

Spec

V V NP b. Stage 2: The IP-stage analysis. The grammar lacks the functional heads C and Agr and their corresponding single-bar and phrasal projections. Consequently sentences are analyzed as: IP

Spec VP Spec V

V NP c. Stage 3: The AgrP-stage analysis. The grammar lacks the functional head C and its corresponding single-bar and phrasal projections. Consequently sentences are analyzed as:43 AgrP

At each stage, sentences are analyzed as instances of the tree provided. A learner in the VP-stage analyzes the German sentence as a VP; in the IP-stage as an IP; and in the AgrP-stage, as an AgrP. Crucially, each stage is simply a type of grammar and to say "Person P is in/at a particular stage (e.g., the VP-stage)" is to say no more and no less than "Person P's knowledge of language L is characterized by grammar G exhibiting the formal properties F." For example, at the VP-stage, it is assumed that the categorial inventory of the grammar altogether lacks the functional categories Infl, Agr, Comp, and their corresponding X' projections (VYS 1991, p. 18). VYS postulate that it is this property of the grammar, namely, an "impoverished" cate696
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Epstein et al.: Second language acquisition garding the subjects' knowledge of German: Does the syntactic inventory of the subjects'grammar of German contain functional categories, or doesn't it? VYS themselves presume that 12%, 6%, and 16% of these three subjects' sentences are to be analyzed with a category "in Infl." They write that "it is certainly possible that these speakers have at least an IP" (p. 24) and (as noted earlier) "we find some indication . . . that these speakers might be in the process of entering the next stage, with a higher functional projection" (p. 22). But if any syntactic analysis attributed to them is presumed to include an Infl node, then it must also be presumed that their grammar contains Infl. Otherwise, how could they construct an analysis containing this category? But if their grammars contain Infl, it cannot be presumed that these subjects are in the VP-stage. Again, such subjects can therefore provide no evidence for the existence of this stage. Why do VYS not attribute functional categories to the categorial inventory of these subjects' grammars? They themselves concede that the empirical support for the VPstage versus a grammar incorporating functional categories is tenuous, writing, "It is difficult to distinguish between this approach and our approach based on empirical data" (pp. 24-25). One reason why they do not attribute functional categories in these three cases may be statistical. VYS justify attributing a VP-stage grammar to these three subjects since "the majority of the sentences (i.e., those containing a verb) produced by these three speakers look like bare VPs" (p. 24). Further, they state that "if there is an IP projection in all of their VP sentences, we would have to explain why in most sentences there is no evidence for the IP" (p. 24). But clearly, the implication here is that (by VYS's own criteria) some sentences do constitute evidence for the presence of IP. The remaining question is, "what exactly are the data that are interpreted as indicating that these subjects 'might be in the process of entering the next stage, with a higher functional projection'?" The data in question indicate that the subjects' grammars do indeed have functional categories. If the data are reliable, the evidence for the VP-stage consequently disappears. If the data are unreliable, the next question is, "were the only unreliable data precisely the data supporting the evidence of functional categories?" If so, a principled account of this must be provided. If not, we must determine precisely which data are reliable and which are not (see sect. 3.3.1, and below, for discussion of methodology). In summary, we hope to have shown that, even accepting VYS's methodology, the arguments they provide for the existence of a VP-stage, at which the L2er's grammar of German altogether lacks functional categories, are arguably uncompelling. Before we turn to the IP-stage, it should be noted that the VP-stage grammar, as postulated by VYS, is in large part formally underspecified. Consequently, our discussion of it has been (necessarily) quite restricted in its scope. Although VYS propose that this grammar generates the phrase structure analysis in the VP tree (42a), myriad (perhaps, all) other properties of the grammar remain unspecified, thus leaving the generative capacity (empirical [predictive] content) of this grammar unclear and in effect "immunizing" it from further empirical test. A more explicit proposal concerning tiie VP-stage would have to address a host of empirical questions including these: (a) If, as VYS propose, the VP-stage grammar lacks functional categories, which, by hypothesis, are intimately involved in, for example, Case assignment in the target grammar (perhaps all grammars, as specified by UG), how are Case assignment and the Case Filter formulated, if indeed these universals are assumed to exist at all within the VP-stage grammar, and what (Case-theoretic) predictions are made by such formulations? (b) More generally, given the absence of functional categories, the command or government or minimal domain relations (or whatever geometric relation(s) one believes expresses syntactic relations) are radically different in this grammar than they are in the target grammar (perhaps, in all adult UG-constrained grammars). How then are syntactic relations, including, for example, agreement, Case assignment, Binding, and theta-assignment, expressed in this grammar? Once this question is answered (by providing an explicit grammar), are the predictions obtained confirmed by the data? (c) As noted by Deprez and Pierce (1993; see also Boser et al. 1991a; 1991b; Lee 1991; Nunez del Prado et al. (to appear); Poeppel & Wexler 1993; and Whitman et al. 1991 for discussion of related issues in LI acquisition), if functional categories are absent at a given stage and if parametric variation among languages concerns morphological variation in functional categories (Borer 1983; Chomsky 1991c; Fukui 1988), then parameter setting (= determining the morphological features of functional heads in the target grammar) simply cannot be done at a prefunctional stage. Is this prediction experimentally supported by the L2 acquisition data? The importance (and sheer number) of such questions cannot be overemphasized. If one attempts to account for some (necessarily restricted) class of experimental findings by positingfundamental syntactic differences between the target grammar (here, German) and the L2ers' grammar (here, the VP-stage), then a host of questions regarding the formal properties and hence generative capacity of the hypothesized grammar (beyond the mere generation of the VP tree in (42a)) must be at least revealed, as in (a)-(c) and the widespread empirical consequences experimentally identified and investigated. As the parametric approach to LI acquisition demonstrates, even a single seemingly minor formal difference (e.g., one feature difference in the morphological specification of one category) can give rise to widespread differences in generative capacity. The VP-stage grammar, once rendered explicit, is surely no exception to the rule that even extremely minor formal differences can yield vast empirical distinctions. 3.3.5. The IP-stage. In this section, we consider evidence for the existence of an IP-stage. We argue that, as in the case of the VP-stage, the evidence is, in our view, unconvincing. At the second stage, the grammar incorporates IP. VYS write: (43) a. "Having developed a functional projection IP beyond the head-final VP (from the previous stage), these speakers optionally raise a verb to the Infl-position . . ." b. "This movement is optional because [in contrast to the next, AgrP-stage] no agreement features are basegenerated in Infl." c. "If the verb does not raise . . . we assume that such an utterance has the structure of a bare VP, similar to the predominant structure of the previous stage." (1991, p. 29)
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Epstein et al.: Second language acquisition Although VYS provide no analyzed data (i.e., no word strings with their associated phrase structure representation), they presumably intend that, for example, the following utterances (both from Kemal, an IP-stage subject) are to be analyzed as in (45), given (43): (44) a. Ich sehen Schleier. (VYS, [24b]) I see veil 'I see (the) veil.' b. Der deustche Buch lesen. (VYS, [23b]) the German book read "(I) read the German book(s).' a. (e.g., AgrP) extant in the categorial inventory of the target grammar, the learner acquires a series of grammars each of which generates: (1) only misanalyses, (2) all the misanalyses of the previous grammar, plus (3) new misanalyses. Even leaving aside the crucial question of how/why subjects make the shift from one stage to another (in the absence of which there is at best a description of stages with no explanation of the acquisition process), it is not clear how the VYS model in (46) can account for L2 acquisition. B. The Full House Principle: At this point one might ask, "Why do VYS assume (43c); that is, why do they assume that the IP-stage subjects' analysis of V-final data consists of the (retentive) VP-structure in (45b)? Why don't VYS postulate instead that the IP-stage subjects' grammar generates only IP-structures and hence that the IP-stage analysis of the word string in (44b) is not the retentive VP-structure (45b) but rather the IP-structure (47)?" (47)

b.

VP V NP Der deutsche Buch lesen For the following reason VYS cannot propose (47). They note "a strong correlation between the verb occurring in Infl and lexical material (not necessarily a subject) occurring in the preceding specifier position." To explain this correlation, they assume that (1) when the verb precedes, say, the direct object, the V has raised to Infl (see (45a)), (2) once a V occurs in Infl, an IP is projected, and (3) the IPstage grammar incorporates the following requirement: (48) Spec IP must be filled by a lexical element. Now, given this assumption, VYS cannot maintain the structure (47) since Spec IP is lexically empty. Hence, they are compelled to assume instead that the IP-stage grammar generates the (retentive) VP-structure (45b). By contrast, representation (45a) reflects the following IP-stage grammar operations/principles: (1) V-raising to Infl, (2) the projection of IP, and (3) the requirement that Spec IP must be lexically filled ( = [48]). In sum, then, the associated "cost" of accounting for the observed strong correlation between the verb occurring in Infl and lexical material (not necessarily the subject) occurring in the Specifier of IP is the assumption that the IPstage grammar still generates VP-structures - a purported fact for which (recall) VYS have no explanation. Regardless of its associated "cost," what is the status of (48)? Concerning the postulation of (48), VYS ask, "Why should the Spec IP position need to be filled by a lexical element?" They suggest that "this may be a consequence of a general requirement that, in order to be licensed, phrase structure positions must be lexically filled at some level of representation" (p. 28). VYS call this requirement the "Full House Principle" (FHP). The assumption that the IP-stage grammar incorporates the FHP is problematic, however. First, it entails discontinuity; that is, UG presumably prohibits the postulation of the FHP. As far as we know, every adult natural-language

Der deutsche Buch lesen Thus, in accordance with (43), VYS propose that data exhibiting verb-direct object (44a) order receive the "V-raising within IP" analysis (45a). By contrast (see [43c]), data displaying direct object-verb order (44b) receive the "VP" analysis (45b).46 A. Increasing overgeneration as a model of L2 acquisition? One crucial aspect of VYS s account is (43c), entailing that an IP-stage grammar retains the VP analysis (45b) from the previous stage. Thus, in this framework, subjects who have progressed from the VP- to the IP-stage have not abandoned the VP-stage misanalysis. Rather, they have acquired a grammar that makes available not only this misanalysis but also a second (IP) misanalysis of the German sentence. The same appears to be true of the third stage (see sect. 3.3.6): "the bare VP-structure is still available to some degree to the speakers in this [AgrP-stage] group" (VYS, p. 33). Moreover, certain other data from these AgrP-stage speakers "could be the result of some sentences having the structure of the previous stage, the IPstage" (p. 33). Thus, crucially in our view, this analysis entails that L2 acquisition of German consists of the ordered acquisition of grammars such that each grammar acquired generates only misanalyses and generates more types of misanalyses than its predecessor did.
(46) Stage/Grammar a. 1st = VP-stage b. 2nd = IP-stage c. 3rd = AgrP-stage generates generates generates Types of misanalyses generated VP-structure > VP-structure and IP-structure > VP-, IP-, and AgrP-structure

With respect to this "retentive" property of their model of acquisition, VYS provide no explanation. But if there is no explanation of this, then there is no explanation of acquisition. That is, in the course of acquiring categories

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Epstein et al.: Second language acquisition grammar violates this principle, as evidenced by the legitimacy of derivations containing phonetically empty (nonlexicalized) categories such as PRO, pro, trace in Spec CP/Comp, and null operators, which may occupy positions that are never "lexicalized" in the course of a derivation (see Chomsky 1981a; 1982 for discussion of such phonetically empty categories).47 Thus, if L2 acquisition of German is in fact possible, it is incumbent upon VYS to explain how it is that the IP-stage subject subsequently abandons the FHP. A second problem with the FHP is that on the one hand, it is assumed to be (like other principles of grammar) an inviolable principle of the IP-stage grammar. Yet, on the other hand, it is invoked to explain what is merely a correlation. To see why it is in this case problematic to invoke a grammatical principle to explain a mere correlation, consider the following data from three of the five (purported) IP-stage subjects.
(49) Sevinc Sentence with V in Infl Something in Spec IP

VYS provide no answer. Note however that these difficult questions would simply disappear if it were assumed instead that the L2er's grammar of German is capable of generating an Infl-final I' (= the LI and L2 order) just as it generates a V-final VP (= the LI and L2 order). Given an Infl-final I', we could then abandon the mysterious Inflinitial IP-stage analysis like (45a) and could postulate instead that the subjects adopt analyses like (50). (50) CP

Kemal Kadir

51 139 103

37 (73%) 110 (79%) 84 (82%)

(adapted from VYSs Table 2, p. 28) If (as VYS propose) the UG-inconsistent FHP is indeed a principle of the IP-stage grammar and if each of these speakers has such a grammar, it follows that for each of them, approximately 20% of their sentences with a verb in Infl violate a principle of their own grammar, namely, the FHP (and, if asked, they would presumably judge these utterances ungrammatical). This of course raises a general question about the reliability of such production data as a basis for inferring properties of the L2ers' grammar. Summarizing up to this point, the FHP accounts for the observed correlation, but it does so at the cost of precluding structure (47) and "forcing" the retentive VP-structure (45b). This, in turn, entails that VYS's model (see [46]) postulates "retention from the previous stage(s)," a phenomenon for which VYS have no explanation. In our view, this retention represents a serious problem in that L2 development is predicted to involve only overgeneration and in fact increasing overgeneration (at least at the stages VYS investigate). Moreover, the FHP is UG-inconsistent; that is, (at least) the IP-stage grammar is discontinuous. Finally, attributing the FHP to the IP-stage grammar entails that approximately 20% of (three of five) IP-stage subjects' V-in-Infl sentences violate a principle of their own grammar and therefore do not reflect competence, thereby raising a general question regarding the reliability of these data. C. An Infl-initial I' and the nonexistence ofCP at the IPstage: An additional point to be made with respect to the IPstage is that Infl is initial in I' - see (42b). The purported postulation of an Infl-initial I' by IP-stage subjects is curious because in both the L2 grammar (German) and the subjects' LI grammar (Korean/Turkish) Infl is arguably final in I'. This oddity is compounded by the assumption that the headfinal property of V , in direct contrast to IP, is "transferred" from the LI (Korean/Turkish) to the L2 (German), with the result that VYS's subjects "do not seem to have any problem in acquiring the German head-final VP" (VYS, p. 5). Thus, under VYS's analysis, the following crucial question emerges: Why is V order readily "transferred" from the LI to the L2 but I' order is not? That is, why do subjects postulate an I' order different from both the LI and the L2?

a. = V-to-I movement b. = [V + I] to C movement c. = movement of the subject from Spec IP to Spec CP In the derivation of (50), the verb moves to Infl, picking up the morphophonetically incorrect suffix -n, and then [V + n] sehen inoves to C, while the subject ich moves from Spec IP to Spec CP exactly the analysis characterizing the target grammar German. Crucially, given the analysis in (50) (cf. VYS's [45a]), the strong and, for VYS, problematic correlation found between V-raising and something (not necessarily the subject) occurring in the associated Spec position would quite naturally reflect acquisition of the target grammar V2 analysis. VYS are aware not only of the problems entailed by their proposed Infl-initial IP analysis (45a) but also of the fact that it is completely eliminated under a V2 reanalysis such as (50), containing the functional projection CP. They write, "Since the functional projection IP in Turkish and Korean would have to be head-final . . . it is not obvious how the head-initial IP is acquired by these speakers. . . . However, in terms of word order, verb raising and filling the specifier position, the IP behaves similarly to the German CP" (p. 30). (Thus, VYS realize that the non-Ll, non-L2 Inflinitial IP analysis they attribute to their IP-stage subjects is indeed similar to the target German CP analysis.) Consequently, VYS entertain the possibility that these subjects have a CP analysis. However, they do not attribute such an analysis to them. 48 VYS's reasons for maintaining the (non-Ll, non-L2) head-initial I' (and the non-Ll, non-L2 CP-less) IP-stage analysis are twofold. First, (51) none of these speakers produce any yes/no questions or WH-questions involving a raised verb and an overt subject that cannot be construed as formulaic (p. 30) Concerning this aspect of the data, we would ask only: (1)
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Epstein et al.: Second language acquisition Do the data contain yes/no questions or u>/j-questions not involving V-raising or nonovert subjects and if so, what is the subjects' syntactic representation of these sentences? (2) What is the subjects' syntactic representation of the purportedly formulaic questions they do utter? Second, VYS do not attribute a CP-analysis to these subjects because: (52) None of the five speakers produce any instances of embedded clauses with an overt complementizer.25 (p. 30) VYS's footnote 25 then notes, (53) Although we cannot necessarily draw conclusions from the general absence of embedded clauses, the fact that none occur in these speakers' data is a good indication that such sentence types do not fall within their competence, (p. 30) First, as discussed in section 3.3.l.B, we disagree with VYS that failure to produce a particular sentence type is a good indication that the grammar is deficient. As noted, an infinite number of generable but unproduceable sentence types undoubtedly exist. None of us have produced or are likely ever to produce, for example, a quadruply centerembedded relative clause, yet we do not conclude that such structures lie beyond our competence. In fact, on the contrary, the grammar generates them, but performance factors "filter" them (i.e., they are not usable/parsable). Thus, a host of performance factors may well be responsible for production failures. Moreover, even if a deficiency in the grammar is responsible for this particular production failure, it is by no means clear that the deficiency resides in the syntactic component. Even more specifically, as we have argued above, it is not at all clear to us that failure to produce embeddings is indicative of the absence of "CP" in the categorial inventory of the syntax. With respect to VYS's hypothesis regarding the absence of CP, notice that the nature of the production failure it is supposed to explain is in fact unclear: (53) implies that "no embedded clauses" are produced, whereas (52) asserts that "no embedded clauses with an overt complementizer" are produced. We are not sure which most accurately characterizes the data. Although VYS supply only ten pieces of data from their IPstage speakers (see VYS; sect. 4.2), it is interesting to note that the following arguably represents a case of embedding (as noted above, VYS provide no cases of a word string with its associated phrase structure representation): (54) Jetzt brau Wohnungsamt fragen. (= VYS (24a)) now need housing-authority ask 'Now (I) need (to) ask the housing authority.' Perhaps, then, (52) more accurately characterizes the IPstage data. But if it is correct only that no embeddings with an overt complementizer were produced, we take this as weak support at best for the absence of CP, since it is altogether possible that this production failure (if in fact it is not attributable to performance factors) is due to a lexical gap (as expected in both LI and L2 acquisition) - in particular, the failure to acquire the lexical entry dafi, as we suggested in section 3.3.1.C In summary, we began by noting that the IP-stage grammar postulated by VYS generates a non-Ll, non-L2 headinitial I'. As VYS note, this Infl-initial misanalysis is similar to the target "V2 in CP" analysis of German. VYS are nonetheless unwilling to attribute a CP analysis to their subjects because of certain production failures that we believe to be unreliable indicators of the absence (of "CP") from the categorial inventory of the syntactic component of 700
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the grammar. We therefore disagree with VYS's strong conclusion that (under their assumptions) "there is thus no support for the existence of a CP at this stage" (p. 31). Our investigation thus lead us to conclude that, as for the VP-stage, the evidence for the IP-stage is insufficient. Before turning to the AgrP-stage, we would like to discuss one more point regarding the IP-stage. Notice that the question of whether VYS's (purported IP-stage) subjects have a "V2 in CP" target analysis, as we have tentatively suggested, is distinct from the question of whether they have CP. Of course, the attribution of our "V2 in CP" analysis to these subjects could turn out to be empirically incorrect, under more detailed investigation (as is true of any empirical hypothesis). Thus, it may be the case that they have CP, but (contra our suggestion) they do not have the target V2 analysis. Interestingly, the latter state of affairs represents a stage of LI development of V2 postulated by Deprez and Pierce (1993); that is, they argue that acquisition of V2 (but not CP) is delayed in LI acquisition. The important point, then, is this: Even if our suggested attribution of a V2 analysis to these subjects turns out to be factually incorrect, this does not necessarily indicate that L2 acquisition of V2 differs significantly from LI acquisition of V2, since LI acquisition of V2 is apparently "delayed." This point is general; that is, a nontarget L2 analysis does not necessarily indicate acquisition distinct from that involved in LI. Again, of course, these matters are entirely empirical.
3.3.6. The AgrP-stage.

A. A proliferation of postulated stages? In the third and final stage postulated by VYS, German sentences become analyzable as in (42c). The defining characteristic of this stage is that Infl, which was allegedly devoid of features in the previous (IP-stage), is now endowed with agreement features. The central diagnostic for the existence of this stage is the subjects' correct use of agreement suffixes.49 It is important to recall that this AgrP-stage grammar (like the IP-stage predecessor) is retentive. That is, VYS suggest (1991, p. 33) that the grammar does not generate just the AgrP misanalysis (43c), but rather generates this misanalysis plus both the IP-stage and VP-stage misanalyses as well. Hence, as noted, their model of the early stages characterizes early L2 acquisition as the internalization of a succession of three grammars such that: (55) a. Each grammar only overgenerates, and b. The set of structures overgenerated at each stage Sn properly includes the set of structures overgenerated at the previous stage Sn_i. As far as we can tell, (55a) is not open to interpretation; that is, VYS s model indeed entails that at the early stages not a single correct/target analysis is generable. However, there does exist a reinterpretation of VYS's results under which (55b) does not obtain. As we will show, this reinterpretation that we will present eliminates (55b), but it does so only at the cost of postulating that the AgrP-stage is no stage at all, but rather is decomposed into three (perhaps four) distinct stages. Given that stages are simply grammars, this proliferation of postulated grammars entails that in certain cases there is a 1-to-l correspondence between subjects and postulated grammar-types. This is of central importance in two respects. First, with respect to description, this maximally high correspondence between subjects and postulated grammars raises the question of whether these grammars describe linguistically significant stages of devel-

Epstein et al.: Second language acquisition opment. Second, with respect to explaining L2 acquisition, increasing the number of postulated grammars increases the number of intergrammar transitions, each of which must be accounted for if an explanation of the process of L2 acquisition is to be provided. Six subjects are assigned to the AgrP-stage: Mine, Gabho, Samran, Emine, Harva, and Ensook. Regarding the (retentive) generation of the IP-structure (42b) by the AgrP-stage subjects, VYS write, "Note that even for these speakers (except for Ensook), they have somewhat fewer empty Spec(AGRP) positions than they do empty subjects. This could be the result of some sentences having the structure of the previous stage, the IP-Stage" (p. 33). Suppose VYS's suggested explanation is correct; that is, suppose some sentences have IP-structure. It then follows that the grammar (of these AgrP-stage) speakers does indeed generate (the "retentive") IP-structure. But VYS's suggested explanation regarding the generation of IP-structure concerns only five of the six purported AgrP-stage speakers; recall, Ensook is excluded. This is important because it has the following consequence: If we accept VYS's suggested explanation, then five of the six subjects' grammars generate IPstructures, but (by hypothesis) Ensook's grammar does not. But now the generative capacity of Ensook's grammar apparently differs in a central respect from that of the other AgrP-stage subjects' grammars; specifically, her grammar does not generate the IP-structure but the other five subjects' grammars do. But now, since VYS assign all six of these subjects to the AgrP-stage, their account entails a contradiction: At the AgrP stage the IP-structure is no longer generated and it is still generated. Our seemingly natural way to avoid this contradictory result is to assume that Ensook has one particular type of grammar (= is at a given stage) whereas the other five have a different type of grammar. Thus, these six speakers in fact represent (at least) two different stages. Now, what about the generation of the VP-structure (42a) at the AgrP stage? VYS write, "We claim . . . that the six speakers at this stage have acquired a full-fledged AGRP. . . . However, except for Harva and Ensook, it appears that the bare VP-structure is still available to some degree to the speakers in this group" (p. 33). Thus, four of the six (AgrP-stage) subjects' grammars (still) generate the VP-structure (43a). But this entails that four of these subjects have a grammar different from that of the remaining two. Thus, putting together VYS's results concerning both "IP generation" and "VP generation" at the AgrP stage, the following picture emerges: (56) VYS's AgrP-stage subjects a. Mine, Gabho, Samran, Emine: Grammar type A generates AgrP-, IP-, and VP-structure b. Harva: Grammar type B generates AgrP-structure and IP-structure c. Ensook: Grammar type C generates only AgrP-structure Thus, under VYS's own assumptions, the "AgrP-stage" (one of the three stages they postulate) would seem to consist of three distinct types of grammars. This would give a total of five grammar types within VYS's account: the VP, the IP, and the three AgrP grammars. At this point it is important to note that in considering the AgrP-stage (VYS, sect. 4.3), VYS discuss three subjects who fall into none of their three stages. According to VYS, these speakers "have not acquired agreement . . . [but] their acquisition of agreement . . . may be somewhat further along than for the speakers at the IP-Stage" (pp. 34-35). Thus, these subjects are not assigned to the IP-stage by VYS. Moreover, they are not at/in the AgrP-stage; rather they "precede the AGRP stage." We conclude that, for these three unclassifiable subjects, VYS's analysis must recognize at least one other type of grammar (No. 3 in [57] below). Of course, under more detailed analysis, conducted in conformity with VYS's methodology, these subjects might not all fall within a single (non-VP, non-IP, non-AgrP) grammar type, but could necessitate the postulation of as many as three more grammar types, yielding a total of eight postulated grammar types. However, assuming these three subjects all fall within a single grammar type, there is a total of six postulated grammar types (for VYS's 17 subjects). Thus, the following taxonomy of stages emerges:
(57) Grammar Type 1. VP-stage 2. IP-stage 3.? Misanalyses Generated VP-structure VP- and IPstructure VP-, IP-, (and AgrP?)-structure Subjects Aysel, Memduh Changsu Sevinc, Kemal, Kadir, Ahmet Mehmet Park, Ozgul, Dosik Mine, Gabho, Samran, Emine Harva Ensook

4. AgrP-stage Type A Vp-, IP-, and AgrPstructure Type B Type C IP- and AgrPstructure AgrP-structure

Grammars 1 and 2 are equivalent to (46a) and (46b). Grammar 3 was just discussed. The decomposition of VYS's AgrP-stage into three distinct grammar types was given in (56). From (57), the following observations can be made: (58) a. As concerns the last nine (non-VP-, non-IP-stage) subjects (who represent more than 50% of VYS's subjects), subjects and grammars are in at best approximately a 2-to-l correspondence. b. The type B grammar/stage is postulated on the basis of a single subject's data. c. The type C grammar/stage is postulated on the basis of a single subject's data. d. (As in VYS's three-stage model itself) the classification of the grammar type internalized by Park, Ozgiil, and Dosik (approximately 17% of the subjects) is unclear (and these three subjects could represent as many as three additional grammar types).

Given our reinterpretation of VYS's data in (57), then, there simply is no single AgrP-stage as they postulate it. Furthermore, (55b) does not obtain; that is, although some stages do retain previous misanalyses, this is not true of all stages. But although our reinterpretation eliminates property (55b) (retention at all stages), (57) is, in our view, descriptively problematic; that is, since there is such a high correspondence between subjects and postulated grammar types, the question arises whether this taxonomy lists a class of linguistically significant stages of syntactic development. Moreover, in the absence of a principled, explanatory account of how/why it is that L2 acquirers make at least five interstage transitions, the process of L2 acquisition is not accounted for. In this regard, note that VYS's analysis may well embrace even more stages than those discussed here, with the result
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Epstein et al.: Second language acquisition that other interstage transitions would demand explanation as well. Specifically, it is not clear to us that the VP-stage is presumed to be the initial stage; in addition, VYS explicitly recognize the possibility that a head-final AgrP-stage (Schwartz & Sprouse 1991) is acquired subsequent to their head-initial AgrP stage. Consequently, depending on the ultimate interpretation of No. 3 in (57), the VYS model of L2 acquisition might in fact recognize 10 nontarget stages, and since nothing in principle limits the VYS model to a maximum of (these) 10 grammars, the possibility of postulating even more grammar types, on the basis of further experimental inquiry, is by no means precluded. It is even more important to recognize that so many grammars are postulated in a study concerning the acquisition of only three functional syntactic categories. This raises a crucial question confronting the entire stage-approach to L2 acquisition (of which VYS is but one example): How many more stages will be postulated by virtue of employing similar techniques in the experimental investigation of all other aspects of the syntactic component, including the principles of Case theory, Control theory, Theta theory, Binding theory, X' theory, Movement theory, and any other aspects of syntax? Of course, a comprehensive account of L2 grammar acquisition must also address the corresponding questions concerning nonsyntactic components of grammar: How many more stages will be postulated by investigating the acquisition of (each specific aspect of) phonology, morphology, semantics, and so on? The possibilities invited by the unconstrained stage-approach are prohibitive, given that a 17-subject study of the acquisition of only three syntactic categories can lead one to postulate as many as 10 distinct stage-grammars. Perhaps most important, though, is that even if (as seems highly unlikely) a definitive (i.e., empirically supported) answer was somehow reached - for example, "There are exactly (these) 67 stages in the acquisition of a second grammar" - an explanatory account of the phenomenon of L2 acquisition (a developmental process) would, in our view, still be lacking, since no explanation of the mechanism(s) accounting for the 67 interstage transitions, the fact that there are 67 (not, e.g., 104) and the relative ordering of the 67 would be provided. B. On the generative capacity of the AgrP-Stage grammar: Before concluding this section, we should note that VYS's characterization of the generative capacity (and categorial inventory) of the AgrP-stage grammar is, in an important respect, unclear. As its name suggests, the defining characteristics of the AgrP-stage are the acquisition of an Agr(eement) Phrase and the resulting generation of structures like (42c), structures lacking Comp and its X' projections Comp' and Comp Phrase (= CP). However, as VYS note, "For all six speakers at this stage, we find some evidence for a CP projection" (p. 33). 50 Thus, under VYS s own assumptions, "it is possible that in addition to the AgrP, these speakers have acquired the CP projection" (p. 34). As in the case of the VP- and IP-stages, the clear possibility (for which there is indeed "some evidence") is that the subjects' competence - in particular the cardinality of the set of syntactic categories - is being underestimated. 4. Alternative explanations We have discussed some of the theoretical and methodological problems associated with partial-access hypotheses, as exemplified by VYS's Weak Continuity Hypothesis. Now let us consider how the Full-Access Hypothesis (or, as it might be called, the Strong Continuity Hypothesis) might account for some of the data provided by VYS's subjects, under the assumption that some of the data turns out to reflect properties of the L2 grammar. Recall that the full-access hypothesis postulates that the L2 learners inventory of functional categories (given by UG) is complete, and hypothesizes that some of the errors observed are due to performance factors or nonsyntactic deficits, including lexical and morphophonetic deficits. Several of these factors may well be related to the experimental tasks used; others are independent of them and reflect difficulties with applying a computation to a structure, as we will suggest in the discussion of our experimental study. Some errors appear to reflect the (mis)use of morphology; other errors result from parameter setting and "establishing new parameter settings" and the ensuing necessary mapping of the principles and parameters of UG onto the language specific aspects of a particular grammar. As a more specific example of how a full-access hypothesis might reinterpret some of the data isolated by VYS, let us consider the IP-stage. Recall that in the L2 learners IP-stage grammar of German, VYS argue that V-to-Infl raising is optional - see (43b) - since (in contrast to the next, AgrP-stage) there are no agreement features in Infl. However, they also assume that if the V does not raise, the sentence has the structure of a bare VP. Therefore, this analysis entails that if an Infl node is generated, the V obligatorily moves into it - in other words, V-to-Infl raising is in fact obligatory when an IP is generated. Why would this be so? The full-access hypothesis provides a natural explanation. Suppose first (contra VYS) that agreement features occupy Infl. Second, assume (as discussed in sect. 3.3.l.C) that, as specified by UG, verbal (affixal) features, such as agreement features, must be "associated with a verb" in S-structure representations. That is, suppose that these L2ers (albeit unconsciously) know (just as an Ller unconsciously knows) that affixes must be affixed before a string can receive a legitimate pronunciation - in other words, that their grammar incorporates the universal and arguably natural morphological principle prohibiting "stranded" affixes at S-structure (as in, e.g., *Bill -s love Mary) (Lasnik 1981). Finally, suppose they also know that the way to associate the verbal, affixal agreement features in Infl with the verb is to raise the verb from V to Infl. If this explanation is correct, then there is no IP-stage. Recall that at the IP-stage (as opposed to the subsequent AgrP-stage) VYS propose that Infl lacks agreement features, yet our explanation crucially assumes that at this stage the grammar does indeed generate derivations in which agreement features are present in Infl. It is important to recognize that if our explanation is rejected and it is assumed instead (with VYS) that V raises to an Infl that is devoid of agreement features, then this analysis too would appear to entail discontinuity. Chomsky (1993) suggests that UG incorporates a constraint on the application of any movement transformation such that the movement applies only in order to satisfy morphological requirements that could not be otherwise satisfied.51 For example, UG specifies that NP-movement is allowed only if the movement supplies a (morphologically illicit) Caseless NP with Case. As an illustration, consider the movement of the NP John in:

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Epstein et al.: Second language acquisition (59) a. Johiij seems [ to be here] (cf. *It seems [John to be here]) b. *]ohnj seems [ is here] (cf. It seems [that John is here]) The NP-movement in (59a) is permissible; a (morphologically illicit) Caseless NV,John, is moved to a Case-marked position. By contrast, the NP-movement in (59b) is disallowed. Having been in a Case-marked position prior to movement, the NP John already had Case. Thus, movement of this NP is not movement whereby a (morphologically illicit) Caseless NP acquires Case - it is unnecessary, hence prohibited. Since V-raising is just another instantiation of movement, it too is allowed to apply only if its application results in the satisfaction of some morphological requirement, such as the attachment of a morphologically illicit stranded agreement affix in Infl. That is, movement of a V to an Infl devoid of features (as in VYS's analysis) is prohibited by UG since there is no morphological motivation for such movement; it does not render a morphologically illicit category (a stranded affix) morphologically legitimate. Our "agreement in Infl" reanalysis is UG-constrained and moreover can explain the obligatoriness of V-raising to Infl. By contrast, VYS's "V-raising to an empty Infl" hypothesis is UG-inconsistent and therefore raises the question implicitly raised by all Weak Continuity Hypotheses: "If L2 grammars have the UG-prohibited property P (in this particular case, morphologically unmotivated application of movement), then which of the infinite set of UG prohibited properties do these L2ers' grammars have and which of the infinite set of UG-prohibited properties can any L2 grammar have?" All too often, this central question is not posed and therefore remains unaddressed in L2 acquisition research, with the result that a theory of L2 acquisition, specifying "possible L2 grammar," is lacking. We summarize our principal points from this subsection as follows: (60) a. Contra (43), VYS's analysis in fact entails that within the IP-stage grammar whenever an Infl is generated, V-raising to Infl is obligatory. b. Within the analysis offered by VYS, there is no explanation for the obligatoriness of V-raising, since Infl is altogether empty. Furthermore, the existence of such movement violates an arguably universal and independently motivated constraint on movement. c. We have suggested that the central property of the IPstage grammar (the existence of V-raising to Infl) can be explained by assuming that the L2er's grammar is capable of generating an agreement affix in the functional category Infl/Agr, which, by virtue of universal principles, can and must be associated with a verb in S-structure representation. d. If our suggested explanation is correct, there is no evidence for the IP-stage grammar (= a grammar incapable of generating agreement features in Infl/Agr). e. The data presented by the Weak Continuity Hypothesis to support the "absence of agreement" at the IP-stage in fact concern "use of correct morphological agreement" (see sect. 3.3.1.C) not the syntax of inflectional morphologyOther alternative explanations of VYS's data have been discussed above. To take one more example, recall our hypothesis that VYS's purported IP-stage subjects have grammars generating CP (not IP) analyses such as (50) involving both V-to-Infl-to-Comp movement and subject movement to Spec CP, reflecting: (1) acquisition of V2, (2) a head-final Infl (as in. both the LI and the L2), and (3) generability of the functional category Comp and its associated X' projections. As noted, our suggested "V2 in CP" (target) analysis both avoids the (unexplained) non-Ll, non-L2 lnf[-initial IP analysis proposed by VYS and explains why it is that "in terms of word order, verb raising, and filling the specifier position, the [VYS] IP behaves similarly to the German CP" (VYS, p. 30). 5. The full-access hypothesis: Results of an L2 acquisition study
5.1. The study

To further support our hypothesis that from early stages of acquisition the grammars of L2 learners incorporate functional as well as lexical categories, we will present data from an experiment of our own that strongly suggests this to be the case.52 These data derive from an experimental study investigating the acquisition of functional categories by both child and adult speakers of Japanese learning English as a second language (ESL). We tested 33 Japanese-speaking children and 18 Japanese-speaking adults learning ESL. The Japanese children, aged 6;00-10;00, are from a Saturday Japanese school located in Medford, Massachusetts, sponsored by the Japanese government. The adult speakers, aged 22 to 36, are graduate students at MIT who were enrolled in a low intermediate ESL class. The average length of residence in an English-speaking country was 3;0 years for the children and l;0 year for the adults. The children had an average of 3;0 years of formal English instruction and the adults an average of 7;0 years. 53 5.1.1. Hypotheses tested. To begin, it should be noted that whether functional categories are present or absent in Japanese, our subjects' LI, is arguably unclear. For example, Fukui (1988) writes, [S]o far, to the best of my knowledge, no strong argument has been given for the postulation of Inflection) as a syntactic entity in Japanese. The same remark appears to apply to the other two functional categories (COMP[lementizer] and DETferminer]) as well. (p. 259) Thus, Fukui tentatively suggests that Japanese may lack the class of functional categories. However, he continues, [Tjhere is an alternative, equally plausible hypothesis. . . .That is, instead of claiming that Japanese lacks the functional categories, one might hypothesize that the language does have the functional categories neither one of which has agreementinducing features. . . . At this point, it is extremely difficult to come up with the decisive evidence between these two hypotheses; furthermore, it is even not clear whether they make different empirical predictions concerning the parametric syntax of English and Japanese, (p. 260) Miyagawa by contrast provides for recent arguments that there are indeed functional categories in Japanese (see Miyagawa 1993 and the references cited there). Notice that if Japanese does lack functional categories, then one could reconstrue VYS's VP-stage (lacking functional categories) as a UG-consistent initial hypothesis in L2 acquisition, equivalent (in the relevant respect) to the grammar of Japanese. On the other hand, if all naturallanguage grammars, including Japanese, incoqjorate funcBEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1996) 19:4

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Epstein et al.: Second language acquisition tional categories into the categorial inventory of the syntactic component, then the categorial inventory of the VPstage grammar is not that of a natural-language grammar. Regardless, one clear empirical prediction that follows from VYS's proposal is that there should be no evidence of functional categories at early stages of acquisition in the grammars of the Japanese subjects we tested. Moreover, if Japanese lacks functional categories and our subjects show evidence of functional categories, we would then have evidence against explanations of L2 acquisition based solely on transfer of grammatical knowledge from the LI to the L2. We focused on a comparison between adults and children in order to isolate as precisely as we could any similarities and differences between these two L2 learner groups, in light of current hypotheses with respect to a critical period in language acquisition (see Johnson & Newport 1991 and sect. 2.1 above). Thus, a possible hypothesis would be that the L2 grammars of children and adults differ in that one but not the other evidences functional categories. Alternatively if child and adult grammars are similarly constrained (contra the Critical Period Hypothesis), then we would expect similarities in the learners' grammars with respect to functional categories. 5.1.2. Stimulus sentences. The Japanese speakers in this study were tested on a wide range of complex syntactic factors. We focused on those structures involving functional categories, specifically, IP and CP. Examples of the stimulus sentences are shown in (61). Sentences (61a-f), exemplifying Present and Past tense, modals, the progressive, and negation were designed to evaluate the learner's knowledge of IP. Sentences (61g-k), exemplifying topicalization, relative clauses, and tuft-questions, were designed to evaluate the learner's knowledge of CP. (61) Examples of Stimulus Sentences
Inflection Phrase a. Present tense The nervous professor inspects the broken television. b. Past tense The nervous doctor wanted a new lawyer in the office. c. Modal The little girl can see a tiny flower in the picture. d. Progressive The clever student is inspecting the expensive basket. e. Negation-rfo-support The happy janitor does not want the new television. f. Negation-Progressive The elderly grandfather is not picking the blue flower. Complementizer Phrase g. Topicalization54 (one clause) Breakfast, the wealthy businessman prepares in the kitchen, h. Topicalization (two clause) i. Subjectgap: Thepencil, the talented architect says is expensive. ii. Object gap: The photograph, the happy architect says he understands i. Relative clauses The lawyer slices the vegetables which thefather eats. j . W/i-questions i. Subject question: Which young girl erases the tiny picture in the notebook? ii. Object question: Which secret message does the young girl find in the basket?

5.1.3. Experimental task. Ideally, of course, converging evidence should be collected from a number of different types of tasks. The first one that we asked subjects to complete was an elicited imitation task. This was chosen as the initial diagnostic for two related reasons: (1) elicited imitation is controlled in very specific ways and this task therefore yielded data that could serve as a basis for future comparisons, and (2) the task enabled us to elicit data comparable to the production data elicited in previous studies of functional categories. One difference between our methodology and that of, say, VYS's study is that we were able to control the syntactic factors that we wanted to isolate and, as a result, could more directly test L2 learners' syntactic competence. Use of the elicited imitation task assumes that if a learner's grammar is not capable of generating a given syntactic structure - for example, one containing functional categories the learner will have particular difficulty in repeating a sentence (word-string) associated with the structure, under the assumption that the task is reconstructive (see Epstein et al. 1993a; 1993b; 1993c; 1994). Subjects were given two tokens of each land of sentence exemplified in (61). All sentences were equalized in syllable length (16) and approximately in number of words (9-11). 5.1.4. Lexical knowledge. Prior to testing, all subjects were given bilingual lists of the lexical items used in the stimulus sentences; that is, the English words were written in the Roman alphabet and in Japanese characters. Subjects were asked to study the words before they participated in the testing session. Immediately before testing, the list was read aloud in English to the subject. Subjects were asked to indicate if they understood each word by either providing a synonym or giving us the Japanese analogue;55 if they did not, they were given an opportunity to review the item again. In addition, the experimenter asked each subject to provide an English synonym for a number of selected words on the list. All of these controls helped to increase the probability that any difficulty that a subject might experience in producing a given stimulus sentence would be due to the structure of the sentence and not to the subject's failure to understand the meaning of a particular word. All subjects were also pretrained on all the experimental tasks. Testing did not begin until a subject had satisfied all these prerequisites. 5.2. Results Overall, as shown in the table in (62), the percentage correct for the sentence structures in (61) was 59% for children and 60% for adults. 56 The subjects thus showed a general ability to produce sentences containing XPs in Spec CP position and sentences containing X (= non-phrasal syntactic categories, i.e., words/lexical elements as explicated in the Appendix) in I(nfl) position. This result suggests that the grammars of both Japanese-speaking adults and Japanese-speaking children contained the functional categories we investigated, at early stages of L2 acquisition. (62) Structure % Correct
Present tense Past tense Modal Child 77 66 Adult 78 64

66

58

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Epstein et al.: Second language acquisition

Structure Progressive Negation (/o-support Progressive Topicalization 1 clause, obj gap 2 clause, obj gap 2 clause, subj gap Relative clauses
VV/j -questions

> Correct Child 61 Adult 72

76 69 53 40 34 56 58 48 59

64 72 69 44 42 65 42 50 60

Obj gap Subj gap Overall

Results of a multifactored Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) indicate no significant differences in results between the child and adult L2 learners. This suggests that child and adult grammars are similarly constrained in this regard. Additional support for this can be found in Figure 8; as shown by the nearly parallel lines, adults and children treated the individual sentence structures comparably. Another important similarity in overall patterns of acquisition emerges when we compare IP-structures with CPstructures across the two groups: Figure 9 shows that sentences involving I(nfl) (sentences [61a-f]) had a lower error rate than sentences involving movement to Spec CP (sentences [61g-k]). 57 Another way that we can state this is

that movement to Spec CP involves long-distance maximal movement, whereas movement to I(nfl) involves only short-distance head movement. The results indicate that the former is more difficult than the latter (adult IP total: 68%, child IP total: 69%; adult CP total: 45%, child CP total: 50%). In addition, we propose that the higher error rates on complex as opposed to simple topicalization is a function of the number of clause boundaries crossed in the movement of the topicalized element to Spec CP. These two results suggest that the errors do not derive from a total absence of functional categories in the grammar but may instead be a function of the type of derivation and the number of boundaries crossed. This same hypothesis emerges from the results of the error analyses, which indicate that no greater than 15% of the errors for any one sentence type involved an error on the functional category in question. In particular, 100% of the functional category errors made on sentences involving topicalization constituted a conversion of this structure to its corresponding declarative sentence. We would interpret these "errors" as suggesting comprehension of the input, which in turn indicates correct syntactic analysis, which then indicates knowledge of functional categories. Taken together with the results for percentage correct, these findings suggest that the problems the L2 learners exhibit in their utterances of these structures involve not a grammatical deficit but some form of production deficit (the precise form of which requires further experimental investigation to corroborate). Results also suggest that the learners can correctly analyze the input in terms of functional categories, again supporting the conclusion that their early grammars do contain functional categories.

eu-

70-

\
^ oa

/V
y \ \

Children Adults

o O 50-

60-

40

A r
c a> w a>
C O

30
C O

a.

c o o

O)

o
CD

o
C D

CM
Q.

CL

,o

,o

- rr

a o

i i

Stniance Types
Figure 8. Results for amount correct for Japanese ESL learners' elicited imitation of sentences with various types of functional categories. E l children; adults.

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Epstein et al.: Second language acquisition 80

Children Age Groups

Adults

Figure 9. Results for amount correct for Japanese children and adults learning ESL: Results for the elicited imitation of IP functional categories compared to CP functional categories. H IP; CP.

To reiterate, the results from this study are, in our view, of interest because they suggest that child and adult L2 acquisition is similarly constrained at least with respect to the properties examined here. This is not a necessary result in that the child L2ers were 10;00 years old or younger and the adults were well beyond even the most liberal definition of adolescence. When the two groups are equalized on ESL proficiency level, the results also suggest, against what is commonly believed, that the children did not find the task easier than the adults did. These results are interesting at another level also. If Japanese does not have functional categories, then the results suggest that the L2 learner does not attempt at early stages of acquisition to impose an LI grammatical analysis (perhaps lacking functional categories) upon the L2 PLD as is argued in many accounts of the L2 acquisition process (see e.g., White 1990). On the other hand, even if Japanese does have functional categories, it does not instantiate syntactic u;/i-movement, that is, overt whmovement to Spec CP. The results reported here indicate that although the Japanese subjects have more difficulty with the CP-structures than with the IP-structures, they do generate these structures, contra the predictions made by a model restricting L2 acquisition to "transfer from the LI" alone. Finally, we argue that the difficulty with the CPstructures does not derive from the absence of CP in the inventory of syntactic categories, but can be characterized in at least two ways: (1) as discussed above, these structures involve long-distance maximal movement, which seems to be more difficult for the learners than the short-distance X-movement involved in IP-structures and (2) since Japanese does not instantiate syntactic u>/i-movement, the Japanese speakers arguably need to assign another value to the parameter governing u>/i-movement for English. Results of

other studies (e.g., Flynn 1987; Martohardjono 1993) indicate that assignment of a new parameter value can appear to "take time" in the course of acquistion, for example, if new parameter setting involves determining the features of certain lexical entries. Althought our account is by no means conclusive, and of course much more research is essential, it is nonetheless consistent with the data collected thus far. To summarize these results, we argue that the errors observed when investigating functional categories do not reflect a knowledge deficit, specifically, the absence of the syntactic categories themselves. Instead, we have suggested that they may well derive from a production problem that is independent of the absence or presence of the functional category in the grammar. This performance difficulty may inhibit the expression of a particular functional category in a given utterance. Our results suggest that this difficulty may vary according to the type of structure involved. For example, the study indicated that error rate increases with increased number of boundaries crossed by a given movement. Moreover, when it appears that there is a grammatical deficit - for example in the acquisition of structures involving CP - this again is arguably not to be explained in terms of the absence of CP, but might be best understood in terms of the need to assign new parameter settings, in this case [overt + whmovement] for English. It is important to note that there is empirical support for this performance-based account (as opposed to a knowledge-deficit account) in that no subject in our study or in VYS's omitted all phonetic reflexes of all functional categories. Of course, if errors are indeed due to a performance factor, this is an empirical issue and the nature of the performance factor (or factors) purportedly responsible for the errors must be determined by rigorous experimentation.

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Epstein et al.: Second language acquisition 6. Conclusions and discussion This target article began by outlining three general approaches to L2 acquisition: the no-access, partial-access, and full-access hypotheses. We considered the conceptual and empirical support for each of these and argued that only the full-access hypothesis exhibits the explanatory power needed to account for L2 learners' knowledge of language. The mechanism offered by the other two hypotheses, such as analogy or Slobin's Operating Principles, fail to explain, describe, or even address the knowledge L2 learners possess. A major problem in the formulation of the no-access and partial-access proposals is that they fail to distinguish the explicit specification of the learners substantive knowledge of language (the grammar) from the process by which such knowledge is presumed to be attained ("via" some "learning process"). These learning processes (whatever else they might be) are construed by proponents of these hypotheses as "tools" with which L2 learners are argued to construct grammars (e.g., "by analogy"); critically, they say nothing about the formal properties of the end-state grammar represented in the learner's mind/brain, the specification of which is undeniably a central goal of an explanatory theory of L2 acquisition. In a more specific discussion of a particular version of the partial-access hypothesis, we considered the Weak Continuity Hypothesis. We considered several methodological and theoretical issues that arose in this context and demonstrated the weaknesses that we believe to be inherent in existing models that fail to postulate UG-constrained L2 acquisition. We next offered alternative explanations of certain data without invoking the arguably nonexplanatory stage-grammar approach central to the Weak Continuity Hypothesis. Finally, we presented experimental results of our own that indicate that the functional categories are apparently available to the L2 learner from early stages of acquisition. Our results are also consistent with a theory claiming that: (1) UG principles and parameters are available to the L2 learner and (2) L2 "language development" is restricted to language-particular lexical, morphological, and phonological acquisition, parameter setting, and the integration of acquired linguistic knowledge with what are, strictly-speaking, grammar-external systems. To conclude, we intend this paper to serve both as an overview of the existing principal approaches to L2 acquisition and as a detailed critique of representative versions of both the no-access hypothesis (Bley-Vroman 1989) and the partial-access hypothesis (VYS 1991). We hope that the issues and many as yet unresolved (but hopefully explicit) questions we have raised will contribute to continued productive development and exchange within the important and interdisciplinary field of L2 acquisition.
(noise) around them in terms of these categories (see in particular Chomsky 1965, sect. 1.5). To illustrate, any normal adult native speaker of English knows, perhaps unconsciously, that there is a discrete subject noun (or noun phrase) bearing person and number features, and that it agrees in person and number with another discrete entity, the verb (in the present tense), as shown for example by (63). (63) Subject He 3s Verb put Agreement s them on the tall table 3s

To know English includes knowing this - namely, that he thirdperson singular (3s), that the third-person singular verbal agreement suffix is -s, not for example -n (= morphological (suffixal) knowledge), and that it appears suffixed (not prefixed or infixed) to the verb, a type of syntactic category and is not for example suffixed to a preposition, a different type of syntactic category, as in (64). (64) "He put them [Pre 3 on] s the tall table 3s 3s

Moreover, to know English is to know that agreement suffixes do not appear suffixed to nouns, or to adjectives, as in (65) and (66). (65) "He put [Noun them] s on the tall table 3s 3s

(66)

"He put them on the [Ad. tall] s table 3s 3s

APPENDIX: SYNTACTIC CATEGORIES AND X' THEORY In this appendix, we will present an introductory informal overview of those aspects of syntactic theory directly relevant to the present study, in particular, X' theory. To begin with, we assume that Universal Grammar provides an innately specified set of abstract syntactic categories, including Noun, Verb, Adjective, and Preposition. This hypothesis asserts that these categories constitute part of the analytical apparatus (knowledge) humans need not learn or be taught, but rather bring to bear in acquiring their language by analyzing the continuous linguistic acoustic speech stream

Thus, this constitutes but one of many forms of evidence that to know English is to have knowledge of a set of distinct syntactic categories distinguished by, for example, the fact that some (verbs) are known to bear agreement suffixes whereas others (nouns, prepositions, adjectives, etc.) are known not to. (For further introductory discussion of the evidence for knowledge of syntactic categories, see Radford 1981, Chs. 2-3; 1988, Chs. 2-6.) Such knowledge of syntactic categories appears to be universal; that is, all (normal) humans acquire such knowledge of their native language. It arises with little or no direct instruction, and independently of whether a speaker has knowledge of a written language. Moreover, the knowledge is highly abstract, that is, in a sense dissociated from the surrounding physical (acoustic) disturbances. To know English entails knowing subject-verb agreement, where, crucially, the abstract syntactic notions involved ("subject," "verb," and "agreement") have absolutely no acoustic properties/import. That is, someone who knows English knows the rule of subject-verb agreement, a rule having nothing to do with how loud, soft, deep, or high one's voice happens to be. Remarkably, it seems to be the case that such knowledge of phenomena like the above-mentioned complexities of subject-verb agreement emerges, under naturalistic conditions, only in humans, indeed indicating that some property of the human mind/brain differentiates us from other organisms/objects linguistically. All these different types of knowledge - that is, knowledge of a human language - appear to be attainable under these conditions only by humans. In addition to the aforementioned innately specified class of syntactic categories (Noun, Verb, Adjective, Preposition), the existence of a phrasal syntactic category corresponding to each is postulated: Noun Phrase (NP), Verb Phrase (VP), Adjective Phrase (AP), and Prepositional Phrase (PP). Thus, there are two types of syntactic categories: heads and their corresponding phrases or "phrasal projections of the head": (67) a. Heads: N, V, A, P, . . . b. Phrases: NP, VP, AP, PP, . . .

To illustrate, the noun cat, a head, when concatenated with a preceding Det(erminer), such as the, yields an NP - the cat. This NP and its constituents Det and N, can be syntactically represented in either of the following two (notationally equivalent) ways:

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(68) a. [NF[D,,, the] [N cat]] (= labeled bracketing) bDet the NP N cat (= tree structure) tional heads are often phonologically and/or morphologically dependent; for example, as noted in the text, the agreement suffix must be attached to a verb in S-structure representation (but not at D-Structure). Moreover, functional categories are often stressless, often clitics or affixes, and sometimes phonologically null, that is, unpronounced (e.g., plural agreement as in They like Bill). Fourth, functional heads typically select only one type of syntactic category (or a restricted class) as complement (e.g., complementizers, such as that, require a sentential complement, as in / think fCoinp that] [St.nll.1KC John left]]). As was discussed in the text, VYS's fundamental claim is that the functional syntactic categories (including complementizers and agreement) are initially absent in the L2 acquisition of German; that is, L2leamers initially have no knowledge of such syntactic categories, which emerge (or "grow") one by one in discrete temporally ordered developmental stages of syntactic acquisition/maturation. The evidence VYS present in support of their hypothesis is that complementizers and agreement (morphology) are (largely) absent in the naturalistic speech elicited from their subjects. In connection with the material discussed in the text, there is one more refinement that must be added to the syntactic analysis presented thus far. To this point, we have assumed that syntactic categories in natural language universally consist of only two types, heads and phrases, thereby postulating a "two-tiered" analysis in which, for example, there exist only two types of nominal expressions, N and NP, as in (74). (74) NP Det - phrasal level N cat <- head level

Not dissimilarly, concatenating a V (e.g., likes) with a following NP (e.g., the cat) forms a VP. (69) a. [VP[V likes] [ NP [Det the] [N cat]]]

b.

NP

Finally, concatenating a VP with a preceding NP yields the syntactic category S(entence). (70) a. [ s [ NP [D(.t the] [N dog]] [VP[V likes] [N1, [IX., the] IN cat]]]]

bNP Det the N dog

S VP V likes Det the NP N cat

the

Consistent with X' (read "X-bar") theory, we hypothesize that: (71) For every type of head (e.g., N), there exists a corresponding phrasal projection (e.g., NP) (as in [67]).

Standard X' theory (assumed in VYS) postulates a third type (or tier) of syntactic category, namely, the single-bar (equivalently, the X' or X-bar) projection, which is neither a head nor a phrase, but is rather an intermediate category appearing "between" the head and the phrase. To illustrate this three-tiered analysis (and some now standard evidence for it), first consider the two-tiered analysis of an NP such as (75):59

Central to the discussion of L2 acquisition in the text is the hypothesis that there exist two different types of heads: (72) a. Lexical heads: e.g., N, V, A, P, . . . b. Functional heads: e.g., Comp(lementizer), Infl(ection), Agreement), . . .

(75)

a. b.

this student of linguistics NP Det 1

1

1 1

PP (= Prepositional Phrase) P of
1 1

An example of the functional head Comp(lementizer) is the "sentenceintroducer" that in English or dafi in German. (73) a. I think [Co, that] [ s(entence) [ NP the cat] [Ve2rb left]] b[comp dafi]

this

student

NP linguistics

An example of the functional head Agr is the third-person singular agreement suffix s in English. As discussed in the text, one (unified) syntactic analysis of verbal agreement, Chomsky (1965), presumes that the agreement suffix appears as a distinct head separate from the main verb in abstract (unpronounced) D-structure representations such as (34a), repeated here (with further details):58 (34)
He DS [sentence W S u bu. ^Agreement j ^ Jl U 3s INP the boy]]]

p v,like]

3s

The functional heads differ from the lexical categories in the following ways. First, functional categories seem not to be involved in assigning or receiving thematic (semantic) roles. Thus, for example, the lexical category V (e.g., kick) assigns the Patient ("kickee") thematic role only to its direct object NP. For example, in Fred will kick the cat, the NP the cat and only the cat is interpretable as referring to the entity that will (potentially) undergo kicking. By contrast, complementizers and agreement suffixes neither assign nor receive thematic roles (also called "6-roles"). Second, unlike lexical heads, functional heads constitute a closed class.New nouns and verbs are readily coined - for example, e-mail as in 7 received the e-mail (= noun) or Fred e-mails Bill (= verb). By contrast, new functional categories (e.g., new complementizers or agreement suffixes) are not "coinable" (= a new adjective). Third, func-

This analysis, recognizing only heads and phrases, postulates six syntactic categories: the entire NP (this student of linguistics), which in turn consists of the three linearly ordered categories, Det (this), N (student), and PP (of linguistics), where the PP is itself analyzed as consisting of 2 linearly ordered categories, a P (of) and an NP (linguistics). This twotiered, six-category analysis hypothesizes that, for example, this of (i.e., Det and P) does not constitute a syntactic category, whereas of linguistics (P and NP) does constitute a syntactic category, namely, a PP. Now notice this crucial point, that just as this of is not analyzed as constituting a syntactic category, so student of linguistics similarly fails to constitute a syntactic category. Under this trinary-branching analysis of the NP, which hypothesizes that the NP consists of three categories (Det, N, and PP), N and PP together do not form a syntactic category. However, there is some evidence that N and PP together in fact do form a syntactic category. Consider (76). (76) I like [D(,t this] [N student] [PP of linguistics] more than I like that one

Here, as the italics indicate, the pronominal form ("proform") one has substituted for student of linguistics (as indicated by the interpretation). Now, if as seems a reasonable hypothesis, such proform-substitution

applies only to syntactic categories (i.e., we do not seem or expect to find preforms that substitute for noncategories such as this of), then student of linguistics (i.e., N and PP) must together form a syntactic

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category, contra the analysis in (75b), in which N and PP together do not constitute a syntactic category. The hypothesized syntactic category consisting of the N student and the PP of linguistics is assumed to be a nominal (= "noun-like") category. However, this nominal category is clearly not a noun (i.e., it is not correctly analyzed as a single word, on a par with student), nor is it correctly unnlyzable as a noun phrase. Unlike a noun phrase, it does not function as subject or object of a sentence. (77) a. *Student of linguistics likes Bill, b. *Bill likes student of linguistics. transitive verb (e.g., kick) - contain a complement NP, whereas other VPs - namely, those headed by an intransitive V (e.g., sleep) - appear to have no complement.

(82)

The boy

a.

VP

b. VP
1 1

1 V ^ \

V NP
Bill V
1

Rather, student of linguistics is a type of nominal category "bigger" than a noun, yet "smaller" than a noun phrase, the latter property indicated by the fact that adding a preceding determiner produces a noun phrase, which can indeed function as a subject or an object NP. (78) a. This student of linguistics likes Bill, b. Bill likes this student of linguistics.

kicked

sleep

In order to represent the hypothesis that student of linguistics is (79) a. b. c. d. a syntactic category (capable of undergoing one-substitution) nominal "bigger" than a noun "smaller" than a noun phrase

If, as seems to be the case, VP lacks a Specifier (an empirical and debated issue), then Specifier too must not be obligatory. If we adopt the X' schema (81) in which each head projects up to both a single-bar and a phrasal projection, then an interesting problem emerges concerning the functional heads Agr and Comp. Concerning the former, recall the motivated and unified syntactic analysis of verbal agreement in which the agreement suffix invariably appears at D-structure as a head separate from the main verb, as for example in (83).

(83) the following t/iree-tiered, seven -category analysis is presumed, in which the N student and the PP of linguistics together constitute a (nominal) syntactic category, namely, N' (read "noun-bar") appearing "between" the phrasal category NP and the head N: (80) Det this NP = phrasal projection N' = single-bar projection N = head PP NP 1 N' N
i 1

.-

Agr 1 (3s)

VP

1 V V
1

1
he (3s)

1
sleep

student

NP

I
of

I
linguistics

This analysis supplants (75b). Thus, X' Theory proposes a three-tiered analysis in which the head (here, N = student), together with its complement (here, PP), form a single-bar projection (N'). The single-bar projection (N') together with its sjjecifier (here, Det) forms the phrasal or maximal projection (here, NP). In other words, there exist three types/levels of nominal categories: N, N' (= Noun + Complement), and NP (also called N lnax , where max = maximal), consisting of a single-bar projection and a Specifier. This overall theory of syntactic categories is called X' theory with the variable "X," because the (strong, unified) hypothesis embodied by this theory is that all heads, not just N, project to a single-bar category and then to a phrasal projection. Thus, we have the core X' schema,60 a highly unified hypothesis concerning the structure of all phrases in all human languages:

The problem with this analysis is clear. It is X'-inconsistent in that Agr is a head, but fails to project up; there is no Agr' or AgrP. The question is. Can we maintain a unified, analysis in which all heads conform to the single (simple) X' schema (81) or must we stipulate that a functional head (or perhaps Agr alone) is different (i.e., induce X'-inconsistent structures)? A second problem is evident as well. The phrasal category S is a phrase, yet it (unlike the NP and VP) is not projected up from any head. Moreover, at the conceptual level, tree (85) exhibits the type of structure - trinary branching - that appeared problematic for NP, as discussed above. A third issue, relevant to the X'-inconsistent analysis of S in (83), is the "tight" syntactic relation between Agr and VP. Recall that unlike a lexical head, a functional head seems to select one (or a restricted class) of complement type(s). For example, Agr seems to have an obligatory VP complement, but notice that the class of categories that can appear as a complement of V is varied, arguably including every phrasal type thus far discussed:

(84) a. b. c. d. e. f.

Verb

Complement 0 NP PP S AP VP Bill)

(81)

XP = "phrasal" or "maximal" or "double-bar" projection X' = "single-bar projection" X = "head" or X (YP) = "Complement"

"Specifier" = (ZP)

sleep kids. [NP the dog] converse [PP with Bill] consider [Bill (to be) silly] become [AP fond of Mary] be. [VP kicking Bill] (as in John will not he kicking

Notice that although X, X', and XP are not parenthesized, Specifier and Complement are. The parentheses indicate "optionally present." Although it is hypothesized that each head obligatorily projects up to a single-bar and to a phrasal category, the Specifier and Complement are each optional. For example, certain VPs - namely those headed by a

If Agr requires a VP complement, then there is, roughly speaking, a "very close syntactic relationship" between these two categories. This close relationship, the failure of the head Agr to project in (83), the failure of S to be a projection of a head in (83), and the (potentially problematic) trinary-branching analysis in (83), can all be accommodated by reanalyzing (83) as follows:61

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(85) AgrP = phrasal Agr' = single-bar N' Agr VP (89) NP N' Agr AgrP Agr' VP

I
N

I
(3s)

V
I
V

|
(3s)
<

1 ^
^ think ^ ^

I
He (3s)

she (3s)

I
sleep

C --^ NP Agr'

C
If this is the correct analysis (and, of course, we desire independent empirical support for it), we now have cross-categorial X' consistency. All categories conform to the X' schema. In (85) VP is the complement to the head Agr; that is, these two categories are in a "close" relationship in that they and they alone constitute the syntactic category, Agr', the single-bar projection of the head Agr. Agr' plus the NP specifier (He) of AgrP (= the subject of the sentence), together form the phrasal projection AgrP. Thus, S is reanalyzed as the (phrasal) projection of Agr, and the aforementioned potential problems regarding (83) are accommodated. Now, if S is reanalyzed as AgrP, what becomes of our other functional head, the "S(entence)"-introducer Comp(lementizer), for example, that in English? Like the functional head Agr (and unlike a lexical head such as V), the functional head Comp seems to require a categorially invariant complement type, namely, a "S(entence)." This "close" relationship between a complementizer and its complement S, the latter reanalyzed here as AgrP, can be accounted for as above by assuming that the two together constitute a single-bar projection, namely, the single-bar projection of Comp (= C in trees), Comp' (= C in trees), as for example in (86). (86) a. She thinks [that he sleeps] b. She thinks CP
1

that

1 1

he (3s)

\i \
V | sleep

Notice that the (optional) Specifier of CP (= Spec CP) is absent here. Cases displaying the existence of Spec CP were presented in section 3.3.2.

c
IMP" 1 N' 1 1 N
1

c -.^^--^ AgrP
that
Agr' _^~-^ ^ ^ VP Agr
i

1 (3s)

V V

He (3s)

sleep

There is empirical evidence, again from the theory of proformsubstitution, independently supporting this X' consistent analysis, in which the complementizer (that) and the AgrP together form a syntactic category, C . Consider so-substitution, as in (87). (87) She said [that he sleeps] but I don't think so Notice so might be interpreted as meaning either "that he sleeps" or "he sleeps" (assuming perhaps wrongly that the two are not synonymous). However, the important point is not how so is interpreted, but rather that it substitutes only for [that he sleeps]. That it does not substitute for [he sleeps] is shown by (88). (88) *She thinks that [he slee))s] but I don't think that so Thus, the ungrammaticaliry of this example (more precisely, the fact that knowing English entails knowing that (88) is ungrammatical) indicates that so is by hypothesis (known to be) an AgrP substitute. Again, assuming (as seems supported by the evidence) that a proform can substitute only for a syntactic category, so-substitution provides evidence for our X'-consistent, unified analysis. The functional head [Colllp that] and its AgrP complement together form a syntactic category that can undergo so-substitution, thereby supporting categorial status. Assuming the most unified hypothesis, that all heads project to both a single-bar and a phrasal category, X' theory imposes the following illustrative analysis ( = D-structure):

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Various versions of this paper have been presented at the following conferences: 1993 Workshop on Recent Advances in Generative Approaches to Second Language Acquisition (MIT); 13th Second Language Research Forum 1993 (University of Pittsburgh and Carnegie-Mellon University); Fourteenth Second Language Research Forum (McGill); International Association for Applied Linguistics (AILA) 1995 (Free University, Amsterdam); Boston University Conference on Language Development (1994), and The Linguistic Society of America (1995). We thank the participants of these conferences for their insightful comments and questions. We wish to extend our appreciation and gratitude to the students and teachers of the Japanese Saturday School, Medford, Massachusetts, and Showa University, Jamaica Plain, Massachusetts, as well as to all the other participants in this study. We wish to acknowledge and thank the many UROP (Undergraduate Research Opportunities Program) students from MIT who have worked on various aspects of the second-language acquisition study on functional categories discussed in this article. The students include Cashman Andrus, Ann Bui, Nikka Lee, Adebisi Lipede, Belinda Chan, Gina Kang, and Whitney Postman. We also thank those who read and commented on various versions of the paper. We have greatly benefited from all discussions and suggestions for change. We extend very special thanks to Robert Freidin, Jim Gair, Barbara Lust, Elaine McNulty, Lorraine Obler, William Rutherford, Julie Sussman, as well as to Carlos Otero and several (anonymous) reviewers from BBS. Special thanks are due to Dean Philip Khoury of MIT for financial support. We also thank Geoffrey Poole both for his valuable commentary and for his assistance in the preparation of this manuscript. Finally, we are indebted to Anne Mark for her editorial help and to Steve Peter for invaluable assistance with this project. NOTES 1. In the text of this paper we would prefer to use the more accurate terms second grammar (G2) and second grammar acquirer (G2er) rather than the standard second language (L2) and second language learner (L2er). However, we will often use the more traditional L2/L2er terms in the interest of convention. For discussion of important distinctions between language and gram-

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Epstein et al.: Second language acquisition

mar in the context of (so-called) second language acquisition, see section 2.4. 2. Throughout we assume that Schachter means that UG is "not entirely available" (cf. "entirely not available") to the adult L2 learner. 3. We will develop and explain these notions in more detail later in the text and, in particular, in the Appendix. 4. For a very clear introduction to the Principles and Parameters model of syntax and child first language acquisition, see Lust (1986) and Atkinson (1992). 5. Throughout this article, we mean by "X is accessible" only that "X constrains the learner's hypothesis space." 6. This parameter concerns Head-Complement order. For example, in (lb) the head "V" (see Appendix), namely [v liked], precedes its NP complement (see Appendix) [NP the man] in English, whereas, in for example, Japanese, the "V" head follows its NP complement. Importantly, the hypothesis (as expressed here by Cook 1988) that in any given language, all heads (e.g., N, V, A, P) either consistently precede or consistently follow their coinplement(s) may well be too strong. For example, German, as illustrated insertion 3.3.2 example (41) is, by hypothesis, C(omplimentizer) initial, but Agr(eement) final. Interestingly, the purported parameter Head-First vs. HeadLast, if veridical, would represent a case of parameterization not attributable to cross-linguistic variation in the morphological features (strong vs. weak) of "functional" (see Appendix) syntactic categories (see Chomsky 1993). 7. That is, following Chomsky (1980; see also Chomsky "Rules and Representations" BBS 3(1) 1980), we are making the claim that UG provides all humans with antecedent knowledge that languages have words. In our work with L2 acquisition, we are asking an empirical question with respect to whether or not L2 learners also approach the L2 learning process with the knowledge that languages will have words/lexical entries. 8. ABBS reviewer writes that L2 learning could proceed on the basis of analogy based on positive evidence. We agree that there may be areas of language learning that resort to analogy. Our point is that if analogy were the only learning strategy available to the L2 learner then the knowledge of ungrammaticality of L2 sentencetypes manifested by learners remains unexplained, especially if the patterns of ungrammaticality are different in the LI and the L2, and the LI can therefore not serve as a source for this knowledge. 9. We are grateful to a reviewer for pointing out the importance of these data with respect to the argument we are developing here. 10. One BBS reviewer notes that we argue in subsequent sections of this paper that the lack of linguistic evidence in the natural speech of a language learner does not necessarily indicate the lack of competence for a particular "associated structure." Thus, we cannot in turn argue that the lack of evidence for nonstructure-dependent utterances in natural-speech samples argues that learners do not in fact invoke structure-independent hypotheses. We agree with this logic. However, we argue that once we move beyond natural speech samples and investigate the properties of learners' linguistic competence in the context of carefully controlled production and comprehension studies systematically varied along certain critical factors, then the evidence we isolate in these contexts can be used to support certain conclusions concerning the nature of the learner's linguistic competence. In the context of this section and paper, we are developing empirical arguments based on the evidence elicited from these systematically controlled studies. 11. To argue this about the nature of the human capacity for language does not mean either that we are arguing that this is the only innate domain of human cognition. Our purpose here is twofold: (1) to argue that one cannot attempt to account for the human capacity for language by appealing to an account that reduces language learning to inductive learning mechanisms (see Chomsky's 1959 review of Skinner (1957) for detailed arguments in this regard) and (2) to argue that the ability to generalize and abstract beyond the data alone is insufficient as an explanation of the language-learning process. To account for all that a child knows about his first language, one is led to assume that much of this knowledge has been innately specified (see, e.g., Chomsky 1980,1986, and references therein for detailed arguments in this regard). 12. As concerns Bley-Vroman's "Adult Foreign Language Learning: A. Native Language Knowledge," a BBS reviewer asserts "Bley-Vroman would have done better to have 'Knowledge of languages (native and other)': if the learner already has knowledge of other languages, that ought to get into the act too." Of course, in the absence of experimental evidence, the knowledge that "ought to get into the act" is unclear. The (purely empirical) question is rather, "what knowledge does get into the act?" 13. A reviewer points out that it might be possible to retain knowledge of what a language is like without having access to UG. But this is precisely the issue we are contending. Under the view that the language faculty, and only the language faculty enables human beings to analyze (certain types of) acoustic disturbances (leaving aside sign language here) as natural language, we question whether it is possible to assign or even recognize units of analysis specific to language (such as phonemes, morphemes, and syntactic structures) to sound, if one does not have access to the language faculty. In short, the question we are raising is: If not the language faculty, then what would enable the learner to recognize and analyze an L2 as natural language, as opposed to, say, a computer language? Whether the L2 learner in fact does treat the L2 as natural language is of course precisely what UG-based L2 acquisition research is attempting to investigate. However, to distinguish "gross architecture of language" from "principles of language" seems to be arbitrary (except that the former more readily accommodates inexplicitness). 14. On the fundamental difference between what we are calling "grammar" versus "language," see, among many other works by Chomsky, 1955; 1964; 1965; 1968; 1975; 1980; 1981a; 1981b; 1982; 1986; 1988; 1991a; 1991b. The interested reader should be forewarned that all these works use different terminology, some of which differs from ours as well. For example, a BBS reviewer points out that, in contrast to us, Chomsky (1986) (in contrast to Chomsky 1955) used the term "grammar" to refer to the linguists' theory, and used the term "language," specifically "I-language," or as the reviewer notes, "generative procedure," to refer to the knowledge-state, not some infinite set of sentences. 15. We find B-V's use of the term expect somewhat misleading in this context. Expectation can fail to come true (e.g., We expect the Red Sox to win the 1996 World Series). However, within B-V's account, the L2ers' expectations always come true. For example, the L2er expectation regarding infinite generative capacity is "invariably correct," since, by hypothesis, all natural-language grammars indeed have precisely this property. Thus, we suggest that a more accurate characterization of L2 acquisition would result from B-V eliminating L2er expectation and instead using the locution L2er knowledge of universals. 16. Depending on B-V's interpretation of etc. in (9), it may be that B-V in fact recognizes all such UG-specified constructs. 17. The only time that one could empirically determine whether the L2 knowledge derived from UG or from UG-via-Ll would be in the case of a mismatch in parameter settings. If all that were available to the L2 learner was a UG-via-Ll, then non-Llinstantiated parameter settings would not be accessible to the L2 learner. As we will discuss in more detail below, such inaccessibility seems not to be the case. 18. For important discussion of the degenerate nature of the primary linguistic data and the (direct) relevance of this to first language acquisition, see Hornstein and Lightfoot (1981, Ch. 1). 19. See section 3.3.2 for a more detailed account of German word order.

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20. This is under the assumption that the experimental results replicate in subsequent studies. 21. We are significantly simplifying the analysis proposed by duPlessis et al. for German as well as their explanation of how their analysis can account for Clahsen and Muysken's data. The reader is referred to the original text as well as to subsequent papers (e.g., Flynn & O'Neil 1988a; Schwartz & Sprouse 1991), which treat the details in considerably more depth. 22. A reviewer asserts that if by completeness is meant "knowing everything that a native speaker knows," then the claim that "L2 completeness is impossible" is too strong, since it is in principle possible to approximate that knowledge with "nonlanguage" learning devices. With respect to the reviewer's assertion, it is, of course, an empirical issue whether some (explicitly defined) existing "non-linguistic learning device" underlies the acquisition of some (explicitly defined) existing L2 linguisticknowledge. What it might mean to "approximate" knowledge, we leave as an open (and in our view, unclear) issue. 23. New parameter setting is the assignment of a new, additional value to a parameter in the case in which the parametric values of the LI and L2 do not match. Often in the literature this process is referred to as parameter resetting; however, this term cannot be accurate. If it were, it would mean that after learning an L2 that differed parametrically from the LI, the learner would lose the LI parameter settings and would therefore no longer have the grammar of the LI represented in the mind/brain. For a discussion of this point and its importance regarding (1) LI acquisition (apparently involving both grammar adoption and "abandonment") and (2) L2 acquisition (involving grammar adoption without abandonment of the LI) and language change, see Hale .(1995). 24. Such a proposal has interesting empirical consequences (not investigated here) regarding both language production and comprehension. 25. One BBS reviewer argues that postposed subordinate adverbial clauses "are frequently used in colloquial Japanese, although they would never appear in writing and, indeed, would be considered 'poor Japanese.'" Thus, this reviewer suggests that Japanese learners are "not exactly acquiring a 'new' parameter value when they learn English." However, S. Miyagawa (personal communication) argues that although postposing of subordinate clauses as well as many other elements is quite common in Japanese and although some syntactic analyses have been proposed for these phenomena, the postposing processes are essentially pragmatic, that is, not syntactic. Thus, it seems untrue that in learning English the Japanese speakers do not have to assign a new parameter value to the head-direction parameter. 26. Even if the learner were, by some wild chance, explicitly told "(15c) is ungrammatical," this is clearly far different from being told that "Each of the infinite number of strings exhibiting wh-extraction from a Relative Clause is ungrammatical." This latter instruction too is different from being told "(15c) violates Subjacency, as opposed to the Case Filter." It is moreover important to note that merely being told "that X" does not entail understanding/knowing that X. On linguistic knowledge of types of ungrammaticality, see Chomsky (1965), Esptein (1990), as well as Grimshaw and Pinker (1989). For a recent introductory discussion of negative evidence, see Atkinson (1992 and the references cited). 27. In these and the examples that follow in this section, standard notation is used: * (an asterisk) indicates ungrammaticality, ? indicates marginality. In addition, hierarchies within ungrammaticality and marginality are indicated by an increasing number of * or ?. Thus, a sentence marked ** is more ungrammatical than a sentence marked *, and a sentence marked ?? is more marginal than a sentence marked ?. All judgments are relative. 28. Cf. Epstein (1991) on using degrees of ungrammaticality as a source of empirical evidence to determine the precise structure of UG. 29. In the case of u;/i-islands, this seems to be due to the unacceptability of clauses containing two u;/i-phrases in Indonesian. 30. A BBS reviewer points out that the pattern exhibited by the Indonesians need not be ascribed to grammatical or UG knowledge, but could be derived from the same (presumably extragrammatical) source that renders the corresponding Indonesian sentences unacceptable. Although this hypothesis, like many others must remain a possibility, it would leave us with two unanswered questions: (1) Why did the same extragrammatical factors render the same sentence-types unacceptable in Indonesian, but acceptable in English for the same set of speakers, (the Indonesians)? (2) Why do we find the same pattern for the English speakers and the Indonesian speakers? In the view that the pattern does not derive from the same source of knowledge (e.g., UG), we are left to ascribe this striking similarity to two different factors: the grammar for the English speakers, and as yet unspecified extragrammatical factors for the Indonesians. 31. A BBS reviewer remarks that degree of unacceptability for the L2 sentences could be derived by obsendng that they are "the reverse" of the LI, without resorting to UG. As we have explained, evidence regarding the unacceptability of tu/j-extraction types is assumed to be unavailable in the input for both LI and L2 learners, since it is highly unlikely that the relative grammaticality status of these sentence-types would or could ever be taught. For the Indonesian learners, knowledge of the acceptability status of these sentence types in Indonesian has already been attained during LI acquisition. Without resorting to UG, these learners could subsequently notice that the L2 facts are the reverse from the LI facts only if they were explicitly taught the grammaticality status of these particular sentences. But the assumption for these sentence-types is that this knowledge is not available from the input, for either LI or L2 learners. 32. Control verbs are verbs such as told, as in: (i) I told John [PRO to buy cookies] The subject of the infinitival clause is a phonetically null noun phrase called "PRO." By virtue of Control theory, PRO is assigned an antecedent with which PRO corefers: In (i) the antecedent is the NPJohn. Hence (i) means (ignoring tense distinctions) "I told John that he (meaningyo/in) 'should' buy cookies." Since John, the direct object of told, is the antecedent of PRO, tell is said to be an "object-control verb." By contrast, promise is a "subject-control verb," as in (ii), in which the subject of promise is the antecedent of PRO. (ii) I promised John [PRO to buy cookies] (meaning: "I promised John that I would buy cookies") The phonetically null subject of finite sentences in null-subject languages, such as Spanish, is assumed to be a noun phrase distinct from PRO called "pro." (iii) [pro hablo] (meaning: "I speak") For arguments supporting a distinction between PRO and pro, see Chomsky 1982, p. 79 and Jaeggli & Safir 1989, pp. 15-21. 33. Adult Japanese and Chinese speakers learning English as a second language were tested on the same structures as the Spanish speakers. We will not report on the results of these two language groups (see Flynn et al. 1991 for a complete report). We will note later in the text that the pattern of results for these two groups matches those obtained for the Spanish speakers in spite of the differences that exist in the Lls of these speakers with respect to tensed and infinitive stmctures and the nature of the control properties of the verbs investigated. 34. "C-command" is commonly defined as: A c-commands B if: (1) the first branching node dominating A dominates B; and (2) A does not dominate B, and (3) A does not equal B (Reinhart 1979). For a deduction of this fundamental syntactic relation, see Epstein (1994; 1995). 35. A BBS reviewer points out that the particular syntactic analysis for a given set of facts may turn out to be wrong and that

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for example "some effects currently attributed to parameterized principles [could] turn out to be due to invariant principles . . . in which case results that could be taken to offer support for the setting of a parameter lose their force." We fully agree with the reviewer: As is the case for any science, linguistic hypotheses are open to continuous revision and reformulation as more data and analyses are brought to bear on the issue in question. However, this does not detract from the force of our argument that LI and L2 acquisition derive from the same linguistic principles. If a particular set of facts, hypothesized to fall out of parameter setting, turns out to be governed instead by invariant principles, this would simply mean that this particular set of facts can no longer be used to substantiate parameter-resetting abilities in the L2 learner. 36. For related discussions, see also Vainikka and YoungScholten (1992; 1993). 37. If functional categories are initially absent in LI acquisition (as hypothesized by Radford [1990]), then VYS's (similar) model of L2 acquisition would not really constitute "partial access," in the sense that LI and L2 functional category acquisition would be similarly constrained. But if (as we believe) functional categories are not initially absent in LI acquisition, as convincingly argued most recently by Boser et al. (1991a; 1991b), Lust (1992), and Poeppel and Wexler (1993), then VYS's "initial absence" hypothesis does indeed constitute partial access in the sense that certain constructs (in this case, functional syntactic categories) constraining LI acquisition are hypothesized to be initially absent in L2 acquisition. 38. Contra a BBS reviewer, our argument does hold even in the framework of checking theory (Chomsky 1993), a very recent approach that, for expository purposes, we do not adopt here. Thus, for example, our morphologically incompetent subject who thinks that, say, third-person plural present tense agreement is -s (e.g., They likes. Bob) could concomitantly know the syntax of subject-verb agreement, as specified within checking theory. See Epstein (1993, forthcoming) for a recent Checking Theory analysis of English verbal agreement. 39. Again, for expository purposes, we are adopting a noncontemporary syntactic analysis of subject-verb agreement. Note that there is another logically possible unified analysis, namely, one in which (contra Chomsky 1965) the agreement suffix invariably appears united with (as opposed to separate from) the main verb (as in Chomsky 1993). See also Chomsky 1991c. 40. This subsection directly follows the presentation in Haegeman 1991, sect. 11.2. For much more detailed discussion of this analysis of German, see Haegeman (1991), Chapter 11, and the references cited therein. We cite the complementizer dafi as doss where our sources have that orthographical variant. 41. Since VYS assume X'-consistent analysis both of German and of L2ers" misanalyses of German (see below), we too will simply assume an X'-consistent analysis as outlined here; that is, we will not argue against VYS's analysis by arguing that the phrase structure theory in which it is formulated, namely, X' theory, is "wrong." However, it should be noted that X' theory, like any formally explicit (falsifiable), well-studied (and far-reaching) empirical hypothesis, is not without potential empirical and conceptual problems. For recent critical discussion, see Chomsky (1994); Freidin (1992a, sect. 2.3); Kayne (1994); Kitahara (1994); (1995; to appear), and the references they cite. For a review of X'-Theory, see the Appendix. 42. Note "CP" = Complementizer Phrase (dafi/that being complementizers (C), i.e., "sentence-introducers"). "AgrP = Agreement Phrase, roughly equivalent to what we have been calling "Sentence," e.g., "Hans bought the book." AgrP is also sometimes called "IP" = Inflectional Phrase, containing Infl = I(nflection), as will be discussed below. See Appendix for detailed clarifying discussion of these syntactic category labels. 43. Note in (42c) VYS replace IP (= Infl Phrase), I' (= Infl') and I (= Infl) with AgrP (= Agreement Phrase), Agr' (= Agreement'), and Agr (= Agreement), respectively. 44. The 17 subjects in VYS's study (and their native languages) are given here. Name Ahmet Aysel Emine Harva Kadir Kemal Mehmet Mine Ozgiil Sevinc Changsu Dosik Ensook Gabho Park Sam ran Language Turkish Turkish Turkish Turkish Turkish Turkish Turkish Turkish Turkish Turkish Korean Korean Korean Korean Korean Korean

45. For purposes of this subsection, the reader may interpret IP as being nondistinct from AgrP, as discussed above. Below, we will see that VYS distinguish IP/I from AgrP/Agr; but here the distinction is irrelevant. 46. Concerning (44b), VYS provide only the word string arid translate it as '(1) read the German book(s).' Since they do not provide word strings with phrase-structure trees assigned, we donot know whether they assume that a null first-person singular subject occupies Spec VP in (44b). This unclarity will not bear on the subsequent discussion. 47. In fact, VYS themselves assume the existence of empty categories, in particular empty subjects. 48. The particular CP analysis they entertain and reject is, unlike (50), one in which CP "replaces" IP and IP is hence missing: C ICP [ c tvp [v NP V]]]] 49. As noted in section 3.3.l.C, VYS seem not to distinguish between the syntax and the morphology of agreement. They write, "Given the [AgrP-stage] tree [(= our (42c))], subject-verb agreement is expected to occur . . . correctly" (VYS, p. 32). Again, we disagree: Knowing that the phrase-structure representation contains an Agr node (= syntactic knowledge) does not entail knowing (38) (= morphological knowledge). 50. The fact that each of these subjects produce wh- and yes/no questions constitutes some of VYS's evidence for the existence of a CP projection. But here (as is the case throughout), VYS provide only word strings (i.e., no syntactic analysis), as in (i) (i) Was ist er denn? (=VYS, fn. 28, ex. b) what is he then (i.e., boy or man) Since they do not provide analyzed data, we do not know whether they assume the following type of utterance receives a CP or an AgrP analysis if indeed the grammar does incorporate "CR." (ii) Ich kaufe dich Eis. (=VYS, 27b) I buy-lSG you-ACC ice cream 51. See also Epstein (1992) for a postulated deduction of some desirable empirical consequences from this independently motivated constraint. 52. The results we report here are part of a much larger study that investigated the acquisition of functional categories by both child and adult Spanish and Japanese speakers learning English as a second language. 53. One reviewer notes that our subject pool differs from that of VYS in terms of socioeconomic status and educational levels asserting that we "gratuitously assume that e.g., L2 acquisition will work the same way in an ESL class for graduate students at the University of Michigan as in a class in German for uneducated Gastarbeiter in Berlin." The reviewer continues, "This is as ridiculous as not paying attention to the difference between upper-class five-year olds and ghetto-dwelling two-year olds in studies of first

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language acquisition." As concerns the latter assertion, with respect to which the reviewer provides no citations, we would ask, "What is the difference in linguistic competence between "upperclass five-year olds" and "ghetto-dwelling two-year olds?" We believe that there are no differences (other than age-related ones), just as there are no principled differences between the linguistic competence of students at the University of Michigan and those who do not attend American universities. To the extent that linguistic competence is biologically determined we expect uniformity here just as we expect uniformity in the visual system to hold independently of socioeconomic factors. Of course, crossstudy/subject is always an important issue as is replication in the experimental natural sciences. 54. Topicalization involves a CP on the assumption that the topic (or a null-operator) moves to Spec CP in a matrix clause (see Lasnik & Saito 1992 and the references cited there for recent discussion of English Topicalization). 55. This included testing subjects' knowledge of the modals (e.g., can) as well as the copula verb, be. 56. Several different scorings were computed with these data. In the results reported in this paper, all errors in imitation were scored as incorrect with the exception of the deletion of adjectives. Thus, if a speaker substituted one lexical item for another (e.g., gentleman for woman) the sentence was scored as incorrect. Similarly, if a speaker (for example) deleted a past tense ending or changed a question into a declarative sentence, the sentence was also scored as incorrect. However, if a speaker simply deleted one of the adjectives in the sentence, it was not scored as incorrect in the results reported here. This was an extremely common error that was made across all structures to a comparable degree. Notice this is an extremely rigorous scoring procedure biased against our hypothesis. In light of this, 59/60% overall success rate is in our view compelling. 57. Here we leave open the question of whether English finite main verbs - as in (61a) and (61b) - are derived by: (1) syntactic affix lowering, that is functional category lowering (as in standard accounts), or by (2) LF V-raising to a functional category (Chomsky 1993), or by (3) application of both (1) and (2) (Chomsky 1991c). 58. The third functional head, Infl, will be discussed here in detail. 59. This discussion directly follows the presentation in Radford 1981, Chapter 3 and Radford 1988, Chapter 4. For more detailed argumentation and empirical support see, Radford 1981,1988 and the references cited there. For other, not dissimilar introductions to X' theory, see Cowper 1992, sect. 2.5; Haegeman 1991, sect. 2.5; Horrocks 1987, sect. 2.3.3; Sells 1985, sect. 2.1; and van Riemsdijk & Williams 1986, sect. 3.3. 60. For expository purposes, we ignore adjunction, as well as the DP hypothesis (Abney 1987) throughout. Under the DP hypothesis, the above arguments for a single-bar N-projection based on one-substitution (interestingly) disappear. More generally, Chomsky 1994, p. 10, suggests that all single-bar projections (i.e., those that are neither maximal nor a head) are syntactically inert. See also Freidin (1992a, sect. 2.3) for important discussion. 61. In certain literature "Agr(eement)" is called "Inflection" ( = 1). Correspondingly AgrP(hrase) is sometimes called "Infl Phrase" (IP).

Open Peer Commentary

Commentary submitted by the qualified professional readership of this jottnial will be considered for publication in a later issue as Continuing Commentary on this article. Integrative overviews and syntheses are especially encouraged.

Functional categories in L2 acquisition: Evidence of presence is not necessarily presence of evidence

John Archibald, Eithne Guilfoyle, and Elizabeth Ritter
Department of Linguistics, University of Calgary, Calgary, Alberta T2N 1N4 Canada. archibal@acs.ucalgary.ca; guilfoyl@acs.ucalgary.ca; ritter@acs.ucalgary.ca

Abstract: Epstein et al. fail to show that L2 learners have full access to UG because they do not explain the relationship between UG and functional categories (FCs). Nor do they provide an explanation of why learners with (supposed) full knowledge of FCs fail to use them in a native-like way.

The partial access hypothesis (PAH) predicts that L2 learners can access phenomena that are part of the LI grammar but not phenomena that are instantiated only in the L2. While it is possible to identify such elements in the domains of phonology and lexicon it is difficult to find syntactic phenomena that are present in the LI but not the L2. Phonologically, an LI could have pitch accent or tone while the L2 has stress; lexically, an LI could have gender while the L2 does not. Archibald (1995) and Carroll (1989) suggest that L2 learners may be unable to trigger new structure. Syntactically, there is variation in the instantiation of a phenomenon, rather than the phenomenon itself. The choice of functional categories (FCs) as the focus for Epstein et al.'s study is, thus, problematic. There is no consensus of the exact number and type of FCs made available by UG, so how can we tell if the learner is accessing UG when acquiring the L2's FCs? To decide whether the full access hypothesis (FAH) or PAH makes the correct predictions, one must be explicit about the relationship between FCs and UG. What information does UG provide the L2 learner about FCs? To determine this we could compare the LI and L2 acquisition data. If children have full access to UG and we find similar data in LI and L2 acquisition we might reasonably conclude that L2 learners also have full access toUG. The LI data on the acquisition of FCs in German and other V2 languages (e.g., papers in Meisel 1992) are remarkably similar to those discussed for L2 acquisition by Vainikka and YoungScholten (VYS). Children use more infinitival verb forms and less verb movement than adults do. How many and what kind of FCs are present in early child stages is controversial. However, even those researchers who have claimed that no FCs are present in early grammars (Guilfoyle & Noonan 1992) have argued that these grammars are constrained by UG. Thus, the absence of FCs does not necessitate lack of access to UG. Conversely, authors who have argued that FCs are present from the earliest stages have also asserted that the FCs of the early grammar are not identical to those of the adult grammar. Either there are fewer FCs (Rizzi 1993/94), or they are underspecified in some way (Roeper 1992), or they contain features that are treated differently in child grammar than in the adult (Wexler 1994). It has been argued that these views are consistent with a grammar that draws on UG. So an L2 grammar that lacks some or all FCs does not necessarily support the PAH. Unless we know the exact relationship between UG and FCs, their presence or absence in the grammar cannot provide an argument for or against either the FAH or PAH. Epstein et al. argue that the presence of inflectional morphol-

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Commentary /Epstein et al.: Second language acquisition ogy is not necessarily evidence for the presence of an FC, nor is the lack of inflectional morphology evidence against a particular FC. However, they fail to provide an articulated analysis of inflection or of the mapping relation between morphology and syntax necessary to support this claim. Such an analysis would need to pay special attention to the paradigmatic nature of inflection. Knowledge of inflection necessarily includes knowledge of a paradigm. The assumption that inflection is present in the grammar can only be based on evidence of paradigmatic variation, and not simply on the presence or absence of any single inflectional item. Even assuming inflection is present and correctly analysed in terms of its morphological content, one would need independent evidence to determine whether or not it has been assigned to the appropriate syntactic category. This type of error might be especially common in noun phrases, where there is evidence for variation in the mapping of inflectional elements to functional projections across languages and across constructions (cf. Borer 1996; Ritter 1995). Assuming that inflectional elements may either be generated in FCs or raised from lexical categories to FCs one needs more explicit evidence to determine whether presence of a particular inflectional element constitutes evidence of an FC. Epstein et al. are also unsuccessful in accounting for the absence of FCs in non-native speaker (NNS) utterances. They argue that NSs find sentences with multiple centre embeddings grammatical but "unusable" and NNSs find certain FCs the same. The equation of NS avoidance of centre embeddings with NNS omission of tense marking is simply implausible. Furthermore, they suggest that comprehension implies correct syntactic analysis which implies knowledge of FCs. An imitation task cannot tell us this. NSs can understand NNSs ungrammatical utterances without representing them. Comprehension is influenced by information from many sources (top-down and bottom-up), not just the ability to represent a structure. In conclusion, Epstein et al. fail to show that L2 learners have full access to FCs, because they do not explain the relationship between UG and FCs. Nor do they provide a clear explanation of why learners with full knowledge of the FCs fail to use them as a native-speaker would. ACKNOWLEDGMENT Guilfoyle and Ritter acknowledge the SSHRCC for grants 410-95-0382 and 410-95-0478, respectively. directly from UG, but also via the LI, a fourth logical hypothesis on UG access which Epstein et al. do not consider. Our suggestion speaks directly to one of the central questions they raise: What exactly does (can) L2 learner know? (sect. 2.2, para. 2) Transfer is discussed in several previous studies, but space limitations allow reference to only a few. In our own data of 125 Hindi-speakers learning English over five grade levels, we find that learners' initial knowledge of productive wh-questions appears to be without "wh-movement" (e.g., You where go?). When wh-movement appears, it does so initially without "inversion" (e.g., What you are doing?) and/or "do-support" (e.g., Where he go?). Even in advanced learners noninversion in direct questions persists. We argue (Bhatt & Hancin-Bhatt 1996) that noninversion in the L2 grammars is a case of nonobvious transfer in the following manner: Hindi, a wh in-situ language, does not have LF wh-movement to Spec-CP. It has been suggested (Mahajan 1990) that Hindi forms constituent questions by QR at LF. What Hindi does at the level of LF (logical form), Hindi-speakers learning English appear to be doing it at the level of surface structure (SS), that is, adjoining wh-phrases to IP yielding questions without any room for inversion or "do-insertion." Additionally, the role of the UG economy principle, "procrastinate," in the derivation of noninverted questions is also warranted. Procrastinate, under our view, militates against any overt (cost ineffective) movement, which explains the three general stages we observe in the acquisition of wh-movement: (I) no movement => (II) adjunction (w/i-phrase moves) => (III) substitution (u;/i-phrase moves to CP-Spec and Infl moves to C). Although the first and third stages can be explained straightforwardly by direct appeal to UG principles, it is the presence of the second stage that mandates the transfer explanation since the relevant derivation does not follow from any known UG principles. We must therefore consider the fourth hypothesis on UG access, the "Full-Transfer/Full Access" model (Schwartz & Sprouse 1996), which has the potential to honor the L2 acquisition facts presented. Epstein et al. have not looked at beginning learners. The cited proficiency levels of the learners in their studies are intermediate to advanced. In fact, their intermediate Japanese subjects have studied English an average of 7.0 years and have lived in an English-speaking country an average of 1 year (sect. 5.1). Their experience with the L2 is greater than that of our own beginners, who had no more than two years of formal instruction, without significant out-of-classroom exposure to the L2 (Hindi-dominant speech community in Delhi). That their learners are not in early stages of L2A may explain the diminished role of the LI in building L2 syntactic representations. Vainikka and Young-Scholten (1996) also show evidence of transfer in the initial state of their subjects (Lls = Turkish, Korean, Italian, and Spanish) learning German in the form of LI settings for the VP - head-initial for Spanish, Italian, but head-final for Korean and Turkish. The weight of the evidence in L2A suggests that the learning algorithm does not proceed initially with all of UG ("unmarked options only") prescriptions (White 1989). As mentioned above, the noncompliance is linked to transfer (see Eubank 1993/94; Hale 1988, pp. 31-32; Schwartz & Sprouse 1996; Vainikka & Young-Scholten 1996; White 1992). In view of the overwhelming transfer effects in early L2A, Epstein et al.'s theory also needs to address questions such as: What does the L2 learner begin with? If they do not accept that syntactic operations and principles in L2A can be guided at least initially by the LI, then it must be shown experimentally that UG is accessed entirely independently of the LI at ALL stages of acquisition, especially beginning levels where it is argued to be most prominent. While we commend these critiques of the No-access and Partial-access positions, we encourage Epstein et al. to address the fourth possibility, which may, we suggest, help explain the interaction between transfer and universal effects in L2A. Acknowledg-

Transfer in L2 grammars
Rakesh M. Bhatta and Barbara Hancin-Bhattb
"Department of English, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN 37996. rakesh@utk.edu; "Department of English, University of South Carolina, Columbia, SC 29208. hancin-bhattb@garnet.cla.sc.edu

Abstract: Although the Full-access hypothesis accounts for a range of empirical generalizations of L2A, it underrepresents the role of language transfer in the construction of the L2 grammar. We suggest the possibility that linguistic principles which constrain the L2 grammar are available both directly from UG and via the LI, a logical hypothesis which Epstein et al. do not consider. In their critical appraisal of three general hypotheses on the role of UG in L2A, Epstein, Flynn, and Martohardjono successfully present strong arguments against the No-access and Partial-access positions, and argue that only the Full-access hypothesis is supported by the data available. Although the Full-access hypothesis accounts for a range of empirical generalizations of L2A, it severely underrepresents the role of transfer - the use of prior linguistic knowledge (LI) - in the construction of the L2 grammar. The generative literature on L2A provides compelling evidence to show that noncompliance with UG initially is linked to transfer. Here we suggest the possibility that linguistic principles and operations which constrain the L2 grammar are not only available

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ing the existence or non-existence of LI influence on the L2 grammar will provide a more representative treatment of the research issues in L2A today. study of Japanese children and adults learning English described in section 5 aimed at comparing their control of functional categories, but scores given include (with a trifling exception in note 56) all errors in repeating test sentences, including ones totally unrelated to functional categories such as wrongly repeated nouns! Moreover, if failure to control relevant syntactic structures causes faulty repetitions (which it may), it is a logical error to assume that such failure is the sole cause or need even be the major cause of such errors. We are told (sect. 5.1.3, para.-1) that this "elicited imitation" task was merely "the first" that these subjects were asked to complete, but no subsequent tests are mentioned. A similar imitation study with Spanish subjects (sect. 3.2.4) claims a significant difference between repetitions of t/iaf-clauses and infinitives, but the only evidence offered, the bar-graph in Figure 7, suggests a difference of only about 12%, with no figures and no way of evaluating significance. A third empirical study lacking crucial data deals with the distinction between subject and object extractions; allegedly the former were rejected more often than the latter, but no supporting evidence of any kind is offered. Instead, we find two sets of figures, one in Figure 5 relating to strong versus weak subjacency violations, and another in the text (example 21) summarizing overall scores on all subjacency violations. On the reasonable assumption that equal numbers of strong and weak violation stimuli were presented, the latter should represent averages of the former, but they do not. I could find no coherent way of relating the two sets to one another; no word of explanation is given, and no references provided that would help the reader evaluate the startlingly high significance level supposedly obtained. The foregoing suggests, while far from exhausting, the amount of material that thorough refereeing could have eliminated before submission for peer commentary. 2. Limited domains of evidence. Epstein et al. restrict themselves to second-language acquisition in its narrowest sense, ignoring (except for a cursory dismissal of Lenneberg 1967) the several other fields of study that bear on the issue of access to UG, and raising again the question of whether this article was properly referred - as it stands, it seems more appropriate for an in-house L2 journal than for BBS. Within linguistics alone, these fields include Creole languages, sign languages, and language deprivation. At first sight, such fields seem to offer Epstein et al. little comfort. It is now clear from recent historical research in Hawaii (Roberts 1995; 1996) that the account of Creole genesis proposed by Bickerton (1984) was empirically correct down to the last detail: Creoles are languages created by children, in a single generation, on the basis of radically degenerate pidgin input data. We now know from literally thousands of contemporary attestations that even in the 1910s, the pidgin spoken by adults in Hawaii was no more stable or elaborated than it had been in the 1790s - in other words, we know that what adults failed to do in over a century, children achieved in less than two decades. These findings and those in sign language mutually support one another: it has been abundantly documented, since Goldin Meadow's (1979) groundbreaking paper, that children acquiring sign languages go well beyond any input they receive, and that the later in life one is exposed to them, the less one grasps of sign languages' extremely subtle and complex grammars. It is also well known that children who are deprived of access to language prior to puberty fail to acquire full natural language, although they may achieve some kind of pidginlike protolanguage (see, e.g., Curtiss 1977, 1988 on the cases of Genie and Chelsea). The picture presented by these areas might seem to suggest that UG access gradually shrinks to zero over years 7-14. However, a strong case for continuing access can still be made, though to make it, Epstein et al. might have to jettison their belief that UG consists of, or provides, knowledge. 3. The brain can't help it. Suppose that universal principles of syntax have only epiphenomenal status, being derived from the

A dim monocular view of Universal-Grammar access

Derek Bickerton
Department of Linguistics, University of Hawaii, Honolulu, HI 96822. derek@hawaii.edu

Abstract: This target article's handling of theory and data and the range of evidence surveyed for its main contention fall short of normal BBS standards. However, the contention itself is reasonable and can be supported if one rejects the "knowledge" metaphor for linguistic competence and accepts that "syntactic principles" are no more than the way the brain does language.

My principal reactions to Epstein et al. s article were threefold: (1) It reads as if it had bypassed the normal (and normally rigorous) BBS refereeing process. (2) For an article in an interdisciplinary journal, it addresses a surprisingly narrow range of data. (3) Despite (1) and (2), its main contention, given the odd caveat, is probably correct. Some explanation of how I reached such apparently self contradictory conclusions seems in order. 1. Sloppy argumentation and data. Epstein et al.'s view of language abstracts away from the facts to an inordinate extent. We are told (Example 1) that English is a "head-first" language, although two of its four major phrasal categories are head medial - Adjective) (almost always ABLE to compete) and N(oun) (the big red BOX on the table in the hall). Third person singular =s is not a "language-particular morphological aspect of English" (sect. 2.1, para. 5) (unlike progressive =ing, which is) but a local instantiation of a universal grammatical category, AGR(eement), central to generative accounts of language. Epstein et al. play fast and loose with the terms Universal Grammar (UG) and "language faculty." These are not synonymous, though treated here as such (see, e.g., the closing paragraph of sect. 2.2). UG is normally restricted to the categories and processes of core syntax, while the language faculty embraces any aspect of the organism that helps make language acquisition possible. Thus it is absurd to suppose that without access to UG one could not distinguish speech from noise or words from nonwords: countless cues (such as being informed that "Dummkopf is a German word" or being called estupido for treating a command in Spanish as noise) would quickly alert one to these distinctions even if one's access to UG were less than zero. A deeper problem underlies these misfired reductios: the equation of UG with "knowledge." This, at best a metaphor - on the most plausible assumption, UG is simply the way languagededicated brain circuits must work, see below - Epstein et al. take with deadpan literalness, concluding that nothing we know about language can come from anywhere but UG. Have they never heard of grammar books? Or do they suppose that, without direct access to UG, I would open my Teach Yourself Italian with jaw dropping stupefaction: Lesson One, Indefinite Article - Gender . . . Huh? Come again? Wozzat mean? In all other spheres, "empirically equivalent" (sect. 2.2, para. 3) knowledge can be acquired in a variety of ways: for instance, one can learn the clarinet by attending music school, by hanging around clarinetists, or through the eerie serendipity of a clarinet savant (seemingly nearest of the three to primary language acquisition). Would one's clarinet solos sound any different as a result? Epstein et al. treat knowledge of language as if, unlike all other forms of knowledge, it could only be acquired through one route, and was totally encapsulated and incommunicable. They should be on firmer ground with experimental data, but both experiments and presentation leave much to be desired. The

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natural processes by which the brain links words to form sentences. There would no longer be any fund of knowledge into which post-adolescents failed for mysterious reasons to tap. The brain would just go on doing what it was built to do, with a second language as much as with a first, unless trauma or degenerative disease disabled it. However, this automatic mechanism would need triggering by linguistic input before a certain age. Zero input would yield cases like Genie's. A limited input would trigger language, as in the pidgin-to-creole case. What the absolute minimum input consists of cannot be determined without human experimentation of a type not readily fundable nowadays. If UG is process not principle, full access to it must continue, or we would stop speaking! But quality of access must change somehow, or adults in Hawaii would have created a creole. Given motivation, and perhaps other variables, adults seem able to acquire existing languages, but not to create new ones. Why this should be so forms an interesting research question, but one that cannot be resolved simply by positing null or reduced access to UG. How then can we account for the notorious differential between average levels of first- and second-language attainment? Varying degrees of motivation could be one factor. Another could arise because advanced Piagetian tactics - going to class, studying grammar books, trying to figure out consciously what we ought to be saying - may actually interfere with, rather than help, the operations of UG. Acquisition of second language by general-cognitive means would predict some correlation between intelligence and second language attainment. I don't know of a good or indeed any study of this, but anecdote and experience suggest no correlation at all. Unpersuasive as Epstein et al.'s arguments are, there remains a good case for a UG potentially open to all. Psychological variables unrelated to language would then lead to second-language learners' widely varying degrees of success. exclude or falsify these various alternatives to their position. More to the point, if non-nativelike judgments are consistent with full access, then what (above chance) pattern of judgments would not be consistent with full access? Under Epstein et al.'s interpretation of the data in section 3.2.2, there is no apparent way to falsify the full access position. This criticism can be generalized to the entire Epstein et al. enterprise, because their full access position is too loosely formulated to allow for falsification. Full access is defined as "UG in its entirety constrains L2 acquisition." (I take care not to confuse this with a related claim that UG is the exclusive source of grammatical knowledge, i.e., "UG entirely constrains L2 acquisition.") So stated, the full access position does not exclude other knowledge. Thus it would permit access to other sources of linguistic knowledge, such as knowledge of the native language or additional nonprimary languages. So stated, it would not exclude knowledge of UG that is derived, along the lines of the Fundamental Difference Hypothesis (Bley-Vroman 1990), from knowledge of the LI. (In sect. 2.4, Epstein et al. suggest that knowledge of UG comes directly from the language faculty, and cannot be derived from other sources. Even so, this is not stipulated in the definition of full access.) Furthermore, it would allow for access to nonlinguistic knowledge. Finally, since Epstein et al. do not develop a generic schedule by which other knowledge is suppressed or supplanted, we must conclude that at any point from initial state to asymptote, UG-in-its-entirety-as-well-as-other-knowledge is available under their hypothesis of full access. With so few constraints on learners' knowledge, Epstein et al. license scads of unwelcome predictions - anything goes, short of wild grammars and expand the areas of overlap with competing proposals. At the same time, they deprive themselves of the obvious choice for falsifying evidence: non-nativelike judgments or imitations. When experimental performance is non-nativelike, Epstein et al. can argue that it is not because UG is not fully accessed, it is because other knowledge is also being accessed. Epstein et al. could justifiably reply that other theories of L2 acquisition lack explicit criteria for falsification (see Beretta 1991; McLaughlin 1987). But this is a matter for discussion elsewhere. And EFM might argue that many of the predictions of their hypothesis are met, and therefore falsification is not an issue. For example, in section 3.2.2, the asymmetry predicted for strong versus weak violations of wh-extractions is attested in L2er experimental performance. But suppose the predictions had not been met. Would Epstein et al. have conceded that their hypothesis had been falsified? One would hope so. However, throughout the text a pattern of explanations for results that had not been explicitly predicted suggests that falsification is not high on their agenda. As we see in section 4, Epstein et al. summarize an assortment of ways to dismiss unruly data: subjects make "performance errors"; they have "nonsyntactic deficits"; they have "difficulties with applying a computation to a structure"; and so on. These factors may indeed come into play. But by resorting to post hoc rationalizations whenever the full access position is vulnerable, Epstein et al. remove a mechanism for falsification. The full access hypothesis, for whatever epistemological truths it is ultimately shown to embrace, is deficient for now because it cannot be falsified. In our everyday theory of (full) duckness, the evidence for a creature being a duck is that it has feathers, quacks, and walks like a duck. The criterial evidence that a creature is not a duck is absence of feathers, vocalizations other than quacks, and movement on the ground by means other than waddling. In applying the theory, we do not dig around for nonplumage deficits, and we make no allowance for performance errors in quacking and waddling. Our theory is simplistic and its application shallow, but at least we can falsify it.

Full access to the evidence for falsification

David Birdsong
Department of French and Italian B7600, University of Texas, Austin, TX 78712-1197. birdsong@ccwf.cc.utexas.edu

Abstract: The Epstein, Flynn, and Martohardjorno full access hypothesis could be enhanced by inclusion of criteria for falsification. Epstein et al. wish to advance the debate on access to UG in L2 acquisition by staking out a position of full access, and by challenging the adequacy of the no access and partial access hypotheses. I submit that the scholarly discourse might be elevated by a consideration of what kinds of data might constitute falsifying evidence. I raise the issue of falsifiability not out of a commitment to a particular philosophy of science; the label "naive falsificationist," as Kuhn dubbed Popper, doesn't stick. My reaction is rather one of frustration with the way data and theory are forced into apparent congruence. I would like to see more rigor in the use of evidence, starting with the articulation of explicit falsification criteria. A straightforward illustration of the need for falsification is Epstein et al.'s account (sect. 3.2.2) of a commingling of Ll-based and UG-based knowledge. Among native speakers of Chinese, Indonesian, and Italian, differing percentages of correct judgments for English sentences are attested. Epstein et al. attribute this variability to the role of the LI in L2 acquisition. The results may be consistent with such a coexistence or interaction of the LI and (fully-accessed) UG, but they are also consistent with partial access, since none of the learner groups responds at native-like levels. And, .because the results are reported as means, it is conceivable that some members of a subject group have no access at all, while others have full or partial access. Clearly, it would be in Epstein et al.'s interest to spell out the type of results that would

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What we have to explain in foreign language learning

Robert Bley-Vroman
Department of English as a Second Language, Program in Second Language Acquisition, University of Hawaii, Honolulu, HI 96822. vroman@hawaii.edu

Abstract: While child language development theory must explain invariant "success," foreign language learning theory must explain variation and lack of success. The fundamental difference hypothesis (FDH) outlines such a theory. Epstein et al. ignore the explanatory burden, mischaracterize the FDH, and underestimate the resources of human cognition. The field of second language acquisition is not divided into camps by views on "access" to UG.

The explanatory burden of the theory of child language development is that language develops in children inevitably and completely on exposure to input. In this sense, we informally say that child language development is "invariably successful." Adult foreign-language learning (L2A) is radically different. There is wide variation, even among learners exposed to very similar input. Few (if any) adult learners achieve native grammatical knowledge, although some can use the foreign language fluently and effectively. The explanatory burden of L2A theory is, in the first instance, to account for this lack of inevitable success and for this variability. For child language development, the theory of innate constraints, triggers, parameter-setting, deductive consequences, and language-specific learning-procedures (the acquisition theory of Universal Grammar) is designed to predict inevitable, invariant, and complete language acquisition on exposure to degenerate data. On the face of it, it is hard to see how such a theory could work for L2A. Child language development theory is chronically "success-plagued" when applied to adult foreign-language learning. "The logical problem of foreign language learning" (BleyVroman 1990) focussed on the need for an L2 acquisition theory which was adequate to the explanatory burden. In addition to arguing that an adequate L2 acquisition theory would need to account for "failure" and variability, Bley-Vroman (1990) also outlined an approach to such a theory: the "Fundamental Difference Hypothesis" (FDH). The FDH holds that, for the adult, information about what languages can be like is primarily available through the first language and the mental representation of its grammar. Various mechanisms not specifically linguistic are involved in the construction of the L2 knowledge system. I made reference to a range of promising developments in cognitive science, including work in general human problem-solving, nonmonotonic reasoning, and production systems. Epstein et al.'s concentration on simplistic "analogy" greatly underestimates the richness of human cognition and suggests a view of the cognitive sciences in which little has happened since Skinner. For a review of the relevance to L2A of current findings on the human capacity to find structure, see Carr and Curran (1994). The proposals of the FDH are thus by no means "astructural" (Epstein et al. target article, sect. 2.3). Bley-Vroman (1990) provides several specific mechanisms which might be involved in L2A, including construction-byconstruction acquisition based on positive evidence (which I discussed in an account of the lack of extraction from coordinate structures - a case which Epstein et al. mention). I also speculated that there were parallels between foreign-language learning and the acquisition of "peripheral constructions" in native languages. The foreign-language learner, in this view, proceeds by accumulating peripheral facts, rather than by setting parameters and deducing consequences. The end result can be a system of knowledge, which, while weakly equivalent to the native language grammar in certain areas, has quite a different origin and, presumably, a different psychological status. (Bley-Vroman 1990, p. 42) Similar observations have also been made by Pinker and Bloom (1990) regarding the evolution of language: they point out that processes like "analogy, rote memory, and Haigspeak," which they

relate to Chomsky's notion of periphery, could "function as a kind of jerry-rigging that could allow formally incomplete grammars to be used in generating and comprehending sentences" (p. 732). Epstein et al. ignore the central issues and fail to propose even an outline of an account which might meet the basic explanatory requirements. As far as one can tell, the essence of their "fullaccess" hypothesis amounts to the uncontroversial and unsurprising observation that many aspects of non-native language performance can be discussed using the vocabulary of linguistic theory. So, for example, studies have shown that beginning Japanese learners of English cannot repeat accurately sentences with subordinate clauses. Epstein et al. say that these learners "'know' that English and Japanese differ in head direction and are working out the consequences of a new parameter setting." More advanced learners do better: "[T]hese L2 leaners had assigned a value to the head direction parameter in conformity with the English value" (sect. 3.2.1, para. 8). Epstein et al.'s new research here is similar. Learners are sometimes able to repeat many kinds of sentences. After a beginning course in syntax, you can describe these sentences using words like "IP," "CP," "Spec." The emptiness of such rhetoric and problems with the theoretical conceptualization have long been noted (Bley-Vroman & Chaudron 1990; White 1989, pp. 94-100). Epstein et al.'s portrayal of the field of SLA as being divided into contending camps based on three degrees of "access" is oversimple and misleading. The FDH permits UG-like effects via the LI and has proposed that "peripheral" language processes might be involved in L2A. Vainikka and Young-Scholten's analysis of the acquisition of German assumes the operation of UG. How is it "partial access"? There is much excellent theoretical work in L2A which does attribute a prominent role to UG (the work of Eubank, of Schwartz, and of White is prominent and contains arguments which must be taken seriously), but a "full-access" view is poorly represented by the work of Flynn and colleagues. Indeed, if there is anything which unites researchers in L2A, it is agreement that research like that reported in this target article is largely irrelevant.

Access to Universal Grammar: The real issues

Hagit Borer
Department of Linguistics, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA 01003. borer@linguist.umass.edu

Abstract: Issues concerning UG access for L2 acquisition as formulated by Epstein et al. are misleading as well as poorly discussed. UG accessibility can only be fully evaluated with respect to the steady state gram mar reached by the learner. The steady state for LI learners is self evidently the adult grammar in the speech community. For L2 learners, however, the steady state is not obvious. Yet, without its clear characterization, debates concerning stages of L2 acquisition and direct and indirect UG accessibility cannot be resolved.

The emergence of greater understanding of L2 acquisition (L2A) alongside the growing awareness of its significance is indeed one of the more exciting developments of the past decade. It is therefore unfortunate that one of the first major articles on this topic to appear in a major cognitive science venue should turn out to give a flawed review of the major theoretical trends, to pose the wrong theoretical questions, and proceed to give even poorer answers. The extent to which LI acquisition (L1A) and L2A are or are not alike is the major subject matter of L2A. However, Epstein et al. avoid this question entirely. In section 2.1 they state briefly that L1A and L2A are distinct, but proceed to attribute this to "differences . . . in assignment of parameter values in LI acquisition versus assignment of additional parametric values in L2 acquisition, o r . . . differences in the way children and adults acquire the

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lexicon and integrate UG with grammar-external performance systems." Along with an equally vague statement, attributing differences between L1A and L2A to "differential ways of instantiating [UG] principles according to the particular demand of the language," and hence making "the acquisition of languageparticular aspects of grammar . . . age-sensitive," this is the sole account for the most crucial question of L2A: why is it clearly behaviorally distinct from L1A? From both a cognitive and a linguistic perspective, the answer they offer to this major question is every bit as problematic as the problem-solving explanation for L2A which they demolish with so much verve. Worse, the discussion, here as elsewhere, reveals a profound misunderstanding of the term Universal Grammar as it has been utilized in linguistic theory and in acquisition models based on it. UG is first and foremost a set of constraints on possible natural language grammars, and only secondarily, and not according to all models, a language acquisition device (LAD). It is perfectly possible for an output grammar to be constrained by UG, although the process of acquisition is informed by an independent acquisition device. Nor is it logically necessary for every step in L1A to be a natural language grammar in the UG sense; the literature on L1A abounds with proposals concerning intermediate stages which are not, themselves, strictly speaking, grammars of natural languages. Ironically enough, this is precisely the nature of current proposals that the early grammar is prefunctional, fully or partially. While in the 80s it was proposed that the presence versus absence of functional projections is a parameter of UG, making it possible for some natural languages (notably Japanese) to have no functional structure, this view is no longer held. To the best of my knowledge, no current analysis of Japanese postulates the absence of a tense node. Yet in the pre-functional stage, it has been claimed, TP may be absent, making that grammatical stage non-UG constrained. The Principles and Parameters Model was put forth originally as a solution to the logical problem of language acquisition, abstracting away from developmental issues altogether. It effectively divides grammatical competence into two components: those parts which are fixed and unchanged, and those parts which are disjunctive in nature, allowing different grammars to select different options. Acquisition becomes the determination by learners as to which of the disjunctive parts of a particular principle are applicable in their grammar. Once this determination is complete, the core grammar of the target language has been acquired. It thus follows that the only part of UG relevant to language acquisition is the "disjunctive" part that varies from language to language. To state, as Epstein et al. do, that "the acquisition of languageparticular aspects of grammar [is] age-sensitive" while other parts of UG are fully accessible amounts to asserting that L2 learners have difficulties in acquiring "language particular aspects" in L2 distinct from those of their LI, acquiring in full only that which is not language particular. The first part of this claim is in essence how Epstein et al. define "Partial Access," which they claim to refute. The second part of this claim is nonsensical. What is fixed and constant across languages is precisely not in need of being learned. A strict application of the Principles and Parameters Model to LI development (without assuming cognitive or linguistic maturation) is, indeed, only compatible with the claim that every intermediate stage of L1A is constrained by UG. Within that model, there is no room for the learner ever to construct a grammar that would violate UG, as all choices for a given parameter are UG compatible. The learner, by definition, can only make mistakes which would lead to a mismatch between the constructed grammar and the target grammar. This is the model that informs the formulation of "Partial Access" by Epstein et al. and its challenge: "Partial Access" attributes to L2 learners an inability to alter their Li choice for the value of a particular parameter, alongside the inability to activate principles which are inert in the LI. The first argument for the acquisition of new parametric settings by L2 learners, and hence against "Partial Access," is based on the acquisition of postposed adverbial clauses in English by Japanese speakers. The argument, unfortunately, is demolished by Epstein et al. s own admission that postposed adverbials do exist in Japanese (note 25).' A second argument concerns the acquisition of the complementation structure of control verbs. Here the discussion seems to assume a version of "Partial Access" that is certainly not the only sensible one. If LI has both infinitival and tensed complements, but their distribution with respect to particular verbs differs from that of L2, the learners need not acquire any new grammatical knowledge. They only have to learn the properties of some lexical items. As an argument against the non-activation of inert principles, Epstein et al. discuss the Empty Category Principle (ECP) and subjacency effects in the English of L2-ers whose Li does not have syntactic movement. "Partial Access," they claim, would predict no Subjacency and ECP effects, as the principles are inert in the LI. This argument is puzzling. A fundamental tenet of syntactic theories is that the same principles constrain overt and covert movement. Logical Form movement is subject to the ECP, and according to most current scholars, to Subjacency as well. Much research is devoted to showing this to be true for Chinese and Japanese, which lack overt WH-movement. The claim that ECP and Subjacency are ever inert in any grammar is incompatible with the very grammatical model EFM assume. Finally, consider the detailed discussion of Vainikka & YoungScholten (VYS). First, once used to point out, correctly, the many methodological problems with V&YS's research, that particular study could not serve as the foundation for attacking an entire approach. Contrary to Epstein et al. s assertion, the methodological problems do not "weaken the theoretical claims made in the Weak Continuity Hypothesis studies." They only weaken the specific claims of VYS. More importantly, VYS s study is not a case of "Partial Access" in the sense of Epstein et al. A pre-functional grammar is not the grammar of Li, nor is it clear in what sense UG is accessible only through LI to give rise to it. In fact, it is not a possible natural language grammar, and hence, unlike the Li grammar, it is not constrained by UG at all. Regardless, then, of the merits or demerits of pre-functional grammars in L1A or L2A, this proposal, like much current literature on L2A, cannot be characterized under the label "Partial Access" or "Full Access." In fact, the description of current research in L2, as it emerges from Epstein et al.'s tripartite classification, is misleading and uninformative. Epstein et al. seem to equate "No Access" with "no grammatical learning," "Partial Access" with "no new grammatical learning," and "Full Access" with "new grammatical learning." Unfortunately, however, "no new grammatical learning" is almost trivially absurd, and if the total of the claim made here is that there is "new grammatical learning," a point which in spite of its relative obviousness is nevertheless rather poorly substantiated, then the main question - what does this new grammatical learning consist of? and what, in the target L2, may or may not be learned? has been evaded. Ultimately, the only true test of full UG accessibility is the degree to which the target language can be attained by L2 learners. Should it turn out to be the case that, given enough exposure, native-like attainment is possible (see Birdsong 1989; Krashen 1985; White 1989), then the full accessibility of UG would become an inevitability. Although poverty-of-the-stimulus arguments do not carry over straightforwardly to L2A, discussions of the Logical Problem of L2A (see White 1989) make it clear that although somewhat different, the problem is nevertheless equally challenging and a perfect acquisition would require the postulation of full UG accessibility on a par with its postulation for the L1A. Should it turn out, however, as appears at least observationally plausible, that native-like attainment is not possible (see Coppieters 1987; Johnson & Newport 1989), the research agenda of L2A should acquire a different direction. The first question to be resolved then is what is the steady state of L2A, and whether given a constant LI and a constant L2, this steady state is homogenous across speakers. An extremely interesting hypothesis in this re-

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spect is the "interlanguage grammar," put forth by B. J. Schwartz, L. Eubank, and others, according to which the grammar constructed by L2 speakers is neither that of the LI nor that of the L2, but a hybrid of sorts. From the perspective of the classification offered by Epstein et al., this work is unclassifiable: it entails learning some new stuff, and hence is not "Partial Access." However, it also entails a measure of adherence to options provided by LI, and is hence not "Full Access." Viewed differently, however, the existence of an "interlanguage grammar," if validated, would be the strongest possible evidence for the existence of UG. The emergence of grammatical constructions in L2 which represent neither the LI grammar nor the target grammar is the ultimate proof for the existence, in the construction of L2 grammars, of an active and powerful innate grammatical system. An example of such a construction is the existence of subject-aux inversion in English embedded questions for LI speakers of Hebrew, a language with subject-verb inversion in embedded clauses, but no auxiliaries, (la) is therefore missing in the LI input and in the L2 input, but is nevertheless a very consistent feature of the L2 performance. On the other hand (lb), which would represent a direct transfer of the LI system, is not attested:
1. a. Mary asked what did Jill cook for dinner

b. Mary asked what cooked Jill for dinner Little attention is paid in studies of L1A to the characterization of the steady state. It is taken to be, self-evidently, the native grammar of the input language. Rather, developmental studies of L1A center on matching intermediate stages with that target, attempting, on the one hand, to account for deviation from it, and on the other hand, to explain the development which guides the learner toward it. This methodology, however, cannot be taken for granted for studies of L2. While matching intermediate stages of L2A with the target grammar has been a main topic for investigation, it is not evident that these can shed light on L2A. If steady state L2 users have a grammar distinct from that of native speakers, a direct similarity between L1A and L2A is no longer expected, and a learning mechanism must be proposed and described that accounts for the knowledge these steady state L2 users have acquired. Postulating a difference between L1A and L2A is independently attractive, as a parallel account gives rise to a number of conceptual problems. First, if stages of L1A are maturationally determined, as is proposed by Borer and Wexler (1987) and subsequent literature, such stages are not expected in L2A. Second, even without grammatical maturation, other developmental proposals are not straightforwardly transferable to L2A. The prefunctional stage hypothesis itself requires very different assumptions when incorporated into L2A. While for L1A it is compatible with gradual structure building, for adult learners it requires the suspension of structures already in existence in the LI grammar. If the principles and parameters model should turn out to be the correct one for modeling L2A, the existence of interlanguage grammars raises an important question with respect to it: Are some parameters in principle resettable, while others are not? For instance, Finer and Broslow (1986) argue that only LI parameter settings which are subsets of parameter settings in L2 can be reset. Consider a different approach. Research on the L2 acquisition of phonology (Bohn & Flege 1992) suggests that the acquisition of the "similar" is harder than the acquisition of the "dissimilar," or "new." Thus the acquisition of the tense/lax distinction for English /i/ and III by LI speakers of German is problematic, as a similar, but not identical, distinction exists in German. On the other hand, the acquisition of the English vowel /as/ is unproblematic, as it does not overlap significantly with any German vowel. Further, while the acquisition of the /i/-/I/ distinction shows little improvement over time, the acquisition of /ae/ shows a marked improvement. This "similar'V'difficult" and "dissimilar'V'easy" association can be accounted for if the l\l-l\l distinction somehow occupies the same "linguistic" slot as an activated distinction in German, and its

acquisition requires "resetting." However, /ae/ occupies a distinct slot, never activated in German altogether, and its acquisition can be accomplished directly. While such an account allows certain acquisition to proceed only through LI, it allows direct access to UG for anything that is truly inert in the LI grammar. Research conducted by Schwartz (1993), although differently focused, suggests that this approach is on the right track for syntax as well. Based on results discussed by White (1991), Schwartz (1993) shows that while French learners of English persist in erroneous adverb placement, the same speakers acquire fully the knowledge that verbs do not move to C and the correct use of do support. Plausibly, the auxiliary system in English with its use of a dummy auxiliary do is sufficiently dissimilar to that of French to warrant acquisition. On the other hand, the placement of adverbs is not. To summarize, supposing that the steady state of L2A is a natural language, the following is the set of questions L2 researchers must face, and some have faced in the last decade: 1. What is the L2 steady state? Is it the same for all L2-ers with the same target? Is it the same for all L2-ers with the same target and the same LI? 2. Of the LI grammar, what is retained? What is given up? Why are certain aspects of the LI grammar retained while others are given up? 3. What do intermediate stages tell us, given that (at least) the following is not true of L2: a. No negative evidence; b. Cognitive immaturity; c. Grammatical immaturity. Do the intermediate stages of L2 constitute "grammars" compatible or incompatible with UG? Are intermediate stages of L2 constant across speakers? NOTE 1. The claim that "postposing processes are essentially pragmatic," seems to reveal a fundamental misunderstanding of the distinction between grammatical processes and their discourse function. Passive, too, is
pragmatically different from active, a fact which does not interfere with its syntactic status.

Parameter-setting in second language acquisition - explanans and explanandum

Susanne E. Carroll
Institute for English and American Studies, Universitaet Potsdam, PF 60 15 53, 14415 Potsdam, Gennany.carroll@rz.uni-pot8dam.de

Abstract: Much second language acquisition (SLA) research confuses the representational and the developmental problems of language acquisition, assuming that attributes of a property theory will explain the transitions between the stages of a psychogrammar, or that induction will explain the properties of the representational systems which encode language. I argue that Principles and Parameter-setting theory deals only with the representational problem, and that induction must play a role in explaining the developmental problem. The conclusion is that both Epstein et al. and the papers they criticize are right; they are just not right about the same issues. Epstein et al. show that the field of SLA (second language acquisition) is suffering from a confusion as to what the explanandum is. We see a systematic failure to distinguish between the

representational and the developmental problems of SLA. The former asks: How does any human come to have representational systems which encode linguistic phenomena? The latter asks: How do a (specific) learner's knowledge systems change over time? Related developmental questions are: What causes learning to begin at time t? What causes the particular transitions between stages? Why does learning stop? Answering these questions entails inventing both property and transition theories of SLA (Gregg 1994). Most non-Universal Grammar (UG) approaches to language learning conflate the two and try to define the property theory via induction. Those theories are seriously wrong as accounts of human cognition. The critique of non-UG approaches to SLA offered here asserts nothing more. UG is a reasonable response to the Representational Problem, but it does not follow

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that UG, and especially the parameters part of Principles and Parameters (P&P) theory, explains the developmental problem of SLA. Why not? There has never been any serious attempt by SLA P&P researchers to connect the construct of parameter-setting to a theory of (a) speech perception, (b) language parsing, (c) cognitive functional architecture, (d) learning relevant for parameter(re)setting, (e) language production, or (f) how UG relates to the metalinguistic classification tasks which comprise so much of the evidence on its behalf. The criticism of vagueness directed at inductivist approaches applies to Epstein et al. as well. Not only does P&P not tell us what the contents of the learner's psychogrammar are (only a case study could do that), it is difficult to pinpoint what the contents of the P&P theory are. When it comes to parameters, it is definitely "here today, gone tomorrow." We need only ask our developmental questions to see the vacuousness of claims of explanatory adequacy regarding the Developmental Problem. There is no theory of triggers for SLA, no account of why setting a parameter in one system does not create unlearning in the others, of why there is no "pendulum effect" (Randall 1990), or how learners interpret ambiguous data (Valian 1990). All of the major questions about how the psychogrammar develops over time remain unanswered, which leads me to ask: Just what do SLA P&P theorists think they are explaining? Who will provide answers? Learnabiliry theory? It is unlikely. Problem 1. Parameter-setting cannot even guarantee learnability of relevant classes of grammars (Gibson & Wexler 1994). Problem 2. Maturation is increasingly being used to explain acquisition. Gibson & Wexler (1994) assume that access to parameters is limited by maturation. This has the effect of ordering the data the learner has access to. Bertolo (1995) generalizes this analysis and offers maturation as a principled account of the gradual nature of language acquisition. This should bring joy to the hearts of all P&P SLA researchers, since we can now explain the absence of sudden, wholescale restructurings in SLA development, originally predicted as the "deductive" consequences of parameter-(re)setting (Meisel 1991), by the assumption that adult bilinguals are all suffering from a language-specific, autonomous, modular, senilitas praecox. Problem 3. How do learners recognise triggers? P&P theory hinges on the availability of triggers, which must be located in the stimuli. However, learnability theory does not explain how the learning mechanism connects to the perceptual and processing systems. Psycholinguistic research has provided solid evidence that bilinguals use the same parsing strategies for L2 stimuli that they use for their LI (see Kilborn & Ito, 1989, and references therein). Learners are transferring highly overleamed Ll-specific processing strategies. Transferred parsing strategies can cause the learner to overlook particular stimuli in the environment (see VanPatten, 1984, for examples). Parsing failure does not necessarily lead to a failure to interpret the stimulus since adults have a number of compensatory mechanisms which permit them to project an interpretation. The standard learnability supposition that learning is error-driven and that parameter-setting is initiated whenever parsing fails (Berwick 1985) is too strong. How, then, can we guarantee that learners in fact notice the relevant stimuli and represent the relevant triggers? Nothing in the SLA P&P literature even acknowledges this issue.1 I conclude that at the moment P&P theory has nothing to say about the developmental problem of SLA. Does P&P theory make the right claims regarding the Representational Problem of SLA? Perhaps not. There is good evidence that the representational systems available to the child are not those available to the adult. Work on speech perception in babies suggests that they are either born with or rapidly develop the capacity to discriminate the full range of phonetic features needed to acquire the phonetic and phonological categories of the LI (Jusyczyk 1992). Various studies (see Werker & Pegg 1992) have provided important evidence for a process of perceptual reorganisation

et al.: Second language acquisition

during the first year of life which makes certain phonetic features unavailable to older children and to adults. There is an absolute loss in the ability to detect certain features, a process sometimes referred to as canalisation. This is proof enough that the representational systems used in LI acquisition are not the same as those deployed in L2 acquisition. Werker and her colleagues have nonetheless shown that for most non-Ll features the capacity to detect them remains into adulthood, but the ability to learn and use them is determined largely by the abstracted categories of the LI phonetic system. Ll-irrelevant features are treated by the parsing system as noise and have no effect on the activation of higher-order categories (phones and phonemes). Flege, in a large body of work (see, e.g., Flege 1987), has shown how adults can nonetheless learn some of the phonetic categories of the L2 via a process of recategorisation. The contrast could not be clearer: in LI acquisition an a priori representational system becomes available and particular features are activated by specific stimuli, retained, and then become the basis for the creation of the phonetic and phonological categories. Features which are not activated "disappear" either in an absolute way (they can no longer be detected at all) or in a relative way (they are ignored by the LI parsers). In L2 acquisition, the parsing strategies of the LI are transferred and play a critical role in determining what input becomes available to the learning mechanism. The categories drawn from existing representational systems which can be imposed by the parsers on the stimuli are imposed. Sometimes phonetic detail can be lost to the system. In other cases, the properties of the categories are readjusted so that there are subtle changes in the "best exemplar" or "central tendency." Finally, new categories can be gradually formed where the stimuli cannot be reduced to the known categories. All of this smacks of induction, which manifests itself across a large number of cognitive domains, including language. Induction therefore plays a role in the explanation of the developmental problem. In my view, the debates about the "accessibility" of UG have given off more heat than light. It is not false to suggest that adult learners "access" UG since they encode linguistic stimuli in language-specific autonomous representational systems which
can ultimately be traced back to UG. It is only false to assert that "learning" in SLA can be reduced to parameter-setting and that induction does not apply to linguistic cognition. NOTE 1. Parsing considerations are relevant to the argumentation in other respects since the case dismissing the partial access hypothesis hinges largely in showing "access" to subjacency by Chinese & Indonesian learners of English, something which can be explained in terms of the architecture of the parser (Berwick & Weinberg 1984), or in terms of specific parsing constraints (Hawkins's argument trespassing generalization, Hawkins, 1996) rather than UG.

How adult second language learning differs from child first language development
Harald Clahsen8 and Pieter Muyskenb
Department of Language & Linguistics, University of Essex, Colchester C04 3SQ, United Kingdom; "Department of Linguistics, Universiteit van Amsterdam, 1012 VT Amsterdam, The Netherlands, harald@essex.ac.uk; tnuysken@let.uva.nl

Abstract: We argue that the model developed in Epstein et al.'s target article does not explain differences between child first language (LI) acquisition and adult second language (L2) acquisition. We therefore sketch an alternative view, originally developed in Clahsen and Muysken (1989), in the light of new empirical findings and theoretical developments.

Epstein et al.'s target article makes use of the so-called full competence hypothesis (FCH), that was originally developed for child LI development, and applies it to adult L2 learning. Under
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the FCH (cf. Poeppel & Wexler 1993), the child embarks on grammatical development with a complete system of syntactic categories and representations, including general principles and parametric options of Universal Grammar (UG). Epstein et al. argue that this is also the case when adults learn an L2. The underlying paradigm of the research reported in the target article is: UG development is interesting, non-UG development is not interesting, so for L2 development to be interesting as a research topic we have to make it as UG as possible. In our view, this is not a very fruitful line of thinking: it is precisely the division of labour between UG- and non-UG learning that is crucial to our understanding of the modular structure of language development. It is implausible that all of LI development is UG-driven, since it is embedded in a highly intricate process of general cognitive development, involving all kinds of learning. Knowledge of language interacts in yet ill-understood ways with other knowledge-systems, many of which have highly abstract computational properties. A non-UG rule such as the one given as a caricature in section 2.4 of the target article about plurals with -s for all objects of less than 40 tons is no more typical of language than it would be of other cognitive systems. Incidentally, Epstein et al. would be surprised if they looked at the semantics of (LI to be sure) Niger-Congo or Sino-Tibetan noun classification systems. Similarly, adult L2 development is plausibly not fully UG-driven. Adults can learn many things, like ritual dances, computer languages, literary forms, and complex kinship systems, which are presumably not fully defined by UG but still share with natural languages a number of computational features such as structure-dependency. If much of L2 learning is not UG-driven, the comparative investigation of LI and L2 acquisition provides a window for the systematic study of the properties of different knowledge systems. How much of a language can you and do you learn without UG? Do we use UG for other symbolic systems besides language? Below we will claim that the triggering properties of morpho-syntactic categories may belong to UG, and indeed differentiate LI from L2, but constituency and structure-dependency, which occur in L2, but also in computer languages and ritual dances, may not. In the target article, differences between LI and adult L2 acquisition are claimed to be peripheral, attributable to L2 learners' ostensible performance difficulties in expressing functional categories in their utterances. Unfortunately, however, these difficulties are not made explicit, and Epstein et al. appeal to future "rigorous experimentation" to determine their precise role for acquisition. This is a very unsatisfactory answer that leaves us with little understanding of the nature of L2 acquisition. We do not see how performance difficulties could lead to children consistently arriving at smarter analyses than adults. In the LI developmental literature, nongrammatical factors such as processing limitations on sentence length, incomplete phonological acquisition, and so on, have been invoked to explain why children do not do as well as the syntactic analyst would predict. It is not clear why adults would be more hindered by performance factors than are children. All we know about performance points the other way. Another explanation for L1/L2 differences to which Epstein et al. allude in passing is that LI settings may get in the way, at least initially, of L2 learners setting the parameters of the language to be acquired. At several points, however, this explanation in terms of transfer effects is undercut by the authors themselves, when they stress the importance of universal, as opposed to LI, features in learning a second language. In our earlier work we argue that L2 learners with different LI backgrounds (= LI parameter settings) often have the same difficulties with second language structures, even if their LI would favor their being acquired easily. Thus Turkish learners, with a Subject-Object-Verb (SOV) LI background, still tend to analyze German in L2 acquisition as a Subject-Verb-Object (SVO) system, ignoring the same cues that it is SOV underlyingly to which LI learners catch on automatically. Such differences between child LI and adult L2 acquisition cannot be interpreted as transfer effects. In trying to explain the differences between LI and L2 development let us adopt a restrictive theory of language learning in which "learning" involves the loss of information specified in UG (Lebeaux 1988). A UG parameter, according to this model of acquisition, provides the language learner with a set of options that have to be filled in by experience. Under this restrictive theory, we would expect that once a parametric option (consistent with the available input) has been chosen, the remaining unexercised options are no longer accessible. This constraint implies that the steady final state, that is, the grammar of a particular language, contains less information on parametric options than the initial state. One desirable consequence of this is that it obviates a learnabiliry problem of LI acquisition: parameter re-setting is made impossible, and thus the child may not switch parameter values back and forth never settling on the correct grammar (Randall 1992; Valian 1989). Another consequence is that adult L2 learners (as a result of their LI acquisition) have lost parametric options which are not instantiated in their native language (Clahsen & Muysken 1989). Thus, under this view, the contrast between LI and adult L2 development is real and fundamental: parametric options specified in UG are accessible to LI but not to adult L2 learners. Some empirical findings from comparative L1/L2 acquisition studies indicate that this view might be correct, in contrast to the position the target article seeks to argue for. Consider the following relatively well-established facts from the acquisition of German. Finiteness and verb-second (V2). Verb raising to Comp (= V2) is restricted to finite verbs in German (cf. sect. 3.3.2 of the target article). The same restriction holds for German child language. Despite theoretical differences, there seems to be agreement among LI acquisition researchers that verb raising is available early on, that only finite verbs undergo V2 and that nonfinite verbs almost always appear in clause-final position (Poeppel & Wexler 1993). This is different in adult L2 learners' German. Here nonfinite verbs (= infinitives) are not restricted to clause-final position, but may appear in the same positions as finite verbs, resulting in a general X-V-Y word order system in which V can be filled with finite and/or nonfinite verbs; cf. (44a) in the target article for illustration. This has been shown to hold for L2 learners with different LI backgrounds (cf. Clahsen & Muysken 1989; Vainikka & Young-Scholten 1994, pp. 283ff). Thus morphologically driven syntactic phenomena such as V2 cause major acquisition problems for adult L2 learners, but not for child LI learners. By contrast, L2 learners have no difficulty manipulating constituents such as NP and PP in production. In this sense, constituency and structure-dependency are clearly part of their L2 competence. Finiteness and negation. The negative element (Neg) always precedes nonfinite verbs in German, and in main clauses Neg follows finite verbal elements. These properties are indirect consequences of V2. Several studies have shown that the same distribution holds for early child German (cf. Clahsen et al. 1993, p. 416; Verrips & Weissenborn 1992, p. 287). The ungrammatical pattern [Infinitive + Neg] does not exist, and if there is a finite verb in a child's sentence, it precedes Neg. Again, this is not the case in adult L2 acquisition: Neg may precede or follow finite as well as nonfinite verbs yielding all possible orders, even the [Infinitive + Neg] pattern which is always ungrammatical in German; see the appendix to Clahsen (1984) for examples. Finiteness and null subjects. In nonfinite clauses, that is, infinitives, referential null subjects are allowed in German, whereas in finite clauses they are ungrammatical. In embedded clauses, referential null subjects are also disallowed. The same restrictions hold for German child language. Null subjects are frequent in young children's speech, but they typically occur in sentences with nonfinite verbs (Weissenborn 1992). In embedded clauses with finite verbs and overt Comp, children do not drop subjects (Clahsen et al. 1995). In adult L2 learners of German, however, subject drop does not interact with finiteness distinctions (cf. Meisel 1991). Moreover, results from reaction-time experiments indicate that adult L2 learners of German treat embedded sen-

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tences containing null subjects on a par with the grammatical control sentences (Clahsen & Hong 1995). This again differs from both adult and child German. These findings show that there are close morphology-syntax connections in child LI development: the distinction between finite and nonfinite verbs is relevant for the placement of verbs and Neg and for the distribution of null subjects. In adult L2 acquisition, however, the syntactic phenomena seem to be independent of the morphological ones. How could these differences be explained? Let us assume, following Chomsky (1995), that parametric options of UG are restricted to a fixed set of formal features (F) of functional categories which can be "strong" or "weak" and that overt movement is feature-driven: only strong features need to be overtly raised and checked. From the perspective of acquisition, this implies that the child is equipped with a mechanism for determining whether F is strong or weak in any particular language and that the acquisition of movement is dependent upon morphological properties. Thus, once the child has discovered a lexical entry associated with some feature F in his particular language, by relying on the parametric option, he will determine its feature strength. Subsequently the parameter is set for F and the unexercised option is lost. If F is a strong feature (as in the cases discussed above) movement effects follow. In this way, morphology-syntax correlations such as those mentioned above for child German can be accounted for. Suppose a model along these lines holds for child LI acquisition.' We can then account for adult L2 acquisition without invoking any extra mechanisms. As parametric options, that is [ strong], are lost as a result of LI acquisition, feature strength is left undetermined in the L2. In other words, when L2 learners acquire a lexical entry corresponding to some feature of the target language, there is no mechanism or device that forces them to decide whether the feature is strong or weak. This implies that phenomena such as verb movement and the syntax of subjects are not driven by morphological properties in L2 learning, and that the acquisition of these properties is not determined by UG parameters. In sum, then, the major difference between LI and adult L2 acquisition seems to be that adult learners have lost access to the open parametric options for morphosyntactic features of UG. ACKNOWLEDGMENT We thank Martin Atkinson, Sonja Eisenbeiss, Claudia Felser, Roger Hawkins, Jiirgen Meisel, and Andrew Radford for helpful suggestions in preparing this note. NOTE 1. One consequence of this might be that monolingual and bilingual language acquisition are different; in the latter there is always a first (= dominant) language and a second weaker language. This, however, is a controversial issue: Cutler et al.(1992) and Schlyter (1993) have produced evidence that this is indeed the case, but others, for example Meisel (1994), argue against qualitative differences between bilingual and monolingual acquisition. We will leave this issue open. creolists' enduring puzzles might be somewhat off-base - namely, is it children or adults that are the main agents of creolization? (For a sample of the debate, see Andersen 1983a and, more recently, Wekker 1995.) A number of P/C phenomena seem to stem from fundamental differences between L1A and L2A, for example, the use of L, in L2A. For example, Sylvain (1936) and Lefebvre and Lumsden (1989) have, among others, argued with some success that certain properties of Haitian Creole (HA) originated with some of its West-African substrates, Ewe/Fongbe, and were "passed down" via L2A of French by Ewe/Fongbe speakers. According to Lefebvre and Lumsden s (1989) relexification hypothesis, adult Fongbe speakers, in trying to learn French, kept their Ll syntax and semantics relatively intact while replacing L, lexemes with forms phonologically derived from L2 [See Lumsden (in press) for refinements and Bickerton (1988), Chaudenson (1990), DeGraff (1992; 1993; 1994a; 1994b; 1994c; 1995, in press a), Thomason & Kaufman (1993), etc., for critiques of this hypothesis.] Certain approaches to L2A are similar in spirit to the relexification hypothesis in providing (noncreolizing) L2A instances where L, properties appear to shape the structure of the learner's (early) interlanguage; [see various contributions to Gass & Selinker (1992), and to Flynn et al. (in press)]. (Following L2A-research terminology, let us use the term "transfer" to refer to such L,-to-L 2 influence.) Is the hypothesis put forward in the target article consistent with the effects of relexification and of transfer? Although adult learners bring in "an already functioning L," (Introduction), Epstein et al. explicitly argue for "non-transfer of [L,s] languagespecific aspects" onto the hypothesized L2 grammars (sect. 3.2.4; also see sects. 2.1 and 3.2.2; Flynn 1987). Such L,-onto-L2 mapping is exactly what Lefebvre and Lumsden's relexification hypothesis would lead us to expect, at least in initial L2A stages. Thus, Epstein et al.'s proposal seems inconsistent with relexification in Creole genesis and with transfer in L2A. Adapting ideas on L2A from Schumann (1982) and Andersen (1983b) and on learnabiliry from Lightfoot (1995) might help resolve this apparent inconsistency, along the following (admittedly very tentative) lines. Beyond assuming UG-constrained acquisition, what is also needed, according to Lightfoot (1995), is a learning theory that delineates what triggers are required to set what parameters, and how; cf. Clark and Roberts (1993); Gibson and Wexler (1994). Whether or not such a learning theory applies uniformly across L1A and L2A, what it does naturally require in each case is that the primary linguistic data (PLD) reach a certain threshold T before UG-constrained learning can proceed. In turn, the PLD constitute the source of the triggers used for parameter setting; in absence of adequate triggers, attained settings might differ from the target. In language-contact contexts, factors determining whether T is reached include: range of uses of- and access to - the target language, length of exposure, sociopsychological context, and so on, while factors determining the robustness of triggers include at least the stability and structural complexity of the PLD (Andersen 1983b; Schumann 1982). If target PLD in L2A remain (moderately) below threshold T, then the adult learner might have no other choice but to resort to relexification-like strategies that make crucial use of L, settings, that is, the learner cannot "attempt" to set L2 parameters in absence of adequate PLD from L2. It is presumably in such circumstances that pidgins are created that reflect substrate properties (cf. Bickerton 1977; 1984; Schumann 1982). It can be further surmised that, in the (literally) worst-case scenario for L2A in which the PLD are catastrophic-ally reduced way below T (e.g., when the inter-language communicative contexts are utterly restricted), no UG-based learning can take place. In such "panic" situations, the learner would have no recourse to UG^qua-Li) as he is not even attempting to learn a language, but only innovates some emergency means toward sporadic communication. It is in these contexts that we find "UG-inconsistent" (perhaps context-based pragmatically oriented) modes of commu-

UG and acquisition in pidginization and creolization

Michel DeGraff
Linguistics and Philosophy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139-4307. degrafl@mit.edu

Abstract: I examine the target articles hypothesis in light of pidginization and creolization (P/C) phenomena. L|-to-L 2 transfer has been argued to be the "central process" in P/C via relexification. This seems incompatible with the view that UC sans Li plays the central role in L2A. I sketch a proposal that reconciles the hypothesis in the target article with, inter alia, the effects of transfer in P/C.

If, as cogently argued by Epstein, Flynn, and Martohardjono, UG uniformly plays the central role in L1A and L2A, then one of

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nications, as in jargons and early/pre-pidgins (cf. Bickerton 1984; Roberts 1995; Schumann 1982). What about Creoles - especially properties thereof that differ from their counterparts in the source languages, as partly documented for HA in DeGraff (1992; 1993; 1994a; 1995; in press a)? Given the above, it could be hypothesized that creolization occurs when the PLD (say, from a pidgin and/or the contact languages) adequately meet threshold T, due to the learners age, length of exposure, extended use, and so on. In this case, UG does kick off and uniformly constrains acquisition (independently of LL, if any), as in the target article. Although the PLD in creolization situations are too variable or too structurally reduced to provide robust triggers (Bickerton 1984; Lightfoot 1995; Andersen 1983b, etc.), the learner still attains a relatively stable system, but one whose (default? unmarked?) settings will be partially independent from those underlying the PLD sources. Yet, acquisition being UG-constrained, the resulting Creole is itself fully UG-consistent. In other words, UG irons out the kinks introduced in the PLD by the sometimes conflicting influences from the various source languages and from the pidgin's fledgling morphosyntax (cf. Mufwene 1996); see various papers in DeGraff (in press b) for recent considerations of learnability issues in P/C. To recapitulate, relexification (or UG-qua-Lj) would play a key role in pidginization (= L2A with PLD below T; cf. Bickerton 1977; Schumann 1982) whereas UG without Lj determines the outcome of creolization (= acquisition with "trigger-poor" PLD above T). This scenario allows substrate and superstrate properties to be transmitted into the Creole via the pidgin, with UG acting as a sieve (Mufwene 1996); see DeGraff (in press a) for one case study in this vein. Fleshing out a theory of language change (and of creolization) requires us to pay attention to non-syntactic factors and even to look outside the language faculty toward external factors (Lightfoot 1995; see also Lightfoot: "The Child's Trigger Experience: Degree-0 Learnability" BBS 12(2) 1989). For P/C, these (often elusive) external factors involve the histories, demographies, and socio-linguistics that shape PLD and triggers from the (incipient) linguistic systems in contact (Baker & Come 1982; Bickerton 1984; Singler 1993, etc). But ultimately it is UG that imposes internal order on the (sometimes chaotic) structures of the emerging languages. In this sense, a learning theory such as Lightfoot's (also see Clark & Roberts 1993; Gibson & Wexler 1993) is fully compatible with and enriches Epstein et al.'s proposal, as applied to the P/C case. Thus, I agree with Epstein et al. that L2ers are able to acquire "new parameter settings" (in the sense of sect. 3.2.1; cf. note 23). But, to fully understand how and when this happens and what goes on in the meantime, one does need a learning theory that takes into account (1) the nature of PLD and triggers on a case-by-case basis; and (2) the influence of L, and/or of non-UG cognitive processes in acquisition with overly impoverished PLD, as in P/C. Indeed, if target settings could be acquired with any amount of PLD whatsoever, then jargons, pidgins, and Creoles would not exist. Is it children or adults who are the main agents of creolization? In light of the target article s findings and my speculations above, this question can perhaps be best rephrased as follows: In the P/C context, who was exposed (for how long) to what kinds of PLD and to what kinds of triggers, if any?

Methodological problems with Epstein, Flynn, and Martohardjono's research

Lynn Eubank
Division of Linguistics, Department of English, University of North Texas, Denton, TX 76203. eubank@jove.acs.unt.edu

Abstract: In this commentary, I examine the experiment reported by Epstein et al. in section 5. What I show here is that the experiment is so poorly executed that little, if anything, can be concluded from it regarding the role of UG in L2 acquisition.

Anonymous review is intended to catch shortcomings in academic work, but sometimes "errors" slip through. Alas, with Epstein, Flynn, and Martohardjono, the process allowed an extraordinarily large number of errors. (To name a couple of the more egregious: criticizing the fundamental difference hypothesis (FDH, sect. 2.4) without reference to Bley-Vroman (1990), the more thorough treatment which deals with several of Epstein et al.'s criticisms; or miscasting Vainikka & Young-Scholten (VYS) as a "partial access" hypothesis (sects. 3.3 and 3.4) and then not discussing their central, published work in Vainikka & Young-Scholten 1994.) But rather than dealing with Epstein et al.'s various misrepresentations, I will focus on their work, specifically, the experimental study they present in section 5. Contra Epstein et al., who claim to find strong support in their study for the view they propose, I will suggest that this study does nothing of the sort. In Epstein et al.'s imitation task, learners were provided with lists of lexical entries as a control for lexical knowledge. The crucial - and, apparently, only - criterion in this control procedure is "understanding." This procedure is woefully inadequate: among other things, it fails to take into consideration lexical frequency, long known to play a significant role in lexical access (for discussion of access factors, see, e.g., Garman 1990). Given this problem alone, the error rates in Epstein et al.'s example 62 could just as well reflect the lack of control over factors associated with lexical access rather than those associated with syntactic representation. Indeed, because Epstein et al.'s error procedure (see note 56) tabulates any failure to repeat stimuli verbatim (except for adjectives), this problem is particularly acute. A second important problem with the Epstein et al. design concerns the Japanese-speaking learners themselves: all are assumed to be at a level of competence where one of VYSs earlier stages would obtain, if there are such stages. But how would one really know? In fact, to test the VYS view experimentally, one would have to use independent measures that operationalize the very criteria that VYS themselves employ: use of the various "Auxiliary" elements for the IP stage; use of CP-related items like complementizers for the CP stage. Instead, Epstein et al. use these criteria in their dependent measure, which opens them to the obvious charge that these learners are beyond the relevant VYS stage in the first place and, therefore, that the Epstein et al. results are simply irrelevant. And, indeed, there is indirect, yet suggestive evidence that VYS would be right in such a criticism: the child L2 data in, for example, Gerbault (1978) indicate that VYS s Verb Phrase (VP) stage would be surpassed within the first year of exposure, that is, nearly two years before the point in time at which Epstein et al. examined their child subjects. (As for the Epstein et al. adults, one simply wonders how "graduate students" at an English-speaking university could be considered to be at only the VYS VP or IP stage.) Now consider the Epstein et al. results. (I won't even mention the lack of empirically testable hypotheses that such results would be intended to falsify.) We are told that there are no significant child-adult differences, but from there on we are left to believe in the simple averages in the table in example 62. But simple means may be very misleading. Suppose, on relative-clause stimuli (CP), for example, that a good number of the learners do poorly (e.g., around 10%) while the others do well (e.g., 90%): the mean result for the whole group would fall more or less in the range of the

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Epstein et al. mean. More generally, by failing to provide adequate statistical support and by focusing their discussion only on differences among individual stimulus types rather than on possible differences among subjects, Epstein et al. fail to provide convincing evidence that their data show much of anything at all about learners. Finally, I bring up an old question about the work of Flynn and her colleagues: What does elicited imitation (El) show? Flynn has long maintained that El is essentially "reconstructive" in nature (Flynn 1987; Flynn & Lust 1990), that is, that it is sensitive to specifically grammatical factors; by contrast, Bley-Vroman & Chaudron (1990) argue that El is confounded by processing effects. In this light, consider Epstein et al. who adopt the "reconstructive" view. Taken at face value, this view would suggest that Epstein et al. s results on CP versus IP sentences - even if not confounded by methodological problems - support the VYS view that CP sentences appear later than IP sentences. Of course, Epstein et al. recognize this as a problem and provide their own, alternative understandings (sect. 3.3.2). They then suggest that their overall El error rates derive from some kind of "production problem" that is independent of representational matters. In fact, one could argue that this "production problem" represents the very problem with El: in all likelihood, the task is sensitive not just to representational concerns, but to difficulties in processing as well. Indeed, that El reflects processing is supported by Flynn's (1995) report that native speakers, properly pressured, produce El error rates not entirely unlike those of non-natives. We are, then, left with ambiguity: El results may be interpreted in either way that one just happens to prefer for a given set of data. UC-constrained research on L2 knowledge is, in fact, an exciting area of academic pursuit. Sadly, what we find in Epstein et al. is an article that not only falls well below minimum scientific standards for the area, but also, with its very selective bibliography, fails to represent the vibrance of the field itself. tualized. The no-access hypothesis is a plausible candidate on the old view that a grammar is primarily a set of rules specific to individual languages, rules which are derived through the application of UG to primary data from a particular language. If UG becomes inaccessible in the adult brain, then no natural grammar can be constructed for a new language. This could account for why most adults are so poor at acquiring new languages. The conception of the relation between UG and the grammar of a language has undergone a radical change over the past decade and a half (at least). With the development of the principles and parameters framework of generative grammar (essentially from the late 1970s - see Chomsky & Lasnik 1993; Freidin 1994a; 1994b), rules that seemed to be specific to individual languages have been replaced by more abstract, general rules which obviously belong to UG itself (e.g., Move Category, alias Move a) and whose syntactic behavior is governed by general principles which apply across languages and often to different syntactic constructions. This research has demonstrated that much of what had been thought to require rules specific to particular languages is automatically subsumed under the principles and grammatical mechanisms of UG. Thus under the current view, a natural language grammar consists of the lexicon of the language plus UG with its relevant parameters fixed in accord with the settings for that language. Since there is essentially no way to separate UG from the grammar of an individual language, it must be that adult language users have rather extensive access to UG. A few years ago, Chomsky put forward the bold conjecture that aside from phonetic variation and Saussurean arbitrariness (the phonetic labelling of lexical items), "variation is limited to nonsubstantive parts of the lexicon and general properties of lexical items. If so, there is only one computational system and one lexicon, apart from this limited kind of variety" (Chomsky 1993, p. 3). If this conjecture proves to be correct, then every adult who has acquired a single language has acquired the computational system and lexicon that underlies every other language. The no-access hypothesis cannot be formulated under this view; however, the partial-access hypothesis still can be. In accordance with the current view that the principles and mechanisms of UG must be an intrinsic part of the knowledge attained in first language acquisition, we would expect the same kind of argument for principles of UG in child language acquisition to apply in the case of adult language acquisition - in particular, arguments from poverty of the stimulus. Perhaps the strongest form of poverty-of-the-stimulus argument involves relative grammaticality judgments where all of the examples are judged to be deviant but where speakers can distinguish examples in terms of degree of deviance. Given that language acquisition at any age never involves instruction about degrees of deviance, a demonstration that such differential judgments follow from principles of UG provides a strong argument for the innateness of UG. Epstein et al. discuss the interesting case of differential judgments for English interrogatives by non-native speakers, showing that even non-native speakers can distinguish between degrees of deviance in English as native speakers do - though with less accuracy. To explain why non-native speakers of English perform with less accuracy, the authors suggest that the native language grammar "plays a role in L2 acquisition" (sect. 3.2.2). For example, Chinese does not have overt movement of interrogatives "resulting in the nonapplication of principles like Subjacency and the ECP." Such explanations may be too facile, especially in view of certain analyses in the literature where such movement constraints have been argued to apply to covert u;/i-movement at Logical Form (see Huang 1995). Such analyses would counter one purported argument against a partial-access hypothesis. Given that the principles of UG are part of the computational system for human language, perhaps the most plausible candidate for a partial-access hypothesis would be that adults are unable to make new parameter settings for the acquisition of new languages (cf. Strozer 1994); though it is not clear that this specific hypothesis is what Epstein et al. have in mind (see Otero's commentary,

Adult language acquisition and Universal Grammar

Robert Freidin
Department of Philosophy/Program in Linguistics, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544-1006. bob@clarity.princeton.edu

Abstract: The current conception of the relation between UG and the grammar of a language rules out the no-access hypothesis, but does not distinguish between the full-access and partial-access hypotheses. The former raises the issue of why language acquisition in child and adult should be so different. The evidence presented in Epstein et al.'s target article seems inconclusive regarding a choice between hypotheses.

The target article makes the very strong claim that Universal Grammar (UG), the portion of the human language faculty that presumably accounts.for the rapid growth of a first language in children, is fully accessible to adults for the acquisition of a "second" language. It rejects the hypothesis that adults attempting to acquire a new language have no access to UG and also the hypothesis that such adults have only limited access to UG. It should be noted, however, that the rejected hypotheses can address perhaps the most salient difference between language acquisition by child and adult, namely, that children acquire a language apparently flawlessly and without conscious effort, in contrast to adults who, if they acquire a second language at all, do so only imperfectly in spite of (or maybe because of) considerable conscious effort. Because the full-access hypothesis does not distinguish between child and adult, it offers no basis for explaining this crucial difference. The plausibility of an account of adult language acquisition1 depends on how the relation between UG and the grammar of the target language (i.e., the state of knowledge attained) is concep-

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this issue). They argue against this possibility on the grounds that adults can acquire new parameter settings for new languages. However, this argument is based solely on the so-called headparameter, which is itself determined solely on the basis of abundant positive evidence in the primary language data. The more convincing case would involve variation for parameter settings which affect the operation of UG principles (e.g., the specification of binding domains, cf. Freidin 1992, Ch. 7; see Freidin & Quicoli 1989 for discussion). Thus it seems to me that the choice between a full-access and partial-access hypothesis has yet to be resolved. Nonetheless, this target article raises many important conceptual and methodological issues in the study of adult language acquisition and demonstrates how UG might inform such investigation, and conversely. NOTE 1. I am going to drop the reference to "second" languages because the relevant distinction is child vs. adult, notfirstvs. second. Presumably if an adult has not acquired afirstlanguage as a child, then that adult will be
incapable of acquiring one as an adult. Note that this is another problem for the full-access hypothesis.

UG and SLA: The access question, and how to beg it

Kevin R. Gregg
St. Andrew's University, 1-1 Manabino, Izumi-shi, Osaka, Japan 590-02. gregg@andrew.ac.jp

Abstract: Epstein, Flynn, and Martohardjono trivialize the question of access to universal grammar in second language acquisition by arguing against a straw-man version of the no-access position and by begging the question of how second language (L2) knowledge is represented in the mind/brain of an adult L2 learner. They compound their errors by employing a research methodology that fails to provide any relevant evidence. Although there is no particular reason to believe, pace Epstein et al., that much of consequence for linguistic theory hinges on the successful elaboration of a second language acquisition (SLA) theory, they do address a respectable intellectual problem. Unfortunately, they address it in terms that no respectable problem would tolerate, and the problem walks away from them in a huff. Epstein et al. need at the very least to give an accurate account of competing positions and to provide some cogent evidence in favor of their own. They fail on both counts. Epstein et al. define "having access to UG (universal grammar)" simply as being constrained within the hypothesis space UG provides (n. 5). This leaves a raft of questions untouched. It is consistent with Epstein et al.'s definition, for instance, to claim that parameters cannot be "reset"; after all, the learners LI (1st language) parameter settings are within that hypothesis space. For that matter, Epstein et al.'s position is consistent with an L2 learners flying in the face of the input and setting every single parameter wrong. Restricting the hypothesis space restricts the learner's choices; it .does not guarantee that the choice will be correct. A theory of L2 knowledge is distinct from a theory of L2 acquisition (Gregg 1996); while Epstein et al. accuse their adversaries of ignoring the former (sect. 6, para. 1), they themselves say nothing about the latter. Of the various partial-access proposals in the SLA literature, the Fundamental Difference Hypothesis (FDH; e.g., Bley-Vroman 1989) is the most detailed, and is thus the one to defeat. Epstein et al.'s version of the FDH is a straw man, a vacuous proposal that L2 grammars are created by "analogy." In fact, the FDH claims that adult L2 learners make use of the full panoply of learning processes available to adults in cognitive areas outside of language, "including distributional analysis, analogy, and hypothesis formation and testing" (Bley-Vroman 1989, p. 54).

Epstein et al.'s anti-analogy argument (sect. 2.3) misses the point (as well as making the odd assumption that a learner would see Mj/i-movement strings as analogous to non-movement strings): appealing to "general learning strategies" (including analogy) is intended to account for the virtually universal failure of adults to acquire an L2. LI acquisition cannot be primarily an inductive learning process, because induction is fallible while LI acquisition is not; the FDH takes the very fallibility of SLA as prima facie evidence of the centrality of inductive processes. The FDH may be wrong - I hope it is -but in any case it is not simply an appeal to analogy. Epstein et al. also make heavy weather of Bley-Vroman s rather innocuous claim as to what an adult learner might "expect" of an L2, namely that it would have words, phonemes, and so on. Epstein et al. see this is as a major concession to a full-access position, on the peculiar grounds that UG specifies a definition of "word," a repertoire of phonemes, and so on. The argument thus runs: UG includes X; L2 grammars include X; therefore L2 learners have UG. Affirming the consequent is never a trivial error, but it is especially egregious here, where the very question of how L2 grammars are internally represented is precisely what is at issue. Grammarians are continually revising their characterisations of the contents of UG and of individual grammars. One thing these characterisations have in common (other than being to a greater or lesser degree wrong) is that they are not themselves the contents of UG or of individual grammars. They are part of the general knowledge of the individual grammarians, and are arrived at through non-modular, inductive processes of thinking. Well, if grammarians can do it, why, mutatis mutandis, can't learners? What is to prevent a learner from coming up with ideas - to a greater or lesser degree wrong, of course - as to what counts as a noun in the L2, or a relative clause? Certainly not the fact that UG has a copyright on the terminology. Epstein et al. claims notwithstanding, there is no a priori reason to reject Chomsky's claim that "language-like systems might be acquired through the exercise of other faculties of mind, though we should expect to find empirical differences in the manner of acquisition and use in this case" (1980, p. 28). The access question is an empirical one; to settle it we need compelling evidence. The published SLA literature includes a large body of relevant, albeit inconsistent, evidence; amazingly, Epstein et al. cite virtually none of it. Other commentators will no doubt fill in some of the lacunae, but I must say something about Epstein et al.'s experiment in section 5, as it is typical of the evidential reeds they lean on. Even assuming, counterintuitively, that the subjects, after 3 to 7 years of formal English instruction, are actually still at an early acquisition stage - assuming, in other words, that the experimental results might actually be relevant to Epstein et al.'s claims, what are the results? Simply that the subjects were able to repeat, with some success, sentences instantiating IP and CP. Epstein et al. deduce that their subjects' English grammars also include IP and CP. Since Epstein et al. presumably would not want to attribute a similar knowledge to a talented parrot, they have an obligation to show why successful imitation entails correct syntactic analysis by the imitator (sect. 5.2, para. 4); they do nothing to discharge this obligation, either in the target article or anywhere else in the published literature. Epstein et al.'s "reconstructive" claim is all the less credible given that most of their stimulus sentences could be correctly interpreted without any syntactic analysis, let alone an analysis involving functional categories, simply on the basis of knowledge of word meaning and common sense: flowers do not smell grandfathers, pencils don't say that architects are expensive, and so on. (Conversely, native speakers can parse sentences without knowing the meaning of the lexical items.) To have any confidence that subjects are using their syntactic knowledge to comprehend a sentence, we need sentences like "The boy that the sandwich ate slices the pencil." We should also investigate whether perfor-

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munce varies according to the (un)grammaticality of the stimulus sentence. Access to UG has been a central theoretical and empirical issue in SLA research for the past fifteen years. Epstein et al.'s contribution toward resolving this issue is, literally, nil. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Thanks to Lynn Eubank and Mark Sawyer for helpful comments. speaking Italian friend does not yet show that universal phonological principles are available to L2 learners, otherwise the German L2 learner should be able just as easily to identify his own accent in English, which, as we all know, is much more difficult (and often requires a cooperating English native speaker). My claim is that L2 learners' knowledge and expectations concerning a second language cannot be attributed to any mysterious access to UG but have to do with the fact that L2 learners have acquired the concept of a language (of a grammar) as a result of having learned the meaning of the word by which this concept is denoted in their native language. When people set out to learn chess they expect the chess pieces not to be made from jelly, but such expectations do not derive from access to universal principles of chess but from familiarity with the notion of board game. Regardless of the question of how such a commonsense notion of a language may develop, there is reason to believe that it is highly likely that it will come closer to the Wittgensteinian concept of language than to Chomsky's idea of Principles and Parameters. Thus, should they ever have this expectation at all, L2 learners will not expect the second language to have infinite generative capacity because they have access to UG but because they assume that in principle, they can do in the second language whatever they can do in the first. I conclude that Epstein et al.'s argument in support of the L2 learners access to UG rests on the conceptual confusion of having the concept of language (i.e., "knowing" what a language is) as a result of knowing the meaning of the relevant word in their first language with having access to UG (whatever this is supposed to mean, if it is supposed to mean something different from Llaccess to UG, which it should, as I have tried to demonstrate). Evidence related to the former is mistakenly used as an argument for the presence of UG-accessibility. Once this confusion has been recognized, the paradox that they attribute to Bley-Vroman's (1989) Fundamental Difference Hypothesis dissolves. Other evidence that may help to clarify the notion of L2 learners' access to UG concerns the alleged fact that L2 learners obey universal constraints on movement in cases that are not instantiated in their native language. But again, there is no need to assume inspiration by UG in cases where L2 learners of English whose LI does not have overt u>/i-movement reject English whquestions that exhibit a violation of subjacency. Without dealing with the evidential value of elicited imitation tasks, I only want to point out two things in this connection. First, there is evidence that supposedly "wh-'m situ" languages such as Japanese do in fact have overt tu/i-movement: Watanabe (1992) has tried to show that there is overt movement of a "pure wh -operator" in Japanese. Takahashi (1993; 1994) presents evidence that Japanese has overt whmovement of lexical wj/i-phrases to Spec of CP, and Grewendorf and Sabel (1996) argue that Japanese lexical w/i-phrases may undergo overt operator movement by adjoining to AgrsP. If it is indeed correct that there is overt wh -(operator) movement in "wh-in situ" languages and that this wh -extraction is subject to specific constraints, as demonstrated by Japanese linguists, then Japanese L2 learners of English are at least familiar with the fact that overt iu/i-fnovevnent is constrained in some way, which already suffices to considerably weaken the above mentioned evidence for L2-access to UG. Second, even if the constraints on overt u>/i-(operator) movement in Japanese did not operate the same way as those that apply to the ungrammatical English sentences rejected by Japanese L2 learners of English, this would still not show that L2 learner's judgments are inspired by UG. Languages like Japanese, Korean, or Hindi have other kinds of overt movement of tuli-phrases, which are instances of scrambling, though not necessarily of operator movement. But Japanese long u;/i-scrambling is not possible out of relative clauses (Saito 1992, p. 72), nor is it possible with subjects; and with respect to extraction out of adjuncts, it behaves exactly like tu/i-movement in English (Saito 1985, p. 246). So the Japanese L2 learners rejection of English wh -extraction out of relative clauses and adjunct clauses may well be attributed to his familiarity with similar situations in his native language which arise with other

Does second language grow?

Gunther Grewendorf
Institut fur Deutsche Spmche und Literatur II, UniversitSt Frankfurt/Main, D-60054 Frankfurt, Germany, grewendorf@lingua.uni-frankfurt.de

Abstract: The evidence that L2 learners have full access to UG is not convincing. The following will be shown: (1) The argument that L2 learners "expect" L2 to have particular properties rests on the conceptual confusion of luwing the concept of language (in the sense of knowing the meaning of "language") with having access to UC. (2) The claim that L2 acquisition takes place under the constraints imposed by universal principles lacks empirical support. (3) The assumption that L2 learners assign new parameter values is based on a problematic example and remains unclear.

We all know that we need to learn the grammar of a second language but that we did not need to learn the grammar of our first language. Depending on our talent, on practice, and on the amount of conscious effort we expend, we acquire the grammatical system of a second language to a higher or lower degree of perfection, but acquisition of our first language was achieved in a perfect way independent of talent and effort. In the second language we do not have intuitions of grammaticality nearly as reliable as we do in our native language. In view of these truisms, one is led to conclude that the claim that L2 learners have access to UC cannot be understood as meaning that L2 acquisition proceeds the same way LI acquisition does, namely, by the unconscious fixation of parameters resulting from oblivious confrontation with the facts. What can be meant by Epstein et al.'s claim that UG principles and parameters are fully available to the L2 learner? I want to show that the evidence they adduce against the "no-access" and "partial-access" hypothesis and for their own claim that L2 learners have "full access" to UG does not provide a satisfactory answer to this question. First, the argument that L2 learners "expect" L2 to have particular properties rests on a conceptual confusion. Second, the argument that L2 acquisition takes place under the constraints imposed by universal principles lacks empirical support. Third, the claim that L2 learners assign new values to parameters is based on a problematic example and remains unclear. Turning first to the conceptual problem, it is certainly true that L2 learners have expectations about the nature of the (grammar of the) second language, for example, that it has lexical items ("words"), that there are rules of pronunciation, that there is some sort of morphology, that there are combinatory rules, that a transitive verb requires an object, and so on. Obviously, these expectations need not be the result of mere observation of the native language. The average L2 learner may not be aware of most of the properties of his native language, or his native language may not exhibit the specific properties he expects from the second language (e.g., overt morphology). But to conclude from this fact that these expectations derive from biologically provided constructs of UG is to overestimate the power of the unconscious. I seriously doubt that L2 learners are generally capable of distinguishing between (totally unfamiliar) speech sounds and other noises without having any reason to associate the former with the intention to convey meanings. And even the ability of the German L2 learner of English to identify the Italian accent of his English-

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et al.: Second language acquisition Can UG and L1 be distinguished in L2 acquisition?

Ken Hale
Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139. khale@mit.edu

kinds of movement. L2 learners perform at significantly lower success rates when judging ungrammatical L2 sentences than native speakers. This difference would be unexpected if both were supposed to have the same kind of access to UG. Given that "knowledge" of L2-constraints on movement does not yet show that UG is operative in L2 acquisition in a direct way, let us put the question of "UG accessibility" in the following form. If L2 acquisition were constrained by the principles of UG, it should not be possible for the L2 learner to acquire a "steady state" of knowledge of the second language that violates UG principles. I must admit I see no reason why the L2 learner should not reach a steady state in which principles of UG are violated, and empirical evidence can be adduced that may well support this view. If pidgin is considered to be an instance of a second language, then there certainly exist L2 steady states that violate principles of UG. After all, this is a crucial assumption of certain theories of creolization. If, however, pidgin is not considered as an instance of L2, then the claim that the result of L2 acquisition cannot violate principles of UG is no longer a matter of empirical study, it is true by definition. It accordingly seems that if we want to keep discussing this problem as a question of empirical study, the goal to specify the notion of "possible L2 grammar" can be achieved rather easily: a possible L2 grammar is a "grammar" (a steady state) with which the L2 learner is satisfied. The claim that L2 learners have access to UG is crucially correlated with the idea that L2 acquisition consists largely of assignment of new or additional parameter values. This idea seems to me to be highly problematic for several reasons. In their criticism of the partial-access hypothesis, Epstein et al. refer to the so-called "head-direction parameter," according to which leftheadedness correlates with adjunction to the right (as in English) while right-headedness correlates with adjunction to the left (as in Japanese). The fact that Japanese L2-learners of English show a preference for the postposing of English subordinate adverbial clauses is taken then as evidence that these L2 learners are able to assign a value to the head-direction parameter in conformity with the English value. Contrary to the authors' claim, however, this does not suggest that UG remains available to the L2 learner. First, the head-direction parameter, at least as stated in Fukui (1993), does not exist, since there are subject-verb-object (SVO) languages like Polish and Russian which make extensive use of scrambling in the form of adjunction to the left (see also Grevvendorf & Sabel 1996). Thus the tests that Epstein et al. refer to cannot be taken as evidence for the possibility of assigning new parameter values. Second, even if we consider the other examples of supposed new parameter settings such as the Japanese L2 learners new assignment of the English parameter value for whmovement, it is absolutely unclear in what way this kind of new parameter fixation is supposed to take place. As is obvious from the effort that it takes to acquire a second language, this parameter setting cannot take place in the unproblematic way it does in first language acquisition. But I fail to imagine myself as fixing a parameter consciously. A generative linguist may well be able to do so, but conscious fixation of parameters nevertheless seems to me to be at variance with the very idea of parametrization as it is instantiated by LI acquisition. To avoid misunderstanding I should emphasize that I do not deny that the L2 learner's knowledge of language (his "steady state") can be described, specified, and analyzed in terms of the theory of Principles and Parameters (if only to state incompatibility with UG). What I do deny is that the process by which such knowledge is attained takes place in the way first languages are acquired according to this theory. What I actually cannot deny is the claim that the L2 learner has "full access to UG," because I still fail to see what might be meant by this claim.

Abstract: The contribution to L2-acquisition which comes from UG is conceptually distinct from that which comes from LI (or from LI and L2 jointly), but it is difficult to tease the two apart. The workings of deep, core principles (e.g., locality and subjacency) are so massively evident in LI and L2 as to be of questionable use in the search for the contribution which is purely of UG.

Although I agree with the basic points of the target article, I wonder, with the authors, whether it is possible to distinguish empirically between two of the theories discussed. One of these is the hypothesis (resembling that of Bley-Vroman's fundamental ' difference hypothesis: FDH) to the effect that "domain-specific linguistic knowledge applied to the L2 'comes from the LI.'" The other is the claim (essentially that of Epstein et al.) that this knowledge " 'comes from' the language faculty itself, since it is this very faculty that specifies universally determined knowledge of LI in the first place" (sect. 2.4, para. 3). This seems to me to be the hardest case to make. If knowledge of LI fully represents the fundamental universal principles of the language faculty, then it will be very difficult, perhaps impossible, to detect the influence of UG, as opposed to the domain-specific principles inherent in knowledge of LI, in the acquisition of L2. To persist in the program of eliminating a theory of this type, encouraged perhaps by the conceptually real distinction between UG and its reflection in LI, we must be able to tease the two apart, somehow. This task becomes all the more difficult when L2, the language being acquired, is itself brought into the picture. Surprisingly, this essential component often goes unmentioned in discussions of this sort, but the contribution of positive evidence coming from L2 must surely be enormous. LI and L2 together might, in fact, so thoroughly embody and therefore mask the constraining effect of UG that, for all practical purposes at this stage of our abilities to probe into these matters, the task is impossible. But it is not very useful to be pessimistic. In what follows, I will rarely mention the contribution which L2 makes to the learning process, concentrating on the possible role of LI. Let us assume that UG is active and accessible to the L2 learner, keeping this as a constant. There are at least two possibilities in relation to LI: (1) once acquired and present in an adult, LI is static and unchanging, a "withered leaf," an "appendix," ceasing to function in any positive way in the acquisition of L2; (2) LI functions in the acquisition of L2 as an embodiment of UG, but LI underdetermines UG. In the first case, only UG could be involved in the acquisition of L2 as a system embodying the domain-specific principles of the language faculty, but I think this is an unlikely scenario. My own experience with LI tells me that it is anything but static; it is constantly being influenced, often in nontrivial ways, by other languages. My experience in multilingual communities tells me the same thing. Who is to say, for example, that a Warlmanpa speaker in Central Australia is not "speaking his language properly" if he uses Warlpiri constructions when in a Warlpiri frame of mind (as when translating from Warlpiri, for example) and quite different Warumungu constructions when in a Warumungu frame of mind? Is he only speaking proper Warlmanpa when he is not using these "alien" constructions? The kind of flexibility just described is commonplace in some parts of the world, and it grows in the course of a person's life; it is not all there once LI is acquired. And we are not talking about trivial "extensions," either, but rather such things as the use or non-use of a second-position auxiliary in certain tenses, a hallmark of some Central Australian languages, but not others. These remarks are little more than anecdotes, at this point, but the suspicions behind them make me leery of (1) above.

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Commentary /Epstein et al.: Second language acquisition 1 am not so suspicions of (2). It is easy to imagine that LI might simply not exemplify some aspect of UG. But we have to be careful in two respects. First, and easiest, we cannot invent some outrageous rule and announce, happily, that no L2 learner ever invents it, so learners must be constrained by UG. The L2 learner is surely guided by what is there in L2. It is probably not accidental that no language has a plural-formation rule which adds the "the suffix -s to all and only those nouns that refer to an object weighing less than 40 tons," but no principle of UG precludes this, surely. What about the following? "Add the suffix -sh to animate nouns to form the dual and plural, add the same suffix to inanimates to form the singular and dual." Or the following: "In cardinality DPs, with numerals from 3 through 10, use the feminine for a masculine noun, and vice versa, and use the plural form of the noun; with numerals from 11 through 19, use the singular accusative for the noun, and for the teen subpart of the numeral use masculine for a masculine noun and feminine for a feminine, and for the unit subpart of the numeral, use feminine for masculine, and vice versa." These learnable and attested systems do not obtrude any principles of UG, but they are in some sense "wondrous and outrageous," surely not something a learner of L2 would "invent," unguided by L2 itself. So far as I am aware, no known wondrous system of this sort is inconsistent with principles of UG, although, to be sure, many have forced us to reconsider and revise our theories of particular details of UG, contributing in this way to the goals our general research program. Where do we look then? I think much of the L2 research described in the target article is based upon an idea that seems to me correct, if I actually understand the research and the problem. The procedure is to take well established principles of UG and see whether the L2 learner is constrained by them, independently of LI. Simple enough. Now a principle like Structural Dependency is of little use, since LI will surely reflect it at every turn. Subjacency and the ECP (empty category principle), on the other hand, are useful and are so identified in the literature. But this is where the second cautionary note should be sounded, I think. Subjacency and the ECP are useful because they are typically associated with movement, and languages differ in their use of syntactic, or overt, movement. Thus, it is natural to ask whether a person whose LI lacks syntactic movement will overgeneralize movement in learning an L2 that has overt movement. A reasonable question, since if not, it is reasonable to assume that UG constrains it. The problem with this line of reasoning has to do with LI: Is it true in each such case that the learners knowledge of LI is totally devoid of evidence for the principle? Presumably, this does not matter, if we assume that the learner has access to UG. But that is what we want to show. So ultimately we must show that LI actually lacks the necessary evidence, that domain-specific linguistic knowledge embodied in LI is properly included in UG and that crucial elements of UG are outside LI. Suppose an individual has an LI that lacks U/7i-movement in syntax, that is, lacks overt displacement of u>/i-words in questions, relative clauses, and the like, having u;/i-in-situ instead, as in the experiments reported by Martohardjono. What does it mean if that speaker never "violates" subjacency when learning an L2 which has tu/i-movement, even in the most aggressive and probative experimental situations? Is it "pure and uncontaminated" UG that constrains L2 acquisition in this case? To answer this question, it will be necessary to show that this learners knowledge of LI is entirely devoid of evidence for subjacency. I think it will be difficult to show this. Minimally, we must learn how one answers an LI question of the form "you know the woman [who wrote which book]?" (cf. English, ungramrnatical: "which book do you know the woman who wrote ?"). Do you answer short (e.g., "Gone with the Wind") or long (e.g., ". . . the woman who wrote Gone with the Wind")? If only long, then there is nothing more to say, since the LI question and the ungramrnatical L2 (English) question are not comparable. If the short answer is possible, then we must probe further to see if the LI question in this instance is truly comparable to the ungrammatical sentence of English, or whether it is to be likened rather to what John (Haj) Ross refers to as a "Perry Mason" question (e.g., lawyer to witness: "(and you say) you know the woman who wrote which book"), which can be answered short. The issue here, of course, is whether Logical Form (LF) movement obeys subjacency or not, an issue not definitively settled. If LF and overt syntactic movement are alike in this respect, then it will be extremely difficult, it seems to me, to locate knowledge of subjacency in UG as distinct from LI (or UG as instantiated in LI). Similarly, it seems to me, relations which involve "locality" (e.g., government, affix-hop, the head movement, concord, selection, etc.) are probably so abundantly present in LI that they will be of little use in detecting the separate influence of UG in L2 acquisition. I emphasize that I am assuming that UG is fully active in L2 acquisition, but I argue that it is difficult, if not impossible, to separate UG from LI. I am entertaining the possibility that "to have knowledge of LI is necessarily to have knowledge of UG." The research question is whether this knowledge is fully accessible to learners of L2, always. The research reported in the target article makes a good case for the idea that it is accessible. But before concluding, I would like to suggest another place to look for evidence for the role of UG alone as distinct from LI or UG in combination with LI. I think that the difficulty referred to above pertains to the grand and deep core principles of UG, like subjacency and locality. These determine the essential grammatical structures of LI. Unsurprisingly, therefore, "evidence" of them is everywhere in LI. But this is probably not true of those aspects of grammar customarily thought of as "parametric." Thus, agreement obeys locality, as demonstrated in the target article, but the very existence of overt agreement morphology is parametric. Now let us ask the following question. What is a possible agreement system? This may be a question that LI is not going to have anything at all to say about. Or, returning to numbers, what is a possible system of grammatical number? Suppose English were the only language. Would we be justified in saving that the only possible number system was one that distinguished singular and plural - or perhaps, singular and nonsingular, or plural and nonplural that is, a simple binary system distinguishing "one" from "more than one"? We would probably have little to say about it, in fact, unless we found a language with the so-called "dual number." Then what would we say? Is the universal system of grammatical number defined by a pair of binary features - say, plus/minus singular and plus/minus plural, or some such thing? Or would we suspect that the existing languages represent just the lower end of a "counting system" - singular, dual, plural - which, if we had more information, would yield up richer n-ary systems: singular, dual, trial, quadruple, . . . , plural. What we find, typically, are simple "binary" systems (singular/nonsingular) and simple "three way" systems (singular/ dual/plural). The question now becomes whether the second 'system is really ternary (i.e., limited n-ary) or is it a system of two binary features as suggested above. Either is possible a priori. We need more data. Hopi gives us evidence in favor of the second alternative. While the Hopi noun makes a three-way number distinction, pronouns and verbs each mark a simple binary opposition - singular/nonsingular and plural/nonplural, respectively (using "plural" here to refer to cardinality greater than two). That is to say, Hopi "analyzes" the three-way number system into two binary oppositions. If Hopi reflects the true universal system of grammatical number, and if n-ary systems are not properly a part of UG, then this is something that an individual's LI could be, and typically would be, too impoverished to reveal. And if this is a system constrained by UG, then here is a place where an aspect of UG can be "seen" separately from the grammar of LI. There are many examples of this sort in the parametric systems of natural languages. The interesting cases, of course, are those for which L2 is likewise too impoverished to reveal the constraining effect of UG - English control, the German IP system, and the head-parameter are probably not instances, unless it can be shown

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that L2 itself fails to provide the positive evidence needed to "set the parameters" correctly. The mental structures involved in such systems as grammatical number, the semantic relations embodied in adpositions, in the tense system, in the aspectual system and so on - these seem to me to be things which could well be variously and underrepresented in the overt morphosyntax of any given natural language, and hence in both LI and L2. But are these aspects of grammar constrained by domain specific linguistic principles? How do we determine this? And how do we actually go about determining that an L2 learner is constrained by UG in learning these aspects of grammar? It will not do simply to show that an adult can learn a complex system of oppositions, unless we can also show that the positive evidence present in L1/L2 significantly underdetermines the system actually acquired. We need to know if overgeneration, beyond what is evident in L1/L2, is constrained by UG. This is not an unpromising situation. But we need more information. In addition to more experimental results, we need more information from the linguistic diversity that exists in the world. We simply do not know how diverse the parametric systems are. We really do not know what is and is not possible in domains of the type just discussed, for example. Each new language studied presents us with something new, quite literally, be it something unexpected, forcing a reconsideration of received theoretical proposals, or something confirmatory, suggesting certain refinements in received theory. That is why linguistic diversity is so important to the field. We must take it seriously, and we must not take it for granted - it is disappearing now at an unprecedented rate, with a large percentage of the worlds languages seriously endangered, lacking child speakers, and unlikely to survive through the next century. cance of Ll-acquisition for our understanding of UG fails to faithfully respect the competence/performance distinction. The similarities (and contrasts) between the LI- and L2-domains within the context of the ground-breaking work of Epstein et al. are, I think, quite instructive. It has become commonplace in studies of LI phonological acquisition at least since Jakobson (1941) to view the acquisition process as involving the attainment of ever more complex segments by the child acquirer. The output of young children shows massive "simplification" vis-a-vis adult forms, steadily approximating these more complex targets as acquisition progresses. As a recent textbook on phonological theory puts it, "the un-marked values are the first to emerge in language acquisition and the last to disappear in language deficit" (Kenstowicz 1994, p. 62). It is of some value to ask, in light of the discussion of Epstein et al., what precisely does the "emerge" in the quotation just cited actually mean? Figure 1 below sketches the acquisition process, assuming UG (= So, the initial state), the "primary linguistic data" (PLD) which triggers, over time, changes in that initial state (= acquisition stages), the steadily developing production system (here called simply the "body" in which the grammar is located), and the regularly changing output of the acquiring child (taken from Hale 1995, p. 18). "Emerge" means, of course, appear at some particular stage of the performance output (O) of the organism. As Epstein et al. make overwhelmingly clear, to attribute appearance in the output to the underlying grammar may involve a failure to recognize the filtering effects of the performance system (B) that is, it is an empirical question whether "late emergence" in acquisition is to be attributed to the current knowledge state of the organism or, in the case of an LI-acquirer, to the current state of maturation of the production system. If it turns out that the latter provides the proper explanation (note that the evidence from language deficits - aphasia, for example - would seem to strongly support such an account), then "late emergence" is irrelevant for our understanding of the developmental staging of linguistic competence. What intrigues me about the figure above, transported to the issue of L2-acquisition, is this: whereas we would all readily accept that the "playback" system of the child is undergoing regular maturational development (B, > B 2 > B 3 . . .), this does not seem to be likely in the case of adult acquirers - they would appear to be working with the same "production system" throughout the acquisition process. If this were true, then the "filtering effects" of the performance system (B) would be constant and could not be used to account for differences in output in L2-acquisition.

Competence and performance in language acquisition

Mark Hale
Department of Modern Languages and Linguistics, Concordia University, Montreal, PQ, Canada H3H 1Z8. hale1@alcor.concordia.ca

Abstract: The implications of Epstein et al. s critical evaluation of much of the existing literature on L2-acquisition extends far beyond the domain they discuss. I argue that similar methodological clarification is urgently needed in analyses of the role of UG in Ll-acquisition, as well as in discussions in such seemingly "distant" areas as the study of language change. The target article provides compelling evidence that, within UGbased approaches to the study of L2-acquisition,1 several a priori plausible hypotheses about the accessibility of UG to adult acquirers (the "no access" and "partial access" hypotheses) are not supported by the empirical evidence. A key component of Epstein et al.'s argument is that existing approaches to the important question of UG-accessibility are marred by a failure to heed the crucial distinction between the output of the grammar (a representation) and the output of the organism (an utterance), that is, the distinction between the products of "linguistic competence" and those of "performance." Since the theory of UG is concerned only with the former, this failure severely undermines the relevance of studies such as that of Vainikka and Young-Scholten (1991) - explicitly asserted as being about UG - for the question at hand. It is not clear at present which cognitive (and/or physiological) systems ^intervene between the grammar and production, nor precisely what types of effects they can have on the output of the grammar. However, it is important to point out, as mentioned but (appropriately) not particularly emphasized by Epstein et al., that precisely the same issues arise in the study of Ll-acquisition. As is the case with literature on the role of UG in L2-acquisition (as surveyed by Epstein et al.), much of the literature on the signifi-

su ^*
s,
L'" 1

s2
B, B. B3

s,

0:

o,

o4

Figure 1 (M. Hale). Staging of the Grammar (S), the Production System ("body," B), and the Output (O).

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Commentary /Epstein et al.: Second language acquisition Epstein et al. provide compelling evidence that the assumption that the production system is constant during L2-acquisition is false. Upon deeper consideration (inspired by the target article), it is clear why this is so: the label "B" covers a set of cognitive systems, operating in real time. Whereas in the case of Llacquisition the most salient aspect of these systems is their maturational development over time (which, at least in its most physiological manifestations, is patently obvious). Epstein et al. make it clear that the "filter" B is also affected by issues such as processing load (in particular, distraction of the relevant cognitive systems by parallel tasks), current physiological state and conditions, and so on. It is clear that such factors also play a key role in accounting for certain aspects of Ll-acquirer's output (e.g., its variability), though they tend to be overshadowed in discussions of that output by maturational considerations. It is, in this regard, helpful to look at the account offered by Vainikka & Young-Scholten (VYS) for the 6-16% of utterances produced by their VP-stage subjects which do not actually fit the "VP-stage" (target article, sect. 3.2.2). You will recall that VYS claim that these utterances reflect the fact that the acquirers are "in the process of entering" the IP-stage. As Epstein et al. properly point out, the grammar is a knowledge state - it is the speakerhearer's current competence to generate linguistic representations. As such, it cannot be "in process" (one either is or is not in a particular knowledge-stage). It seems clear from the Figure 1 that the source for variable output, once the grammar is excluded, is to be sought in differences in the real-time state of the processing system. Finally, this in turn has implications for similar claims in historical linguistics. It is common to come across claims that a particular language was "in process" between, for example, word order X and word order Y. Since, under modern assumptions, language = grammar, such assertions cannot be correct. All grammatical output must be able to be generated by the current knowledge-state (= grammar). Hale (1995) develops these implications further. NOTE
1. It is clear to me from my own contact with cognitive scientists working in a variety of subdisciplines that the assumption of an innate UG is by no means universally held. It is important to realize that the work discussed by Epstein et al. explicitly adopts and invokes such a model. The issues which arise when confronting the question of the continued accessibility of UG in L2-acquisition are simply irrelevant for scholars whose work assumes there is no such thing as UG (attributing, e.g., Llncquisition to "general learning strategies" and "analogy"). As Epstein et al. point out, a host of other issues do arise for such scholars, none of which has been explicitly dealt with in the literature.

L2 access to UG: Now you see it, now you don't

Michael Harrington
Centre for Language Teaching and Research, University of Queensland, Brisbane 4072 OLD Australia, mwharr@cltr.uq.oz.au

Abstract: The confirmatory nature of the empirical evidence used to establish UG effects in L2 development is considered. Specific issues are also raised concerning the internal validity of Epstein et al.'s findings. It is concluded that the role of UG in adult L2 development will only be established when researchers better understand the interaction between the development of UG-constrained structural knowledge and the development of overall L2 proficiency. At issue is the extent to which innate, human language-specific knowledge (UG) constrains L2 development. Epstein et al. address this issue in terms of the learner's access to UG structures X,, X2, Xn, accessibility being used interchangeably with constraint. According to the "full access" view, the full range of UG principles and parameters available to the LI child learner, are, in principle,

available to the L2 child or adult learner. As the authors make clear, this does not mean that adult L2 development is fully explained by UG, which is posited to constrain only the development of the core grammar. The role of UG in the development of the adult L2 core grammar is obscured by the fact that there is significant variation in ultimate learning outcomes among adult L2 learners (Birdsong 1992). These differences are apparent in core and non-core aspects of the grammar - both within and between learners - and, prima facie, are not expected if UG is a biologically determined, modularly encapsulated process like vision. Given this variability, researchers attempting to establish the empirical effects for UG must take a confirmatory tack in data interpretation. In the study reported here, for example, response rates of 60% on functional category structures are considered consistent with the full access view, as these core grammar structures are apparently unavailable in the participants' LI Japanese. The remaining 40% of responses are then attributed to largely unspecified non-UG factors and processes, for instance, computational demands, memorial resources, and affective factors. The now-you-see-it, now-you-don't nature of the empirical evidence thus requires a compelling theoretical account of the results. A major obstacle to testing for UG effects is the fact that the adult L2 subjects must be proficient enough in the non-UGconstrained aspects of the L2 to perform the grammaticality judgments, elicited imitations, and so forth, on structures that are designed to test such effects. The problem of circularity between proficiency as a result of a UG-constrained developmental process or the cause of the correct (= native-like) responses can be minimized by dissociating UG structure effects from overall proficiency. Epstein et al. attempted to do this by testing subjects who were putatively at the early stages of L2 development. The ability of child and adult L2 learners to correctly imitate 60% of the functional category sentence stimuli, despite having "early grammars" (sect. 3.3.2, para. 2) was presented as evidence supporting a "full access" role for UG. As Epstein et al. report no independent measures of proficiency in the study, it is debatable whether the adult Japanese participants were, in fact, at the early stages of L2 development. The level of English required for international students in the United States to gain admittance to extremely competitive institutions like MIT is usually beyond the "early stages" of L2 acquisition. A score upwards of 600 is typically required on the standardized Test of English as a Foreign Language (TOEFL), which requires an extremely strong command of English, particularly structure, which Japanese students get in junior high and high school, and which makes up an important part of the entrance examination to the upper tier universities from which a Japanese graduate student at MIT typically comes. That the adults were enrolled in a "low intermediate" ESL class (sect. 3.3.2, C) may say more about the relative sophistication of ESL classes offered in Cambridge than about the participants' grammatical knowledge. Another way to demonstrate that UG constraints are available to adult learners is to show similar responses by the child and adult learners. Epstein et al. report a null effect on an ANOVA comparing the two groups, though the design was not given. Care must be taken in arguing conceptual significance for a statistical null effect, the latter merely indicating that both samples had the same amount of variability. As little detail was provided (e.g., experimental effects, item effects), it makes the reported null effect difficult to interpret. The fact that 58% of the adults were able to imitate the stimulus sentences may mean that half the adults got both tokens of each structure, suggesting full access for some, but not others; or that all the subjects got one token each, resulting in strong item effects. Likewise, for the 60% correct response rate by the children, with the possibility that there are between-group asymmetries. The error analysis reported ostensibly addresses this issue, but the same lack of detail is a problem; for example, what is an "error on the functional category" (sect. 3.3.2)? To be sure, the complex nature of the question means that a single study cannot

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hope to resolve the issue. However, a basic coin of experimental research is internal validity, and in its absence the results must be questioned, as Epstein et al. did with Vainikka & Young-Scholten findings. Even with these important methodological caveats, the authors are not wrong in stating that the range of evidence is consistent with the "full-access" view, in that all the subjects produced the non-Ll UG structures, at least some of the time. The issue, however, remains concerning when there is "enough" evidence to conclude that a constraint is operative, and will not be answered until the nonUG effects that contribute so heavily to performance outcomes, that is, computational deficits, can be specified and related to the UG structures in question (Juffs & Harrington 1996). Finally, given the multi-disciplinary audience for this target article, it is important to underscore the fact that the theory under discussion is a theory of formal constraints on the development of L2 knowledge, and not a complete theory of L2 acquisition. Although the development of the grammatical knowledge constrained by UG is a crucial aspect of L2 development, the more important question for the development of general theory of L2 acquisition is how this structural knowledge interacts with other aspects of the learning process. It is not until more is done on this front that we will be able to understand the extent to which UG constrains L2 acquisition.

John John
Figure 1 (Kanno). Tree diagram.

yonda read

In support of the early presence of functional categories in second language acquisition

Kazue Kanno
Department of East Asian Languages and Literatures, University of Hawaii, Manoa, Honolulu, HI 96822. kanno@uhunix.uhcc.hawaii.edu

Abstract: This commentary focuses on whether the full set of categories is available to beginning L2 learners. After critiquing Epstein et al.'s experimental evidence for the presence of functional categories, I outline the results of an experiment involving English speakers learning Japanese as a second language that does indeed point toward the early presence of fuuctional categories. Epstein, Flynn, and Martohardjono argue that the full set of lexical and functional categories is available to L2 learners at all stages of acquisition, in accordance with the strong continuity hypothesis. This view is worth pursuing, if only because it constitutes the null hypothesis. As even proponents of the weak continuity hypothesis (e.g., Vainikka & Young-Scholten 1994) acknowledge, there is no obvious reason why adults should lack functional categories in their L2 structural representations. (Unlike the case of LI acquisition, for example, maturation cannot offer an explanation for the early absence of functional categories.) In order to test the full-access hypothesis properly, it is necessary both to work with subjects who are unquestionably in the early stages of acquisition and to consider a phenomenon that clearly involves the presence of functional categories. Epstein et al.'s task (reported in sect. 5) meets neither of these conditions, since they work with subjects who have had several years of English instruction (an average of 3 years for the children and 7 years for the adults) and who have had a significant period of residence in an English-speaking country. Moreover, although Epstein et al.'s argumentation is based on the assumption that an elicited imitation task can be used to examine the structural knowledge of L2 learners, they offer no independent evidence that the Japanese subjects assign the same structural representations to the test sentences that native speakers of English do. Even granting that elicited imitation can shed light on structural knowledge, one could easily question Epstein et al.'s assumption that modal verbs are transparently instances of Infl and that topicalization requires the presence of a CP projection. For example, Hyams (1986) claims that modals are

instances of V in Italian, and Baltin (1982) argues that topicalization is adjunction to IP. (Lasnik and Saito 1992, p. 78, are cited in support of the claim that topicalization involves the CP projection, but they actually propose that matrix topicalization can involve either movement to SPEC of CP or IP adjunction.) In addition, since VP is a possible adjunction site for leftward movement in Japanese, there is no reason to assume that Japanese speakers believe that English topicalization involves adjunction to a functional category rather than to a VP (with an internal subject). Let us consider a somewhat different approach to the study of functional categories in early SLA. In Japanese, the subject and direct object are marked by case particles which contrast in terms of their omissibility: the objective can be freely "dropped" while the nominative cannot. (1) Nominative case particle g is missing 'John 0 sono hon o yonda John that book Ac read 'John read that book.' (2) Accusative case particle o is missing John ga sono hon 0 yonda. John Nm that book read 'John read that book.' Fukuda (1993) suggests that we can account for this contrast in a straightforward fashion by assuming (a) that the case particles are syntactic heads (instances of the functional category 'K,' which is presumably not found in English) and (b) that null case is a type of empty category and therefore subject to the empty category principle (ECP). (3) The Empty Category Principle Nonpronominal empty categories must be properly governed. Null case in a direct object phrase can be lexically governed by the verb, but no proper governor is available for null case in a subject phrase (since INFL is not a lexical head), as the tree in Figure 1 illustrates. Kanno's (in press) study of case drop in SLA contains data relevant to the presence of functional categories in beginning L2 learners. The study involved 26 American college students who were enrolled in a first-year Japanese course. At the time of the experiment, they had had approximately 13 weeks of instruction, with 250 minutes of class time per week. An examination of the instructional material and interviews with the instructors revealed that the students had received no information about the subjectobject asymmetry in case drop. (Most of the class time was devoted to the development of speaking, listening, reading, and writing skills, including mastery of the two Japanese syllabaries.)

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Subjects were presented with a variety of transitive sentences containing different combinations of overt and null case and asked to rate the naturalness of these patterns on a scale of 1 (unnatural) to 3 (natural). The subjects exhibited a strong, statistically significant preference for null objective case over its nominative counterpart (2.49 vs. 1.71), consistent with the UG principle. Indeed, their performance was not significantly different from that of a native speaker control group. This suggests both that the L'2 learners are able to use the ECP for a phenomenon that has no counterpart in their native language and that their structural representations contain the functional categories (here K) to which this principle applies. Claims about L2 learners' syntactic knowledge and representations (including those proposed here) are necessarily theorydependent and encounter many methodological problems. Nonetheless, I believe there is evidence for the early presence of functional categories, justifying further research on this subject. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Thanks to William O'Grady and Kevin Gregg for comments. we must have a subject before a verb, hence "-null subject"; in Chinese we can omit the subject of a sentence when the context is clear, hence "+null subject"); and (5) many errors that we observe with L2 learners are errors not due to UG parameters but are due to the influence of LI properties (e.g., subject-verb agreement errors and word order arrangement errors produced by Chinese learners of English). I think no one would want to deny that as distinct groups, child LI learners and adult L2 learners display qualitative differences in their ultimate control of the target language. Related to the above question is the fact that there are also individual differences among L2 learners in how well they acquire a second language. Again, if L2 learners have full access to UG principles and if UG serves as a solution to "the logical problem in L2 acquisition," why can some L2 learners acquire their second (or even third) language to near-native proficiency while others can barely produce complete sentences after even years of exposure to the language? One might be tempted to say that the latter are not motivated to learn the language, or that they are too old to learn it. But, then we are using UG-external factors to account for individual problems to which UG does not give uniform solutions. How much weight are we going to assign to UG versus non-UG factors in accounting for the learners' ultimate performance? Individual differences of the kind observed in L2 are rare among children, because children uniformly seem (at least according to UG theory) to acquire their first language to native proficiency no matter where they grow up and what language they learn (not counting putative feral child cases like Genie). In order to address these two issues, I think that Epstein et al. need to give strong empirical evidence showing that (1) the differences between LI and L2 acquisition are indeed not due to variability in the accessibility of UG, and that (2) there is a causeeffect relationship between UG constraints and L2 learners' linguistic behavior. I don't think that we are provided with such evidence, or even that it is possible for Epstein et al. to provide such evidence, given the state of the art in L2 research. We are told by Epstein et al. that L2 learners are sensitive to some grammatical violations (in grammaticality judgment) and are able to repeat some formalized sentences (in elicited imitation). However, grammatically judgment, elicited imitation, or the like at most tell us whether L2 learners are sensitive to certain parameters; even there the results are often consistent with alternative explanations. Consider the experiment in which an L2 learner judges the grammaticality of the sentence "Which man did Tom fix the door that had broken?" sect. 3.2.2, Ex. 20a). The learner could reject such sentences on a number of grounds, for example, that the phrase "which man" cannot be assigned a sentence constituent (something they had learned in school about English ujfc-questions), or that they have never heard of a question with the structure 'Wi-element + auxiliary + subject noun + verb + object noun + relative clause." Moreover, how can one tease apart the constraints of UG from the influence of the learner's L2 experience in a grammaticality judgment task or an elicited imitation task? This becomes more difficult when one uses subjects who have substantial linguistic experience in L2 (as have the "advanced" students who have studied in the United States, or children who have lived in Massachusetts for 3 years in Epstein et al.'s experiments sects. 3.2.2 and 5.1). There are too many degrees of freedom in accounting for Epstein et al.'s data, and it is not clear to me that there is a direct link between UG principles and the experimental patterns they observe. Epstein et al. argue that UG allows us to describe the knowledge base of the L2 learner, that is, the end-state grammar. They insist that the no-access hypothesis "fails to distinguish between what the L2 learner knows (content of grammar) and how he attains this grammar (process)" (sect. 2.3, para. 1). However, it seems that Epstein et al.'s full-access hypothesis fares no better in this regard because it tells us at best what the learners possess (the

Why don't L2 learners end up with uniform and perfect linguistic competence?
Ping Li
Department of Psychology, University of Richmond, VA 23173. plng@urvax.urich.edu

Abstract: Children in a given linguistic environment all uniformly acquire their target language, but adult learners of L2 do not. UG accounts for children's uniform linguistic behavior, but it cannot serve a similar role in accounting for adult learners' linguistic behavior. I argue that Epstein et al.'s study does not answer the question of why L2 learners end up with nonuniform and imperfect linguistic competence in learning a second language. Epstein, Flynn, and Martohardjono propose that UG is available to L2 learners wholly, in all of its power, and in the same way as it is available to LI learners. This proposal is thought-provoking, but as it currently stands, I see major gaps between theoretical exposition and empirical evidence and between UG principles and L2 learners' linguistic behavior. Epstein et al. undertake a lengthy analysis of the alternative hypotheses and subsequently reject them, but they provide little solid empirical grounds to support their own position. Their strong argument leaves many fundamental issues unanswered, two of which I will focus on here: (1) the differences between child LI and adult L2 acquisition, and (2) individual differences among adult L2 learners. My first question: If adults can indeed "grow" a language with the right UG parameters as children, why don't they all end up with the same linguistic competence in L2 as children in LI? In LI, UG serves as a solution to the "logical problem of language acquisition," that is, limited and "degenerate" input from the linguistic environment can trigger parameter setting for a particular language, resulting in a productive grammatical system. Here, UG principles are not explicitly taught to children who learn their LI by natural exposure to the language. Children, given a linguistic environment for a limited number of years, all learn their target language (LI, L2, or L3) without much trouble. Apparently, motivating a similar account for adult L2 is difficult, because (1) adult L2 learners may receive rich and systematic input through formal instruction; (2) unlike children, adult learners approach the L2 task at different ages, with different linguistic backgrounds and using different learning methods; (3) most, if not all, adult learners fail to achieve perfect linguistic competence in a second language, no matter how hard they try and for how long; (4) there is no empirical evidence that UG principles cannot be taught or are not actually taught in classrooms (e.g., in English

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et al.: Second language acquisition by growth? In the Principles and Parameters model, UG constitutes the biological endowment which, via domain-specific learning procedures, selects the triggers which determine its growth into an I-language. Is it possible to maintain that this embryo remains intact once the actual LI learning process originates a mental structure? But even if it does remain intact, since UG principles are realized in all natural languages, it may be impossible to determine whether it is the UG principles or the I-language principles which are available to an adult. Thus, it may be difficult to determine whether adults access UG principles or I-language principles. 2. Even under the assumption that "grown" UG principles are as active as their embryo counterparts, we still have to deal with the proposal that parameter-setting may not be accessible to adults because it relates to the UG lexicon which is the sub-module subject to maturation (Ouhalla 1993; Tsimpli & Rousseau 1991). Assuming that parameters are defined as ( features) of functional categories, the selection procedure that responds to the environment trigger (the LI data) may not be available for adult L2 acquisition. In other words, adult L2 learning may be blind to the () features which trigger primary language acquisition. If this is the case, adult L2 learners will not instantiate the various properties of a given parameter on the basis of the () of the functional categories but will project a non-native grammar via, for instance, local re-structuring. Consequently, the various properties associated with a given parameter in an I-language may be displayed in a non-native grammar. Non-native grammars will not be I-languages however, because they are not the result of the selection procedure (parameter setting) which characterizes an I-language. 3. If the mind does not begin with pre-specified modules but undergoes a process of modularization (Karmiloff-Smith 1992; see also multiple book review of Beyond Modularity BBS17(4) 1994), how will this affect L2 learning? It seems to us that something along the lines of the process of "representational redescription," the process by which information that is in a cognitive system becomes progressively explicit knowledge to that system, could play an important role in L2 acquisition. In fact, it could explain the "age factor phenomenon" which, unlike the "critical period hypothesis" has not been challenged. In other words, both UG principles and parameter-setting may be subject to "representational redescription" and consequently, nonprimary acquisition will progressively ("the age factor") differ from primary acquisition. Furthermore, parameter-setting will be gradually displaced by local restructuring, which might be closely related to "representational redescription." 4. UG principles such as overt versus covert instantiation of whmovement do not seem to be the kinds of constructs that will provide evidence for UG accessibility. As Epstein et al. argue, analogy cannot explain the results obtained by Martohardjono (1991) with respect to the instantiation of tt>/i-movement in the English non-native grammar of Chinese and Indonesian speakers. However, this in itself does not exclude the LI as the source of knowledge, because w/i-movement applies covertly (at the level of logical form) in Chinese and Indonesian. Thus, the L2 data should provide enough evidence for projecting a non-native grammar with overt uj/i-movement. Hence, perhaps constructs such as the parametrized [] features, which account for language variation, will provide us with insights as to the differences between LI and L2 acquisition.

content), but not how they come to possess it (the process). To Epstein et al., what implies how, since UG is biologically determined. It is like saying: UG leads to end-state grammar with the right parameter settings for both children and adults, but don't ask me how, because UG is innately given. At one point, Epstein et al. say that it is difficult to distinguish empirically the claim of direct access to UG and the claim of access to UG via LI (sect. 2.4). The difficulty arises, I think, because the UG account of L2 does not allow us to tap into the underlying processes governing L2 acquisition. The difficulty also poses a serious question related to my my earlier point: How can we test the role of UG empirically in L2ithrough rigorously controlled experiments? In sum, I Ihink that there is more to be said about the relationship between UG principles and L2 acquisition, but I don't think that Epstein et al. have provided us with strong lines of theorizing or rigorous methodology in testing UG principles in L2 acquisition. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to thank Liz Bates, Michael Bond, Francois Grosjean, and Thomas Lee for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this
commentary.

To "grow" and what "to grow," that is one question

Juana M. Liceras
Department of Modern Languages, University of Ottawa, Ottawa, Ontario, KIN 6N5, Canada. jliceras@aix l.uottawa.ca

Abstract: L2 learners may access UG principles because these are realized in all natural languages. Since this is not the case for the parametrized aspects of language, parameter setting may be progressively replaced by restructuring mechanisms which are specifically related to the process of representational redescription because L2 learners are not sensitive to the [] features which define parameters. Epstein, Flynn, and Martohardjono have done us a great service in opening the discussion on the nature of second language acquisition to the interdisciplinary community because the discipline and some of its tenets cannot but benefit from being exposed to healthy scrutiny. While I agree with the authors that arguments against the availability of UG in L2 acquisition are not strong and that the discussion becomes fussy both in terms of the vocabulary used and the manipulation of the data, I believe that the actual problem is far from being as transparent as they mean to present it. First, it is not clear how the formula L2 acquisition = LI acquisition minus maturation would work. Namely, is there any "growing" that affects UG? Second, while principles are supposed to be realized in all natural languages, parameters account for variation and are clearly related to differences among languages. Thus, it is possible that parameter-setting is related to maturation or growth and consequently not available as such to the adult learner. Third, will the selection procedure which accounts for LI acquisition (Piatelli-Palmarini 1989) be immune to growth? That is, if UG constitutes the basis for the "language instinct" (Pinker 1994), should it not grow into a unique mental structure that would shape any subsequent development? Fourth, not all linguistic constructs are relevant for addressing the issue of the possible idiosyncrasy of L2 grammars. 1. The fact that maturation does not affect adult L2 acquisition is in itself a fundamental distinction which will determine the overall nature of the learning procedure. In Epstein et al.'s model of the relationship between UG and a given "core grammar," UG remains constant and accessible (Fig. 4). That is, maturation does not affect UG. But is this UG the actual initial state? Are they proposing that UG as a mental representation is not at all affected

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Universal Grammar and critical periods: A most amusing paradox

Philip Lieberman
Cognitive and Linguistic Sciences, Brown University, Providence, Rl 029121978. lieberman@cogvax.cog.brown.edu

Abstract: Epstein et al. take as given that, (1) a hypothetical Universal Grammar (UG) exists that allows children effortlessly to acquire their first language; they then argue (2) that critical or sensitive periods do not block the UG from second language acquisition. Therefore, why can't we all effortlessly "acquire" Tibetan in six months or so? Data concerning the neural bases of language are also noted.

tion. It is clear that the brain regions that are activated by words depend on the intrinsic properties of the concepts coded by the word (Martin et al. 1995). In short, the neural underpinnings of the lexicon are not localized to a linguistic lexicon coding prepositional logic; they are distributed and reflect knowledge of the real world coded throughout the brain. Nor can a clear case be made for "universal phonetics." The supposedly innate phonetic contrasts cited in section 2.2 can be "acquired" by a comparatively simple simulation of associative distributed neural networks modelled on current knowledge of neocortical physiology; it can "learn" to identify the formant frequency patterns that specify stop-consonants in syllables like [ba], [da], and [ga] (Seebach et al. 1994).

The primary argument for the existence of Chomsky's hypothetical Universal Grammar (UG) is that though all normal human children raised under reasonable circumstances effortlessly acquire a particular language or languages, it has become apparent that only a small subset of the sentences of any language can be described by means of the algorithms used by linguists. As Jackendoff (1994, p. 26) notes,
Thousands of linguists throughout the world have been trying for decades to figure out the principles behind the grammatical patterns of various languages. . . . But any linguist will tell you that we are nowhere near a complete account of the mental grammar for any language.

Language is learned
Brian MacWhinney
Department of Psychology, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA 15213. macwhinney+@cmu.edu

The obvious difficulty that adults have in acquiring new languages after puberty has been ascribed to the existence of a "critical" or "sensitive" period within which the brain retains "plasticity" allowing the UG to function, or alternatively to allow new learned cognitive-motor "programs" to become instantiated neurally (e.g., Bates et al. 1992; Lieberman 1991). This effect of age on the acquisition of grammar has been documented by Johnson and Newport (1989) and is apparent on any university campus. People of "a certain age" generally find it impossible to acquire a second language at "native" proficiency. Epstein, Flynn, and Martohardjono dispute these findings and argue that the hypothetical UG is available in second language learning. So, a most amusing paradox emerges. If the UG allows young children to acquire languages effortlessly without formal instruction and this target articles argument is correct, why can't we all learn to speak Tibetan with native proficiency? I will not address the question of whether UG exists here (cf. Lieberman 1991), but a few comments concerning the biology of language are warranted. The lateralization of the human brain is not, in itself, an index for the "language area of the brain" (sect. 2.1). Brain lateralization is a "primitive" feature; the brains of frogs are lateralized to control their vocalizations (Bauer 1993). Moreover, studies of brain lateralization are not central to the issue of sensitive periods. Neurophysiologic and behavioral studies of many species demonstrate, beyond reasonable doubt, that many of the neural substrates that regulate behavior are shaped phenotypically, that is, in response to environmental stimuli within "sensitive" periods, which in some instances terminate in an abrupt manner yielding "critical" periods. Edelman (1987) reviewed this issue. Subsequent data confirm that critical periods exist. Neuroanatomical experiments, for example, show that inputs to visual cortex develop in early life in accordance with visual input; different visual inputs yield different input connections (Hata & Stryker 1994). The concept of a "language area of the brain" is itself an anachronism. It is apparent that distributed neural circuits involving neuroanatomical structures throughout the brain regulate language (Lieberman 1991; Mueller 1996). Studies of intact human subjects using Positron Emission Tomography, for example, show that naming pictures of both animals and tools activated the ventral temporal lobes and Broca's area. Tool names activated a left premotor area (also activated by imagined hand movements) an area in the left middle temporal gyms also activated by action words. In contrast, animal names activated the left medial occipital lobe, a region involved in the earliest stages of visual percep-

Abstract: Epstein et al. attribute second language learning to the forces of transfer and language universals. They show that transfer is minimally involved in certain types of learning and therefore conclude that universals are involved. However, they forget to consider the important role of learning in second language acquisition.

Any basic textbook on second language learning makes it clear to the reader right at the beginning that there are three potential sources of second language linguistic knowledge. These three sources are transfer, language universals, and learning. The latter is often referred to as "L2 generalization." Bypassing this tradition, Epstein et al. assume that the only plausible sources of L2 structures are transfer and universals. Since speakers of languages as different as Japanese and Spanish behave similarly when judging complex English sentences for grammaticality, they conclude, reasonably enough, that LI>L2 transfer cannot be the source of this knowledge. This leaves them with only one possible source for second language learning Universal Grammar. However, the conclusion that they reach is far from inescapable. Epstein et al. ignore the obvious possibility that the learners enrolled in their experiments might be basing their grammaticality judgments on the facts they have learned about their new language, rather than on the urgings of UG. In other words, Epstein et al. ignore the third possible source of second language knowledge, that is, the role of L2 learning. The exclusion of this third potential factor is not an accidental omission. It is clear that Epstein et al. believe that neither a first nor a second language is learned in the usual sense. After all, they argue, language learning through mechanisms such as distributional analysis, operating principles, analogy, or hypothesis testing involves nothing more than the application of "strategies." According to their analysis, real language identification requires parameter-setting, rather than strategy application, since strategies can never identify the parameters that underlie language competence. Therefore, according to Epstein et al., students of second language learning can safely ignore learning and restrict their attention to the impact of transfer and universals on second language learning. Robert Bley-Vroman has been singled out as the principle source of the notion that second languages may be learned. However, there are dozens of researchers in cognitive psychology who have been exploring the possibility that both first and second languages are learned on the basis of exposure to primary linguistic data. These researchers have used both symbolic systems (Ling& Marinov 1993) and connectionist networks (MacWhinney & Leinbach 1991; MacWhinney et al. 1989) to model the learning of all aspects of language development. Most recently, it has become clear that the various arguments regarding the "poverty"

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of the linguistic stimulus as a motivation for a belief in Universal Grammar fail to stand up against the facts of first language acquisition and the capabilities of connectionist modeling (MacWhinney 1993). The Competition Model of MacWhinney and Bates (1989) provides a particularly clear alternative to the analysis promoted by Epstein et al. Moreover, this alternative analysis has been articulated fairly thoroughly as an account of second language learning in adulthood (MacWhinney 1996b). The Competition Model emphasizes the role of transfer and L2 learning as the primary determinants of second language acquisition, while minimizing the importance assigned to language universals. This account has been supported in dozens of empirical papers examining second language learning in Dutch English, English > Dutch, Japanese English, English > Japanese, Italian > English, German English, English > Russian, Chinese > Chinese contexts across a variety of onEnglish, and English line experimental measures of language comprehension and lexical processing. The basic findings of this work are that there is good evidence for both transfer and learning in second language acquisition. Transfer is the strongest in the areas of phonology and lexicon, where specific between-language equivalencies are easily established. In the area of syntax, some local attachment structures, such as adjective-noun orderings, show a brief period of initial transfer, but are quickly overwhelmed by strong L2 learning. In general, the stronger and more reliable syntactic patterns are learned first. The last patterns to be learned are those involving the complex raising and control structures examined by Epstein et al. When these structures are learned, they are acquired in a conservative fashion that minimizes potential false overgeneralizations. The linkage of the Competition Model to connectionist formalisms has important empirical consequences. In particular, it places the phenomena of transfer and analogical generalization on a much stronger formal basis. To the degree that we can model both the established first language system and the developing second language system within a single network topology, we can make precise predictions regarding the ways in which transfer will occur. MacWhinney (1996a) presents one such model for the learning of major word order patterns in the Dutch > English and English Dutch contexts. In that model, we see an initial period of transfer, followed by a period of L2 learning that resembles the stages of native language learning. However, the model generalizes only very cautiously across syntactic patterns. When confronted with complex and structurally variable patterns of the type studied by Epstein et al., the model shows virtually no transfer and only slow L2 generalization learning. Although UG and the Competition Model differ vastly in methods, assumptions, and conclusions, the basic empirical findings provided by Epstein et al. are compatible with both. In the framework espoused by Epstein et al., these data are used to argue that second language learning is controlled by Universal Grammar. In the framework of the Competition Model, these data are used as evidence that transfer is blocked for complex structures that show little cross-language equivalence. Given the ability of both accounts to deal quite happily with these data, it would be interesting to know whether UG models are also able to account for the empirical data on syntactic learning that have been collected in the context of the Competition Model.
should be able to consciously transform their I-Language; adults should be able to transform pidgins into Creoles; adults should be as likely as children to restructure their grammars on the basis of "functional" pressure. All the foregoing are false, however, which seriously calls into question the correctness of their hypothesis.

Some incorrect implications of the fullaccess hypothesis

Frederick J. Newmeyer
Department of Linguistics, University of Washington, Seattle, WA 981954340. fjn@u.washington.edu

As the authors of the target article are aware, I have gone on record as an advocate of the hypothesis that adult second language learners have full access to UG in second language acquisition (see, for example, Newmeyer 1983; Newmeyer & Weinberger 1988). In recent years, however, I have begun to explore the implications of this hypothesis for other domains and have found disturbing evidence that suggests that it might not be right. A corollary of the full-access hypothesis is the claim that one's "I-Language" (Chomsky 1986) does not become fixed in childhood, but has the capacity to develop throughout one's lifetime. Thus, in the view of Epstein et al., an adult-acquired second language is an I-Language. It follows then that there should be evidence from other domains that our I-Language can change in adulthood. In particular, the following three propositions should be true: 1. Adults should be able to consciously transform their I-Language. 2. Adults should be able to transform pidgins into Creoles. 3. Adults should be as likely as children to restructure their grammars on the basis of "functional" pressure. I believe all three propositions to be false. As for the first, there is good evidence that, no matter how hard we try, consciouslyinitiated changes to our own dialect are never fully integrated into our I-Language, but remain as "appendages" to it. Labov (1972), for example, discusses how difficult it is for middle class blacks who did not grow up in vernacular culture to learn the vernacular as adults and adds: "If it is true that Received Pronunciation cannot be mastered by someone who has been to the wrong school, this would stand as additional confirmation of the fact that the regular rules of the vernacular must be formed in the preadolescentyears" (p. 290). Alongthese lines, Emonds (1985; 1986) and Pateman (1987) give examples of late-acquired prestige constructions that seem unintegrable into one's linguistic system. As for the second proposition, Derek Bickerton reports (personal communication) that there are no reliable examples of adults transforming a pidgin into a Creole in one generation. But children do it with ease. As Slobin (1977) has noted in this regard: "It seems, given the limited but suggestive evidence at hand, that it is adult speakers who invent new forms, using them with some degree of variability in their speech. Children, exposed to this variability, tend to make these new forms obligatory and regular" (p. 205, emphasis added). Third, every generative model of language change with which I am familiar assumes that it is children, not adults, who have the capacity to restructure their grammars due to parsing pressure or as the result of a change in the external evidence presented to them. The most thorough recent study of language change in action, Ravid (1995), notes that the functionally driven changes in Hebrew observed among lower-class speakers are all initiated in childhood. But if the I-Language of adults is as malleable as that of children, as Einstein et al. claim, then shouldn't adults be major players in initiating language change? At the risk of appearing to tarnish Epstein et al. with the sin of guilt by association, I might point out that the idea that adults are as apt as children to restructure their grammars due to external pressures has always been a hallmark of the functionalist opposition to generative grammar (for a recent statement to that effect, see Croft 1995). Perhaps Epstein et al. would try to explain why these propositions are false by appealing to the same "grammar-external performance systems' that make learning a second language so difficult for most adults. For example, they propose a "performance-based" explanation for why long-distance movement is difficult for Japanese learners of English: "The assignment of a new parameter value can appear to "take time" in the course of acquisition, for

Abstract: If Epstein et al. are right that adult second language learners have full access to UG, then all of the following should be true: adults

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Commentary /Epstein et al.: Second language acquisition example, if new parameter setting involves determining the features of certain lexical entries" (sect. 5.2, penultimate para.). This leads me to my second major criticism of the target article. The sketchy remarks on these putative performance systems make them look nothing like well-understood performance systems that affect language production. And, one might ask, how are we to distinguish an explanation employing them from one which says simply that an L2 is "parasitic" on an LI, so adult Japanese learners need to "take time" as they assess the positive evidence and call into play whatever cognitive tricks they can muster to get English wh-movement right. If UG were available to children and adults equally, we would expect adults to be even faster than children at "time-taking" complex cognitive tasks, not slower. But apparently it takes adults longer than children to get their parameters reset. The conclusion then seems to be that adults are not literally resetting parameters at all - they are simply doing their best with the parameters that they already have. The necessity of having to resort to poorly understood performance factors to explain every difference between LI and L2 acquisition undercuts Epstein et al.'s often repeated assertion that UG "is fully available to the L2 learner," who has "full access" to it in acquisition. Given the everyday English meanings of the words "available" and "access," this assertion is simply not correct. UG may be there, but a host of mechanisms block available access to it for the normal adult. An analogy might help to illustrate my point. Imagine human vision being very different from what it actually is. Suppose that in adulthood the neural wiring allowing vision remained essentially unchanged from childhood, but that most adults had the tendency to develop severely degenerated retinas, corneas, irises, and so on. As a result, few adults in this imaginary world would be able to see reliably enough to undertake any task in which good vision was required without, say, the accompaniment of a fully-sighted child. Would we be comfortable saying that in this world visual competence is "fully available" to adults? How, I would ask Epstein et al., is such a world fundamentally different from the world that they posit, in which we have so little true access to our UG as adults, that overwhelming our attempts to call it into play in learning a second language end in abject failure? other failings of their proposal and the experiments intended to support it. O'Grady (1996; in press) outlines an acquisition device consisting of five innate modules, none of which corresponds to UG in the conventional sense. A perceptual module is responsible for the analysis of the auditory stimulus, a learning module offers the means to formulate hypotheses in an appropriately constrained manner (e.g., it includes the Subset Principle), a conceptual module makes available an inventory of notions relevant to grammatical contrasts (e.g., singular-plural, past-nonpast), a propositional module provides a representation of predicate-argument structure, and a computational module provides a set of structurebuilding operations. The latter module is largely responsible for the architecture of syntactic representations, ensuring that they exhibit binary branching and other hierarchical features, in accordance with principles largely shared by the mechanisms used for arithmetical computation. The grammar produced by this acquisition device has at its core a type of categorial syntax (e.g., Wood 1993), which builds representations such as the following by drawing on the resources of the propositional and computational modules. (The information in angled brackets indicates the number and type of categories with which an element must combine.) (2) N Mary S (=V < 0 > ) y<N> left

Syntactic representations and the L2 acquisition device

William O'Grady
Department of Linguistics, University of Hawaii Honolulu, HI 96822.

ogrady@hawaii.edu

Abstract: Epstein et al.'s theory of SLA is heavily dependent on assumptions about both the nature of the acquisition device and the grammar that it produces. This commentary briefly explores the consequences of an alternative set of assumptions, focusing on the possibility that the acquisition device does not include UG and that syntactic representations do not contain functional projections. Epstein, Flynn, and Martohardjono claim that adults have access to the full resources of UG and that even beginning L2 learners who may express neither tense nor agreement overtly - nonetheless construct representations containing syntactic projections for both elements. (1) [c..[AKr..Mary [T1, [VI, work]]]] The success of this argument depends on controversial assumptions about both the acquisition device and the grammar that it produces. By adopting a different set of assumptions, one arrives at very different conclusions about the nature of SLA. I Believe that this point is worth pursuing and I will devote my commentary to it, confident that colleagues will take Epstein et al. to task for

Here, the verb leave - a "functor category" requiring a nominal argument - combines with Mary, satisfying that dependency and creating a sentence. (Note that S is treated as a verbal category with no unsatisfied dependencies - Keenan and Timberlake 1988 - not as a projection of an abstract functional category.) According to the proposal outlined in O'Grady (1996), adults have access to a diminished version of the LI acquisition device, with the computational and propositional modules intact but the perceptual and conceptual modules (and perhaps the learning module) compromised to some degree. This predicts defects and difficulties in the mastery of L2 phonology and of the subtle semantic contrasts that underlie many morphosyntactic phenomena (e.g., the use of articles in English), but predicts that fullfledged syntactic representations should be within the reach of even beginning L2 learners. However, the representations in question do not at all resemble those posited by Epstein et al. Consider in this regard the common case of learners who produce full sentences (e.g., 'Mary work), but without agreement inflection. Thanks to the continuing availability of the propositional and computational modules of the acquisition device, these learners are able to build representations parallel to (2) above just as native speakers of English do. The eventual emergence of agreement depends on their ability to take note of the -s affix (via the perceptual module) and to link it with the notions of person and number provided by the conceptual module. Assuming that these are still available, the same operations responsible for the formation of (2) will yield (3). (3)

S (=v <0> )
N
Mary
y<N3sg>

work-s

Here, the affix has combined with the verb, creating a verbal category that depends on a 3rd person singular nominal (the dependency on the nominal argument coming from the root and the person/number features from the affix). This representation involves no phrasal projections other than those employed in (2):

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Commentary /Epstein et al.: Second language acquisition the only difference is the presence of a particular morpheme - the agreement affix - and the person/number features associated with it. Given this view of the acquisition device, it is possible to maintain both that the complete structure-building resources of the language faculty are available to the L2 learner (which allows the formation of full-fledged syntactic representations) and that certain types of elements (e.g., verbal affixes and the person/number features associated with them) can be missing from these representations in the early stages of L2 (or LI) development. This is because, in contrast to Epstein et al.'s approach, the emergence of affixal elements is not dependent on the module of the acquisition device that determines the architecture of syntactic representations. Moreover, affixal elements are not treated as syntactic heads and do not create phrase structure; their absence therefore does not dramatically alter the character of the syntactic representation. (Of course, by eliminating functional projections in this manner, we lose familiar GB analyses of phenomena such as verb-second effects in German and adverb placement in French and English; however, these analyses are questionable to begin with - see, e.g., Anderson 1993 on the first issue and Iatridou 1990 and Baker 1991 on the second.) No syntactic theory is accepted by more than the minority of linguists. Each is compatible with a different acquisition device and, therefore, with a different view of LI and L2 acquisition. Epstein et al. have perhaps demonstrated the consequences of one syntactic theory. Some will doubtlessly feel the exploration of alternatives remains a worthwhile enterprise. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Thanks to Kevin Gregg and Kazue Kanno for comments. HI would appear to be of little interest at our current level of understanding. There is plenty of persuasive evidence (cf. sect. 2 of the target article and Strozer 1994, sect. 7.3.1) that fluent speakers of a foreign language know many things about the language which they could not possibly have learned, so the "poverty of the stimulus" argument applies here as well. In contrast, H2b is a highly interesting and not implausible hypothesis, and is not without advocates (see Smith & Tsimpli 1995; Strozer 1994, and references therein). If so, one would expect H2b to receive more attention than HI in any study of the topic, not just the passing and misleading remark at the end of section 3.1. 2 This is because the basic fact that demands explanation is that most (possibly all) normal adults who try do not succeed in developing a truly native command of a single foreign language, no matter how hard they try or for how long, even with conscious effort and with the help of instruction (including negative evidence), while any normal child can come to speak a number of languages natively without need of instruction (in particular, negative evidence) or conscious effort. As Chomsky has repeatedly remarked, becoming a native speaker is not something the child does, but something that happens to the child. However, it is not something that happens to the adult.3 That this is the basic issue is partially acknowledged in section 2.1, where it is observed that "there are clearly differences between child and adult language learning." A particularly interesting fact is that the differences in the degree of success between two adult acquirers can be vast, while presently available tools reveal no similar relevant differences among children.4 The question is, Why is this so? From this perspective, the terms Epstein et al. use may prove misleading. In the case of children, "language growth" is a more appropriate term than "language learning," as Chomsky has repeatedly emphasized (cf. Cook & Newson 1996, p. 296). Our question then becomes, Is further language growth more likely than growth in stature for a twenty year old? As Chomsky has noted, there are empirical consequences to the assumption that at least some of the invariant principles remain active in adult acquisition, whereas parameter-setting raises difficulties, because it entails that at the steady state attained in language growth the invariant principles of language are "wired in," and "remain distinct from language-particular properties," hence distinct from "the acquired elements of language, which bear a greater cost" (Chomsky 1995a, n. 23, originally written in September of 1988). As he put it a few months later (Chomsky 1989): It seems that invariant principles of language count as "less costly" than those that reflect particular parametric choices. Intuitively, it is as if the invariant principles are "wired in" and therefore less costly than language-specific properties. If this is correct, then in the steady state of mature knowledge of language, there must still be a differentiation between invariant principles of the biological endowment and language-specific principles. The great merit of the target article is that it formulates and attempts to address some central questions in the study of nonnative language acquisition, and does so at a high level of sophistication. Even if the evidence offered in support of H2a is not as compelling as the authors appear to believe, their contribution is an important one and deserves to be carefully examined and discussed. But the extremely tentative nature of the research which can be carried out at the current state of our knowledge (or ignorance) must be recognized. The results can be, at best, suggestive, which is not the impression one gets in reading the target article. It does not appear to be the case that its experimental base and its analysis of the data are already sufficiently strong, or that the interpretations of the results are sufficiently sound and well-supported. It is much too early for that. Most people would agree that the field is still in its infancy. As our theoretical understanding deepens, conclusions are likely to be quickly undermined. It comes as no surprise that recent theoretical advances have already led to a radical reinterpretation of some results confidently offered as evidence of adult parameter setting.

Language growth after puberty?

Carlos P. Otero
Program in Romance Linguistics, University of California, Los Angeles, CA 90095-153202. otero@ucla.edu

Abstract: The range of hypotheses considered is surprising in that the most arguably plausible one is not included: the invariant principles of language are available for life, while the parameters of variation cannot be set after puberty. This hypothesis provides a better explanation than the author's for both the deep similarities and the vast differences between child "language growth" and adult language acquisition. The field of foreign language acquisition, as understood by researchers at the cutting edge such as the authors of the target article (it is hard to think of a team with better credentials), is only about ten years old, and the realization that this new field has much to contribute to the study of language and mind, as a careful reading of the article makes clear, is of even more recent vintage. Naturally enough, Epstein et al. raise a host of important and much debated issues that deserve careful attention. For want of space, I will comment only on what I take to be the central issue. The range of hypotheses Epstein et al. consider is surprising in that one of the hypotheses found in the literature (and, arguably, the most plausible) is not included. This is the hypothesis which claims that the invariant principles supplied by the genetic endowment for language (the language "organ"), if normally developed during the "window of opportunity" provided by the maturational schedule, are available for life, while the uninstantiated settings remain available only during childhood (making true multilingualism possible for children - cf. sect. 1.2) since the brain appears to lose its plasticity for parameter setting relatively early, perhaps before puberty.1 Let us call this set of assumptions Hypothesis 2b or H2h. What Epstein et al. present as "the" partial access hypothesis (call it H2a) is clearly not the only "logical possibility" outside the no access hypothesis (call it HI) and the full access hypothesis (call it H3).

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NOTES 1. Cf. Chomsky (1988), p. 179: "Something must happen to the brain about the time of puberty. . . . Most biological capacities have a time at which they have to operate, and they won't operate before or after that time." Why should the little we know about embryologieal development be irrelevant in the case of "language growth"? This is of course what underlies a proper understanding of the two dimensions of the Critical Period Hypothesis, too lightly dismissed in section 2.1. (See Strozer 1994, Ch. 7, for an alternative view; cf. Ioup et al. 1994). Since some adult language acquisition is possible, it must be the case that this acquisition is within the range of the human mind, a conclusion not in conflict with faculty autonomy (contrary to the assertion in sect. 1.2) under the assumption that child language growth and adult language acquisition are not identical developments, which appears to be a truism (see sect. 2.1). 2. Misleading in that Strozer's proposal of the late 1980s (developed further in Strozer 1994) is not unlike a proposal made independently at about the same time which goes without mention (Clahsen & Muysken 1989), but differs radically from Schachter's proposal. Furthermore, it takes for granted that "other nonparametric grammatical options not instantiated in the LI are available to the L2 learners," contrary to what the target article appears to suggest. The main point of contention is whether adult learners are capable of parameter setting, and Strozer's proposal is consistent with the findings of the most searching and thorough investigation of the question to date, in particular, with the conclusion that the foreign language syntax of perhaps the most closely observed learner is far from (lawless, in sharp contrast with his "stunning" lexical ability (Smith & Tsimpli 1995, p. 122). 3. This has repeatedly been noted. For example, Cordemoy points out that "children learn their native language more easily than an adult can learn a new language," as Chomsky has noted (1966, n. 114). Chomsky himself takes a stronger stand: "we say that a child of five and a foreign adult are on their way towards acquiring" a language; the child, "in the normal course of events, will come to 'have'" the language, while "the foreigner probably will not" (1992, p. 102). There are reasons to believe that when the learner's output "appears to approximate to that of a native speaker,... it none the less does not have the same status" (Smith & Tsimpli 1995, p. 36; see also Sorace 1992; 1993a; 1993b). As is well known, unusually gifted individuals are no exception: the carefully studied syntax of a linguistically gifted savant appears to be "basically English with a range of alternative veneers" (Smith & Tsimpli 1995, p. 122); of the celebrated linguist and polyglot Roman Jakobson it was said that he could speak Russian in many different languages. Compare Obler and Fein (eds.) 1988 and references therein. 4. It is important to keep in mind that these are unexplained individual differences. As Chomsky has recently emphasized once more (during the discussion following the presentation of Chomsky 1995b), "nobody has the slightest idea what all that's about." This followed what seems to be a rather illuminating remark: "I'm completely incapable of learning a second language. 1 just can't do it, partly because I'm so bored out of my mind by it that I can't put my mind to it. But I probably can't do it." Crucially, children do not have to put their minds to it.

Now for some facts, with a focus on development and an explicit role for the L1
Bonnie D. Schwartz
Department of Linguistics and English Language, University of Durham, Durham DH1 3JT England, b.d.schwartz@durhatn.ac.uk

Abstract: Curiously, two central areas are unaddressed by Epstein et al.: (i) L1A-L2A differences; (ii) L2 development. Here, findings relevant to (i) and (ii) - as well as their significance - are discussed. Together these form the basis for contesting Epstein et al.'s "Full Access" approach, but nonetheless analyses of the L2 data argue for UG-constrained L2A. Also discussed is the inadequacy of accounts (like Epstein et al.'s) without an explicit and prominent role for the LI. 1. Facts. Most of us who argue that (adult) L2A is UGconstrained do so based on facts. Let us review some. Robust findings in the L2A literature document word-order patterns distinct from what the target language (TL) allows. Consider, for example, the six facts in Table 1 below. What is the generalization to be drawn from (l)-(6)? Word-order patterns found neither in the TL nor during L1A of the TA occur robustly and consistently in the course of L2A of the TL. What do facts such as (l)-(6) have to say to the issue of "UC access"? On their own, nothing. Differences alone between L1A and L2A (of a given TL) say nothing about the type of knowledge at stake (Schwartz 1990). What matters is analysis. (l)-(6) all have UG-compatible analyses, which crucially implicate the LI syntax. Facts such as (l)-(6) challenge Epstein et al.'s statement: "many patterns of acquisition match for both LI and L2 acquisition, suggesting that similar processes underlie these two types of acquisition." Assumingthe viability of UG-constrained analyses for (l)-(6) (space precludes summaries), matching L1-L2 acquisition patterns are not necessary to argue for UG-constrained (adult) L2A. But are mere "matches" even sufficient? All the "matches" Epstein et al. cite are problematic: (7) Morpheme-order studies (sect. 2.3): Epstein et al. argue extensively for differentiating syntactic from lexical/ morphological knowledge (sect. 3.3.1, C), saying the former alone implicates UG.1 Thus morpheme orders are irrelevant to UG issues (Schwartz & Sprouse, 1996 pp. 57-8, n. 17). (8) Cook's relative-clause study (sect. 2.3): What can one infer from L1A-L2A similarities like "low proportion of word perfect imitations [and] . . . of correct answers to comprehension questions"? Such gross similarities "tell us nothing about the actual content of the [knowledge] represented in the learnerfs'] mind/brain" - and in fact exemplify Epstein et al.'s charge against others: lack of "even descriptive adequacy."2

Table 1 (Schwartz).

TL
(1) English English French French German German German

LI
French Turkish Dutch English Romance Turkish Romance

Adult or Child older children young child adults adults adults adult adults children

ok in Phenomenon VAdvO XV (e.g. OV) XV & 'V2' (e.g. OAuxSV) *quantifier float (*SVtoiis('all')X) V3' (e.g. AdvSV)

in L1A

TL?
NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO

ofTL?
NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO

Source White (1992b) Haznedar (1995) Hulk (1991) Hawkins et al. (1993) Meisel et al. (1981) Schwartz & Sprouse (1994) Meisel et al. (1981) Pienemann (1980)

(2) (3)
(4)

(5) (6)

vx

(e.g. AuxVO)

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(9) Principal Branching Direction (PBD) (Sect. 3.2.1): Higherproficiency Ll-Japanese L2ers significantly "prefer" postposed adverbial clauses in English, similar to early English L1A. Atkinson's (1992, p. 285, n. 13) remarks on PBD in L1A are relevant: "much of [Lusts] work is concerned with children's preferences . . . , and is therefore more plausibly linked to processing strategies than to representational issues." If so, Flynn's PBD work in L2A is also unrelated to UG issues. (10) Subject control (sect. 3.2.4): Epstein et al. claim that as early in English L1A, L2ers miscomprehend subject control, citing d'Anglejan & Tucker (1975) and Cooper et al. (1979). However, those sources actually show high comprehension of subject control for all groups (French, Arabic, Hebrew) acquiring English (mean across least-proficient, 75%; native controls, 93%). (Moreover, L2ers" "preferences" in elicited imitation are irrelevant to UG issues; see Atkinson quoted above.) Summarizing, Epstein et al. draw the conclusion that UG constrains L2A from the premise of L1A-L2A similarities. However, L1AL2A similarities are neither necessary nor sufficient for this conclusion: first, (l)-(6) contest the premise, but analyses of them nevertheless support UG-constrained L2A; second, data from Epstein et al. either fall outside UG, do not address "knowledge states," or do not represent L1A-L2A similarities - they are therefore insufficient for deducing anything about UG's role in L2A. 2. Development. In stark contrast with VO data from Romance speakers' early L2A of German ((6) above), Vainikka & YoungScholten's (VYS's) least-proficient Korean/Turkish subjects overwhelmingly produce OV.3 Comparable findings dissociate L l ArabicfromLl-TurkishL2AofDutch.Jansenetal.(1981)showthat especially early on, Turks use OV heavily, whereas Arabic speakers mostly produce VO. These asymmetries demand explanation. Many researchers, following the lead of Lydia White, attribute asymmetries such as these to the L2er's knowledge state, one significantly defined by the LI grammar: (11) Korean/Turkish are XV, determining those speakers' earliest L2 state; (12) Romance/Arabic are VX, determining those speakers' earliest L2 state, with later parameter REsetting to XV for German/Dutch. By contrast, Epstein et al.'s treatment of VYS's data ignores the LI. Indeed, Epstein et al. in general ignore important developmental asymmetries such as the above. In their zeal to support their Full Access account, which contains no explicit role for the LI grammar, they ignore the data most revealing in this regard and most damaging to their position. Why do Epstein et al. relegate LI influence to a bit part? Perhaps it is because, like Dulay et al. (1982), Epstein et al. misassume an "if-and-only-if" relation between (a) similarity in LI and L2 development and (b) similarity in cognitive processes (and hence knowledge types), as discussed in section I. 4 Perhaps it is because Epstein et al. misassume that LI influence is inextricably linked to behaviorism. My best guess: they fail to separate Strong Continuity from the LI initial state. But Strong Continuity merely maintains that all developmental states of knowledge are UGconstrained. Schwartz & Eubank (1996, p. 4) observe that "exploring the mechanisms of development of Interlanguage requires an understanding of what a particular stage changed from - and, taking this to its logical extension, this means coming to an understanding of the precise form of the L2 initial state." In short, Epstein et al. ban LI syntax from defining the L2 initial state - and consequently end up denying (purely syntactic) development of L2 knowledge states. In fact, they fail to specify what the L2 initial state is. Unlike many other generative L2 researchers, Epstein et al. are stuck at "access/no access"; they have yet to see that '"access to UG' alone does not constitute an explanation for Interlanguage development" (Schwartz & Eubank 1996, p. 3). NOTES 1. Given this (valid) distinction, why - in Epstein et al.'s study - are 4 of 6 purported tests for INFL ((61a)-(61d)) morphological and lexical?
2. Indeed, almost every study Epstein et al. approvingly summarize is subject to this charge, as is theirs. More remarkable is that much generative L2A research that does attempt to characterize L2ers' knowledge (e.g., (l)-(5) above) is either not mentioned or (under-/mis-)cited in passing. 3. Epstein et al.'s account of verb raising ((62c)) begs the question: why is (the feature of) Agr only optional? At issue are (abstract) features, not the phonetic shape of affixes. 4. Schwartz (1992) argues - assuming child L2A is UG-constrained that the critical comparison is not between L1A and L2A, but rather adult and child L2A. Does the adult L2 developmental path mirror the L2 child's? If so, then adult L2A is UG-constrained; if not, only child L2A is. Syntactic (naturalistic, longitudinal) data show developmental paths to be the same.

Metalinguistic ability and primary linguistic data

M. A. Sharwood Smith
Utrecht University, 3513 JK Utrecht, The Netherlands. mike.s.smith@let.ruu.nl

Abstract: The role of metalinguistic ability in L2 development is seriously underestimated. It may be seen both (1) as a means of initiating or boosting the flow of primary linguistic data and (2) as a generator of substitute knowledge (derived, but epistemologically distinct from domain-specific knowledge) that may compete with or compensate for perceived gaps in the learners current underlying competence. It cannot serve as a simple means of distinguishing the rival theoretical positions.

I will argue that the potential contribution of metalinguistic ability in shaping L2 development has been generally misrepresented. Admitting an important role for metalinguistic knowledge in the mature learner seems to confirm the fundamental difference hypothesis (FDH). Also, the large scale deployment of metalinguistic knowledge is incompatible with the notion that second language learners have access to UG. A closer look at the nature of metalinguistic ability provides the FDH with more credibility than is granted by Epstein et al. At the same time, it opens up new possibilities for rival positions. A characteristic of older learners is their cognitive maturity. Depending upon their degree of literacy and linguistic training, they have more or less explicit knowledge about what language is and how it is structured. The irrelevance of this knowledge has recently been reformulated in learnability terms as a claim to ineffectiveness of negative evidence to enable learners to (re)set parameters (Schwartz 1986; White 1990). Metalinguistic knowledge may be seen as epistemologically similar to encyclopedic knowledge. When freely generalising on the basis of current knowledge, it is crucial for learners to be told what is not possible. They will maintain a false hypothesis about, say, customs in Rome or null subject pronouns in English until they get the explicit information that Romans do not behave the way they imagined or that the null subject option is ungrammatical. So, L2 Spanish learners of English can simultaneously become metalinguisticallij aware that null subjects are unacceptable, but, in their unreflecting use of English, continue to say " is very cold here." The resetting of the appropriate parameter can only be triggered by primary linguistic data (PLD) (Hilles 1986). The "atrophied UG" positions hold that L2 grammatical knowledge cannot be created by UG. It must therefore be the kind of knowledge that is dependent on negative evidence for the extinction of false assumptions: Spanish learners would never reset the English parameter relating to null subjects. On correctly producing the "It is very cold" they will either be: (1) producing, Spanishstyle, what is optional in Spanish, or: (2) filling the subject gap by applying consciously gained metaknowledge about English. In the first case, the optional use of lexically filled subject position will mimic exactly the usage in Spanish, following appropriate pragmatic constraints. In the second case, the use of the metalinguistic "patch" will be sporadic, that is, assuming the

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Krashen (1985) position that the deployment of such knowledge is highly limited in spontaneous language use, making, for example, excessive demands on the learners attentional capacities. Does metalinguistic knowledge play only this "poor substitute" role in L2? Consider what is, nowadays, a highly unusual type of acquisition. On the face of it, acquiring a language available only in written form and without the benefit of native speakers ought to be, for adults, a purely metacognitive affair: many foreign language learners know this type of situation. Nevertheless, there are people on this globe who converse fluently even in Latin, enough to provoke the question of whether it is actually possible to fully acquire a dead language. There is, indeed, a prima-facie argument for their being speakers of a natural language with a grammar that conforms totally with UG and reflects just those parametersettings instantiated in the (written) input. In order to revive Latin as an LI, one might have to have children grow up amongst Latin-speaking adults. The children would process the PLD through the filter provided by UG and thereby recreate a mother tongue. Our young neo-Latinates would then become the first new generation of native speakers. Under one scenario, the parents would be speaking a Latin that was learned as an L2, using the LI as a basis and adapting this initial template (Sharwood Smith 1994) to formulate utterances in via relexification, analogy, and so forth. In arguing the apparently bizarre position that written PLD might, after all, be enough to enable full acquisition, a cognitive ability is implicated that, ironically enough, is a mainstay of NoAccess theory. Since written input is even more impoverished than spoken data - many of the communicative props available in speech situations are unavailable - learners are forced to adopt metalinguistically sophisticated ways of extracting meaning. They are, nevertheless, presented with word, sentence, and paragraph boundaries explicitly (visually) marked as gaps on paper. They can identify words more easily, attempt to locate them in a dictionary, puzzle over word order, backtrack to previous sentences, and so on. Consequently, they seem able to read with increasing speed and efficiency until the interpretation of texts becomes spontaneous and similar to the decoding of conversational speech. At some point, learners may start to acquire Latin, set parameters, and do all the things that accord with the access-to-UG positions by virtue of having PLD freed up by painstaking textual interpretation. Now it is argued, in Epstein et al., that the alleged assumption of learners that the architecture of L2 will be "not utterly different" from that of LI implies that they do, after all, have access to domain-specific knowledge. The authors see this as a serious contradiction. But it depends on the nature of the learner's "assumption." This may not involve direct access to domainspecific knowledge but rather to a representational redescription of it. This is Karmiloff-Smith's (1992; see also BBS multiple book review of Karmiloff-Smith s Beyond Modularity BBS 17(4) 1994) view of metalinguistic knowledge. Explicit representations of structure come about in an optional but normal LI phase that may occur after each (subconscious, implicit) change in the developing grammar has occurred (Karmiloff-Smith 1992). It seems at least reasonable that, over time, it is this redescribed knowledge that might form the basis for the general learning principles alleged to account for all L2 learning just as it might give some learners the ability to liberate PLD even from highly impoverished input. In sum, the metalinguistic capacities of the L2 learner may be seen in different ways, as a means of initiating or boosting the flow of PLD or as a generator of substitute knowledge (derived from prior domain-specific knowledge) that may compete with, patch, or compensate for perceived gaps in the learner's current underlying L2 competence. So, if we grant a more substantial role to metalinguistic ability, this does not automatically threaten FullAccess positions: it can even be incorporated usefully within them. However, it also means that the Fundamental Difference Hypothesis itself represents a perfectly coherent position and may be seen as a suitable rival rather than a mere straw man.

On gradience and optionality in non-native grammars

Antonella Sorace
Department of Applied Linguistics, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh EH8 9LN, Scotland, antonella@ling.ed.ac.uk

Abstract: Epstein et al.'s "full access to Universal Grammar" position is conceptually and empirically problematic. Its shortcomings are illustrated through a brief discussion of the following issues: (1) initial versus final states of grammatical knowledge in a second language, (2) knowledge of gradience of grainmaticality, (3) optionality and retention in non-native grammars, and (4) the empirical measurement of syntactic knowledge.

The target article has the merit of drawing attention to the potential relevance of L2 acquisition for the investigation of human cognition. However, the array of arguments presented by Epstein et al. fail to convince either the L2 acquisition expert or the general reader. Epstein et al. leave out of their discussion vast areas of recent research that bear directly on the question of "access to UG"; they do not seem to have taken on board any of the criticisms that have been made of their approach; at times they do not accurately represent the theoretical positions that they criticize. They also take as axiomatic certain assumptions that are at best controversial. In particular, Epstein et al. assume that if UG is accessible to L2 learners and constrains the development of non-native grammars, there must be identity between the knowledge representations constructed by L2 learners and the corresponding representations in the monolingual LI speaker. L1-L2 identity becomes the only criterion against which the naturalness of non-native grammars is evaluated. This "identity view" is a fundamental flaw of much literature on second language acquisition, which Epstein et al.'s target article helps to perpetuate. They provide data (based almost exclusively on their own studies) in support of what they term the "full access" position, that is, that the L2 functional categories are available to L2 learners in a continuous fashion from the early stages of acquisition regardless of the facts of their LI. In their view, therefore, there is identity between LI and L2 early grammars. Leaving aside rather serious methodological problems that undermine Epstein et al.'s study, two objections may be raised to the identity view. The more obvious one has to do with the striking omission of any reference to the many reports that the LI does affect the initial stage of L2 acquisition, either absolutely (e.g., Schwartz & Sprouse 1994; White 1989), or partially (e.g., Eubank 1994 on underspecification of features associated with functional heads as a case of partial transfer). Less obviously, the question of access to UG can be addressed not only on the basis of initial grammars, but also - perhaps more crucially - from the point of view offinal grammars. That is, if L1-L2 identity is not found at the level of initial grammars, it is always possible to argue that this is because of LI influence or, as Epstein et al. would argue, because of "production problems" (sect. 5.2) that would disappear with increasing exposure to the L2 input. However, if identity is not found in final state grammars after years of exposure then it is difficult to maintain that L2 knowledge is really the sanw kind of outcome as native knowledge. If L1-L2 identity is the only available criterion, one might indeed be tempted to interpret differences between native and near-native speakers as an indication that UG cannot be accessed in its entirety. But this is not an inescapable conclusion: it has been shown (Sorace 1993a) that L2 knowledge at the near-native level may be systematically divergent from the corresponding knowledge in native speakers and still UG-constrained. The target article discusses at some length Martohardjono's very interesting study which, probably for the first time in the field, proposes to look at degrees of acceptability as a more subtle and revealing probe of L2 learners' grammatical knowledge than simple discrimination between acceptable and unacceptable. In many cases, (un)grammaticality is a matter of degree, rather than

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Commentary /Epstein et al.: Second language acquisition an either-or question, and native speakers have strong intuitions about the relative strength of violations. This makes it possible to redefine ultimate attainment in a second language in terms of sensitivity to the "acceptability hierarchies" of native speakers. I have investigated non-native intuitions about acceptability hierarchies in several domains (e.g., Sorace 1993b; 1993c; 1995) and have found, first, that it is easier for L2 learners to acquire sensitivity to hierarchies governed by lexical-semantic factors that to those arising out of syntactic constraints, and second, contra Martohardjono, that ultimate attainment is in some cases clearly determined by the grammatical status of particular constructions in the LI. Lack of identity between LI and L2 hierarchies, as mentioned before, does not entail that L2 grammars are not constrained by UG. Epstein et al.'s treatment of this topic - like Martohardjono s considers only one possible source of gradient acceptability, namely, the cumulative effect of how many constraints are violated. Another possible source of gradience could be the relative inherent strength of UG principles themselves (what Epstein 1990 defines as "different types of ungrammaticality" as opposed to "different degrees"). If one accepts this distinction, then the empirical question for L2 acquisition is whether L2 learners can become equally sensitive to cumulative deviance and to inherent degrees of ungrammaticality. Preliminary evidence (Sorace 1993c) suggests that sensitivity to the relative strength of principles may be a more direct reflection of UG than sensitivity to the number of constraints violated in derivations. Epstein et al. criticise Vainikka & Young-Scholten for analysing L2 development in terms of retentive stages (i.e., grammars), each of which may contain structures generated by the previous grammars). They object that if the functional category IP were consistently absent at an early VP stage, then it should not be possible to find any evidence for IP at that stage; similarly, if CP develops after IP, then the CP stage should be completely free of evidence for IP-structures. In other words, Epstein et al. endorse a view of interlanguage development as a succession of discrete, nonoverlapping grammars that do not allow optionality. But the existence of optionality is a well-documented fact of both native grammars and child LI grammars (e.g., Fukui 1993; Wexler 1994): it is disconcerting that Epstein et al. do not acknowledge this literature at all. If optionality is both a stable and a developmental characteristic of natural grammars, why should it be "unnatural" in L2 learner grammars? Optionality is indeed attested in L2 acquisition (Eubank 1994). The difference between LI and L2 acquisition in this respect is that optionality is mostly temporary in child grammars (children eventually converge towards the only structure allowed by the target language), whereas it may be permanent in adult learner grammars. An increasing number of studies in fact suggest that permanent optionality may be regarded as a distinctive feature of non-native grammars (Papp 1996; Robertson et al. 1995). Again, the only testing ground to decide whether or not optionality is permanent is the state of knowledge represented in advanced, or final, L2 grammars. From a methodological point of view, Epstein et al.'s elicited imitation is inadequate for capturing optionality or gradient acceptability in L2 learners' syntactic competence. If the aim is to test knowledge of acceptability hierarchies, what is needed is an elicitation technique that allows the researcher to measure acceptability judgments on an interval scale, and therefore to determine the strength of preference that speakers have for one construction over another. One such technique is magnitude estimation of linguistic acceptability, a procedure borrowed from psychophysics which may be successfully adapted to psychosociological and other non-physical domains. Experiments with both native and non-native speakers (see Bard et al. 1996 for details) have shown magnitude estimation to be a robust and reliable tool for research on grammatical competence, and a particularly revealing method for the investigation of acceptability hierarchies in different areas of linguistic inquiry.

Appreciating the poverty of the stimulus in second language acquisition

Rex A. Sprouse
Department of Germanic Studies, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47405. rsprouse@indiana.edu

Abstract: The most compelling evidence for Epstein et al.'s central thesis that adult second language acquisition is constrained by the innate cognitive structures that constrain native language acquisition would be evidence of poverty of the stimulus. Although there are studies that point to such evidence, Epstein et al.'s primary form of argumentation, targetlike performance by second-language acquiring adults, is much less convincing.

The most interesting approach to the study of adult second language acquisition (L2A), in my opinion, involves the hypothesis that it is constrained by the innate cognitive structures that constrain L1A (Universal Grammar, UG). Although Epstein et al. purport to offer support for this approach, I suggest here that they undervalue argumentation from the poverty of the stimulus, which is the classic argumentation for UG in child language acquisition (see Chomsky 1986 and many others). After several decades of extensive investigation, generative linguists have documented a wide range of complex syntactic properties in natural language grammars which are routinely acquired despite overwhelming underdetermination in the primary linguistic data available to the language acquiring child: subject-nonsubject, complement-noncomplement, and pronominal-nonpronominal asymmetries, restrictions on interpretation of pronouns, locality conditions on movement, interpretive effects of movement, and so on. While linguists continually strive to refine syntactic theory, it is well established that these poverty of the stimulus problems unequivocally point to an innate domain-specific restriction on the grammatical hypothesis space available to the language acquiring child. Stated perhaps crudely, children figure out the intricacies of backward pronominalization before they figure out how to tie their shoes. This demands an explanation in terms of innate cognitive architecture, because the environment alone does not provide an adequate account. However, it is not obvious that adult L2A is characterized by the same dual poverty of the stimulus as L1A, since adults have higher reasoning skills unavailable to small children, and it is an empirical question whether Interlanguage exhibits the same complex patterns of knowledge found in native adult grammars and developing child grammars. The identification of genuine poverty of the stimulus problems in adult L2A would represent the strongest possible demonstration that adult L2 acquisition is indeed constrained by innate mechanisms. Consider, for example, Schwartz & Sprouses (1994) longitudinal study of the European Science Foundation's Cevdet transcripts, in which Cevdet's TurkishGerman Interlanguage exhibited a pronominal-nonpronominal asymmetry with postverbal subjects for a full year. This type of asymmetry is attested in French, but in neither Turkish nor German, which excludes both the LI and the target language as possible explanations. Thus, a genuine poverty of the stimulus problem attested in a native grammar is mirrored in an Interlanguage grammar. Similarly Martohardjono (1993, discussed in the target article, sect. 3.2.2) showed that L2 learners with Lls lacking overt syntactic movement exhibited the same sort of weakstrong distinction in movement violations in English exhibited by native speakers of English. This is again an L2A poverty of the stimulus, which is found in a native grammar and which can be attributed neither to the LI nor to target language input. I consider it irrelevant to the discussion at hand that in the first example the relevant Interlanguage property happens not to match the target language, while there is an Interlanguage-target language match in the second example (see Finer & Broselow 1986). Unfortunately, Epstein et al.'s primary form of argumentation is not an appeal to the poverty of the stimulus in L2A, but (1) to a

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Commentary /Epstein et al.: Second language acquisition

reanalysis of Vainikka & Young-Scholten's (VYS 1994) data, in which Epstein et al. argue for the presence of functional categories from the earliest stages; and (2) to target-like performance by L2 acquiring adults. However, VYS is an inappropriate target for Epstein et al.'s critique, because (their idiosyncratic and distorted interpretation of VYS's position notwithstanding) VYS assume that L2A is fully constrained by UG. In fact, in light of Epstein et al.'s reluctance to consider the transfer of abstract properties of the LI grammar at the initial stage of L2 development (sect. 5.2), it is extremely ironic that Epstein et al. attack VYS so furiously, since they actually represent very similar positions conceptually: minimal or no effects of transfer, but "full access" to UG. In their discussion of their own L2A study of Japanese-English Interlanguage (sect. 5), Epstein et al. lose sight of the fact that the assumption of functional categories in linguists' analyses of linguistic data does not immediately mean that the operation of UG is required to account for the ability of adults to (re-)produce sentences with periphrastic verb forms. Here Epstein et al. make the error of equating a theoretical construct that accounts for many empirical phenomena with one particular subset of phenomena associated with that construct under particular theories. This error is hardly surprising, since they have already told us that UG is required in adult L2A in order to account for the presence of words (sect. 2.2) and for the absence of grammatical rules containing predicates like "weighing less than 40 tons" (sect. 2.4). This rhetoric fails to appreciate what poverty of the stimulus means for adults, since adults have developed general problem solving skills which could easily lead adult learners (as it has led generations of grammarians) to such knowledge. In order to demonstrate the role of UG in L2A one must either design experiments that probe grammatical knowledge beyond both the LI grammar and the L2 input (as in, e.g., Martohardjono 1993) or search for evidence of such knowledge in production data (as in, e.g., Schwartz & Sprouse 1994). Simply showing that adults are not totally incapable of any sort of L2 performance will convince no one. tion" (Introduction). Together, these two assumptions instill a selfconcept of SLA as an adolescent field just starting to talk back to a parent discipline. I do not doubt that modern SLA research has new things to say about L2 acquisition, and that it can contribute to linguistic theory. What I doubt is that these activities are without relevant precedent. I offer here two sketches illustrating the real (long, rich) history of SLA studies, and the complex interactions of that history with linguistic theory. (1) Roman bilingual education (ca. 50 BCE) was probably the first widespread experience of SLA within western culture. Aristocrats' children were exposed to Latin and Greek at home, then acquired literacy and metalinguistic skills in the two languages simultaneously at school, a system which fostered Roman commitment to the equivalence of LI and L2 knowledge (Thomas, in preparation). Eventually, the concept that LI and L2 learning were essentially identical outlived its supporting social circumstances. The Roman bilingual ideal eroded so that few children entered school knowing Greek, but schools continued to teach Latin and Greek literacy in tandem. From this era (ca. 350 CE) we have Augustine's famous reflections on learning LI Latin and L2 Greek (Confessions, 1.8; 14). Augustine attributed his native fluency in Latin and lastingly mediocre Greek to the different circumstances of his exposure, home versus classroom. There is no evidence that (in modern terms) he considered LI and L2 knowledge as other than "epistemologically equivalent" (Schwartz 1986). Although this scandalized Wittgenstein (1953), for Augustine LI and L2 acquisition were not fundamentally different; in this sense he assumed a fourth-century version of the full access hypothesis. (2) In thirteenth-century Paris, the Modistae (speculative grammarians) developed proposals about the necessary properties of language, a draft of "universal grammar." They based their work not on cross-linguistic observations, but on arguments which assumed an isomorphism between grammar and logic. Insofar as they used data, they used Latin data - and Latin was their L2. The Modistae held an implicit version of the full access hypothesis, because they invested their knowledge of L2 with the status of knowledge of an ideal human language. Furthermore, the terminology the Modistae used to analyze language was appropriated from the L2 grammatical tradition (Thomas 1995). Thus, the first articulations of universal grammar in the west were shaped by L2 data, and expressed in terms borrowed from the experience of SLA. It is not the case that twentieth-century study of SLA has just now achieved the maturity to address linguistic theory. Rather, reflection on L2 knowledge (at least in part) gave birth to linguistic theory. Several concessions are in order. The first is obvious: generative theories of SLA (e.g., full access) cannot predate generative theory. But when did generative theory start? Chomsky (1966) locates his intellectual ancestors in the seventeenth century, while others (inter alios, Breva-Claramonte 1977) have argued that generative theory has a considerably longer past. A second concession is related: if we can speak of (e.g.) an Augustinian full access hypothesis, it resembles Epstein et al.'s full access only after abstracting away from many details. But I would argue that current SLA research suffers because, through the virtually unexamined conviction that a Kuhnian (1962) paradigm shift separates itself from its own past, no one tries to define where that resemblance fails and where it may hold. As a result, the field frets its (self-imposed) isolation (Gass 1993). Third, it could be said that a drive to understand the process of how L2s are acquired may distinguish modern discussion of SLA. But despite liberal use of the word "process" in Epstein et al.'s first four paragraphs, notice that their three hypotheses focus more on what resources are at the disposal of L2 learners than on the mechanisms (processes) by which learners move through successive states of knowledge of L2. Earlier conceptualizations of SLA paid little attention to mechanisms; but that work may be ahead of the present cutting edge of the field as well. Finally, it should be clear that fourth- or thirteenth-century
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"Full access" and the history of linguistics

Margaret Thomas
Program in Linguistics, Slavic and Eastern Languages Department, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA 02167. thomasm@bcvms.bc.edu

Abstract: This commentary addresses two pervasive misconceptions which emerge in Epstein et al.'s target article: (1) that study of second language acquisition (SLA) began in the mid-twentieth century; (2) that SLA has only recently become able to contribute to linguistic theory. There is abundant historical counterevidence; I argue that (1) and (2) obscure the legitimacy of Epstein et al.'s "full access" hypothesis.

My remarks are mainly addressed to what readers may consider the least controversial portion of the target article: its first four paragraphs. In this section, Epstein, Flynn, and Martohardjono invoke two pervasive assumptions about second language acquisition (SLA) research. I believe that both are unwarranted and, in fact, distort our view of Epstein et al.'s "full access" hypothesis, diminishing its legitimate status. I will argue against these two assumptions, and will suggest that we reconstruct a full access hypothesis without them. The first assumption is entrenched in modern study of SLA: that the germane history of the field began sometime in the 1970s (or at the earliest, 1940s). Epstein et al. do not spell this out, but it is implicit in their statement that "until recently [SLA] was not well understood . . . because traditional approaches to the study of L2 learning were inextricably linked to language pedagogy alone" (Introduction). A second conventional assumption is that SLA is only now developing to the point where it can command the interest of theoretical linguistics. This belief hovers under the surface of Epstein et al.'s text: "Traditionally, . . . language scientists have paid little attention to the issues surrounding L2 acquisi-

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linguistic-historiographical evidence does not have the same role within SLA research as the arguments for full access of the kind that Epstein et al. present. To understand the history of something is not necessarily to understand its nature. But it behooves us to consider full access from every angle: empirical, because it finds support in the research represented in this target article and its commentaries; logical, because it may preempt the position of null hypothesis (Schwartz 1986); and historical, because it is not a late twentieth-century invention. Its core insight goes back to the beginning of intellectual curiosity about SLA, and in fact, western linguistics owes much to its inception. these verbs, even though the Spanish counterparts of these verbs do not take infinitives (I simplify slightly). The question, however, is: Why do they? Or putting the matter differently: What is it about English and Spanish clauses containing these verbs that UG comes to rescue? Whatever the answer, it must relate to the grammatical factors that prevent these two verbs in Spanish from appearing with an embedded infinitive. Obviously, much knowledge needs to be gained about matters like this, and it would help to have some answers at our disposal for the theory of L2. However, there is no doubt that Epstein et al.'s article is a step in the right direction.

Towards characterizing what the L2 learner knows

Esther Torrego
Bilingual ESL Program/Hispanic Studies, University of Massachusetts, Boston, MA 02125. torrego@umbsky.cc.umb.edu

Partial transfer, not partial access

Anne Vainikka3 and Martha Young-Scholtenb
"Institute for Research in Cognitive Science, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104-6228; "Department of Linguistics and English Language, University of Durham, Durham DH1 3JT, United Kingdom. vainikka@linc.cis.upenn.edu; martha.young-scholten@durham.ac.uk

Abstract: This target article is mostly a presentation of experimental research devoted to the larger issue of the role of Universal Grammar in second language learning. Deliberately excluding the aspects of human cognition that makes second language (L2) so variant, Epstein et al. focus on what the learners may know and how they come to know it. This is the aspect of Epstein et al.'s work which is more limiting, and potentially more interesting.

Abstract: Our results support the idea that adults have access to the principles and parameters of Universal Grammar (UG), contrary to Epstein et al.'s misrepresentation of our work as involvingptirtial access to UG. For both LI and L2 acquisition, functional projections appear to develop in a gradual fashion, but in L2 acquisition there is partial transfer in that the lowest projection (VP) is transferred from the speaker's LI.

Epstein, Flynn, and Martohardjono present an overview of what they believe are the three main theoretical trends of the emerging and increasingly important area of research on second language (L2) acquisition, arguing for one of them. Their view is that research in L2 is guided by one of the following approaches: (1) no aspect of UG is available to the language learner; (2) a partial aspect of UG is available, and (3) L2 is constrained entirely by UG. They advocate (3). While their critique of the first two approaches offers some illuminating points, the main subject of their target article is the specific pieces of research they have done in support of (3). In most of the paper, the substantive question they raise is: What exactly does (can) the L2 learner know, and how does the L2 learner come to know it? It would seem difficult to do justice to alternatives that do not address the questions that Epstein et al. address. The most compelling part of their work, however, is precisely their attempt to offer an explicit characterization of the linguistic knowledge of L2 learners, and how they acquire it. The role of invariance of linguistic knowledge in L2 learners is likely to be secondary to that of the language teacher. What is more, as with all research concerning language, the question of invariance in L2 learners seems indispensable to the whole enterprise. Nothing of this, of course, eliminates the many murky issues attending answers about the acquisition of L2 grammars; and for the most part, the aspects of human cognition that make foreign language learning so hard are not addressed in this target article. But ignorance in these matters should not impede investigation of what exactly the L2 learner does or can know, and how the L2 learner comes to know it. This is not to say that the more specific empirical work Epstein et al. present is without theoretical reverberation. For example, their approach to the Head parameter seems straightforward, but it is not without commitment to empirical consequences. What would happen if, rather than by the directionality parameters of Head-complement relations, the surface ordering of elements were to be determined by structural hierarchy, along the lines of Kayne's (1994) proposal, or Chomsky's (1995) revision of it, or some other version? Some of the consequences may remain, and some others may not. Let us take another concrete example, this time having to do with Spanish. Epstein et al. report that Spanish speakers learning English, when confronted with verbs such as "remind" and "tell," invariably choose the infinitival structures for

Because our findings support Epstein, Flynn, and Martohardjono's position regarding full access to Universal Grammar (UG), we are dismayed by their misapprehension of our research methodology, which seems to have led to misinterpretation of our results, reflected most strikingly in their misrepresentation of our approach as one involved partial access to UG (Introduction, para. 8). Our study re-examines Clahsen and Muysken's (1986) claim that adult L2 acquisition (L2A) of German phase structure is fundamentally different from acquisition by German children, a claim partly based on the production data from the ZISA and von Stutterheim corpuses which we also used. Because their data were collected largely through interviews of non-instructed learners, we followed similar procedures, adding several elicitation tasks designed to reduce ellipsis, which interviewing promotes (full details appear in Vainikka & Young-Scholten 1994; 1996b). We were successful in eliciting the data required for our purposes: a full range of subject, verb, and object types. Our results led us to propose that only lexical categories such as VP are present at the earliest stages of L2A - similar to Radford's (1990) proposal for LI acquisition. LI learners serve as a "control group" for UG-based research in L2 acquisition, given children's presumed full access to UG. Identifying commonalities between LI and L2 acquisition while controlling for possible influence of the L2 learners mother tongue enables the researcher to explore the issue of adult access to UG. We chose spontaneous and elicited production data to allow a direct comparison with related work on the early LI acquisition of phrase structure, which is exclusively based on production data. Among our results is the intriguing finding that both children and adults produce nontarget "root infinitives" (Wexler 1994) in early-stage German. Along with Radford and several other L1A researchers, including Clahsen et al. (1994) on German and Wijnen (1994) on Dutch, we adopt for L1A a non-maturationist, weak continuity approach under which functional projections gradually emerge. While the child has access to all principles and parameters of UG from the start, much syntactic structure is initially absent; functional projections develop through the interaction of the input language with UG parameters (in contrast to the approach adopted by Epstein et al. for L1A, where the entirety of adult syntactic structure is assumed to exist from the outset of development). The relevant stages are summarized in Table 1.

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Coimnentary/Epstein Table 1 (Vainikka & Young-Scholten). Stages in LI (Clahsen 1991) and L2 development of German. VP [initial] VP [final] FP [initial] II II II II II AGRP [initial] III III III III III

et al.: Second language acquisition

have all the answers - our research suggests that we have not yet arrived at the final explanation for second language acquisition.

PROJECTION German children Korean adults Turkish adults Italian adults Spanish adults

UG, the L1, and questions of evidence

Lydia White
Department of Linguistics, McGill University, Montreal, Oue. H3A 1G5, Canada. lwhite@langs.lan.mcgill.ca

I-i I-i

-ii -ii

Abstract: Epstein, Flynn, and Martohardjono's presentation of the principal approaches to UG access in L2 acquisition is misleading; they have neglected the possibility that the LI grammar forms the learner's initial representation of the L2, with subsequent modifications constrained by UG. Furthermore, their experimental data are open to several interpretations and are consistent with a number of different positions in the field.

While both LI and L2 learners start at the VP-stage, evidence of transfer exists in that headedness of the VP is initially transferred from the L2 learner's mother tongue, to later flip if necessary. This transfer is only partial; at subsequent non-final stages, both children and adults in all four language groups posit head-initial functional projections, although the AgrP in German is head-final, and functional projections are head-final in Korean and Turkish. Clearly children and adults have something in common here: their access to X'-Theory. The rich morphology and instances of obligatory syntactic movement in German provide a window on the relationship between morphological and syntactic development. Similar to what Epstein et al. note regarding Dulay and Burt's L2A findings (sect. 2.3, para. 6), we propose that the acquisition patterns for functional morphemes such as the German agreement suffixes displayed by L2 learners do not derive from their LI knowledge. Regardless of the parallelisms, it is clear that the LI and L2 acquisition processes are not identical. One of the observed differences is that adults, even at more advanced stages, often produce sentences reflecting earlier stages. This phenomenon is also observable in L1A, but it is our impression that children "shed" earlier grammars more quickly than adults do. One characterization of L1-L2 differences concerns the difference in possible triggers for syntactic structure, explored in Vainikka and YoungScholten (1995). Such a morphosyntactic difference could potentially be tied to the notion of a sensitive period for language development. Epstein et al. might disapprove of our stage-based analyses (cf. sect. 3.3.6), but their alternative analysis - consisting chiefly of the elusive notion of "performance" - fails to account for the parallel development in the LI and L2 acquisition of phrase structure. All research attempting to define stages of syntactic development in the fields of language acquisition and language change faces the challenge of non-instantaneous changes; in historical linguistics, this problem has been solved by adopting the notion of simultaneously present, competing grammars (Santorini 1993). Thus stages are necessarily idealizations. A further misunderstanding concerns the status of certain syntactic phenomena with respect to UG. In particular, contrary to Epstein et al. s claim, we propose no syntactic principles specific to L2A (sect. 3.4.5, para. 8). The Full House Principle, which requires that syntactic positions be filled, is a general one, operative in L1A, L2A, and adult syntax. While the discussion of this principle in the syntactic literature has been preliminary, it has recently been developed and utilized in Speas's (1994) work on null subjects. Several of the consequences of our syntactic assumptions are addressed in Vainikka and Young-Scholten (1996a). Whatever the ultimate conclusion may be regarding the syntactic structure young children possess when they only produce utterances without finite verbs and other functional elements, our L2 data show that adults behave in much the same manner as young children and thus can be said to have full access to whatever principles and parameters of UG are involved in the development of phrase structure. In raising new questions - to which none of us

One cannot consider the issue of UG access in L2 acquisition in isolation from a theory of the L2 learner's mental representation of grammar. For many years, a central claim has been that the LI (in whole or in part) serves as the L2 learners initial representation of the L2. This claim has been made for a number of properties of grammar, including parameters (White 1985b; 1991), null arguments (Martohardjono & Gair 1993; White 1992c), headedness of functional or lexical categories (Eubank 1993/1994; Vainikka & Young-Scholten 1994), and the total grammar (Schwartz & Sprouse 1994). In all cases, associated "deep" consequences of the LI grammar, such as clustering of parametric properties, are argued to be present. This is not a "no access" or "partial access" position, since UG is assumed not to be restricted to an LI instantiation (White 1989, p. 50). Proponents of this position assume (as do Epstein et al.) that UG does not essentially change as a result of LI acquisition and remains available in nonprimary acquisition. In response to properties of the L2 input that reveal the inadequacy of the LI grammar, the learner has recourse to UG options, for example, new parameter settings (Hilles 1986; Hirakawa 1990; Schwartz & Sprouse 1994; Thomas 1991b; White 1985b). These new settings will not necessarily be appropriate for the L2 (Finer & Broselow 1986) and there are circumstances where the relevant L2 properties will be unattainable (Schwartz & Gubala-Ryzack 1992; White 1989); thus, identical outcomes in LI and L2 acquisition are not predicted. In their overview of the UG access debate, Epstein et al. neglect the possibility that both the LI and UG are centrally involved. Their presentation of the role of the LI is naive and simplistic. They imply that transfer necessarily involves only superficial properties. They effectively allow for only two possibilities; either the LI is the sole source of access to UG-specified knowledge (their "no access" and "partial access" positions) or L2 learners have direct access to UG alone ("full access"). In fact, Epstein et al.'s position on the role of the LI is inconsistent. They attribute some influence to the LI, although its precise status is unclear. While denying that the LI constitutes the L2 learners initial state, they nevertheless speak of the need to assign new parametric values when LI and L2 differ (sect. 3.2.1). But if the L2 learner does not use the LI representation as a starting point, the issue of match or mismatch between LI and L2 does notarise. If L2 learners start from UG, all parameter settings are new settings; thus there should be no difference between cases where LI and L2 settings coincide and cases where they differ. The various hypotheses on access to UG differ in the predictions they make regarding the L2 initial state, developmental changes and final outcome. Given the approach advocated by Epstein et al. (i.e., UG and a minimal role for LI, the onus is on them to show that there are L2 data which could not be accounted for on the basis of LI knowledge alone, or on the basis of the LI as the initial representation with subsequent UG-constrained restructuring. It is not as simple as demonstrating absence of transfer effects or presence of functional categories.

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The results of Epstein et al. s experiment (sect. 5.2) are consistent with any position on UG access. The results fail to distinguish between hypotheses that assume a role for the LI versus those that do not because subjects had the same LI and because results could be attributed to that LI, if Japanese has functional categories. (Indeed, the uncertain status of functional categories in Japanese makes it a poor choice of LI.) The results also fail to distinguish between weak and strong continuity (which are not, contra Epstein et al., synonymous with partial and full access) because the learners were not beginners. The problem is that similarities in the performance of learners at a particular point are consistent both with earlier differences and with earlier similarities. The presence of functional categories at one stage is no guarantee of their presence at an earlier stage. Lack of evidence for transfer at some point does not preclude an Ll-based representation at an earlier stage. This is not to say that there are no published data that can help to distinguish between the various approaches to UG access, but those data are not to be found in Epstein et al.'s work.

Authors' Response
Universal Grammar and second language acquisition: The null hypothesis
Samuel David Epstein,a Suzanne Flynn,b and Gita Martohardjono0
"Department of Linguistics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138. epstein@fas.harvard.edu; "Department of Foreign Languages and Literatures, Linguistics and Philosophy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139. sflynn@mit.edu; cDepartment of Linguistics, Queens College and the Graduate Center, City University of New York, Flushing, NY 11367. qmaqcaqcuni@.acc.qc.edu

Abstract: The target article advanced the null, unified and widely misinterpreted generative hypothesis regarding second language (L2) acquisition. Postulating that UG (Universal Grammar) constrains L2 knowledge growth does not entail identical developmental trajectories for L2 and first language (LI) acquisition; nor does it preclude a role for the LI. In embracing this hypothesis, we maintain a distinction between competence and performance. Those who conflate the two repeat fundamental and by no means unprecedented misconstruals of the generative enterprise, and more specifically, of the empirical content of the null hypothesis regarding L2 linguistic knowledge growth. We hope to have identified certain common goals, the adoption of which might constitute a firm foundation for continued productive interdisciplinary development of contemporary theoretical and experimental L2 acquisition research. To the same natural effects we must, as far as possible, assign the same causes. Isaac Newton, as quoted by L. K. Nash. In: Nature of the Natural Sciences (1963, p. 183)

called this the "Full Access Hypothesis" (FAH). The simplicity of the FAH can be misleading, because it is also the strongest position among those positing a language-specific cognitive function; it is, as pointed out by Ton-ego and Kanno, the null hypothesis. The commentaries about this null hypothesis can be classified into four groups. The first group identified innovative applications of the FAH to domains of linguistic research that we had not originally considered (see e.g., M. Hales comments on historical linguistics and DeGraff s regarding pidgins and Creoles). A second group viewed the underlying assumptions of the FAH (namely, that there exists, by hypothesis, a language-specific module) as untenable, and proposed alternative accounts of language acquisition not appealing to UG (see e.g., MacWhinney and O'Grady). Members of this as well as other groups appealed, to one extent or another, to notions such as "higher reasoning skills," "general cognitive ability," "learning," and "intelligence" (see e.g., Bickerton, Clahsen & Muysken, Grewendorf, Sharwood Smith, and Sprouse). A majority of commentators, constituting the third group, viewed the FAH skeptically, willing to accord LI - but not L2 acquisition full access to UG (see e.g., Liceras and Otero). Finally, a fourth group consisted of L2 researchers who themselves adopt the FAH, but believe that, in certain respects, we did not present an entirely accurate characterization of its role in the target article (e.g., Eubank, Schwartz, and White). Because we have little to say regarding the commentaries of the first two groups, we will principally address the comments of the last two. In the process, several important theoretical and experimental issues concerning the domain of contemporary generative L2 acquisition research will emerge. Given that generative L2 inquiry is, as aptly stated by Otero, "in its infancy," (cf. Thomas) the appearance of the controversies articulated in the target article and the commentaries is hardly surprising and is, in our view, a desirable outcome of this entire project. A principal objective of the target article was to present these issues in an open forum that would invite productive interdisciplinary discussion. We are indebted to each of the commentators for their time and effort in expressing their thoughtful views. In the following, we will address what we believe to be the central issues they raised. R2. The scope of the target article Because it is not possible to provide a comprehensive analysis of all contemporary L2 acquisition research in one article, we carefully investigated some of the most explicit proposals in the field whose claims diverge significantly from the null hypothesis (as stated in sect. 1 above). We examined the conceptual and methodological underpinnings of these proposals, as well as some of their unnoted empirical consequences. We chose Vainikka & YoungScholten's (VYS s) analysis as a case study of the partial access hypothesis because it is one of the most syntactically explicit hypotheses for which empirical support has been adduced.1 Because the target article was to be an introduction to contemporary research in generative L2 acquisition rendered comprehensible to our colleagues in other areas of cognitive science (as evidenced, e.g., by the appearance of our Appendix), we chose accessibility to UG as one central

R1. Introduction The objective of the target article was to present both conceptual arguments and empirical evidence for a simple yet compelling idea: that the independent cognitive module (UG) that constrains first language (LI) acquisition similarly constrains second language (L2) acquisition. We 746
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Response/Epstein et al.: Second language acquisition theme. We agree with Schwartz and White, who note that some research in generative L2 acquisition has progressed "beyond" the question of UG accessibility to an investigation of the nature of the initial state in L2 acquisition. As indicated by the commentaries we received, however, the issue of accessibility is (as also perceived by Otero and by Freidin) certainly far from resolved, and thus warrants considerable further discussion. We will address the relationship between the FAH and the L2 initial state in section 5. R2.1. A note on empirical inquiry. We take UG accessibility in L2 acquisition to be an entirely empirical issue. Hence there are no "proofs." Instead, there are data (ranging from controlled experimental results to observations of naturalistic speech) that are interpreted according to a theory in which we have some confidence. Specifically with respect to linguistic inquiry, there are, on the one hand, hypotheses about (idealized) knowledge-states, and, on the other hand, experiments in which behavior is recorded and interpreted by the experimenter as indicative of a hypothesized knowledge-state. Many commentaries might be read as either directly expressing the belief or directly implying that, for example, there exist exactly nine questions constituting "the real issues" (see the last paragraph of Borer), or that generative linguistic research is deductive, reveals "facts" or "truisms," while providing "proofs," "solutions," or absolute certainties (e.g., see Bickerton, Clahsen & Muysken, Gregg, Grewendorf, Lieberman, MacWhinney, Newmeyer, Schwartz, and Vainikka & Young-Scholten). It is important to remember, however, that in empirical inquiry, all such terms are merely abbreviatory conventions. One can find the evidence we adduce for our hypothesis more or less persuasive, but to provide "facts" and "proofs" was certainly not our goal, and is indeed antithetical to our fundamental methodological assumptions. Needless to say, "what is observed is often neither relevant nor significant, and what is relevant and significant is often very difficult to observe, in linguistics no less than in the freshman physics laboratory, or, for that matter, anywhere in science."2 We should also note here that we would not evaluate the adequacy of any empirical hypothesis (advanced in any field) on the basis of any one or a combination of the following criteria - even if statistical support were provided: (1) its representation in textbooks (MacWhinney); (2) the number of university campuses hosting proponents (Lieberman); (3) whether a majority of researchers subscribe to it (O'Grady); (4) whether it enjoys a consensus (Archibald et al.); (5) whether it is taught in beginning syntax classes (BleyVroman); or (6) whether "most current scholars" endorse it (Borer). We began with the FAH as an empirical question, on a par with certain other competing hypotheses in the field. In this context, we sought to provide explicit examples of extant arguments and experimental results that could be interpreted (or reinterpreted) as providing some evidence supporting the null hypotheses, namely that the language faculty constrains the hypothesis space in all human natural language acquisition processes. R3. Distinguishing knowledge from its development One of the recurring critiques of the FAH is that it fails to explain L2 development (e.g., Borer, Carroll, Gregg, Grewendorf, Schwartz). In L2 generative acquisition research, as in associated LI acquisition research, there are at least three major areas to investigate: (1) knowledgestates, (2) development of the knowledge-states, and (3) use of knowledge of language.3 We assume that these three domains must be separated but that they are nonetheless intimately related. Before one can investigate the development or use of a given knowledge-state, it is crucial that the knowledge-state in question be at least partially specified. Therefore, before one can address the questions of: (i) how the L2 learner develops this knowledge-state X, and (ii) how the L2 learner uses this knowledge-state, the knowledge-state (or the relevant aspect of it) must itself, be specified. That is to say, although an appropriately circumscribed theory of humanly attainable linguistic or syntactic competence (the knowledge-state) underlies theories of development and use, it is not itself a theory of these phenomena. No theory of humanly attainable linguistic knowledge-states seeks (in isolation) to explain use and development, nor should it. Several commentators seem to regard the explanation of development as one (if not the most) important aspect of a theory of L2 acquisition, interpreting the FAH's inability to explain development as an inherent and fatal flaw (see, e.g., Clahsen & Muysken's discussion which, like Borers, purports to define the "real and fundamental"). Insofar as the FAH only claims that L2 learners' grammars are constrained by UG principles and parameters, it says little, by itself, about development or the course of acquisition. This is because it is a hypothesis about attainable L2 learner knowledge-states, that is, what the L2 learner can come to know, and not a hypothesis about how language acquisition proceeds (development) or about how language is used (performance). This fundamental distinction, described by Carroll as the difference between the "representational" and the "developmental," is critical in understanding exactly what the FAH purports to explain. Under the FAH, development would be accounted for by, at least, the interaction of a theory of attainable knowledge-states with a theory of linguistically significant environmental stimuli (triggers) plus learnability theory (development) and a theory of processing (use). This, by the way, means that the FAH allows for the postulation of a UGconsistent L2 interlanguage grammar (ILG) that is identical neither to the LI nor to the L2, contra Whites interpretation. Given certain contemporary formulations (which, of course, may well be incorrect), many of the "decisions" the learner makes depend on the acquisition of morphological features of lexical entries (e.g., is the [C +WH] in the L2 marked + or - strong?). It is critical therefore that the learner have the right environmental input and the ability to analyze it as a "triggering experience."4 These processes will indeed be time-sensitive and data-dependent. A serious attempt must be made therefore to link (or construct) principled theories of attainable human linguistic knowledge-states, learnability, and parsing, and their significant points of interaction. The empirical burden placed on development will be characterized

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Response/Epstein et al.: Second language acquisition differently by different formulations of the relative contributions of these interacting empirical hypotheses. R3.1. The FAH and the steady-state. An assumption several commentators seem to make is that UG accessibility entails reaching the target L2 steady-state. Is this so? Looking back at the intergrammar models outlined in the target article, it seems to us that UG accessibility entails only the following: at no stage should the L2 learners knowledge-state violate any principle(s) of UG. We note here that knowledge-state (competence) should not be confused or conflated with, for example, "utterances" or observed behavior. The question of whether the L2 learner (and this holds for the LI learner as well) reaches the target steady-state is not determined by UG alone, but also by (at least) certain performance factors (e.g., see Goodluck & Tavakolian 1982), learnability (the hypothesis selection procedure), and environmental factors, that is, triggers in the input (see Gibson & Wexler 1994, and Lightfoot 1989 for recent discussions). To take but one illustrative example, it is possible that input is not processed linguistically (e.g., syntactic parsing) or nonlinguistically (e.g., developing cochlear function) in the same way by children and adults. This could, in principle, mean that the triggers (environmental factors) necessary to "incite" the adult L2 learners hypothesis selection procedure to adopt a new knowledge-state are, in effect, missing. All such possibilities are to be experimentally determined by testing articulated learnability and performance theories in interaction with UG, and if correct, the FAH. But nothing posited within the theory of UG ensures the attainment of the steady-state (even in the case of LI acquisition), contrary to the perspective adopted by numerous commentators. Notice, however, that even if such attainment were, in fact, an entailment of UG accessibility, and therefore of the FAH, we would still need to investigate the relationship between the attainment of the steady-state and the attainment of full "proficiency" (see below).
R3.1.1. The necessity of specifying the hypothesis space.

is acquired can we proceed to build models specifying how this acquisition takes place. The FAH is quite deliberate in distinguishing the target of L2 acquisition from the process: it argues on conceptual and methodological grounds against what Carroll calls the collapse of the explanans and explanandum. Therefore, one purpose of the target article was not, as Gregg and Sharwood Smith assert, to argue against a straw-man version of the no-access position but rather to reveal the serious and often unrecognized pitfalls of failing to separate distinct theoretical constructs as illustrated in our detailed examination of the Fundamental Difference Hypothesis. The FAH, as we construe it, rightly presumes that knowledge is distinct from, but intimately related to, development and use. This is, we believe, a necessary distinction, not different from the one maintained by generativists investigating LI acquisition, or by cognitive scientists in general. In our view, many of the objections raised by the commentators stem from a failure to make this crucial distinction. As correctly noted by, for example, Harrington, the target article was not an attempt to present a "complete" theory of L2, or of L2 development. Rather, we suggested that the productivity of such theorizing is greatly enhanced if we first make explicit our assumptions about what constitutes competence, performance, and development in L2 acquisition. R4. Competence versus performance The issues surrounding the competence/performance distinction are complex; they cut across a number of different classes of commentaries as well as distinct but related interdisciplinary areas of inquiry. One major misconception in the commentaries related directly to the competence/performance distinction is that, by virtue of our adopting the FAH, we were committed to the prediction that LI and L2 acquisition are absolutely identical processes yielding identical products. However, the FAH itself entails neither the prediction of developmental identity nor of native-like "proficiency" (performance). We consider this misconception about the predictive content of the FAH to be one of the most prevalent detrimental misinferences made in generative L2 acquisition research. We suspect that this apparent confusion stems from a failure to maintain the crucial distinction between competence and performance. Indeed, one purpose of the target article is to clarify precisely this point. Another prevalent objection to the FAH consists of the pervasive, but in many cases anecdotal, claim that L2 learners, unlike LI learners, often fail to achieve nativelike proficiency (e.g., Borer, Grewendorf, Lieberman, Newmeyer). Statements to this effect range from Newmeyers linguistically inexplicit pronouncement that adult L2 learning ends "in abject failure," to Gregg's equally inexplicit assertion regarding the alleged "virtually universal failure of adults to acquire an L2," to the entirely curious questions concerning the FAH posed by Lieberman: "why can't we all effortlessly 'acquire' Tibetan in six months or so? . . . Why can't we all learn to speak Tibetan with native proficiency?" It is, in our view and that of others, far from experimentally established that even full proficiency never occurs. As pointed out by Sharwood Smith, adult proficiency in more than one language is not that uncommon in multilingual settings (see also Bialystok & Hakuta 1994; Cook 1995;

The charge that the FAH fails as an explanation of L2 acquisition is perhaps most clearly exemplified in Gregg's commentary (but see also Li), which seems to express dissatisfaction at how little the FAH elucidates L2 acquisition. He writes that the FAH, as we articulate it, leaves "untouched a raft of questions." This is certainly true; in fact, an infinite number of questions is left untouched, as is typical of circumscribed empirical inquiry in any field. For example, Gregg points to the FAH's inability to guarantee success in attaining the target grammar, noting that "restricting the hypothesis space restricts the learner's choices; it does not guarantee that the choice will be correct. A theory of L2 knowledge is distinct from a theory of L2 acquisition." Again, we concur, though we do not see this as a shortcoming, but as a necessary distinction between specifying the hypothesis space and specifying the hypothesis selection procedure(s). If "theory of L2 acquisition" means a theory of how knowledge of the L2 develops, the FAH itself is indeed not sufficient, nor is it intended to be. It is formulated in such a way, however, that, in concert with interacting theories of (at least) processing and learnability, it can contribute directly to explanations of what it is that develops; arguably, the articulation of such explanations is methodologically prior to questions about how it develops. Only if we first construct explicit, formal empirical hypotheses about what 748
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Response/Epstein et al.: Second language acquisition Flynn & Manuel 1994; Wode 1991). However, even if it were the exception for L2 learners to achieve full L2 proficiency, would this refute the FAH? Many commentators seem to think so, although we suspect that this too is based on a mistaken conflation of the steady knowledge-state (competence) and proficiency (performance). Although it is true that we would not expect full proficiency without full grammatical competence, the converse does not necessarily hold (see Li 1995 and Martohardjono & Flynn 1995, among others). Just as in LI acquisition (see, e.g., Crain 1991), it is not at all clear that the failure to observe nativelike proficiency entails the absence of full syntactic component competence or even full general competence. Furthermore, the question of what constitutes "nativelike proficiency" is, we believe, fraught with a lack of clarity. Controlled LI experimental studies are required to determine as precisely as possible the nature of "nativelike proficiency." Moreover, once "nativelike" is (provisionally) determined, it is not self-evident just how "nativelike" L2 learners' performance must be to legitimately suggest competence. 5 There is, first of all, the experimental difficulty of deciding what constitutes sufficient behavioral evidence for the principled postulation of underlying knowledge states. All behavior observed in experimental tasks is necessarily influenced by numerous performance factors (see Martohardjono, in press). Before we conclude or simply assert that L2 performance that diverges from "nativelike" standards is the result of competence deficit(s) (see Grewendorf), we must first investigate whether differences in native and non-native performance might not be traceable to a host of possible performance or processing factors, a result consistent with the null hypothesis: the FAH. Experiments examining differences between LI and L2 processing (Fernandez 1995; Flynn 1995) suggest that this might well be a fruitful line of inquiry. As in the natural sciences, we need to devise more sensitive methods, in the case at hand, diagnostics that can more reliably assess the formal properties of L2 intergrammars. This is the problem Martohardjono (1993) attempts to address in her studies investigating knowledge of gradience in grammaticality and systematiciry in L2 intergrammars, as described in the target article. Sorace's (1993) research on near-native grammaticality judgments is also directly relevant in this regard. At this point it seems necessary to specify some of the ways we think the FAH might, in principle, interact with an articulated theory of performance. Minimally, such a theory would specify how knowledge is accessed in real-time production and comprehension (behavior). We can posit a model parallel to the ones in Figures 2-4 of the target article depicting the course of the development of proficiency, proceeding from an explicit specification of an initial state of no proficiency in the L2, through intermediate stages, to perhaps full proficiency. Notice that although the two models, one of competence the other of performance, are parallel, it is nonetheless necessary to specify how developing competence and developing performance are temporally linked (bridge theories). Thus, if a learner is in intergrammar knowledge-state n, this does not ipso facto entail his being at any particular stage in his proficiency in using the intergrammar n. Rather, this is an interesting and important empirical question yet to be thoroughly investigated. L2 acquisition theory has long suggested that the use of the target language is even influenced by nonlinguistic factors such as motivation, or competing cognitive structures (cf. Felix 1984). It is therefore entirely possible and completely consistent with the FAH that a given L2 learner has reached the steady state of the target grammar without it ever being reflected in his use of the target grammar. This, incidentally, constitutes our reply to the question Newmeyer raises with his analogy to vision: If, for example, corneal degeneration were solely responsible for ubiquitous adult blindness, then we would indeed argue that the remainder of visual competence is intact (or "accessible" by perhaps yet-to-be-discovered noncomeal avenues) even though the system is entirely unusable as a result of such adult-onset corneal abnormalities. Similarly, if someone were born with no eardrums, we would argue that the innate capacity for language acquisition (UG) remains, although the development of spoken language will be, by hypothesis, adversely affected. (How it is affected and how auditory linguistic development characteristically unfolds are empirical matters.) Finally, if some adult native English speakers (i.e., knower's) entire supraglottal vocal tract, auditory processing mechanisms, and visual system were (somehow) surgically removed, leaving them with no ability to see, speak, or hear, we would not hypothesize that the knowledge of language was simultaneously "excised."6 R5. Metalinguistic awareness: What is it and what is its role in L2 acquisition? One critical difference in the development of knowledgestates and of proficiency, it seems to us, is that the former is apparently unconscious, whereas some aspects of the latter may be uniformly and crosslinguistically registered at some conscious level by the learner (which aspects being an empirical issue). This brings us to another prevalent objection to the FAH expressed in the commentaries: the alleged role of metalinguistic knowledge in L2 acquisition. For example, Bickerton and Grewendorf object to our critique of the Fundamental Difference Hypothesis, which, recall, posits that L2 learners' "expectations" influence the L2 intergrammar attained. Both commentators assert that L2 learners undeniably have expectations. The FAH does not preclude this. However, if they do, then at least the following critical questions arise: What metalinguistic knowledge do L2 learners have, exactly? How does this (experimentally investigated) metalinguistic knowledge influence the formal properties of the output knowledgestate^) that develop? These are entirely empirical and are perhaps even currently experimentally investigable matters. For example, one commentator, Grewendorf, asserts, without any empirical evidence, that the acquisition of "the concept of a language" (which he altogether fails to define) plays a central, metalinguistic role in L2 acquisition: My claim is that L2 learners' knowledge and expectations concerning a second language cannot be attributed to any mysterious access to UG but have to do with the fact that L2 learners have acquired the concept ofa language (of a grammar) as a result of having learned the meaning of the word by which this concept is denoted in their native language. In contrast to Grewendorf, many commentators fail even to specify the nature of the purported metalinguistic contribution, let alone the linguistically significant impact it is alleged to have on the L2 grammar. For example, Sharwood Smith writes:
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Resjwnse/Epstein et al.: Second language acquisition The role of metalinguistic ability in L2 development is seriously underestimated. It may be seen both (1) as a means of initiating or boosting the flow of primary linguistic data and (2) as a generator of substitute knowledge (derived, but epistemologically destinct from doman-specific knowledge) that may compete with or compensate for perceived gaps in the learner's current underlying competence. Finally, some commentators simply assert (with no supporting evidence) that certain metalinguistic factors are self-evident, rendering the entire L2 empirical research enterprise (in contrast to all other empirical inquiry) "easy," and (apparently) complete: "If we want to keep discussing this problem as a question of empirical study, the goal to specify the notion of'possible L2 grammar' can be achieved rather easily: a possible L2 grammar is a "grammar" (a steady-state) with which the L2 learner is satisfied" (Grewendorf ). Once again, the specific forms of metalinguistic L2 awareness and their influence on explicit aspects of the L2 grammar (e.g., the acquisition of knowledge concerning main clause German V2 by adult Turkish Llers) are empirical issues. Pronouncements, purported factual assertions without any accompanying evidence, anecdotes, opinions, and the like will not suffice. Rather, if one is interested, one must carefully design and conduct controlled experiments investigating explicit, testable hypotheses concerning the nature of L2 metalinguistic awareness and its effects on particular formal properties of the hypothesized L2 grammar (e.g., X'-theoretic LF representations of VPs in French past-tense negated conditional clauses). R6. The FAH, UG, and the initial state Another prevalent criticism expressed in several commentaries (e.g., Bhatt & Hancin-Bhatt, Gregg, Kanno, Li, Schwartz, and White) is that the FAH denies a significant role for the LI in the L2 acquisition process, but this is not the case. As stated in the target article, the FAH fully allows a role for the LI, though it does not itself make any predictions about the initial state of the L2 learner vis-a-vis the LI. In the following, we hope to clarify this issue.7 To begin, the development of a principled theory of L2 acquisition requires an account of the role of the LI in conjunction with an account of the contribution of UG. Since the late 1970s, much empirical work in generative L2 acquisition research has attempted to articulate this union in some way. For example, Flynn (1987) proposes the following operational criteria for development of an explanatory theory of L2 acquisition. To meet the criteria set for a creative component a theory must: formulate significant linguistic and abstract principles provide empirical evidence for the role of these principles in LI acquisition provide empirical evidence of their predictive value in L2 acquisition. To represent a contrastive component a theory must: lead to precise predictions of where knowledge of the LI interferes in L2 acquisition and where it does not integrate an explanation of these interference phenomena with the general principles of the creative component. An important point to stress is that the theory must also be internally consistent. Constructing a principled theory of L2 acquisition has proven a difficult and painstaking task, as one would imagine and indeed expect. As noted above and in the target article, one of the greatest and most basic challenges in developing such a theory has been in determining what constitutes evidence for L2 competence. Reaching consensus among researchers is often difficult as exemplified in many of the commentaries on the target article, although this is not unique to the field of L2 acquisition. Indeed, one of the goals of the target article was to raise critical questions about the nature of the evidence that is often advanced in support of a particular claim. As noted above and in the target article, many performance factors may disguise or distort the evidence that one needs to make a reasonable inference about the linguistic competence of the L2 learner. Again, all empirical inquiry into human knowledge and behavior must contend with the difficulties of separating evidence from interacting domains. In contrast to the LI acquisition process, however, these distorting factors are perhaps even more at issue. Although this is a difficult problem, it certainly does not render the entire enterprise otiose. These difficulties aside, we nonetheless agree with our colleagues (Schwartz, White, and Eubank), that one of the next questions to be addressed concerns the nature of the initial state of the L2 learner. We assert here again that the FAH does not specify the entire nature of this state, nor should it do so. It was not the intent of the target article to discuss this, both because it was beyond the scope of the central focus of accessibility and because research into the L2 initial state has only recently begun (see Schwartz & Eubank 1996). To the extent that the field has been able to isolate certain bodies of illuminating data, however, three major trends seem to have emerged, providing us with some pretheoretic information regarding the initial state of the L2 learner. For illustrative purposes, let us consider the (idealized) case of a Japanese and a Spanish speaker (all else being equal) learning English as an L2. A body of empirical research (e.g., Finer 1991; Flynn 1983; 1987 on Japanese and Spanish; Martohardjono & Gair 1993; Thomas 1991; Uziel 1993 for related trends with other language groups) suggests the following: (1) At all stages of acquisition, most notably at the earliest stage,8 there are differences between the developmental patterns of Japanese and Spanish speakers. From this type of finding, we infer that the LI does indeed matter in some way. (2) As a partial corollary to (1) above, the differences we observe between the Japanese and Spanish speakers cannot readily be explained in terms of the L2 learner "superimposing" the formal properties of the LI grammar onto the L2 grammar. That is, the L2 learner, in spite of some of the claims made in the commentaries (White and Schwartz), does not appear to attempt to construct the L2 grammar in total conformity with the LI grammar. As noted in the target article, when discussing differences and similarities between the Japanese and Spanish speakers learning English as an L2, the Japanese speakers did not more readily "acquire" those aspects of the target grammar that "matched" those properties of the LI grammar. We would not have expected this if the Japanese speakers were simply constructing the grammar of English as if it were identical in the relevant respects to the grammar of Japanese. In addition, we found no evidence in the thousands of utterances elicited from the Japanese speakers that they, for example, had any difficulty with the SVO word order pattern of English; nor did we find any utterances (among the thousands) of a Japanese speaker at any level of English

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flesponse/Epstein et al.: Second language acquisition competence "speaking English as if it were Japanese." That is, we do not find the Japanese speakers trying to impose the SOV word order pattern onto English. This is not the only example of this kind but it serves as an important one. (3) There are, in our view, profound similarities in the developmental patterns "evinced" by the Japanese and Spanish speakers learning English, as noted in the target article. From this we again infer that the LI grammar does not determine development of the L2 grammar in any surface-matching manner. How do we account, therefore, for these three patterns of results and, consequently, what can we say about the initial state? Assuming a Principles and Parameters framework, we are unable to argue that all L2 learners begin at So, as is the case for a young child acquiring an LI grammar. We also cannot argue, assuming that parameters have binary values, that the initial state for an L2 learner is one in which, for example, all settings revert to the unmarked/marked setting. If this were the case, we would predict that patterns of acquisition for the Japanese and Spanish learners would be in relevant respects the same. But the evidence suggests otherwise, as discussed above. At the same time, it appears that L2 learners do not assume the target L2 grammar has the same parametric settings as their LI. If this were the case, we would expect evidence that L2 learners were incorrectly imposing LI values onto the L2 grammar. Referring back to our word order examples above, we would expect to have found that the Japanese speakers "postulated" that English was a head-final language, like Japanese. Again, this does not seem to be the case. At the same time, it appears that there are still differences between the Japanese and Spanish speakers in their patterns of development of English. What do these patterns suggest? Theoretically, the above tripartition perhaps suggests that the theory of binary parameters is inadequate in this regard. This might instead suggest that we have not yet isolated or properly interpreted the critical data set. We simply do not yet have any firm answers here as the field is just beginning to formulate the next set of questions to be asked and has only recently begun to address them experimentally. It was not our intent in the target article to review the incipient data collected or the argumentation thus far advanced. Rather, our intent was to both argue for the role of the FAH in L2 acquisition and to examine, in perhaps unprecedented detail, an important and, we think, representative study. In this way, we sought (i) to illustrate the theoretical complexity of contemporary L2 acquisition research, and (ii) to examine carefully experimental issues (e.g., questions concerning the nature of evidence and its interpretation), so that as we proceed to questions at the next level, we might be in a position to develop more revealing modes of inquiry. R7. Methodology Another criticism advanced by several commentators concerned the methodology employed in our experimental study from which it was concluded that our case for full access should be dismissed (e.g., Birdsong, Eubank, Gregg, and Li). Experimental methodology is, as we note in the target article, a very complex issue in all empirical inquiry, including cognitive science in general, and linguistic research in particular. Experimentally based inference from observed behavior to attributed knowledge is not deductive. As in all empirical research, the object of inquiry (be it physical laws or knowledge of language) is not directly observable. On the other hand, on the assumption that performance does indeed involve competence, the former is perhaps the only (albeit imperfect) way to investigate the latter.
We assume that methods of data elicitation can be evaluated with regard to their accessibility to experimental method. The strength of such methods can be evaluated in terms of their effectiveness in evidencing various hypothesized factors of language competence. Their reliability can be assessed in terms of their replication across behaviors within a task. Their validity can be assessed in terms of converging evidence across different tasks, and in terms of the theoretical significance of the factors evidenced by the task. (Lust et al. 1987, p. 274.)

No one experimental task is a priori, better (or, in this case, worse) than any other, although we would reiterate the point made in the target article that more controlled experimental tasks stand a better chance of eliciting relevant data. R7.1. Elicited imitation. Some methodological questions were raised about the elicited imitation task, in the experimental study reported in the target article (e.g., Eubank). To begin, we needed production data as a basis of comparison with the data gathered by Vainikka and YoungScholten. As noted in the target article, they elicited production data from their subjects by means of a number of different production tasks such as descriptive narration. One of our criticisms of the Vainikka and Young-Scholten study was that their methodologies were nonoptimal for supporting the hypotheses they advanced. A principal criticism we made was that the absence of an acoustic-phonetic "instantiation" of a particular functional syntactic category in the utterances elicited from their subjects did not, in our view, entail the absence of that functional category in the developing syntactic-category inventory of their subjects. The subjects may not have had the opportunity to utter an instantiation of a particular functional syntactic category simply because it was not required by the task. This is not a novel observation on our part - it is one that has been made elsewhere (see Hyams & Safir 1991) - but it is a potentially serious drawback inherent in such "naturalistic" production studies. In addition, we thought that Vainikka and YoungScholten's overall experimental design was nonoptimal in several ways (e.g., the number of subjects is very low). These factors, we believe, challenge the experimental support for their hypotheses. To test our hypothesis that functional categories are a part of the developing grammars from early stages of acquisition, we needed: (1) production data for a basis of comparison with the Vainikka and Young-Scholten data and (2) carefully controlled experimental design, that is, a methodology that would allow us to control precisely the factors relevant to determining the existence (or nonexistence) of functional categories in the categorial inventory of the syntactic component of the early developing grammars of L2 learners. The elicited imitation (El) task satisfies both criteria. El accesses specifically grammatical aspects of language knowledge in a manner that can be precise, scientifically controlled, and amenable to experimental method. The El task provides a test of language production. It involves a direct request for the subject to repeat a sentence presented as a model for the learner. El data consist of the
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References/Epstein et al.: Second language acquisition L2 learners attempted repetition of the stimulus in response to this request. These data are measured by comparing the L2 learners utterance to the model utterance with respect to specific features of the stimulus sentence that may be systematically varied. As discussed extensively elsewhere (see, e.g., references in Lust et al. 1987), the underlying assumptions concerning El include the assumption that the learners' attempted repetition reflects their ability to construct the model sentence. The utterance reflects a mapping between the target grammar and the learners grammar. This, in turn, allows quantitative evaluation of variance. Thus, El is reconstructive, and as demonstrated in numerous studies, not simply rote. Consequently, El does reveal aspects of grammatical competence to a significant degree. Contrary to the claim that El does not provide us with a measure of linguistic competence, the El task, when adapted to experimental method, is a comparatively reliable measure of linguistic competence in both LI and L2 acquisition. As noted in Lust et al. (1987), Chomsky (1964a, p. 39) speculated that "the child's ability to repeat sentences and nonsentences . . . might provide some evidence as to the underlying system that he is using." The correctness of Chomsky's speculation has been supported by large bodies of controlled experimental data in both LI and L2. The outright dismissal of all such El data seems to us unwarranted. As we stated in the target article, ultimately and ideally we would not only rely on El data, but we would seek converging data from a number of different controlled methodologies. Needless to say, in all empirical inquiry, including linguistic research, the potentially relevant data is never exhausted (K. Hale).
NOTES 1. We simply disagree with Vainikka and Young-Scholten's claim, expressed in their commentary, that the target article "misapprehends Vainikka and Young-Scholten's research methodology." Concerning their claim that "partial access" is a misnomer, we agree that the nomenclature may not be optimal, but we nonetheless maintain all the claims we made in the target article regarding their hypotheses. Finally, we would like to note here that Vainikka and Young-Scholten 1994, 1995, 1996a, and 1996b, each cited in their commentary, all postdate the original submission of the target article to Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 2. Chomsky (1964d) Current issues in linguistic theory. In: The structure of language: Readings in the philosophy of language, ed. J. A. Fodor & J. J. Katz. Prentice Hall. 3. Among his many other works, see, e.g., Chomsky (1986). 4. See also Vainikka & Young-Scholten (1995) as cited in their commentary. 5. For a specific example, see again the discussion of the L2 acquisition of German V-second in the target article. See also Grimshaw and Rosen (1990) for a different type of argument that, in certain LI studies, relatively imperfect performance does not necessarily indicate incompetence. 6. For a very recent discussion of failures to adhere to the competence/performance distinction in the context of contemporary phonological theory, see Reiss and Hale (1996). 7. See also Epstein, Flynn, and Martohardjono (in preparation). 8. There are important questions concerning the notion "earliest stage." We are crucially concerned with L2 learners who have begun to construct the L2 syntactic component. Although we cannot give a ready metric for determining this, we hope to avoid focusing on a "learner" who is not engaged in linguistically significant L2 grammar formation.

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R8. Conclusion The FAH is not a comprehensive model of second language acquisition, but rather a research program based on the null hypothesis that all human natural language acquisition, and therefore second language acquisition, derives from the language faculty. Although it is a working empirical hypothesis, it has direct consequences for the way in which explicit questions concerning at least development and use are posted and addressed in an emerging theory of second language acquisition: that is, as domains that are tightly linked to, but crucially separate from, the language faculty itself. The target article also sought to contribute to ongoing discussion of experimental design and interpretation. We agree with Carroll (without sharing her apparent pessimism) that it is time for a serious attempt to connect UG theory to theories of parsing, learnability, and other domains directly related to human linguistic knowledge. We believe that the provisional adoption of the null hypothesis as a working hypothesis will allow second language acquisition research to play a critical role in this endeavor. This, we hope, will contribute significantly to our evolving understanding of the myriad complexities of human language cognition. ACKNOWLEDGMENT
We are indebted to Geoffrey Poole, Madelyn Kissock, Mark Hale, and Steve Peter for invaluable feedback on our response to the commentaries. We are also grateful to Mary Violette for her help with this response.
Letters "a" and ur** appearing before authors* initials refer to target article and response respectively.
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