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Karl M arx it Fri#drich Engels

ARTICLES
IN THE

NEW AMERICAN CYCLOPiEDIA.


AA
the flnrt letter in the alphabets all written languages, if except tlie EthiA I opto or AbyB8^lan, of which it is the thirteenth,
of we

as a numeral, and stood for five handred, and whoa a dash was placed on .th top, thus, X for ten times that numW , .or five , i T1 rank it holds bo universally has been sup- thousand It is the first of the seven IwmiDioal t poied to indicate either a common origin of w rit letters in the Julian calendaran imitation of itte ra Ifundinales, which had been in .use ten language, (Wa claim in the letter it s e lft o p ^ ini^lM^omans long before the introduction oedenoe, founded on some natural of Ohristiaa^. In logic, the letter A denotes now held by ^ in e n t philologltp.4Irat_toi8 ^ -vsal fflfcrraative. In the eomiUa of the ter hai no ipeoial claim* toJjflKg p ly ^ " ^ s ^ e \ t t g r A was used in giving sufhead of the alphabet. N^so, nNtjmiual triids it represented it is the representative qfvow eK ^ u i t ; h ^ e Cicero, in Us speech dements of Ian ^ U U tf^ ta lu ta ru , In ancient ably the lymbc Augmitali*, in English it 'iq v a ^ , a n tif ^ auoUt, simple sounds A u g v ^ Aiutu Ageriui, sounds are hr agrum, avrum fuart iall, When three are denoted O H . When EDITED names, a remi ^ientVnedals it indi&mous street with a comprehensive Issned, as Arwhich is proni It is the mark also ft-equentl, historical introduction anagram* prMont the i !ie wordZutoby It doe* who; ton,aA. D. HAL DRAPER ivm M9giUty f 6 d uniti u-escriptioM It reprMenti no la bills of Its vocal value abbreviation for hMt b a u t v < H p r f t , 'aeaepU, It is likeli'rance eoablnatlon wlfc o / with irchants to mark their time* quite lodSlteui, J3. 0., instead of the ,<he 1| lagllrfi iime spelt^Mflft. the chemical aumei; Bmham, The prlfflto^iouiu ilon j (as 1&fm ti) 1* alRO repltented lu dlfiterent ways, by eomblmiiieni of n Utter*. These vai'loa* H iee^ N U lJetter, to tim octi Tof TLac gether with ether riiaUap ineongrur reader the a@qaliition of tiu Ingllih lanraage ofTiie ancle' vew dllReult te fcrelgnew. The hiitorlcal fca- turies repra' tnrei ef fee letter A are !atere*ting, The lound sic. A ltw ef this letter was dUllked by Cicero, (probably ever, in y that seand of it wlileh we new have m mare,) sequently An and ift the treatise 0faer, 0. xUxm he first noV

terms It iniueiH^9 U U ^ f doubtlei* from the esplratien eeeessary te pveduse the *ound, altheap, ea the same prlaelple, the other vewels sheali have eqaally *hared hi* di*. Sy the an^Bts A was employed

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'^independent Soc i a l i s t clippingbooTc

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KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS

Articles in the

New American Cyeiopaedia

EDITED with a historical introduction by HAL DRAPER

INDEPENDENT SOCIALIST PRESS Berkeley, Calif.

CONTENTS
/

INTRODUCTION 1. Dana and the Trib u n e.......... .............. 7 2. Marx, Engels and the ' N A C ..... .......... 10 ' i. The canon of Marx-Engels Articles........ .18 4. From the Marx-Engels Correspondence...... 21 5. Notes on the Articles............... ...... 29 / ? 6. Notes on the Appendices.................... 47 MARX AND ENGELS: ARTICLES IN THE 'NAC, .............. . 52 A b a t i s ..... . Adjutant........................................ Afghanistan....................... ............. 52 A i r e y ..... , .......................... ...... . 56 Albuer a ............................. ............ 57 Algeria............................... ......... 57 A l m a ............................................ 61 Airanunition...... ................................ 62 Armada, Spanish..................... .......... 63 A r m y ................................ \*......... 64 Arqpiebuse. ...................................... 83 Artillery*............................. ...... 83 A s p e r n .......................................... 94 A ttack.............................. ............ ^6 Ayacucho. . ........................... . 98 Barbette......................... .............. 98 Barclay de T o l l y .............................. Bastion.............................100 B a ttery........................................ 100 B a t t l e ............................. . * * ^ * * Bayonet ............................... . 103 Bern..... .... .... ................. ... ^ .V . .. 103 Bennigsen..................... ...... . 105 Beresford................................. . B e r m e .......................................... 107 Bernadotte........................... ......... 107 Berthier.......... ................ ..... ...... Ill Bessieres................................ . 113 Bidassoa.......... , ........ ............... -. 113 Bivouac................................... 115 Blenheim....................................... 116 Blindage................................ ...... 116 Bltlcher. . ......................... ............. 117 B l u m ..... .................... ................ 124 Bolivar.... .......... ............... . ....... 125 Bomarsund. ............. ............ . . ....... , 13 2 Boirib......... ................. ............ ... 132 Bomb K e t c h ..................... . ........ 133 Bomb-proof..................... ........ ...... 133 Bomb Vessel...,................... ........... 133 Bombardier. ......................... .......... 133 Bombardment.......................... ........ 133 Bonnet................................ ......... 134

Borodino...................................... Bosquet........................................ Bourrienne.................................... Brescia........................................ Bridge, Military.............................. Bridge-head................................... B r u n e .......................................... B u d a ........................................... Bugeaud....................................... B u r m a h ......................................... C a m p ........................................... Campaign....................................... Captain............................... ........ Carabine............... ....................... Carcass........................................ Carronade..................................... cartridge..................................... Case S h o t ..................................... Catapult.................... .................. Cavalry........................................ Coehorn........................................ Fortification................................. Infantry............................... ....... N a v y ........................................... APPENDICES 1. The Five Dubiosa.......................... 2. Engels' List of 28 May 1857.............. 3. The Three Rejects......................... 4. The America Cyclopaedia................... 5. T a b l e s .....................................

134 136 137 137 138 141 141 142 144 145 148 149 150 150 150 151 151 152 152 153 165 166 177 188 194 196 198 202 204

X n d e p e n d e n t s o c i a l i s t CLIPPINGBOOKS, C No. 5 Copyright Q 1969

by the Independent Socialist Press

Order from:

INDEPENDENT SOCIALIST PRESS Box 6332 Albany sta. Berkeley, C a l . 9^706

Introduction
The articles forming the bulk of this book were vrritten by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels for the Seu Amerioan Cyclopaedia, a 16volume reference work conceived and edited by Charles A. Dana and George Ripley, published by D, Ap pleton and ConQ>any from 1858 to 1863, with several subsequent re printings. The man resj^nsible for getting them written was Dana. the day. In the middle of this course, the colonists, including Dana, were convertisd to Fourierism (called *'Associationism") by Al bert Brisbane, Charles Fourier's chief disciple in the U.S.; and the colony was converted into a phalanstery" in accordance with the blueprints for that brand of utopia. _ This was what Danas early "so cialism" consisted of. He was la ter to explain, rather apologetic ally but not inaccurately, how li mited this "sociilism" was; "...the socialism of that day [I.e. Fourierism] contemplated merely a system of associated living, of combined households, with jlnt stock ownership of the joint prop erty; every stockholder to get his share In the profits, whlcVi he had helped to earn, and the share earned by the capital ownership was most repugnant to the theor ists we are speaking of. Individ uality and liberty were thclr cherished objects, aiad all forms of communism they zealously repu diated. Nor did the soclal:i.sm we are considering start from the un educated or the poor. Its adher ents were the people who had gath ered In the fruit of the highest education, the fullest knov^ledge, the highest refinement that was known to American society Ln those times." When Brook Farm foundered after the "phalanstery" burned down, Da na had already gotten some journ alistic experience by editing with Ripley a magazine called the Har binger, which lasted from 1845 to 1849, first printed at Brook Farm and then in New York; and he had

Dana & the ^Tribune*


Charles Anderson Dana (18191897) was b o m at Hinsdale, N.H. At the age of 9, his mother dead and his father a failure at busi ness, he went to live with an unc le in Vermont; then with another in Buffalo, working as a store clerk. Naturally intelligent and mainly self-educated through study and wide reading, he qualified for entrance into Harvard, where he lasted into the junio year, with very high grades, before dropping out for lack of money. He taught school for a year, but, having al ready become sympathetic to the ideas of the Transcendentalists as represented by Emerson and the Rev. George Ripley, he applied in July 1841 for admission to Brook Farm, the utopian communal colony which Ripley had been instrumental in , founding. Here he was a tower of strength as a practical man and efficient worker, though T. W. Higginson was to say of him: He was the best all-round man at Brook Farm, but was held not to be quite so zealous or unselfish for the faith as some others." At any rate, during five years here he *et some of the most distinguished men of

8
also made the acquiaintance o Hor ace Greeley, whose'New York V M was syapathetic to Fourierisn as well as to several other isas. In February 1847 Greeley took hjta on as city editor of the T n b u w * The New York Tribune was Greel ey, and Greeley was the Tribune, in this era pf personal joumalisn. Without fonaal schooling but with an appealing personal style and great moral fervor, he had founded the paper on a shoestring and made it a national ideological power. Most references to it as the "most influential newspaper in the country are a bit misleading. The New York Daily Tribune i found ed in April 1841, was by no means the paper of largest circulation in the city. It was the Weekly Tri bune, started in September of that year and compiled from material in the daily issues, which circulated all over the country and reached a record-breaking circulation of 200,000. Testimonials to its extra ordinary iaq)act on its large readership are easy to compile: "The Tribune became a liberal power of the first magnitude," (Henry Steele Commager.) It had "a power never before or since known in this country." (James Ford Rhodes.) Greeleys "was the only journalistic voice heard from New j . York to California." (John Teblpfel.) "The New York Tribune for a whole generation ... stood pretiminent ap mong the organs of opinion in tho United States; it was one of the great leaders of the nation... Its weekly edition penetrated to the remotest hamlets of the West." (Al lan Nevins.) Greeley was quite radical for so influential a leader. He took up a variety of causes besides Fou rierism; in general he was a social reformer, anxious to do good for the "Laboring Class." More basical ly he was oriented toward elimina ting the exoeeeee of the new and raw capitalist development of the country, in order the better to preserve what he conceived to be the fundamental values of the so ciety. Most of the causes he advo cated are no longer regardea as radical: advocacy of labor union ism; opposition to capital punish ment; a homestead law for the set tlement of the We 5 t; govemjaent aid to a Pacific railroad; liquor pro hibition; more significantly for the time, opposition to slavery and to the Mexican War. And one other very important cause: the protect ive tariff. He was without loubt one of the most enlightened bour geois reformers of ije day. Two years after he had become a regular European cprfespondant for the Tribune, Marx summed up the pa per's political character, in a letter to Engels primarily discuss- , ing the latest book by the American economist Heniy Carey: "The Tribune naturally is blow ing the trumpet, for Carey'e book till it's blue In the face. Both, to be sure, have this In common: that in the form of Slmoncianphilanthropic-sociailatic t nti-industrlalism they represent the protectlonist-^l.e* ixuiuatrial bourgeolsie in America. This le also the secret why the Tribune^ in spite of all its 'ii^' and social istic pretenses, can be the 'lead ing journal* in the United States. [14 June 1853.1 ' V An evaluation of this sort, ap- . parently paradoxical, was not easy to make at the time. Since then, it has been heard in retrospect:

"He {Greeley) was eminently a 'safe' radical. When he duvoutly fought for the American S : stem, what did it matfcer if he allowed Albert Brisbane to pay hit' a hun dred dollars a week for printing a column on Fourierism? Brisbane was ... a cheap price for a pro gressive reputation." (Arthur Sohleeinger Jr*) "He believed In what he called 'beneficent capitalism.'... Ac tually, his Idea was to direct the forces of capltallstt so that in dustry, labor and agriculture

could complenent each other in laproving the coBBon lot. (Edtfin Emory,) ^ ^ f o r the Establishaent of the day# the Tribune did indeed seen to represent a threateningly radical voice. At the tiae of a bloody riot in Astor Place when the militia shot down aen and woaen, the highcirculation New York Herald had this to say about its coiq>etitor: "The late fearful riot has op ened up a new and alarming subject of investigation, and that Is how far the anarchical socialism of the Tribune ... has operated in this community in unsettling the foundations of law and order and arraying the poor against the rich ... Do we really see the beginning of socialism In America?" This was the paper on which the yoiing Brook Para graduate becaae the valued city editor, then aanaging editor (the first aan in Aaerican joumalisa with that title, it is said). But in the spring of 1848, after the outbreak of revol ution in Paris, Dana took a tein>orary leave from the job in order to cover the revolutionary events personally, sending home a series of articles. He wrote as follows in the first of these, once again illustrating his conception of socialisa: "It is no longer Fourierism or Connunlsm, nor this nor that part icular system which occupies the public mind of France, but It Is the general idea of Social rights and Social Reorganization. Every one Is more or less a Socialist except the usurers and traders by nature, and even among them some thing of the light has penetrated But the iaaediate impact of the revolutionary events had a radical izing effect on him. His reports began e^ressing a defense of the revolutionary violence of the peop le as having been imposed on them

by the resisting party in the bourgeoisie." He returned to Ameri ca filled with new ideas, sympathe tic with the ideas of Proudhon, and leaning toward the latter*s nostrum of free credit for workers as the sovereign social remedy. He was ca pable of writing: "Let others give aid and comfort to despots. Be it ours to stand for Liberty and Justice, nor fear to lock arms with those who are called hot-heads and demagogues, lAen the good cause requires It." This revolutionary flush did not last long. His biographer J. H. Wilson gives the year 1855, six years after his trip to Europe, as marking the end of Dana's "illu sions" regarding social reform. It was at this time that he wrote an editorial for the TvLbune announc ing the failure of the North Amer ican Phalanx in New Jersey, one of the main Fourierist colonies. The editorial came to this conclusion: "Between assoclatlonlsm [Four ierism] and poverty there Is a na tural contradiction, and we sus pect that the former can never be completely realized until the pro gress of science. Invention, and Industry has endowed society with an abundance of wealth of every kind, suihh as we now scarcely im agine." This was the bridge over which he passed from utopian Fourierism to a very practical capitalism. Even at this time Dana was hostile to trade-union militancy and strikes (as was his aentor Proud hon, for that matter) but, during the rest of his life he aoved fur ther and further right. The Dio-tiotiary of Ameriocm Biography ^ while labeling hia a "liberal," goes on to relate that he "opposed labor unions formed to conduct strikes, arguing that the workers' true remedy for unfair industrial conditions lay in coop erative industrial effort. His hos-

x u

tlllty to militant labor persist ed throughout his life, and gave nany of his utterances on Indus trial questions an Illiberal and even reactionary tendency." In tiae, Dana also became viru lently imperialistic, and, in city politics, involved with "sose of the worst figures in Tammany," ta king a position against a number of important reforms. In this later period his chief claim to fame was his editorship of the New Yrk Sun, one of the most successful examples of personal journalism. Its apothe osis of "human interest" stories and crime news was a transition to the "yellow journalism" (Dana's term) of Hearst and Pulitzer, who were going to overshadow him in the newspaper world. Toward the end, when the adroit W. M. Laffan, an intimate of some of the biggest millionaires of the time, became publisher of Dana's <Sim, the paper (to quote Dana's biographer Rosebault) turned into the "outstand ing champion" of the "Captains of Industry" of the age. By 1896 Benjamin Tucker, the ed itor of Libertyt wrote that Dana "is today traducer in chief of all who stand for the people and are actuated by a desire for the peop le's welfare..." In that year Dana led the press in a violent denun ciation of Bryan's presidential campaign, especially when Bryan came to New York to speak at Mad ison Square Garden at the height of the contest. Tucker thereupon issued a pamphlet reprint of the six articles which a much younger Dana had written for the Tribune expounding Proudhon's social phil osophy, imder the title Proudhon and Hie ''Bank of the People, " Be ing a Defence of the Great French Amrohiat, .. A Series of Seuapaper Artiolee Written by Charlea A,

On the Tribu^t the young and radical Dana was Greeleys right# hand man. When editor Greeley was off in the field, managing editor Dana even revised'Greeley's own dispatches for th paper, with as iron a hand as he exercised on anyone else's copy. The tension between the two men was going to lead to a break after the begin ning of the Civil War (primarily because Dana became a bitter-ender), eventuating in Dana's firing in 1862, but for over a decade there was a close association. It was during this period that Dana signed up Marx as a European correspondent for the paper.

M a rx, Engels & the NAC


Dana kad met Marx in Cologne duing his visit to the European revo lution. How they got together is cloudy: there are different ver sions in the biographies of Marx by Mehring, by Nicolaievsky and Maenchen-Helfen, and by Berlin, though the first two agree on point ing to Albert Brisbane as the link and 1848 as the year. (None of Da na's biographers mentions any as sociation with Marx at all.) Dana was powerfully impressed by Marx personally? "I saw Karl Marx, the leader of the people's movement [In Cologne]. At that time his star was just In the ascendant. He was a man In the thirties with a sqiiat powerful body, a fine face and thick black hair. His features Indicated great energy and behind his moderation and reserve one could detect the passionate fire of a daring spir it." (Dana, quoted by Mehring.) Nicolaievsky and Maenchen-Helfen write: "Dana paid Marx a visit, and spent a 'delightful' evening with him, as he was fond of recalling In later years, and took away with

Dana* ..... This episode brings u s b a c k to Dana's Tribune period, with which we are concerned as far as the SAC goes.

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him an abiding inpression that in ' Marx he had met the most acute far-seeing of the revolutionar ies. In July, 1850, he wrote to Marx from New York that he always kept himself Informed of Marx's activities and whereabouts and asked him idiether he would ^ot like to come to America. Marx's answer is unknown." The Tribune was outstanding aBong American papers in employing regular foreign correspondents; in the early 1850s it employed eight een. It was in August 1851 that Da na invited Marx, now living in Lon don, to write for the paper. This arrangement provided a relatively regular, if small, stipeAd for Marx for many years his only regular source of income other tiitfn Engels' financial support. The articles which Marx contrib uted to the Tribune ranged over all of British and world politics, but one big ingredient was military af fairs and events. This material was actually written or drafted by En gels, who had made a special study of military science since the days when he had fought in the army of the German revolution of 1848. As far as Dana or anyone else knew, all the articles were written by Marx, but in;fact there was a di vision of labor between him and Engels. Since at first Marx did not write English well enough and was in any case absorbed in his economic researches, Engels started the work off with a ghostwritten series on the German revolution of 1848 (later republished, at first under Marx's name, as Revolution Counterrevolution in Germany in~ 1848)t of which the first article appeared in the Tribune on 25 Oct ober 1851 (dated September 1851). The first article written by Marx in German, translated by Engels was in the Tribune of 21 August 1852, dealing with current English electoral politics. The relation ship continued, through various vi cissitudes, into 1862, when Marxfs last article in the paper was pub lished in the March 10 issue. Even after Dana's own political views had moved far from his '48 radicalism, his respect for Marx did not abate. There is in inter esting vignette in James Parton's Life of Eoraoe Greeley (boston, 1854), in a chapter devoted to de tailing a typical working day at the Tribune office: "Mr. Dana enters with a quick, de cided step, goes straight to his desk... and is soon lost in the perusal of 'Karl Marx,' cx 'An American Woman in Paris. " The quotation-marks (single in the original) around Marx's name are a bit puzzling, but since this was written while Marx's disfatches were still coming in, I presume Parton means that Dana is reading an article just received frca Marx. There is another interesting doc ument that deserves insertion here, especially since it ends with a reference to Marx's work for the SAC, In 1860, when Marx ;as prepar ing to sue the Sational-l H t u n g for publishing Karl Vogt's slanders against him, he gathered "testimo nial" letters, of which a number were published toward the end of his Herr Vogt, The last of this group is by Dana, signing as "Man aging Editor of the N. Y. Tribune^** dated March 8, I860, addressed to "Dr. Charles Marx" of cc irse writ ten at Marx's request. In this let ter Dana does two things simulta neously, quite cleverly: he gives Marx a shield against Yogi's sland ers, by ea^hasizing Marx'j patriot ic anxiety for Germany's mity and independence, and in the >ame sent ences he separates himself from Marx politically. The texc of the letter is reproduced below from the Marx-Engels Werke, Vol.. 14, p.679- ' 680.

DANA"S 'TESTIMONIAL" LETTER TO MARX

Tribune Offioe, New lovk, Maroh 8th, i860 My dear Sir, In reply to your request I am very happy to state the facts of your connection with various publica tions In the United States concerning which 1 have had a personal knowledge. Nearly nine years ago I engaged you to write for the New York Tribune^ and the engagement has been continued ever since. You have written for us constantly, without a single weeks' Interruption, that I can remember; and you are not only one of the most highly valued, but one of the best paid contributors attached to the jour nal. The only fault I have had to find with you has been that you have occasionally exhibited too Ger man a tone of feeling for an American newspaper. This has been the case with reference both to Rus sia and France. In questions relating to both, Czarlsm and Bonapartism, I have sometimes thought that you manifested too much interest and too great anxiety for the unity and independence of Germany. This was more striking perhaps in connection with the late Italian war than on any other occasion. In that I agreed perfectly with you: sympathy with the Italian people, I had as little confidence as you in the sincerity of the French Emperor, and believ ed as little as you that Italian liberty was to be expected from him; but I did not think that Ger many had any such ground for alarm as you, in com mon with other patriotic Germans, thought she had. I must add that in all your writings which have passed through my hands, you have always manifested the most cordial Interest in the welfare and pro gress of the labouring classes; and that you have written much with direct reference to that end. I have also at various times within the past five or six years been the medium through which contrib utions of yours have been furnished to Putnam'e Monthly, a literary magazine of high character; and also to the New Amerioan Cyclopaedia, of which I am also an editor, and for which you have furnished some very Important articles. If any other explanations are needed I shall be happy to furnish them. Meanwhile I remain, yours very faithfully, Charlea A Dana, Managing Editor of the N, y. Tribune Dr. Charles Marx

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13
This is not the place to retell the whole story of Marx's relations with Dana and the Tribune*I but certain aspects form the backdrop for similar problems that arose with the articles for the M C Briefly these were four: r.(l) Dana often changed or partially rewrote articles arbitrarily >a practice not limited to Marx's. (2) He ar bitrarily decided whether an arti cle should be signed with Marx's name or appear as an editor^l or unsigned leading article. (3) There was the constant question of the paper's low payment for foreign correspondence which its editors valued very highly. (4) At first, when the Trvbune did not print an article submitted, it simply did not pay, and the time spent on the work was lost. In the early part of 1857 Marx's relations with the Tribune were, in fact, at a low point. Among other things, many of Marx's articles were not being printed, therefore not paid for; and Marx was consid ering the possibilities of breaking with the paper and making other connections. It was at this time that he wrote bitterly to Engels: "It la truly disgusting that one is condemned to consider onseself lucky If such a rag takes you on. Making soup out of pounded and ground-up bones like a pauper in a workhouse, that'# what political work is reduced to when one is wholly condemned to such an out fit." [23 January 1857.] On 6 February, Marx wrote Dana that he would not be able to con fine his articles to his paper, in effect threatening to take his cor*In general, see any of the ma jor biographies of Marx except Isaiah Berlin's (whose section on this subject is replete with inac curacies) or the collection The Ameriotm J o u m a t i m of M<xrx and Engels (N.Y., New American Libra ry, 1966), introduction by Charles Blitzer. respondence elsewhere, though (as he told Engels) he did not say he was suspending work for the Trib une, Dana dad not reply until the latter part of March. His propiti atory offer (Marx reported to En gels on 24 March) was couched in friendly terms but it amounted on ly to an agreement to pay Marx for at least one article per week whe ther the article was printed or not; a second article in the week would be paid for only if actually printed. It was shortly after t^is cri sis, and perhaps under it;; prod, that in a letter of 6 April Dana also invited Marx to collaborate on the New Yorker's new pvoject, the Hew American Cyolopaedia, The idea for the new eticyclopedia may have come first from George Ripley, for it is recordea that Ripley had harbored such an ambi tion since youthful days. Ripley was Dana's friend and co-editor from the days of Brook F a m and the Harbinger* In 1849 he had joined Dana on the Tribune as its litera ry editor, and in 1856 established the first regular newspaper bookreview department. The Dana article in tho Diction ary of American Biography relates that "A trip which Dana made with W. H. Appleton to the opeaing of the Chicago Rock Island Railroad resulted in plans for an .r\merican Cyclopaedia in sixteen volumes..." though it is not clear what the railroad had to do with ic. Other wise Dana's biographers ax'e re markably unconcerned abouc this no table achievement.^ *0f four book-length biographies of Dana, most notice of the NAC is taken in J. H. Wilson's standard Life of Charlee A, Dana (N.Y., Har per, 1907), though Wilson does not get the name right; he cAlls it the American Cyclopaedia* Candace Stone's Dana and The Sun [N.Y., Dodd, Mead, 1938) barely mentions its existence, without gi/ing it any name. Charles J. Rosebault's

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Although Dana devoted much time to the project, it was his co-editor George Ripley who ran the edi torial and administrative side o the NAC operation and (according to the did the bulk of the editing. Apparently because of financial difficulties, the first run of Vol ume 1 was limited to only 1000, ev en though Dana wrote a friend be fore publication that 10,000 should have been the figure. It started selling well immediately.** On 6 April 1858 Dana was writing that "The Cyclopaedia sells pretty well... Of volume 1 five thousand have gone ahead, and the tide rises still..." A combined sales figure of three million copies has been given for the two editions of the encyclopedia, i.e. including the second edition entitled the Amerie can Cyclopaedia launched in 1873. Robert Collison's comprehensive history Enoyolopedias (2nd ed., N.Y., Hafner, 1966) describes the M C as "a praiseworthy effort: well over three hundred contributors collaborated in its compilation, and it quickly gained authority in North America." Dana's biographer Wilson opines that it may be "re garded as the principal American work of its time." As background for the restric tions which Dana imposed on Marxs contributions to the NAC, one should When Dana Was The Sun (N.Y., McBride, 1931) has a half-sentence about it which manages to make three errors; he too does not know its name. A. H. Fenton's semi-fictionalized biography Dana of The Sun (N.Y., Farrar Rinehart, 1941) does not mention the encyclopedia at all. **The date on the title-page of Volume 1 is 1858, but the copyright date is 1857. In Volume 2 (first printing only) the statement is made that "The First Volume of this work was published on the last of December [1857]..." The Preface to Volume 1 is dated December 1, 1857.

read the Preface to the first vol ume, which emphasizes these restric tions very strongly. Most of this Preface is given below. As if this were not enough, the first printing of Volume 2 carried four extra pages which, besides listing some of the contributors, also reprinted two "blurbs" from reviews of the first volume, both of which stressed the style of wri ting. One, taken from the Amen o a n Church Monthly of March 1858, was plainly inserted in order to bear witness to the complete objectivity and impartiality of the treatment: "plain, straightforward," "simple and severely chaste," etc. It was entirely in line with this emphasis that Dana wrote Marx insisting that his articles "should show not the slightest party tend ency regarding questions of polit ics, religion and philosophy," but must be unimpassioned, impartial and disinterested. Therefore also, Dana refused to permit Marx to write on sensitive subjects that is, on any political, social or economic subjects, or even any phil osophical ones since he was well aware (as we have seen) of "the passionate fire" of revolution which animated the man whom he had recognized as "the most acute and far-seeing of the revolutionaries" in 1848. Hhat then? Of the arti cles which Marx had been sending to the Tribune since 1851 under his own name, it was the analyses of military matters (actually written by Engels) which had most impressed the editors by their expertise. Mi litary science and military history were relatively "safe" subjects. It was in this field, therefore, that Dana invited Marx to contribute. Marx and Engels were, then, on warning to exclude all partisanship from their style. And it is certain ly true that the tone of their W C articles is relatively bland and objective for them. Still it is clear that value-judgments crept in more frequently than the editors desired. The extent to which this is true may be gauged by examining

PREFACE TO THE NEW AMERICAN CICLOPAEDIA (Exaerpte) It is the design of the New Amerioan Cyclopaedia to furnish a condensed exhibition of the present state of human knowledge on the most important sub jects of inquiry. The discussion of the controvert ed points of science, philosophy, religion, or pol> itics, does not enter within the compass of its plan; but it aims exclusively at an accurate .nd impartial account of the development of opinion in the exercise of thought... In preparing the materials of the work, neither the Editors nor their collaborators have attenq>ted or desired to make it a vehicle for the expression of personal notions. As far as was consistent with the nature of the case, they have confined themselves to the historical relation of facts, with* out assuming the functions of advocates or Judges. In instances which seemed to demand a positive ver diet, they have endeavored to present an illustra tion of evidence rather than an exhibition of argu ment. At the same time each subject has been treat ed in the point of view of those with whom it is a speciality, and not in that of indifferent or hos tile observers. In order to secure the most com plete justice, in this respect, the various arti cles in the work have been intrusted, as far as possible, to writers whose studies, position, opi nions, and tastes, were a guarantee of their thor ough information, and which furnished a presumption of their fairness and impartiality. Thus, in the different branches of science, the articles have been prepared by men of eminent accomplishments in each of the respective departments; the articles o v i History, by historical students in special provin ces; on Biography, especially of living persons, b/ those most familiar with the life and character of the subjects; on Military and Naval affairs, by military and naval men; ... In the preparation of this volume nearly a hun dred writers have taken part, including persons in almost every quarter of the United States, in Grea^ Britain, and on the Continent of Europe. No re striction has been laid on their pens, except that of abstinence from the expression of private dog matic judgments, and from the introduction of sect arian comments at war with the professed historic al character of the work. ... In this fact, it is hoped, will be found a guarantee of the universal! ty and impartiality of the work, impressing upon it a disinterested character, no less by the necessit/ of the case than by the good ifaith of individual professions.

what happened to many of these art icles when rewrite jobs were perforaed on them for the "second ed ition" entitled the Amerioan Cyclo~ paedia (see Section 6 belotf, notes on ^ e ^ i x IV) and there observ ing the predictable blue-penciling of certain phrases. A good example is the article "Bemadotte, trtiich is notably blander in the rewrite; in "Algeria**^ many of the attacks on French colonial atrocities are reduced and toned down; for the case of "Bolivar," see the notes on that article in Section 5. Because the Tribune articles co vered more varied fields, Engels' contributions played a minor role; but since the SAC material was so heavily slanted toward the milita ry, it fell to Engels to do the bulk of the work. Of the 67 arti cles (see Appendix V, Table 1), on ly eight are ascribed to Marx alone, of which two ("Bemadotte" and "Bol ivar") are medium-long, the rest short. Eight more are ascribed to Marx and Engels jointly, all of them short except "BlUcher." This leaves 51 ascribed to Engels alone, including the very longest articles of all, like "Army," "Cavalry," "Infantry," and "Navy." Of course, these ascriptions by the MEW edit ors involve estimates of the rela tive amount of work done on each article by the two men; for even where an article is assigned wholly to one or the other, there was a certain aaount of joint work. Gen erally sp*akin^, Marx did the gen eral-biographical research, and al so acted as Engels* research assis tant in the British Museum, since Engels was doing his work in Man chester. Engels undertook the burden of the work willingly, as usual, part icularly because Marx and his fami ly were going through a period of disheartening financial and person al troubles, while, through it all, Marx was trying to complete the economic studies which eventuated in 1859 in the publication of his Hque of Political Eoonomy, With the outbreak of economic crisis in

1857 Engels foimd another motiva tion, intimated in his letter to Marx of 15 November. After explain ing how glad he is that the crisis is bound to bring revolutionary prospects and break up the debili tating atBosphere of apathy and dullness, he writes: military studies, therefore, immediately take on more practical signific ance; 1 am throwing myself without delay into the subject of the ex isting organization and basic tac tics of the Prussian, Austrian, Ba varian and French armies..." The letter reflects Engels' char acteristic "bounce," but he was al ready suffering from serious ill ness. In the summer of 1857 he had developed glandular trouble, which continued to dog him during much of the period when he was working on M C articles. Many delays in the delivery of articles, as we shall see, were due to the fact that he was persuaded to spend a good deal of time at the seashore in order to recover his health enough to go on with the work. The SAC articles were, then, written under rather difficult cir cumstances in general, and increa singly with the feeling that it was a matter of turning out ill-paid potboilers. Engels was indeed later to refer to them as "mere pot-boilers, nothing more; they can peace fully remain buried." (Letter to Hermann SchlUter, 29 January 1891, MEW, Vol.38, p.16.) But, as Mehring connents in Karl Mai^, thi Mim an exaggeration. It mis ly true of a number of the short and inconsequential articles on military terms and the like; but a number of the longer military-historical surveys and biographical pieces embodied a good deal of con scientious research, and are still of considerable interest from the standpoint of the development of Marx and Engels' ideas. Indeed, in his letter of 14 February 1858 (see below) Engels expressed a certain pride in the quality of the arti cles being sent to Dana; "in very many cases, independent works in

17
stead of the lousy compilations which he otherwise gets." Engels would have been cheered if he ever saw (and we do not know if he ever did see) the first pi*int> ing of Volume 5, which contained a supplementary section with six pa ges of "opinions of the Press." There are excerpts from 22 publi cations praising the M C f often re ferring to specific articles, al most always in the humanities. But two articles by Engels come in for mention. A blurb from the Boston Pilot says, reviewing Volume 4s "The article on 'Cavalry' we are tempted to pronounce the best thing in the volume it is full of Interesting details, and is written In a simple and unscient ific style, which Is exactly suit ed to a popular cyclopaedia." And an excerpt from the Boston Poet emphasizes the up-to-dateness of the treatment: "...here many recent events are chronicled and condensed with great fidelity as, for Instance, the Incidents of the Crimean War (Alma)..." A decade later, when he had to outline his own literary biography on two occasions, Marx did not om it the SACt In a letter to his friend Kugelmann of 30 January 1868 Marx enclosed such an outline for the benefit of a writer named Kertbeny. One of the items was: "1851-1860: regular contributor on the Engllsh-Amerlcan Tribune (New York). Contributions to Putncm*e Revieh) (New York) and the new ^Cyclopaedia AmeivCaana' (New York)."* *An inaccurate version of this passage is included in Marx's Lettere to Dr, Kugelmarm (N.Y., 1954), p. 62. Marx's statement is itself inaccurate, even if his own contri butions are assimilated with Eng els': the dates should be 1851-1862; the Tribune can hardly be called English-American; the name of the 5n 7 October of the same year, wri ting to N. F. Danielson, rlarx wrote in a similar list: "1851-1861: Continuous contrib utions In the English language to the New York Tribune, Put^iam'e Re view, and New American Cyalopaedia," There was an earlier occasion, also, when Marx cited his connec tion with the cyclopaedia as part of his biographical record. This was in a long letter to Weber, his attorney in the suit against the Berlin National-Zeitung^ mder date 24 February 1860, i.e. before the termination of his work on the M C , The SAC articles have long re mained unfamiliar even to students of Marx's writings. The first Rus sian and German translatitms of the whole body of articles, in the re spective Collected Works editions, will be discussed in a laxer sec tion, but we may mention aow that the first time any of the articles ever appeared in German transla tion was as late as 1956 {the art icle "Army" in the Engels collec tion Die Arrnee), The firsc Russian edition of the Marx-Engels Soahineniia, presenting a partial and inaccurate collection in ^934, was the source for the first and only time any of these articles have been reprinted in their original English in the Marx-Engels collec tion Revolution in Spain (N.Y., In ternational Publishers, 1939; Marx ist Library, Vol. 12). This volume included three articles, of which one, "Badajoz," was rejected from the Marx-Engels canon in the sec ond Russian edition. The other two were "Bidassoa" (which wa given the Spanish spelling with one "s") and "Bolivar."

second periodical was Putiiam's Mon thly Magazine (later changed to Putnam 'e Magazine'^; and of course in listing the cyclopaedia Marx has its name mixed up with the rival Enoyalopaedia Americana,

18
ial material in MEW, Vol. 14, 29-30, particularly the forewords and notes. (2) An article published in Voproay latorii K,PS,S, [hereafter abbreviated V,I,KPSS\, 1958, No. 4, by E. Staroselskaia, A. Dergunova, and E. Udaltsov, entitled "An Un scientific Approach to the Study of the Legacy Left by the Founders of Marxism," pp. 184-85, 190, 192-93, criticizing recent Western biblio graphical material on Marx and Eng els. (3) The Marx-Engels correspond ence itself, as contained in MEW, Vol. 29-30. As we shall see, it is not fUlly taken into account by the editors of MEW (4) Lists of contributors to the MC which appeared in Volumes 2, 5 and 16 of the encyclopedia it self, but in the firat printing only. Marx's name is not included in the Vol. 2 list. The list in Vol. 5 includes thijul "Charles Marx, P.D. [aia], Lon don, Eng. Artillery^ Bemadotteg Bolivar, Cavalryt The list in Volume 16, covering the whole set, is a little longer: "Charles Marx, Ph.D., London, Eng. Army, Artillery, Bemadotte, Bolivart Caoalrryt Fortifioation. Infantry, Navy, Of course, another use of these lists is to prove that certain art icles were not sent in by Marx. While these are the four sources that have been accessible to me, the editorial material in MEW is, in turn, based on additional sour ces which are indispensable for a determination of the authorship of many of the articles. These include: (1) Letters by Charles Dana to Marx. (2) Marx's private notebooks, in which he entered articles sent to New York. (3) Papers left by Marx and Eng els including outlines and excerpts

The Canon of M-E Articles


The determination of which art icles in the M C were written by Marx and/or Engels has long been in a confused state. Of the few refer ences to be found in biographies or other books on this question, most are inaccurate including s(Mae of recent publication. The first authoritative assemb lage of these articles was made in the second edition of the Marx-Engels Soohineniia [Works], Vol. 14, published in Moscow in 1959 under the editorial supervision of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism. This edition presented 67 articles as the definitive canon a consider able change from the first edition put out by the Institute. The first edition (in Vol. 11, Part 2, Mos cow, 1934) had been the very first attempt of any kind to collect the articles between a pair of book co vers. It included 28 articles, but three of these were later elimina ted from the canon and denied ad mission to the second edition. These three were: Augereau, "Austerlitz," and Badajoz.'* (See Ap pendix III.) The Marx-Engels Werke, Vol. 14 (E. Berlin, Dietz, 1961), issued by the Institut fUr Marxismus-Leninismus beim ZK der SED the Insti tute of Marxism-Leninism attached to the Central Committee of the East German Communist Party was explicitly based on the second Rus sian edition. The main foreword is by the Russian institute, followed by a short supplement signed by the German. The canon presented is the same 67 articles. References in this book are usu ally to the German MEW Vol. 14 for the articles themselves. Vol. 29-30 for the Marx-Engels correspondence about them, along with acctHnpanying annotations and introductory mater ial. The following remarks on the can on are based on four sources: (1) The above-mentioned editor

19
for articles, etc. (4) Records of D. Appleton and Co., publishers of the NAC, Earlier references to the arti cles had mostly been based on pas sages in the Marx-Engels correspon dence. This is an unreliable ap proach by itself, since the letters refer to contemplated articles which were never in fact written, and to articles which may have been submitted by Marx but which were not printed, or printed only with considerable revision or in drastic ally shortened form, in either case changed to the point of unrecognizability. Also, there is more than one case where the same article is referred to in the correspondence under two or more names and has been taken to be different articles. These facts probably account for the widespread inaccuracies in oth erwise knowledgeable books. Mehring's Karl Mean: (Ann Arbor, 1962) p. 254, says, for example, that "it would appear in fact that the regu lar co-operation of the two friends in the preparation of the encyclo pedia never got beyond the letter C." Chaloner and Henderson's in troduction to their collection eta Ae Military Critic (Manchester, 1959) mentions the names of nine ar ticles as by Engels: of these, two ("Cannon and "Aboukir") are by neither Marx nor Engels; one of the remaining seven is by Marx, and two others by Marx-Engels in collabora tion. Yelena Stepanova's Frederick En^ela (Moscow, 1958; trans. by J. Gibbons) su^risingly says that "the two friends wrote about eighty articles on military topics" an overestimation even if one counts articles written but not printed, and in any case they were not all on military topics. The M C is not mentioned at all in the biographies by Nicolaievsky and Maenchen-Helfen, Isaiah Berlin, or Riazanov. Particularly disappointing is the vague treatment of these arti cles in Gustav Mayer's otherwise comprehensive Friedrich Engele, Eine Biographie (2 vols.. The Hague, Nijhoff, 1934). Since the n w e of the encyclopedia was, cu riously enough, never mentioned in any of the letters which Marx and Engels wrote to each other in the course of the work, Mayer apparent ly did notknow what the name was; it is certainly not given in the book. The only specific articles mentioned are "Army" and "Bltlcher," references to which are in the correspondence. It it likely that he never looked up vhe arti cles themselves. He writes: "But we are spared the c.eed to consider these articles here; En-> gels himself labeled th e > f l compil ations and declared that a subse quent disinterment [of them] was unnecessary. They would ^e worth while considering only In a separ ate publication of his military writings." (Vol. 2, p.66.] It would seem that Mayer has made an error here; as we havt* seen, En gels reference to "compilations" is just the reverse of what Mayer says. Two of the most recent books, published some years after the full availability of the facts, are the worst in this respect. Ti^e introduc tion by Charles Blitzer to The Amer ican J o u m a l i m of Marx end Engela (New American Library, 1966), while providing a good summary of the Tribune connection, has en errorfilled passage on the cyclopaedia articles. It is less surprising to find that Grace Carlton's very un reliable biography Friedi-ich Engela, The Shadow Prophet (London, 1965) says, "[Engels] contributed one article at least on 'Army.'" In 1956 Maximilien Rubel's great Bibliogro^hie dea Oeuvree de Karl Marx (Paris, Riviere) included a list of the cyclopaedia articles written by Marx and by Marx-Engels, as well as a few by Engels alone, mentioning as sources the Marx-Engelse correspondence, E. D:?ahn's Marx-Bibliographie^ and Korl Marx, Chronik aeinea Leben (Moscow, 1934), but his 1960 Supplhient to this re markable work noted the information in the first edition of the Russian

IF
Soohineniia (which was itself very inaccurate, we now know) and in the V,I,KPSS article (which in fact was largely a critique of Rubel). In sum, on this point the Rubel bib liography stands in need of conplete revision. A number of the articles that have, at one time or another, been ascribed to Marx or Engels were, we know now, by other writers. In Engels' letter of 22 April 18S7 giving his first reaction to the encyclopedia project (see Sec tion 4 below), his enthusiastic re sponse mentioned several article subjects that we do not hear about again in the letters: Alexander, AriatotUt Auaterlitz, Caeeap, Car not^ Chartim, Code SapolSon, Colum, C o m m n i m , Epicurus, Socialism besides his enumeration of lihole branches of knowledge. A translation of the article ' Chart ism" was in fact published under Marx's name in the Bemsteinian Sozialiatieoke Monatehefte for 16 November 1916; but it was written by William Humphreys (according to the list of contributors in Volume 5, first printing), who was also the author of "Abd el Kader." The article on Epicurus was written by the liberal German-Aaerican journ alist Hermann Raster, editor of the New York Abend-Zeitung, who also wrote a number of other articles for the encyclopedia. "Hegel" was written by Henry Smith; "Socialism" by Parke Godwin, one of Dana's Fourierist friends. The article "Cannon" has been ascribed to Marx or Engels very persistently, because the Marx-Engelse correspondence does repeatedly refer to an article of this title which Engels was working on. Howev er, this is actually the article "Artillery," It was mailed to Dana under the heading "Cannon" because Marx thought it was too late to get into the "A" volume, but as a mat* ter of fact the first volume of the cyclopaedia ended with "Araguay." It therefore became possible for Dana to publish the article under the heading "Artillery," and he did so. In a later volume the NAC also published an article on "Cannon," but this was not by Marx or Engels. V,IKPSS refers in proof to Dana's letter of 8 January 1858, in which he informs Marx that the article on Cannon would be ptiblished under the title "Artillery." The same article is also referred to as "History of Arms," but the article "Arms" vdiich appeared in the SAC was written by Henry W. Herbert (according to the list in Volume 5, first printing). The title "Castrum," which oc curs in s<e Marx-Engels letters, simply refers to the article "Camp." There is no article headed "Castrum" in the cyclopaedia. Other article subjects came up for discussion in the correspond ence. In his letter of 23 April 1857 Marx expressed a preference for subjects like "Ricardo, Sismondi, etc." In an exchange of let ters (Marx on 23 May 1857 and Eng els on 28 May) they discussed the idea of writing an article on "Aes thetics" but rejected it. Another article title came up much later when Dana requested one on Bengal ("Histojry of the Bengal Rebellion" in Marx's letter of 23 January 1858, and just "Bengal Rebellion" in Engels' of 25 January). Engels advised declining the commission since it would take too much time but suggested it might be written later under the heading "Hindustan Rebellion." Nothing came of it. Other article titles that came up are considered in Section 6 be low, in coimection with Appendices I to III. In addition to the 67 articles which were published in the NAC, Marx sent at least five more to New York, making 72 in all at a mini mum. For some reason, only two of these are singled out for special mention in MEW, Vol. 14, note 1: "Altogether, 67 articles by Marx and Engels appeared; two smaller p i e c e s 'Abensberg' and 'Cartouch' were apparently severely Bhortened by the editors of the encyclopedia, who oftmn performed

21
operations on the text when pub lishing the contributions. Both of these articles were excluded from the text of the present volue; they are contained in the appropriate notes..." And in fact the brief texts of these two articles are translated into German in other notes. The same is not done, however, for the article Btllow," which is more or less in the same case. (For the five articles written but not pub lished, see below Section 6, Appen dix I.) When V,I,KPSS states that Marx sent to the editor not less than 70 articles," the authors probably have in mind the 67 articles of the canon plus "Abensberg," "BUlow," and "Cartouch." It should be borne in mind that elren as far as the 67 published ar ticles are concerned, we have no certain way of knowing to what ex tent the NAC editors made changes, additions or excisions. We know that in his letter of 11 March 1858 Engels expressed the suspicion that Dana had "considerably shortened our articles," but this was sisq>ly because of the discrepancies be tween Marx's estimate of the pay ments and the actual payments; they had not yet seen the first volume as published, and there is no follow-up on this in the correspond ence. We know there was a regular problem of this sort with the 2W2>ime articles; and it is reasonable to make the guess that, for the cyclopaedia, Dana or Ripley may have softened e^^pressions or judg ments here and there in the arti cles sent in by Marx. In some ca ses MEW definitely indicates parts of the published articles that were added in New York; these are dis cussed in the notes on the text wherever necessary, and the added sections have been eliminated from this book. Finally, this is as good a place as any to mention that, out of 16 biographical articles in the 67, there are three cases where the names of the subjects are wrongly given in the cyclopaedia. These are: Bennigsen, Bolivar, Bosquet. (For details, see the notes in each case in Section 5.) In none of these cases do the MEW editors take notice of the error, surprisingly enough.

From The M arx-E n gls Correspondence


In the published correspondence between Marx and Engels iMEW^ Vol. 29-30), e can follow the high lights of their relations with Da na and the c^lopaedia otfice. (See Appendix V, Table 2 for a list of the relevant letters.) The first reaction to Dana's in vitation to participate in the proj ect is Marx's letter to bngels of 21 April 1857, enclosing Dana's let ter and asking: "Be so gc^od as to write by retuzm mail what I should answer to the enclosed letter by Dana. I must send the anrwer by the Friday mail." Engels' reply of 22 April is ex uberant: he leaps iomiedii.tely to a grandiose project for doing the whole encyclopedia themselves to gether with a consortium of their friends: "The bbsiness about the ency clopedia reaches me at just the right moment, and probably like wise for you. Voitit enfin the prospect of being able to fill the holes in your budget, and for me the expectation of regularly occupying my evenings. 'Peace was demoralizing me': since I had no more articles to write for the Tribune, I have led a bohemian life to too great an extent, the opportunities being numerous here. As far as the military art icles are concerned, Dana should immediately answer the following questions: "1. How many volumes will the whole thing have, and how far does he intend to go in the first volume, or in the first and sec ond?

22
' 2 . Should the military arti cles limit themselves mainly to the explanation of technical terms, such as for example: Artil lery, Setting up camp, Column; with historical marginal glosses and a concise resumi of the vari ous branches of military science, as for example:- Artillery: (1) explanation; (2) history and pres ent state; (3) resum& of the bran ches of the modern science of art illery (shooting, serving the guns, harnessing, use in the field and against fortresses, etc.) "3. Or will there also be arti cles on military history? for ex ample, under the heads of Austerlitz, Arbela, etc., short accounts of the battles themselves, and, under Alexander, Caesar, Carnot, etc., military biographies to gether with an indication of each person's epoch-making advances in progress. "So write vmediately to Steffen to get from him the title or au thor of an encyclopedia of mili tary science which is as complete and as short as possible; one which has the most articles but the shortest would be best, for it will serve to inform me at once which articles I have to do, and give me the alphabetical ord er as fully and conveniently as possible. As soon as I have this, I can get to work on the letters A and B; perhaps even sooner, since I can spot many articles in Brockhaus alone, and some even without it. "The pay will be good enough even at $2 per large page; much of the stuff is just transcribing or translating, and the bigger arti cles will not be very much work. Ia i D iimnediately going to look at a couple of English encyclopedias to see whioh articles they have, but after all Brockhaus in parti cular, which still remains the best starting-point, is more com plete, and also it seems to serve Dana as his model. "It would not hurt if some phil ological pieces could be picked up. for example, the Germanic langu ages, Middle High German or Old High German etc. literature (the same in the Romance languages, es pecially the Provencal). Slavic subjects would be undertaken eith er by the Jakob woman or by Herr Gurowski; the former indeed und erstands more about these langu ages than I do. "Which articles will you und ertake? In any case, German phi losophy Biography of modern Eng lish and French statesmen? Some financial subjects? Chartitm? Communism? Socialism? Aristotle Epicurus~Code Napol^on-~and the like. Without any party tend ency whatever, such topics are certainly harder to handle than the nice military subjects, where it goes without saying one is al ways on the side of the victor. 'Take as many articles as you can get, and gradiially organize a bureau. M. Pieper can alao slave away at it; he is very ser viceable for biographical materi al and also keeps some useful dull information in his ingenious skull. Perhaps Lupus also would be ready to do work in the field of classical antiquity; I'll seel "Although the work will aot be very interesting (at least not the biggest part of it), still the bvisiness gives me infinite pleasure since it will mean a tremendous lift for you. I have really been devilishly fearful how the Tribune affair would end, especially when Dana tried to put you on half pay; but now things will go all right; and while pay ment won't come very soonj still this is a very secure position, and one can always prepare a couple of letters of the alphabet in advance without worryiag: the money will come along in good time. ... "Have Dana also tell you wheth er the articles should in general take up more or less spacs than, for instance, in Brockhaus, and whether the whole thiag ia esti-

23
mated to be larger or smaller in bulk than Brockhaus. Then we'll know where we stand. Also, when you get pald*~and how soon the enterprise Is to be completed. It's good to know all that. "In your place I trould propose to him to do the whole encyclo pedia alone; we'd certainly bring it off. In any case, take i ^ t you can get; if we have 100 to 200 pages in every volume, that isn't too much; we can easily sup ply as much 'solid' erudition as there is solid California gold to pay for it." (Wilhelm Steffen was at this time a friend of Marx's, in emigra tion; in 1852 he had been a witness for the defense in the Communist trial in Cologne. "Brockhaus" was the leading German encyclopedia. Therese Albertine Luise Robinson, n^e von Jakob, was a writer and translator of Serbian folk tales into German. Count Adam Gurowski was a Polish publicist who had emi grated to the U.S. in 1849 and wrote for the New York Tribune, Wil helm Pieper had been a member of the Communist League; living in London as a journalist and philologist, he was friendly with Marx. "Lupus" was Wilhelm Wolff, a long-time close friend and comrade.) Marx replied on 23 April that he would write Dana immediately, but that "there can be no talk about establishing a bureau here in Lon don. There are no useful people here," after explaining why some of the friends mentioned by Engels were not available. Of himself he goes on to say: "For my part, I would prefer to write articles for Dana like: Ric ardo, Sismondi, etc. In any event, this sort of thing can be written objectively, in the Yankee sense. It is difficult to present German philosophy in English. However, I will propose various subjects to Dana and leave the choice to him." Marx's letter of 8 May has a passage beginning, "I have written everything to Dana as yoa told me," but, while he is clearly referring to Engels' long letter of 22 April, it is unfortunately not clear whe ther this statement refers to Eng els' propositions for the cyclopae dia or to another problem in Eng els' letter (about an article on Bazancourt). The next sentence in fact refers to the latter, but in the following sentence Marx harks back to Engels' request about Stef fen: "Steffen knows of no book like the one you need [an English mili tary encyclopedia]; he himself seams to be busy with an English translation of RUstow's CSLb o t b Reevweaen,^^ On 23 May, Marx wrote again: "This morning the enclosed came from Dana. I find it puzzling how the Yankee can expect that the stuff for Volume 1 will be in New York by the beginning of July when he doesn't give us his commissions till the end of May. "Give consideration once again to what articles should be offered, outside of the military subjects. Philosophical subjects are, in point of fact, too badly paid, and besides difficult to do in English. Do you know if there is any book at all in German or French on biog raphies of big industrialists? "Just as puzzling to me: how aes thetics is to be handled in one page, fundamentally, and on the ba sis of Hegel. "Does Lupus want to undertake something?" Engels' reply of 28 May re marked, "Dana must be crazy to stip ulate one page for Aesthetics," but this just about marked the end of the discussion about extending the range of articles to be done. As Mehring's Hael Marx says: "Nothing came of the suggestion that an of fice [the bureau] should be organ ized, chiefly because it proved im possible to obtain suitable co-op erators, and apart from this, the prospects turned out to be far less brilliant than Engels had hoped..." It is clear that only one of the

24
obstacles was Dana's insistence that the articles nust be written nonpartisanly, though this alone would have made it difficult for Marx to undertake articles in the political fields suggested by Eng els ("Chartism? Communism? Social* ism?") without great frustration. Marx, who was then immersed in his economic studies, would have killed two birds with one stone if Dana had been willing to assign him sub jects like "Ricardo, Sismondi, etc." but here too Dana was no doubt afraid of partisan presentations. Otherwise we might now have some first drafts of Marx's later Theo^ riea of Siarplne Value* The project settled down to mostly the militaria, which,-as Engels had said with mordant irony, could more easily be written with no "party tendency whatever" because the military ana lyst "is always on the side of the victor." Engels' letter of 28 May gets down to specifics with regard to the military articles: "Dana must be crazy to stipulate one page for aesthetics. Nor has the fellow got the faintest notion about military subjects. On the next page, a list of articles that occur to me, out of Brockhaus and my own memory. But since I must first compare an English military encyclopedia, these can't be de finitive; who can remember all the technical expressions that begin with A In English. Apropos: there does exist such an encyclopedia by a scribbler of the lousiest kind, J. H. Stocqueler; can you make In quiries about price, size, etc.? "Very nice of him to want to have the articles with the re quired profundity and conciseness yetl~by the first of July. Again, real Yankee. In any case It proves that more value Is set on mere show than on actual content, as Is already proved by the $2 per page. "Give Dana the list as a provi sional one and tell him that, since with this rate of pay one can't do work on speculation, he should state just what he wants. (It's exactly these hackwork arti cles, which are the easiest, that make the pay acceptable.) L second list of teohnioal terms for A will follow very soon. As soon as these are settled, he will, as far as I'm concerned, have the lists up to D, E or G, so he can then push the work straight on." The list attached to this letter by Engels was as follows: ENGELS' LIST OF 28 MAY 1857 Abensberg (battle of 1809).1/4 p. Abukir d i t t o .... . 1/4 p. Axle (artillery) ...... 1/8 ditto Acre, St. Jean d' (Sieges of).. 1/4 ditto to 1/2 Actlum (battle of) .... 1/3 to 1/4 Adjutant 1/4 to 1/2 Afghanistan (Invasion by English) .... 2 Aland Isles see Bomarsund Albuera (battle) ............. 1/4 Aldenhoven ditto 1797 ..>... 1/4 Alessandria (fortress and sieges) .... 1/4 Algeria (French conquest of and English bombardment of) .... 2-3 Almeida (siege of In Peninsular 1/4 War) ...... .......... Amusette (artillery) .... . 1/10 Anglesey (Marquis of) ........ 1/2 Attack (In battle and sle|,e).. 1/2 Antwerp (fortress & slege&) .... 1 Approaches ............. 1/2 fully Arbela (battle of) ........... 1/4 Arquebusler 1/8 Aspern and Essllng (battle 1809) ... 3/4 Augereau (Marshal) ........... 1/2 Advanced guard 1/2 Of this list of 23 subjects, on ly seven are included in this vol ume as part of the accepted canon (including "Arquebuse" for "Arquebusier); remarks on the others will be fotind in Appendix II. But a siege of ill health put Engels out of commission tor a speedy dispatch of the work such as he had confidently expectad. Dana was pressing for the completed art icles and Marx was in a quandary oh

. L

25
how to explain the delay. On 6 luly 1857 he wrote Engels: "..at this moment it's all a question of haste. You know that, on your advice, I sent still a second list to Dana; so what ex cuse can I give the man? I cant plead illness, since then I would have to entirely break off my Tri bune correspondence and quite re duce my already very meager in come. If Dana has to, he can re sort to the man who has already supplied him with a part of the military articles. In this case I would be out of the picture. To avoid this, I must write Friday, The ticklish thing is to know what to write. "You realize that nothing is more disagreeable than to press upon you during your illness, and in fact when you left here I had no idea that you, in your condition, would immediately take up your desk work again, and indeed so se riously." On 11 July 1857 Engels reported more optimistically on his health, and promised some of the articles for early delivery. By 25 August, he was wondering why Dana had not yet written about a list for the letter B. Marx (26 August) ex plained that "The situation with Dana is not very good." He had not wanted to bother Engels with the story during his illness, but as a matter of fact Dana had sent the B list a while back (Marx here en closed this list but it has not been preserved). In this list, "There are only two non-military articles: Blum' and 'Bourrienne." Dana had written at the same time urging quick delivery of the arti cles and promising immediate pay ment on receipt. At this point Marx had had no excuse for not complying except to plead illness and domest ic difficulties, and therefore had also to suspend the Tribune arti cles. "Meanwhile," continued Marx, "I learned that Major Ripley* is now co-editor of the Tribime, so in case of need Dana has a pie-aller for the Cyclopaedia." Then Marx goes on to mention Engels^ wavering physical condi tion, in spite of two batches of articles received from him, and to explain that, knowing that his ill ness would not permit hio to keep up with Dana's expected demands, he made up an excuse to put off the New York editor. But: "On August 17 I received the enclosed better from Dana. As for the letter b, there's no question at this time of comple ting it, but rather of getting it ready as fast as possiblt. If that isn't possible, the whole, business will have to be given up^" He adds: "The result is that my economic si tuation has become quite untenable and even my situation with the Tribune has become shaky." However, they muddled through these difficulties of hetlth and time to work, though occasional brief references in the correspond ence continue to show the tension between pressure from Ne, York and the difficulties caused by Engels' lingering health problems. On 18 September 1857 Engels wa writing? "Which French generals ard which of their heroic deeds do you want looked into more closely? Give me as much time as possible^ since I can't work well more thar. two hour$ in a row." In order to stall Dana a while.

*Marx seems to be under the mis taken impression that Ripley was a military man. This reference to "Major" Ripley is no doubt the source of the similar error in a MEW note (Vol. 29, p.681, n.l59). Marx's second error in this sent ence is to refer to Ripley as co editor of the Tribune, Ripley was co-editor of the cyclopaedia, but on the Tribune he was the literary editor and one of ten associate ed itors under Dana.

26
Marx had pretended he had mailed articles which Dana had never re ceived. On 21 September Marx con fesses the further difficulties this had gotten him into: "Last Friday I got a letter from Dana, cool and curt. I answered hia that I would put In a claim at the post office. Further: since 1 had 'Algeria* and 'Ammunition' on hand, I sent them off with the reaark that 1 had kept a oopy of them; that I still have 'Army' in the original and would forthwith get it copied and Immediately sent off (I did this because in your last letters you repeatedly re ported that 'Army* was nearly fin ished)... 1 have sent your B and C lists to Daxui." On 22 September 1857 Engels wrote that as soon as possible he would finish "some of B again, which you can use for mailing con tinuous shipments to Dana, and thereby improve the mood he's in. In the meantime I have put my hands on some money, and enclose a fivepound note." Marx was in dire fin ancial straits at this point; on 23 September he wrote his friend: "The main thing, the only thing that can extricate me is rapid pro gress with the Cyclopaedia." On 19 October Engels again assured that he would "take care of some of the smaller pieces and send them to you fvom time to time, so that Dana will see things are still go ing along." His determination to get more articles to do was undim inished; "I'd like the list for D soon; else Mr. Dana will anticipate us again. What does the honorable nan write otherwise haven't you heard from him?" (29 October 1857.) At the end of that month, Marx wrote that he had received two let ters from Dana: "First, that 'Army' arrived in time. Second, that as a result of the commercial crisis all European correspondents [of the Tri~ hme\ except me and Bayard Taylor are being dismissed..." This natu rally dimmed the prospects for Cy clopaedia work too. In November Marx kept pr .^ssing Engels for the article "Artillery"; "It's a matter of decisive moment (for me) to send stuff to America." (13 November.) But Engels was still incapable of full-scale work: ex plaining why he could not finish "Artillery," he wrote: "Only two evenings are left, and I cannot write every evening without my head spinning." (16 November.) And: "I cannot work much or continuously right now, but the most possible will be done." (7 December.) This situation continued into 1858. On 5 January, Marx again had to raise the possibility of giving up the cyclopaedia work altogether in order to ease the strain on Eng els: "1 am, In fact, in very coabarrassed straits regarding the let ter C. Since November 27 nothing more has been sent to Dana., since I long ago finished my part of the work (that is, the non-military part). If Manchester affairs do not permit you to get ahead with the thing In earnest, I'll have to put an end to the whole business and give Dana notice for the Cyclo paedia on some pretext or other. It is bound to make him suspicious In the end and to compromise me if 1 send long new lists and do not finish the old ones. Consequently al^o, he does not answer and sends nothing new. But such work can't even be remunerative, what vlth con tinual defaults for months. "It's not possible for ma to con sider undertaking the military sub jects myself; this would force me to spend a great deal of time in the Museum and yet not produce any thing decent thereby, sinea I must absolutely finish the other jobs and they take all my time-'else the house would come crashing iown on my head t "So, my boy, try to come to a de finite resolution one way or the other." But Engels refused to give up. Writing 6 January he reported he

27
was beginning on C that very even ing, and optimistically promised "you will be able to send something every week." Besides, he argued, "In the midst of this [business] crisis, the [SAC] people will not be in a hurry to go to press, else Dana would have written you long ago." (He was referring to Volume 3, but, as a matter of fact, the C articles did not begin until Vol ume 4.) On 7 January he was press ing Marx to get the D list from Dana. On 23 January 18S8 Marx sent En gels a letter just received from Dana, asking for new B articles; "The disagreeable result of it for me is that I am considerably in debt to the fellow, since I mis calculated my claims [for payment for articles] and drew on his funds again after sending off 'Cannon' [i.e. 'Artillery']. Besides, the pay Is not even a penny a line. "Now as regards the new articles that Dana wants under B and the main thing for me Is to quickly pay the overdraft with Appleton, since otherwise I can't draw anything on the Tpibune and therefore will be in danger of sinking *they are all taken from the list you drew up with one exception. As far as con cerns the one exception^ 'The His tory of the Bengal Rebellion,' It seems to me the most practical thing to do Is to refuse Dana point-blank on this. Where come by the sources In the short space of time? Since It 'shall be sent at once' and 'as brief as possible'. It would be quite a job, with ab solutely no relationship between the pay and the amount of work, and It would only hinder the com pletion of the other articles. What is your opinion? The main thing is the military stuff, but the whole thing, military and pol itical, does not seem to me to be developed enough to 'be sent at once f M Engels answered on 25 January: "It is totally impossible to do the Bengal Rebellion in the time required," and suggested that Dana postpone the subject to the H's, under "Hindustan Rebellion or some thing else. The note of complaint at the low rate of pay in comparisor. with the work required was continued in Marx's letter of 29 January: jIt Is very good that you made 'Borodino' longer. Since the fel low s columns are so immense and his pay so bad, the only remedy Is tc stretch out the article. I hope that when you get to 'Cavalry' you will spread It out as much as you can, so that I'll be freed from my debt to the dogs." Marx's letter of 1 February in cludes a little vignette of his working day: "Whenever Ijn at the Museum, I have such a lor of stuff to look up that the time (now only till 4 o'clock) is gone before I look around. Then the trip home. Thus a lot of time is lost." It is in this letter cf 1 Febru ary 1858 that Marx also gives a long list of the B articles on which he and Engels worked. We in sert it here for its bibliographic interest. It begins by referring to a "new" list of B articles sent by Dana; ' "The new B's are: Bida^aoa (bat tle of), Blenheim (ditto), Bupmah (war In), Bomca>8und (siege), Boro dino (battle), Breaoia (assault). Bridge-head, Billow, Buda (siege of), Bereaford, Berme, When Dana says, ' most of them I asked you before,' that is an error. He is mixing up your list of B's with hia He himself requested only: "Barbette, Baation, Bayonet, Bar clay de Tolly, Battery, Battle, Bern, Bennigaen, Berthier, B e m a dotte, Beaaihrea, Bivouac,,Blind age, Bllhher, Blum, Bolivar, Bomb, Bombardier, Bombai^ent, Bomb (Ketah, Proof, Veaael), Bonnet, Boaquet, Bourrienne, Bridge (pon toon), Brown (Sir George), Brune, Bugeccud. (The ass has received all of these.)"

4^0 The financial difficulties with the drafts on the Appleton funds continued. Again on 14 February Marx vnrote; "I had totally miscal culated in my estimate of the pay ment for the last pieces sent in, and such overdrafts increased his debt to the publisher. Engels re plied with further complaints against the low rate of pay; "In any case he can no longer expect the sort of thing we send him in very many cases independent works instead of the lousy compilations which he otherwise gets. Press him to pay better, and then we'll see. (18 February.) On 22 February Marx explained his financial "deadlock with Ap pleton due to the overdraft and his consequent debt, which he had to pay off in manuscripts. He opined that "the threat to stop the supply [of articles] would bring Dana and Appleton round and induce them to offer better payment," but this form of pressure could not be ap plied till the overdraft was paid off. In this letter Marx was in a rage with the New Yorkers: With regard to the lousy Yankees, I would of course take the greatest pleasure in writing Messrs. Dana and Appleton both to kindly (The three blanks apparently represent bow4erization by the MSH editors.) Engels advised caution: 1 am not of the opinion that we should possibly give up Appleton; then we would have to look to the Contin ent. The encyclopedia course is ve ry useful to me, and in the last analysis the thing goes so slowly that, if our financial circumstan ces were less pressing, we culd carry it on very comfortably. But in any case we will demand a vote of confidence as soon as conditions permit [i.e. ask for better pay]; I do believe this will help immedi ately." (24 February 1858.) On 11 March 1858, Engels letter harks back to Marx's miscalcula tions of how much the articles sent were going to bring: I have a sus picion about friend Dana, that he considerably shortened our articles; otherwise you couldn't have miscal culated so badly. Some day at your convenience look up the encycloped ia in Trllbner. This seems to mean that neither Marx nor Engels had so far bothered to look at their arti cles in the already published first volume, nor had the publisher sent a copy. We do not know from the cor respondence whether Marx ever did check as Engels advised. It was not until April of the following year that Marx finally did hold out for better pay, after Dana wrote on 15 March 185 asking for articles on "Fortification" and "Infantry so we learn from Marx's letter to Engels of 9 April. Presu mably Dana agreed, for the articles were written and delivered. Engels' article on "Fortification" was in Marx's hands on 10 June 1859, but "Infantry" was delayed. In Septemb er Marx was still awaiting it from Engels, in order to help solve his money troubles again: "On this art icle the question is not whether it is deep but whether it is long," he wrote on 23 September. But an eye 1 inflammation delayed Engeli> still, and it was not imtil 10 October that Marx received the piece. There is no direct statement in the correspondence on why the ord ers for articles from New York had dwindled; it may have been due as much to Dana as to Marx. The next request for an article did not come until 8 September 1860: Dana urgent ly asked for an article on "Navy." Marx, however, was initially reluc tant. He wrote Engels on 25 Septem ber; "...After your stay here in Lon don, I wrote Dana I would prefer it if he assigned the article 'Na vy' to some other Cyclopaedia con tributor. Since then I received no answer from him and believed the thing had been dropped, until the enclosed letter popped In. If It Is at all possible for you to do the thlng~lt does not matter how short or superflclal~thl would be of the greatest importance to

29
me right at this moment^ since I was forced on September 14 to get a two-month advance draft on Dana (payable two months from date) in order to get a breathing-space. I wrote him about it, appealing to his old friendship, since other wise this is against the princip les of the Trihune* Now my letter crossed his. So right now is the time to keep him in a good mood, besides keeping him believing we can do anything. So if it is at all possible, you would do me the greatest favor if you did the piece. Dana asks for a maximum of ten pages. Five will do also, if thats the way it goes. It's a question above all of sending him something." The time was inopportune for En gels, and Marx did not get the art icle until 23 November 1860. Following this date, we find Marx on two occasions telling cor respondents that the Cyclopaedia had suspended operations because of the financial crisis (letter to Lassalle 15 February 1861; to Carl Siebel 28 March 1861.) Presumably Dana had written Marx to this ef fect; but if there was a suspension it was of brief duration. There is no record of any further requests from Dana for articles for the en cyclopedia. majority are historical-ofiplanatory, and are omitted here. All ref erences to MEy are to Volume 14 un less otherwise specified, "AIREY" From AfSJ/ (p.716, n.48): "Engels was aided in witlng this article by material which Marx gathered for him from English sources; the notes have survived. They include especially extracts from Airey*s brochure Addreeaee be fore Military Board at Chelsea (LondAn, 1856). The quotation giv en in the article is froa this source." "ALBUERA Engels' article on "Aibuera" contained a minor mistake, Dana learned, and Marx heard from him about it in January 1858 ^oon after the publication of the first volume of the Cyclopaedia. The ond of the article had mentioned that the siege of Badajoz fortress was lift ed a few days after the battle of Albuera, which took place 16 May 1811, but in fact the siage had lasted till the beginning of June 1811. Informed by Marx, t^ngels wrote on 25 January that he had still not been able to check the fact: "As for the alleged mistake, I cannot look it up now... The note was taken from Brockhaus, so it should be quite correct." But in his letter of 18 Febniary he groaned, "In the case of Badajoz, that wretched Brockhaus certainly led me astray." "ALGERIA" From m w (p.724, n.82):

Notes on the A rticles


These notes refer only to the 67 articles of the accepted canon. Notes on articles included in the various appendices will be found in Section 6 below. Summarized here, in alphabetical order of the articles, is miscella neous information from various sources, primarily two; the editor ial masbter in and references to the articles in the Marx-Engels correspondence. In the case of the latter, we have excluded routine passages, but all passages of gen eral interest are given here in full. As for AfEV notes, the great

"The editors of the HkC made some changes in Engels' essay 'Al geria.' As is brought out in Eng els' letter to Marx of 22 Septemb er 1857, there was contained in the original text not available to us a description of the lib-

eratlon war of the Algerian peop^ under the leadership of Abd el Kader against the French conquer ors and a chasacterization of the colonial activity of Marshal Bugeaud in Algeria. These passages were cut out by the editors, to the detriment of the content, ap parently because there was a spe cial article already included in the Cyclopaedia on Abd el Kader and an essay 'Bugeaud,' comnissloned from Marx, had been provi ded for. Also other signs of edi torial interference [in the arti cle] have been established." The reference here to Engels' letter of 22 September 1857 is not well taken, since it by no means clearly states what this note as cribes to it. (See the text of the passage under "Bugeatid" below.) Perhaps the MEW editors are basing themselves on Dana's correspondence. The published article on "Al geria" does have a very strong and lengthy passage on the atrocities of French colonial rule in Algeria, so strong in fact as to be quite out of keeping with Dana's aim of "objective" presentation. The note in continues as follows on another aspect of the article; the editors object to the criticism expressed in the article on the Algerian piracy operations: "In writing this essay Engels understood enough to disrejtard the tendentious presentation of Alge rian history in the bourgeois histotical literature and in the bour geoisvencyclopedias, although these were then the only sources avail able to him. (Engels used, above all, the essay 'Algeria' in Wigcmd'a Converaatione-Lexioorif Vol. 1, Leipzig, 1846, from which is evidently taken the quotation given on page 103 [of MEW Vol. 14]). Since at that time the history of the African countries had not yet been fully researched, some obso lete and onesided presentations inevitably found their way into his essay from the sources he used, on certain questions. This

is the case, for example, with re spect to the representation of the role of the Christian powers in the struggle against the Al^jerian pirates (these powers, as in well known, to a great extent practised piracy themselves), and of ihe circumstances and motivatioa of the original seizure of Algeria by the French."

"ARMADA" From MEW (p.737, n.l65): "The original version of this es say 'Armada' was written by Engels essentially on the basis of mate rial which Marx had collected and sent to him. There were excerpts which Marx had prepared from vari ous sources. Some of the passages in thisaimaterial which Mar:: worked up were taken over by Engels un changed. After Marx received Eng els' finished text, he clarified a number of pertinent details and then sent the contribution in its final form to New York."

"ARMY" MEW (p.705-06, n.l) gives sour ces used for this article v^hich are not included in our list or "Refer ence Works Used by Marx and Engels" in Appendix V: "Engels used many special sour ces for this article from the works of the historians and mili tary writers of ancient tLaes (He rodotus, Xenophon, Sallust, Polyb ius, Vegetius, and others), as well as various encyclopedias. Some of these sources are nentioned by Engels in the article. Among the materials which he used for his preliminary work on this article, still extant are his ex cerpts from RUstow's Heen.'eaen lotd KriegfUhmmg C, Juliua C&kore (Go tha, 1855) as well as from the ar ticle 'Army' in the seventh edi tion of the Enoyolopaedia Britan^ niaa (1842, Vol. 3). Marx likewise

31
made excerpts for Engels' article from scholarly works and encyclo pedias on certain questions of mi litary history. Also extant are his excerpts from the three vol umes of [J. 6.] Wilkinson's Mznnere and Cuetome of the Anoient Egyptiane (London, 1837), as well as from works by Herodotus, Thu cydides, Polybius, Josephus Fla vius, and other ancient histori ans." Engels spent a good deal of time on the article, with Marx acting as research assistant in the British Museum. The work required a review of virtually the entire span of mi litary history. Marx, to hasten completion, suggested at the begin ning that Engels postpone some sec tions to later headings: "I think you can limit yourself simply to some generalities as far as the ancient world is con cerned, and say straight out in the article itself that these topics will be treated under 'Greek Army' and 'Roman Army.' Thus time will be gained. Meanw while we can not only get hold of the [book by] RUstow but I can send you a mass of other details, since I have now found, after a long search, a complete collec tion of sources for the military history of ancient times, in the Museum." [6 July 1857.] A few days later Marx sent some more notes for the article: "The enclosed notes are not worth much, except perhaps a couple of quotations. I have, to be sure, looked at the Enayalopaedia Brit-camioat but did not have time to read it really thoroughly. So I'm afraid these notes will hardly have anything new for you. Also used: Ersch and Gruber, Enoyolopidie Univereelle [Allgemeine EnoyolojpSdie &c.]; Pauly, Realenoyolopddie der Claaaieohen Alther-tumewieaeneohaft (1844-52). Just now it is impossible for me to read the works themselves. It's a pity I didn't get to it sooner. The Enayalopaedia Britanniaa is copied pretty much word for word from the German and French works, and therefore hard to get away from, without reading the special ist works themselves." [16 July 1857.1 In view of the remarks in this letter about the various encyclo pedias, this is as good a place as any to mention some other comments on the same subject. We have al ready quoted Engels' letter of 22 April 1857. On 25 September Marx wrote: "For my biographies, etc. I was naturally forced to look ip all kinds of encyclopedias, iucluding German ones. In so doii|g, I found that under the headings 'Labor,' 'Classes,' "Production,' .^tc., we are honestly being cribbed, but stupidly. Yet they all avoid men tioning us, even when they devote columns to Herr Edgar Bauer and similar great men. Tant mieux pour nous* The biographies in the Ger man encyclopedias are written for children under eight. The French ones are partisan, but at least sophisticated. The English ency clopedias honestly plagiarize the French and German. In the German encyclopedias the same fellows seem to give out with the same piss for the most varied publishers. Ersch and Gruber is good only in the later volumes, which contain many scholarly studies. ... "[P.S.] Pauly's ReatenayolopMie des Althertume is solid." It is in the same letter of 25 September 1857 that Marx acknow ledged receipt of the finished ar ticle from Engels, and wrote an appreciation of the essay which is itself of great interest: "Your 'Army' is very fine... "The history of the Army brings out more clearly than anything else the correctness of our view on the connection between the pro ductive forces and social relations. In general the army is important for economic development. For ex-

32
anple, wages were fully developed among the ancients first in the army. Similarly among the Romans the peoulim oaatrenae [soldiers' camp property] was the first leg al form which recognized movable property of anyone other than the father of a family. Similarly, the guild system among the corporation ot fdbri [army artisans]. Similar ly here the first use of machinery on a large scale. Even the special value of metals and their use as money appears to rest originally as soon as Grimm's Stone Age was over on their military signi ficance. Also, the division of la bor within one branch was first carried out in the army. The whole history of bourgeois society, fur thermore, is very strikingly sum marized herein. If you ever have the time, you must work the thing out from this standpoint. "The only points which have been omitted from your presentation, in my opinion, are: (1) The first ful ly formed appearance of the mercen ary s*ldier system, on a large scale and all at once, among the Carthaginians. (For our private use I will look up a work by a Berliner on the Carthaginian army, one which I became acquainted with only later.) [This probably refers to Wilhelm Btittlcher's Geaohiohte der Carthager, Berlin, 1827.] "(2) The development of the army system in Italy in the 15th and beginning of the 16th century. At any rate, tactical tricks were worked out here. Likewise extreme ly himorous is Machlavelll's de scription ... in his Hiatory of Florence of the way the condottieri fought one another. ... "(3) Finally, the Asiatic milita ry system, as it appeared first among the Persians but then came in, although very variously modified, among the Mongolians and Turks, etc." "ARTILLERY" MEW (p.739, n.l78 180) fills out two bibliographic references that occur in the article. The men tion of Charles Hippolyte d*i Paravey near the beginning "evidently refers to Paravey's work MSi^ire BUT la dSoowerte tree anoianne en Aaie et dccna l*Indo~Ferae la poudre h oanon et dee armea h feu*' (Paris, 1850). A little lator the reference is to Roger Bacon's Epiatolae Fratria Rogerii Baaonia, de aeoretia operibua artia et mturae, et de nullitate magiae^ which was then generally dated 1216 as Eng els does, but which is now assign ed to the 1240s.

"AYACUCHO" From VEV Cp757f n,166). In de scribing the battle in this article, Engels used notes made by harx, sent to Manchester with hi. ' letter of 21 September 1857. The final part of the piece comes from Marx. The characterization of Esnartero and his supporters expresses the evaluation which Marx had oiven in his article "Espartero" published in the New York Daily Tribune of 19 August 1854 as a leading article.

"BARCLAY DE TOLLY" MEV (p.720, n.64) says this was a joint work, though Marx ras re sponsible for the finished form. Among the sources used: Martens, Reoueil de traitea d'allianoe, de paixg de neutralitS; Jomini, Vie politique et militaire de Ja^olS^ ant Vol. 4; and Theodor von B e m hardi, DenkuQrdigkeiten auj dem Leben dea kaiaerl, ruaa, Gsnerala von der Infanterie Carl Frledrioh Grafen von Toll, Leipzig, 1856. In the first sentence of the NAC art icle, Barclay's birth date is giv en as 1759, corrected in kSW to 1761. In this MEW note, there is a long polemical passage directed against Marx-Engels' dim evaluation of the Russian general Kutusoff (to use the NAC spelling)^ It con-

33
tends, in accordance with the So viet hestorical line, that Kutusoff was a better general than Bar clay. It goes as follows, refer ring to the three sources listed above: "in these books, the history of the Fatherland War of 1812 la gi ven tendentlously, sonetlmes cob pletely distorted. This was Inev itably reflected In the Judgments of some aspects made In the essay by Marx and Engels, since they lacked objective sources at that time. In particular. Inaccurately presented In this essay are the reasons for the appointment of Kutusoff to the post of conoBander In-chlef of the Russian army, his motivation for giving up the posi tion at Gshatsk (more precisely, at Zarevo-Salmlstsche), and his role In the leadership of the broader military operations of the Russian troops. Entirely unfound ed Is the contrast made between Kutusoff and Barclay de Tolly; the latter was an Important general and a patriot of Russia, but he was considerably Inferior to the great general Kutusoff In strate gic ability, grasp of the nature of war, military experience, and authority among the army and the people. It was precisely these facts which forced Czar Alexander I., In spite of his hostility to Kutusoff, to agree to the appoint ment of Kutusoff as commander-lnchlef, under the pressure of pub lic opinion." A further note (n.69) enlarges on the reference to Kutusoffs posi tion at Zarevo-Saimistsche: "...southWiBst of Gshatsk, which the Russian troops entered on August 29. The position was given up by the Russian army on the decision of Kutusoff... Kutusoff Intended to launch a decisive battle against the French with a favorable rela. tlon of forces, for which purpose, however, he had to await reinforce ments, to gain time and unite with the main forces. On these grounds the Russian army withdrew from Zarevo-Salalstsche to Borodino." "BATTERY" Of the published article, only the first part is by Engels, and only this part is reproduced in this book. The rest, beginning with "Floating Batteries,* was added in New York "evidently by an Ameri can specialist," says MEW (p.728, n.lll). BEM" From MEW (p.729, n.113): "Marx wrote the largest part of this essay. The political charac terization of Bem Is by him, as well as the final editing and the literary form of the whole sketch. On the other hand, Marx took over almost word for word the charact erization of Bem as a military man, and the avaluatlon of his mi litary activity during the Polish uprising of 1830-31 and during the revolutionary war In Slebenbilrgen (1848-49), that are found In Eng els ' letter to Marx of 18 Septem ber 1857 and also In the notes which he specially put together for Marx. In addition Engels heiped Marx In the selection and refining of the biographical ma terial." Marx to Engels, 15 September 1857: "About Bam's Polish deeds, I find the following: 'He dj.stlnguIshed himself In the battle of Iganln. In which he fought with 12 light and 4 heavy guns against 40 Russian cannon of heavy caliber; then In the battle of Ostrolenka. Here he advanced with his battery at a galop up to the Russian skir mish line, directed an annihila ting fire against the divisions that had crossed the Narew River, withstood heavy fire from 80 can non and forced the enemy to re treat. Following this engagement, the was made] a colonel, soon after-

vard commander-ln~chle of the whole artillery, and a general when the Polish battle force was concentrated In Warsaw. During the days of September 3-6, Bern brought the whole power of his artillery into the struggle, while he placed the fieldpieces between the indiv idual defense-works of the outer line, pushed forward on the 6th with 40 cannon up to Wola, which had already been taken by the Rus sians, but, supported neither by infantry nor cavalry, had to re tire. When the Polish army moved on Fraga on the night of the 7th, he captured the bridge with 40 can non, but on the morning of the 8th received news of the agreement made with the Russians and Malachowskl's order to move to Modlin with the artillery. See his state ment, Allgemeine Augeburger Zeit~ ung for 1831, in which he discuss es the latter events and attacks Krukowiecki.' [This quotation is from an unidentified source.] "Since I do not trust the fore going authority, I ask you to check this passage and fix it up for me briefly in the best equivalent English." Engels replied on the 18th: "Regarding Bem I would say only the following: [The following par agraph is in English] "At the battle of Iganin, where he commanded the artillery, he was noticed for the skill and persever ance with which he fought it against the superior Russian batteries* At Ostrolenka, he again commanded the artillery in this capacity; when the Polish army had been finally repulsed in its attacks against the Russians who had passed the Narew, he covered the retreat by a bold advance with the whole of his guns. He was now created colonel, soon after general and called to the command in chief of the whole Pol ish artillery. When the Russians assaulted the entrenchments of War saw and took Wola, Bem advanced with forty guns against this, the principal work of the whole line.

but the superior force of Russian artillery opposed to him prevented the Polish infantry from revurnIng to the assault and compt'lled Bem to retire. "The rest of the stuff is entire ly commonplace. On Iganin I have no materials here; it was not a very important military action a de fense of an embankment which as us ual was made useless by a f.banking movement the 40 caimon of heavy caliber are flatly a lie; likewise the retreat of the Russians to Os trolenka, which might hold crue only for skirmish or support, troops or a couple of exposisd batallions. What I say in the fore going [paragraph] is the moi^t fa vorable view, for Diebitsch for bade pursuit." "BENNIGSEN" Vrom MEW (p.725-26, n.92): "As is clear from Engels' letter to Marx of 10 September 1857 as well as from the preparatory mate rial which has survived, the first draft of this essay was written by Engels. For this purpose Eijels leaned on such sources as uomlni's Vie pot'Ltique et militaire de Napolion (Paris, 1827) and otners. This draft was supplementec by ma terial from Marx, which he took from the French encyclopedia Biographie Univeraelle, Vol. 3, Paris, 1854, from Napoleon's memoj^rs ( M mireSf pour eervir h I'hitftoire de Franaet eoue Napolion^ , Paris, 1823) as well as other works." There is no notice takeu by the MEW editors of the fact thrit, in the ilMC article, the subject's name is spelled Benningsen throughout. MEW uses the spelling Benn.gsen throughout, in all volumes, without comment on the discrepancy. The spelling with the extra n persisted throughout the Ajpleton encyclopedias; it remained so in the American Cyclopaedia (che "sec ond edition"). In Johnson*} Univer sal CyolopaediUt published jointly by Appleton and A. J. Johnson in

35
1896, the spelling is said to be Bennigsen, or Benningsen"; like wise in the new edition of this work entitled the Vnvoepsat Cyoto^ paedia, issued by the sane joint publishers in 1900, The spelling with irtg is not found in any m o d e m reference work as far as I have been able to check, with one exception mentioned below, and not in any books about the man. However, this spelling %e found in some French encyclopedic works of the 19th century: Larousse's Grand Dzationnaire Univerael du XIXe Sieo~ e. Vol. 2, 1867; Dezobry and Ba chelet's Diatiormaire GinSral de Bi~ ogvaphie et d'Hietoire, 1888; and Nouvelle Biographie GSndrale. ed. 5 (Paris, Didot, 1866). Of course, all of these were published after the writing of the NAC article, but the Nouvelle Bio~ giKipkie G^ndrale refers to two ear lier sources. One is given siatply as Convereatuma-Lexioorif but the spelling with ing does not show up xn any of the works with something like this title in whole or part that I have been able to consult. The other reference is to ''Die Zeitgenoeaen, 1822, 2nd series." I have not been able to consult the second series, but an examination of the first series of this work shows it to be an unreliable source; it is possible that the ing spell ing derives from it. Among American reference works, the ing spelling is still to be found in Lippinaott'a Pronouncing Biographical Dictionary^ ed. Joseph Thomas, 5th ed., 1930, which lists the subject as 'Benningsen, written also Bennigsen," and refers as source to the Uouvelle Biographie Generale, But there is an earlier case more to the point: the Enoyolopaedia Americana^ Vol. 2, 1 8 4 9 , which was the leading American en cyclopedia when the NAC was being put together and its entry is spelled Benningsen. It is possible, then, that the NAC editorial office adopted the spelling Benningsen from its rival.

From MEW (p.749, n.236): 'the original draft of the arti cle was by Engels; it was material ly supplemented, and sent to New York in final form, by Marx. When Marx and Engels were working on the essay, it is obvious from the various excerpts they copied, and also from Engels' letter ;o Marx of 11 March 1858, that thay col lected the material for the arti cle from various sources: Engels used mainly Napier's work Hiatory of the War in the Peninaulai Marx used reference works and encyclo pedias. " This was one of the few that En gels tried to get out of doing, ask ing Marx on 18 February 1858, "Can't you undertake 'Billow' and 'Beresford'7 I don't have the framework for these biographies here, but can give you the main military points," Marx answered, "I can write the bi ographical matter, but you write the whole military part, in Eyvgliah, so that these articles dont sound dif ferent from the others. Besides, mere hints (from you] will not serve me here, since to carry them out I'd have to go into studies that are presently impossible for me." (22 February.) On the 24th Engels wrote more encouragingly, "I can quickly ferret outtthe necessary material on Beresford..." but the article still remained a bit of "unpleas antness" (letter of 4 March). Trans mitting the article on 11 March, he remarked: "Herewith what I have been able to put together on 'Beresiord' out of Napier. On his expedition to Buenos Aires at the beglni:lng of the century, I have been able to find nothing; but It Is glorious and would be worth the trouble of looking it up. He capitulated, rump and stump, with all the Eng lish troops."

"BERNADOTTE From MEV (p.735, n.l53): "When Marx wrote the essay Bernadotte,' Engels provided him. In his letters of 21 and 22 Septemb er 1857, with very thorough de tails on the military activity of Bernadotte, especially on his part In Napoleon's campaigns against Prussia in 1806 and against Aus tria in 1809. The evaluation which Engels gave of Bernadette's role In these campaigns was adopted by Marx almost word for word. Since Marx was concerned to illizminate all sides of Bernadotte and to evaluate him above all as a states man and diplomat, he collected comprehensive biographical mater ial, as is shown by the extant extracts from encyclopedias and historical literature." There was an extensive cross-discussion of Bernadotte in the corre spondence. Engels sketched out a treatment as follows in a letter written on 11 or 12 September 1857; "in 1813 Bernadotte was not a general but a diplomat. He pre vented the generals under him from taking the offensive, and when Biilow in spite of his orders had won two victories, at Grossbeeren and Dennewitz, Bernadotte stopped the pursuit. He continued to maintain connections with the French. When BlUcher had marched to the Elbe to unite forces with him in order to force him to act finally, still he held back until Sir Ch. Stewart (the English commissioner in his camp) declared that if he did not march now he would not pay out an other penny. This helped never theless the Swedes appeared at [the battle of] Leipzig under fire only honoris aauea and did not lose 200 men in battle during the whole campaign. Bernadotte was the French ambassador in Vienna in 1798; he flew the tricolor in celebra tion of a victory over the Austrians, the people stormed his hotel and burned the flag. He took his

departure, but Napoleon decided against him and moved the Di:.ectory to let the matter drop." Marx commented in a lettvsr of 17 September: "'Bernadotte' is tricky to deal with. The French generals wio wrote under Louis-Philippe are mojtly his unconditional partisans; thi pres ent-day writers under Boustrapa [Louis Bonaparte] equally his un conditional opponents. The main controversial points, on w U c h I am asking you for information, are these: (1) His participation in the bat tle of Austerlitz through t he man euvers which he executed before it. (2) His behavior in the 1 attle of Jena; and before the battle of Eylau. (3) His behavior in the battle of Wagram. "As to his ambassadorship^ in Vien na, the case is not exactly the way you put it. It has been prt ved (among others, Schlosser's Z ii * Beur^ theilung Napoleons') that the Bonapartist newspapers in Pari,, de nounced Bernadotte as a royalist because he did not hang ou: the French flag. They drove hiu to that step of his which Bonapart: : after wards disavowed. "On the whole Bonaparte lensed that Besnadotte was the 's zatesman' among his generals, cae who followed his 'own plans.' ie and particularly his brothers, through their petty and mean intrj -sues against Bernadotte, gave hi a a more important position than h< would otherwise have been able lo main tain. "Napoleon was, in general, vile to every individual whom he cred ited with having 'personal aims.'" Engels' answer to thesi; ques tions came under date 21 September: "Austerlitz, He [Bernadjtte] was sent by Napoleon to Iglau^ to obsexrve from there the Arch luke Fer dinand in Bohemia; in goo i time he received Napoleon's comma.id to

37
cone to Briinn, which he did; was placed with his corps between Soult and Lannes (in the center), and helped to throw back the out flanking move through the allied right wing. I do not recall any especially important action by Bernadotte in these circumstances; nor do I find anything in Jomlni. 'Vena. Here it is established that Bernadotte did indeed receive the command from Napoleon to with draw from Naumburg to Dornburg, while Davout, who was also in Naum burg, was supposed to march on Apolda. In the order sent to Davout it was stated that if Bernadotte had already united with him, both of them should march on Apolda. Davout wanted to do this, since he had himself reconnoitered the Prus sians' line of march and convinced himself that Bernadotte would not run into any of the enemy in the direction of Dornburg. He even of fered to put himself ynder B e m a dotte's ootmcmd. But the latter re mained unbending about the fact that in the order that came to him the reference to Apolda did not ap pear, and he marched off. The con sequence was that he marched around the whole day of the 14th without finding the enemy, while Davout had to give battle alone at Auerstedt; had Bernadotte been there, or had he only marched off toward the thundering of the can non on the 14th, then this victory which was at bottiom indecisive would have been as decisive as the battle of Jena. Only the encounter of the Prussian army at Auerstedt with the fugitives from Jena, and the strategic preparation for the battle by Napoleon, thereupon made the affair a decisive one in its consequences nevertheless. No one has gotten to the bottom of why Bernadotte did that. Jomini calls it une exaatitude trap sarupuleuae* Apparently he enjoyed, by the lit eral execution of the order, to cast discredit on Napoleon, since here indeed Napoleon worked on the basis of false premises. *'Eylau, When Bennigsen set out to strike at the troops of Ney, who had pushed too far and stood to the left rear of Bernadotte, Na poleon laid a trap for him; Ney moved south, Bernadotte back to the southwest, with an order to lure Bennigsen to the Vistula, while Napoleon marched from Po land north on Bennigsen*s lines of communication. A staff officer with written orders for Bernadotte was captured by the Cossacks, and Ben nigsen thereby discovered the threatening danger, which he bare ly got past. On his part Bernadotte was left without instructions by this same contingency, and there fore behind the line. I don't see there is anything in this to re proach him for. "Woffram, On the first day of battle, 'Eugene debouched near Wagram; but, fighting here in the midst of enemy reserves, and not being supported by Bernadotte, who had engaged battle neither soon enough nor boldly enough, he was at tacked from front and flank, and was pulled back sharply right up to my guard.' [This quotation is from Henri Jomini, Vie politique et militaire de Napolion^,,^ t.3, p. 266.1 On the second day of the bat tle I find nothing special on Bern adotte. "In any case. Monsieur Bernadotte was not a very great general; he in no way really distinguished him self; and as a politician the Gas con stuck out all over him fine idea that, to want co succeed Nap oleon as emperor! Engels continued in a letter the next day: "Some more on Bernadotte at Wagram: When on July 5, especially be cause of his half-hearted behavior, the French were held up in their attack, Bernadotte in the center had taken the village of Adlerklaa, which projected out a bit in front of the French line; and on the morn* ing of the 6th, when the Austrians moved forward to a concentric at tack, he stood on the open plain in front of it, inscead of having

JCS

a strongly occupied Adlerklaa be fore his own front. When the Austrlans came on, he found this po sition too hazardous (for days be fore, his troops had finally been suffering severe losses because of his half-hearted behavior) and moved onto a plateau behind Adler klaa, but left no occupation force In the village, which Bellegarde's Austrlans Immediately proceeded to occupy In strength. "As a result of this, the French center was threatened, and Massena, who commanded It, sent out a division which re-took It but were In turn expelled from it by D'Aspre's grenadiers. Then Nap oleon himself came and took over the leadership, formulated a new plan of battle, and thereby thwarted the Auatrians maneuv ers. Bernadotte*s boners here are entirely Indisputable, if Jomlni's presentation is at all correcu" Much of this went to shape the finished article. "BERTHIER Engels to Marx, 11 or 12 Septem ber 1857, in a letter of which only a fragment remains, beginning as follows: "...Berthler was simply a clerk, without any Ideas but frightfully zealous and precise; when Napoleon sent him to Bavaria In 1809 to re organize the troops, even before he arrived he had divided the army Into three parts through ordvee et Qontre-ordreei Davout with half at Regensburg, Massena with the other half at Augsburg, In-between them the Bavarians at Abensberg, so that if Archduke Karl had advanced quickly, he could have beaten the corps one at a time. Only Napole on's arrival and the Austrlans* slowness saved the French." BESSIERES In his letter of 17 September 1857 Marx asked Engels for a mili

tary evaluation of Bessi^res. Eng els replied: "On Bessi^res the on ly thing I can say is that he mosta ly commanded the guard, especially the cavalry a post in which brains were pretty much supexrluous. He was a good sort, that's all." (21 September 1857.)

"b l Uc h e r " From MEW (p.737-38, n.l68): "Most of the blograi-fllcal de tails for this essay vere collect ed by Marx. In addltlcn Marx took care of the final editing as well as of the literary shaping of the text, in which he usee passages from a letter written to him by Engels on 22 September 1857. These passages concern especially the characterization of BlUcher as a military commander, aid contain an evaluation of his periormance in battle in the most imfortant cam paigns. This characterization, which was supplemented by Marx with factual material and a thor ough description of BlUcher's act ivity as a general, formed the nu cleus of the article. Engels' col laboration was also ev idenced by his extracts from Milff ling's book, quoted in the text, Puaeages from my life,.., which described the campaign of 1813-14 ' a book which Marx also used as a stmrce." Marx opened the dincussion with Engels by writing on 17 September 1857; "Blticher' you "lave to write up regarding his main battles, his general military character, lastly his tactical merits w dch are so much emphasized by voi Griesheim," referring to Gustav von Griesheim, Vorleaungen liber die 2aktik, Ber lin, 1855. Engels answered, "One of these days I will also send you something on Bltlucher^ as soon as I have read through Mtlf fling." (18 September.) On 22 Sep;.ember, Engels included a long secti m on BlUcher in his letter: "BlUaher, During tl.e campaign in

39
the Palatinate, 1794 he distingu ished himself as an outpost gener al and as leader of the light cav alry, The best proof of this Is his published Journal, which still qual ifies as a classic work. In spite of the bad German. He kept the French In a continual state of al arm, provided headquarters with the best reports on the enemy's move ments, continually carried out sur prise attacks and raids, usually with success. In 1806 at Auerstedt his cavalry charge miscarried; his advice, to repeat It reinforced with all available strength, was rejected (this from memory). His retreat to Ldbeck and his vindi cation In the end was one of the few honorable episodes In this his tory, although his strategic man euvers during this time were oft en cavalierly made; and his final capture was not his own fault, since he, like the whole Prussian army, was cut off, and in addition he had the longest detour to make around the rearguard. During the period up to 1813, he was regarded by Von Scharnhorst and the Tugendbund (Gnelsenau was, as is known, one of the leaders and therefore remained suspect in the eyes of the king all his life) as the only possible leader of the kind who would be useful to them, and he was made out a hero, as was Hecker by Blind and his associates; and they had chosen their man very well. He was, as M(iffling says, the very model of a soldier; besides he had all the popular passions against Napoleon and the French to the highest degree; had plebeian hank erings, dialect, style of speaking, and manners; enormous talent for gaining the common man's enthusi asm for himself; and as a military man, foolhardy bravery, a very quick eye for terrain, boldness in decision, and enough Intelligence to work out the most correct deci sions himaelf in the simpler ca ses, and to rely on Gnelsenau and Milffling in the more difficult ones. Of strategy he did not und erstand an lota. '"It was no secret to Europe that Prince BlUcher vho had now, 1815, passed his 70th year, und erstood nothing whatever of the conduct of a war; so little, in deed, that when a pltn was laid before him for appro' al, even re lating to some unimpertant oper ation, he could not form any clear idea of it or judge whether it was good or bad.' [Qviotatlon from MUffling, p. 225.] "In fact, he could not under stand a map and shared this stra tegic Ignorance with nearly half of Napoleon's marshals. For this he had Gnelsenau, in whom he had the most unoondltional confidence. The campaign of 1813 and 1814 took an entirely different ending with out Blttcher; no other general of the time had achiever what he did: out of the most refractory ele ments (Langeron and York in open revolt against him) Le built a sol id army out of one victory and a vigorous pursuit (Katzbach), an ar my which was capable of anything and with which he could, on his own responsibility, risk making the march on Wartenburg and the Saale a march which was militarily very rash but politically very necessary because of Bernadotte whereby he gave up all his lines of communica tion, and even forced the decadent grand army (which he had saved in Silesia after the battle of Dresden by his pursuit of the French up to Bautzen, so that Napoleon had to turn back to meet him) to risk the battle of Leipzig. At that time, everything in general had a touch of rebellion about it; and BlUcher had made a pact with 3/4 of the Northern army (Bdlow. Tauentzien, WlntZingerode) that, if Bernadotte did not march, they \7ould unite with BlUcher on thei.r own respon sibility. After the battle of Leip zig, BlUcher was the only one to do something toward t pursuit, al though this was not ;hat it should have been he was hi idered because the princes were there. In 1814 the strategic boners which were so severely punished in the Montmlrail

4 U

region are to be written down to the account of Gnelsenau and Milffling; the decision to march on Par is at any cost, whereby the cam paign was decided, stands to the ad vantage of BlUcher; in 1815 BlUcher is to be given a high valuation for his march on Waterloo, after the battle of Llgny; this march stands almost alone, and no general other than BlUcher wouid have obtained such efforts from his soldiers; Immediately thereafter, the model pursuit to Paris, which stands as a classic example like the one from Jena to Stettin. That BlUcher could even impress better generals is shown by his relations with Langeron (who had commanded a large army against the Turks and was a welleducated German emigrant) and York, who not only quickly submitted to his leadership despite all their in itial recalcitrance but even entire ly took his side and became his best lieutenants. Basically BlUcher was a cavalry general; this was his spe cialty and here he excelled, since it is a purely tactical department and presupposes no strategic know ledge. He demanded much from his troops, but they did it, and will ingly; and I do not believe that any general of the 19th century other than Napoleon and recently Radetzky was in a position to exact so much from them as was BlUcher. It must also be recognized that never and nowhere did he ever lose his head or his courage, that he was a tena cious in defense as energetic in attack, and of swift decisiveness in tight sit\iations. Finally, in the 1813-15 war, which was half an insurrectionary war, he was com pletely in place and was well sup plemented by his staff; and in this sitaation he was a very dangerous adversary." "BOLIVAR** In this article Marx definitely slanted the account toward a highly critical view of Bolivar, both as a personality and as a dictator. From the political standpoint it is one

of the most interesting of the arti cles, since Marx's revulsion against the authoritarian character of the **Liberator** comes through so sharp ly. Indeed, Dana objected to it on this account. Marx told Engels in a letter of 14 February 1858: "With regard to a rather long article on 'Bolivar,' Dana furth ermore expresses misgivings be cause it is written ia a partisan style, and he asks for my author ities. Of course, I can give them to him, though it is a peculiar demand. As for the partisan style, I did somewhat drop the encyclope< die tone, to be sure. To see the most cowardly, mean a.td wretched scoundrel decried as I'lapoleon I. was somewhat too absurd. Bolivar is a true Soulouque." This is why the ar ;icle appeared in the M C with a list of three sources appended as famished by Marx. In each of the nhree, there is a mistake in citing tne author or title. The first, by Gen. H. Lafay ette Villaume Ducoudray-Holstein, is listed by Marx in che French ver sion, with the spelling "Ducoudrey" although (p.744 , n.203) states that Marx actually used the 1830 London edition in two volumes en titled Memoire of Sin.on Bolivar, as shown by the extracts he left. The second is given by Marx as Memoirs of Gen, John Miller,.^, but there is a mistake here toe. John Miller edited these memoirs oy his brother General William Miller; the correct title is Memoirs of Gmex^l Miller. There is an error alto in the title of the third as given by Marx; it should read A Narrative of the Ex pedition to the Rivers Orinoco and Apure^ in South Amerisa, by G. Hippisley. All three of these are ac counts by foreign legionnaires who had served with Bolivar and turned hostile to him. Dana published Marx's article, perhaps overcoming hiS misgivings; but it may be noted that when the contents of the VAC vere revised for the American Cyclopaedia, the article was substantially rewrit-

41
ten. The material unfavorable to Bolivar was much reduced; many stings were removed; and the new article ended with a passage which strongly repudiated any hostile view, even hailing Bolivar for his "love of freedom." The reference in Marx's letter contrasting Bolivar with Napleon reflects the low estimate which Marx had gathered of the "Liberasources, who denied him military ability and any qual ities of greatness. In this period Marx was in the full swing of op position to Bonapartism, but the immediate butt is not the first Na poleon but the nephew, Louis Bona parte. This explains the remark about Faustin Soulouque. Soulouque, whose showy coronation as Emperor of Haiti took place in 1852 just a few months before the "Emperor of the French" was proclaimed in Par is, was really a stand-in for Lou is Bonaparte, who was customarily called the "French Soulouque" by the anti-Bon^partist press, and by Marx also. The political hostility to Bolivar which had been awakened by the research for his NAC arti cle showed up twice in Marx's next long work, also an anti-Bonapartist polemic, Herr Vogt (I860) for which see MEW, Vol. 14, p.575, 685. When Marx's "Bolivar" was re printed in the American Communistsponsored collection of Marx-Engels articles Revolution in Spain (N.Y., International Publishers, 1939), it was accoaq)anied by no editorial com ment. As late as 1951, when William Z. Foster published his Outline Po litical History of the Amerioaa (same publisher), Marx's article was quoted favorably as a guide to Bolivar. But when the second Rus sian edition of the Marx-Engels Soohineniia (Vol. 14, 1959) was pub lished, it became clear that this was not the "correct" Soviet party line on Latin American history. The polemic against Marx's interpreta* tion was carried over, in transla tion, to MEW, The longest attack, couched in terms of "excusing" Marx for not knowing any better in his day, is here quoted from MEW (p. 742-43, n.l99): "The essay 'Boliver y Ponte' was written by Marx in a period when the history of the struggle of the Latin American countries for their Independence (1810 to 1826) had been very little researched. At that time, the books and memoirs of those European ad/enturers who had taken part In this struggle out of self-serving motives were rather widely disseminated. Since they had not got what they wanted In Latin America, maay of them portrayed the struggle for Inde pendence of these countries In a distorted way. This applies also to the memoirs of the Frenchman Ducoudray-Holsteln, who had been Bolivar's chief of staff for a while and then became his enemy; to the book of the Ep.gllshman Hlpplsley, who had deserted from Bo livar's army, as well as to the Memoir8 of General Miller, which Is an untrustworthy editing of the notes recorded by William Miller, one of the participants In the Pe ruvian struggle for Independence, by his brother John. In these books the struggle ol the Latin Americans and many of their lead ers were tendentlousl/ portrayed. These authors especlfislly Imputed to Bolivar many bad q^ialltles of character (treacherousness, arro gance, cowardice), while his real weaknesses (love of ostentation and power, which especially came to light in his last years when he based himself on the conservative nobility and the church) was exag gerated out of proportion. Boliv ar's struggle against the federalIst-separatlst elements and for the unification of the Lacin American republics was portrayed by these authors as the demands of a dicta tor. Also contained in these accounts are pronounced Inaccura cies, like (among others) the in correct assertion of DucoudrayHolsteln about Bolivar's refusal in 1810 to take part In the strug gle for Venezuela's independence.

4^
"In reality Simon Bolivar played an outstanding role In the strug gle for Latin American independ ence, as has been established by later objective investigations. He succeeded in binding together for a while in this struggle the patri otic elements of the Creole land owners (Latin Americans of Spanish descent), the bourgeoisie, and the mass of people, including the Indi ans and Negroes. Through all the contradictions, Bolivar led the struggle for the liberation of a series of Latin American countries from the Spanish yoke, for the er ection of a republican form of go vernment in these countries, and for the carrying out of some pro gressive bourgeois reforms. "Naturally Marx had at that time no other sources at his disposal than the books of the authors men tioned, whose bias was then only little known. It was therefore in evitable that Marx got a onesided view of Bolivar's personality which was reflected in his essay. This striving of Bolivar's for personal power which was exaggerated in the literature mentioned could not re main without Influence on Marx's attitude toward Bolivar. In Boliv ar's politics there emerged feat ures of Bonapartism, against which in that period Marx and Engels were carrying on an irreconcilable strug gle. Nevertheless Marx did not over look such progressive sides of Bolivar's work as the liberation of the Negro slaves. Seen as a whole, he ascribed great signifi cance to the anti-colonial movement of the Latin American people and evaluated it as a revolutionary liberation movement." A condensed version appears in MBW, Vol. 29, p.692, n.259. In the Foreword to Vol. 14 signed by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism at Moscow, there is this further elab oration: "...Marx's antipathy toward this political leader was influenced to a certain extent by the basicaliy anti-Bonapartist attitude of Marx and Engels' political journalism during these years, their efforts to destroy the reactlonai^ cult around Napoleon I. and his imita tors, among whom Marx also included Bolivar oik the basis ol his sources (of whose dubiousness he could not be convinced at that time)." Further annotations in MEW sup ply the sources of some of the quo tations u s M in the article, and do not neglect to reiterate their "un trustworthiness." The quotation from Monteverde, near i:he beginning of the article, is from the Memoira of General Miller^ Vol. 2, London, 1829, p. according to MEW (p.744, n.202) which adds: "In this book Bolivar's motives for the im prisonment of Miranda are onesidedly presented. Bolivar was, to judge from his reply to Montsverde, real ly convinced that Miranda had com mitted treason." Further on, the quotation from Hurtado Mendoza is taken from Ducoudray-Holstein's Me~ moire of Simon Bolivar^ Vol. 1, Lon don, 1830, p. 170-71. C A f f i l / , p.744, n.203.) The quotation from an "eye witness" which appears about midway through the article is taken from the same work, Vol. 2. (Ibid., n.206.) However, the indictment of Marx's interpretation of Bolivar which is offered by his Communiiit editors is only partly acceptable in terms of m o d e m research; the side which can not be confirmed is the political side. It is true there are many fac tual errors in the article, and it cannot be followed in its complete refusal to grant Bolivar any posi tive qualities of personal charac ter and ability. But m o d e m schol arship only strengthens the case for Marx's attack on Bolivar's au thoritarianism and Bonapartist pro pensities, as can be seen from Ger hard Masur's Simon. Bolivar (Univ. of New Mexico Press, 1948) and also (if we consider his massive docu mentation in spite of his pro-Span ish viewpoint) Salvador de Madari aga's Bolvoar (New York London, 1952). Furthermore, the Communist edi

43
tors' key statement that 'Natural ly Marx had at that time no other sources at his disposal than the books of the authors mentioned, whose bias was then only little Inown," is easily disproved. We know that, in working on the M C articles, Marx went through all the encyclopedias French, German and English-language. In the major en cyclopedias of the U.S., England, France and Germany that lay before him, the articles on Bolivar varied only from very favorable to eulog istic. At most, an article may men tion "suspicions" of dictatorial tendencies, in passing. All those we have checked end with panegyrics. In two cases that discuss their sources, the Enayalopaa^dia Amerio<xna (1849) warns the reader against Ducoudray-Holstein, and the Brit ish Venny Enayolopaedia (1836) warns against both Ducoudray-Holstein and Hippisley. None of them reflects the hostility of the ex-legionnaires. The picture presented by the encyc lopedias is clear and onesided but in the direction opposite to that claimed in MEW, It was Marx's arti cle in the NAC that was out of step when it appeared. Even aside from Bolivar's general authoritarianism, other questions raised by the Commu nist editors (such as Bolivar's be trayal of Miranda) have by no means been settled by m o d e m scholarship, being at least as controversial how as they were then. One of Marx's mistakes is not caught by the Communist editors at all; the name of the subject is gi ven wrongly as "Bolivar y Ponte." Obviously Marx did not understand the structure of the Spanish sur name, or took this mistake over from Ducoudray-Holstein. Bolivar y Ponte was the name of the subject's father, but his own (to give it all the accents) was Sim^n Bolivar y Palacios. AfB f / , Vol. 29, repeats Marx's mistake in its name index. It is interesting to report that when an anti-Madariaga jehad broke out in South America after the pub lication of the Spanish historian's image-breaking study of Bolivar, one of the leading ciltists in the Caracas school of Bolivarian hagi- i ography, Angel Francisco Brice, pub* lished a pamphlet eni:itled El BoU de Marx Ampliado por Madari~ aga (Caracas, 19SJ). As the title indicates, Brice tries to make an amalgam of Marx's and Madariaga's point of view, which are poles apart. A few years later Brice pub lished another pamphlet, Bolvoar \ ViBto por Carlos Marx (Caracas, 1961), which has no trouble finding I biographical errors in Marx's aci count, none of them bearing on the basic political interpretation. It would appear from this last publi cation by Brice that a pamphlet containing Marx's article in Span ish, entitled SimSn Bolv-oar^ had been published somewhere (the good scholar does not reveal where or by whan) with a foreword which says that Marx wrote it for the Enoyolopaedia Britanniaal As a result of Brice's 1952 booklet, M. A. Osorio Jimenez included a sev-tion on Marx's article in his Bibliograf%a Cr%tiaa de la DetraaoiSn Bolivariana. quot ing Brice. "BORODINO" In his letter acco;npanying the manuscript of this article, Engels wrote to Marx, 28 Jam?ary 1858; "Borodino* could not be made short er, unfortunately, since up to now the battle has been represented al together wrongly." However, the Soviet line in his tory objects to Engels' representa tion. In part this is a continua tion of the difference in view over the role of the Russien general Kutusoff which was discussed (above) under "Barclay de Tolly." m EW (p. 746-47, n.221) criticizes Engels as follows: "In the article 'Borodino' Engels gives a clear presentation of the grandeur of this mighty battle, of the stubbornness and steadfast re solution shown by both of the con tending armies in the battle, and sketches a considerably more object-

44 pared the turn in the .ourse of the Ive picture of the course of the war in favor of Russia and the de battle than authors of many Western feat of the Napoleonic army by the European works on mllit&ry history. Russian army, in spite of the Nevertheless we must establish forced surrender of Moscow which some inaccuracies In the elucida was expedient under the given cir tion of various sides of this event. cumstances. An essential Influence on Engels "Later research also produces standpoint was* In this connection, materially more data oa the numer the book of the German historian ical relation of forces and the Bernhardl on General Toll which he amount of casualties sviffered by lists at the end of the essay and both armies. According to these which contains a whole series of data, the French disposed of over tendentious assertions, stemming 135.000 men and 587 cannon during from Toll himself as well as his the battle, and the RuasIans over biographers. The Inaccuracies in 120.000 men and 640 caanon; the Engels' essay concern mainly the losses of the French aiiounted to judgment of the results of the bat 58.000 dead and wounded, while the tle, which Engels was inclined to Russians lost about 40,000 men." see as a victory for the Napolecn* ic army, and also the role of the comaander'-in-chief of the Russian "BOSQUET" army, M. I. Kutusoff, in this bat From MEW (p.731, n.l29): tle. The position selected by Katusoff and the arrangement of the "The first part of this contrib Russian troops was not at all in ution, as shown by the extant pre correct, as the article says it paratory material steo s from Marx; was. The mostly vulnerable left the last part, however, which deals flank of the Russians had a reliabife with the part taken bj Bosquet in support by a considerable force of the Crimean war (1853-56), was reserves, which had been placed written by Engels (see his letter there by Kntusoff and were clever to Marx of 22 September 1857)." ly used by him in the course of Engels' letter of 22 September the battle. This Indeed explains 1857 was written in response to Napoleon's forced renunciation o Marx's request of 17 Sjpteraber for turning the Russian left flank and something on Bosquets military the shifting of the direction of conduct in the Crimea: his main blow more to the center of the Russian position. Kutusoff "Bosquet, At the Aljra he execu did not remain passive in the bat ted the flanking attark by the tle, but constantly influenced its French right wing aga. nst the Rus progress, by parrying and frustra sian left wing with ar energy and ting Napoleon's designs, as is es rapidity to which the Russians pecially clearly shown by the Rus have given recognltloj , and brought sian cavalry's thrust in the rear even artillery up to he plateau of the French left flank, a suc through pathless raviites consid cessful movement carried through ered impracticable. H < ^ would have on his orders. The over-all result merited great praise l.ere were it of the battle was thoroughly un not that he faced an tpponent much favorable for Napoleon. He did not weaker numerically. At Balaklava understand he had to destroy the he was quickly at hanu to disengage main forces of the Russian a m y , the English right win; , so that the and thereby he suffered enormous rest of the English 1 ; ght cavalry damage. The battle disclosed not could withdraw under he protection only the capacity of the Russian of his troops, and the; Russians lost troops for steadfast defense but their desire to push :orward. At also their ability to deal anni InkermauQ he was already prepared hilating blows. Its outcome pre

45
early In the morning to Intervene with three batalllons and 2 bat teries, but, having been refused, he proceeded to place three brig ades as a reserve behind the Eng lish right wing (on the Tchornala slope) and moved Into battle with two brigades about eleven o'clock, upon %Alch the Russians beat a re treat. The English had engaged all their troops, the Russians still had 16 batalllons at their dispo sal, and without Bosquet the Eng lish would have been lost. The 16 Intact Russian batalllons covered the retreat. In this case pursuit was not very possible; the plat eau ends 3000 paces from the bat tlefield. On every occasion Bos quet had therefore shown himself to be prompt, vigilant, active. In short a model commander, as he had also done during the whole time he led the covering troops on the Tchornala slope. One cannot say much on whether or not he would have answered as commanding gener al In chief; he had many qualities, and anyone who Is an excellent vanguard general, as he was, has to prove himself almost only as a atrategioian, for which there was no great opportunity In the whole Sebastopol campaign." As in the case of the spelling of Bennigsen's name, there is no edit orial notice taken in MEW of the fact that the SAC article gives Bos quet's first names as Marie Joseph, isntead of Pierre Joseph Fran9 ois. The MEW translation of the text fol lows the M C in giving the name as Narie Joseph, but the personal-name index gives the correct data. Since I have been unable to find any au thority for "Marie Joseph" in any reference work, before or after the SACf the source of the mistake must remain speculative. "BRIDGE. MILITARY" From MEW (p.734, n.150): "From Engels' letter to Marx of 18 September 1857 it can be seen that Marx was involved in the as semblage of material for this ar ticle and sent Engels a number of extracts from encyclopedias on military bridges." An extract from Engels' letter to Marx of 11 or 12 September 1857 provides a typical example of the cooperation between the two men: "Can you find out what BookbrUoken (pontB h ahevalets) are called In English? Also a description of the Austrian Blrago-type pontoons would be desirable, and a short excerpt only a hint on the na ture of pontoons In the various armies (see Sir Howard Douglas, Militapy Bridgea^i whether the Russians and the Prussians still have canvas pontoons. I have no ma terial here [In RydeJ, and what I have In Manchester is very old. I have a bit on English pontoons..." If Marx did inform him that Book-brttoken are trestle bridges, the term did not get into the article, though the use of trestles is men tioned. "BUGEAUD'* MEW (p.741, n.l89) notes that Marx's essential sources included: Dr. Wagner's !The Tricolor on the Atlaai or, Algeria and the French Conquest (London, Edin. N.Y., 1854); D. Stem's Hiatoire de la Re volution de 1848t Vol. 1 (Paris, 1850). The note continues with a remark which ties up with the pass age already quoted above under "Algeria": "It is possible that Marx also used the details on Bugeaud's act ivity in Algeria which Engels ci ted In the first version of the es say 'Algeria' and which was elim inated by the encyclopedia's ed itors on publication. It also ap pears from Engels' letters to Marx of 17 and 22 September 1857 that Engels had a part in collecting the material for this essay."

In response to Marx's request of 17 September 1857 for a military sum mation of Bugeaudf Engels replied (22 September):

"Bugeaudt Most of it is already indicated in the article Algeria.' He was a middling general, whose victories in Algeria and Morocco did not have much significance. That he conquered Algeria with 100,000 men, adapted military strategy there to the nature of the country and the enemy, and broke or rather suppressed the capacity for resistance of the Ar abs (not the Kabyles) these do "CARABINE" not entitle him to my high esti mation, for I do not believe that The last sentence in the NAC art he made the plans. He was a bit icle, not included in the article as of a swashbuckler and proved on given in this book, was added to Eng the Tafna that he was not only ve els' article in New Yoirk, as follows: nal but that he was also indeci "Several improvements in breech-load sive when in a difficult position. ing carabines have rec&ntly been made With 100,000 men and with lieuten in the United States, and submitted ants like Lamoiciere, Changamier, for trial to an ordnance board at Cavaignac, Negrier, Duvlvier, de West Point." iMEW p.7*>6, n.216.) veloped in the course of a tenyear war, he could do something of "FORTIFICATION" a Job without having great ability, especially since the French gener To Engels' article r.he editors ap al staff is ve7*y goodi besides, his pended a long table li&ting U.S. own activity was limited mainly forts, preceded by the sentence: "The just to the disposition (where it following statement exh.ibits the is not known what the staff did for . fortifications of the Imited States him) and command of the reserve, now existing or in course of con since only individual divisions and struction (Oct. 1859), and the amount brigades acted in any one spot." expended for their construction, mod ification and rppair:" (Qnitted from The allusion to the Tafna is to the this book.) iMEW, p.75.' -54, n.258.) Treaty on the Tafna between Bugeaud and Abd el Kader, the Algerian reb el leader, signed 30 May 1857 in the neighborhood of the Tafna Riv er, The article on Bugeaud included a passage on the secret bribe which he accepted. "BURMAH" Engels found the writing of this article dull and burdensome. On 11 February 1858 he complained: "I have not got far enough with the pieces I have started Burmah,' etc. to think of being able to finish them this evening on time. The 'Burmah' is a very disagreeable Job long "NAVY" The last section of this article, beginning after a dash with the words "The origin of the navy of the United States..."--to be found in the second column of the nextto-last page of the article as it appears in this book is omitted from MEW, A note (p.7F6, n.272) ex plains: "At the end of this article, the editors of the M C appended a sec tion reporting the development of the U.S. Navy since toe year 1775.

books to read through, and yet no thing really serious t( make of it, as it must be pretty s l ort." And again on 18 Febrxiary: "'Burmah' is a very laborious article^" On 24 Feb ruary he reported: "halif done the information on the last war is wear isome to ferret out." On 4 March: "I had finished 'Burmal'i' when I had to make various necesst^ry additions from another source. s:-^nce it is not yet finished, the garbage will have to wait till Tuesday." But on 15 March, Marx finally received it in the mail.

47
This section contains data on the state of the American Navy up to the publication of Vol. 12 of the encyclopedia (1861)^ In which the article by Engels written some aonths previously was Included. The last statement is not altogeth er clear and seems to indicate that this section includes some of Engels* work; therefore I have let it stand as part of the text, though it can not be ascribed to Engels in its present form. "BROWN. SIR GEORGE" It is surprising that MEW makes no statement anywhere on the dispo sition of this article. Yet the Marx-Engels correspondence is quite clear in its references to it. On 17 September 1857, Marx lists it a s one of Engels' jobs. On 21 Septembe he reminds Engels about it: "Final ly, on Sir G Browns about whom I know nothing. Not necessary to have much on the man." On the 23rd he writes again, "Is there anything at all to say about that ass Sir G, BrotmV' Finally, in his retrospect ive letter of 1 February 1858 (quo ted in Section 4 above), Marx lists the B articles originally requested by Dana, including "Brown (Sir George)," and adds: "The ass [Dana] has received all of these." It is possible, therefore, that the short article on Brown which ap pears in the M C should be added to the 67 articles presently in the canon. "BflLOW" On 1 February 1858 Marx wrote to Engels that Dana had presented a neNl list of B subjects, including "BOlowJ Later that month (lth and 22nd) the] two discussed who was to do what par of the essay. On the 24th Engels wrote that "with regard to 'BUlow' I am in a dilemma, since I absolutely do not know where to find any good book on the War of Liberation. His resol-1 ute spirit at Grossteeren must be acknowledged (he struck at the French against Bernadottes will), and the Dennewltz victory is very noteworthy; 40,000 Prussians beat 70,000 Frenchmen. I will look asound some more meanwhile." In subsequent letters Engels re ferred to the task of working up the subject as a bit of "unpleas antness" and as "giving me indig estion." Finally Marx wrote on 19 March 1858: "Drop 'BUlow,* on which I have enough for an ordinary biog^

N o te! on the A ppendices


On Appendix I TH E FIVE D U B IO S A
There are at least five articles which were definitely sent to the New York SAC office by Marx but which were not published, or pub lished in so revised or summary a form as to be unrecognizable. The HAC texts of these articles are gi ven in Appendix I. **ABENSBERG This was included by Engels in his 28 May 1857 list of contempla ted subjects; in his letter to Marx of 11 July 1857, it was among those promised "positively for Friday." MEW (p.717, n.50) states; "To one of the stages in the bat tle of Regensburg--the battle of Abensberg Engels devoted his art icle 'Abensberg, which he wrote at about the same time as his es say Aspern and which was pub lished In 1858 In Volume 1 of the HAC The brevity of this article leaves one to surmise that the or iginal text was considerably shortened by the editors of the Cyclopaedia." [Vol. 14, p.717, n.50.] The note then includes a transla tion of the article.

x ^hy (short one) in case search ing for aaterial holds you up any longer..." The editors of MEW explain (Vol. 29, p.691, n.254): "The article 'bQIov* has not been included [aoong the 67 of the can on] ... because its original text is not available. From the prepara tory material for this work which has been preserved, it can be con cluded that the article was changed by the editors of the NAC to the point of being unrecogniz able." In another note (Vol. 14, p.707, n.l) saying nuch the same thing, they put itif "...one can conclude that the article was severely short ened by the editors of the encyclo pedia and changed to the point of being unrecognizable." However, Marx's remark in his letter of 19 March 1858 may be considered to cast some doubt on this reasoning.

its explosiveness, as t/ell as the dates of the Introduction of per cussion guns In the various armies. Both of these things would be de sirable. If you could go to the British Museum some time at your convenience and hunt up something on them for me, these articles would soon be done; otlierwise things will bog down m y libra ries here have nothing on them." On 30 January 1858 Engels quer ied, "How goes it with 'Camp,' 'Catapults' and 'Caps' (Percus sion)?" On 1 Februar>' Marx report ed that he hild finished his part of "Catapult" and most of "Camp," add ing: "The piece on Cap Is detailed, because of the very va ried kinds of gun locks to enumer ate. I would have finished with the crap already If the new order had not come from Dana in the mean time. I'm sending you the garbage all together."

But the last sentence would not seem to apply to the unfinished article on Percussion Caps. Tiiere is no fur Besides the mention of this arti ther mention in the correspondence. cle already quoted in Section 3, MEW MEV (Vol. 29, p.690, n.242) simply (p.746, n,219) introduces a transla states, "This article was not pub tion of the short M C article as fol lished in the A4C." lows: "At the same time as the arti It is true that there is no art cle 'Case Shot,' Engels wrote a icle in the M C imder "Cap [or Caps], short definition for the hext subject Percussion," but under "Percussien word 'Cartouch.' Following is the Cap" (Vol. 13) there is a cross-ref text of the published explanation in erence: "See F u l m i n a t a e The arti Vol. 4 of the M C f evidently short cle on "Fulminates" (Vol. 8) cer ened." The source of this informa tainly does not encourage the idea tion is not civen. that it is the article which is dis cussed in Marx and Engels' letters. "FULMINATES" or "CAPS (PERCUSSION)" It is not mainly on percussion caps in any case, and the references in The references in the Marx-Engthe article are American in emphas els correspondence are all to "Per is. There is only the possibility cussion Caps"; the term "Fulminates" that an article submit ted by Marx is not mentioned there. On 7 Janu went into the making of the NAC ver ary 1858 Engels, writing about the sion. list of C articles he was working We may also note that the V,IKPSS on, says that it will be difficult article has a sentenc3 which reads: to find material on two, "Camp" and "Marx prepared the material for art "Caps (percussion)." icles by Engels such as 'Camp,' 'Catapult,' 'Fulminates' [the Russ "For Percussion Caps, the main ian word used is fulminaty]t 'Mili thing Is the history of the dis tary Bridge,' for the article 'Arcovery of potassium chlorate and "CARTOUCH"

49
/ * aad "oth'S.M This soaiuU' as if 'th w i t e r s are identifying the M C" article on "Fulninates*' with the article on "Percission Caps" which the MarX'Engels correspondence dis* cusses. cles were written by Marx or Engels and, in fact, it aust be assumed that they were not. For information only. Appendix II presents the brieAJtexts of these nine articles, as follows: Aaret St Jean d' Aotitaa Aland lalande Aldenhoven Aleaaandria Almeida Amuaette Angleaey Arbela

On Appendix It ENGELS L IS T OF 2 8 MAY 1857


In his letter of 28 May 1857, En gels set down a list of 23 article headings to be proposed to Dana. As mentioned in Section 4 above, where the list is reproduced, only seven of these headings were turned into articles published in the M C and figuring among the 67 of the canon, as follows: Adjutant Afgkanietan Albuera Algeria Attack Arquebuae Aspem

On A p p e n d i x III

THE THREE

REJECTS

Of the rest, three are represented by no separate heading in the HACi AdtKcnaad guard Approaohea Axle (artille^) Four more are accounted for as follows: "Abensberg" is discussed under Appendix I; "Augereau" under Appendix III. The article "Aboukir * is specifically mentioned by MEW and VIKPSS as having been proved not to be by Marx or Engels. As for tke heading which Engels lists as "Antwerp (fortress and sieges)," it must be reported that the NAC ar ticle on Antwerp contains only two sentences on the fortifications and nothing on the sieges. This leaves nine articles which are mentioned on Engels' list and actually exist as M C entries. None of these is mentioned again in the Marx-Engels correspondence (nor by MEW or V,I,KPSS) with the exception of "Arbela," which had previously been brought up by Engels in his let ter of 22 April 1857 as one example of an article on military history that might be written. Clearly,tthen, there is no evi dence that any of these nine arti

The three articles in Appendix III are those which were included in the first Russian edition of the Marx-Engels Soohineniiat and then eliminated from the second edition: "Augereau," "Austerlitz," and "Badajoz." MEW gives no explanation for the change. VIKPSS explains the case of Austerliti" as follows: "the non-participation of Marx and Eng els has been established by an ex amination of the records of the Cy clopaedia [presumably meaning the publisher Appleton]. It has been es> tablished that the author of the ar>j t i d e 'Austerlitz* was G. Herbert, who wrote a number of articles on military subjects for the M C . " Perhaps the other two caises were established in the same way. However, the publication of these] three articles in the first Russian edition gave them some currency. As we have already mentioned at the end] of Section 1, "Badajoz" was one of the three articles reprinted in the Marx-Engels collection Revolution in\ Spain, For this reason, they are given in Appendix III. It is not clear why these three articles were included in the canon in the first place. The Marx-Engels correspondence gives no more likely ground for including them than sevevl ral others. "Augereau" merely fig ures in Engels' list of 28 May 1857 alo^g with 22 others. Ip the same letter, "Austerlitz" is mentioned

50 separately only as an exaaple of a possible military topic, along with "Arbela"; and in Engels' letter of 2 1 September 1857, the section head ed "Austerlitz is clearly con cerned with the article on B emadotte. As for "Badajoz," it fig ures in the correspondence only in connection with Engels' boner in the article "Albuera," The nine articles which : emained essentially the same were: Army Captain Bern Shot BlUoher Cavalry Bourvierme Co e h o m Bridge, Military Twenty-four of the headi igs were eliminated completely. These were all specific military terms,, with the one exception of the biographi cal "Airey." Abatia Airey Arquebuee Attack Barbette Baetion Battery Battle Berme Blindage Bomb Bomb Ketch Bomb-procf Bomb Veet^l Bombardit ? Bcmbardmint Bonnet Bridge-head Camp Campaign Carabine Carcass Carronadt Cartridge

On A p p e n d i x IV

THE A M E R IC A N C Y C L O P A E D I A ( S ec on d E d i t i o n )
Although the M w Ameriaan Cyclo paedia went through several print ings, with different dates on the title-pages, the publishers, D. Ap pleton Co., reserved the term "second edition" for the complete revision of the encyclopedia which started appearing in 1873 under a different and shorter title, the American Cyclopaedia (retaining the same subtitle), still edited by George Ripley and Charles A, Dana. The preface states: "Only such por tions of the original matter have been retained as were found to be in accordance with the existing state of knowledge," and stresses that every page was newly type-set. What was done with the Marx-Engels articles in this "second edi tion? Only nine of the articles re tained essentially the same, in cluding two of the longest, albeit in some of these cases light revi sion and updating or addition of new material took place. In general, three kinds of things happened to the rest of the materi al where it was still used: (1) It was much condensed. (2) The amount of space devoted to military mat ters and military history, especial ly in the case of place names, was drastically reduced. (3) The tone of the revised articles, even where based on Marx-Engels passages, is much blander; expressions of opini on and judgment are often stricken.

In eight cases the articles are virtually all new. In one case, "Infantry," the conception of the article is entirely different; where Engels' was largely an his4;orical account, the new article is mainly a description of infantry jrganization in the chief co^trie<> at the time. These eight are: Artillery Bosque!; Ayacucho BurmaK Barclay de Tolly Fortification Bidassoa Infant:^ In five cases the articles have been quite thoroughly revised: Afghanistan AIgeria Armada Bemadotte Brescia

In seven others, the revisions have been even more sweeping, though parts of the Marx-Engels articles are still visible: Adjutant Ammunition Bayonet Berthier Bessihr<2 s Buda Navy

In the following seven^ the MarxEngels articles have been sharply

51
condensed as well as rewritten: Bermigsen Bereaford Bler^im Blum Bolivar Brwne Bugeccud of contributors included in this volume does not show who wrote it. Marx's name is also mentioned prom inently in the article on the "In> temational Association" meaning the International Working Men's As sociation, i.e the First Interna tional in Volume 9, written by N. L. Thieblin. There is passing mention of Marx in the long article on "Socialism" in Volvme 15. The ve ry long article on the "Commune de Paris," by Edward L. Burlingame, does not mention Marx. There is no mention of Engels in any of these articles. The second article in Appendix IV is from the next in the series of Appleton encyclopedias, A'pple^ tone Annual Cyclopaedia, a year book. Appearing in the volume for 1883 (New Series, Vol. 8; N.Y., D. Appleton Co., 1884), it is in the obituary section, marking Marx's death. The volume gives no indication of the author of the article, which contains a number of factual inaccuracies. Speculation on the possible au thors of these two articles will in evitably include Dana himself.
EAL DEAFER

And in the following five, the condensation has gone to the point of leaving merely a svimmary of a few lines or a paragraph: Atbuera Ahna Aspem Bamxraund Borodino

The prefatory matter in Volume 1, harking back to the "First Edition, 1858-1863" which was called the M C , gives a "List of Contributors" to that edition in which Marx's name is given as "Karl Marx, Ph.D., London, Eng." But the relatively short list of the "Corps of Contributors" to the new edition does not include Marx. However, in this edition Marx has become a subject, an entry in the encyclopedia itself, as a result of the worldwide notoriety which he gained following the Paris Commune. The article on him, reproduced in Appendix IV, appeared in Volume 11, dated 187S, p. 216. The partial list

Marx & Engels Articles in the N .A .C .

Abotis

the army, and under a chief of the staff, who takes to himself the higher funotion.H of AB ATIS, or ABirris, in military strategy, * adjutant, and leaves him merely the traninaission of ord and the r^ulation of the i eter ' ' wark made of felled trees, in frequent use nal routine duty of the corps. The arrrnwde mountain warfare. On emergeaoy, the ments in such cases, however, are so dif are laid lengthwise, with the branches ^todnted outwards to repel the invader^ while ferent in different armies, that it is impos S tr u n k s serve as a breastwork for thoaefendsible to g^ve even a general view of them. In aiitK' "When the abatis is deliberately ^ p lo y ed l no two armies, for instance, are the functioi s of an a^utant to a general commanding a i;.)rps as the means of defending a mountain for daim ie exactly alike. Beside these re^ adju iastance, the boughs of the tree are Stripped of their leaves and pointed, the trunks are embed- i tants, the requirements of monarchical inptituded in the ground, and the branches interwoven, : tions have created in almost all European si ates hosts of titular adjutants-general to the mon to as to fprm a sort of ehetavx de frw6.^ arch, whose functions are imaginary, eraept when called upon to do duty with their /naster; and ven then, these functions are o t a purely formal kind.

Adiutont
~ ADJTJl'ANT, an ais'istant ofiScef or aide-decamp attached to commanders of larger or smaller bodies of troops. Generally evei^ commander of a battalion c f infantry,. o ot a regiment of cavalry has an adjatrat; l io chiefe <rf brigades, divisions, c ^ s darmfee, and the coramander-in-chie^ have one or more as the importance of the command may require. The adjutant has to make knosm the commaHds of hia chief, and to see to their execution, as well as to receive^ or cmleot the reports intended for hia chief. He has, thwefope, in his charge, to a ^ ea t eattwt, th ? in te r M .i e c o n o m y of his body of troopfc He regulates the rotation of duty among ite com ponent ptfts, and gives out the d^yorders; at the same time, he is a sort of clerk to his chief carries on the correspondeace with tachments and with the superior authorities, arrange* the daUy reports and returns mto tabular form, and keeps the journal and statis tical books of his body of troops. Lar^r bodies of troops now generally have f s t a f f attachedtaken from the general ptaff of

AfglMNiiatcm
AFGHANISTAlf, an extensive countr- of Asia, north-wBt of India. It lies between l (a-8ia and the Indies, and in the other directio ; be^ tween the Hindoo Koosh and the Indian 0-an. It formerly included the Persian provine;3 of Khoraesan and Eohistan, together with I erat, Beloo6histaO, Oadimere, and Sinde, _ a >d a considerable part of the Punjanb. In its ent limits there are probably not more pah ' 4,000,000 inhabitants. The surface of Af;;han( istan is very irregular,^lofty table landi., VMt mountains, deep valleys, and ravines, L ' all mountainous tropical countries it pryaenw every variety of climate. In the Hindoo E KW, the snow lies all the year on the lofty sun.mit*, 1 while in the valleys the thermometer ranf jstip ' to 130. The heat is greater in the eMteru i in the western parts, but the climate is ;iffiy cooler than that of India;, and althft^h tne al;

52

53
tern&tiobs o f temperature between summer and the peculiar character of the people, invest the winter, e r d(iy and night, are v e r y great, tlie country with a political importanco that cun country is generally healthy. The principal Bcarcely beover-estiniated in Uie affairs of centi'al diseases are fevers, catarrhs, and ophthalmia. Asia. The government is a monarcliy, but tlio Occasionally the small-pox is destructive. The kings autliority over his high-spirited and tur soil is of exuberant fertility. Date palms bulent subjecta, is personal and very uncertain. ilonrish in liie oases of the sandy wastes; the The kingdom is divided into provinces, c.ncli su sugar cane and cotton in the warm valleys; and perintended by a representative of the sovereign, European ftuits and vegetables grow luxuriantly who collects the revenue and remits it to the on the hill-side terraces up to a level of 6,000_or capital. The Afghans are a brave, hai-dy, and 7,000 feet. The mountains are clothed with indei>endent race; they follow pastoral or agi inoble fwests, which are frequented by bears, cultural occupations only, cschewing trade and wolves, and foxes, while the lion, the leopard, commerce, which tlicy conteinptnously resign and the tiger, are found in districts congenial to to Hindoos, and to other inhabitants of towns. their haMts. The animals useful to mankind "With them, war is an excitement and relief are not wanting. There is a fine variety of from the monotonous occupation of indus sheep of the Persian or large-tailed breed. The trial pursuits. The Afghans are divided into horses are of good size and blood. The camel clans, over whicli the various chiefs exercise and ass are Used as beasts of burthen, and goats, a sort of feudal supremacy, Tlieir indomitable dogs, and cats, are to be found in greftt ntlmbei's. liatred of rule, and their lovo of individual in Beside the Hindoo Koosh, which is a continua dependence, alone prevents their becoming a tion of the Himalayas, there is a awuntain powerful nation ; but this very irregularity and chain, called the Solyman mountain, on the uncertainty of action m.akes them dangerous iwnth-west; and between Afghanistan and neighbors, liable to bo blown about by the Balkh, there is a chain known as the Paropawind of caprice, or to bo stirred up by po misan range, very littJe information concerning litical intriguers, who artfully excite tlieir pas which has, however, reached Europe. The rivers sions. The two principal tribes are the Dooranees and Ghiljies, who are always at feud are few in number; the Helraund and the 0 ^ with each other. 'I'he Dooranee is tlio more bool arw the most important. These take their powerful; and in virtue of their supremacy tlieir rise in the Hindoo Koosh, the Cabool flowing ameer or khan made himself king of Afghanis east and falling into the Indus near Attock; the Helmund flowing west through the district of tan. He has a revenue of about $10,000,000. His authority is supreme only in his Seiestan and falling into the lake of Zurrah. The tribe. The military contingents are chiefly fur Helmund has the peculiarity of overflowing its nished by the Dooranees; the rest of the army is banks annually like the Nile, bringing fertility supplied either by the otlier clans, or by military to the soil, which, beyond the limit of the inun adventurers who enlist into tlie service in hopes dation, is sandy desert. The principal dties of o f pay or plunder. Justice in the towns is ad Afghanistan are Cabool, the capital, Ghuznee, ministered by cadLs, but the Afghans rarely Peshawer, and Candahar. Cabool is a fine town, resort to law. Their khans have the right of lat. 34 10' N. long. 60 43' E., on the river of punishment even to the extent of life or death. the same name. 'The buildings are of wood, Avenging of blood is a family duty; nevertheless, neat and commodious, and the town being sur they are said to be a liberal and generous people rounded with fine gardens, has a very pleasing aspect. It is environed with villages, and is in when unprovoked, and the rights of hospitality the midst of a large plain encircled with low , are so sacred that a deadly enemy who eats bread and salt, obtained even by stratagem, is sacred hills. The tomb of the emperor Baber is its from revenge, and may oven claim the protection ^ ie f monument. Peshawer is a large city, with of his host against all other danger. In religion a population estimated at 100,000. Glmznee, a they are Mohammedans, and of the Soonee .<<ect; city of ancient renown, once the capital of the but they are not bigoted, and alliances between great sultau Mahmoud, luvs fallen from its great Sheeahs and Soonees are by no means uncom estate and is now a poor place. Near it is mon. A%hanistan has been subjected alternately Hahinouds tomb. Candiihar was founded as to Mogul and Persian dominion. Previous to the recently as 1754. It is ou tlie site of an ancient advent of the British ou the shores of India the city. It was for a few years tlie capital; but in foreign invasions which swept the plains of Hin1774 the seat of goveraineiit was removed to dostan always proceeded from Afghanistan. Sul Cabool. It is believed to contain 100,000 intan Malinioudthe Great, Genghis Khan, Tamer );aUitant9. Near the city is the tomb of Shah lane, and Nadir Shah, all took this road. In 1747 Ahmed, the founder of the city, an asylum so after the death of Nadir, Shah Ahmed, who had fi.icred that even the king may not remove a learned the art of war under tliat military ad criminal who has taken refuge within its walls. The geographical position of Afghanistan, and venturer, determined to shake off the Persian

54
yoke. Under him Afglianistau reached its high est point of greatncsii and prosperity iu modern times. He belonged to the iiiinily of the Suddosis, and his first act was to seize upon tho booty \vhich his late chicf liod gathered in India. Ill 1748 ho succeeded iu expelling the Mogul governor from Cabool and Peshnwer, and cross ing the Indus he rapidly overran tho Punjaub. llis kingdom extended from Ehovassan to Delhi, and ho even measured svrords with tlio MahratU\ powers. Those great enterprises did not, however, prevent him from cultivating some of the arts of peace, and ho was favorably known as a poet and historian, lie died in 1772, and left his crown to his sonTimour, who, however, was uactpud to the weighty charge. Ho aban doned tho city of Candahar, -which had been founded by his father, aud had, in a few years, become a weidthy and populous town, and re moved tho seat of government back to Cabool. During his reigu the internal dissensions of tho tribes, which Lad been repressed by the firm hand of Shah Ahmed, were revived. In 1793 Timour died, and Siinan succeeded him. This prince conccived tho idea of consolidating tho Mohammedan power of Indio, and this plan, which might liavo seriously endangered the British possessions, was thought so important that Sir John Malcolm was sent to tlie frontier to keep the Afghwis in check, in case of their making any movement, and at the same timo negotiations were opened with Persia, by whoso assistance the Afghans might be placed between two fires. These precautions were, however, unnecessary ; Siman Shah was more than suf ficiently occupied by conspiracies, and disturb ances at home, aud his great plans were nipped iu the bud. The kings brother, Mohainmed, throw himself into Herat with the design ot erecting an independent principality, but failing in his attempt he fled into Persia. Siman Sha i had been assisted in attaining the tlirone by tho Bairukshee family, at tho head of which was Shoir Afras Khan. Simans appointment of ' an unpopular vizier excited tho hatred of his old supporters, who organized o conspiracy which was discovered, and Sheir Afras was put to death. Mohammed was now recall ed by the conspirators, Siman was taken pris oner and his eyes put out. In opposition to Mohammed, who was supported by tho Dooranees, Shah Soojah was put forward by tho Ghilgies, and held the throne for some timo; but he was at last defeated, chiefly through the treachery of his own supporters, aud was forced to take refuge amongst the Sikhs. In 1809 N aiwleou had seui, Geu. Gardanuo to Persia iu the hope of inducing tho shah to invade Indi.'i. and tho Indian government sent a representative to the court of Shah Soojah to create an oppo sition to Persia. At this epoch, Runjeet S ngh rose into power aud fame. He W !W a Sikh chicftain, and by his genius made his cs unt i j independent of tho Afghans, and ere.'ted a kingdom in tho Punjaub, earning for imself tho title^ of Mah.arajah (chief rtyah), <ind tlie respect of the Anglo-Indian governn snt. The usurper Mohanuned was, however, not des tined to enjoy his triumph long. Futteh Khan, his vizier, who had alternately fluctuated be tween Mohammed and Shah Soojah, as a abition or temporary interest prompted, was seized by tho kings son Kamran, nis eyes put out, and afterward cruelly jmt to de.ith. 1 he powerful family of the murdered vizier swore to av; his death. Tho puppet Sliah Sooj.ih was nc^ain brought forward and !h[ohammed e.xpei;ed. Shah Soojah having given oflcnee, however, was presently deposed, and another brother crowned in his stead. Mohammed fled to Herat, of wiiich lie continued in possession, and in 1829 oi> his death his son Kamran succeeded him in tho ;ovornment of that district. Tho Bairukshee .amily, having now attained chicf power, divided the territory among themselves, but following tho national usage quarrelled, and were only united in presence of a common enemy. One of the brothers, Mohammed Khan, hold the oity of Peshawer, for wliich he jiaid tribute to y-.unjeet Sitigh; another held Gliuznoe; a tliird Candahar ; while in Cabool, Dost Mohammed^ tlio most powerful of the family, held sway. To this prince, Capt. Alexander Burnes was lent as ambassador in 1835, when Ilussia and ' Ing land were intriguing against cach other in Per sia and CentrnI Asia. lie offered an .'illi:\nce which the Dost was but too e.'vgcr to accept; but the Anglo-Indian government demai.ded every thing from him, while it ofl:'ered abso'r.Uely nothing in return. In the me.in time, in 1 ?38, the Persians, with liussian aid and advice, laid siege to Herat, the key of Afgh.anistar and India; a Persian and a Rus.sian agent arrived at Cabool, and the Dost, by the constant rctusal of any positive engagement on tho part of tho British, was, at last, actually compelled t>) re ceive overtures from the otlier parties. Burnes left, and Lord Auckland, then governor-general of India, influenced by his secretary V V . McNaghten, determined to punish Do.st Mohammed, for what he himself h.id compelled him to do. Ho resolved to dethrone him, and to stl up Shah Soojah, now a pensioner of tho It.diau government. A treaty was concluded with Shah Soojah, and with the Sikhs; tho shah be gan collecting an army, paid and oflicered by the British, and an Anglo-Indian force was con centrated on tho Sutlej. McNaghten, sec onded by Burnes, was to accompany the expe dition in the quality of eiiVDy in Afghan- itan. Iu the mean time the Persians liad raised tho siege of Herat, and thus tho only valid r. asou for interference in Afghanistan wasrem;vod,

55
but, nevertheless, in December 18S8, tlie army marched towtird Siiide, which country was co erced into submission, nnd the payment of a contribution for the benefit of the Silch> and Shah Soojaii. Feb. 2 0 ,18S9, the Britisl) army passed tlie Indus. It consisted of about 12,000 men, with above 40,000 camp-followers, . beside the new levies of the shah. The Uolan pass was traversed in March ; want of provi sions and forage began to bo fe lt; the camels dropped by hundreds, and a great part of the bagjfage wai lost. April 7, the army en tered the Kojuk pass, traversed it withour resistance, and on April 25 entered Candahar, which the Afghan princes, brothers of Dost Mohammed, had abandoned. After a rest of two months, Sir John Keane, the commander, advanced with the main body of the army to ward ti>o north, leaving a brigade under Nott, in Candahar. GUuznee, the impregnable stronj'hold of Afghanistan, was taken, July 23, C x deserter having brought information that the Cabool gate was the only one which had not been walled up; it wosaccordingly blown down, and the place w .ts then stormed. After thi;' disaster, the army which Dost Mohammed had collected, at once disbanded, and Cabool to(> opened its gates, Aug. C . Shah Soojah was installed in due form, but the real direction of government remained in the hands of McNaghten, who also paid all Shah Soojahs expenses out of the Indian treasury. The conquest of Afghanistan seemed accomplished, and a con siderable portion of tho troops was sent back. But tho Afghans woro noways content to ba ruled by tho Feringluc Kafirs (European infi dels), and during tho whole of 1840 and 41, in surrection followed on insurrection in every part of the country. Tho Anglo-Indian troop , had to bo constantly on the move. Yet, MoKaghten declared this to be the normal state of Afghan society, and wrote homo th.it every thin;; went on well, ond Shah Soojahs power wa;; taking root. In vain wore the warnings of tho military officers and the other political agcnt.=. Dost Mohammed liad surrendered tci tho Brit ish in October,. 1840, and was sent to India; every insurrection during the summer o f41 wa: successfully repressed, and toward October, McNaghten, nominated governor of Bomb.iy, intended leaving with another body of troops for India. But then the storm broke out. Tho occupation of Afghanistan cost the Indian treas ury 1,250,000 per annum : 16,000 troops, Anglo-Indian, and Shah Soojahs, had to be pniU in Afghanistan ; 8,000 more lay in Sinde, and the Bolan pass; Shah Soojahs regal splendor?!, tho salaries of his functionaries, and all ex )ensci of his court and government, were paid by tho Indian treassury, and finally, the Afghan chiefs were subsidized, or rather bribed, from the sam j source, in or3er to keep them out of mischief. McNaghten was informed of tho impossibility of going on at this rate of spending money. Ho attempted retrenchment, but the only possible way to enforce it was to cut down tho allow ances of "flia chiefs. The very 3ay lie attempt ed this, the chiefs formed a conspiracy for the extermination of the British, and thus McNagh ten himself was the means of bringing about the concentration of those insurrectionary forces, which hitherto had struggled against the in vaders singly, and without unity or concert; though it is certain, too, that by this time the hatr^ of British dominion among the Afghans had reached the highest point.^The English in Cabool were commanded by Gen. Elphinstone, a gouty, irresolute, completely helpless old man, whose orders constantly contradicted each other. The troops occupied a sort of fortified camp, which was so extensive that the garrison was BCMoely sufiSclent to man the ramparts, much less to detach ^ d ies to act in the field. The works were so imperfect that ditch and parapet could be ridden over -on horseback. As if this was not enough^' the camp was commanded almost within m n*t range by the neighboring heights, and to crown the absurdity of the arrang^ents, all provisions, and medical stores, were in two detached forts at some distance from camp, separated from it, moreover, by walled gardens and another small fort not occupied by the English. The citadel or Bala Hissar of Cabool would have offered strong and splendid winter quarters for the whole army, but to please Shah Soojah, it was not occupied. Nov. 2, 1841, the insurrection broke out. The house of Alexander Burnes, in the city, wm at tacked and he himself murdered. The British generid did nothing, and the insurrection grew strong by impunity. Elphinstone, utterly help less, at the mercy of all sorts of contradictory advice, very soon got every thing into that con fusion which Napoleon described by the three words, ordre, cantreordre, desordre. The Bala Hissar was, even now, not occupied. A few companies were sent against the thousands of insurgents, and of course were beaten. This still more emboldened the Afghans. Nov. 3, the forts close to the camp were occupied. On the 9th, the commissariat fort (garrison ed by only 80 men) was taken by the Af ghans, and the British were thus reduced to starvation. On the 5th, Elphinstone already talked of buying a free passage out of the coun try. In fact, by the middle of November, his irresolution and incapacity had so demoral ized the troops that neither Europeans nor Sepoys were any longer fit to meet the Afghans in the open field. Then the negotiations began. During these, -McNaghten was murdered in a conference with Afghan chiefs. Snow began to

56
cover the ground, provisions were scaxce. At last, Jan, 1, a capitulation was conoladed. All the money, 190,000, was to be handed over to tiie Afghans, and bills signed for 140,000 uM H . All the artillery and ammunition, except 0 aix-pounders and S mountain guns, were t& re main. All Afghanistan was to be evacuated.' The chiefs, on the other hand, promised eafe conduct, provisions, and baggage cattle. Jm. 6, the BriUsh marched out, 4^600 combataJits *nd 1 i ,600oamp-followera. Ono nmrch I sufficed to dissolve the last remnant of otder, and to mis tip soldiers and compi-foUowers Jn one liopeless confuMon, rendering aB reristance impossible. The cold and mow and the want of provisions acted os in Napoleons retreat from Moscow. Bat instead of O o s s a e k s a t e - ^ spectfol distance, the B riti^ were harosseid by' inftiriated Afghan marksmen, armed with limgrange matchjocks, occupying every height. The, chiefs who signed the capitulation neither could nor Would restrain tl mounthih tribes.- The Koord-Oabool "pase-beowne tle ' grave of nearly all the army, and the* small remuant, less than 200 Euroi^ans, fell'at'the entrance of the Jugdaluk pass^ Only One man, Dr. Brydon, reached Jelalabad to tell the tale. Manjr officers, however, had bMn seized by the Afgwsj^nd kept in<saptivity. 'Jekdabad was held ^ Sitlos brigade. Oapitnlatioa was demanded of him, but he reftased to evacuate the town, so did Nott at Oandahar. Qhuanee had fallen; there was not a 3ingle man ia tli# place that understood any thinyiAout artiilei^,= <md" the Sepoys of the rarrison had'sucoatnbM to'' the climate. In tne mean time, the Britishauthorities on the frontier, at the ''first new ' of the disaster of Cabool, hod ooaisentrailied at Peshawer the troops destined for-thd relief of the regiments in Afghanistan. But tran^rtatitfa was wanting and the Sepoys fell sicltin gi<eat' numbers. Gen. Pollock, in February, took the command, and by the end of March,'1843, ceived further reinforcements. He tSien forced the Khyber pass, and advanoed to the relief of Sale at Jelalabad ; l>ere Sale had ft few days; be fore completely defeated the investit^ Afghan army. Lord Ellenborough, now governor-gen eral of India, ordered tlie troops to^all back;' but both Nott and Pollock found a-welcome excuse in the want of transportation. At last, by the beginning of July, publie e^nion la India forced Lord Ellenborongh to do something for the recovery of the national honor and the prestige o f the British army; accordingly, he authorized an advance on Oabool, both trota Oandahar and Jelalabad. By the middl o f August, Pollock and Nott faad oome to an un^ derstai^ng respecting their idoveiM^ and Aug. 30, Pollock moved toweirds @iAtoo^'laoh' ed Gundamuck, ond beat a body of Afghaiis On the 23d, cwrie l the Jugdnluk pass' Sepi, 8, defeated' tl^' assembled strength o f thd etsaniy on the IStli at Tezeen, and encamped on this 15 th under the walls of Oabool. N o ^ ir? mean tim^ had, Aug. 7, evacuated CaniSki . har, and inatbea with all his forces toward' Ghuznee, After some minw eDgag^emfeut VlW' defeated a liffge body of Afghans; Aug 80, took possession of Ghuznee, whieh had: beeii abandoned'by the enemy, S e p t.d e str o y e d the works od town, ^ in delated the Af*> i in the strong position of Alydan, a*idi IT, arrived near Oabool, wiire Pol^ at once established his oommnnkL UoH. with h to. Shah Soc^ah had, losg b^D intilSBped by #6m of the chie&, ftnd i^aoe * then so vegtuar government had existed in A(gtw istan? nominally, Futteh Jung, his son, was king. P oilo^ despatched a body of cavalry after the ^ b o ^ 'p i^ n e rs, but these had sucoeed.;d in bribing t h ^ guard, and met him on the road As. a m ath of, voigeance, the basaar of Oiibool waa destroyed, on^ which occasion the soldiera plan^red^peot of the town and mass&ied many inhabitaiBts^ Oct. 12, the British left Oa viool >aai:mrohed by Jelalabad and Ieshawer to Jndiik' FutteiJung, despairing of his portion, fsUowed thei^. Dost Moham mad was nom dismissed to m captivity, and r e n t e d to his kingdom. Thus nded tho atteioj^ '^ i the British to set up aprinceof Jteir owii> m ak tag lft:A%hawgtan. ^

A ir y
A I ^ Y , Sot Biohibd, E. G L Kj mi^or-gww>: al, and, at present^ quartermaster-general of-Uhe British army, enter^ the serviee in 1831 19 ens i ^ .was m ^ e a captain 182fi, a Ikutt oaatc^onel 1861, and as such took the commtto ' of ft brigade in the army of the east in 1864.. >iriii the Orimeaa expedition was aboot to sail Awsa' Voma, he waamade, Sept. 1864, qnartermaBter* gmeral' of the expeditionary force, and, as oieh, became one of the 6 or 8 offlcws who, under the command of Lord 'Ba^w, hare been charged with destroying the EngJiik m m W dint of routine, ostensible fulfilment of du^, and want common srase and energy. jTo Aireys share, feU the fixing of the pi oportions in w h i^ the different artioks of sampequipage, teats, great-coats, Uankets, booto* should be dealt out to t^e various rej^aents. Acoordipg to his <own'djnisoo'^bel'oro'lhre C3ielk o ( f t is ^ of inquiry), itiiene aevBT

57
was a period after the first week in Deo. 1 ^ 4 , 'when there was not at Balaklava a considerable supply of warm olothing, and at that very time . there were regituents engaged at the front iu. ; the trenchesL which were suffering aeotely from 1 the want of these very artiolesj which lay in ' readinesB for them at a distance of 7 or 8 miles." Thi^ he says, was not his fault; there nTer having been the slightest difficulty in getting his ognature of approval to a r#quiaitioaifor ^ suoh articles. On the contrary, lip gives hhn-'* self credit for having, as much as possible, abridg^ and Hmpliiied the routine process of approving, reducing', or disapproving the requi sition salt to him by d ivi^ nal &d. regima^td ofScers. deployed line told with murderous effect on the dense masses; and when the British^ final- { ly, charged with the bayonet, the French fiedr ia disorder down the hill. This supreme ef fort cost the British line four'>fifths of their numbw very near in killed and wounded; bat the battle was decided, and Soult retreated, though the etegeof B o ^ o s was t ^ d a few days aftepwardi . . -

Al9rki

A lbura

ALGERIA, a division of northern Africa, for merly the Turkish pashalic of ^ ^ e r s, but since 1830 included in the foreign dominions of France. It is bounded N. by the Mediterranean, E. by ' Tunis, W. by Morocco, S. by the Great Saharoii The extreme length is 600 miles from E. to W. ;f the extreme breadth 200 miles from N. to S. The AL6DEBA, a village and riv^'et in the > Atlas ridge constitutes an important physical Spanish province of Estremadura, about 12 feature in the country, and divides the arable miles 8. E. of Bad^os. In the spnng of 1811, land of the sea-board from the desert. It also the British laid sie^^ to Badigos, then in the constitntes the northern and southern water hands of the French, and were pressing the shed of the province. The main ridge runs fortress very hard. Beresford, with about from east to west, bat the whole province is 10,000 British and Germans, and 20,000 Portu inte^^ted in all directions with ^urs from the guese and Spanish broops, covered the siege at central rang& The loftiest of the western Albnera. Soult advano^ with the disposable mountains is Mount 'Wanashrees, the Mons portion of the army of Andalusia, and attacked , Zalocus of Ptolemy; of the eastern the JurMm May 16. The English right was post jura and Aurep. These attain a height of ed on a rounded hill, from wUch a saddle- nearly 7,000 teet. The principal river is ^ p e d prolongation extended along the centre the Shelliff. There ore rivers of considerable and left. In front the position was covered by size also, which flow from the south side of the the Albuera river. Soult at once recognized Atlas, and lose themselves in the desert. Kone of this round hill as the commanding point and these rivers are navigable. They are nearly dried key of the position; he therefore merely occu up in the summer, but overflow a considerable pied the centre and left, and prepM^d an attack extent of country in the spring and fertilize the en m am upon the English right. In ^ ite of soil.The climate is not ctmsidered unhealthy the protestation of his officers, Beresford had by some travellers. Ophthalmia and cutaneous posted nearly all the English and Grman diseases are common. It is said there are no troops on the centre and left, so that the de endemic fevers, but the great loss of the French fence of the hill devolved almost exclusively troops by disease may perhaps lead to a different upon Spanish levies. Accordingly, when Soults conclusion. The atmosphere is pui^e and bright, in&ntry advanced in dense concentric columns the summer very h ot; and in the winter severe up this hiH, the Spaniards v ^ soon gave way, weather is occasionally experienced, especially and the whole British portion was at once in the hill country. On the limits of the desert turned. At tlus decisive moment, after Beres the soil is arid and sandy, but between the ford had several times refused to send British mountain districts it is fertile, and especially or German troops to the right, a subordinate so in the neighborhood of the streams. staff officer, on hia own responsibility, ordered ^ Grain crops of ^ kinds, fhiits, European and the advance of srane 7,000 English troops. tropical; flowers, and particularly roses, of re They deployed on the back of the saddle markable beauty; and a species of sugar-cane, shaped height, crashed the first French battal said to be the largest and most productive of ions by their fire, and on arriving at the hUl, < any known ^>eeie8, grow in Algeria. The do mestic animals of every variety are numerous. found it occupied by a not very orderly mass Horses, of course, are excellent; asses are of of deep columns, without s p ^ t o ; deploy. fine growth and much used for riding. The npoD these they advancedt The <fir of their

58
otunel and dromedary of Algeria are the modern town was almost destroyed by tle Buperior. The merino sheep is 1im French. It has nmnulkstures of carpets and and ^ td n was fint supplied bota __^ blankets. South o f the Atlas is the Zpab, the The Nntaidian lion, the panther Mid leopard, ancient Gffltoka. The chief place is Biscu-a; the ostriches, serpents, scorpionsj and o t W ven- Biscareeus are a peaceful race, much liked in omoas r ^ ile s , are abondontIlie Berbers, the northern ports as servants and porters.^A l Kabyles, or Maeidh, for they known by the geria Jus b e^ successively conquered by the three names, are believed to have beea Uie Roma*, tha Vandal, and the Arab, When aboriginal inhabitants, Ofvtbdr history as a Moors were driven from Spain in 1493, Fei^moe little is known, fbrther tlUn that once nand sont an expedition against A lgie'-i,^ d cocupied the whole of north-western and seizing. on Oran, Bougiah, and Algiers, he iu-e to be found also 'oa the otran ooaat The threatened the aul^ugation of the country. Kabyles live in tbemountain district. TSe other , Unable to o < ^ with the powerful invader, Seinhabitants are Arabs, the descendants of the lim C u t i^ the emir of the MetiOJah, a fer Mussuhsan invaders. Moors, Turks, E n o u g h s, tile plain in the .neighborhood of i l g i c ^ Jews, and negroes, and lastly the w ^ h , are asked asistDoa &om the Tqrks, and the cetefound in the oountry. The populaiMam 1862 h ra t^ oorsaii^ B arharossa Horus^jvas sent to was .3,078,035, of which 184,HS were Euro his asSstanoe; 'HotsH appear^ in 16l6, and peans of all nations, beside a military force of having first made h im s^ master of the 100,000 men. The Kabyles ore an industrious country and slain Selim Outemi with his own race, living in regular villages, excellent cultiva- hand, he attadced the Spaniards, and after tors, and w^rkiojp.in mines, in metals, and in a war of ^iuTing fortunes, was obliged to coarse woomn and cotton factories. They make throw himself into Tlemcen, where a Spanish gunpowder and soap, gather honey and wax, army besieged him, and having succeeded in and supply the towns with poultry, fruit, a w capturing Mm, put him to death in 1818. His other provisions. The Arabs follow the habits brother, Khair-ed-Deen, succeeded him, - )nght of their ancestors, leading a nomadic life, assistance fh>m the sultan, Selim I., and ac shifting their camps from place to place accord knowledged that prince as his sovereign. Se ing as the necessities of pasturage or other cir lim accordingly appointed him pasha of Algiers, cumstances compel them. - The Moors ar$ aid sent him a body of troops with which he rS robably the least respectable of the inhabitants, was able to repulse the Spaniards, and eventu iving in the towns, and more luxurious th&n ally to make himself master of the cointry. either the Arabs or Kabyles, they are, flrom the His exploits against the Christians in the Medi constant oppression of their Tarkish rtd^rs, a terranean gained him the dignity of capud^ timid race, reserving nevertheless their ^uelty pasha ftom Solyman I. Charles V .m ade an. and vindictiveness, while in moral ch^acter attempt to reinstate the Spanish authority, and they stand very low.The chief towns of Al a powerful expedition of 870 vessels and 80,000 geria are Algiers the capital, Constantine, pop ; men crossed the Mediterranean in 1641. jjut a ulation about 20,000, and Bona, a fortified town terHble storm and earthquake dispersed the on the sea-coast, TOpulation about 10,000 in 1847. fleet, and cut off all communication between it Kear this are the coral fisheries, frequented and the army. Without shelter, and exposed by the fishers from France and Italy. Bougiah to the harassing attacks of a daring enemy, the is on the galf of the same name. The cap ture of troops were compelled to reembark, and make this place was hastened by the outrages of *^0 tlieir escape With a loss of 8,000 men, 15 vessels Kabyles* in the neighborhood, who wrecked a of war, and 140 transports. From this time French brig by cutting her cable and then plun forward therfe were unceasing hostilities be dered her and massacred the crew.There are tween the Bttfbary powers and the knights of some remains of antiquitv in the ioterior, ^ Malta; tfienoe rorang that system of piracy pecially in the province of Constantin^, amopj; which made the Algerine corsairs so terri'/le in others those of the ancient city of Lftmbessa; the Mediterranean, and which was so long sub with remains of the city gates, parts o^ an am mitted to by the Christian powers. The Engphitheatre, and a mausoleum supi^rted bv lish under Blt&e, the French under Doquesne, Corinthian pillars. On the coast is Colean the Dutch, abd other powers, at various times Cherchell, the ancient Julia Osasarea, a place of attacked Algiers; and Duquesne having twice some importance to the F^hch. It was the bombarded i t the dey sent for the French con ftsidence of Juba, and in itj^ neighborhood are sul of Louis XIV., and having learned ftwn him ancient remains. Oran is a fortified. towb. thp cost o f the bombardment, jeerin^^y told It remained in possession of the Spaniard# until him that he t^ould himself have burnt down 1792. Tlemcen, once the residence of Ab4-elthe city fw half the money.The wstem of pri Kader,> dtuated in a fertile country; the vateering w#,Continued in spite of"^the con tant ancient city was destroyed by fire in 1670, and oppositiOQpf lheEuropean powers; and aven

59
the shores of Spain and Italy were soSiwiinies invaded by the desperadoes who carried on this terrible trade of war and plunder. Tliousands of Christian slaves constantly languished in oaptivity in Algiers; and societies ctf pious men were formed, whose express object was to pass to and from Algiers annually for the purpose of ransoming the prisoners with the funds remit ted to their care by relatives. Meanwhile, -the authority of the Turkish government had been reduced to a name. The deys were elected by the Janizaries, and had declarisd their inde pendence of the Porte. The last Turkish pasha had been expelled by Dey Ibrahim in 1706; and the janizaries by tumultuous elections aj^pointed new chirfs, whom in their mutiniee they often murdered. The Janizaries were recruit ed from the immigrants from Turkey, no native, though the son of a janizary by a woman of the country, being admitted into their ranks. The dey sent occasional presents to Oonstantinople as a token of his nominal t^Ue^ance; bat all regular tribute iiras withdrawn, and tho' Turks, hampered by their constant ntruggles with RuaBia, were too weak to chastise the rebels of a distant proTioce. It was reserved to the young republic of the United States to point the way to an abolition of the monstrous tyranny. Dur ing the wars of the French revolution and of Napoleon, the powerful fleets in the Mediterra nean had protected commerce, and the<Algertnes had been compelled to a respite of their lawless exactions. On the renewal of peace, the Algerines commenced their depredations; and the Americans, who in 1795 had been compelled to follow the example of European nations, and to subsidize the dey for peace, now refused the tribute. In 1815, Oommodore De catur encountered an Algerine squadron, took a frigate and a brig, and sailed into the bay of Algiers, where he forced the dey to surrender all American prisoners, and to abandon all future claims for tribute. This bold example was followed by the English, who, nnder Lord Exmouth, bombarded the city in 1816, and re duced it to ashes, compelling the dey to surrender his prisoners. This was, howerer, only a punishment; for piraoy was not supmessed, and in 1826 the Algerines open ly se iz^ Italian vessels in the Mediterranean, and even carried their incursions into tho North sea. In 1818, Hussein Bey suoneeded to the government; in 1823, the dwelling of the French consul having been plundered, and va rious outrages having been committed on ves sels nnder the French flag, reparation was de manded without success. A t last the dey of Algiers personally insulted the consul of France, and nsed expressions disrespectful to the king of France, who had not replied to a letter which the dey had written, in respect of a debt due by the French government to Jew mer chants who were indebted to Hussein. To enforce an apology, a French squadron was sent, which blockaded Algiers. Negotiations were opened between France, Mehemet AH, and the Porte, by which Mehemet Ali, with the assistanoe of France, undertook to conquer Algiers, and -to pay a regular tribute to the sul tan, o f whom he would hold the government. This was broken off partly from the opposition o f Ewland, and partly because Mehemet Ali And France conld not agree as to the precise arrangements by which the scheme was to be carried into eflSsct. The government of Char]^ X. now undertook an expedition against Algiers single-handed, and on June 13, 1880, an army of 88,000 men, and 4,000 horses, disembarked before Algie!%, jinder command of Oen. Bourmont. Hussein Dey had levied an army of 60,000 to oppose them, but having allowed them to land, he conld make no effective resist ance; and Algiers ci^iitulated July 4, on condition that persons private property and the religion of the country should be respected, and that the dey and his Turks should retire, "nie Franoh took possession of the city. Among the Sprfl, t J ^ took 18 ships of war, 1,600 bronze oannoi^ and nectrly $10,000,000 in specie. They immediately garrisoned Algiers, and es tablished a military regency. The government of Charles X. had intended to surrender Algiers to the sultan, and instructions to that effect were actually on their way to Constantinople, when the events of July, 1830, deposed Charles X. One of tho first acts of his successor was to decide on retaining the conquest, and Clausel was sent over os general-in-chief in place of Bourmont From the first occupation of Alge ria by the French to the present time, the unhappy country has been the arena of unceasing bloodshed, rapine, and violence. Each town, large and small, has been conquered in detail at an immense sacrifice of life; The Arab and Kabyle tribes, to' whom independence is pre cious, and hatred of foreign domination a prin ciple dearer than life itself, have been crushed ' and broken by the terrible rozzias in which dwellings aud property are burnt and de stroyed, standing crops cut down, and the mis. crable wretches who remain massacred, or sub jected to all the horrors of lust, and brutality, riiis barbarous system of warfare has been per sisted in by the French against all the dictates of humanity, civilization, and Christianity. It is alleged in extenuation, that the Kabyles are ferocious, addicted to murder, torturing their prisoners, and that with savages lenity is a mis take. 'Ihe policy of a civilized government resorting to the lex talionis may well be doubted. And judging of the tree by its fruits, after an expenditure of probably $100,000,000,

60
and a aacrifioe of hundreds of tbousaDds of livos, all that can be said of Algeria is that it is a school of war for French generals and soldiers, in which all the French officers who won lattrels in the Oritnean war re* ceived their military training and edacation. As an, attempt at cdouization, the numbers of Europeans compared with the natives show its present almost total failure; and this in one of the most fertile countries of the world, the an cient granary of Italy, within 20 hours of France, where security of lifls and property alike from military friends and sa v s^ enemies alone are wanted. Whether tl^e faUure is at tributable to an inherent delinst in the French chai'acter, which unfits them for emigration, or to irgudicious local administration, it is not within our province to discuss. >Every im portant town, Oonstantine, Bona, Bougiab, Arzew, Hortaganem, Tlemcen, was' carried by storm with all the accompanying horrors. The natives submitted with an ill grace to their Turk ish rulers, who had at least the merit of being oo-reliponists; but they found no advantage in the so-called civilization of the new government, against which, beside, they had all the repug nance of religious fanaticism. Ea<^ ^vernor came bnt to renew the severities of his prede cessor; proclamations announced the most gra cious intentions, but the army of occnpation, tlie military movements, the terrible "cgrnelties practised on both sides, all r e f a ^ the p ro fi^ uons of peace and good-will. In 1881, Baron Pichon had been appointed civil intendant, and he endeavored to organize a system of civil ad ministration which ^ould move with the mili tary government^ but the check which hi measures would have placed ou the governorin-Chief offended Savary, duo de Rovigo, Napo leons ancient minister of police, and on his representation Pichon was recalled. Under Sa vary, Algeria was made the exile of all those whose pditical or social misconduct had brought tliem under the lash of the law ; and a foreign legion, the soldiers of wltich wore forbidden to enter the cities, was introduced into Algeria. In 1883, a petition was presented to the w u n ber of deputies, stating, for 8 years we have suffered every possible act of injustice. 'When ever complaints aro preferred to the authori ties, they are only answered by new atrocities, particularly directed against those by whom the complaints were brought forward. On tliat account no one dares to mov^ for which reason there are no signatures to this petition. 0 my lords, we beseech you in Uie name of humani ty, to relieve us from this crushing tyranny: to ransom us from the bonds of slavery. If the land is to be under martial law, if there is to be no civil power, we are undone; there will never be peace for us. This petition led to a commusion of inquiry,, the consequence of ____ was the estaDlishim entof a cifil ad-ainwhich istraUon. After the death of Savary, unde^ ad interim rule of Gen. Voirol, some meoLores had been commenced calculated to ollaj the irritation; the draining of swamps, tlie im provement of the roads, the organization of a native militia. This, however, was abandoned on the return of llarsbal Clause!, under whom a first and most unfortunate exp^ition ag<-'iMt Oonstantine was undertaken. His governni^t was so unsatisfactory, that apetition prayir.^ in quiry into its abuses, signed oy 64 leading oersons connected with the province, was for warded to Paris in 1836. This led event. isll;r to Olansel's resignation. The whole of }jonis Philippe's reign was occupied in attempts at colonization, which only resulted in land-job bing operations; in military colonization, which was useless, as the cultivators were not safe away from t ie guns of their own block-houses,; in attempts to settle the eastern part.of Igaria, and to drive out Abd-el-Kader from Oran and the west. The fall of that restless and . intrepid chieftain so far pacified, the < >unr try, that the great tribe .of . the HomSuies Garabas sent in their submission at once. On the revolution of 1848, Gen. Oavaignac wm appointed to supersede the Duke dAujnae in the governorAip of the province, and he and the Prince dp Joinville, who was also in ^ g e ria, then retired. But the republic did not seem more fortunate than the monarchy m the administration of this province. Several gp' n ors succeeded each other during ita .hiritf ensU ence. Colonists were sent out to till the 1 nds^ b u t they died of^ or quitted in disgust. In^349, Gen. Pelissier marched against seyer^ tribes, and the' v i l l a s ,o f the Beni. Sillem; ;heir cixrt> 9 and all ^wceteible property were burnt and d^troje'd ia' usual, because they refused tribute' In Zaab, a fertile district o t the edge of the d ^ r t, great e*oTtement hiving arisen "In cohs^hence of the preaching of a marabout, siikpedition was despatched a^ iinst t h ^ . 1,200stibjjg, which they succeeded de feating: aiid ijtwas found that, the reydt was Tride-spreadj aiid fomented by secret assodntions ca ll^ l^ e Siifi Abderrahman,^wh6se rel^ '^ feri^ot; bu?down until an eM eiition undeiP Genat^ds 'Canrobert and Jlerbiuor: had been sent against them ; and the siew of 2!oatcha, an* Arab" town, proved that the natives had neither JiJst courage nor contracted affec tion for theiir invaders. The town resiatei the effor^ of the besiegers for 51 days, ahr' was taken by storm at last. Little Kabylia d -1 not . give in its siirriender till 18S1, when ,Ge:^ St. A m at^ gnljidtied it, and thereby established a lihe' o t betwei Plillipraville

61
and Constantine. The French bulletma and French papers abound in statements of the peace and prosperity of Algeria. These are, however, ALMA, a small river in the Crimea, run atribnte to national vanity. The country is even ning from the high ground in the neighborhood now as unsettled in the Interior as ever. The of Bakhtchisarai in a westerly direction, and French snpremaoy ia perfectly illusory, except emptying its waters into Kalamitabay, between on the coast and near the towns. The tribes Eupatoria and Sebastopol. The southern bank stiU assert their independence and detestation o f . this river, which rises very steep toward of the French regime, and the atrocious system its mouth, and evei-ywhei'o commands the op o f razzias has not been abandoned; for m the posite shore, was selected during the late Enssoyear 1867 a successful razzia was made by Mar Turkish war by Prince Mentchikoff as a defen shal Bandon on the villages ^ d dwelling-places sive position in which to receive the onset of of the hitherto unsubdued Kabyles, in order to the auied armies just landed in the Crimea. add their territory to the French dominions. . The forces under his command comprised 43 The natives are still ruled with a rod of iron, battalions, 16 squadrons, 100 Cossacks, and 96 and continual outbreaks show the uncertain guns, in all 85,000 men. The allies landed on tenure of the French occupation, and the hol Sept. 14, 1864, a little north of the Alma, 28,lowness of peace maintained by such means. 000 French (4 divisions), 28,000 English (five Indeed, a trial which took place at Oran in infantry and one cavalry division), and 6,000 AuKUst 1857, in which Captain Doineau, the Turks. Their artillery was exactly as numer h ew of the Bureau Arabe, was proved guilty ous as that of the Russians, viz.; 72 French o f murdering a prominent and wealthy native, and 24 English guns. The Russian position revealed a hwitual exercise of the most cruel ana was of considerable apparent strength, but in despotic power on the part of the French ofiScials, reality offered many weak points. Its front ex even of subordinate rank whicK jpstly attracted tended nearly 6 miles, far too great a distance the attention of the world. A t present, the gov for the small number of troops at Mentchikoffs ernment is divided into the three provinces o^,, disposal. The right wing was completely un Constantine on the east, Algiers in the centred supported, while the left (on account of the and Oranin the west. The country is under the allied fleets the fire from which commanded control of a governor-general, who is oomthe coast) could not occupy the position as far mander-in-chief, assisted by a secretaiy and civil as the sea, and therefore labored under the same intendant, and a council composed of the direc defect. The plan of the allies was founded on tor of the interior, the nav^ commandant, the these facts. H ie front of the Russians was -to be military intendant and attorney-generjJ, whose occupied by false attacks, while the French, badness is to confirm the acts of the governor. Under the.cover of the 5 fleets, were to turn Th eonteil des eontmtieux at Algiers takes the Ru^ian left, and the Ehglish, under the cognizance of civil and criminal offences. The cover of their civalry, to turn their right.On provincM where a civil administration has been the 20th the attack took place. It was to be orgDiz6d have m ^ors, justices, and commismade at daybreak, but owing to the slow move noQers of police. The native tribes living un ments of the English, the French could not yender the Mohaanmedan religion still have their t p e to advance across the river before Aat cadis: but between them a system of arbitra time. On tlie French extreme right. Bosquets division passed the river, which was aln^ost tion has been established, which they are said to prefer, and an officer (I'avoeat des Aralei) is everywhere-fordable, and climbed the sfeep banl of the southern shore without finding specially charged with the duty of defending Arab interests before the French tribunals. any resistance; Means were also found, by Vigorous effort, to bring 12 guns up to the Since the French occupation, it is stated that ';eau. To the left of Bosquet, Canrobert commerce has considerably increased. The im ught his division across the river, and ports are valued at about $22,000,000, the ex began to deploy on the high ground, while ports, $3,000,000. The imports are cotton, woollen, and silk goods, grain and flour, lime, Prihce Napoleons division was engaged in clearing the gardens, vineyards, and houses of and refined sugar; the exports are rough coral, skins, wheat, oil, and wool, with other smAll the village of Alma from the Russian skir matters. mishers. To all these attacks, made with 29 battalions, Mentchikoff opposed in his first and second lines only 9 battinions, in support of which 7 more soon arrived. These 16 battal ions, eupported by 40 guns and 4 squadrons of hussars, had to bear the brunt of the immense ly superior attack of the French, who were

Altma

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sapported by the retn ^ in g 9 battalions of Toreyg division. Thaa all St. Amauds t n x ^ wr6 eng6^:d, wltfa' tbd' ^xoej^ibii of the Tnrics, who femaln6(t iri /riserie; The result could not Tong be dottbtM. The Bus< Siaoft rfowly gave yray, and retired In as good <^er as could be expeoted. In the mean time the English had commenced their attack.: Abotat 4 oclock the fire of Bosquet's gnns from the height of the plateau fet th6 left of the Bussiftn position had sh<ifwa' the battle to be seriou8l|r en g^ ed ; in about an hotir the Etiglidi fdcirthi^ing line en^ged that' of the Rasfllaris. -Tlie English haol dven -6p fhe-^an of taming the Bussian right, since the KOsslan c a v a l^ twice as sh-oog, wfthbnt'lJossact^ as that of the British, covered that wing b o os even to menace the English left. AoccSrdingly, Lord Baglan determined to attack tiie Ku^alis straight before him. He feB upon a e i f centre, haviM in, his first line BrdWns light diviiioii and Evans division; the tw o divisions of the duke of Cambridge and Gen: England formed the second line, while the reserve (Oathcarts division), supported by the cavalry, followed behind the left wing. The first line d^loyed and charged two villages before its irdtit, and after dislodging the Bussians, passed the Alma. Here the reports vary. The English distinctly maintain that their light division reached the breastwork behind which the BusMana had placed their heavy artillery, btrtf Were then' repulsed. The BussianS declare that the'light division never got well across the riVerj pinch less up the steep on which this breastwc^ was placed. At all events, the second line marched close behind, deployed, had to fall into coltiinn again to pass the Alma aiid to elimb .up the heights; deployed again, and after several vol ley^ charged. It was the duke of Cambridges division (guards and Highlanders) wpecimly, which came to the rtscue of the light divisipti. Evans, though slow in his advance, was n o t. j ^ lle d i so that Englands division in his rear could scarcely ^ v e him aty suppoH. The breastwork was taken by the guards and High landers, and the positiom was, after a short but Violent struggle, abandoned by the Russians. Eighte&ft Biissian battalions were here engaged agaibst the same number of English battalions; and If the English battalions were stronger than the Bussian. by some 6 0 'men each, the Bussians amply made up for thi^ by their superiority in artillery and the strength of the position. The English infantry fire, however, which is generally reputed Its very itttirderons, was especially so on this occasion. Most of the troops engaged were armed with the'Mitii6 rifle, and the impact of their bullets, killing whole files at once, was most destnjtfttw to the d e^ Bussian columns. 7 her .having ^1 tLeir infantry, excep 6 ~bafi engarod, and no hope to stem the tide, orokd off the battle, the eiaValry ^ artillery, together With the srtall' fi serve, covering the retreat, which was lestea. The English fought decidedly than any other troops in this battle,' btE itt their habitual clumsy way of mtuafltevrig;;itei ploying, forming Columns, and deplo}*ing unnecessarily, under the eneinyS' fiH e,, w which both time and lives were lost. ^h\i b^tnsequence of this battle was to the alliSlj undisptiWd ^ s e s s io n of the open cOubtrVof' the Crimea as long as the Bussians retimmed withott reip&rcements,'and the opening road to SebastopoT, By the fir^ a d v a h l^ did not profti^.wat o f th

A m im w iiiiq w

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AMMPJHIXXON, comprises the projeciiles, chargef^ ^n4 articles used for priming, required for the use of fire-arms, and, as ^ e wo; d is ge^r^^fIy understood, supposes thew artick-s to be n ^ e up read^ for use. Thus, small arm anxmuttid^n |(mpri]?6s cartridges and perou^3ion, ca p s(th e latter, o f course, are ^ unnecesswy where flint-ldoks or the needle-gun are in use); field-ar^ery ammunition is composed of :hot, loade4 ftell, case shot, slirapn^ caritrilges, priming tubes, matches, portfires, with i gickets for rocket-batteries. In fortresf and sieg6^ the powder is generally kept in b an r^ and made up in cartridges when required or use.; so! are '^ e various compositions required during, > siege i the hollow shot are also filled on the spot. The proportion of aumiUnition .accbmpanying an army in .Uie 3^d varies ac'cbr^lng to circumstance'. Gener^y an infantry soldier carries 60 rounds, selilom m ore; and .a ^injilar quantity per man ac .ampanies the itfmy in wagons, while a fa: i e r supiplj follows with the park columns a m.jc h or tWo to th e rear. For field-artillery, between 150 and; ^ 0 rounds per gun are always witL tho battery,; partly Jn the gun-limber b o x ^ p jj^ y in s^aratd wagons; another 200 ronh^ are generally with the ammunition-reserve pf the army, and a third supply follows wim the park columns. This is the rule |nm ort c i ^ ized armies, and applies, of course; to the beginning of a campaign only ; aftw a few months of campaigning, the ammunition-re serves are generally very severely d^awn i' x)n, perhaps w ftfter a dis^trous battl^ and t h ^ replacing is a&m difficult and ^ow.

63
Lisbon in the beginning of May, but, owing to the death of the admiral Santa Oruz, and his j SPAKsJft, the great naval arma- vice-admiral, the departure was delayed. The meof'Btmt-by King Philip II. of Spain, in 1688, duke of Medina Sidonia, a man totally un for the conquest of En^and, in order thereby acquainted with naval matters, was now made to serve Ctod, and to retome unto his church captain-general of the fleet; his vice-admiral, a great many conMte souls tiiat are omressed ' llartinez de Eicdde,.however, was an expert by the heretics, enemies to our Iroly Oathollo seaman. Having left Lisbon for Corunna for f^tb, which have them snbjeot to<&eir sects, storM, May 29, 1588, the fleet was dispersed by and unhappiness. (Expedit. HUmm. in Angl. fl violent storm, and, though all the ships joined Tra Deteriptio, A . D. 1588.) The fullest ac at Corunna with the exception of four, they count of this armament is given in a book pub were considerably shattered, and had to be re l is h ^ about tlie time it set sail, by order of paired. Beports having reached England that Philip, under the title La FeUeUima Armada the armament was completely disabled, the gov q w d Ry Don Felipe nuettro SeHor mando ernment ordered its own ships to be laid up; mnUur en el P w rto de Liahoa 1588. Heehapor but Lord Howard, the admiral, opposed this or JPed/ro de Pax Salas. A copy of this work was der, set sail for Corunna, learned the truth, and, procured for Lord Burleigh, so that the English on his return, continued warlike preparations. government was beforehand a^nainted with Soon after, being informed that the armada every detail of the expedition. (This copy, con had hove in sight, he weighed anchor and ac taining notes up to March, 1588, is now in the companied it on its way up the channel, harass British museum.) The fleet is therein stated ing the Spanish ships whenever an opportunity to have consisted of 66 galleons and large ships, presented itself. The Spaniards, in the mean 26 iirea of 800 to 700 tons, 19 tenders of 70 to time, proceeded to the coast of Flanders, keep 100 tons, 18 small fngates, 4 galeasses and 4 ing as close together as possible. In the vari galleys, in all 180 vessels, with a total tonnage ous minor engagements which took place, the of Y5,8<J8 tons. They were armed with 2,481 handier ships, more numerous crews, and better guns, of which 1,497 were of bronze, mostly full seamanship of the English, always gave them cannon (48 pdrs.), culverines (long 80 and 20 the victory over the clumsy and undermanned pdr*.), o.; the ammunition consisted of 128,- Spanish galleons, crowded as they were with 790 round shot and 6,176 cwt. of powdw, ^ vsoldiers. The Spanish artillery, too, was very ing about 60 rounds per gun, at an average badly served, and almost always planted, too charge of 4J lbs. The ships were manned with high. Off Calais the armada cast anchor, wait 8,062 sailors, and carried 19,296 s o ld i^ and 180 ing for the duke of Parmas fleet to come out of priesta and monks. Mules, carts, &c., were on the Flemish harbors; but it soon received word board to move the field artillery wheta landed. The that his ships, being unfit for fighting, could not whole was provisioned, according to the above come out until the armada had passed the authority, for 6 months. This fleet, unequalled (Straits and driven off the Anglo-Dutch blockad in its time, was to proceed to the Hemidi coast, ing squadron. It accordingly weighed again, where another army o f 80,000 foot and 4,000 but, when in sight of Dunkirk, was becalmed horse, under the duke of Parma, waa to em between the English fleet on one side and the bark, under its protection, in flat-bottomed Dutch on the other. Lord Howard prepared vessels constructed for the purpose, and man fire-ships, and when, during the night of Aug. 7, ned by sailors brou^t from the M tic . The the breeze sprang up again, he sent 8 of them whole were then to proceed to England. In that among the enemy. They produced a perfect country Queen Elizabeth had, by vigorous exer panic in the Spanish fleet. Some ships weighed tions, increased her fleet of originally 80 ships, anchor, some cut their cables, drifting before to some 180 vessels of various sizes, but gener the wind; the whole fleet got into confusion, ally inferior in that respect to those of the Span several ships ran foul of each other and were iards. They were, however, manned by 17,600 disabled. By morning order was far from be sailors, and therefore possessed far more numer ing restored, and the several divisions were ous crews than the Spanish fleet. The English scattered far and wide. Then Lord Howard, military force was divided into two armies, one, reinforced as he was by the ships equipped by of 18,600 men, under the earl of Leicester, for the nobility and gentry, as also by the blockad immediately opposing the enemy; the other, ing squadron under Lord Byron, and ably sec 46,000, for the defence of the queens person. onded by Sir Francis Drake, engaged the enemy According to a MS. in the British museum, enat 4 A. M. The battje, or rather chase (for the titlied Details of the English Force Assembled English were evidently superior on every point to Oppose the Spanish Armada, (MS. Reg. 18th of attack), lasted till dark. The Spaniards 0. 3cd.), 2 ^ 0 infantry were also expected fiwm fought bravely, but their unwieldy ships were the Low Gooatries. The armada was to leave . unfit for the navigation of narrow waters, and

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T h eyii^'cbm i^stely aer vice, soTEafclQie calasirii, after a certahi number of y f9 , jWrted'into the hermotybii or reserve. severs los& 'ae.^Wetlon ............................ ^ senttj was settled in a sort of mfiitawith the duke of Parmas transports having The thas been foiled, a landing in England by the ry w>lQli}e*, Btt ample extent of land betog set armada olone was out of the question. It was apart Ibr eoeh nian is an equivalent for his srfound that the greater part of the provisions on vioes. <fliese oolouies were mostly dtuated in board had been consumed, and as access to 'the low<w |>art <af the oomntiy, wher& attacks Spanish Flanders was now impossible, nothiag from th n e^ b b tia g Asiatic states were to be ooloides only were estiti^ll^remained but to return to Spam to lay in fresh wticipated; a stores. (See CertainAdvertiBementsontoflreon ^ mmer M e , the Ethiopans not bdng land Concerning the Losses and Distresses Hap* v y fomiidHMa opponents. The s^ength of pened to the Spanish Navie on the Coast of Ire the army lay to its infantry, and partionlsfly in land, London, 1688Examination of Emanuel Its ardiers. Beside these latter there were Fremosa, who served in the San Juan, 1,100 bodies of foot floldjers, variously armed and distons, flag-ship of Admiral Ricalde). The pas triboted into battalions, according to th^ir sage through the channel being also closed arms; spearmen, swordsmen, clubmen, idiogers, by the English fleet, nothing remained but to & C L The infantiv was supported by nxamtfm round Scotland on tlieir way home. The ar war-dbAftote, each m ann^ by 2 men, one to mada was but little harassed by the fleet of drive and tha:other to use the bow. Cavalry Lord Seymour sent in pursnitj as that fleet was does n ei flgtM on the monuments. One soli* badly supplied with ammunition and could not tary draw i^'of a man on horseback is oonsid venture on an attack. But after the Span ered to belong to tlie Boman epoch, and it ^ iards had rounded the Orkneys dreadiful storms peara certain that the nse of thehortofor riding arose and dispersed the whole fleet. Some and of c a v ( ^ became known to the EgyptiMia ships were driven back as far as the coast of th ro n g th w A-siati^ neighbors only. That at Norway, where they fell on the rooks; oth a later period they had a numerous cavalry, ers foundered in tlie North sea, or struck on acting, ^ all cavaby in ancient times, on the the rocks on the coast of Scotland or the He wings of the infantry, is certain from the imabrides. Soon after, fresh storms overtook nimity of the ancient historians on this point. them on tho west coast of Ireland, where The defensive armor of the Egyptians consisted above 80 vessels were lost Those of the of sh ield hdmets, and breastolatee, or eoats-ofcrews who escaped on shore were mostly killed; miul, of varioaa materials. Their mode of at about 200 were executed by command of the tacking a fortifled position shows many of the lord deputy. Of the whole fleet not more means and artifices known to the Greeks and than 60 vessels, and those in the most shat Eomans. 'Hiey had the tesi/udo, or ^ttringtered condition, and with famine on board, ram, the tinea, and scaling-ladder; tBat fhey, reached Santander about the middle of Sep however, also knew the nse of movable towers, tember, when the plan of invading England and that tiiey. nndermined walls, as Sir G. Wilwas definitively given up. Unson soaintains, is a mere supposition. From the tin^ o f PsMnmetions a coi^s of Grecian merouuies was maintained; tiiey were also coloDlzed ill lower Egypt.^Assyria furnishes ns with &e ewHest specimen of those Asiatic armies which, for above 1,000 years, struggled Army Ibr t ^ poesesaion of the countries between the Mediterranean and the Indus. There, as in AKSnr,1B^rganized body of armed men Egypt, t!^ monuments are our principal source which a state mtuntains for purposes of offen of information. The infantry appear armed sive or defensive war. Of th6 armies of ancient Edmilar to the Egyptian, though the bow seems history the first of which we know any thing pos less prominent, and the arms offensive aiwi de itive is that of Egypt Its grwid epoch of glory fensive Ub generally of better mi^e and more coincides with the reign of Khamses II. (SesostastefU appearance. There is, beside, more va tris), and the paintings and inscriptions r a tin g riety of armament, on account pf the greater to his exploits, on the numerous monuments of extent o f the empire. Spear, bow, sword, and his iign, form the principal source of our knowl dagger, are tiie principal weapons. Assyrians edge on Egyptian military matters. The war in the army of Xerxes are also represented with rior caste of Egypt was diyided into two class iion-mounted clubs. The defensive armament es, hermotyUi and ealaiirU, the first 16P,000, the other250,000 strong, in their best times. It consisted of ahelmet (often very tastefully work appears that these two classes wro di&tiogi^hed ed), a coat of i!B^l of felt or leather, and a from each other merely b r aW or Iwojrtb of str- shields TiWi war'chariota still ftmaoed an im ai it.
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portant portion of the army; it Lad 2 occu pants, and the driver had to shelter the bow man with his shield. Many of those who fight in chariots are represented in long coats-ofmail. Then there was the cavalry, which here we meet with for the first time. In the earliest sonlptures the rider mounts the bare back of his horse; later on, a sort of pad is introduced, and in one sculpture a high saddle is depicted, simi lar to that now in use in the East. The cavalry can scarcely have been very difierent from that of the Persians and later eastern nationslight, irregular horse, attacking in disorderly swarms, easily repelled by a well-armed, solid infantry, but formidable to a disordered or beaten army. Accordingly, it figured in rank behind the char ioteers, who appear to have formed the aristo cratic arm of the service. In infantry tactics some progress toward regular movements and formations in ranks and files appears to have been made. The bowmen either fought in ad vance, where they were always covered, each of them, by a shield-bearer, or they formed the rear rank, the first tind second ranks, armed with spears, stooping or kneeling to enable them to shoot. In sieges they certainly knew the use of movable towers and mining; and, from a passage in Ezekiel, it would almost appear that they made some sort of mound or artificial hill to command the walls of the towna rude be ginning of the Roman aggtx. Their movable and fixed towers, too, were elevated to the height of the besieged wcdl, and higher, so as to command it. The ram and vinea they used also; and, numerous as their armies were, they turned off whole arms of rivers into new beds in order to gain access to a weak front of the attacked place, or to use the dry bed of the riv er as a road into the fortress. The Babylonians seem to have had armies similar to those of the Assjrrians, but special details are wanting.The Persian empire owed its greatness to its found ers, the warlike nomads of the present Farsistan; a nation of horsemen, with whom cavalry took at once that predominant rank which it has since held in all eastern armies, up to the recent introduction of modern European drill. Darius Hystaspes established a standing army, in order to keep the conquered provinces in subjection, as well as to prevent the frMuent revolts of the satraps, or civil governors. Every province thus had its garrison, under a sepa rate commander; fortifaed towns, beside, were occupied by detachments. The provinces had to bear the expense of maintaining these troops. To this standing army also belonged the guards of the king, 10,000 chosen infantry (the Immor tals, Athanatoi), resplendent with gold, follow ed on the march by long trains of carriages, with their harems and servants, and of camels with provisions, beside 1,000 halberdiers, 1,000 horse guards, and numerous war-chariots, some of them armed with scythes. For expeditions of magnitude this armament was considered insufficient, and a general levy from all the prov inces of the empire took place. The mass of these various contingents formed a truly orien tal army, composed of the most heterogeneous parts, varying among themselves in armament and mode of fighting, and accompanied by im mense trains of b^gage and innumerable camp-followers. It is to the presence of these latter that we must ascribe the enormous num bers of the Persian armies as estimated by the Greeks. The soldiers, according to their re spective nationality, were armed with bows, javelins, spears, swords, clubs, daggers, slings, &c. The contingent of every province had its separate commander; they appear, from Herodo tus, to have been divided by tens, hundreds, ihousands, <fec., with oflBcers to command each decimal snbdivision. The commands of large corps or of the wings of the army were general ly given to members of the royal family. Among the infantry the Persian and the other Aryan nations (Medes and Bactrians) formed the ilUe. They were armed with bows, spears of moderate size, and a short sword; the head was protected by a sort of turban, the body by a coat covered with iron scales; the shield was mostly of wicker-work. Yet this Hite, as well as the rest of the Perisian infantry, was misera bly beaten whenever it was opposed to even the smallest bodies of Greeks, and its unwieldy and' disorderly crowds appear quite incapable of any but passive resistance ogainst the incipient pha lanx of Sparta and Athens; witness Marathon, Platraa, Mycale, and Thermopyles. The warchariots, which in the Persian army appear for the last time in history, might be useful on quite level ground against such a motley crowd as the Persian infantry themselves were, but against a solid mass of pikemen, su( h as the Greeks form ed, or g a in st light troops taking advantage of inequalities of ground, they were worse than useless. The least obstacle stopped them. In battle the horses got frightened, and, no longer under command, ran down their own infantry. As to the cavalry, the earlier periods of the em pire give us little proof of its excellence. There were 10,000 horse on the plain of Marathona good cavalry country^et they could not break the Athenian ranks. In later times it distin guished itself at the Granicus, where, formed in one line, it fell on the heads of the Macedonian columns as they emerged from the fords of the river, and upset them before they could deploy. It thus successfully opposed Alexanders ad vanced guard, under Ptolemy, for a long while, until the main body arrived and the light troops man<Buvred on its flanks, when, having no sec ond line or reserve, it had to retire. But at this

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period the Persian army Sad Iseen strangE&eiiea Dy the iafttsion of a Greek element, Imported by the Greek mercenaries, who, soon after Xerx es, were taken into pay by the king; and the cavalry tactics displayed by Meinnon on the Graaicus are so thoroughly nn-Asiatio that we may, in the absence of positive information, at once osoribe them to Greek inflaence.The ar mies of Greece are the first of the detdled oripanization of which we have ample and certain information. With them the history of tactics, especially infantry tactics, may be said to begin. Without stopping to give an account of the warlike system of the heroic age of Greece, as de scribed in Homer, when cavalry was unknown, when the nobility and cliieft fought in warchariots, or descended from them for a dnel with, an equally prominent enemy, and when the infantry appears to have been little better than that of the Asiatics, we at once pass to tiba military force of Athens in the time of her greatness. In Athens every free bom man was liable to military service. The holders of cer tain public offices alone, and, in the earlier times, the fourth or poorest class of freemen, were exempt. It was a militia system based upon slavery. Every youth on attaining his 18tl year was obliged to do duty for 2 years, especially in watching tho frontiers. During this time his military education was completed; afterword he remained liable to service up to his 60th year. In case of war the assembled citizens fixed the number of men to be colled out; in extreme coses only the levies cn masse (panstratia) were resorted to. Thq straUgi, 10 of whom were annually elected by the people, had to levy these troops and to organize them, so that the men of each tribe, or phyle, formed a body under a separate phylarch. These offi cers, as well as the taxiarchs, or captains of companies, were equally elected by the people. The whole of this levy formed the heovy infan try (hopUta) destined for the phalanx or deep lino formotion of spearmen, which originally formed tho whole of the armed force, and sub sequently, after the addition of light troops and cavalry, remained its mainstay^the corps which decided the battle. Tho phalanx was formed in -various degrees of depth ; we find mentioned phalanxes of 8,12, 25 deep. The armature of the hoplito) consisted of a breastplate or corslet, liclmet, oval target, spear, and short sword. Thc/or<e of the Athenian phalanx was attack; its charge was renowned for its furious imletus, especially after Miltiades, at Marathon, lad introduced tlie quickening of the pace dur ing the charge, so that they came down on the enemy with a run. On tho defensive, tho more solid and closer phalanx of Sparta wos its superior. 'Wliile at Marathon the whole force of the Athenians cousisted of a heavy armed pjjalanx of 10,066 hoplitie, at Plottea they had, beside 8,606 hoplitae, on equol number of light infontry. The tremendous pressure of the Persion invasions necessitated on extension of tho liability to service; the poorest cloSs, thot of the thetes, was enrolled. They were formed into light troops (^ymneta, ptili) ; they hod no defensive ormor ot oil, or a target only, and were supplied with a spear and javelins. With the extension of the Athenian power, their light troops wore reinforced by the contingents of their ollies, and even by mercenary troops. Acornanions, jEtolians, and Cretons, celebroted as archers and sUngers, were added. An inter mediate closs of troops, between them and the hoplitso, was formed, the peltaiUe, ormed simi lar to the light infontry, but capable of occupy ing oud maintaining a position. They were, however, of but little importance until after the Peloponnesian ^ar, when Iphicrotes reorgan ized tliem. The light troops of the Athenians enjoyed a high reputation for intelligence and quickness both in resolution and in execution. On several occasions, probably in difficult ground, they even successfully opposed the Spartan phalanx. The Athenian cavalry was introduced at a time when the republic was alreody rich ond powerful. The mountainous ground of Attica was unfavorable to this arm, but the neighborhood of Tliessaly and Bceotia, countries ribli in horses, and consequently tho first to form cavalry, soon caused its introduc tion in the other states of Greece. The Athe nian cavalry, first 306, tlien 666, and oven 1,660 strong, was composed of the richest citi zens, and formed a standing corps even in time of peace. They were a very effective body, extremely watchful, intelligent, and enterpris ing. Their position in battle, as well as that of the light troops, was generally on the wings of the ph^anx. In later times, the Athenians olso maintained a corps of 200 mercenary mounted archers {Mppotoxola). The Athenian soldier, up to the time of Pericles, received no pay. Af terward 2 oboli (beside 2 more for provisions, whicli the soldier had to find) were given, and sometimes even the hoplitm received as much as 2 drachms. Officers received double po^, cavalry soldiers three-fold, generals four-fold. The corps of heavy cavalry alone cost 40 talents ($46,666) per annum in time of peace, during war considerably more. The order of bat tle and mode of fighting were extreniely sim ple; the phalanx formed tho centre, the men locking their spears, and covering tho wliolo front with their row of shields. They attacked the hostile phalanx in a parallel front. When the first onset was not sufficient to break the enemys order, tlie struggle Jiand to hand with the sword decided the battle. In the mean time the light troops and cavalry either attack

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ed tlie corresponding troops of tlio oiieniy, or &tteippted to operate on the flank und rear of the phalanx, and to take advantage of any dis order manifesting itself in it. In case of a vietory they undertook the pursuit, in case of de feat they covered the retreat as much as possible. They were also used for reconnoitiing expeditions and forays, they harassed the enemy on the march, especially wlien ho had to pass a defile, and they tried to capture his convoys and stragglers^ Thus the order of battle y/aa ex tremely simple; the phalanx always operated as a whole; its subdivisions into smaller bodies had no technical significance; their command ers had no other task than to see that the order of the phalanx was not broken, or at least quickly restored. What the strength of Athe nian armies was during the Persian wars, we have shown above b.y a few examples. At the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, the force mustered 13,000 hoplita) for field service, 61,000 (the youngest and the oldest soldiers) for gar rison duty, 1,200 horsemen, and 1,G00 archers. According to Boeckhs calculations the force sent against Syracuse numbered 38,560 m en; rein forcements despatched afterward, 26,000 men ; in all nearly 65,000 men. After the complete ruin of this expedition, indeed, Atliens was as much exhausted a . )France aftertheKussian cam paign of 1812.^ai'ta was the military state, p ar excellence, of Greece. If the general gym nastic education of the Athenians developed the ^ ility os much as the strengtli of the body, the Spartans directed their attention mostly to strength, endurance, and hardiness. They valued steadiness in the ranks, and military point of honor, more than intelligence. The Athenian was educated as if he was to fight among light troops, yet in war he was fitted in to his fixed place in the heavy phalanx; the Spartaiij on the contrary, was brought up for service m the phalanx, and nothing else. It is evident that as long as the phalanx deoi^d the battle, the Spartan, in the long run, had the best of it. In Sparta, every freeman was en rolled in the armj; lists from his 20th to his 60th year. The ephori determined the nnmber to be called out, which was generally chosen among the middle-aged men, from 30 to 40. As in Athejis, the men belonging to the same tribe or locality were enrolled in the same body of troops. The organization of the army was iJased upon the confraternities (eTumotice) intro duced by Lycurgus, 2 of which formed a pentecostys; 2 of these were united into a loohos, and 8 or 4 lochi into a mora. This was the organization in Xenophons timef; in former periods it appears to have varied. The strength of a mora is variously stated at from 400 to 900 men, and their number at one time was said to be 600. These various bodies of free Spartans formed the phalanx; the hoplitsa forming it were armed with a spear, a ^ o rt sword, and a shield fastened romid the neck. Later on, Oleomenes introduced the large Oarian shield, fastened by a string on the left arm, and leaving both hands of the soldier free. The Spartans considered it disgracefp.1 for their men to return, after a defeat, without their shields; the preservation of the shield proved the re treat to have been mode in good order and a compact phalanx, while single fu^tives, run ning for their lives, of course had to throw away the clumsy shield. The Spartan phaltmx was generally 8 deep, but sometimes the depth was doubled by plying one wing behind the other. The men appear to have marched in step; some elementary evolutions were also in use, such as changing front to the rear by the half-tum of each man, advancing or retiring a wing by wheeling, &c., but they would seem to have been introduced at a later period only. In their best times, the Spartan phalanx, like that of Athens, knew the parallel front attack only. The ranks, on the march, were distant from each other 6 feet, in the charge 3 feet, and in a position receiving the charge, only 1 | foot, from rank to rank. The army was commanded by one of the kings, who, with his suite (dcmotia), occupied a position in the centre of the phalanx. Afterward, the number of the free Spartans having considerably de creased, the strength of the phalanx was kept up by a selection from the subjected Peri(Bci. The cawlry was never stronger than about 600 men, divided into troops (ulami) of 50 men. It merely covered the wings. T W e w ^ beside, a body of 300 mounted men^ the elite of the Spartan youth, but they dismount ed in battle, and formed a sort of body-gnard of hoplitcB around the king. Of light troops, there were the tUritm, inhabitants of the mountains near Arcadia, who generally covered the left w ing; the hoplitaj of the phalanx, be.side, had Hdot servants, who were expected in battle to do duty as sl^irmishers; thus, the 5,000 hoplitffl at Plateea brought 35,000 Helot light troops with them, but of the exploits of these latter wa find nothing stated in history.The simple tactics of the Greeks underwent consid erable changes after the Peloponnesian war. At the battle of Leuctra, Epaminondas had to op pose, with a small force of Thebans, the far more numerous, and hitherto invincible Spartan phalanx. The plain, parallel front attack, here, would have been equivalent to certain defeat, both wings b e i^ outflanked by the longer front of the enemy, i^aminondas, instead of advanc ing in line, formed his army into a deep column, and advanced against one wing of the Spartan ^ alanx, where the king had taken hi's station. He succeeded in breaking through the Spartan

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line at thiis the decisive point; he then wheeled his troops ronndi, and moving on eitter hand, ho himself outflanked the broken line, which could not form a new front without losing its tactical order. A t the battle of Mantinea, the ! Spartans formed their phalanx with a greater depth, but, nevertheless, the Thehan eolumn a g a in broke through it. AgesOaus in toarta, EmothOTs, Iphiorates, Ohabrias in Athens, also iniroduoed c h a n ^ in infkntry tactics. Iphkvates improved the peUastOy a ^ r t of light infantry, capable, however, in ease of need, to fight in line. They were armed with a small round target, strong linen corslet, Md long spear of w o o i Ohabrias made the first rai& of the phalanx, when on the defen^ft kneel down to receive the enemys charge. E w squares, and other columns, &C., were intiyduced, and accordingly deployments formw part of the elementary tactics. A t the same tim^ . greater attention was paid to light infmtry of aU ; several species of arms were borrowed from the barbarous and senfl-barbarous neigh bors of the Greeks, such as ardierSj mounted and on foot, slingera, &c. The m ^onty of the soldiers of this peiiod consisted of mercenaries. The wealtlay citizens, instead of _domg duty themselves, found it more convenient to pay for a substitute. The character of the phalanx, as the preeminently national portion of the army, in which the free citizens of the state only were admitted, thus snflfered iSwm ttis ad mixture of mercenaries, who had no ^ h t of citiaen^ip. Toward the apjawach of _the Ma cedonian epoch, Greece and her <xdonies were as much a mart for soldiers of fortune, and T ^ uM -nftT iftrifliL as Switzerland in llie ,18th and 19th centuries. The Egyptian Mn{^ had at an early time formed a corps of Greek troops. Af terward the Persian king gave his sonao stea^ness by the admission of a body of Greek mercenaries.' The chiefs of these bodiM w.ere regular condottieri, as much as those of It^ly in the 16th century. During this period, war like engines for throvnn^ stonw. JartgL^Sidj incendiary pfojectHes, were introduce^ esp^ daUy by the Athenians. Pericles *hwa^ used some simUar machines at the sie ^ of Samos. Sieges were carried on by forming a une ot contravallation, with ditch, or parapet, r o u ^ the place, investing it, and by the attempt to place ie war-engines in a oommanding po rtion near the w S s . Mining waS nse o f to bring the walls down. A t the assanlt, the column formed the t^na^nmm, the outer r a i ^ holding their shiel^ before tiiotn and the inner r a iis holding theta over their .heads, so as to form a roof (called by the Eftmans, tetiudo), agunst the projectiles of the While Greek skill WM thus mainly toward shaping uie flejdble material'of^Ihe mercenary bands into all sorts of novel and artificial formations, and in adopting or inventing new species of l i ^ t ' troops, to tha detriment of the ancient Doric heavy ^ a lw x , which at that time alfflie could decide b ^ e p , a monardiy grew up, which, adopting all improvements, formed a body of heavy infSmtry of such colossal dimensions, that no anay with which it came in contact could r e ^ t its diiock. Philip of Macedon form ed a stending army of about 80,000 infontry, and 3,000 caimlry. The main body of the army was an immense phalanx of some 16,000 or 18.000 men, formw upon the principle of the Spartan phalanx, but improved in armament. The small Grecian shield was replaced by the large oblong Oarian buckler, and the moderate ly sized spear by the Macedonian pike (sarista) of 24 feet in len^h. The depth of this phalanx varied, under PMip, from 8, to 10,12,24 men. With the tremendous length of the pikes, each of th<8 6 front ranks could, on levelling them, make the points project in front of the flrstrank. The regular advance of such a long firont of from 1.000 to 2,000 Mien, presupposes a great perfec tion of elementary drill, which in consequence was continually priictised. Alexander completed this organizafion. His phalanx was, normally, 16,884 men 'strpng, or 1,024 in flront by 16 deep. The filej of 16 (loeJios) was conducted by a lochagi^ who stood in the frt>nt rank. Two ffles foBmed a dilochy, 2 of which made a tetrarchy, ^ of whidi a taxiarchy, 2 of whicha xenagjrct syntagma, Iftm eninfant by 16 d e^ . This was the evolutionary unity, the march being made in columns of xenagies, 16 in front, fe t e e n xenagies (equal to 8 pentecosiarohies, or 4 chiliarchies, or 2 telarchies) formed^ a small phalanx, 2 of which a diphalangarchy, and 4 a tetraphalangarchy or phalanx properly so called. Every one of these subdi visions had its corresponding officer. The di- phalangarchy of the right wing was called head, that of the left wing, tail, or rear. When ever extraoidinaiy soliiUty was requjred, the left wing took staition behind the right, form ing-612 men in front by 82 in depth. On the other hand, by, deploying the 8 rear^ranks on the left of the front ranks, the extent of front could be doubled, and the depth reduced to 8. The distances of ranks and files were similar to those of the Spartans, but the close or der was so compact that the single soldier in the middle of the phalanx could not' turn. In tervals between th,e subdivisions of the phalanx were not allowed in battle; the whole formed one continnons line, charing m mwraUle. The phalanx was formed by Macedonian volunteers exclusively; though, after the conquest of Greec& G r e ^ s ls o could enter it. The scddiers were w hopUts. Besida shield

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and pike, they carried a helmet and sword, althongh the hand-to-hand fight with the latter weapon cannot very often have been required after the charge of that forest of pikes. When the phalanx had to meet the Roman legion, -the case indeed was different. The whole phalangite ^fitem, from the earliest Doric times down to the breaking up of the Macedonian empire, Buffered from one great inconvenience; it wanted flexibility. Unless on a level and open plain, t h ^ long, deep lines, could not move with order and regularity. Every obstacle in front forced it to form column, in which shape it was not prepared to act. Moreover, it haa no sec ond line or reserve. As soon, therefore, as it was met by an army, formed in smaller bodies and adapted to turn obstacles of ground without breaking line, and disposed in several lines sec onding each other, the phalanx could not help going into broken ground, where its new op ponent completely cut it up. But to such op ponents as Alexander had at Arbela, his 2 large phalanxes must have appeared invincible. Be side this heavy infantry of the line, Alexander had a guard of 6,000 hyraspistsa, still more heavily armed, with even lai^er bucklers and longer pikes. His light infantry consisted of argyraspides, with small silver-plated shields, and of numerous peltastse, both of which troops were organized in demi-ph^anxes of normally 8,192 men, being able to fight either in extended order or in line, like the hoplitsa; and their phalanx often had the same success. The Ifacedonian cavalry was composed of young Macedonian and Thess^ian noblemen, with the addition, subsequently, of a body of horsemen frotn Greece proper. They were divided into B<juadrons of which the Macedonian no bility alone formed 8. They belonged to what we should call heavy cavalry; they wore a helmet, ciiirass with cuissarts of iron scales to protect the leg, and were armed with a long sword w d pike. The horse, too, wore a front let of iron. This class of cavdry, the cataphracti, received great attention both from Philip and Alexander; the latter used it for his decisive manoeuvre at Arbela, when he first beat and pursued one wing of the Persians, and then, passing behind their centre, fell upon the rear of the other wing. They choired in various formations: in line, in common rec tangular column, in rhomboid or wedge;shaped column. The light cavalry had no defensive armor; it carried javelips and light short lances; there was also a corps of acrobalistee, or mounted archcrs. These troops served for outpost duty, patrols, reconnoitring, and irreg ular warfare generally. They were the contin gents of Tliraciau and Illyrian tribes, wliich, beside, furnished some few thousands of irreg ular infantry. A new arm, invented by Alex ander, claims our attention from the circum stance that it has been imitated in modern times, the di machos, moiuited troops, expected to fight either as cavalry or as infantry. The dragoons of the 16th and following centuries are a complete counterpart to these, as wo shall see hereafter. "W e have, however, no informa tion os to whether tliese hybrid troops of an tiquity were more successful in their double task than the modern dragoons. Thus was composed the array with which Alexander conquered the country between the Mediterra nean, the Oxus, and the Sutledj. As to its strength, at Arbela, it consisted of 2 large pha lanxes of hoplitoa (say 30,000 men), 2 semi phalanxes of peltastoo (16,000), 4,000 cavalry, and 6,000 irregular troops, in all about 56,000 men. At the Granicus, his force of all arms was 85,000 men, of whom 6,000 were cavalry.Of the Carthaginian -army wo know no details; even the strength of the force with which Han nibal passed the Alps, is disputed. The armies of the successors of Alexander show no im provements on his formations; the introduction of elephants was but of .short duration; when terrified by fire, these animals were more for midable to their own troops than to the enemy. The later Greek armies (under the Achcaan league) were formed partly on the Macedonian, partly on the Roman system.Tlie Roman army presents us with the most perfect system of infantry tactics invented during the time when the use of gunpowder was unknown. It maintains the predominance of heavy infantry and compact bodies, but adds to it mobility of the separate smaller bodies, the possibility of fighting in broken cround, the disposition of several lines one bdiind the other, partly as supports and reliefs, partly as a powerful re serve, and finally a system of training the single soldier which was even more to the purpose than that of Sparta. The Romans, accord ingly, overthrew every armament opposed to them, the Macedonian phalanx as well as the Numidian horse.In Romo every citizen, from his 17th to his 46th or 60th year, was liable to serve, unless he belonged to the lowest class, or had served in 20 campaigns on foot, or 10 cam paigns as a horseman. Generally the younger men only were selected, TJie drill of the sol dier was very severe, and calculated to develop his bodily powers in every imaginable way. Running, jumping, vaulting, climbing, wrest ling, swimming, first nalied, then in full arma ment, were largely practised, beside the regular drill in the use of the arras and the various movements. Long marches in heavy marghing order, every soldier carrying from 40 to 60 lbs., were kept up at the rate of 4 miles an hour, 'pieuse of the intrenching tools, and the throw ing up of intrenched camps in a short time, also

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formed part of the miHtary ddacatloD; and not tional arm of &e Bomans. The qualitative only the recruits, but even the legions of vet> distinction between the 8 lines, os far as it was erans, had to undergo all these exercises in based upon age and length of service, soon disorder to keep their bodies fresh and supple, and oppeared too. In the battle of Mitellus against to remain inured to fatigue and want. Such Jogurthfl^ there appeared, according to Sallust, soldiers were, indeed, fit to conquer the world. for the last time hastati, principes, triarii. In the best times of the republic there were Marius now formed out of the 80 manipuli of generally 2 consular armies, each consisting of the legion 10 cohorts, and disposed them in 2 2 legions and the contingents of the allies (in lines of 6 cohorts each. At the same time, the infantry of equal strength, cavalry double the normal strength of tho cohort was rtUsed to 600 strength of the Romans). The levy of the men; the 1st cohort, under the primus pilus, troops was made in a general assembly of the carried tho legionary eagle. The cavalry re citizens on the capitol or Oahipus Martius; an mained formed in turmea of SO rank and file equal number of men was taken from every and 8 decurions, the 1st of whom commanded tribe, which was again equally subdivided the turma. The armature of the Roman in among the 4 legions, until the number was fantry consisted of a shield of demi-cylindrio completed. Very often citizens, freed from shape, 4 feet by 2J, made of wood, covered service b y ^ e or tlieir numerous campaigns, with leather and strengthened with iron fast entered again as volunteers. The recruits were enings; in the middle it had a boss {umbo) to then sworn in and dismissed until required. parry off spear-thrusts. The helmet was of When callcd in, the youngest and poorest were brass, generally with a prolongation behind to taken for the vdites, the next in age and means protect the neck, and fastened on with leather fur the hastati and principos, the oldest and bands covered with brass sc^es. Tho breast wealthiest for the triarii. Every legion counted plate, about a foot square, was fastened on a 1,200 velites, 1,200 hastati. 1,200 principes, 600 leather corslet with scaled straps passing over triarii, and SO O horsemen (knights), in all 4,600. the shoulder; for the centurions, it consisted The hastati, principes, and triarii, were each of a coat of mail covered with brass sctdes. The divided into 10 manipuli or companies, and an right leg, exposed when advanced for tho equal number of velites attached to each. The 8word*thrqst, was protected by a brass plate. velites (rorarti, occtntiyfwentaHi) formed tho Beside the short sword, whicn was used for light infantry of the legion, and stood on its thrusting more than for cutting, the soldiers wings along with the cavalry. The hastati carried the pilum, a heavy spear 4J feet wood, formed the 1st, the principes the 2d line; they with a projecting iron point of l|foot, or nearly were originally armed with spears. The triarii 6 feet in all lon^, but 2 | inches square in the formed the reserve, and were armed with tho wood, and weighmg about 10 or 11 lbs. When pilum, a short but extremely heavy and dan thrown at 10 or 16 paces distance, it often pen gerous ^ear, which they threw into the front etrated shields and breastplates, and almost ranks of the enemy immediately before enga every time threw down its man. The velites, ging him sword in hand. Every manipulus was lightly equipped, carried light short iavelins. commanded by a centurion, having a 2d centu In the later periods of the republic, when bar rion for his lieutenant. The centurions ranked baric auxiliaries undertook tho light service, through the whole of the legion, from the 2d this class of troops disappears entirely. The centurion of the last or 10th manipulus of the cavalry were provided with defensive armor hastati to the 1st centurion of the 1st manipulus similar to that of the infantry, a lance and a of the triarii who, in the absence longer sword. But the Roman national cavalry of a superior oflicer, even took the command of was not vei7 good, and preferred to fight dis the whole legion. Commonly, the primus pilus mounted. In later periods it was entirely done commanded (\Utho triarii, the same as the primus . away with, and Numidian, Spanish, Gallic, and princeps (1st centurion of 1st manipulus of German horsemen, supplanted it. The tactical )rincipes), all the principes and the primus disposition of the troops admitted of great mo lostatus, and all the hastati of the l^ion. The bility. The manipuli were formed with inter egion was commanded in the earlier times in vals equal to their extent of front; the depth turns by its 6 military tribunes; each of them varied from 5 or 6 to 10 men. The manipuli held the command for 2 montibis. After the 1st of the 2d line were placed behind the intervals civil war, legates were placed as standing chiefs of the 1st; the triarii still further to the rear, at the head of every legion; the tribunes now but in one unbroken lino. According to cir were mostly oflBcers intrusted with the staff or cumstances, tho manipuli of each line could administrative business. The difference of ar close up or form line without intervals, or those mament of the 3 lines had disappeared before of the 2d line could march up to fill the inter the time of Marius. The pilum had been given vals of the 1st; or else, where greater depth to all 8 lines of the legion; it now was the na was required, the manipuli of the principes

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closed up each in rear of the corresponding manipnlus of the hastati, doubling its depth. When opposed to the elephants of Pyrrhus, the 3 linos all formed Avith intervals, each manipulus covering the one in its front, so as to leave room for the animals to pass straight through the order of battle. In this formation the clumsiness of the phalanx was in every -vvay successfully overcomo. The legion could move and mancoavre, without breakmg its order of battle, in ^ound where the phalanx durst not venture without the utmost risk. One or two manipuli at most would have to shorten their front to detilo past an obstacle; in a few mo< ments, the front was restored. The legion could cover the whole of its front by light troops, 09 they could retire, on the advance ot the line, through the intervals. But the prin> cip^ advantage was the disposition in a pluraiity of lines, brought into action successively, according to the requirements of the moment. With the phalanx, one shock had to decide. No fi*esh troops were in reserve to take up the fight in case of a reversein fact that case was never provided for. The legion could engage the enemy with its light troops and cavalry on the whole of his frontcould oppose to the advance of his phalanx its first line of hastati, which was not so easily beaten, as at least 6 of the 10 manipuli had first to be broken singlycould wear out the strength of the enemy by the advance of the hastati, and finally decide the victory by the triarii. Thus tlie troops and the progress of the battle remained in the hand of the general, while the phalanx, once engaged, was irretriev ably engaged with all its strength, and had to. see the oattle out. It the Roman general de sired to break off the combat, the leglonwy organization permitted him to take up a posi tion with his reserves, while the troops engaged before retired through the intervals, and took up a position in their turn. Under all circum stances, there was always a portion of the troops in good order, for even if the triarii were re pulsed, the 2 first lines had re-formed behind tliem. When the legions of Flaminius met Philips phalanx in the plains of Thessaly, their first attack was at once repulsed; but charge following charge, the Macedonians got tired and lost part of their compactness of formation; and wherever a sign of disorder manifested itself, there was a Roman manipulus to attempt an inroad into the clumsy mass. At last, 20 mani puli attacking the flanks and rear of the phalanx, tactical continuity could no longer be main tained ; the deep line dissolved into a swarm of fugitives, and the battle was lost. Against cavalry, the legion formed the orJis, a sort of square with baggage in the centre. On the march, when an attack was to be apprehended, it formed the legio qiuidraUi^ a sort of length ened column with a wide front, baggage in the centre. This was of course possible in the open plain, only where the line of march could go across the country. In Oojsars time the legions were mostly recruited by voluntary enlistment in Italy. Since the Social war, the right of citizenship, and with it liability for service, was extended to all Italy, and consequently there were far more men available than required. The pay was about equal to the earnings of a laborer; recruits, therefore, were plentiful, even without having recourse to the conscription. In exceptional cases only weie legions recruited in the provinces; thus Oeesar had his fifth le gion recruited in Roman Gallia, but afterward it received the Roman naturalization m trume. The legions were far from having the nominal strengSi of 4,500 men; those of Csesar were seldom much above 8,000. Levies of recruits were formed into new legions (legionea tironvan), rather than mixed with the veterans in the old legions; these new legions were at first ex cluded from battles in the open field, and prin cipally used for guarding the camp. The legion was divided into 10 cohorts of 8 manipuli each. The names of hastati, principes, triarii, were maintained as far as necessary to denote the rank of oflBioers according to the svstem indi cated above; as to the soldiers, tnese names had lost all significance# The 6 centurions of the first cohort of each legion were, by right, present at councils of war. The centurions rose from the ranks, and seldom attained higher command ; the school for superior oflScers was in the persond staff of the general, consisting of young men of education, who soon advanced to th rank of tribuni militum, and later on to that ot legati. The armament of the soldier remained the same: pilum and sword. Beside Ms accoutrements, the soldier carried his per sonal baggage, weighing from 85 to 60 pounds. The contrivanoe for carrying it was so clumsy that the baggage had first to be deposited be fore the soldier was ready for battle. The oamp-utensils of the army werejiarried on the back of horses and mules, of whfeh a legion re quired about 600. Every legion had its eagle, and every cohort its colors. For light infantry, Osesar drew from his legions a certain number of men {anteaignani), men equally fit for light service and for close fight in line. Beside these, he had his provincial auxiliaries, Cretan archers, Balearic slingers, Gallic and Numidian contin gents, and German mercenaries. His cavalry con sisted partly of Gallic, partly of German troops. The Roman velites and cav ^y Ijad disappeared some time ago.^The staff of the army consisted of the lega^ appointed by the senate, the lieu tenants of the general, whom he employed to command detached corps, or portions of the order of battle. Osesar, for the first time, gave

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to every legion a legate as staading commander. If there were not legati enough, the qucestor, too, had to. take the command of a legion. He waa properly the paymaster of the army, and chief of the oommissariat, and was assisted in this office by numerous clerks and orderlies. Attached to the staff were the triheni miUtum, and the young volunteers above mentioned {conM>erml6a^ eomitea prcBtoHi), doing duty as a^jutantsB, orderly officers; but in battle they fought iaUne, the same as private soldiers, in the ranks of tie eoJiors preBtoria, coneistiog of the lictoi^s, clerks, servants, guides (ap^latoTe\ and ordwlies (a/pparitorei) of the head-^oarters. The goceral, beside, had a sort of penonal gaacd, coasting of veterans, who voluntarily bad r^nlisted on the call of their former <^ef. This troop, mounted on the march, but fighting on foot, was considered the ilite of the army; it carried and guarded the vexUlum, the signal^ banner for the whole army. In b a tt^ CsBsar peuerally fought in S lines, 4 cohorts per leigion in the firet, and 3 in the second and third lines each; the cohorts of the second line Messed on the intervals of the first. Thje second lina hn/i to relieve the first; the thirdline forn}ed>agen eral reserve for decisive mancpuv^es agwnst the fr(t or flank of the enemy, or for parrying his decifflve. thrusts. Wherever the enemy so far outflanked the line that its prolongatipn became necisBai7 , the awpy was dispoeea in two lines only. One single line (aeies ^^0! ^made use of in an extreme case of n e ^ (N^y, and then without intervals between the cc^ortsj in the defence of a camp, however, it was ti,e rule, as the line was ^ 1 8 to 10 deep, an^ <^oul4. iotva.. a reserve from the men who had nx> ;rpom on the ]parapet. Augustus completed work of .making the Boman troops * regular st^ding army. He had 25 legions idistributed ^ over the empire, of which 8 were on the Bhioe (con sidered'the main strength, r<>5w, of the army), 8 in Spain, 3 in Africa, 8 itt 3 ^ p t, 4 in Syria and Ajsia Minor, 6 in thd iOanTtoim countries. Italy was garrisoned by ciiosen troops recruited exclusively in , l ^ t country, and fcnrming the imperial guard; this consisted of 12, lisiter on, of 14 cohorts; beside these the city of Homo bad 7 cohorts of municipal ^ a rd s {vigil&i), formed, originally, from emahdpated slaves. Beside tiis regular army, the^provinces had to furnish, as formerly, their light auxiliary troops, now mostly reduced to a sort of militia for ^a^rifion and police duty. On ,menaced frontiers, however, not only ^ese auxiliary troops, tmt foreign merceUanes, too, were em ployed in active service. The ni^nbei: of legions increased under Tr^an to 80, under Sepl^^us Severus to 88. The legions, beside cum bers, had names, te^en from thehr eifttio&s (Z. ^rman4ca, Z. itoZic), from emperors (X. Augu8ta\ from gods ( i . Primigenia^ L. Jijpollmarw), or conferred as honorary diatincfeona -(Z. fidelity Z- P(, Z. iniykta). The orgaaization ofwe legion im^rwentsome changes. The comman^r was nQW called prasifectus. The first^ cohort was double4 strength (cohors miUiaria), axid the normal strengih of the legioi^ raised to o,l0O infantey and 726 cavalry; this was to be minimum, and in case of need oaie or. eohorte m iU iar^ were to be added. coJum miUiaria, "W SA commanded by 9 ^ m i^ tribune, the others by tribunes or rank of was thus connned to jSul terns. The admission of liberated, or non*] erated sl^ve% of the provi^cei^ a4d.lill sorts of people into the legions, became;the rule; ^m(o;iipitizenship being req|w edf^ the p r ^ ian ain Xtaty only, and even there this was abandoned in later times. The Eoman nation ality of tiie army was thus very soon drowned in th e :influx of barbaric and semirbarbacic, Eomanijsed and non^omanizedelements; the officers alone m aint^ed the Eoman character. deteri6ration of ffie elements oomposing the army very soon reacted upon its armament and taeucs. The heavy breastplate and pilum yffsth thrown overboard; the toilsome system of drill, Which had formed *lhe conquerora of the world, was n ^ e c te d ; camp-folJtewerf and lux uries became necessary to the army, and the impedifH&nta (train of baggage) increased as strength and ^Hdurance decreased. As had been the case in Greece, the decline was mark ed by neglect of the heavy line-infantry, by a foolish jEaney for all sorts of light armament, and by the adoption of barbaric equipments and tactics. Thus we find innumerable clos^cationa of M|fet tro c^ {mtasiMa^ea^ exeuhatores^
e!iDef^9^ prcmtrtaiorea^ eoutati,

/hiniiioreSylMMatarii, tragularU)^ armed with all sorts of ptojeCtale% and we are told by Vegetitts that the cavalry had been improved in imi tation of the Gbths, Alani, and Huns. Final ly, an distinction of equipment and armament between B(natis and barbariaus ceased, and the Gtemans, physically and morally superior, marched over' the bodies of the un-Romanized legitms.The conquest of the Occident by the Germans thus was opposed by but a small rem nant, a'dim tradition of the ancient Boman tactics; but even this small remnfflat was now deistroyed. The whole of the middle ages is as barten a period for the develoianent of tactics as for that any other science. The feud^ system, though in its very origin a military organization, was essentially opposed to .disci pline. Bebellions and secessions of large vas sals, with i^ iir contingents, were of regular occurrence. The ^stribution of orders to the

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chiefs turned generally into a tnmultuous coun cil of war, wliich rendered all extensive opera tions impossible. Wars, therefore, were seldom directed on decisive points; struggles for the possession of a single locality filled up entire campaigns. The only operations of magnitude occurring in all this period (passing over the confused times from the 6th to the 12th cen tury), are the expeditions of the German em perors against Italy, and the crusades, the one as resultless as the other.-The infantay of the middle ages, composed of the feudal retainers and part of the peasantry, was chiefly, composed of pikemen, and mostly contemptible. It was great sport for the knights, covered as they were with iron all over, to ride singly into this unprotected rabble, and lay about them with a v^iU, A portion of the infantry was afmed, on the continent of Europe, with the crdssbow, while m England the longbow became the national weapon of the peasantry. This long bow was a very formidable weapon, and se a re d the superiority of the English over the French at Crecy, Poitiers, and Agincourt. Easily protected against rain, which rendered the crossbow unserviceable at times, it pro jected its arrow to distances above 200 yards, oj* much less than the effective range of the old smooth-bored musket. The arrow pene trated a one-inch board, and would even pass through breastplates. Thus it long maintained its place even against the first small fire-arms, especially as six arrows could be shot oflF while the musket of that epoch could be loaded and fired once; and even as late as the end of the 16th century Queen Elizabeth attempted to reintroduce tie national longbow as a weapon of war. It was especially effective against cavalry; the arrows, even if the armor of the men-at-arms was proof against them, wounded or killed the horses, and the unhorsed knights were thereby disable^ and generally made prisoners. The archers acted either in skirmishing order or in line. Cavalry was the decisive arm of the middle ages. The knights in full armor formed the first effective body of heavy cavalry, charing in regular for mation, which we meet with in history; for Alex anders cataphracti, though they decided the day at Arbela, were so much an exception that we hear nothing more of them after that day, and during the ^whole sequel of ancient history, infantry maintains its preeminent rank in battle. The only progress, then, which the middle ages have bequeathed to us, is the creation of a caval ry, from which our modern mounted service de scends in a direct line. And yet, what a clum sy thing this cavalry was, is proved by the one fact, that during the whole middle ages the cavalry wsa the heavy, slow-moving arm, while all light service and quick movements \^ere execule^ ByTiiiim ThelinrgKts, how ever, did not always fight in close order. They preferred fighting duels with single opponents, or spurring their horses into the m i^t of the hostile infantry; thus the mode of fighting pufc a battle was ^rried back to the Homeric times. When &ey did act in close order, they charged either in line (one deep, the more lightly-armed esquires forming the second rank) or in deep column. ^ Such a charge was undertaken, as a rule, against the knights (men-at-arms) only of the opposing army; upon its infantry it would have been wasted. The horses, heavily laden with their own as well as their riders armor, could run but riowly and for short distances. During the crusad^ therefore, and in the wars with the Mongolians in Poland and Silesia, this immov able cavalry was constantly tired out, and, finally, worsted by the active light horsemen of the E ^t. In the Austrian and Burgundian wars against Swit^rland, the men-at-arms, en tangled in difficult ground, had to dismount and form a phalanx even more immovable t.han that of Macedon; in mountain defiles, rocks and stumps of trees were hurled down upon them, in consequence of which the phalanx lost its tactical order, and "v^as scattered by a reso lute attack.Toward the 14th century a kind of lighter cavalry was introduc^, and a portion of the archers were mounted to facilitate their manoeuvring; but these and other changes were soon rendered useless, abandoned, or turn ed to different account by the introduction of that new element, which was destined to change the whole system of warfaregunpowder. From the Arabs in Spain the knowledge of tlio cot^osition and the use of gunpowder spread to France and the rest of Europe; the Arabs themselves had received it from nations fur ther east, who again had it from the original inventors, the Chinese. In the first half of the 14th century cannon first was introduced into European armies; heavy, unwieldy pieces of ordnance, throwing stone balls, and unfit for any thing but the war of sieges. Small arms were, however, soon invented. The city of Perugia in Italy supplied itself in 1864, with 600 hand-guns, the barrels not more than eight inches long; they subsequently gave rise to the. manufacture of pistols (so called from Pistoja in Tuscany). Not long afterward longer and heavier hand-guns (arquel>usc) were manufac tured, corresponding to our present musket; but short and heavy in the barrel, they had but a restricted range, and the matchlock was an almost absolute hinderance to correct aim, be side having nearly every other possiljle disad vantage. Toward the close of the 14th century there was no military force in western Europe without its artillery and arquebusiers. But the influence of the new arm on general tactics was

74
Torj little perceptible. BotH l&rj^ and fire-arms took a very long time in loading, and 'W bat with their clumsiness and costliness, thej had not even superseded the crossbow by 1450. In the mean time the general breaking up of the feudal system, and the rise of cities, con tributed to change the composition of armies. The larger vassals were either subdued by cen tral authority, as in France, or had become quasi-independent sovereigns, os in Germany and Italy. The power of the lesser nobility was broken by the central authority in conjunc tion with the cities. The feudal armies no longer existed; new armies were formed from the numerous mercenaries whom the ruin of feudal ism had set free to serve those who would pay them. Thus, something approaching standing armies arose; but these mercenaries, men of aU nations, difficult to keep in order, and not vei*y regularly paid, committed very great excesses. In France, King Charles VII. therefore formed a permanent force from native elements. In 1445 he levied 15 compagniea d'ordonnanee of 600 men each; in all, 9,000 cavalry garrisoned in the towns of the kingdbm, and paid with regularity. Every company was divided into 100 lances; a lance consisted of one man-atarms, 8 archere, an esquire, and a page. Thus they formed a mixture of heavy cavalry with mounted archers, the 2 arms, in battle, acting of course separately. In 1448 he added 16,000 francs-archers, under 4 captains-general, each commanding 8 companies of 500 men. The whole of the archers had the crossbow. They were recruited and armed by the parishes, and free from all taxes. This may be considered the first standing army of modern times.At the close of this first period of modern tactics, as they emerged from mediajval confusion, the state of things may be summed up as follows: The main body of the infantry, consisting of mercenaries, was armed with pike and sword, breastplate and helmet. It fought in deep, close masses, but, better armed and drilled than the feudal infantry, it showed greater tenacity and order in combat. The standing levies and the mercenaries, soldiers by profession, were ot course superior to the casual levies and discon nected bands of feudal retainers. The heavy cavalry now found it sometimes necessary to charge in close array against infantry. The light infantry was still principally composed of archers, but the use of the hand-gun for skir mishers gained ground. The cavjury remained, as yet, the princijjal arm; heavy cavalry, menat-arms encased in iron, but no longer com posed, in every case, of the nobility, and re duced from its former chivalrous and Homeric mode of fighting to the more prosaic ne cessity of charging in close ordev^ But the un wieldiness of such cavalry was now gene rally felt, and many devices were planned to find a lighter kind of horse. Mounted arch ers, as has been stated, had in part to supply this want; in Italy and the neighboring coun tries the itradiotiy light cavalry on the Turkish plan, composed of Bosnians and Albanian, mercenaries, a sort of Bashi-Bazouks, found ready employment, and were much feared, especi^y in pursuits. Poland and Hungary had, beside the heavy cavalry adopted from the West, retained their own national light cavalry. The artillery was in its infancy. The heavy guns of the time were, indeed, taken into the field, but could not leave their position after it was once taken up; the powder was bad, the load ing difficult and slow, and the range of the stone-balls short.^The close of the 16th and the beginning of the 16th century are marked by a double progress; the French improved the artillery, and the Spaniards gave a new charac ter to the infantry. Charles VIII. of France so far made his guns movable that, not only could he take them into tlie field, but make them change their position during battle and follow the other troops in their movements, which, however, were not very quick. He thereby became the founder of field artillery. His guns, mounted on wheeled carriages and plentifully horsed, proved immensely superior to the old-fashioned clumsy artillery of the Italians (drawn by bullocks), and did such execu tion in the deep columns of the Italian infantry, that Macchiavelli wrote his Art of War princip^y in order to propose formations, by which the eflfect of such artillery on infantry could be counteracted. In the battle of Marignano, Francis I. of France defeated the Swiss pikemen by the effective fire and the mobility of this artillery, which, from flanking positions, enfiladed the Swiss order of battle. But the reign of the pike, for infanti-y, was on thei de cline. The Spaniards improved the common hand-gun (oryueftttac) and introduced it into tlie regular heavy infantry. Their musket (kacquebutte) was a heavy, long-barrelled arm, bored for S-onnce buDets, and fired from a rest formed by a forked pole. It sent its bullet through the strongest breastplate, and was therefore decisive against the heavy cavalry, which got into disorder as soon as the men began falling. Ten or 15 musketeers were placed v/ith every company of pikemen, and the effect' of their fire, at Pavia, astonished both allies and enemies. Frundsberg relates tliat, in that battle a single shot from such a musket used to bring down several men and horses. From that time dates the superiority of the Spanish infantry, which lasted for above 100 years.The war consequent upon the rebellion of the Netherlands was of great influence on the formation of armies. Both Spaniards and

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Dutch improved all arms considerably. Hith erto, in the armies of mercenaries, every man offering for enlistment had to come fully equip ped, armed, and acquainted 'with the use of his arms. But in this long war, carried on dur ing 40 years oh a small extent of country, the available recruits of this class soon became scarce. The Dutch had to put up with such able-bodied volunteers as they could get, and the government now was under the necessity of see ing them drilled. Maurice of Nassau composed the first drill-regulations of modern times, and thereby laid the foundation for tbe uniform in struction of a whole army. The infantry began again to march in step; it gained much in homogeneity and solidity. It was now formed into smaller bodies; the companies, hith erto 400 to 600, were reduced to 150 and 200 men, 10 companies forming a regiment. Tho improved musket gained ground upon the pike; one-third of the whole infantry consisted of musketeers, mixed in each company with tho )ikemen. These latter, being required for land-to-hand fight only, retained their helmet, )reastplate, and steel gauntlets; the musketeers threw away all defensive armor. The forma tion was generally 2 deep for the pikemen, and from 5 to 8 deep for tlie musketeers; as soon as the first rank had fired, it retired to load again. Still greater changes took place in cavalry, and here, too, Maurice of Nassau took the lead. In the impossibility of forming a heavy cavalry of men-at-arms, ho organized a body of light-horse recruited in Germany, armed them with a helmet, cuirass, brassarts for the arms, steel gauntlets, and long boots, and as with tho lance they would not have been a match for tho heavy-armed Spanish cavalry, he gave them a sword and long pistols. This new class of horsemen, approaching our modern cuirassiers, soon proved superior to the far less numerous and less movable Spanish men-atarms, whoso horses they shot down before the slow mass broke in upon them. Maurice of Nassau liad his cuirassiers drilled as well as his infantry; he so far succeeded, that he could venture to execute in battle, changes of front and other evolutions, with large and small bodies of them. Alva, too, soon found the neecssity of improving hia light horse; hitherto they had been fit for skirmishing and single combat only, but under his direction they soon learned to charge in a body, the same as the heavy cavalry. The formation of cavalry remained still 5 to 8 deep. About this time Henry IV. of France introduced a new kind of mounted service, the dragoons, originally infantry, mount ed on horses for quicker locomotion only; but very few years after their introduction, they were used as cavalry as well, and equipped for this double service. They had neither defen* sive armor nor high boots, but a cavalry sword, and sometimes a lance; beside, they carried the infantry musket, or a shorter carbine. These troops did not, however, come up to the expec tations which had led to their formation; they soon became a portion of the regular cavalry, and ceased to fight as infantry. (The emperor Nicholas of Russia attempted to revive the original dragoons by forming a body of 16,000 men strong, fit for dismounted as well as mount ed service; they never found occasion to dis mount in battle, always fought as cavalry, and are now broken up and incorporated, as caval ry dragoons, with the remaining Russian caval ry.) In artillery tlie French maintained the superiority they had gained. The prolonge was invented by them about this time, and case-shot introduced by Henry IV. The Span iards and Dutch, too, lightened and simplified their artillery, but still it remained a clumsy concern, and light, movable pieces of effective calibre and range were still unknown.With the 30 years war opens the period of Gustavus Adolphus, tho great military reformer of tho 17th century. His infantry regiments were composed of two-thirds musketeers, and onethird pikemen. Some regiments consisted of musketeers alone. The muskets were so much lightened, that the rest for firing them became unnecessary.. He also introduced paper cart ridges, by which loading was much facilitated. The deep formation was done away with; his pikemen stood 6, his musketeers only 8 deep. These latter were drilled in firing by platoons and ranks. The unwieldy regiments of 2,000 or 3,000 men were reduced to 1,800 or 1,400, in 8 companies, and 2 regiments formed into a brig ade. With this formation ho defeated the deep masses of his opponents, often disposed, like a column or full square, 80 deep, upon which his artillery played with terrible effect. The cav alry was reorganized upon similar principles. The men-at-arms were completely done away with. The cuirassiers lost the brassarts, and some other useless pieces of defensive armor; they were thus made considerably lighter and more movable. His dragoons fought nearly always as cavalry. Both cuirassiers and dra goons were formed only 3 deep, and had strict orders not to lose time with firing, but to charge at once sword in hand. They were divided into squadrons of 126 men. The artil lery was improved by the addition of light guns. Tho leather guns of Gustavus Adolphus are celebrated, but were not long retained. They were replaced by cast-iron ^pounders, so light'that they could be drawii by 2 horses; they could be fired 6 times while a musketeer fired twice; 2 of these were attached to every regiment of infantry. Thus, the division of light tmd heavy field artillery was established;

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the light guns accompanied the infan&y while in all armies. There were no longer any menthe heavy ones remained in reserve, or took up at-arms; ttie cuirassiers maintained the breasta poeitf< T > n for the whole of the tiattle^ The 'plate and helmet only; in France and Sweden, armies of this time beg^ to Bhow' the in- the breastplate was done away with too. The creaaing preponderance of in fe n ^ Over cav increa^ng ffiisienoy Bnd rapidity of infentpry alry, I t Leipsic, in 1681, Gustavns Adoiphns fire told veiy much against cavalry. It was h ^ 19,000 infantry and 11,000 cavalTYr Tilljr soon considered perfectly useless for this latter arm to ^ a rg e infantry sword in hand; md had 81,000 infantry and 13,000 cavalry. At the opinion of the irresistibility of a firing Bne LQtzen, 1682, Wallenstein had 24,000 infantry became prevtJent that cavalry, too, wa and 16,000 cavalry (in 170 squ^rons). The taught toso rely on its carbines than on the number of guns, too, increased with the intro sword. Thus,more during this period, it often oc duction of light pieces; the' Swedes often had curs that 2 lines of cavalry maintain a firing from 6 to 12 guns for every 1,000 men; and at fight against each other the same as if they were the battle of the Lech, Gustavus Adolphus infantry; and It was considered v ^ daring, to forced the p^assage of that river under cover of ride up to 20 yards from the enemy, fire a vol the fire of 72 heavy guns. During the latter ley, and chtarge at a trot. Charles XII.^ how half of the 17th and the first h ^ of thd 18th ever, stuck ta the rule of his great predecessor. century, the pike, and all defensive attadr for cavalry never stopped to fire; it always infantry, was finally done away with by the His charged, sword in hand, a g ^ s t any thing op genei^ introduction of the bayonet. This wea posing it, cavalry, infantry, batttaies, and topon, invented in France about 1640, had to trenchments; and always with success. The struggle 80 years against the pike. The AusFrench, too, broke through the new system trians first adopted it for all their infantry, the recommenced relying on the sword only. The Prussians next; the French retained the pike depth of c a ^ ry was still further reduced from till 1703, the Russians till 1721. The flint-lock, 4 to 8. In artfllery, the lightening of the guns, invented in France about the same time as the the use of cmtridges and case-shot, become, bayonet, was also gradusQly introduced, before now, general. Another great chanw was that the yew 1700, into most armies. It materially abridged the operation of loading, protected, to of the incorporation of tMs arm with the army. some degree, the powder in the pain from rain, Hitherto, though the guns belonged to the > proper and thus contributed very much to tJie abolition state, the men serving them were m soldiers, but formed a sort of guild, and artil of the pike. Yet firing was still so dow that a lery was considered not an arm but a handi T nnT i yraa not expected to use more than from 24 The officwrs had no rank in the army, to 86 teartridgesin a battle; until in the latter half craft. and were considered more related to maste^ of this penod improved regulations, better tailors and <arpenters than to gentlemen with drill, and further improvement in the construc a commission in their pockets. About this tion of smafl arms (especially the iron ramrod, time, hortreverj artillery wae made a coAiponent first introduced in Prussia), enaMed tho soldier part of the army, and divided into companies to ftre with considerable rapidity. This neoes- and battalions: the cofiiTerted into ritabfed a still fartiier reduction of the depth of permanent soldiers, men*were and the officers ranked formation, and infantry was notsr formed only with the infEBitry and cavalry. The centrali 4 deep. A specie^ iliti infantry was created zation and permanence of the armed contingent in the companies of grenadiers, Originally in upon this change, paved the way for tha sci tended to throw hand-grenades before Coming ence of artillery, which, under the old system, to close Quarters, but soon reduced to fight with could not devdop itself.The pasjjwe f r ^ the m t^ e t only. In some G^naian. armies deep fbrmatlon to line, from the pike to ^ e riflemen had been formed as early as the 30 musket, from the of cavalry to that years war; the rifle itself had been invented of infantry, had supremacy thus been gradually aemat Leit>ac in 1498. This arm was now mixed plished when Frederic the Great op^ed his with me musket, the best shots in each company campaigns, and, with them, the classical of being artned with it; but, out of Germany, the line tactics. He formed his infkntry 8 era de^, rifle found but little favor. The Austrians had and got it to fire 5 times in 1 minute. In his also a sort of light infantry. c^led jMf^itiowa. first battles at Mollwitz, this faif^tty Orostian and Servian irregulars from the mili very ployed line, and repelled, by its ra]^d fife, all tary frontier agidnst Turk^, useful in roving chargesm of the Austrian cavalry, whieh h ^ j ^ t expeditk>ns and pursuit, but, from the ^ t ic s of totally routed the Prussian horse; aftr finish the day ftnd their absolute want of drifl, useless ing with the cavalry, the Prussiaaa in fa n ^ at in battle. The French and Dutch treated, for tacked the Auttrian infantry, defeated it, and purposes, irregular infantty eafied ctmthuB won* fh battle. Formatioa f squares fO gtA m /rm u^. Cavalry, too, wi lightened

77
against cavalry wai neter attempted in grelk battles, but>' wben infantry, on the march, waa surprised by hostile cavalry. In a battle, the extreme wings of the infantry stretched , round en potence, when menaced by cavaliy, and this was generally found sufficient. To op pose the Austrian pandours, Frederic formed amilar irregular troops, infantry and cavalry, but never relied on them in battle, where they seldom were engaged. The slow advance of the firing-line decided his battles. Cavalry, neglected under his predecessor, was now made to undergo a complete revolution. It was formed omy 2 deep, and firing, except on pur suit, was strictly prohibited. Horsemanship, considered, hitherto, of minor iniportanoe, was now cultivated with the greatest attention. All evolutions bad to be practised at fall speed, and the men were required to remain well closed up. By the exertions of Seydlitz, the cavalry of Frederic was made superior to any other then existing or ever existing before i t ; and its bold riding, close order, dashing charge, and quick rallying, have never yet been equalled by any that succeeded it. The artillery was considerably lightened, and, indeed, so much that some of the heavy-calibred guns were not able to ataad full charges, and had, therefore, to be abolished afterward. Yet the heavy ar tillery was still very slow and ,dumsy in its inovements, owing to inferior and heavy car riages and impeifect organization. In battle, it took up its position from l^e first, and some times changed it for a second position, more in advance, but nuoioeuvring, there was none. The light artillery, the regimental guns at tached to the infantry, were placed in front of the infantry-line, 50 paces in advance of the intervfds of the battalions; they advanced with the infantry, the gtms dragged by the men, and opened fire with canister at 800 yards. The number of guns was very large, from 3 to 6 gnns per 1,000 men. The infantry, as well as the cavalry, were divided into brig^es and di visions, but as there was scarcely any manoeu vring after the battle had once begun, and every tettalion had to remain in its proper {>lace in the line, these subdivisions had no tac tical influence ; with the cavalry, a general of brigade might, during a charge, now and then, have to act upon his own responsibility; but with the infantry, such a case could never oc cur. This line-formation, infantry in 2 lines in the centre, cavaliy in 2 or 8 lines on the wings, was a considerable progress upon the deep for mation of former ^ y s ; it developed the full eflfect of infantry fire, as well as or the charge of cavalp', by allowing as many men as possible to act simultaneously; but its very perfection in this point confined the whole army, as it were, in a strait-waistcoat. Every squadron. battalion, or gun, had its regulated place in the order of battle, which could not be inverted or in any way disturbed without affecting the efiiciency of the whole. On, the march, therefore, every thing had to be so arranged that when the arlny formed front again for encampment or battle, every subdivision got exactly into its correct place. Thus, any manceuvres to be exe cuted, had to be executed with the whole army; to detach a single portion of it for a flank ati^ k , to form a particular reserve for the attack, witb superior forces, of a weak point, would have been impracticable and faulty with such slow troops, fit, only, to fight in line, and with an order of battle of such stiffness. Then, the advance in battle of 'such long lines was exe cuted with considerable slowness, in order to keep up with the alignment. Tents followed the army constantly, and were pitched every night; the camp was slightly intrenched. The troops were fed from magazines, the baking establie^ments accompanying the army as much as pos sible. In short, the baggage and other train of the army were enormous, and hampered its movements to a degree unknown nowadays. Yet, with all these drawbacks, the military or ganization of Frederic the Great was by far the best of its day, and was eagerly adopted by all other European governments. The recruit ing of the forces was almost everywhere carried on by voluntary enlistments, assisted by kid napping; and it was only after very severe losses that Frederic had recourse to forced leyies from his provinces.When the war of the coalition against the French republic began, the French army was disorganized by the loss of its officers, and numbered less than 150,000 men. The numbers of the enemy were far su perior ; new levies became necessary, and were made to an inmiense extent, in the shape of national volunteers, of which, in 1793, there must have been at least 500 battalions in exist ence. These troops were not drilled, nor was there time to drill them according to the com plicated system of line-tactics, and to the degree of perfection required by movements in line. Every attempt to meet the enemy in line was followed by a signal defeat, though the French had far superior numbers. A new system of tactics became necessary. The American rev olution had shown the advantage to be gained with undisciplined troops, from extended order and skirmishiag fire. The French adopted it, and supported the skirmishers by deep columns, in which a little disorder was less objectionable, so long as the mags remained well together. In this formation, they launched their superior numbers against the enemy, and were generally successful. This new formation and the want of experience of their troops led them to fight in broken ground, in villages and woods, where

78
they found shelter from the enemys where his line was invariably disoMl&ri^;' ^I^ir want of tents, field-batteries, 4.V C()|apS|ed them to bivouac without shelter, an^ tp lite ipon what the country afforded them/ ^ l i s they g^nd a mobility nnknowBi to ihejbpiiiei^i^ who were encumbered with tents and' ^ sorts of baggage. When the revolution^ Vftr produced, in Napoleon, the man wh9 t^tioed this new mode of warfare to a recul&r system, combined it with what was isitlll liseM In (he old ^stem, and brought the new.nqtethodf at once*to that degree of perfection which Freder ic had given to line-tactics^then IVench were a&ewt invincible, until th^ir opj^eiits had learnt from them and mies upon tlie new model. The principal fea tures of tins new system are: the restoration of the old principle that every citizen is liable, in case of need, to be called out for the defence of the country, and the consequent formation of the army, by compulsory levies, of greater or less extent, from tlie whole of the inhabitants; a change by which the numeric force of armies was at once raised to three-fold the average of Frederics time, and might, in case of need, be increased to larger proportions still. Then, the discarding of camp utensils, and of de pending for provisions upon magazines, the mtroduction of the bivouac and of the rule that war feeds war; the celerity and inde pendence of an army was hereby increased as much as its numeric force by the rule of general liability to serve. In tactical organiza tion, the principle of mixing infantry, cavalry, and artillery in the smaller portions of an ar my, in corps and divisions, became the rule. Every division thus became a complete army on a reduced scale, fit to act independently, and capable of considerable power of resistance even ag&inst superior numbers. The order of battle, now, was based upon the column; it served as Uie reservoir, from which sallied and to which re turned, the swarms of skirmishers; as the wedgelike compact mass to be launched against a par ticular point of the enemys line; as the form to approach the enemy and then to deploy, if the ground and the state of the engagement made it desirable to oppose firing-lines to the enemy. The mutual supporting of the 8 arms developed to its full extent by their combination in small bodies, and the combination of the 8 forms of fighting;, skirmisher!^ line, and column, com posed the great tactical superiority of modern armies. Any kind of ground, thereby, became fit for fighting in i t ; and the ability of rapidly judging the advantages and disadvantages of ground, and of at oncc disposing troops accordingly, became one of the chief requirements of a captain. And not only in the commanderin-chief, but in the subordinate officers, l^ese quslities, and general aptness for independent command, were now a necessity. Corps, divi sions. brigades, and detachments, were constontly placed in situations where their com manders had to act on their own responsibility; the battle-field no longer presented its long unbroken lines of infantry disposed in a vast plain with cavalry on the wings; but the single corps and divisions, massed in columns, stood hidden behind villages, roads, or hills, separat ed from each other by seemingly large inter vals, while but a small portion of the troops appeared actually engaged in skirmishing and firing artillery, until the decisive moment ap proached. Lines of battle extended with the numbers and with this formation; it was not necessary actually to fill up every interval with a line visible to the enemy, so long as troops were at hand to come up when required. Turn ing of flanks now became generwly a strateg i c operation, the stronger army placing itaolf compIeMy Tjeiween the weaker one and its communications, so that a sinsle defeat conld annihilate an army and decide a campaign. The favorite tactical manoeuvre was tlie break ing through the enemy's centre, wi& fresh troops, as soon as the state of affairs showed that his last reserves were e n ^ e d . Beserves, which in line-tactics would have been out of place and would have deducted from the efBciency of tiiearmy in the decisive moment, now became the chief means to decide an action. The Order of battle, extending as it did in front, extended also in depth; from the skirmishing line to the position of the reserves tlie depth was very often 2 miles and more. In short, if the new system required less drill and parade-precision, it required far greater rapidity, exertions, and intelligence from every one, from the highest commander as well as the lowest ^irmisber; and every fresh improvement made since Napoleon, tends in that direction. The changes in the materiel of armies were but trifling during this period; constant wars left little time for such improvements the in troduction of which requires time. Two very important innovations took place in the French army .shortly before the revolution; the adop tion of. a new model of musket of reduced calibre and windage, and with a curved stock instead of the straight one hitherto in use. This weapon, more accurately worked, contributed a great deal toward the superiority of the French skirmishers, and remained the model upon which with trifling alterations the muskets in use in all armies up to the introduction of per cussion locks, were constructed. The second was the simplification and improvement of the artillery by Gribeauval. The French artillery under Louis XV. was completely neglected; the guns were of all sorts of calibres, the carriages

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wero old-fashioued, and the models upon which tliey were csoostructed not even uniform. Gribeauval, who had served during the 7 years war with the Austrians, and there seen better mod els, succeeded in reducing the number of cal<^ ibres, equalizing and improving the models, and greatly simplifying the whole system. It was with his guns and carriages that' Napoleon fought his wars. The English artillery, which -vvas in the worst possible state when the war with France broke out, was gradually, but slowly, considerably improved; with it origi nated the block-tail carriage, which has since been adopted by many continental armies, and the arrangement for mounting the foot artillery men on the limbers and ammunition wagons. Horse artillery, invented by Frederic the Great, was much cultivated during Napoleons period, especially by himself, and its proper tactics were first developed. When the war was over, it was found that the British were the most efiScient in this arm. Of all large European armies, the Austrian is the only one which sup plies the place of horse-artillery by batteries in which the men are mounted on wagons provid ed for the purpose.The German armies still Tept up til especial class of infantry armed with rifles, and the new system of fighting in extended order gave a fresh importance to this arm. It was especially cultivated, and in 1838 taken up by the French, who felt the want of a long range musket for Algiers. The tiraUleurs (2 Ktn0nnM, afterward ehcuteurs d pied^ were formed, and brought to a state of efficiency without paralld. This formation gave rise to great improvements in rifles, and by which both range and precision were increased to a won derful degree. The names of Delvigne, Thouvenot, Mini6, became celebrated thereby. For the totality of the infantry, the percussion lock was introduced between 1880 and 1840 in most armies; as usual, the English and the Russians were the last. In the mean time, great efforts were made in various quarters still further to improve small arms, and to produce a musket of superior range which could be given to the whole of the infantry. The Prussians intro duced the needle gun, a rifle arm loaded at the breech, and capable of very rapid firing, and having a long range; the invention, originated in Bdgium, was considerably improved by them. This gun has been given to all their light battalions; the remainder of the infantry have recently got their old muskets, by a very simple process, turned into Mini6 rifles. The English were the first this time to arm the whole of their infantry with a superior musket, viz., the Enfield rifle, a slight alteration of the Hini6; its superiority was fully proved in the Crimea, and saved them at fnkerman.In tactical arrangements, no changes of impor tance have taken place for infantry and cavalry, we except the great improvement of light infantry tactics by the French chasseurt, and the new Prussian system of columns of compauies, which latter formation, with perhaps some variations, will no doubt soon become general from its great tactical advantages. The formation is still 8 deep with the Russians and Austrians, the English have formed 2 deep ever since Napoleons time; the Prussians march 3 deep, but mostly fight 2 deep, the 3d rank form ing the skirmishers and their supports; and the French, hitherto formed 8 deep, have fought 2 deep in the Crimea, and are introducing this formation in the whole army. As to cavalry, the Russian experiment of restoring Uie drar goons of the lYth century and its failure have been mentioned.In artillery, considerable im)rovements of detail and simplification of calijres, and models for wheels, carriages, &c., lave ^ e n place in every army. The science of artillery has been greatly improved. Yet no considerable change have taken place. Most continental armies carry 6 and 12-pounders; the Piedmontese 8 and 16-pounders; the Span ish 8 and 12*pounders; the French, who hither to had 8 and 12-pounders, are now introducing Louis Napoleons so-called howitzer gun, a simple light 12-pounder, from which smaU shells are also fired, and which is to replace every other kind of field gun. The British have 3 and 6-pounders in the colonies, but in their ar mies sent out from England, now only use 9pounders, 12-pouuders, and 18-pounders. In the Crimea they oven had a field battery of 82pounders, but it always stuck fast.The general organization of modern armies is very much alike. With the exception of the British and American, they are recruited by compulsory levy, based either upon conscription, in which case the men, after serving their time, are dismissed for life, or upon the reserve system, in which the time of actual service is short, but the men remain liable to be called out again for a certain time afterward. France is the most striking example of the first, Prussia of Uie second system. Even in England, where both line and militia are generally recruited by voluntary en listment, the conscription (or ballot) is by law established for the militia should volunteers bo y/anting. In Switzerland, no standing army exists; the whole force consists of militia driv ed for a short time only. Tlie enlistment of foreign mercenaries is still the rule in some countries; Naples and the Pope still have their Swiss regiments; the French their foreign le gion ; and England, in case of serious war, is regulwly compelled to resort to this expedient. The time of actual service varies veiy much; from a couple of weeks with the Swiss, 18 months to 2 years with the smaller German

80
states, and 8 years with the Prussmns, to 6 or 6 yeais in France, 12 years in England, and 16 to 25 in Russia. The oflficers are recruited in various ways. la most armies there are now no legal impediments to advancement from the ranks, but the practical impediments vary very much. In France and Austria a portion of the oflScers must be taken from the sergeants; in Russia the insufficient number of educated can didates makes this a necessity. In Prussia the examination for officers commissions, in peace, is a W to uneducated men; in England ad vancement from the ranks is a rare exception. For the remainder of the officers, there are ^in most countries military schools, though with tlie exception of France, it is not necessary to pass through them. In military education the French, in general education the Prussian offi cers are ahead; the English and the Russians stand lowest in both. As to the horses requir ed, we believe Prussia is the only country in which the equine population too is subject to compulsory levies, the owners being bought off at fixed rates. With the exceptions named above, the equipment and armament of modern armies is now everywhere nearly the same. There is, of course, a great difference in the quiQity and workmanship of the material. In this respect, the Russians stand lowest, the English, where the industrial advantages at their command are really made use of, stand highwt. The infantry of all armies is divided into lino and light infantry. The 1st is the rule, and composes the mass of all infantry; real light infantry ia everywhere the exception. Of this latter, the French have at present dec^odly the best in quality and a oonsiderablie iMimber: 21 battalions of chafiseurs, 9 oi ZouaveBj, and 6 of native Algerian tirailleurs. The Austrian light infantry, especially the rifleji, M fe very good, too; there are 82 battalions of them. The Prussians have 9 battalions of rifies and 40 of light infantry ; the latter, however, not sufficiently up in their special duty. The Eng lish have no real light infantry, except their 6 battalions of rifles, and are, next to the Ros sians, decidedly the least for that Idnd of duty. The Russians maybe said to ;bewith out any real light infantry, for theif 6 rifle battalions vanish in their enormous armyi Cavalry, too, is everywhere divided iatos heavy and light. Cuirassiers are always heafy, hus sars,. ehasseurs, chevaux-Iegers, always light horse. Dragoons and lancers are in some ai*mies light, in others heavy cavali^i and the Russians would also be without light ^ v jJry were it not for the Cossacks. The beist light cavalry is undoubtedly that of the AQBtrians, the national Hungarian hussars and hus sars. l i e same division art^ery, with the exception of who as stated now have only one cfdibre. In other armies there are still light and heavy harries, according to ihe calibres attached to them. Light artillery is still subdivided in hom and foot, the 1st iespecially intended to act in oompany with oataljry. The Austrians, as stated, have no hor'se artillery; the English and French have B fO pi*oper fbot-artillery, the men being carried on the limbers and ammunition w ^ ons.-The infantry is formed into oomp^es, battalions, -and regiments. The battalion is the tactical unity; it is the form in which the troops fight, a few exceptional oases left aside. A battalion, tiierefore, must not be too strcHig to be commionded by the voice and eye of its chief, nw tod weak to act as an independent body in battle, even after tlie losses of a cam paign. The strength, therefore, varies from 600 to 1,400 men; 800 to 1,000 forms the avera^. The division of a battalion into eompandes has for its object the fixing of its evolutionary subdivisions, the efficiency of the men in the details of mo drill, and the more commodious, economical administration. Practically, com panies appear as serrate bodies in skirmishing only, and with the Prussians, in the formation in columns of companies, where each of the 4 companies forms columns in 3 platoons; this fonnation presupposes strong companies, and they are in- Prussia 250 strong. The number of companies in a battalion varies as much as their strength. The English have 10, of from 90 to 120 men, the Rusaans and Prussians 4 of 250 men, tl^ Freiwh and Austritms 6 of vary ing strength. Batflhlions are formed into re^ments, more for administrative and disciplina rian purposes and to insure uniformity of di'ill, than for any tactical object; in formations for war, therefore, the battalions of one regiment are often sep^ted. In Rusma and Austria there are 4, in Prussia 8, in France 2 service battalions^ beside depots to every regpment; in England, most regiments are formedj in peace, 'but 1 battalion. Oavalrv is divided mto sqaadron# and regiments. > The squadron frcHn 'lOO to 200 men, forms tibe tactical and administratis unity; the English alone subdivi^ the squadron, for administrative pur poses, into 2 troops. There are from 8 to lO eervioe sqnadrons to a regiment; the 3riii|Bh have, in peace, but 8 squadrons, of abont*|w horse; th Prussians '4 of 150 horse j French 6 of 180 to 200 horse; the Austrifins'e or 8 of 200 horse ; the Russians ft to 10 of 150 to 170 horse. With cavalry the remment is a body of tactical significance, as a r^unent oflfers the means to make im independent ^arge, the squadrons niBtaally supporting each other, and is for tbifl purpose 6'medof suffioient etreogtb, iiE ., btnred W *d 1,600 horse. f0on4 haye miiii 'vrook regiments ttmk are

81

but small, and therefore the remainder of tois obHged to put 4 or 5 of them to l ^ ^ d e ; on arm is fonAed into cavalry divisions of 2 bri the other hand, the Austrian and Russimi regi gades each,' for the purpose of reserve cavalry. ments in many oases are as strong as an averse brigade. The French have nominally yfety Two or 8 divisions, sometimes 4, are, for la r^ r armies, formed into an army-corps. Such a strong remments, but have hitherto appe^ed corps has everywhere its own cavalry and ar la the field in considerably reduced numbers, owing to thdr poverty in horses. Artillery is tillery, even where the divisions have none; and, where these latter are mixed bodies, there formed in batteries ; the formation in regiments is still a reserve of cavalry and artillery placed or brigades in this arm is only for p e ^ pur at the disposal of the commander of the corps. poses, as almost in every case of actual service Napoleon was the first to form these, and, not the batteries are sure to become separated, and satisfied therewith, he organized the whole of are always used so. Four guns is ^th least the remaining cavtdry into reserve cavalry-coi-ps number, and the Austrians have 8; the French of 2 or 6 divisions of cavalry with horse-artillery and English t guns per battery. Riflemen or attached. The Russians have retained this for other real l i ^ t infantry are generfJly orpnuod mation of their reserve cavalry, and the other ^ battalions and companies only, not in regi armies are likely to take it up again in a war ments : the nature of the arm is repugnant to of importance, though the effect obtained has its reunion in large masses. The eatoe is toe never yet been in proportion to the immense with sappers and miners, they being, be mass of horsemen thus concentrated on one side, but a very small portion the army. point. Such is the modern organization of the The French alone make an exception in this fighting part of an army. But, in spite of the latter case; but their S regiment^ eapper^nd abolition of tents, magazines, field-bakerie^ and miners, count only 6 batt^ions in alL With bread-wagons, there is still a large train of the regiment the formation of most armiOT in non-combatants and of vehicles necessary to time of peace is generdly considered complete. insure the effidenoy of the army in a campaign. The larger bodies, brigades, divisions, armyTo give an idea of this, we will only state the corps, are mostly formed when war breaks out. train required, *w5Cording to the existing regu The Russians and Prussians alone have their lations, for 1 army-corp& of the Prussian ser army fully organized and the h i^ e r ^minands vice: filled up, as if for actual war. But m Prussia Artillery trln: p k colnmns of 80 wagons, 1 laborathis is completely illusory, tmleM at least a whole army-corpsbe mobmaed, which supposes pontoon wagons, 6 tool wagons, 1 the calling in of the landwehr of a whole prov n wagons. 103 team horses, ince; and if in Russia the troops are actually trata: W wagons (for 1,600 or 2,000 slci). with the regiments, yet the late war has shown eMrT6 t r B l niIW wasoQ^ Reserve train: 1 wagon, T6 reserv ^o rses. that the origiaial divisions and corps very soon l a all, 40a wagons, 1,791 horses, 8,000 got mixed, so that the advantage pm ed from To enable the commanders of armies, armysuch a formation is more for peace thto for war. corps aiid cUvisions to conduct, each in his In war, several battalions or squadrons are sphere, the troops intrusted to him, a separate formed into a brigade; from 4 to 8 battalions corps is formed in every army except the Brit for inftotry, or from 6 to 20 squadrons for ish, composed of officers exclusively, and called cav^y. With large cavalry regiments^ the staff. T^e fonctions of these ofBcers are to latter may very well stand in lieu of brigade; reconnoitre and sketch the ground on which but they are very generally reduced to smaller the army moves or may move; to assist in strength by the detachmente they have to send making out plans for operations, and to arrange to the divisions. Light and line inf^tpr may them in d e t^ so that no time is lost, no con with advantage be mixed in a brigade, but not fusion arises, no useless fatigue is incurred by light and heavy cavalry. The Austrians veiy the troops. They are, therefore, in highly hngenerally add a battery to each brigade. A portant positions, and ought to have a thoroughly combination of brigades forms division. In finished milili^^ education, with a full knommost armies, it is composed of all the 8 arm^ edge of the capabilities of each arm on the say 2 brigades of infantry, 4to 6 s^adrons, and march and in battle. They are accordingly 1 to 8 batteries. The French and R usswm have taken in all countries from the most able no cavalry to their divisions, the E n g l^ form subjects, and carefully trained in the highest them of infantry exclusively. U ijl^ , therefore, military schools. The English alone im ^ n e these nations wish to fight at a disadvantage, any subaltern or field-officer selected from they are obliged to attach cavahy (and wtiHery the army at large is fit for such a p^ition, respectively) to the divisions whenever the ewe and the consequence is that their staffs we occurs; which is easUy overlwked or o ^ n in inferior, and the army incapable of any but convenient or impossible. The proportion of the slowest and simplest manoeuvres, while divisionary caval^, however, is everywhere

82
the oommaU^er, if at idl oonieientioua, tc^do small arms and gunpowder; there are the Tariall the staff work hitnmlf. * A divifilcia daa fiel* ous barracks, arsenals, stores, the fortresses dom hav mate thui one a^aclid, with their equipments and the staff of officers ab amj^ooips has a staff of US owix tiaSef the commanding them; finally, there are the com direetkm oi a superior or a sfarff-afilcegfj and an missariat and general staff of the army, which, amylias altiil 8la^, with sfreral' genei^, uafor the whole ot the armed foroe, are even a ohief who, in urgient o a ^ giv^ hk cat- more numerous and have more expensive du der ia tl &ante of the oomniaiider; Hie chief ties to perform than the staff and commissariat tlie taf^ in the British army, has all m n> of a single active army. The staff especially tint^oeral aod a qnarteftnaster-general ttnder has very important ^ties. It is generally his oi^rs; iii oth^ armies the a^fbtitiat-general is divided into Ahistprical section (coUeoting ma at the'sMnetlme chief of the stalf; in iim oe the terials relaUre to ^ e history of war, the forma ^ieft>fl2ieiBte^ iMiites boJ:h oaf^iMea in himtion of armiss, dra., past and present), a topo elf, and has a difi^ent departiaWI f< r each graphical section (intrusted with the collection tiirdef his orders. The adjtrlantogttieKd^iB the of m a^ and the tiigbnometrical survey of the chiefo f the of the a r m y , t h e whole country), a statistical section, dM . At wportsof altsohofdinate d^[)artii>e&ti^l>^ies the head of aU these establishments, as well as of the id arranges ^ matteM'reiMive of the army, stands the ministry of war, organ t dteolpliii^ instriietion, formatton| ei^ni|)mint, ized diffiurently in diflbrent countries, but com* arfittiiheiBt, Ac. * All gnbordiat08'io(^8 ig|j<^d prising, as must be evident l^om the preceding ob tifiron^'hiia with the coinmaiideMn4Mf. If servations, a vast variety of subjects. As an ex cMef of #ie 8(ff at tho same time, he cril^ierates ample we givethe organization ofthe French minirttii commander in the foriliation M xd woiic' istryof war. Itcomprises7 directions or divisions: ing ot of plans of operation aod mweroents 1, of thejp#rMniMZ ; 2, of the artillery; 8, of Uie fl til army. The 'proper arrangemMtt 6f these engineers and fortresses; ^ of administrative in ddtall i s ^ department of theqnwtfjptnaateraffairs; 6, of Algeria; 6, war dep6t historical, genen^; the ^tetaik of marches, cmrtc^meQts, topographical, &c., and sections of the staff ^; eiMaEiipM^^ are prepared by hitio. A s ^ 7, finances of the war department. Immediaty ddnt littmher of ^-officers ard a^teiehed to attachsd to the ministry are the following con h e a d -q ^ t^ for recoanoitring tie' ^ound, sultative commissions, composed of general and p r ^ a l ^ ^pt^ a to the defence or ivttacdc of field-officers and professional men, viz.: the posif^oasj^^; ' There is, hee^e, a obmHutttder- committees of the staff of infantry, of cavalry, m-chi#of ttie artillery, and a superit* ^igiceerof artillery, of fortification, of medical affairs, officer ffer thek respective dispartments; a few and the commiiuons for veterinary science and depQtie to represMit the chief of the stuff'oh for public works. Sucli is the vast machiaery particnlAr points of the battle-field, and a iram- devoted to recruiting, remounting, feeding, di wr of orderly officers and rderlies to '<rry r- recting, and always reproducing a modern first den and despatched To the head-qUarters class army. The masses brought together cor itffther ffttached the chief of the oommiBsari^, respond to such an organization. Though Na with his c l e ^ the paymMter thd' anay, the poleons grand army of 1812, when he had 200,ohi^ of the mi^cal departn^nt, an# the jadge- 000 men in Spain, 200,000 in France, Italy, Ger advooate, or director f the department bf mili many, and Poland, and invaded Russia with tary iustice. The staflfe of the atmy^ciMps and 450.000 men and 1,800 guns, has never yet been divisiona are r^jnlated on the same model, equalled; though we shall most Ukely never see such an army again united for one operation but with greater sitnplioity- and a recced vyAml; the sta;fik brigades and re^tneoits^are as these 460,000 men, yet the large continental Still lass'nnmeroTts, and tho sta# of a bditalion states of Europe, Prussia included, can ea<^ of may consist merdy of the oconzBa^di^, Ms ad them raise an armed and disciplined force of jutant, m officer a paymaster, a* sei^ant as 600.000 men, and more; and their armies, dixki, and a drtimmer or bttgleman. regulate though not more than from 1^ to 8 per ct. of their population, have never yet been reached and keep npthemllttaiy oroe<iif acj^eat^tion, tttitnerotti estaMiehmoQt^ besid# thoso hitherto . at any former jperiod of history.The system named, re required. There w e reoruiling and of the United States bases the defence of the r^olttilinf oommianoners; tJie ltter&ea con- country substantially on the militia of the dif netiM wi& Hie^tdministraltcm of sa ^ n ^ l s- ferent states, and on volunteer armies raised as taMishments fw the breediai of h&nMm^ic^ta- occasion demands; the standing military force, ry aohools .f^r officers and non-oommmioned employed munly in preserving order among officsra, model battalions, squadrons, aad bat* the Indian tribes of the West, consisting, ac teries, normal riding school^ and schools for cording to the report of the secretary of war terinary surgeons. There are in most ooun- for 18!?r, of only aoout 18,000 men. triss national founderies and manu&otories for

83
Arqif^lHisa

wheel-lock, in which the flint was fixed so as to be stationary, over the pan, and a toothed wheel, ARQUEBUSE, sometimes, but incorrectly, by means of a spring, was set in rapid motion agftiust its dg6, bo as to project a shower written harqnebuse, from the French arquelvse^ of sparks into the powder below. To the and comipted in English, particularly on the wheel-lock succeeded the snapbance, as it was Scottish borders, into hagbut, or hackbut^the called. This was the first uncouth rudiment earliest form of the musket, which became re of the flint and steel lock, which was brought ally serviceable in the field for military pur to such perfection by Joseph Manton, and poses; So long ago as the battle of Bosworth, which has only, Anythin few years, been en A. D. 1485, it was introduced under the name tirely superseded by thea percussion cap, than of a hand-^n, which was nothing more than a which it is not easy to imagine a quicker aad short iron cylinder closed with a g^tfcwi-breech more infallible instrument of ignition. The at on end, and provided with a touch-hole, snapbance came into use for fine pistols, fowlfastened to the end of a stout wooden pole, like ifig-pieces, and choice musquetoons, during the the handle of a spear or halberd. This hand T T ngTiah civil wars; but their rarity and high gun or miniat^re cannon was loaded with slugs price kept them out of general use, except ^ or small bullets upon a charge of coarse pow the arms gentlemen and officers of rank, der, and was discharged by means of a match while the of matchlock still continued the wea applied to the vent, the instrument being sup pon of the rank and file. It is remarkable that ported on the shoulder of the front rank man, there has been far less advancement than one who was a pikeman or halberdier, and directed would have iutiagined, from the first invention by means of the handle, and fired, though of the improved arquebuse until very recent course without any aim, by the rear rank. Even of days, in the mere workmanship of the barrel earlier than this, at the battle of Agincourt, ac and the accurate fiight of the ball. The difficulty cording to Halls chroniole, the l&itons were of aiming truly seems to have arisen solely from armed with fiery hand-guns. So clumsy, the defective method of firing, the clumsiness of however, and slow of operation were these an the piece, and the extreme slowness of the ig tique firearms, that, in spite of their formidable nition ; for many barrels of groat an sound and unaccustomed appearance, they pro tiquity, especially arquebuse those of Spanish manufacture, duced little or no effect. In the reign of Henry having been altered to the percnssion principle, VIIL, although during its earlier years, the new-stocked, and properly balanced, are found battle of Pavia was won by the fire of the to shoot with great accuracy and even unuspal Spanish Arquebusiers, the longbow still held penetration, at long ranges. its own as the superior weapon, in virtue of it aoouraoy of aim, its range,jwd penetration; and even in the reign of Elizabeth, the long bow is ^oken of as the queen of weapons, although die had musketeers in her army, and assisted Henry IV., of France, with a body of horse arquebusiers, commanded by Ool. James, A r f M l ^ r y an Micestor of the well-known novelist. During ARTILLERY. The invention of gunpowder, her re i^ , this arm was greatly improved, al and its application to throwing heavy bodies though it was still so long and cumbersome that in a given direction, are now pretty generally it comd only be fired &om a forked rest planted conceded to have been of eastern origin. In in the earth before the marksman, that indis China and India, saltpetre is the spontaneous pensable instrument being sometimes furnished excrescence of the soil, and, very naturally, the with a pike or halberd-head, so as, when set natives soon became acquainted with its prop obliquely in the ground, to serve as a palisade. erties. Fireworks made of mixtures of this The barrels of these old pieces are extremely salt with other combustible bodies were man long, of very thick metal, usually small-bored, ufactured at a very early period in China, and and sometimes, already, rifled; as is the case used for purposes of war as well as for public with the piece still preserved at Hamilton pal festivities. We have no information at what ace, in Scotland, with which the-regent Murray time the peculiar composition of saltpetre, sul was shot by Hamilton of Bothwellhaugh, in phur, and charcoal became known, the explosive the year 1570. They were fired by moans of quality of which has given it such an immense a coil of match, or wick, of prepared hemp, importance. According to some Chinese chron passed through a hammer, like that of a mod icles, mentioned by M. Paravoy in a report ern firelock, which, being released by the pull made to the French academy in 1850, guns ing of the trigger, threw down the lighted were known as early as C18 B. C .; in other match into the pan, and discharged the piece. ancient Chinese writings, fire-balls proiected In due time the matchlock gave way to the

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from bamboo tabes, and a sort of exploding shell, are described. At all events, the use ot gunpowder and cannon for warlike purposes does not appear to have been properly devel oped in the earlier periods of Chinese history, ns the first authenticated instance of their ex tensive application is of a date as late as 1232 of our era, when the Chinese, besieged by the Mongols in Kni-fang-fn, defended themselves with cannon throwing stone balls, and used explosive shells, petards, and other fireworks based upon gunpowder.The Hindoos appear to have had some sort of warlike fireworks as early as the time of Alexander the Great, ac cording to the evidence of the Greek writers JElian, Ctesias, Philostratus, and Themistius. This, however, certainly was not gunpowder, though saltpetre may have largely entered into its composition. In the Hindoo laws some sort of fire-arms appears to bo alluded to ; gunpow der is certainly mentioned in them, and, ac cording to Prof. A. N. Wilson, its composi tion is described in old Hindoo medical works. The first mention of cannon, however, coin cide pretty nearly with the oldest ascertained positive date of its occurrence in China. Ohaseds poems, about 1200, speak of fire-en gines throwing balls, the whistling of which was heard at the distance of 10 coss (1,600 yards). About 1258 we read of fireworks on carriage.^ belonging to the king of Delhi. A hundred years later the use of artillery was general in India; and when the Portuguese ar rived there, in 1498, they found the Indians as far advanced in the use of fire-arms as they themselves were.From the Chinese and Hin doos the Arabs received saltpetre and fireworks. Two of the Arabic names for saltpetre signify Chirui salt, and C7nna snow. Chinese red and white fire is mentioned by their ancient au thor.?. Incendiaiy fireworks are also of a date almost contemporaneous with the great Arabic invasion of Asia and Africa. Not to mention the maujanitt, a somewhat mythical fire-arm said to have been known and used by Mohammed, it is certain that the Byzantine Greeks received the first knowledge of fireworks (afterward de veloped in the Greek fire) from their Arab ene mies. A writer of the 9th century, Marcus Grac chus, gives a composition of 6 parts of saltpetre, 2 of sulphur, 1 of coal, which comes very near to the correct composition of gunpowder. The latter is stated with sufficient exactness, and first of all European writers, by Roger Bacon, about 1216, in his Liber de Nullitate Magiat, but yet for fully a hundred years the western na tions remained ignorant of its use. The Arabs, however, appear to have soon improved upon tlie knowledge they received from the Chinese. According to Condes history of the Moors in Spain, guns were used, 1118, in the siege of Saragossa, arid a culverin of 4 Ib. calibre, among other guns, was cast in Spain in 1132. Abdel-Mumen is reported to have taken Mohadia, near Bona, in Algeria, with fire-arms, in 1166, and the following year Niebla, in Spain, was defended against the Castilians with fire-machines throwing bolts and stones. If the nature of the engines used by the Arabs in the 12th century remains still to be investigated, it is quite' certain that in 1280 artillery was used against Cordova, and that by the beginning of the 14th century its knowledge had passed frorii the Arabs to the Spaniards. Ferdinand IV. took Gibraltar by cannon in 1808. Baza in 1812 and 1328, Martos in 1826, Alicante in 1881, were attacked with artillery, and carcasses were thrown by guns in some of these sieges. From the Spaniards the use of artillery passed to the remaining European nations. The French, in the siege of Puy Guillaume in 1888, had guns, and in the same year the German knights in Prussia used them. By 1860, fire arms were common in all countries of western, southern, and central Europe. That artillery is of eastern origin, is also proved by the man ufacture of the oldest European ordnance. The gun was made of bars of wrought iron welded longitudinally together, and strengthened by heavy iron rings forced over them. It was composed of several pieccs, the movable breech being fixed to the flight after loading. The oldest Chinese and Indian guns ai-e inade ex actly in the same way, and they are as old, or older, than the oldest European guns. Both European and Asiatic cannon,'about the 14th century, were of very inferior construction, showing artillery to have still been in its in fancy. Thus, if it remains uncertain when the composition of gunpowder and its application to fire-arms were invented, we can at least fix the period when it first became an important engine in warfare ; the very clumsiness of the guns of the 14th century, wherever they occur, proves their novelty as regular war-machines. The European guns of the 14th century were very unwieldy alfairs. The large-calibred ones could only be moved by being taken to pieces, <^ch piece forming a wagon-load. Even the small-oalibred gima were exceedingly heavy, there being then no proper proportion establ i ^ d between the weight of the gun and that of the shot^ nor between the shot and the eharg* When they were brought into posi tion^ a sort timber framework or soaJffolding was wetased, for each gun to be fired from. The town of ^Ghent had a gun which, with the framew<ark, meaoored 50 feet in length. Guncarriages were etill unknown. The cannons were mostly fired at very high elevations, like our m o rti^ d 'OQae^^tly had very little effect antal were intpodueei. The pro-

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jeotiles were generally round shot of stone, for email calibres sometimea iron bolts. Tet, with all tbese drawbacks, cannon was not only Bsed in sieges and the defence of towns, but in the field abo, and on board shipa of war. As early as 1886 the English took 2 French vessels arm ^ with cannon. If the guns recovered firom the Mary Bose (sunk 1546) may serve as a due, those first ship guns were simply let into and secured in a log of wood hollowed out for the purpose, so as to be incapable of elevatJie course of the 16th century, con siderable improvements were made, both in #te construction and application of artillery. Oannon began to be cast of iron, copper, or brass. The movable breech was falling into disuse, the whole gun being cast of a piece. The best founderies were in France and Ger many. In France, too, the first attempts were made to bring up and place guns undr cover during a siege. About 1450 a sort of trench was introduced, and shortly after the first breeching batteries were constructed by the brothers Bureau, with the aid of which the Iring oi France, Charles VII., retook in one v w all the places the English had taken from him. The greatest improvements were, how ever, made by Charles VIIL of France. He finally did away with the movable breech, oast his guns of brass and in one piec^ intro duced trunnions, and gun-carriages on wheels, and had none but iron shot. He also simplified th e , calibres, and took the lighter regularly into the field. Of these, the double cannon was placed on a 4-wheeled carriage drawn by 85 horses; the remainder had 2-wheeled car riages, the trails dragging on the ground, and were drawn by from 24 down to 2 horses. A body of gunners was attached to each, and the serrtce po orgaaized as to constitute the first distinct corps of field artillery; the lighter ctJibres were movable enough to shift about with the other troops during action, and even to keep up with the cavdry. It was this new arm which procured to Charles VIIL his sur prising successes in Italy. The Italian ordnance was stUl moved by bullocks; the guns were still composed of several pieces, and had to be placed on their frames when the position was reached; they fired stone shot, and were alto gether so clumsy that the French fired a gun oitener in an hour than the Italians could do in a day. The battle of Fornovo C1495), gained by the French field artillery, spread terror over Italy, and the new arm was considered irre sistible. Macchiavellis Arte della Chierra waa written expresdy, in order to indicate means to .counteract its effect by the skilful disposition of the infantry and cavsdry. The successors of Charles VIII., Louis XII. and Francis L, con tinued to improve and lighten their field artil lery. Francis organized the ordnance as a dis tinct department, under a grand-master of the ordnance. His field-guns broke the hitherto invincible masses of the Swiss pikemen at Marig nano, 1615, by rapidly moving from one flank ing position to another, and thus they decided the battle. The Chinese and Arabs knew the use and manufacture of shells, and it is proba ble that from the latter this knowledge passed to the European nations. Still, the adoption of this projectile, and of the mortar from which it is now fired, did not take place in Europe be fore the second half of the 15th century, and is commonly aaoribed to Pandolfo Malatesta, prince of Bimia. The fiist shells consisted of 2 hollow metal'hemispheres screwed together, the art of casting them hollow was of later invention. The emperor Charles V., was not behind his French rivals in the improvement of field-guns. He introduced limbers, thus turning the two wheeled gun, when it had to be moved, into a 4-wheeled vehicle capable of going at a faster pace and of surmounting obstacles of ground. Thus his light guns, at the battle of K6mi in 1554, could advance at a gaUop.The first the oretical research^ respecting gunnery and the flight of projectiles, also fall in this period. Tartaglia, an Italian, is said to be the discoverer of the fact that the angle of elevation of 45 gives, vaeuo, the greatest range. The Span iards Collado and Ufano also occupied them selves with similar inquiries. Thus the theo retical foundations for scientific gunnery were laid. About the same time Vannocci Biringoccios inquiries into the art of casting (1540) produced considerable progress in the manufac ture of cannon, while the invention of the calibre scale by Hartmann, by which every part of a gun was measured by its proportion to the diameter of bore, gave a certain standard for the construction of ordnance, and paved the way for the introduction of fixed theoretical principles, and of general experimental rules. One of the first effects of the improved artillery was a total change in the art of fortification. Since the time of the Assyrian and Babylonian monarchies, that art had made but little progress. But now the new fire-arm everywhere made a breach on the masonry walls of the old system, and a new plan had to be invented. The de fences had to be constructed so as to expose as little masonry as possible to the direct fire of the besieger, and to admit of a strong artillery being placed on the ramparts. The old masonry waU was replaced by an earthwork rampart, only faced with masonry, and the small flanking town was turned into a large pentagonal bastion. Gradually the whole of the maspnrj used in fortification was covered against direct fire by outlying earthworks, and by the middle of the Ifth century the defence of a fortified

86

piaoo became once more relatively stronger than the attack, until Vaubaa again gav the asoendiuit to the latter. Hitherto thei opera tion of loading had been oaprried on with loose powder shovelled into the gun. About 1600 the introdttotion of' cartridges, cloth bags containing the prescribed qttanti^ of pow der, mndiL abrid^d the time necessary for load ing, and insured greater precision of fire by ^eater equality of charge. Another important invention was made about the same time, that of grape-shot and case-shot. The ooTistmotion of nel^CTns, adapted for throwing hollow shot, also belongs to this period. The numerous iriegea occurring during the war of Spain against the Netherlands contributed very much to the imwovement of the artillery used in the defence and attack of places, especially as regards the use of mwrtars and howitzers, of shells!, caroassas, and red-hot shot, and eoK^sition of ftizes au4 other military fireworlts. I^e^^brea in uae in the beginning of the iTth century were stUl of all sizes, from the 48-pounder to the small est falconets bored for balls of ^ lb. weight. In spite of all improvements, field artSlery was still 80 imperfect that all this variety of <^ibre was required to obtain sometibing like the effect we now realize with a few middle-sized guns be tween the 6-pounder and the 12-pounder. The Il^ t calibres, at that time, had mobility, but no effect; the large calibres had effect, %ut no mo bility; tiie intermediate ones had ndther the one nor the other in a degree sufficient for all purposes. Consequently, all <libre8 were main tained, and jumbled together in one mass, each battery consisting generally of a regukr assort ment of cannon. The elevation was given to the piece by a quoin. The carriage'Ww6 still clumsv, and a separate model was of course requfarea.for each calibre, so that if was next to impossible to take spare wheels and' carriages into the field. The axletrees were of Wood, and of a different size for each calibre. In ad<6tion to this, the dimensions of the cannon and carriag8 were not even the stune for one single calibre, there being everywhere a great many pieces o old construction, and many differ ences of construction, in the several work shops of a country. Cartridges were still con fined to gims in fortresses; in the field the can non was loaded with loose powder, introduced on a shovel, upon which a wad and the shot were rammed down. Loose powder was equally work ed down the touchhole, and the Wftole process was extremely *slow. The ganners were not considered regular soldiers, but formed a guild of their own, recruiting themselves by appren tices, and sworn not to divulge thift sdjorets and mysteries of their handicraft. Wheii a war broke out, the beUigerents took many of .them intos their service as they eoold flet, oiver

and a^ v e 'ffiieir peace'^tablishment. of these ggnners or bombardiers received the com mand of a gtin, ha,d a saddle-horse, and appren tice, and as many professional asristahts 6s he required, beside the requisite nnm ]^ of men for shifting hMvy pieces. Their pa^was four fold that of a soldier. The horses < tJie artil lery were cci4ftaoted for when a wftr.brc4ce out; the contractOT alsb found harness and dtiverB. In battle the guns were placed in a row in frOht of the line, *md unlimbered; the horsiw w6re taken out of the shafts. When an advance was ordered, the limbers were horsed, and the gons limbered up ; sometimes the l i f t e r oalitoes were ^ v e ^ for short distances, by toen. The powder and shot were carried in separate caiNa; the limbers had not yet any boxes for aateotinition. MaiKBuvring, loading, priming; pointliag, and firing, were operations of great downess, aocoraing to Our present notions, and the number c^hitSj With such imperfect machito^, and the^ataaost total want of science in gmmtKy, must have bedn small indeed. The appearance of Gustavus Adolphus in Germany, during the 80 years war, marks an immense progress in artil lery. This great Warrior did away with the extremely small calibres, which he r^lac(d, firet, by his so-called leather guns, light wroaghtiron tubes eovered with ropes and leatfier. These were intended to fire grape-HSshot' only, which thus was first introduced into field war fare. Hitherto its use had been confined to the defence of the ditch in fortresses. Along with grape and case shot, he also introducM tridges in his field artillery. The leather ^ h s not proviflg Vdry durable, were replaced by light east-iron 4-pounder^ 16 calibres long, weighing 6 cwt. with the carriage, and drawn by two horses. Two of these pieces were att^hed to each regiment of infantry. 'Rms the regimental artillery which was preserved in many armies up to the beginning of this centu ry, arose by Supereeding the old small calibred, but comparatively clumsy guns, aid was origi nally intended for case shot only, though v ^ soon it was also made to fire ronnd shot. The heavy gans vere kept distinct, and formed into powerful batteries occupying favorable pomtioBs on the wings or in fi-ont of the centre of tlie army. Thus by the separation of the lig^t froto the heavy artillery, and by the formation of batteries, ^ e tactics of field artillery were founded. It was General Torstensoii, the in spector-general of the Swedish artillery, who mainly contributed to these restdts by wMdh field artillery now first became an independent arm, sul^ect to distinct rules of its own for its use tn battle. Two further impOTtant inven tions were made about this time: abotlt 1600, that of the hoi^nt<d ^evating serew, as it ws used mrtif <MnMUvals times, and

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that of tubes filled with powder fbr *pfiming, instead ^ w ortog powder into the touohhole. Both pointing and loading became mtioh faoUitated thereby. Another great impro\ement was the invention of the prolonge^ for iBaiiO BU vring at short distances. The nuffibey df gtins carried into t W f i ^ daring the 17t& ioaatary, was very large. At Groifonhftgen, Gustavua Adolphus had 80 pieces with 20,000 men, and at I rankfort-ou-tho-Odcr, 200 pieces with 18,000 men. Artillery trains of 100 to 200 guns were of very common occurrence during the wars of Louis XIV. At Molplaquet, nearly 300.pieces of cannon were employed on both sides; this was the largest mass of artillery hitherto brought together on a single field of battle. Mortars were very generally taken into the field about this time. The French still maintained their superiority in artillery. They were the first to do away with the old guild system and enrol the gunners as regular soldiers, forming, in 1671, a regiment of artillery, and regulating the vai-ious duties and ranks of the officers. Thus this branch of service was recog nized as an independent arm, and the education of the officers and men was taken in hand by the state. An artillery school, for at least 50 years the only one in existence, was founded in France in 1690. A hand-book of artilleristic science, very good for the time, was published in 1697 by Saint Rumy. Still tJae secrecy sur rounding the mystery of gunnery was so great that many improvements adopted in other countries were as yet unknown in France, aud the construction and composition of every European artillery differed widely from any otlier. Thus the Frcnch had not yet adonted the howitzer, which had been invented in Hol land and adopted in most armies before 1700. Limber boxes for ammunition, first introduced by Mauricc of Nassau, wero unknown in France, and indeed but little adopted. The gun, car riage, and limber were too heavy to admit of their being encumbered with the extra weight of ammunition. The very small calibres, up to 8 lbs. inclusive, had indeed been done away with, but the light regimental artillery was unknown in Franco. The charges used in the artillery of the times hitherto considered were, for guns, generally very heavy; originally equal in weight to the ball. Although the powder was of inferior quality, those charges were still far stronger in oftect than those now ia use, thus they were one of the chief causes of the tremendous weight of the cannon. To resist such charges the weight of a brass cannon was often from 250 to 400 times the weight of the shot. Gradually, however,, the necessity of lightening the guns compelled a reduction of the charge, and about the beginning of the 18th century, the charjie was ficncrally only onehalf the weight of the shot. I'or mortars and howitzers the charge was regulated by the dis tance, and generally very small. The end of the l7th and begiuning of the 18th century was the period in which the artillery was in most countries finally incorporated in the army, de prived of its mediosval character of a guild, re cognized as an arm, and thus enabled to take a more regular and vapid development. The con sequence was an almost immediate and very marked progress. The irregularity and variety of calibres and models, the uncertainty of all existing empirical rules, the total want of well-established principle, now became evident aud unbearable. Accordingly, experiments were everywhere made on a large scale to ascertain the effects of calibres, the relations of the cali bre to the charge and to the weight and length of the gun, the distribution of metal in the cannon, the ranges, the effects of recoil on the carriages, &c. Between 1780 and 1740, liolidor directed such experiments at La Fdre in France, Robius in England, and Papacino dAntoni at Turin. The result was a great simplification t> f the calibres, a better distribution of the metnl of tlie gun, and a very general reduction of the charges, which were now between J and ^ the weiglitoftheshot. Theprogressofscientificgnnnery went side by side with these improvement'^, Galileo had originated the parobolic theory, Torricelli his pupil, Anderson, Newton, lilondcl, Bernouilli, Wolff, and Euler, occupied theniselves with further determining the flight of pro jectiles, the resistance of the air, and the causcs of their deviations. The above-named experi mental artillerists also contributed inatcrinlly to the advancement of the mathemoticnl portion of gunnery. Under Fi'cderic the Great the Prussian field artillery was again considerably lightened. The short, light, regimental guns, not more than 14,16, or 18 calibres long, and weighing from 80 to 150 times the weight oi the shot, were found to have a sufficient range for the battles of those days, decided princi pally by infantry fire. Accordingly, the king had all his 12-pounders cast the same propor tional length and weight. The Austri.ms, in 1753, followed this example, as well as most other states; but Frederic himself, in the latter part of his reign, again provided his re serve artillery with long powerful guns, his ex perience at Leuthen having convinced him of their superior effects. Frederic the Great in troduced a new arm by mounting the gunners of some of his batteries, and thus creating horse artillery, destined to give the same support to cavalry as foot-artillery did to infantry. The new arm proved extremely effective, and was very soon adopted by most armies; some, as the Austrians, mounting the gunners in separate wagons as a substitute. The proportion of guns with the armies of the 18th century was

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still very large. Froclcrio the Oreat had, in 1756, with 70,000 men 206 guns, 1762 with 67,000 men 275 guns, 1778 with 180,000 men 811 guns. These guns, with the exception of the regimental ones which followed their bat talions, were organized in batteries of various sizes from 6 to 20 guns each. The rerimental guns advanced with the infantry, while the batteries were firing from chosen positions, and sometimes advanced to a second position, but here they generally awaited the issue of tho battle; they left, as regards mobility, still very much to bo desired, and at Kunorsdorf, the loss of the battle was due to the impoesibihty of bringing up the artillery in tho decisive moment. The Prussian general, Tempelhof, also intro duced field-mortar batteries, the light mortars bciog carried on the backs of mules; but they were soon again abolished after their useless ness had been proved in the war of 1792 and '93. The scientific branch of artillery wm, during this period, cultivated especidly in Germany. Struensec and Tempelhof wrote use ful works on the subject, but Scharnhorst was the leading artilleryman of his day. His hand book of artillery is the first comprehensive really scientific treatise on the subject, while his hand-book for officers, published as early as 1787, contains the first scientific development of the tactic-s of field artillery. His works, though antiquated in many respects, are still classical. In the Austrian service, Gen. V(^a, in the Spanish, Gen. Morla, in tlie Prussian, Hoyer and Rouvroy, made valuable contribu tions to artilleristic literature. The French had reorganized their artillery according to the sys tem of Vali<iro in 1732; they retained 24, 10, 12, 8, and 4-pounders, and adopted the 8-inch howitzer. Still there wt\s a great variety of models of construction; the guns were from 23 to 26 calibres long, and weighed about 250 times os much as the corresponding shot. At length, in 1774, General Griboauvid, who had served with tho Austriahs in the 7 years war, and who knew the superiority of the new Prussian and Austrian artilleries, carried the introduction of his new system. The siege artillery was definitively separated from the field artillery. It wjvs formed of all guns heavier than 12-pounders, and of all tho old heavy 12-pounder guns. Tho field artillery was composed of 12-pounder, 8-pounder, and 4-pounder guns, all 18 calibres long, weighing 150 times the weight of tho shot, and of a C inch howitzer. Tho charge for tho guns was definitely fixed at one-third the weight of the shot, the perpendicular elevating screw was introduced, and every part of a gun or car riage was made according to a fixed model, so as to be easily replaced from the stores. Seven models of wheels, and 3 models of axletrees,

were sufficient for all the various vohicles used in the French artillery. Although the use of limber-boxes to carry a supply of ammunition was known to most artillerists, Gribeauval did not introduce them in France. The 4-pounders were distributed with the infantry, every battalion receiving 2 of them; the 8 and 12pounders weto . distributed in separate bat teries as reserve artillery, with a field-forge to every battery. Train and artisan companies were organized, and altogether this artillery of Gribeauval was tho first corps of its kind es tablished on a modern footing.. It has proved superior to any of its day, in the proportions by which its constructions were regulated, in itH material, and in its organization, and for many years it has served as a model. Thanks to Gribeauvals improvements, the French ar tillery, during the wars of the revolution^ was su perior to any other, and soon became, in tho hands of Napoleon, an arm of hitherto unknown power. There was no alteration made, except that the system of regimental guns was de finitively done away with in 1799, and that with the immense number of 6-pounder and 8pounder guns conquered in nil parts of Europe, these calibres were also introduced in tho ser vice. The whole of tho field artillery was or ganized into batteries of C pieces, among which one was generally a howitzer, and the remain der guns. But if thero was little or no change in tho material, there was an immense one in the tactics of artillery. Although the number of guns was somewhat dimini^ed in conse quence of the abolition of regimental pieces, the effect of artillery in a battlo was heightened by its skilful use. * Napoleon used a number of light guns, attached to tho divisions of in fantry, to engage battle, to make tho enemy show his strength, fec., while tho mass of tho ar tillery was held in reserve, until the decisive point of attack was determined on; then enor mous batteries were suddenly formed, all acting upon that point, and thus preparing by a tre mendous cannonade tho final attack of the in^ fan try reserves. At Fricdland 70 guns, at Wagram 100 guns, were thus formed in line; at Borodino, a battery of 80 guns prepared Neys attack on Semenovka. On the other hand, the largo masses of reserve cavalry formed by Na poleon, required for their support a correspond ing forco of horse artillery, which arm again received tho fullest attention, and was very nu merously represented in tho French armies, where its proper tactical uso was first practical ly established. Without Gribeauvals improve ments, this new uso of artillery would havo been impossible, and with tho necessity for tho altered tactics, these improvements gradually, and with slight alterations, found their way into all continental armies.The British artillery,

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about the beginning of the French revolutionary w ar, was exceedingly neglected, and much be hind that of other nations. They had two regi mental guns to each battalion, but no reserve artillery. The guns were horsed in single team, the drivers walking alongside Avith long whips. Horses and drivers were hired. The materiel was of very old-fashioned con struction, and except for very short distances, the pieces could niove at a walk only. Horso artillery was unknown. After 1800, however, when experience had shown the inadequacy of this system, the artillery was thoroughly reor ganized by Major Spearman, The limbers were adapted for double team, the guns brigaded in batteries of 6 pieces, and in general those im provements were introduced which had been in use for some time already on the continent. No expense being spared, the British artillery soon was the neatest, most solidly, and most luxuri ously equipped of its kind; great attention was )aid to the newly erected corps of horso artilery, which sooix distinguished itself by the biildness, rapidity, and precision of its manoeu vres. As to fresh improvements in the mate riel^ they were confined to the construction of the vehicles; the block-tail gun-oarria^e, and the ammunition wagon with a limber to it have eince been adopted in most countries of the con tinent.^The proportion of artillery to the other components of an army became a little more fixed during this period. The strongest pro portion of artillery now present with an army was that of the Prussians at Pirmasens-^7 guns for every 1,000 men. Napoleon considered 8 gnns per 1,000 men quite sufficient, and this proportion has become a general rule. The number of rounds to accompany a gun was also fixed; at least 200 rounds per gun, of which I or ^ were caise shot. During the peace following the downfall of Napoleon, the artiller ies of ^1 European powers underwent gradual improvements. The light calibres of 8 and 4 lbs. were everywhere abolished, the improved carriages and wagons of the English artillery were adopted in most countries. The charge was fixed almost everywhere at the metal of the gun at, or near, 150 times the weight of the shot, and the length of the piece at from 16 te 18 calibres. The French reorganized their artillery in 182T. The field-guns were fixed at 8 and 12 lb. calibre, 18 calibres long, charge ^ weight of metal in gun 150 times that of the hot. The English carriages and wagons were adopted, and limber-boxes for the first time in troduced into the French service. Two kinds of howitzers, of 15 and 16 centimetres of bore, were attached to th,e 8 and 12-pounder batter ies, respectively. A great simplicity distin guishes this new system of field artillery. There are but 2 'size- of gun-carriages, 1 size of limber, 1 size of wheel, and 2 sizes of axlefcpees to all the vehicles used in the French field batteries. Beside this, a separate moun tain artillery was introduced, carrying howit zers of 12 centimetres bore.The English field artillery now has for its almost exclusive calibre the 9-pounders of 17 calibres long, weight 1^ cwt. to 1 pound weight of shot, charge ^ the weight of shot. In every battery there are 2 24-pounder 5j-inch howitzers. Six-pounder and 12-pounder guns were not sent out at all in the late Russian war. There are 2 sizes of wheels in use. In both the English and French foot artillery the gunners are mounted during manoeuvres on the limber and ammunition wagons.The Prussian army carries 6 and 12pounder guns, 18 calibres long, weighing 145 times, and charged with | the weight of the shot. The howitzers are 5i and 6^inch bore. There are. 6 guns and'2 howitzers to a battery. There are 2 wheels and 2 axletrees, and 1 lim ber. The gun-carriages are of Gribeauval con struction. In the foot artillery, for quick ma noeuvres, 5 gunners, sufficient to serve the gun, mount the limber-box and the off-horses ; the remaining 3 follow as best they can. The am munition wagons are not, therefore, attached to the guns, as in the French and British service, but form a column apart, and are kept out of range daring action. The improved English ammunition wagon was adopted in 1842. The Austrian artillery has 6 and 12-pounder guns, 16 calibres long, weighing 185 times, charged with i the weight of the shot. -The howitzers ^ e simUar to those of the Prussian service. Six guns and 2 howitzers compose a battery.^The Russian artillery has 6 and 12pounder gons, 18 calibres long, 150 times the weight of the shot, with a charge of J its weight The howitzers are 5 and 6-inch bore. According to the calibre and destination, either 8 or 12 pieces form a battery, one-half of wWch are guns, and the other half howitzers. The Sardinian army has 8-poiinder and 16pounder guns^ with a corresponding size of howitzer. The smaller German armies all have 6 and 12-pounders, the Spaniards 8 and 12pounders, the Portuguese, Swedes, Danes, Bel gians, Dutch, and Neapolitans 6 and 12-pound ers.The start given to the British artillery by M^or Spearmans reorganization, along with the interest for further improvement thereby awakened in that service, and tlie wide range oflfered to artilleristic progress by the im mense naval artillery of Great Britain, have contributed to many important inventions. The British compositions for fireworks, as well as their gunpowder, are superior to any other, and the precision of their time fnzes is unequal* led. The principal invention latterly made in the British artillery are the shrapnel shells

90
(hollow shot, filled with musket balls, and plodlng during the flight), by which the ef fective range of grape h ^ been rendered e ^ a l to that of round shot. The Fre^oh, sldlfo! as they are as constructors and organizers, are nearly the only army which has not yet adopted this new and terrible projectile; tiiey nave not been able to make out the> i\ize composi tion, upon which every thing depwids.A new system of field artUlery has been proposed by liouis Napbleon, and appears to be in course of adoption in France. The whole of the 4 calibres of guns and howitzers now in use, to be super seded b;p a light 12-pounder gun, 15^ calibres long, we^hing 110 times, and charged with | the weight of the solid shot. A ^ell of 12 centim. (the same now used in the mountain artillery), to be fired out of the same gun with a redtio^ charge, thus superseding howitzers for the special use of hollow shot. The experiments made in 4 artillery schools of France have been very successful, and it is said that these guns showed a marked superiority, in the Crimea, over the Russian guns, mostly 6-poandersThe English, however, maintain that their loaag 9*ppunder is superior in range and precimoa to thisnew gun, and it is to be observed that they wer6 th^ first to introduce, but very soon again to abs^caj, a light 12-pounder for a clikatrge of I the /BbiO itV weight, and which has e^tidently serv^ Louis Napoleon as a modeL The firing of shells from common guns is taken &om the Frus^ Bittu service, where, in sieges, the. 24rpounder8 are made to fii*eshells for certain purposes. Nev ertheless, the capabilities of Louis Napoleons gun have still to be determined by eXperienc^ and as nothing special has been published on its eflTects in tbe late war, we cannot here be ex pected finally to judge on its merits. -The laws and experimental nlaxims for propelling solid, hollow, or other projectiles, from cannon, the ascertained proportions of range, elevation, charge, the effects of w in d ^ and other causes of deviation, the probabilities of hitting the mark, and the various circumstances that may occor in warfare, constitute the science of gun>nery. Though the fact, that a heavy body projected in mcu<?, in a directioa different from the Vertical, will describe a parabola in its fiight, forms the fundamental priifoiple of tbis sci^k^.yet the resistance of the air, increasing as it does with the velocity of the moving body, alters very materially the application of the parabolic theory in gunnery practice.. Thus for guns propelling their shot at an initial ve locity of 1,400 to 1,700 feet in a second, the line of fi%ht varies considerably from the ^eoretic parabola, so much so that with them, the greatest range is obtained at an elevation of only about 20 degrees, while according to> th parabolic theory it should be at ^ degrees. FraoMoal experinaeiits have determined, with some degree of precision, thcee deviations, and thus fixed the proper elevations for each class of guns, for a given ^urge and range. But there are other circumstanoes affecting the flight of the shot. There 1% first of all, the windage, or the differ ence by, which the diameter of Ae shot must be less than tihat of the bore, to facilitate load ing. It! causes first an escape of the esSpanding gas dtffing tixe explosion of the charge, in other words, a reduction of the force, and secondly an irregularity in the direction of the shot, caui^ng deflections in a vertical, or horizontal sense. Then there is the una voidable inequality in the weight of the charg^ or in its condition at the moment it is used, the eco^htricity of the diot, the centre of gravity not coinciding with the centre of the sphere, which causes deflections Tarying according to the rdafive position of the eentres at the .moment of firing, and maity oth^ causes producing irregularity of results under seemingly the ame conditions of fiight For field-gWis, we have seen that t^e chMrge of 4 of the shots weight, and a length of lfr-18 calibres are (dmost universally adopted. 'With such charges, ^ e point-blank range (the gun being laid Iwrizontal), the shot wiU touch the ground at aix>ut 800 yards distanc^ and by elevating the gnn. this range may be increased up to 8,000 or 4,000 yarda ^ c h ar range, however, leaves all probability of hitting the mark out of 4he question, and for actual and eflSective practice, t ^ range of field-guma dc^ not excem 1,400 or 1,500 yardsj at which dis tance soarcely 1 shot out of 6 or 8 might be ex pected to hit the mark. The decisive ranges, in which alone eannon can contribute to the issue of a battle, are, for round shot and shell, between 600 1,100 yards,; and at these ranges the probability of striking the object is in deed far greater. Thus it is reckoned that at ?00 yards about 50per cent., at 900yards about 85 per cent., at 1,100 yards 25 per cent, out of the shots fired from a 6-pounder, will hit atargetrepresenting the front ik a battalion in column of attack (34 yards long by 2 yards high). The 9 And 12 pounder will give somewhat better results, .in some experiments made in France in 1860, the. 8-pounders fiE id 12-pounders then in use gave the following Insults, against a targ^ 80 metres by 8 m etr^ (representing a troop of .cavalry) a t:
BOOmet. 0 0 m et. 100 m et. SnOnwt. SnOmet.

12-pders, hit#, 6 4 p .c t 8-pdera, T

5 4 p .c t 44

43 p.ot 8T p .ct 40 28

82 p.ct 28

Thou^ the target was higher by one-half, the practice here remained below the avert^e stated above. With field-howitzers the charge is con siderably less in proportion to the weight of the projectile than with guns. The short l e ^ ^

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tice. One of the best of this class of guns, is of the piece (7 to 10 calibres) and the necessity the Prussian brass 24-pouuder of 10 feet 4 of firing it at great elenratiora, inches, or 22 calibres long, weighing G O cwt.; this. The recoU from a howitzer fired tmder for dismounting practice in a siege, there is no high elevation, acting downward as "well m gun like it. fo r most purposes, liowever, a b^kward, would, if a heavy c ^ ^ was length of 16 to 20 oalibrcs is found quite siirastrain the carriage so as to disable it after a few cient, and as, upon an average, size of calibre rounds. This the reason why m most conttwill be preferable to extreme precision, a ninss nental artUleries severfd charges a r e m use m of 60 cwt. of iron or gun-metal will bo more same field-howitzer, ^ u s m a ^ Jie ^ e r to usefully employed, as u rule, in a heavy 82prodnce a given range by ^fe^ent combjn^ion pounder of lG-17 calibres long. The new long of charge and elevation. Where this b not the iron 32-pounder, one of the finest guns in the case, as in the British artillery, the elevation navy, 9 feet long, 50 cwt., measures but taken is necessarily very low, and scarcely ex* British 164 calibres. The long 68-pouuder, 112 cwt., ceeding that of guns; the range-tables for the pivot-giui of all tlie large screw 131 gun-ships, British 24-pounder howitzer, 2|-pound charge, measures 10 feet 10 inches, or a trifle more do not extend beyond 1,050 yard^^^f^ ^ dethan 16 calibres; another kind of pivot-gnn vation: the same elevation, for the 9 ^n n d er the long 56-pounder of 98 cwt., measures 11 SxLgivingarangeof 1,400 yards. T h eresa or I7i calibres. Still a great number of pec^iar short kind of howitzer in ^ m most feet, less effective guns enter into nav.'il arinaGerman armies, which is capable of an eleva monts even now, bored-up guns of merely tion of from 16 to 20 degrees, thus acting somer 11 or 12 calibres, and carronades of i-8 calibres what like a mortar; its charge is, necessarUy, long. There is, however, another kind of naval but small; it has this advantage over t ^ com gun that was introduced about 35 years ago mon, long howitzer, that its by General Paixhans, and has since received an to drop into covered positions, behind undula immense importance, the shcll-gim. Ihis kind tions of ground, &c. This advantage iSr of ordnance has undergone considerable im ever, of a doubtful nature against movable obprovement, and the French shell-gun still comes iects like troops, th o u # of great importance nearest to that constructed by the inventor; it where the object covered from has retained the cylindrical chamber for the immovable; and as to direct fiw^ t h ^ bowi^ charge. In the English service the chamber is zers, from their shortness (16 to 1 either a short frustum of a cone, reducing only s i ^ charge, are all but useless. very slightly the diameter of the boro, or tliere to obtain various ranges at an eleyatKai fixed is no chamber at all; it measures m length by the purpose intended (direct firing ^ e l^ from 10 to 13 calibres, and is intended for hollow ing), necessarily varies very much; in the Pru^ shot exclusively; but the loug 68- nlrs. and 5CBian field artillery, where * 2 pdi's. mentioned above tlirow so id snot and still used, not less than twelve different charges shell indiscriminately. In the U. S. navy occur. Withal, the howitzer is but a very im Capt. Dahlgren has proposed a new system ot perfect piece of cannon, and the shell-guns, consisting of short guns ot very large superseded by an effective field she calibre (11 and 9 inches bore), which has been better The heavy cannon used in tortre^es, partly adopted in the armament of several new sieges,* and naval armapents, are of various frigates. The value of this system has still to bo dewnption. Up to late Russian war, it fixed by actual experience, which must deter was not customary to use m mine whether the tremendous effect of such heavier guns than 24-pounders, or, ^ the very enormous shells can bo obtained without the outside, a few 82-pounders. Since tha siege of sacrifice of precision, which cannot but sutter Sebastopol, howcvev, siogo-guiis from the great elevation required at long ranges. are the same, or, rather, the ettect of the In sieges and naval gunnery, the charges are as variable as the constructions of the guns tliemship-guns in trcucliM and proved so unexpectedly superior to that ot the selves, and tho ends to bo attuiued, lu laying customary light siogc-^mns, that the war ot a breach in masonry, tho heaviest charges aro sieges will heuccforth have to bo deoidcd, in a used, and these amount, with some very heavy great measure, by such ^aval c^nnon^ and solid guus, to one-half the weight of the !n both siege and naval ni'tillery, theie are shot. On the whole, however, one-fourth may ecnerally found various models of guns loi the bo considered a full average charge for siege 4m o calibre. There are light and short guns, purposes, increased sometimes to one-third, di 'and there arc long and heavy ones. Mobint> minished at others to one-sixth. On board being a minor consideration, guns for particular ship, there are generally 3 classes of charges to purposes are often made 22 to 25 calibres long, each gun ; the high charge, for distant practice, a n d some of these are, in consequence of this chasing, &c., the medium charge, for the avergreater length, as precise as rillcs in their prac
i s

92
ng effectivo distances of naval engagements; the reduced, for close quarters and double shot ting. For the long 82-pdrs. they are equal to tV, i, Riid tV of th shots weight. For short liglit guns and shell-guns, these proportions are of course still more reduced; but with the lat ter, too, the hollow shot does not reach tlie weight of the solid one. Beside guns and shel^ guns, heavy liuwitzers and mortars enter into the composition of siege and naval artillery. Howitzers are short pieces intended to throw shell at an elevation up to 12 or 30 degrees, and to be fixed on carri^es; mortars are still shorter pieces, fixed to blocks, intended to throw shell at an elevation generally exceeding 20 degrees, and increasing even to 60 degi*ees. Uoth are chambered ordnance; i.e. the cham ber or part of the bore intended to receive the charge, is less in diameter than the flight or general bore. Howitzers are seldom of a cali bre exceeding 8 inches, but mortars are bored up to 13, 15, and more inches. The flight of a shell from a mortar, from the smallness of the chtirge(l-20tli to l-40th of the weightof theshell), and from its considerable elevation, is less inter fered witli by the rcsistonce of the air, nnd hero the parabolic theory may be used in gunnery calculotions without material deviation from practical results. Shells from mortars are in tended to act either by bursting, and, as car casses, setting fire to combustible objects by the jet of flame from the fuzes, or by their weight as well, in breaking through vaulted and other wise secured roofs; in the latter case the high er elevation is preferred, giving the highest flight and greatest momentum of fall. Shells from howitzers are intended to act, first by im pact, and afterward by bursting. From their great elevation, and tlie small initial velocity imparted to the shell, and consequent little re sistance offered to it by the air, a mortar throws its projectile further than any other kind of ordnance, the object fired at being generally a whole town, there is little precision required; and thus it happens that the effective range of heavy mortars extends to 4,000 yards and up ward, from which distance Sveaborg was bom barded by the Anglo-French moi'tar-boats. The application of these different kinds of can non, projectiles, and charges, during a siege, will bo treated of under that head; the use of naval artillery constitutes nearly the whole fighting part of naval elementary tactics, and does therefore not belong to this subject; it thus only remains for us to make a few observations on the use and tactics of field artillery.Artilkry has no am\3 for hand-to-hand fight; all its forces are concentrated in the distant effect of its fire. It is, moreover, in fighting condition as long only as it is in position ; as soon as it lim bers up, or attaches the prolonge for a move ment, it is temporarily disabled* From both causes, it is the most defensive of all the 3 arms; its powere of attack are very limited indeed, for attack is onward movement, and its culminating point is the clash of steel against steel. The critical moment for artillery is therefore the advance, taking position, and get ting ready for action under tiie enemys fire. Its deployments into line, its preliminary move ments, will have to be masked either by obsta cles of ground or by lines of troops. It will thus gain a position parallel to the line it has to occupy, nnd then advance into position straight against the enemy, so as not to expose itself to a flanking fire. The choice of a position is a thing of the highest importance, both as regards the effect of the fire of a battery, and that of the enemys fire upon it. To place his guns so that their effect on the enemy is as telling as possi ble, is the first important point; security from the enemy\s fire the second. A good position must afford firm and level standing ground for the wheels and trails of the guns; if the wheels do not stand level, no good practice is possible; and if the trail digs into the ground, t le carriage will soon be broken by the power of recoil. It must, beside, afford a free view of the ground held by the enemy, and admit of as much lib erty of movement as possible. Finally, the ground in front, between the battery and the enemy, must be favorable to the effect of our arms, and unfavorable, if possible, to that of theirs. The most favorable ground is a firm and level one, affording the advantage of rico chet practice, and making the shot that go short strike the enemy after the first graze. It is wonderful what difference the nature of the ground will make in artillery pructice. On soft ground the shot, on grazing, will deflect or make irregular rebounds, if they do not stick fast in it at once. The way the furrows run in ploughed land, makes a great difference, espe cially with canister and shrapnell firing; if they run crossways, most of the shot will bury themselves in them. If the ground be soft, un dulating, or broken immediately in front of us, but level and hard further on toward the ene my, it will favor our practice, and protect us from his. Firing down or up inclinations of more than 6 d^rees, or firing from the top of one hill to that of another, is very unfavorable. As to our safety from the enemys fire, very small objects will increase that. A thin fence, scarce ly hiding our position, a group of shrubs, or high corn, will prevent his taking correct aim. A small abrupt bank on which our guns are placed will catch the most dangerous of his >rojectiles. A dyke makes a capital parapet, )ut the best protection is the crest of a slight undulation of ground, behind which we draw uur guns bo far back that the enemy sees noth-

93
iug bnt til muzzles; in tliis position every shot striking the ground in front, will bound high over our heads. Still better is it, if wo can cut out a stand for our guus into the crest, about 2 feet deep, flattening out to the rear with tlio slope, so as to command the whole of tlio ex ternal slope of the hill. The Frencli under Napoleon were extremely skilful in placing their guns, and from them all other nations have learnt this art. Regarding the enemy, the position should bo chosen so as to be freo from flunk or enfilading fire ; regarding our own troops, it should not hamper their movcmenU;. The usual distance from gun to gun in line is 20 yards, but there is no necessity to adhere strictly to any of these rules of the paradeground. Once in position, the limber.s remain close behind their guns, while the wagons, in some services, remain imder cover. "Where tho wagons arc used for mounting tho men, they too must run the chance of going into effective range. The battery directs its fire upon that portion of the enemys forces which at the time most menaces our position; if our infantry is to attack, it fires upon either tho opposing artil lery, if that is yet to bo silenccd, or upon the masses of infantry if they expose themselves; but if a portion of tho enemy advance to actual attack, tliat is the point to aim at, not minding tho hostile artillery which fires on us. Our firo against artillery will be most efliective when tliat artillery cannot reply, i. e. Avhen it is lim bering up, moving, or unlimbcring. A few good shots causo great confusion in such mo ments. The old rule that artillery, excepting in pressing moments of importance, should not approach infantry to within 300 yards, or the range of small arms, will now soon be antiqua ted. With the increasing range of modern mus kets, field artillery, to be effective, cannot any longer keep out of musket range; and a gun with its limbr, horses, and gunners, forms a group quite large enough for skirmishers to firo at, at G O O yards with the Mini6 or Enfield rillc. Tlie long-established idea, that who wishes to live long must enlist in the artillery, appears to be no longer true, for it is evident that ekirmishing^ from a distance will in future be tlic most eSective way of combating artillery ; and where is the battle-field in which there could not be found capital cover for skirmishers within G O O yards from any possible artillery emplacement ?Against advancing lines or col umns of infantry, artillery has thus far always had the advantage; a few effective rounds of grape, or a couple of solid shot ploughing tlirougha deep column, have a terrib y cooling effect. The nearer the attack comes, the moro effective becomes our practice; and even at tho last moment we cun easily withdraw our guns from an opponent of such slowness; though whether a line of chasseurs de Vincennes, ad vancing at the pas gymnastigue, would not bo down upon us before we had limbered up, nuist still remain doubtful.Against cavalry, cool ness gives the advantage to artillery. If the latter reserve their grape to within 100 yards, and then give a well-aimed volley, the cav^ry will be found pretty far off by the tune the smoke has cleared away. At all events, to lim ber, up and trv to escape, would be the worst plan; for cavalry would be sure to overtake the gunfi,^Artillery against ar^|illery, the ground, the calibres, the relative number of gons, and the use made thereof by the parties, will de cide. It is, however, to be noticed, that thoxigh the large calibre has an undoubted advantage at long, ranges, the smaller calibre approaches in its effects those of the large one as the ranges decrease, and at short distances almost equals them. At ^rodino, Napoleons artillery con sisted principally of 3 and 4-ponnders, while the Eussians exulted in their numerous 12pounders; yet the French small pop-guns had aecidedly the best of it.In supporting either infantry or cavalry, the artillery will have always to gain a position on its flank. If the infantry advances, it advances by half-batteries or sections on a line with the skirmishers, or rather in advance of i t ; as soon as the infantry masses prepare to attack with the bayonet, it trots up to 400 yards from the enemy, and pre pares the charge by a rapid fire of case shot. If the attack is repelled, the artillery will re-open its fire on the pursuing enemy until compelled to withdraw ; but if the attack succeeds, its fire contribute a great deal to the completion of the success, one-half of the guns firing while the other advances. Horse artillery, as a sup porting am^ to cavalry, imparting to it some of that defensive element which it naturally lacks altogether, is now one of the most favorite branches of all services, and brought to high perfection in all European armies. Though in tended to act on cav^ry ground, and in com pany with cavalry, there is no horse artillery in the world which would not be prepared to gal lop across a c^mntry where it9 own cavaby would not follow without sacrificing its order and cohesion. The horse artillery of every country forms the boldest and skilfdlest riders of its army, and they will take a particular pride, on any grand field-day, in dashing across obstacles, guns and all, before which the cavalry will stop. Ihe tactics of horse artillery consist in boldness and coolness. Rapidity, suddenness of appear ance, quickness of fire, readiness to move off at a moments notice, and to take that road which is too difficult for the cavalry, these are the chief qu^ties of a good horse artillery. Choice of position there is but little in this constant change of places; every position is good so as

94
of the mvalry; and i ti s daring the ebbing and flowing of cavalry engagements, that tlw artSl e r y , skirting the Mvancing and reccing waves. has to show everyjBoment i t superior hor^ manship and presence of mind in getting clear of t h i s surging sea across a l l sorte of |round where not every cavalry dares, or likes to f o l low. In the attack and defence of posts, the t e c t i c s of a r t i l l e r y are similar. The principal thing i s ^always to f f r e upon that point' from which, in defence, threatens the nest and ino^ direct danger, or in attack, from wMch our advwce can be most effectually checked. Th^e*^otion of material obstacles also forms partof i t sd uties, and here the vjurious calibre a n , d kinds o f ^ordnance are applied aooordii^ to their nature and effect; howitzers for setting f i r e to houses, heavy guns to batter down gates, w a l l a , and barricades. All these remarks i^i^y to the a r t i l l e r y which in every army i s attached to the d i visi ons. But the grandest results are obtained by the reserve a r t i l l e r y in ^ a t and decisive b a t t l e s . Held back out of eight and out of ran^ during the greater part of the day, i ti s brought forward in a mass up<Mi the deci sive point as soon as the time for tie ^ort has come. Formed in a crescent a mile or more in extent, i t concentrates i t s destructive f i r e upon a comparatively smsJl point. Unless an equivdent force of guns i s there to met i t , half an hour s rapid firing s e t t l e s the matter* The enemy begins to witer under the haiUtorm of howling shot; the intact reserves o infantry advance a l a s t , sharp, short struggle, and the victory i s won. Thus did Napoleon prepare Hacdontdd s advance at Wagram, and resistance was broken before the 8 divisions advancing in a column had fired a shot or crossed a bayonet. And since those great days only can the tactics of f i e l d art illery be said to e a d s t . (See ^so O A NNOlir.)

It IS close to the enemy and out of the W

A fpm
ASPERN and Essi.ino, a town and village on the north side of the Danube, the former about half a league, the latter about 2 leagues below Vienna, situated on the great meadowy plain of the Marchlield, extending from the rivor to the wooded mountain lieights of the Bisamberg, celebrated for the 2 days terrible fighting between the Frencl> nnd Austrians, on May 21 and 22, 1809, and the first defeat of the emperor Napoleon, who was here beaten and forced to retreat by the arcluluke Charles.In the early part of the campaign, Napoleon, with

the grand army, had made his way through the Tyrol, up the rivers Inn and Iser; had defeated the archduke at Eckmtihl; forced him across the Danube, into the mountains of Bohemia, at Ratisbon, which he took by assanlt, thus inter posing between the Austrian army and capital; and then, detaching Davoust with 40,000 men to amuse the imperial general, had descended the Danube, and made himself master of Vien na; while from the Italian side his lientenanti, Eugene Beauharnois, and Macdonald, were ad vancing victoriously through Dalmatia, Carniola, and up the valley of the Muhr, in which Jellachich was severely defeated, to join tlieir commander. In the mean time, the archduke Charles, who since his defeat at Eckmtihl had been moving slowly down the river, on the northern side, hoping for an opportunity to fight at advantage and rescue the empire under tlie walls of the capital itself, took post with his army on the Bisamberg, over against the island of Lobau, and another smaller islet, which here divide the Danube into 4 channels. The archduke was at the head of 100,000 men, and was in hourly expectation of beinj joined by his brother, the arcluluke John, witii 40,000 more, which would have been raised to 60,000, had that prince effected his junction, as he was explicitly ordered to do, with Kolowrat at Lintz, and which would have occupied a most commanding position in the rear of Na poleon, and on the principal line of his commu nications.It was Napoleons object, who had concentrated under his own orders 80,000 ad mirable soldiers ready to take the field, includ ing the imperial guard and the reserve cavalry of Bessidres, to cross the Danube and give bat tle to the archduke, in the hope of crushing him before the arrival of his Ieinforcements. To this intent, he bridged the river from the rigljt bank to the island of Lobau, with a struc ture of most solid materials, supported on 68 large boats and 9 huge rafts, and from Lobau to the Marchfield, midway between the villages of Aspern and Essling, Avith a slighter fabric of pontoons; and on the morning of the 21st be gan to pass his troops across, with the utmost alacrity and diligence. The Austrian command er, froin his mountain position, perceived the rashness of the manojuvre, by which the em peror was pushing his vast host across a wide and rapid river, by means of a single bridge, which could only admit of a slow and gradual defiling of the men of all arms, over its long and narrow causeway, difficult to cavalry, yet more ditiicult to artillery; and which, in case of his being forced to retreat, scarcely offered a possibility of saving the array; and perceiving it, resolved at once to avail himself of the op portunity of crushing half the French host on

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the northern bank, while the r ^ t of the anny was either in the act of passing, or on the southern side. Sending orders to Eolowrat, Nordman, and the other oflBcers in command up tiie river, to prepare boats la d ^ witii heavy materials and combustibles for the destruction of the bridge^ when the time should arrive^ the archduke kept his great army out of Mght, ordering his cavalry and outposts only to make a nominal resistance, and then to fall back be fore the advance of the French, which was led by Massena; until at 12 oclock the movement of the enemy was sufficiently developed, above 40,000 French being already on the northern shore^to justify his assuming the initiative. At that hour, descending from the wooded heights of the Bisamberg, with 80,000 men, of whom 14,000 were splendid cavalry, and 288 cannons, lie precipitated himself upon the ene my, making the 2 villages of Aspern and Essling, on NapoleonS flanks, the principal points of his attack; the central ^ace between these 2 strong places, which were built of stone, with garden walls and many enclosures, was occu pied by the tremendous Austrian batteries, guarded chiefly by cavalry, with Hohenzollerns infantry in reserve in the rear. The lighting on both the flank attacks was terrific, and the fury of the assaults and obstinacy of the de fence almost unparallelod in the history of war. Both villages were taken and retaken several times, and so terribly did the Austrian artillery devastate the French lines, that Napoleon or dered a grand charge of cavalry to take the batteries, If possible. The su^rb French cuirassiers of the guard charged with their usual impetuous valor, routed the Austrian horse, and would have carried the guns, but that tiiey were hastily withdrawn, and the in fantry formed in squares, which, as at Waterloo afterward, defied all attempts to break their impenetrable formation, and at last defeated the horse, and compelled them to retire, shattered and decimated, into their own line& In the mean time, Aspern was taken by the imperial ists, their centre was gradually but irresistibly gaining ground, in spite of the gallant devotion of the cuirassiers, who charged again and again with constantly dim nishipg numbers, and who alone prevented the French lines from being broken through.Night brought a brief cessa tion of the strife; but the French had suflFered a decided defeat in a pitched battle; tifcieir left flank was turned, their centre forced back almost to the brides; and although Essling, on their right, had been defended by the gallantry of Lannes, it was surrounded by the Austrians, who slept on their arms among the French dead, Waiting only the return of light to renew their offensive operations.^During the whole night, ho\feyer, fresh forces were defiling across the bridges^ and debouching upon the Marchfield, and at daybreak, after all the losses of the pre#^ing day, Napoleon had full 70,000 men in tine while Davoust was beginning to cross over at the head of 30,000 more. The battle began by renewed attacks on the two disputed vil* i^ e s; Essling was carried by the imperialists, and Aspern retaken by the French. Both vil lages were the scene of desperate fighting all day long, and both were taken and retaken sev er^ times with the bayonet, but at last re mained in the hands of the Austrians, who, in the e'<rening^ advanced their artillery beyond both places, and actually crossed their fire upon the rear' of the French. But during these bloody conflicts, Napoleon, who was relieved by his tast accession of forces from the neces sity of acting on the defensive, had recourse to his favorite manoeuvre of an overwhelming at tack on the centre. At the head of a huge column of above 20,000 infantry, with 200 can non preceding them, and a tremendous cavalry force in their rear, he launched Lannes and Oudinot directly on the Austrian centre, where the lines appeared the weakest, between the left of Hohenzollern and the right of Rosen berg. At first, this tremendous attack seemed to be perfectly succesrful; the Austrian lines were forced r a huge gap made between Rosen berg and Hohenzollern, into which the cavalry burst with appalling fury, and cut their way clear through to the reserves of the prince of Reuss, far in the rear; and already the cry went abroad, that the battle was lost but the archduke Charles was equal to the emergency; the reserve *grenadiers were brought up at double quick time, and formed in a checker of squares; the numerous dragoons of prince Lichtenstein came galloping up behind them, and, with the colors of Zachs corps in his own hand, tlie gallant prince restored the battle. The terrific column of Lannes could advance no further, but halting, began to exchange volleys with the squares, and, unable to deploy, was crushed by the concentrated fire of the bat teries, playing on it at half musket shot. In vain the cavalry charged home on the bayonets of the squaresj for not a square wavered or was broken ; and, at length, the Austrian dragoons of the reserve, coming up with loud shouts, charged the cuirassiers in their turn, routed them, and drove them ih confusion back upon their infantry, and completed 'the disorder. Immediately after this repulse, Hohenzollern broke through the French lines on the right of the centre with 6 Hungarian regiments of grenadiera, and carried ^1 before him, even to the rear of Essling, which, with Aspern, were both carried finally by the imperialists. From these villages, as the Austrian centre was now driving all Wore it, in spite of the unoar-

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aUeled exertions of jthe French army, which was BO Wm ftill retreat to the island e i Lohaa, batteries crossed their fire, with rntal effect, on the bridges, every B^lot teflinff on t ^ crowded maases of men and horses.-t-M^uwhite, to augment the perils of the French, the bridge connecting the island with the soothem Bbore was broken- by the Austrian fitefeoats and rafts, OTd ^ escape from the Island was Jenaered, for the moment, imposrible. fitaij with unexampled firmness the rear-guord of i^e French held the Austrians in check, until, at midnight, the last of the enemy having with drawn from the field of battle into the island, the thunder of the Austrian batteries ceased, and the exhausted artillerists fell asleep beside their guns, worn out by the fatigues of that unt>araUeled and glorious day.Seven thousand French were buried on the field of battle by the victors; 20,793 were carried, wounded and prisoners, into Vienna. Lannes and St. Hilaire were mortally wounded, and died a few days afterward. On the side of the imperialists, 87 superior officers, and 4,200 privates, were killed; beside 16,300 wounded. But &e victo ry, ^ined under the very walls, and almost witliin sight of the capital, was complete; the enemy, broken, defeated, and dispirited, were cooped up in the narrow limits of the island of Lobau, and, had the archduke John, in obedi ence to his orders, made his appearance in the rear of the French with 60,000 fres^ men, on the morning following the defeat of Aspern, it were difficult to say what might not have been the result.^But Napoleons time had not yet arrived, and the nations were yet doomed to suffer 4 years longer, before the final downfall of the military colossus should restore thmi to their lost freedom, by the fields of Leipfiio and Waterloo. calculations of the enemy, takes him away from his base of operations, and compels him to fight different from those whfch he expected, and for which he was prepared: and perhaps, positively disadvantageous to h i ^ ! ! The two most remarkable instances of offensive operations and direct attacks, used & strictly defensive campaigns, occurred in the two wonderful campaigns of Napoleon: ^ t of
ba^hmefli Jo

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which was t e f c
thesnr|-eSS

strictly in the deftttde Of an invaded country, attacked his ene mies on all sides, and on every occasion; and, inferior, on the whole, to thfe 1nvader^ bontnved always to be superior, gehei'ally victorious, on the point of attack po'uflfortanate result of both these camp^ens detracts nothing from the conception or the details of dther. They were both lost from cau^s 'Entirely independent of their plan or excauses both political and strategetical, which were the vast superiority of the dhed means, and the impossibility that any oi nation, exhausted by wars of a quarter of a C6nturt, should resist the attack of a world in ^ m s against it. It has been said that when two al'mito aj*e set face to face in the field, that artriy Which takes the initiative, or in other Wbrd^ attach, has the decided advantage. It however, that those who have adopted this view, have been dazzled by the splendid achievements of a few great generals, and of one oi* two great military nations, which have owed their successes to attacks on the gnindestscal^; and that the opinion requires mnch modification. Epaminondas, Alexander Hannibal, O^sar, and, last not least, Napoleon I.j wei^, emphatically, attacking generals, and f the main, ty endured all their great reverses, in actions assumed the initiative, everything to the impetuosity AllBck 1 ^ onset, and to their _ ATTACK, in its general, slrategetical mean rapid intelligence in following up successes and ing, 18 held to signify the taking of the initiative converting disasters, on the part of their ene in any particular skirmish, combat, engagement, my, into in-etrievable ruin. They are by no or pitcnod battle; in. all of which on party means equal in the defensive. The history of must necessarily commence with offensive, the the greatest battles in the world seems to show other with defensive, operations. The attack that, where the attacked army has solid and IS generally considered the more successful, and obstinate endurance sufficient to make it to re consequently, armies acting on the defensive, sist, th broken, until the fire of the assailants that is to say, in wars of a strictly defensive begins to die out, and exhaustion and reaction nature, often initiate offensive campaigns, and to Succeed, and ean then assume the offensive even in defensive campaigns deliver offensive and attock m its turn, the defensive action is actions. In the former case, the object to be the s^est. But there are few armies, or ingained is that the defending arniy, by shifting d ^a, races of men, who can be intrusted to |:tles. Even the Boinans,' thouffh the place and scene of operation, disturbe the ngnt sQch 1jk& maghificent iia thb defence of walled to w ^

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and wonderful in offensive field operations, were never celebrated in the defensive; and their history shows no battle in which, after fighting all day under reverse and on the defen sive, they in the end attacked and won. The satDf is generally characteristic of the French armlfes and leaders. The Greeks, on the contrai^, fi)ught many of their best battles, as those of Marathon, Thennopylae, PlatBBa, and many others, but the latter especially, on the plan of receiving the assault until it slackens, and then attacking the half-exhausfted and sur prised asMilants. The same has been the Eng lish', andy to a greW extent, the Swiss and Ger man system for many ages, and generally success ful ^ t h those troops, as it has been in later days with the Ameritsans, The battles of Orecy, PoitiierE^ A^ncourt, Waterloo, Aspern and Essling, and many others, too numerous to be re corded, were fought exactly on the same princi ple ; and it may be added that in the war of 1812~14, the Americans successfully retorted on the English, who almost invariably attacked tliem, and that toocontrary to their usual modein column, the plan which they had proved to be so valuable against the French, and_which they have still more recently proved agains^ the Russians,The ordinary modes of attack are the following, when two armies aro opposed face to face, in the field, and when both intiend to fight. First, and simplest, the direct parallel attack, when the assai ing force joins battle, at once, along the whole front, from wing to wing, and fights it out by sheer force. Second, the attack by the wings, either on both simultane ously, or on one first and then on the other, successively, keeping the centre retired. This was Napoleons favorite battle,'by which, having caused the enemy to weaken his centre in order to strengthen his wingSj while he kept his own centre retired and fortitied by immense reserves of cavalry, he finally rushed into the central ^ p and finished the action with an exterminat ing blow. Third, the attack by the centre, keeping the wings retired and in reserve. This is the most faulty of all attacks, and has rarely been adopted, and, it is believed, never suocessfull^y. If an army be forced into this position,it is generally surrounded and annihilated, as WM the Roman attacking army at Oann. It is, on the contrary, an admirable position of de- f fence.^ Fourth, the oblique attack, invented by Epaminondas, and practised by him, with splen did success, at Leuctra and Mantinea. It consists in attacking one wing of the enemy, witli one wing secretly and Successively reinforced, while the centre and other wing are retired, but are so manoeavred as to thre.iten a constant attack, and prevent the defending party from strength ening its own weak point, until it is too late. This was the favorite method of the Austrian Olairfait, by which ho constantly defeated the Turks; and of Frederic tlie Great, who was wont to say that he was only fighting Epami nondas his battles over again, in his own finest victories. It is worthy of remark that the Greeks, the'French generally, as well as the Russians and the Austrians, have gained all their best battles by attack of columns; which, when they are not effectually checked and brought to a stand, break through the centre and carry all before tliem. The Romans, the English, and the Americans, almost invariably, have fought and still tight, whether in attack or on defence, in line; in which fomiation they have always proved able to resist and hold in check the assaulting column with their centre, until by the advance of their wings they can overlap the enemys flanks and crush him. It is worthy of remark, that wherever the Eng lish have varied from what may be called their national order of attack, in line two deep, and have assailed in column, as at Fontenoy and J^hippewa, they have suffered disaster. The inference is nearly irresistible, that the central attack by column is radically faulty against firm and steady troops, although it is sure of success against an enemy of interior physique and disci pline, especially if he be demoraUzed in spirit. In attacking a redoubt or field fortification, if it be defended only by infantry, the assailants may march immediately to the attack; if it bo de fended also by cannon, it is necessary first to silence cannon by cannon. The cannonade is conducted in such a way as to break the pali sades, dismount the Pieces, and plough up the parapet, and thus to oblige the defending cannon to be withdrawn into the interior. After the attacking artillery luxs thus produced its effect, the light infantry, principally riflemen, envelop a part of the work, directing their fire upon the crest of the parapet, so as to oblige the defend ers either not to sliow themselves at all, or at least to fire hurriedly. Gradually the riflemen approach, and converge their aim, and the columns of attack are formed, preceded by men ai'med with axes and carrying ladders. The men in the front rank may also be furnished with fascines which both serve as bucklers and will assist in filling up tlie ditch. The guns of the work are now brought back and directed against the assailing columns, and the attacking riflemen redouble their fire, aiming paiticularly upon the artillery men of the defence who may attempt to reload their pieces. If the assailants succeed in reaching the ditch, it is essential that they sliould in the assault act together, and leap into the work from all sides at once. They therefore wait a moment upon the brim for a concerted signal; and iu mounting upon the parapet they aro met by howitzer shells, rolling

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eral and 808 o&ers a&d men killed, 620 wound ed, amoug ^em 6 generals. The next day G^t). Oanterac, who now commanded the (Spanish army, concluded a capitulation, by whioh apt only he and all his troops surrendered | 4 ^ e rs of war but also all the Spanidi t ^ p s itf Peru, aU military posts, artillery, and magWnfteft, and the whole of Peru, as far as they stSill bdld it YOuzco, Arequipa, Puno, Quilca, &C.), wre delivered up to thd insurgents. The troops d^ivered up* as prisoners of war co u n ted in all to nearfy 13,000. Thus the Spanish domiiilon was defimtiTdy destroyed, wid on Aug. St8, 1825, ^ e (ingress of Chuquisaca prOeteiihedllte independence of the republic of Bolivia.- The name Aymuchos has in Spain befcn given to Espartero and his military partisans. Aportioii of the military camarilla grouped arouttdhtm had served with him in ttxe war*agfBnst the ^ u th American insurrection, where, "besidd by mdlit&ry comradeship, they were boun4 to gether by their common habits of gambling, aifld actu^Iy pledged themselves to Bupp^ eabh other politicaUy when returned to Spain. This pledge ti^ey have honestly kept, much to IJietr interests. The nickname of AyacochOs was cdirfierted on them in order to inSply that Espak^ro a ^ his party had materially cofltributed to the unfortunate issue of that: btftfle. This, however, is false, though tije report has been so assiduously spread that even now it Is Ayocvche genertdly credited in Spain. Esparteto hot Oftly AYAGUOHO, a department in the republic was notpres6ntatthebattleof Ayftcuclw), but he of Pent j 181,921. Near its chief tolVD, was ncrt even in America when it happened, b0also iiam.M Ayacucho, the battle was fought ing on his wasage to Spain, whither Viceroy which finally secured the independence of Span La Serna had sent him w th despatches for ish South Ajnerica. After the battle otf Junin dinand VII. He had embarked at Quilca, Jiftne (Aug. 6, 1824), the Spanish viceroy, Qen. La 5,1824, in tibie British brig Tiber, arriving in attempted by m^oeuvring to oat off the Cadiz Sept. 28, and at l ^ r i d Oct. 1% oommunications of the insurgent army, under again si^ed fbr Americafrom Bordeaux ontlkiit Gen. Sucre. Unsuccessful in thL *, he at last very same Dec. 9,1824, on which the birttliSof drew his opponent to the plain of Ayacucho^ Ayacudbo wfts fought. (See Dci JuM^egnndo where the Spaniards took up a defwdve tkjsi- F l o r e z - M a d r i d , 1844, y j(^ tion on a height. They n u n ^red 18 battalions Prind|, Madrid, 1B48.) * ' of infantry, with artillery and cavalry, la* all 9,dl0 men. Oa Dec. 8, 1824, thfr advanced guards of both armies becanie engaged, attd^ on the following day Suer advanced with 5,780 inea to the attack. The 2d Ck>lombia& ^viwon, tmder Gen. Cordova, attacked the Spanish left, and at once threw it into disorder. The Peru BARBETTE. In a battery, guns are said to vian division on the left, under Geu. Llamar, met with a more obstinate resistaoice, a&d cOuld bo placed en barbette when they stand high make no progress Until the reserve, i&tider Gen. enough to fire over the crest of the parget in stead of, as usual, through embrasurea To raise Lara, came up. The enemys retreat ^now b ^ coming general, the cavalry was launched in tho guns to this height, various means are pursuit, dispersing the Spanish horse isQd com adopted. In field fortifications, an earthwork platform behind the parapet forms the station; pleting the defeat of the inlkntijf. iards lost 6 generals killed and 2,6)00 killed, for the gun, In a permanent fortification, tho wounded, and priscmers, -among the latter the common high sliding carriage or the traversing viceroy. The South American loss was 1 nen- platform raises the gun to the required level.
s t one s, and trunks or t r e e s , and at tho top'aro received by the defenders at tho point of the bayonet or with the butt of the musket. The advantage of position issfilwith the defenders, but the s p i r i t of attack gives to the assailants great moral superiority; and i f the work be not defend^ by other works upon i t sf l anks, i t A v i l l be d i t i i c u l t , though not quite unprecedent e d , to repel even at this point a valiant a s s a u l t . Temporary works may bo attacked by surprise or by open force, and in either case i ti sthe f i r s t duty of the commander to obtain by spies or roconnoissance, tho f u l l e s t possible information concerning the character of the work, i t s gar r i s o n , defences, and resources. The infantry arc often thrown in an attack upon their own resources, when they must rely upon their own f e r t i l e invention, fi r i n g the abatis by lighted f a g o t s ,f i l l i n g up small ditches with bundles of hay, escalading palisadeswith ladders under the protection of a fi r i n g party, bursting barricaded doors or windows by a bag of powder; and by such measures decisively and boldly used, they w i l l generally be able to overcome any of the ordinary obstructions.

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Guns placed en barhetu have not the same cover from the enemys fire as tiiose firing through embrasnres; they are, therefore, dis posed in this manner where the pvapet cannot afford to be weakened by the ou tti^ off em brasures, or where it is desirable to extend their range more to the right and left than would Ira possible with embrasures. On this aocoont, guns are placed n hai^etU in field fortifications; in the salient angles of works; and in strand bat' ' tenira destined to act agoinit ships, especially if the parapet is of masonry. To protect them ^from enfilading fire, traverses u 4 IxN G M iets are *constracted wmh necessary. upon Alexander by Bernadocte, had now become not a thingof choice, butof dire necessity. While Barclay de Tolly had the great merit of resisting the ignorant clamors tbr battle which arose from the Russian rank and file, as wdl as from head quarter he executed the retreat with remai^a' ble ability, ineessantly engaging some part of his troops in order to afford to Prince Bt^ration the means of effecting a junction with Mm, and to Admiral Tsohitschag6ff the f)Eioilitie for &lling in the r ^ r of the enemy. When forced to a battle, p .at Smolensk, he took a position which {n^^venti^ ^ e battle from becoming de cisive*, .Wh^n,'not &r from Moscow, a decisive battle :W A S longer to be avoided, he selected the strong p^utioa of Gzhatsk, har^y to be as sailed 4b front, and to be turned only by very extended irunndabout ways. He had already post^ his army when KutnsofiT arrived, in whoseihands the intrigues of the Russian gene ftorckiy de Tolly rals, and the murmurs of the Muscovite army BARCLAY DE TOLLY, Miohbl, Knssian agdnst the foreigner hewing the holy war, prince and field-marshal,born in Livoniain 1^59, had placed the supreme command. Out of spite died at Insterburg, in East Prussia, Mdy 25,1818. against Barclay de Tolly, Kutusoff abandoned In 1769, when not yet 11, he entered the K us^n th^^^ lines o Gzhatsk, in consequence of which army, and served during 28 years in its differ* the Russian army had to accept battle in the ent campaigns against the Turks, Swede?, and unfavorable portion of the Borodina During Poles, but did not emerge from the inferior that battle, Aug. 26, Barclay, commanding the ranks before 1798. He distin^ished himself in right wing, was the only general who held his the campaign of 1806. His military reputation post, not retii*ing until the 27tb, thus covering dates from the year 1807, when, at the head the retreat f the Russian army, which, but of the Russian vanguard, he most gallantly de^ for him, would have been completely defended Prussian Eylau, making a prolonged fitroyedv A^ber the retreat from the Borodin, stand in the streets, the church, and the church no, beyond Moscow, it was Barclay de Tolly yard of that town. In 1808 he forced the > again wlio prevented any useless attempt at Swedes back into Oarelia, and, in 1809, as gen a defence of the holy city. During the cam eral of infantry, imitated, on a much larger s^e^ paign of 181$, Barclay took the fortress of Thorn, the celebrated march of Charles QustavuS ottct April 4, 1813^ vanquished Lauriston at Eonigsthe frozen waters of the Little Beltj by mar<m- wnrthx, covered, after the defeat of Bautzen, ing 12,000 Russians with artillery, ammunition, May 8, the retreat of the allied army, won the provisions, and baggt^e, over the ice which cov battle of G<^'litz, contributed to Yandammes ered the gulf of Bothnia. He to<A: Umen, ac capituJatio% and distinguished himself in the celerated by his appearance the revolution pre battle of liupsic. During the campaign of paring against Gustavus IV., and compelled 1814 he commanded no independent corps, and the Swedes to sue for peace. After 1810 he acted in an administrative and diplomatical, was intrusted with the direction of the Rus rather than,, in <a military character. By the sian war ministry. In 1812 he a ^ m e d the stern discipline he imposed upon the troops un command of the 1st army of the west. Its der his itnmediate control, he won the good )rincipal corps, at the head of which he placed opinions of the French people. On Napoleons limself, and which official reports had swollen return, from Elba, he arrived too late from to 550,000 men, proved, in fact, to consist Of P ol^d to assist at the battle of Waterloo, but 104,000 only, while the aggregate of the troops, parti^k in tl^ second invasion of France. He stationed from the coasts of the Baltic to the dipd on a journey to the bath of Carlsbad. banks of the Pruth, did not muster beyond Thft, lart yeflrs of his life were darkened by 200,000, Thus the retreat of the Russian calumny. He was, beyond question, the best army, the original design of which Fftpoleon, in of Alexapdera generals, unpretending, perse his memorials of St. Helena, fa l^ y attHbnted vering^ i>esolnte, and f^ll of common sense. to Barclay de T<dly, and which, long before the rupture between Russia and Franpej h(i4 been elaborated by ^ e Prussian general, Phnll,and after the declaration of war, waa a^Et;:preS8ed

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iMflofI
B A S T IO N '. I n a n c ie n t fo rtific a tio n ,IS o w a H a

of towns were flanked by round or sqnaro towera, from which archera and war machines could direct their projectiles on the rtorining enemy W l-ale he was held in check by the ditch. On the introduction of artillery into Lurope, these towera were made considerably and ultimately, in the beginning of the 16th century, the Italian engineers made tiiem polyconal insteafl of round or square, thus forming a bastion. This is an irregular pentagon one Bide of which is turned inward toward the tower, so that the opposite salient angle faces the open field. The 2 longer sides, enclorfng the salient angle, are called the faces * , the a shorter ones, connecting wall or rarfipart, are called the ^ ^3. The faces are destined to reply to the distant fire of the enemy, the flanks to protect the ditch by their fire. The first Italian bastions still shpwed their descent from the ancient toWers. Ihey kept close to the main walls; the sahent angle was very obtuse, the faces short, and the paj'" pet revetted with masonry to the very top. With such email bastions, the main office of J^e fl^nk was the defence of the ditch m front of thewrtain connecting 2 bastions; consequently, tne flanks were placed perpendicular to the curtain. These bastions were distributed either on the angles of the polygon forming the whole ncdnte of the fortress, or where one side of the polygon was so long that a part was not within effective musket range of the 2 projecting an intermediate bastion, calM was erected on its middle. With the improv ing siege artillery of the 17th century, l >*ger bastions became necessary, and very ciirtain lost its importance, the ^astioM bng now the principal points to be attack^. The office of the flanks was also changed: had to enfilade, chiefly, the ditch face of the opposite bastion, a n d instead of beinjr erected p e rp e n d ic u la r to the curtain, they were made p e r p e n d ic u la r to the tion of that face, called the The height of the masonry ^evetement was reduced so as to be covered from direct fire by the glacis or the parapet of the ^oj^er ou^ works. Thus bastions, in the hands of the old French and German school, and in those* of Vauban and Owhorn^ under^^i^t m an y changes of form and size, tintil about 1740, Oormontaigne published a system of b ^ tionwy fortification, which is generally wnsidered as the most perfect of its kind. His bas tions are as large as they can weU be made; his flanks are nearly, but not quite, pei^endicular to the lines of defenc^ and gr^ improvemento are made ia the ditworksi rBarttons are.

either fuU or empty. In the f i i s toa^ the whole of the iiotertor i s raised to the ^eight of the rampant; in the l a t t e r , ^ e rampart.^ wund the Jnterior;id of t i i e bastion wit^ a wfficlt breadth for lerving the guns, and low in *he middle of ^ work. U cavaliers, are sometimes erected sides of whieb run parallel with t l ^ or toe bastion, and are elevated high enoo^ t o ^ o w of the guns being Sr6d over i t s par^p^ ^ o m the commanding height of such cavalier^ guns of the greatest range are generally them in prder to aanoy the enemy at a The systemj Q ff o f t t i f i c a t i o n was the only one k n o w n fro m 16tU end o f r t l i e |8th when Mont^embert put forward several new methods ^ tions, a m o n g which the polygonal o r capontire svs^ f t i s fort r e s s e s , and the system of wjtto several tiers of g u i i a , have found i r t o i r tf a s ^ < ^ - '
c e a t u r y ,

BATTERY. In field artillery, th is expression means a number of guns, frum 4 neccssary horses, gunners, and destined generally to act together m battle. Ihe British and French have 6 the Austrians 8, the Russians 8 or 12, ^ n s to a battery. Field batteries are divided into light, heavy, and howitzer batteries; in some coun tries, there are, beside, mountain batteries. In describing a position for battle, the woid battery is also used to indicate any spot wliei e Guns are placed. In siege artillery, batteiy means either any one of the lines of the for tress which is armed with guns, or else, es pecially, a number of g u n s placed m line for the attack of a fortress, and covered by a parapet. The construction of this parapet, and the emnlacements for the guns, are what is understoou Ey the construction of a battery. With their profiles, batteries arc cither elevated, half sunken, or sunken; with respect to their armainent, guns, howitzer, mortar batteries ; with re spect to the shelter afforded, batteries with em brasures, barbette batteries (without embra sures), casemated batteries (covered in bomb proof). With respect to the purpose aimed at, there are dismounting batteries, to dismount tlic guns in one of the lines of the fortress, parallel to which tiiey are constructed; ricoohetting bat teries, constructed in the prolongation of a line, and destined to enfilade it, the balls and shells just passing over the parapet and hopping along the litie in low jumps; mortar batteri-s to

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^ e W apet should be at le a s T ir^ r 18 feet bombard the interior of the bastions and tho thick : but if the calibre of the e n e m y is very buildings in the fortress; breaching batteries, to heavy, and the ground bad. a thickness of 24 feet bring down the revetement walls of tlie scarp of may be required. A height of 7 or 8 feet gives tho rampart; counter batteries, erected on the sufiBcient protection* The guns should have a crown of tho glacis opposite tho flanks, to clear distance of from 10 to 14 feet; ^ traverew lenco the fire of a flank which protects the ditch are necessarj^, the parapet will have to be lengtnin front of the breach. Strand batteries are intrenchments thrown up on particular points oned acoordmglj.' of a sea shore to act against hostile men-otw ar; they are either permanent, in which case they are generally constructed of masonry, and often casematedjWith several tiers of guns, or tem porary earthworks, mostly barbet tlie batteries to insure a wider sweep; in either case they Battto BATTLE. encounter of two hostile bod are generally closed to the rear against a sudden (ittack by landed infantry. To construct an ies of troops is called a battle, when these bodies earthwork battery, tho principal dimensions aye form the main armies of either party, or at least, traced, and the earth procured from a ditch m are acting independently on their own separate front or rear of tho intended parapet. Ihe seat of war. Before the introduction ot gun outer slopo of the parapet is l e f t without revcte- powder, all battles were decided by actual handment, but tho interior slope and tho cheeks or to-hand fight. With the Greeks and Macedoni interior sides of tho embrasures are reyettecl ans the charge of the close phalanx bristling with fascines, gabions, hurdles, casks hlled with with spears, followed up by a s h o r t engagement earth, sandbags, or sods of turf, so as to retain with the sword, brought about the decision. the earth in its position, even with a steep slope. With the Pvomans, the attack of tho legion dis A herme' or level space, is generally left stand posed in three lines, admitted of a renewal of the ing between the outer slope of the parapet and charge by the second lino, and of decisive ma tho ditcli in front, to strengthen t le parapet. noeuvring with tho third. The Roman line ad A banquette is constructed inside the battery, vanced up to within 10 or 15 yards of the ene between the embrasures, high enough for a man my, darted their pila, v e r y heavy jave ins into to stand on and look over tho parapet. An him, and then closed sword in hand, u the first enaulment or parapet forming an obtuse angle line was checked, the second advanced through with that of the battery is often constructed on . the intervals of the first, and if still the resistance one or both flanks, to protect it against flanking was n o t overcome, the third line, or reserve, broke fire. Where the battery can be enfiladed, tra in upon the enemys centre, or tell upon one of verses or epaulments between the guns become his wings. During tho middle ages, charges of necessary. In barbette batteries, this protection i steel-clad cavalry of the knights had to decide is strengthened by a further elevation of tho cencral actions, u n t i l t h e introduction of artillery traverses several feet above tho height of the and small fire-arms restored the preponderance parapet, which elevation is continued across the of infantry. From that tirao the superior numparapet to its outer crest, and called a bonnet. ber and construction of fire-arms with an army Tho guns are placed on platforms constructed T uras the chief element in battle, of planks and sleepers, or other timbers, to in 18th century, the whole of the armies of Europe sure permanency of emplacement. The ammuni had provided their infantry with tion is kept partly in recesses under the Parapet;, were about o n a par as to the qu^ity of their partly in a sunken building of timber fire-arms. I t was then the number of shots in bomb proof with earth. To shelter tho gun fired in a given time, with average ners from rifle firing, the embrasures are often which became the decisive element. The in closed by blindages of strong planks, to open fantry was drawn up in long lines, deep, to either side when the gun is run out^, or pro it was drilled with the minutest care, to insure vided with a hole for tho muzzle to pass through. s S e s s and rapid up to 5 tunes in a The fire of the enemy is rendered innocuous by minute; the long lines advanced slowly gainst blindages of timbers laid with one end on the each other, firing all the while, and supported inner crest of tho parapet, and sloping to_ tho by artiUery firing grape; finally, the in^ground behind. In batteries where howitzers curred by one party caused the troops to waver, Ire used, the soles of the embrasures slope up and this moment was seized by the other party ward instead of downward; in moftar^batter for an advance with the bayonet, which gene ies. there are no embrasures at all, the high rally proved decisive. If of the two ai-mies elevation taken insuring the passage of the shell before the beginning of the battle, had over the crest of the parapet. To give eftec- taken up its position, the other attempted genetive protection against the fire of heavy guns,
T h e
f i r i n g ,

o n e

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n^y to Attaok it uader an aoute an^e, so as to oattUuUi,. and there to eavf^pe, oo^ pf l i i s yrmgi^ that wing, and th^ nearest |M >j!tim tlw o e i^ , were thoa thrown into diswder by supeiSef/forces, and crowded ^>thr in deep inassea,J9 |)|^;p[hich the attaoking party plAjed urith hia hi^Vy artillery. This was liteeiayorite mtiKBavre of Frederic the Great, peoiaUy WjcoeasfW'aik JLeuthen. Sometiine too, the cavalry ivaalH loose upon the wavriog in&ntiy of ^^.eamy, and in many inf^aces with ugwd sacce^; but upon the whol^ the q u ^ fire p the infantry lines gave the decisionftpd thiiylre was so efibctive, that it hiE# mndered thebattl es of this period the bloodiest i^ m o ^ m times. Frederic the Great lost* lat ;K<din, 12,000 men out of 18,00C^ and at K^oersdorf, it^j^O out of 30,000, while in the bloodiest hat-* tie .of # Kapcdeons campaigns, at BorodihQf thQ B ila n s lost not quite one^half f their, tnwpa W killed and wounded. The French evoli;^a imd Napoleon completely diiu^ad the of battles. The army was organiaed ia di^i^ioiw of about H O ,000 men, inui^y, oavalry, aqd artillery mixed; it fought no longi^ in line exobuively, but in column and in fikirmisluug op4W also. In this furmatiun it wM & Qlonger xmpfiaeney to select open plains al<H 3 t for <hattlfiel^; wood^ ,villages, faymryards, jay iutersectod ^o u n d was rajther welcome than other wise. ^cethisnejxrformatioahasbnadopteld by 41 armies, a battle has become a very differ ent thing from what it was in the 18th eentory. Then, al^pogh the army wcis generally disposed inthi!e;line^ one attack, or sA most^ two or three ati^icks, in rapid ..succession, decided its fate; fflps9r>>lojengftg^entmayla3ta whoieday aod eyitt4wo,or tHreday8, attach, cooiMr-tteolw^ an4 snto<!Bavres succeeding each with v ^ m g suocesi*, all the time throogk A hatde, attfe{Mresent day, is generally engaged by the a4Ta& 9ed guard of the attacking party tending skJriBoisbers out with their supports. As soon ast t ^ y find serious resistance, which g#srally happ^s at some ground favorable for defence, flight artillery, covered by ^Ijirmii^eia and small bodies of cavalry, advances, and the:ma1a body of the advan^jed guard |takes A cannonade generally ftilows, and a d ^ of animunition is wasted* in order 4o facilitate reooi^ noitrinfc and to induce the eoemy to show his strengWi In the mean time, divisliEM a after divi^n arrives, and is shown into its figliting
position, according to the knowledge s for ob tained of the measures of t l i e enemy*T the points favoring an attack, skirmisheirs are seot forward, and supported where uecessjiiy by lines and artillery; flank at^(^s are peepared* troops are concentrated for |he of in^ portaat postsin frontof the pfs t h t

enemy, who makes his arrangements ac^i ly. bcane ipanoeuvring takes place, in qn tJireateii dje3feiive position*, or to B Q enaSM f;-* threatening a;ttaoji: with a counter-oharge; grad ually the army draws nearer to tl)<3^y> the poiats ijjli attack are finally fixed,-n the masses adi^jjce from the covered podtiitos tW j hitherto oco^iod. The fire of infantry/te lifiej and of art^iery, now prevails, 4irected a^ofli the ppihts tQ b^ aUapked; the advance of the troops destinedlor-^ charge follows, a cavalry*cha*iii on a raasll ;8 ^ e occasionally inlervenii^. Tlie atrnggt^ ,& >r- ^nr^rtant posts has now set they are takaif^and retaken, fresh tro^^^ bi]:^{ sent forward tilrns by either party. Th ia^ tervals betwfen sch posts now becoma tha battle-iflield iop-dei^oyed liujes of infamtryt aofd for occa^onal bt^yonet charges, which, bowevw, scarcely at any time result in aotutd himd'^* hand fight, whUe in villages, farm-yards, intrenchments, &c., the bayonet is often eoottfli actually rusei^ >> la this open ground too, toe cavalry .dflU Tts forward whenever opportunities offer themseiyep, while the artillery contiouee to play and to advance to new pobitions. WWle thus the battle is oscillating the inten. tions, the jjdj^positiona, and, above all, tho strength of ^ e two contending armies are be coming more apparent; more and more troops are engaged, and it soon is shown which party has tiie stronger body of intact forces in reserve fiM T the final a*d decisive attack. Either the attaddng paiftyihas so far been successful, and may how ventsp^J^ launch his reserve upon thei centre w fiawk ^ th defending party, or the lU ;tack hasiibeenfso ^ repulsed and cannot be sas^ tained by fresh-troops, ia which case.the defend" ing party may Imng his reserves fprwanl, and by a powerful charge, onfvert the repulse into a df^t Ixim0st;ea9 e8^the decisive attack isdirected agatof^ some pirt^of the enemys front, in, ordeir to break through, his line. As much artillery as posmble is oc^wsentrated upon the chosen point; infantry advances ia, dose masses, a ^ as s< ^ as. its .eharge has proved successful,, cavalry dashes into the opening, thus made, deployiog right apdieft, taking in fiank and rear the ene mys Mne, aad, as the expression is,, rolling it np toward its two wiags. Sqch an attack, to be a < ^ ally defl&ive, must, however, be undertaken w i^ a large force, and not before the enen^y has -en^gaged his l u t r ^ r v e s ; otherwise, the losses inourrc^ would be out of a31 proportioa to_the very meagr^ reiuiltti to be obtained, and might even .cause ..the.loss of the battle. In most cases, a comaiander will rather break off a battle (taking a decidedly unfavorable turn, ^ a n engage his last reserves, and wait for the decisive charge nd with the preseiri; organizaSen this may in mo^ cases be

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^ n e with a coinparativefy moderate loss, as the enemy after a w^l-contested battle, is generally in a shattered condition also. The reserves and i^tillery take a fresh position to the rear, under cover of which the troops are gradually disen gaged and retire. It then depends upon the vivacity of the pursuit, whether tJie retreat be made in good order or not. The enemy will send his cavalry against the troops trying to dis engage themselves; and cavalry must, therefore, be at hand to assist them. But if the cavalry of the retiring party be routed and his infantry attained before it is out of reach, then the rout becomes general, and the rear-guard, in its now defensive position, will have hard work before it unless night is approaching, which is generally the case. iSuch is the average i-outine of a mod ern battle, supposing the parties to be pretty equal in strength and leadership; wi th a decided superiority on one side, the affair is much abridged, and combinations take place, the vari ations of which are innumerable; but under fill circumstance-i, modern battles between civ ilized armies will, on the whole, bear the char acter above described. and sharp-pointed sword, wliich can bo fixed in a slide on one side of the muzzle of the rifle. It is thus certainly less firmly fixed, but as such infantry are expected to charge in line in exceptional cases only, this drawback is considered to be balanced by the manifold uses in which such an instrument can be employed.

iin

Roycme t

BAYOITET. This weapon, now generally in troduced for all line-infantry, is usually stated to have been invented in-France (apparently at Bayonne, whence the name) about the year 1640, According to other accounts, it was adopted by the Dutch from the Malays, who attached their Teris^ or dagger, to a musket, and introduced into France about the year 1679. Up to that time, the musketeers had no effective weapon for close combat, and consequently had to be mixed with pikemen to protect them from a closing enemy. The bayonet enabled musket eers to withstand cavalry or pikemen, and thus gradually superseded the latter arm. Originally, it was fastened to a stick for insertion into the barrel of the musket, but as it thus prevented the soldier from firing with bayonet fixed, the tube passing round the barrel was afterward invented. Still, the pike maintained itself for above half a century as an infantry weapon. The Aiistrians were the first to exchange it, for all their line infantry, for the musket and bay onet ; the Prussians followed in 1689; the French did not do away entirely with the pike until 1703, nor the Russians till 1721. The battle of Spire, in 1703, was the first in which charges of infantry were made with fixed bayonets. For light infantry, the bayonet is now generally replaced by a short, straight

BES, J ozbf, a Polish general, borii' at Tarnow, in Galicia, in 1795, died Dec. 10,1850. The passion of his life was hatred of Russia. At the epoch when Napoleon, by victories and proclamations, was exciting a belief in the resurrection of Poland, Bern entered the corps of cadets at Warsaw, and received his military training at the artillery-school directed by Gen. Pelletier. On leaving this school, he was ap pointed lieutejjant of the horse-artillery; served in that capacity under Davoust and Macdonald in the campaign of 1812; won the cross of the legion of honor by his cooperation in the defence of Dantzic; and, after the surrender of that for tress, returned to Poland. As the czar Alexander, affecting a great predilection for the Polish na tion, now reorganized the Polish army, Bern en tered the latter in 1815, as an officer of artillery, but was soon dismissed for fighting a duel with his superioP. However, he was subsequently ap pointed military teacher at the artilfery-school of Warsaw and promoted to the rank of cap tain. He now introduced the use of the Congreve rocket into the Polish army, recording the ex periments made on this occasion in a volume originally published in French and then trans lated into German. He was querulous and insubordinate, and, fi'om 1820 to 1825, was several times arraigned before courts-martial, punished with imprisonment, released, impris oned again, and at last sent to Kock, a remote Polish village, there to vegetate under strict police surveillance. He did not obtain his dis charge from the Polish army until the death of Alexander, and the Petersburg insurrection made Constantine lose sight of him. Leaving Russian Poland, Bern now retired to Lemberg, where he became an overseer in a large distil lery, and elaborated a book on steam applied to the distillation of alcohol. When fhe Warsaw insurrection of 1830 broke out he joined it, af ter a few months was made a major of artillery, and fought, in June, 1831, at the battle of Ostrolenk, where he was noticed for the skill and perseverance with which he fought against the superior Russian batteries. When the Po-

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TTs^ army IiacTbeen finely repul^d iii its attacks against the Russians who had passed the Narev, he covered the retreat by a bold advance with the whole of his guns. He was now created col onel, soon after general, and called to th6 command-in-cbief of the Polish artillery. At the storming of Warsaw by the Russians he fought bravely, but, as a commander, committed the fault of not using his 40 guns, and allowing the Russians to take Vola, the principal point of defence. After the fall of Warsaw he emi grated to Prussia with the rest of the army, urged the men not to lay down, their arms be fore the Pnassians, and thus provoked a bloody and unnecessary struggle, called at that time the battle of Fischau. He then abandoned the army and organized in Germany committees for the support of Polish emigrant^ after which he went to Paris. His extraordinary charac ter, in which a laborious fondness for the exact Bciences was blended with restless impulses for action, caused him to readily embark in adven turous enterprises, whose feUiire gave an advan tage to his enemies. Thus having itt 1883, on his own responsibility, undertaken without suc cess to raise a Polish le^on for Don Pedro, he was denounced as a traitor, and was fired at by one of his disappointed countrymen, in Bourge^ whae: lie came to enga^ the Poles for his legion. Travels through Portugal, Spain, Hol land, Belgium, and France, absorbed his tim during the period from 1834 to 18^. In 1848, on the first appearance of revolutionary s^ p * toms in Austrian Poland, he hastened to Lem berg and thence, Oct. 14, to Vienna, where all that was done to strengthen the works of de fence and organize the revolutionary forces, was due to his personal exertions. The disorderly flight in which, Oct. 25, a sally of the Viennese mobile guard, headed by himself, had resulted, wrung'from him stern expressions of reproof, replied to by noisy accusations of treason, which, in spite of their absw^ity, gained such influence that, but for fear of an insurrection on the part of the Polish legion, he would have been dragged ^fore a court-martial. After his remarkable defence, Oct 28, of the great barricade erected in the Jagemzeile, and after the opening of ne gotiations between the Vienna m^istrates Md PrinceWindisohgratz, he disappeared. Suspicion, heightened by his mysterious escape, dogged him from Vientia -to Pesth, whe^"e, on account of his prudent advice to the Hungarian govern ment, not to allow the establishment of a roecial Polish legion, a Pole named Kolo^jecki fired a pistol on the pretended traitor and severely wounded him. The war in Transylvania, with the command of which Ae Hungarian govern ment iptrusted Bem, leaving it, however, to his own ingenuity to find the u^nies with which to carry it on, forms the most important portion of his militery life, and throws a ^eat light upon the peculiar character of his generalship. Open ing the first campaign toward the end of Dec. 1848, with a force of about 8,000 men, badly armed, hastily collected, and consisting of most heterogeneous dementsraw Magyar levies, Honveds, Viennese refugees, and a small knot of Poles, a mottey crew reenforced in his pro gress through Transylvania by successive drafts from Szeklers, Saxons, Slaves and Roumanians Bern had about 2 months later end<?d his cam paign, vanquished Puchner with an Austrian army of 20,000 men, Engelhardt with the atociliary force of 6,000 Russians, and Urban with his freebooters. Compelling the latter to take refuge in the Bukovina, and the two former to withdraw to Wi^achia, he kept the whole of Transylvania save the small fortress of Karlsburg. Bold surprises, audacious manauvres, forced marches, and the great confidence he knew how to inspire in his troops by his own example, by the ski&ul selection of covered localities, and by dways affording artillery support at the decisive moment, proved him to be a first-rate general for the partisan and small mountain warfare of this first campaign. He also showed himself a master in the art of suddenly creating and disciplining an army; but being c o n ^ t with We fi^psrrough sketch of organization, and neglecting to form a nucleus of clioice troops, which was a matter of prime necessity, his ex temporized army was sure to vanish like a di*eam on the first serious disasters. During his hold of Transylvania he did himselt honor by preventing tlie useless and impolitic cruelties contemplated by the M^yar com missioners. The policy of conciliation between the antagonist nationalities aided him in swell ing his force, in a few months, to 40,000 or 60,000 men, well provided with cavalry and artillery. If, notwithstanding, some admirable raanoBuvreSj the expedition to the Banat, which he engaged in with this numerically strong army, produced no lasting effect, the circumstance of his hands being tied by the cooperation of the incapable Hungarian general, must bo taken into account. The irruption into Transylvania of large Russian forces, and the defeats conse quently sustained by the Magyai'S, called Bem back to the theatre of his first campaign. After a vain attempt to crcate a diversion in the rear of the enemy, by the invasion of Mol davia, he returned to Transylvania, there to bo completely routed, July 2S, at Schiissburg, by the 8 times stronger Russian forces under Lilders, escaping captivity himself only by a plunge into a morass from which some dispersed Mag yar hussars happened to pick him up. Having collected the remainder of his forces, he storm ed Hermannstadt for the second time, Aug. 5, but for want of reenforcements soon had to

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leave it, aiul after an unfortunate fight, Aug. 7, ho retraced his steps to Hungary, where lio arrived in time to witness the loss of the decisive battle at Temesvar. After a vain attempt to make a last stand at Lugos with what remained of the Magyar forces, he reentered Transylva nia, kept his ground there against over whelming forces, until Aug. 19, when he Avas compelled to take refuge in the Turkish terri tory. With the purpose of opening to liimself a new field of activity against Russia, Bern em braced the Mussulman faitli, and was raised by the sultan to the dignity of a pasha, under the name of Amurath, with a command in the Turkish army; but, on the remonstrances of the European powers, he was relegated to Aleppo. Having tiiere succeeded in repressing some sanguinary excesses committed daring Nov. 1850, on the Christian residents by the Mussulman populace, ho died about a month /ater, of a violent fever, for which he would allow no medical aid. breaking up, at the head of the horse, the cen tre of the I?olish army, anil, in consequence of some bold surprises, successfully executed on the banks of the lower Niemen, was rewarded by Catharine II. with the order of St. Vladimir, a sabre of honor, and 200 serfs. During his Polish campaign he exhibited the qualities of a good cavalry officerfire, audacity, and quick nessbut not the higher attainments indispen sable for the chief of an army. After the Po lish campaign, he was despatched to the army in Persia, where, by means of a bombardment, lasting 10 days, he compelled Derbend, on the Caspian sea, to surrender. Tlie cross of tlie order of St. George of the second class, was the last gift he received from Catharine II., after Avhose death he was recalled and disgraced by her successor. Count Pahlen, military governor of St. Petersburg, was organizing at that time the conspiracy by which Paul lost his life. Pahlen, knowing the reckless character of Benningsen, let him into the secret, and gave him the post of honorthat of leading the conspira tors in the emperors bedchamber. It was Bcnningsen who dragged Paul from the chimney, where he had secreted himself; and when the other cons^pirators hesitated, on Pauls refusal to abdicate, Benningsen exclaimed, Enough talk, untied his own sash, rushed on Paul, and after a struggle, in which he was aided by the others, succeeded in strangling the victim. To shorten the process, Beimingsen struck him on the head with a heavy silver snuff box. Imniedialely on the accession of Alexander I., Bcnniugseu received a military connnand in Lithu ania. At the commencement of the campaign of 180()-7, he coinjnanded a corps in the lirst army under Kameuskithe second being cuniraanded by Buxhdvden^he tried in vain to cover Warsaw against the French, was forced to retreat to Paltusk on the Narev, and there, Dec. 24, 1806, proved able' to repulse an at tack of Lannes and Bernadotte, bis forces being greatly superior, since Napoleon, with his main force, had marched upon the second Russian array. Benningsen forwarded vain-glorious re])orts to the emperor Alexander, and, b^ dint of in trigues against Kamenski and Buxbovden, soon gained the supreme command of the army des tined to operate against Napoleon. At the end of January, 1807, he made an offensive move ment against Napoleons winter quarters, and esc.'iped by mere chance the snare Napoleon had laid for him, and then fought the battle of Eylau. Eylau having fallen on the 7th, the main battle, which, in order to break Napoleons vio lent pursuit, Benningsen was forced to accept, occurred on Feb. 8. The tenacity of the Rus sian troops, the arrival of the Prussians under Lestocq, and the slowness with which the single French corps appeared on the scene of action.

Hiennigsen
IJICNNINGSEN, L k v i x A u g u s t T i i E o r n i L K , count, a Knssiun general, borii in Brunswick, Feb. 10, 1745, whore ])i.s father served as coloncl in the guards, died Oct. 3, 182G. As a page, he spent 5 years at the Hanoverian court of George II.; entered the Hanoverian army, and having advanced to tlie rank of captain in tlie foot guards, participated in the last campaign of the 7 years war. His excessive passion for the fair sex at that time made more noise than his warlike exploits. In order to marry the daughter of tlie baron of Steinberg, the Hano verian minister at the court of Vienna, he left tlic army, reti red to his'Hanoverian estate of Ban teh i, by dint of lavish expenditure got hopelessly in debt, and, on the death of his wife, re solved to restore his fortune by entering the J{us.sian military service. Made a lieutenantcolonel by Catharine II., he served first under Komauzofi; against the Turks, and then under Suwaroff, against the rebel ?ugatehefl*. Dur ing a furlough granted to him he went to Han over to carry off Mile, von Schwiehelt, a lady renowned for her beauty. On his return to Hussia, the protection of Bomanzoif and Po temkin procured for him the command of a regiment. Having distinguished himself at the siege of Otchakov, in lYBSJie was appointed brigadier-general. In the Polish campaign of 1793-04, ho commanded a corps of light troops; was created general after theatFairs of Orschani and Solli; decided the victory of Vilna, by

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made the viotory'doubtful. Both parties claim ed it, and at any rate, the field of Eylatias Njqwleon hiraaelf saidwas the bloodiest among all hb battles. B^hningsen had Te D m m snng, and received from the czar a Eussito order, a pension of 12,000 rubles, and a letter of congratulation, praising him as the vaoquisher of the never vanquish^^d oapttdn. In the Jpring, he intrenched himself at Heilsberg, and neglected to attack Napoleon, while part of the French army was still occnpiMwith the siege of Dantzic; but, after the fdl of Dantzic, and the junction of the French army, thought the time for attack had arrived. First delayed by Nappleons vanguard, which mqstered Ijie thii[d part only of his own numerical force, he was soon manoeuvred back by Kapoleon into his intrenched camp. There Napoleon attack ed him in vain June 10, with but two corps and some battalions of the guard, but on the next day induced him to abandon his camp and beat a retreat. Suddenly, however, and without waiting for a corps of 28,p00 men, which had already reached Tilsit, he returned to the offensive, occupied Friedland, and there drew up his army, with the river Alle in his rear, and the bridge of Friedland as his only line of retreat. Instead of quickly advancing, before Napoleon was able to concentrate his troops, he allowed himself to be amused for 5 or 6 hours by Lannes and Mortier, until, to ward 6 oclock, Napoleon had his forces ready, and thi commanded the attack. The Eussians were thrown on the river, Friedland was tjien, and the bridge destroyed by the Rus sians themselves, although their whole right wing stood still on the opposite side. Thus the battle of Friedland, June 14, costing the Rusian army above 20,000 men, was lost. It was eaid that Benningsen was at that time influ enced by his wife, a Polisli woman. During this whole campaign Benningsen committed fault upon fault, his whole conduct exhibitmg a strange compound of rash imprudence and weak irresolution. During the campaign of 1812, his principal activity was displayed at the head-quarters of the emperor Alexander, where he intrigued against Barclay de Tolly, with a view to get his place. In the campaign of 1818, he commanded a Russian army of reserve, and was created count by Alexander, on the battlefield of Leipsic. Receiving afterward the order to dislodge Davoust from Hamburg, he beleaguered it until Napoleons abdication of April, 1814, put an end to hostilities. For the peaceful occupation of Hamburg, then effected by hhn, he claimed and received new honors and emoluments. After having held the command of the army of the wuth^ in Bessarabia, from 1814J o 181^ he finally retiredTJTliirHanoveritm estate, wTiere Be died, having squandwed most of his fortune, and leaving hk children poor in the Russian service.

BERESFORD, W i l l i a m G a b b , viscount, British general, bom in Ireland, Oct. 2, 1768, died in Kent, Jan. 8, 1854. The illegitimate son of George, 1st marquis of Waterford, he en tered the army at the age of 16, and served in Nova Scotia until 1790. During this i>eriod, he lost one of his eyes from an accidental shot by a brother officer. He served at Toulon, Cor sica, the We^t Indies (under Abercromby), the East Indies, and Egypt, under Baird. On his return, in 1800, he was made colonel by brevet. He subsequently was employed in Ireland, at the conquOTt of the Cape of Good Hope, and (as brigadier-general) against Buenos Ayres, in 1806, where he was compelled to surrender, but finally escaped. In 1807 he commanded the forces which captured Madeira, and wiis made governor of that island. In 1808 he be came mj^or-general, and, having arrived in Por tugal with the English forces, was intrusted with the whole organization of the Portuguese army, including the militia. He was one of the commissioners for adjusting the terms of the celebrated convention of Cintra; was present during the retreat on, and battle of Corunna, where he covered the embarkation of Sir John Moores troops; and, in March, 1809, was ap pointed marshal and generalissimo of the Portu guese army, soon raised by him into an excel lent force, whether of attack or defence. He fought all through the Peninsular war, until its close in 1814, vigorously supporting Welling ton. On the only considerable occasion, how ever, when he held the chief command, at the battle of Albuera, in 1811, he displayed very )oor generalship, and the day would have been ost but for the act of a subaltern in diso bedience of his orders. He took part in the victories of Salamanca, Vittoria, Bayonne, Orthes, and Toulouse. For these services he was created a field-marshal of Portugal, duke of Elvas, and marquis of Santo Oampo. In 1810 he was chosen member of parliament for the county of Waterford (he never took his seat), and, in 1814, was created Baron Beresford of Albuera and Dungannon; in 1823 he was advanced to the dignity of vis count. In 1814 he went on a diplomatic mission to Brazil, where, in 1817, he repress ed a conspiracy. On his return, he succes

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sively became lieutenant-general of the ord nance, general of the armj, and (from 1828 to 1830) master-general of the ordnance. Hav ing assisted Don Miguel, in 1828, he was de prived of his baton as field-marshal of Portu gal. In politics, he was actively, though silent ly,^ a decided tory. Ilis military eflficiency chiefly consisted in his successful reorganization of the Portuguese troops, whom, by great skill and unwearied exertions, he finally rendered sufficiently firm and well disciplined to cope even with the French. In 1832 he married his cousin, Louisa, daughter of the archbishop of Tuam, and widow of Thomas Hope, the mil lionaire banker, and author of Anastasius. He kft no cMldren, and the title became extinct ^t" his death. a lawyer, and was educated for that profession, b|^ his military impulses induced laim to enlist seo^tly, in 1T80, in the royal marines, where he haJ advanced to the grade of sergeant, when the French revolution broke out. Thence his advancement became rapid. InlT92 he served as colonel in Oustines anny; commanded a demi-brigade in 1793 ; was in the same year, through Klebers patronage, promoted to the rank of brigadier-general, and contributed, as general of division in the army of the Sambro and Meuse, under Kleber and Jourdan, to the victory of Fleurus, June 26,1794, the success of Jttlich, and the capitulation of Maestricht. He also did good service in the campaign of 179596 against the Austrian generals Olairfait, Kray, and the archduke Charles. Ordered by the di rectory, at the beginning of 1797, to march 20,000 men as reenforcements to the Italian army, his first interview in Italy with Bonaparte decided their future relations. In spite of his natural greatness, Bonaparte entertained a petty and suspicious jealousy of the army of the Rhino and its generals. He understood at once that Bernadotte aspired to an independent career. The latter, on his part, was too much of a Gascon to justly appreciate the distance between a genius like Bonaparte and a man of abilities like himself. Hence their mutual dislike. Dur ing the invasion o^Istria Bernadotte distinguish ed himself at the passage of the Tagliamentd, where he led the vanguard, and at the capture of the fortress of Gradisca, March 19,1797. Afterthe so-called revolution of the 18th Fnictidor, Bona parte ordered his generals to collect from their respective divisions addresses in favor of that conp d^Stat; but Bernadotte first protested, then affected great reluotance in obeying, and at last sent an address to the directory, but quite the reverse of that asked for, and without convey ing it through Bonapartes hands. The latter on his journey to Paris, whither he repaired to lay before the directory the treaty of Oampo Formio, visited and cajoled Bernadotte at his head-quarters at Udine, but the following day, through an order from Milan, deprived him of half his division of tho army of the Rhine, and commanded him to march the other half back to France. After many remonstrances, compro mises, and new quarrels, Bernadotte was at last prevailed upon to accept the emb^sy to Vienna. There, acting up to the instructions of Talley rand, he assumed a conciliatory attitude which the Paris journals, inspired by Bonaparte and his brothers, declared to be fuU of royalist ten dencies ; expatiating, in proof of these charges, on the suppression of the tricolored flag at the entrance of his hotel, and of the republican cockade on the hats of his suite. Being repri manded for this by the directory, Bernadotte,

BerffM

BERME, in fortification, a horizontal bank of ground left standing between the upper interior edge of the ditch and the exterior slope of the parapet of a work. It is generally made about 3 feet wide. Its principal object is to strength en the parapet, and to prevent the earth of which it is composed from rolling down into the ditch, after heavy rain, tliaw, &c. It may also serve sometimes as an exterior communi cation round the works. It is, however, not to be overlooked that the berme serves as a very convenient resting and collecting place for atorming and scaling parties, in consequence of which it is entirely done away with in many systems of pemanent fortification, and in oth ers protected by a crenellated wall, so as to form a covered line of fire for infantry. In field for tification, or the construction of siege-batteries, with a ditch in front, a berme is generally una voidable, as the scarp of the ditch is scarcely ever revetted, and without such an intermediate epace, both scarp and parapet would soon crum ble under the changes of the weather.

B^rnoclofte
shal

BERNADOTTE, J e a n B a p t i s t e J u l e s , mar of the French empire, prince of Ponte Corvo, and, under the name of Charles XIV. John, king of Sweden and Norway, was born Jan. 26, 1764, at Pan, in the department of Basses Pyrenees, died March 8, 1844, in the royal palace at Stockholm. He was the son of

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on April 18,1798, the anniversai7 of aTiennese anti-Jacobin demonstration, hoisted the trioolored flag with the inscription, Liberty,' equal ity, fraternity, and had his hotel stormed by a Viennese mob, his flag burnt, and his own life endangered. The Austrian goveimnent declin ing to ^ve the satisfaction demanded, Bemadotte withdrew to Rastadt with all his legation; but the directory, on the advice of Bonapartej, who had himself been instrumental in provoking the scandal, hushed up the affair and dropped their representative. Bernadettes relationship to Bonaparte family consequent upon his marriage, in Aug. 1798, with Mile. D6sir6e Clary, the daughter of a Marseilles merchant, and Joseph Bonapartes sister-in-law, seemed but to confirm his opposition to Napoleon. As commander of the army of observation on the upper Rhine, in 1799, he proved incompetent for the charge, and thus verified beforehand Napoleons judgment at St. Heleu^ that ho was a better lieutenant than genei'al-iu-chief. At the head of the war ministry, after the directo rial 6meuto of the 80th PriuriaL his plans of operation were less remarkable than his intrigues with the Jacobins, through whose re viving influence he tried to create for himself a personal following in the ranks of the army. Yet one morning, Sept. 18, 1799, ho found his resignation announced in the Moniteur before lie was awaro that ho had tendered it. Tiiis trick was played upon him by Si6yes and Roger Ducos, the directors allied to Bona* parte. While commonding the ai*my of the west, he extinguished tlie last sparks of the Vendean war. After the proclamation of the empire, which mado hirn a marshal, he was intrusted with the command of the army of Han over. In this capacity as well as during his later command of the ai-my of northern Germany, ho took care to create for himself, among the north ern people, a reputation for independence, mod eration, and administrative ability. At the head of the corps stationed in Hanover, which.formed the first corps of the grand array, ho participated in the campaign of 1805 against the Austrians and Prussians. He was sent by Napoleon to Tglau, to observe the movements of Archduke Ferdinand in Bohemia; then, called back to Brunn, he, with his corps, was posted at the battle of Austerlitz in the centre between Soult and Lannes, and contributed to baffle the at tempt of the allied right wing at outflanking tho French army. On Juno 5,1806, he was creatcd prince of Ponte Corvo. During the campaign of 1806-7 against Prussia, he commanded the first corps d^ai'tnie. He received from Najwleon the order to march from Naumburg upon jDornburg, while Davoust, also stationed at Naumburg, was tomarch upon Apolda; theorderheld by Davoust adding that, if Bernadotte had already efifected his junction with him, they might conjointly march upon Apolda. Having reconnoitred the movements of the Prussians, and made sure that no enemy was to be encountered in the direction of Dornburg, Davoust proposed to Bernadotte a combined march upon Apolda, and even offered to place himself under his command. The latter, however, sticking to the literal interpretation of Napoleons order, marched off in the direction of Dornburg without meeting an enemy dur ing the whole day; while Davoust had alone to bear the brunt of the battle of Auerstiidt, which, through Bernadottes absence, ended in an in decisive victory. It wa.s only the meeting of the fugitives of Auerstiidt with tho fugitives from Jena, and the strategetical combinations of Napoleon, that counteracted the consequences of tho deliberate blunder committed by Beraadotte. Napoleon signed an order to bring Ber nadotte before a court-martial, but on further consideration rescinded it. After the battle of Jena, Bernadotte defeated the Prussians at Halle, Oct. 17, conjointly with Soult and Murat, pur sued the Prussian general BlQcher to Lilbeck, and contributed to bis capitulation at Radzau, Nov. 17,1806. He also defeated the Russians in the plains of Mohrungen, not far from Thorn, Jan. 25, 1807. After the peace of Tilsit, ac cording to the alliance concluded between Den mark and Napoleon, French troops were to occupy the Danish islands, thence to act against Sweden. Accordingly, March 23, 1808, the very day when Russia invaded Finland, Berna dotte was commanded to move upon Seeland in order to penetrate with the Danes into Swe den, to dethrone its king, and to partition tho country between Denmark and Russia; a strange mission for a man destined soon after to reign at Stockholm. He passed tho Belt and arrived in Seeland at the h ^ of 82,000 French men, Dutch, and Spaniards; 10,000 of the latter, however, contriving, by the assistance of an English fleet, to decamp under Gen. de la RomaQa. Bei*nadotte undertook nothing and effected nothing during his stay in Seeland. Being recalled to Germany, there to assist in tho new war between Franco and Austria, he re ceived the command of the 9th corps, mainly composed of Saxons. The battle of Wagram, July 5 and 6,1809, added new fuel to his misun derstandings with Napoleon. On the first day, Eugene Bcauharnais, having debouched in the vicinity of Wagram, and dashed into the centre of the hostile reserves, was not suflicieutly sup ported by Bernadotte, who engaged his troops too late, and too weakly. Attacked in front and flank, Eugene was roughly thrown back upon Napoleons guard, and the first shock of tho French attack was thus broken by Berna dottes lukewarmness, who, meanwhile, liad oc cupied the village of Adlerklau, in the centre

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duke of Augustenburg, and despatched of the Frencli army, but somewhat in advance late Jiaron Moerner to Gen. Wrede, with instruc of the French line. On the following day, at tions enjoining the latter to bring Napoleon 6 oclock in the morning, when the Austrians over to the kings choice. Moerner, however, advanced for a concentric attack, Bernadotte a young man belonging to the very large party deployed before Adlerklau, instead of placing in Sweden which tlien expected the recovery that village, strongly occupied, in his front. of their country only from an intimato alli Judging, ou the arrival of the Austriaus, that ance with Fvance, ou his arrival at Paris, this position was too hazardous, he fell took upon himself, in connection with Lapio, a back upon a plateau in the rear of Adler French otlicer in the engineers, with klau, leaving the village unoccupied, so that young Seigneul, the Swedish consul-general, and with it was immediately taken by Bcllegardes Aus Count Wrede himself, to present Bernadotte as trians. The French ccutre being thus endan candidate for the Swedish throne, all of them gered, Massena, its commander, seiit forward a taking care to conceal their proceedings from division to retake Adlerklau, which division, Count Lagerbielke, the Swedish minister at however, was again dislodged by DAspres the Tuileries, and all firmly convinced by a grenadiers. At that moment, Napoleon him series of misunderstandings, artfully kept up self arrived, took the supreme command, form by Bernadotte, that the latter was real y the ed a new plan of battle, and bafBed the m.n- candidate of Napoleon. On June 29, accord ncBuvres of the Austriaus. Thus Bernadotte ingly, Wrede and Seigneul sent despatches to had again, as at Auorstiidt, endangered the suc the Swedish minister of foreign attairs, both cess the day. On his part, he complained of announcing that Napoleon would, with great Napoleons having, in violation of ml miiitaiy pleasure, see the royal succession offered to his rulU ordered Gen. Dupas, whose French di lieutenant and relative. In spite of the opposi vision formed part of Bernadettes corps, to act independently of his command. His resigna tion of Charles XIII., the diet of the States, at tion, which he tendered, was accepted, after Orebro, elected Bernadotte crown prince of Sweden, Aug. 21, 1810. The king was also Napoleon had become aware of a,n order ot the day addressed by Bernadotte to his Saxons, m compelled to adopt him as his son, under the discord with the imperial bulletin. Shortly al name of Charles John. Napoleon reluctantly, ter his arrival at Paris, where he entered into and with bad grace, ordered Bernadotte to ac intrigues with Fouoh6, the Walcheren expeui- cept the offered dignity. Leaving Paris, Sept. tion (July 80, 1809) caused the French minis 28,1810, he landed at Helsingborg, Oct. 2, there try, in the absence of the emperor, to intrust abjured the Catholic profession, entered Stock Bernadotte with the defence of Antwerp. Ihe holm Nov. 1, attended the assembly of the states, blunders of the English rendered action on hu Nov. 6, and from that moment grasped the part unnecessary ; but he took the occasion reins of the state. Since the disastrous peace to slip into a proclamation, issued to his troops, of Frederikshamn, the idea prevailing in Sweden the charge against Napoleon of having neglect was the reconqucst of Finland, without which, ed to prepare the proper means of defence for it was thought, as Napoleon wrote to Alexander, the Belgian coast, lie was deprived of Ins Feb. 28, 1811, Sweden had ccased to exist, command; ordered, on his return to Pans, to at least as a power independent of Russia. It leave it for his princedom of Ponte Corvo, and, was but by an intimate alliance with Napoleon refusing to comply Avith that order, ho was thiit th Swedes could hope to recover that summoned to Vienna. After some lively alter jrovince. To this conviction Bernadotte owed cations with Napoleon, at Schdnbrunn, he ac lis election. During the kings sickness, from cepted the general government of the Koman March lY, 1811, to January 7, 1812, Charles states, a sort of honorable exile.-^The circum- John was appointed regent; but this was a stanccs which brought about his election as question of etiquette only, since from the day crown prince of Sweden, were not fully cmci- of his arrival, he conducted all affairs. Napo dated until long after his death. Charles ^111., leon, too much of a parvenu himself to spare the after the adoption of Charles Augus^ duke ot susceptibilities of his ex-lieutenant, compelled A u g u ste n b u rg , as his son, and as heir to the him, Nov. 17, 1810, in spite of a prior engage Swedish throne, sent Count "W rede to 1 aris, to ment, to accede to the continental system, and ask for the duko the hand of the princess Char declare war against England. He suppressed lotte, daughter of Lucien Bonaparte. On the his revenues as a French prince; declined to sudden death of the duko of Augustenburg, receive his despatches directly addressed to him, May 18, 1810, Russia pressed upon Charles because he was not a sovereign his equal; XIII. the adoption of the duke of Oldenburg, and sent back the order of the Seraphim, beLipon the new-born king of Rome by while Napoleon supported the claims of Frede ric VI., king of Denmark. The old kmg him Charles John. This petty chicanery afforded self otYered the succe^jsion to the brother of the to the latter the pretext only for a coqrse of

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action long decided upon. Ilardly was be in stalled at Stockholm, when he admitted to a public audience the Russian general, Suclitelen, who was detested by the Swedes for having suborned the commander of Sweaborg, and even allowed that personage to be accredited as ambassador to the Swedish court. On Dcc. 18, 1810, he held a conference with Czerniclieff, in wliich he declared himself to bo anxious to win the good opinion of the czar, and to resign Finland forever, on the condition of Norway being detached from Denmark, and annexed to Sweden. By the same Czernicheff, he sent a most flattering letter to the czar Alexander. As he thus drew nearer to Russia, the Swedish generals who had over thrown Gustavus IV.. and favored his own election, retired from him. Their opposition, rciichoed by the army and the people, threat ened to become dangerous, when the invasion of Swedish Pomerania by a French division, Jan. 17, 1812a measure executed by Napo leon on secret advice from Stockholmafford ed at last to Charles John a plausible pretext for officially declaring the neutrality of Sweden. Secretly, however, and behind the back of the diet, he concluded with Alexander an oftensive alliance against France, signed March 27, 1812, at St. Petersburg, in which the annexation of Norway to Sweden wfcS also stipulated. Napoleons declaration of war against Russia made Bernadotte for a time the arbiter of the destinies of Europe. Napoleon offered him, on the condition of his attacking Russia with 40,000 Swedes, Finland, Mecklenburg, Stettin, and all the territory between Stettin and VolgMt. Bernadotte might have decided the campaign and occupied St. Petersburg before Napoleon arrived at Moscow. He preferred acting as the Lepi^s of a triumvirate formed with England ana Russia. Inducing the sultan to ratify the peace of Bucharest, he enabled the Russian ad miral Tchitchakoff to withdraw his forces from the banl^ of the Danube and to operate oil the flftnlr of the French army. He also mediated the peace of Orebro, concluded July 18, 1812, between England on the one side, and Russia and Sweden on the other. Frightened at Napo leons first successes, Alexander invited Charles John to n interview, at the same time offering him the command-in-chief of the Russian armies. Prudent enough to decline the latter offer, he accepted the invitation. On Aug. 27 he arrived at Abo, where he found Alexander very lowspirited and rather inclined to sue for peace. Having himself gone too far to recede, he steeled the wavering czar by showing that Napoleons apparent successes must lead to his ruin. The conference resulted in the so-called treaty of Abo, to which a secret article was appended, giving the alliance the character of a family com pact. In iact, Charles John received nothing but promises, while Russia, without the slight est sacrifice, secured the then invaluable alliance of Sweden. By authentic documents it has been recently proved that it depended at that time on Bernadotte alone to have Finland restored to Sweden; but the^Jascon ruler, deluded by Alex anders flattery, that one day the imperial crown of France, when fallen from Napoleons brow, might rest upon his, already considered Sweden as a mere pia-alUr. After the French retreat from Moscow, he formjdly broke off diplomatic relations with France, and when England guaranteed him Norway by treaty of Maich 18, 1818, he entered the coalition. Furnished with English subsidies, he landed in May, 1818, at Stralsund with about 25,000 Swedes and advanced toward the Elbe. Dur ing the armistice of June 4, 1813, he played an important part at the meeting in Trachenberg, where the emperor Alexander pre sented him to the king of Pru.ssia, and where the general plan of the campaign was decided upon. As commander-in-chief of the army of the north, composed of Swedes, Russians, Prussians, English, Hanseatic, and north Ger man troops, he kept up very equivocal connec tions with the French army, managed by an in dividual who frequented his head-quarters as a friend, and grounded on his presumption that the French would gladly exchange Napoleons rule for Bernadettes, if he only gave them proofs of forbearance and clemency. Oonsequentij^, he prevented the generals placed under his command from taking the offensive, an3^ when Bdlow twice, at Grossbeeren and Desnewitz, had vanquished the French despite lu3 orders, stopped the pursuit of the beaten ahhj^. * When Mllcher, in order to force him to action, had marched upon the Elbe, and effected his junction with him, it was only the threat held out by Sir Charles Stewart, the English commissary in his camp, of stopping the supplies, that induced him to move on. Still the Swedes appeared on the battle field of Leipsic for ap pearance sake only, and during the whole cam paign lost not 200 men before the enem3^ When the allies entered France, he retained the army of Sweden on her frontiers. After Na poleons abdication, he repaired personally to ' Paris to remind Alexander of the promises held out to him at Abo. Talleyrand cut short his puerile hopes by telling the council of the allied kings, that tljere was no alternative but Bona parte or the Bourbons,every thing else being a merer'lntrigue. Charles John having, after the battle of Leipsic, invaded the duchies of Hol stein and Schleswig, at the head of an army composed of Swede^ Germans, and Russians, Frederic VI., king of Denmark, in the presence of vastly superior forces, was forced to sign,

Ill
Jan. 14, 1814, the peace of Kiel, by -which Nor way was ceded to Sweden, The Norwegians, however, demurring to being so unceremo niously disposed ot proclaimed the independ ence of Norway under the auspices of Christian Frederic, crown prince of Denmark. The repre sentatives of the nation assembling at Eidsvold, adopted. May 17, 1814, a constitution still in force, and the most democratic of modern Eu rope. Having put in motion a Swedish army and fleet, and seized upon the fortress of Trederickstadt, which commands the access to Christiania, Charles John entered into nego tiation, agreed to consider Norway aa an inde pendent state and to accept the constitution of Eidsvold, carried the assent of the assembled Btorthing Oct. 7, and Nov. 10, 1814, repaired to Christiania, there, in his own and the kings name, to take the oath upon the constitution. Charles XIII. expiring Feb. 5, 1818, Bernadotte, under the name of Charles XIV. John, was acknowledged by Europe as king both of Sweden and Norway. He now attempted to change the Norwegian constitution, to restore the abolished nobility, to secure to himself an absolute veto and the right of dismissing all oflScers, civil and military. This attempt gave rise to serious conflicts, and led, March 18, 1828, even to a cavalry charge upon the inhab itants of Christiania, who were celebrating the anniversary of their constitution. A violent outbreak seemed imminent, when the French revolution of 1830 caused the king to resort for the moment to conciliatory steps. Still Norway, for the acquisition of which he had sacrificed every thing, remained the constant source of embarrassments throughout his whole reign. After the first days of the French revolution of 1830, there existed a single man in Europe who thought the king of Sweden a fit pretender for the French throne, and that man was Bernadotte himself. More than once he repeated to the French diplomatic agents at Stockholm, How does it happen that Laflitte has not thought of me ? The changed aspect of Europe, and, above all, the Polish insurrection, inspired him for a moment with the idea of making front against Russia. His ofiers in this sense to Lord Palmerston meeting with a flat refusal, he had to expiate his transitory idea of independence by concluding, June 23, 1834, a convention or^alliance with the emperor Nicholas, which rendered him a vassal of Russia. From that moment his policy in Sweden was distinguished by encroachments on the liberty of the press, persecution of the crime of Use-majeate, and resistance to improvements, even such as the emancipation of industry from the old laws of guilds and corporations. By playing upon the jealousies of the different orders constituting the Swedish diet, he long succeeded in para lyzing all movement, but the liberal resolutions of the diet of 1844, which were to be converted, according to the constitution, into laws by the diet of 1845, threatened his policy with final discomfiture, when his death occurred.If Sweden, during the reign of Charles XIV., partly recovered from a century and a half of miseries and misfortunes, this was due not to Bernadotte, but exclusively to the native ener gies of the nation, and the agencies of a long peace.

S e r fh io r
BERTIIIER, Lotus Alexaxpp.k, marshal of Franco, prince and duko of Noufchatcl and Vnlcngin, prince of Wagram, born at Versailles, Nov. 20, 1753, murdered at liamberg, Juno 1, 1815. Ho was educated as a soldier by his father, tlio chief of the corps of topographical engineers un der Louis XVI. From the topographical bureau of the king, he passed to active service, first as lieutenant in the general staif, and subsequently as a captain of dragoons. In the American war of independence he served under L.'xfayette, In 1789, Louis XVI. appointed him major-gen eral of the national guard of Versailles, and on Oct. 5 and G , 1790, as well as Feb. 19, 1791, he did good service to the royal family. Ho perceived, however, that tho revolution opened a field for military talents, and wo find him, in turn, tho chief of the general staflf, under Lafay ette, Luckner, and Custine. During tho reign of terror ho avoided suspicion by exhibiting zeal in the Vendcan war. His personal bravery at tho defence of Saumur, Juno 12, 1795, se cured an honorable mention in tho reports of tho commissaries of the convention. After tho 9th Thermidor, he was appointed chief of tlie gen eral staff of Kellermann, and by causing tho French army to take up the lines of Borghetto, contributed to arrest tho advance of the enemy. Thus his reputation as a chief of tho general staff was established before Bonaparte singled him out for that post. During tlio campaign of 1796-7, he also proved himself a good gen eral of division in the battles of Mondovi (April 22, 1796), Lodi, (May 10, 1796), Codogno (May 9,1796), and Rivoli (Jan. 14, 1797). Of a weak character, of a tenacious activity, of a her culean strength of constitution, Avhich allowed him to work during 8 consecutive nighte, of a stupendous memory for every thing respecting the details of military operations, such as move ments of corps, number of forces, cantonments, chiefs; of a promptitude always to be relied

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"uMD, orderly and exact, weir versed ini the use of maps, with aa acute appreciation of the pe culiarities of the ground, schooled to I'eport in simple and lucid terms on the itoost complicated militaiy movements, safScientl^ experienced and qmck-sighted to know on the day of action where to deUver the orders received, and him self attending to their execution, the living telegraph of his chief on the field of "battle, and his indefatigable writing machine at fhe desk, he was ^ e paragon of a staff officer for a gen eral*who reserved to himself all the superior etaflf functions. Despite bis retnonstrances, Bcmaparte placed him, in 1798^^at the head of the army destined to occupy Rome, there to proclaim the republic, and to take the pope pris oner. E(|ually unable to prevent the robberies committed at Rome by French generals, comisaaries and purveyors, and to arrest the mutiny in the French ranks, he resigned his command to the hands of Massena, and r^aired to Milan, where he fell in loVe with the beautiful Ma dame Visconti; his eccentric and lasting pas sion for whom caused him during the expedition to Egypt to be nicknamed the chief of the faction des amoureux^ and cost him the best part of the 40,000,000 francs successively bestowed upon him by his imperial master. After his return from Egypt, he seconded Bona partes intrigues on the 18th and 19th Brumjdre, and was appointed minister of war, a post he occupied till April 2,1800. Acting again as chief of the general staff during the second Italian campaign, he contributed somewhat to the apparently false position iu which Banaparte had placed himself at Marengo, by cred iting felse reports as to the route and position of the Austrian army. After the victory, hav ing conclude4^ an armistice with Gen. Melas, he was employed on several diplomatic errands^ and then reifislated in the war ministry, which he held till the proclamation of the empire. He then became completely attached to the perscHi of the emperor, whom, with the title of major-general of the grand army, he accom panied as chief of the general staff during all his campaigns. Napoleon showered titles, dignities, emoluments, pensions, and donation^ upon him. May 19, 1808, he was created marshal of the empire, grand cordon of thei legion of honor, grand huntsman of France. Oct. 17, 1806, he had the honor of stipulating with Mack the terms of the capitulation of Ulm. From the Prussian campaign of 1806, he carried home the dignity of sovereign prince of NeufchAtel and Vdengin. In 1808 he was ordered to marry the princess Elizabeth Maria of Bavaria-Birkenfeld, the king of Bavarias niece, and was made vice-constable of France. In 1809, Napoleon placed him as general-inchief at the head of the grand army'destined to operate from Bavaria against Austria. On April 6 he declared war, and on the 15th had already contrived to compromise the campaign. He divided the army into 8 parts, posting W & voust with half of the French forces aJ Regens burg, Massena with the other half at Augsburg, and between them, at Avensberg, ther Bavari ans, so that by quickly advancing, the archduke Charles might have vanquished these corps singly. Th slowness of the A drians and the arr val of Napoleon saved tiie French army. In lis more congenial functions, however, and under the eyes of his master, he rendered ex cellent service in this same campaign, and added to hia long list of titles that of prince of Wagram. During the Russian campaign he broke down even as chief of the general staff. After the conflagration of Moscow he proved unable even to interpret the orders of hia mas te r; but in epiite of his urgent request to be allowed to return with Napoleon to France, the latter ordered him to stay with the army in Russia. The narrowness of his mind and his devotion to routine were now fully illustrated in the midst of the fearful odds against which the French had to struggle. True to his traditions, he gave to a battalion, some times to a company of the rear-guard, the same orders as if that rear-guard was still composed of 80,000 m en; assigned posts to regiments and divisions Which had long ceased to exist, and, to make up for his own want of activity, Multiplied couriers and for mulas. During the years 1813-14 we find him again at his usual post. After the deposition of Napoleon had been procl9,imed by the senate, Berthier, under false pretences, slunk away ftom his patron, sent in his own adhesion to the senate and the provisional government, even before Napoleons abdication, and pro ceeded, at the head of the marshals of the em pire, to OompiSgne, there to address Louis XVlII. in the most servile langua^. On June 4, 1814, Louis XVIII. created him peer of France, and captain of a company of the newly established royal guard. His principality of Neufchfi,tel he resigned to the Mng of Pru^ia in exchange for a pension of 34,000 florins. On Napoleons return from Elba, he followed Louis XVIII. to Ghent. However, having fall en into disgrace with the king in consequence of the concealment of ,a letter received from Napoleon, he withdrew to Bamberg, where, June 1,1815, he was killed by 6 men in masks, who threw him out of one of the windows of his father-in-laws palace. His memoirs were publisiied in Paris in 1826.

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Fucnterrabia, having tho Bidassoaiii front, whilo the centre and left extended across several BESSIJ:RES, J e a n marslial of ridges of hills toward St. Jean de Luz. From this position he onco attempted to relieve the t l i o French empire, born at blockaded garrison of Pampeluna, but was re department of Lot, Aug. 6 , ^ w ! 1 .of pulsed. San Sebastian, besieged by Wellington, T nt70 n March 1 , 1813. He entered the con was now hard pressed, and Soult resolved to stitutional guard of Louis XVL, in 1791, serve raise the siege. From his position of the lower non-commissioned o f f i c e r in the mounted Bidassoa it was but 9 miles to Oyarzun, a vil chasseurs of the Pyr6n6es, soon after be lage on the road to San Sebastian; and if he came a captain of chaaseurs. After the victory could reach that village the siege must bo of Roveredo, Sept. 4,1796, Bonaparte promoted raised. Accordingly, toward the end of Aug. him on the b attle-field to the raiik ot colonel. 1813, he concentrated 2 columns on tlie Bidas Commander of the guides of the soa. Tho one on the loft, under Gen. Clausel, chief during the Italian campaign ot lTyb consisting of 20,000 men and 29 guns, took a colonel of the same corps in position on a ridge of hills opposite Vera (a ed attached to i t for the g r e a t e r part pf hisl i f e place beyond which tho upper course of tho In 1802, the rank of general of river was in the hands of tho allies), while Gen. conferred upon him, and in 1804 Rcille with 18,000 men, and a reserve of 7,000 Bhal of the empire. He f o u g h t at the baUles of under Foy, took his station lower down, near Roveredo, Rivoli, S t . Jean w deoi the road h orn Bayonne to Iran. The French M a re n g o where he commanded the last d e ^ c i intrenched camp to the rear was hold by Bive cavalry c h a r g e Austerlitz, Jena, Eylau, DErlon with 3 divisions, to ward off any turn L d S d l L l Despatched in 1808 to assume ing movement of tho allied right, 'Wellington the command of a division of 18,000 ^^en st a had been informed of Soults plan, and had tioned in the Spanish proy^ince of Salamanca he taken every precaution. Tho exti'eme left of found on his arrival that Gen. Cuesta hadtal^ea his position, sheltered in front by the tidal up a position between Valladolid and BrgM, estuary of the Bidassoa, was well intrenched, thus threatening to intersect the line of com though but slightly occupied; tho centre, munication of Madrid witli France. formed by the extremely strong and rugged attacked him and won the victory of Medina ridges of San Marcial, was strengthened with del Bio Sccco. After the failure of the Eng field-works, and held by Freyros Spaniards, tho l i sh Walcheren expedition, Napoleon substitut 1st British division standing as a reserve on ed Bessi&res for Bernadotte, in command of the tlieir left rear near the Irun road. The right Belgian army. In the same year (1809), he wing, on the rocky descents of the Pefia de was creatcd duke of I s t r i a . At the head of a Ilaya mountain, was held by Longas Spaniards cavalry division he routed the Austrian general, and the 4th Anglo-Portuguese division; Ingliss Hohenzollern, at the battle of Esaling. Dur brigade of the 7th division connecting it with ing the Russian expedition he acted as chiet the light division at Vera, and with the troops commander of the mounted guard, and on the detached still further to the right among tho opening of the German campaign of 1813, as a s , that Reille should hills. Soults plan Av the commander of the French cavalry, t i e take San Marcial (which he intended forming died on the battle-field while attacking the de into a bridge-head for ulterior operations), and f i l e of Rippach, in Saxony, on the eve ot the drive the allies toward their right, into tho battle of Lutzen. I l i spopularity with the com ravines of PeHa de Ilaya, thus clearing the high mon soldiers may bo inferred from the circum road for Foy, who was to advance along it stance that i t was thought prudent to with straight on Oyarzun, whilo Clausel, after leav hold the news of his death for some time from ing a division to observe Vera, should pass tho the armv. Bidassoa a little below that place, and drivo wliatever troops opposed him up the PeOa de IL'iya, thus seconding and flanking Reilles at tack. On tho morning of Aug. 31, Reilles troops forded the river in several columns, car ried tho first ridge of San Marcial with a rush, and advanced toward tho higher and command Bidassoa ridges of that group of hills. But in this i3IDASS0A, a small river of the Basque ing difiicult his troops, imperfectly man provinces of Spain, noted for the battles lougiit aged, gotground into disorder; skirmishers and sup upon its banks, between the French under Soult became mingled, and in some places and the English, Spaniards, and Portucucsc, un ports crowded together in disordered groups, when der Wellington. After the defeat of Vittoria in tho Spanish columns rushed down the hill and 1813, Soult collected his troops in a position, drove them back to the river. A second attlie right of wliich rested on tlie sea opposite
B
a p t i s t e

f a

InBBlt* WwkiiHi MBaHh for *>tiinMnn'

X.

An example of the preparatory materials for NAC articles found among Engels* papers, this rough sketch is based on the battle plans and descriptions contained in W* F. P. Napier's History of the War in the Peninsula, Vol. 6, Lon don, 1840). Napier's Explanatory Sketch No. 5 presents two battle plans for the area. The sketch is reproduced here from the Marx-Engels Werke, Vol. 14, facing page 258. The caption found at bottom right is "Schlachtfeld an der Bidassoa" [Battlefield on the Bidassoa]. The other written labels present the following place names and topographical features, reading generally from left to right and top to bottom: Urogne, Rhune, Sans Culottes, Puerto, Bayonnette, Hogsback, Commissari, Croix des Bouquets, Biriatu, Bildox, Mandale, Vera, Salinas, Irun, San Marcial, Lesaca, Pena de Haya. The Bidassoa River is not labeled on the sketch. (Note that the spelling of some of the names is not consis tent in Napier and that several of them are misspelled in the MEW note on p. 747-748.)

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division placed in 1st line many men were told tack was at first more successful, and brought off to work at the redoubts, the 5th British the French up to the Spanish position; but division and Aylmers brigade forded the tidal tlien its force was spent, and another advance estuary, and marched toward the intrenched of the Spaniards drove them back into the camp called the Sansculottes. As soon as they Bidassoa la great disorder. Soult having had passed to the other side, the guns from learned in the mean time that Clause! had San Marcial opened, and 5 more columns ad made good his attack, slowly conquering ground vanced to ford the river. They had formed on Pena de H ^a, and driving Portugupe, on the right bank before the French could offer Spaniards, and British before him, was just any resistance; in fact, the surprise complete forming cdlumns out of Eeilles reserves and ly succeeded; the French battalions, as they Foys troops for a third and final attack, when arrived singly and irregularly, were defeated, news came that DErlon had been attacked in his camp by strong forces. Wellington, as - and the whole line, including the key of the position, the hill of Croix des Bouquets, was soon as the concentration of the French on the taken before any reserves could arrive. The lower Bidassoa left no longer any doubt of the camp of Biriatu and Bildox, connecting Reille real point of attack, had ordered all troops in with Olausel, was turned by Freyres taking the hills on his extreme right to attack what the Mandale hill, and abandoned. Reilles ever was before them. This attack, though troops retreated in disorder until they were repulsed, was very serious, and might possibly stopped at Urogne by Soult, who arrived in be renewed. At the same time, a portion of haste with the reserves from Espelette. While the British light division was drawn up on the still there, he was informed of an attack on left bank of the Bidassoa so as to flank ClauUrdax; but he was not a moment in doubt sels advance. Soult now gave up the intend about the real point of attack, and marched on ed attack, and drew Reilles troops back across the lower Bidassoa, where he arrived too late the Bidassoa. Those of Olausel were not ex to restore the battle. The British centre, in tricated till late in the night, and after a severe the mean time, had attacked Olausel, and gradu struggle to force the bridge at Vera, the fords ally forced his positions by both front and flank having become impassable by a heavy fall of attacks. Toward evening he was confined to rain on the same day, the allies took San Sebas the highest point of the ridge, the Grande tian, except the citadel, by storm, and this latter Rhune, and that hill he abandoned next day. post surrendered on Sept. 9.The second bat The loss of the French was about 1,400, that of tle of the Bidassoa took place Oct. 7, when Wel the allies about 1,600 killed and wounded. The lington forced the passage of that river. Soults surprise was so well managed that the real de )08ition was about the same as before; Foy fence of the French positions had to be made leld the intrenched camp of St. Jean de Luz, by 10,000 men only, who, on being vigorously ; ) Erlon held Urdax and the camp of Ainhoa, attacked by 88,000 allies, were driven from them Olausel was posted on a ridge connecting before any reserves could come to their support. Urdax with the lower Bidassoa, and Eeille stood along that river from Olausels right down to the sea. The Jsvhole front was intrenched, and the French were still employed in strengthen-ing their works. The British right stood op posed to Foy and DErlon; the centre, com posed of Girons Spaniards and the light division, Bivouac with Longas Spaniards and the 4th division BIVOUAC (Fr., probably from Ger. lei and in reserve, in all 20,000 men, faced Olausel; wac/ie), an encampment of troops by night while on the lower Bidassoa Freyres Spaniards, in the open air, without tents, each soldier the 1st and 5th Anglo-Portuguese divisions, and sleeping in his clothes, with his arras by his the unattached brigade of Aylmer and Wilson, side. In tlie warfare yf the ancients, the in all 24,000 men, were i-eady to attack Reille. troops were protected by tents, as by movable Wellington prepared every thing for a surprise. cities. In mediaeval times, castles and abbeys His troops were drawn up well sheltered from were opened to feudal and princely armies as the view of the enemy during the night before they marched by. The popular masses who, Oct. 7, and the tents of his camp were not struck. impelled by religious enthusiasm, precipitated Beside, he had been informed by smugglers of themselves in the crusades into Asia, formed the locality of 8 fords in the tidal estuary of rather ;a" mob than an army, and all but the the Bidassoa, all passable at low water, and un leading knights and princes and their immedi known to the French, who considered them ate followers bivouacked upon the ground, like selves perfectly safe on that side. On the the wild nomadic tribes who roam the plains morning of the 7th, while the French reserves of Asia. With the return of regular warfare were encamped far to the rear, and of the one

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tented camps again, reappeared, and were coinmon in Europe during the last 2 centuries. But in the gigantic Napoleonic wars it was found that rapid movements were of more im)ortance than the health of soldiers, and the uxurj of tents disappeared from the fields of Surope, excepting sometimes in the caso of the English armies. Entire armies bivouacked around fires, or, if the neighborhood of the enemy rendered it necessary, without fires, deeping upon straw, or perhaps upon the naked ground, a part of the soldiers keeping guard. Among historical bivouacs none has been more celebrated by poetry and painting than that of the eve of the battle of Austerlitz. made light work of the thus isolated Bavarians, and undertook the general pursuit, while Marl borough, havii^ completely cut oflF the retreat of the 18,000 irenchmen blocked up in Blen heim, compelled them to lay down their arms. Among them was Marshal Tallard. The total loss of the Franco-Bavarians was 80,000 killed, wounded, and prisoners; that of the victors, about 11,000 tnen. Tiie battle decided tho cam]>aign, Bavaria fell into the hands of the Austrians, and the prestige of Louis XIV. was gone. This battle is one of tho highest tactical interest, showing very conspicuously the Immense difference between the tactics of that time and those of our day. The very cir cumstance which would now be considered one of the greatest advantages of a defensive position, viz., the having 2 villages in front of tho flanks, was with troops of the 18th century the cause of defeat. At that time, in fantry was totally unfit for that skii-mishing and apparently irregular fighting which now makes a village of masonry houses, occupied by good troops, almost impregnable. This battle is called in France, and on the continent gen erally, the battle of Hochstiidt, from a little town of this name in the vicinity, which was already known to fame by a battle fought there on Sept. 20 of the preceding year.

BLENHEIM, or a village about 23 miles 'from Augsburg, in BaVaria, tho theatre of a great battle, fought Aug. 13, 1704, between the English and Austrians, under Marlborough and Prince Eugene, and the French and Bavarians, under Marshal Tallard, Marsin, and the elector of Bavaria. The Austrian states being menaced by a direct invasion ou the side of Germany, Marlborough marched from Flan ders to their assistance. The allies agreed to act on the defensive in Italy, tho Netherlands, and the lower Rhine, and to concentrate all their available forces on the Danube. Marlbor ough, after storming the Bavarian intrenchments on the Schellenberg, passed the Danube, and effected his junction with Eugene, after which both at once marched to attack the ene my. They found him behind the Nebel brook, with the villages of Blenheim and Kitzingen strongly occupied in front of either fiank. The French had the right wing, the Bavarians held the left. Their line was nearly 5 miles in ex tent, each army having its cavalry on its wings, so that a portion of the centre was held by both French and Bavarian cavalry. The position had not yet been properly occupied according to the then prevailing rules of tactics. The mass of the French infantry, 27 battalions, was crammed together in Blenheim, consequently in a position completely helpless for troops or ganized as they were then, and adapted for line fighting in an open country only. The attack of the Anglo-Austrians, however, surprised them in this dangerous condition, and Marlborough very soon drew all the advantages from it which the occasion olfered. Having in vain attacked Blenheim, he suddenly drew his main strength toward his centre, and with it broke through the centre of his opponents. Eugene

b l i n d a g e , in fortification, any fixture for preventing the enemy from seeing what is going on in a particular spot. Such are, for in stance, the fascines placed on the inner crest of a battery, and continued over the top of the embrasures; they make it more difficult, from a distance, to perceive any thing through the embrasures. More complete blindages are some times fixed to the embrasures, consisting of 2 stout boards, moving in slides from either f^e, 80 that the embrasure can be completely closed by them. If the line of fire is always directed to the same spot, they need not be opened out when the gun.Js run out, a hole being cut through them for the muzzle to pass. A mov able lid closes the hole, when necessary. Other blindages are used to cover tlie gunners in a battery from vertical fire; they consist of plain strong timbers, one end of wliich is laid on the inner crest of the parapet, the other on the ground. Unless the she Is are very heavy, and come down nearly in a vertical direction, they do not pass through such a blindage, but merely graze it, and go off at an angle. In trenching^

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some kinds of blindages are used to protect the Bappera from fire; they are movable on trucks, and pushed forward as the work advances. Against musket fire, a wall of strong boards, lined on the outside with sheet iron, supported by strong timbers, is sufficient. Against can non firCj large square boxes, or frames, filled with earth, sandbags, or fascines, are necessary. The most common kind of sappers blindage consists of a very large gabion, or cylinder of wicker work, filled with fascines, which is rolled before them by the workmen. "Wherever the sap has to be covered in from above, the blind age is constructed by laying square balks across the top, and covering them with fascines, and finally with earth, which renders them suf ficiently bomb and shot proof. he distinguished himself during the campaign in the p^atinat against republican France as a leader of the light cavalry. Being promoted, May 28, 1794, after the victorious affair of Kirrweiler, to the rank of major-general, the actions of Luxemburg, Kaiserslautern, Morschheim, Weidenthal, Edesheim, Edenkoben, se cured him a rising reputation. While inces santly alarming the French by bold coups de main and successful enterprises, he never neg lected keeping the head-quarters supplied with the best information as to the hostile move ments. His diary, written during this cam paign, and published in 1796, by Oount Goltz, his adjutant, is considered, despite its illiterate style, as a classical work on vanguard service. After the peace of Basel he married again. Frederic WUliam III., on his accession to the throne, appointed him lieutenant-^neral, in which quality he occupied, and administered as governor, Erfurt, Muhlhausen, and MUnster. In 1805 a small corps was collected under him at Bayreuth to watch the immediate M O cK ar consequences for Prussia of the, battle of AjisBLt^CHER, Gebhaed Lebereoht von, terlitz, vii., the occupation of the principality of Anspach by Bernadottes corps, in 1806 he led pBince of Wahlstadt, Prussian field-marsh^, the Prussian vanguard at the battle of Auerborn Dec. 16, 1Y42, at Rostock, in _Meckstiidt. His charge was, however, broken by lenburg-Schwerin, died at Kneblowitz, m bilethe terrible fire of Davousts artillery, and his sia, Sept. 12, 1819. He was sent in 1754, while proposal to renew it with fresh forces and the a boy, to the island of Rtigen, and there secretly whole of the cavah-y, was rejected by the king enlisted in a regiment of Swedish hussars as enof Prussia. After the double defeat at Auereien, to serve against Frederic II. ofPrussia. Hade stadt and Jena, he retired down the Elbe, while prisoner in the campaign of 1758, he w ^, after Napoleon drove the main body of the Prussian a years captivity, and after he had obtained his army in one wild chase from Jena to Stettin. dismissal from the Swedish service, P/evailed On his retrograde movement, Blticher took up upon to enter the Prussian army. March 3, the remnants of different corps, which swelled 1771 he was appointed senior captain or cavairy. In 1778, Capt. von J^ersfeld, a his army to ab'out 25,000 men. His retreat to Lttbeck, before the united forces of Soult, Bernatural son of the margrave of Schwedt, being appointed in his stead to the vacant post nadotte, andMilrat, forms one of the few honor able episodes in that epoch of German degrada of major, he wrote to Trederio P* tion. Since Llibeck was a neutral territory, his Jagersfeld, who possesses no merit but that ot being the son of the margrave of Schwedt, has making the streets of that open town the been preferred to me. I beg your majesty to theatre of a desperate fight, which exposed it to a 3 days sack on the part of the French j r r a n t m y dismissal. In reply FredericII. ordered him to be shut up in prison, but when, notwith soldiery, afforded the subject of passion^e censure; but under existing circumstances the standing a somewhat protracted confinement, he refused to retract his letter, the king com important thing was to give the German people plied with his petition in a note to this ellect: one example, at least, of stanch resistance. Capt. von Blilcher may go to the devil. He Thrown out of Labeck, he had to capitulate in now retired to Polish Silesia, married soon after, the plain of Eadkow, Nov. 6, 1806, on the ex became a farmer, acquired a small estate in Pom press condition that the cause of his surrender erania, and, after the death of Frederic II., re should be stated in writing to be ivant of am entered his former regiment as mmor, on the munition and provisions, Liberated on his express condition of his appointment being dated word of honor, he repaired to Hamburg, there, back to 1779. Some months later his wife died. in company with his sons, to kill time % cardHaving participated in the bloodless invasion of playing, smoking, and drinking. Being ex Holland, he was appointed lieutenant-colonel, changed for Gen. Victor, he was appointed June 3,1788. Aug. 20,1790, he became colonel governor-general of Pomerania; but one of the and commander of the 1st battalic of the regi secret articles of the alliance conclud^ Feb. ment of hussars he had entered in lT0. In 1794 21,1812, by Prussia with Napoleon, stipulated

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lor BltlcHers discharge from service, like that of Schamhorst, and other distinguished Pruawan patriots. To soothe this official disgrace, the king secretly bestowed upon him the hand some estate of BluMendorf, in Silesia. During the years that marked the period of transition between the peace of Tilsit and the German war of independence, Schamhorst and Gneisenau, the chiefs of the Tugendbund, desiring to extemporize a popular hero, chose BlClcber. In propagating his fame among the masses, they succeeded so well, that when Frederic William III. called the Prussians to arms by the procla mation of March 17, 1818, they were strong enough to impose him upon the king as the general-in-chief of the Prussian armyi In the well-contested, but for the allies unfortunate, batUea of Ltltzen and Bautzen, he acted under the command of Wittgenstein. During the re treat of the allied armies from Bautzen to Schweidnitz, he lay in ambush at Hayna^ from which he fell, with his cavalry, on the French advanced guard under Maison, who, in this aflfair, lost 1,500 men and 11 guns. Through this surprise Bliloher raised the spirit of the Prussian army, and made Kapoleon very' cau tious in pursuit. Blllohers command, of an in^pendent army dates from the expiration of the truce of Trachenberg, Aug. 10, 1818. The allied sovereigns had then divided their forces into 8 armies: the army of the north under Bernadotte, stationed along the lower Elbe; the grand army advancing through Bohemia, and the Silesian army, with Bltlcher as its com mander-in-chief, supported by Gneisenau as the chief of his staff, and Muffling as Ms quarter master-general. These 2 men, attached to him in the same quality until the peace of 1815, sup plied all his strategetical plans. BlUcher himself, as Mttffling says, understood nothing of the strategetical conduct of a war; so little indeed, that when a plan was laid before him for ap proval, even relating to some unimportant operation, he could not form any clear idea of it, or judge whether it was good or bad. Like many of Napoleons marshals, he was unable to read the maps. The Silesian army was com posed of 8 corps d^armee: 40,000 Eussians, under Count Langeron; 16,000 men under Baron von Sacken; and a Prussian corps of40,000 men under Gen. York. Blilchers position was extremely difficult at the head of this heterogeneous army. Langeron, who had already held independent commands, and demurred to serving under a foreign general, was, moreover, aware that Bltl cher had received secret orders to limit himself to the defensive, but was altogether ignorpt that the latter, in an interview, on Aug. 11, with Bar clay do Tolly, at Reichenbach, had xtorted ^ e permission to act according to circTiinstancei^. ,^enoe Langei!on.*thonght h^naself justified, m ' disobeying orders, whenever the general-inchief seemed to him to swerve from the pre concerted plan, and in this mutinous conduct he waa strongly supported by Gen. York. The danger arising from this state of things became more and more threatening, when the battie on the Katzbach secured Blficher that hold on his army which guided it to the gates of Paris. Marshal Macdonald, charged by Napoleon to drive the Silesian array back into the interior of Silesia, began the battle by attacking, Aug. 26, Bltlohers outposts, stationed from Prausnitz to Kraitsch, where the Neisae flows in to the Katzb^h. The so-called battie on the Katzbach consisted, in fact, of 4 different actions, the first of which, the dislodging by a bayonet attack fi*om a plateau behind a ridge on the right bank of the Neisse of about 8 French battalions, which constituted hardly one-tenth of the hostile force, led to results quite out of proportion to its original importancei in conse quence of the fugitives from the plateau not being collected at Niedererayn, and left behind the Katzbach at Kraitsch, in which case their flight would have had no influence whatever on the rest of tiie French array; in consequence of different defeats, inflicted at nightfall upon the enemy by Sackens and Langerons corps stationed on the/ left bank of the Neiss; in con sequence of M^shal Macdonald, who oommanded in person on the left bank, and had defended himself weakly till 7 oclock in the evening against Langerons attack, marching his troops at once after sunset to Goldberg, in such a state of exhaustion that they could no longer fight, and must fall into the enemys hand; and, lastly, in consequence of the state of the season, violent rains swelling the otherwise insignificant streams the fugitive French had to traverse^the Neisse, the Katzbach, the Deichsel, and the Bober to rtoid torrents, and making the roads almost impraOTcable. Thus it occurred, that with the aid of the country militia in the mountains on the left flank of the Silesian army, the battle on the Katzbach, insignificant in itself, resulted in the capture of 18,000 to 20,000 prisoners, above 200 pieces of artillery, and more than 800 ammu nition, hospital, and baggage wagons, with bag gage, &c. After the battle Bltlcher did every thing to instigate his forces to exert their utmost strength in the pursuit of the enemy, justly rep resenting to them that with some bodily exertion they might spare a new battle. Sept. 8, he crossed the Neisse, with his army, and on the 4tJi proceeded by Bischofswerda to concentrate at Bantzen. By this move he saved the grand army, which, routed at Dresden, Aug. 27, and forced to retreat be hind the Erzgebirge, was now disengaged; Napoleon being compelled to advance with reenforcements toward Bautzen, there to take up

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the army defeated on the Katzbach, andTto battle to tl Silesian army. During hf!s stay ; in the Q. E; corner of Saxonyj^ on ^he right bank of tho Elbe, Bliichcr, by a scriw of re treats ond advances, always shunned bAttlo when oflfered by Napoleon, but always engaged when encountering single detachments of the French army. Sept. 22, 23, and 24, he ex ecuted a flank march on the right of the en emy, advancing by forced marches to the lower Elbe, in the vicinity of the army of the north. Oct. 2, he bridged the Elba at Elster with pontoons, and on tho morning of the 3d his army defiled. This movement, not only bold, but even hazardous, inasmuch as he completely abandoned his lines of communica tion, -was necessitated by supreme political reasons, and led finally to the battle of Leipsic, which, but for Blttclier, the slow and over cautious grand army would never have rislced. The army of the north, of which Bernadotte wns the conimander-in-chief, was about 90,000 strong, and it was, consequently, of the utmost importance that it should advance on Saxony. By means of the close connection which ho maintained with Billow and Wintzingerodc, tho commanders of the Prussian and Kussian corps forming part of the army of the north, Blacher obtained tho most convincing proofs of Bcrnadottcs coquetry with the French, and of the impossibility of inciting him to any ac tivity, so long as he remained alone on a sepa rate theatre of war. Btilow and Wintzingerode declared themselves ready to act in spite of Bernadotte, but to do so they wanted the sup port of 100,000 men. Hence Bllichers resolu tion to venture upon his flank march, in which he persisted despite the orders he had received from the soveieigns to draw near to them on the left, toward Bohemia. He was not to be diverted from his purpose through tho obsta cles which Bernadotte systematically threw in liis way, even after the crossing of the Elbe by the Silesian army. Before leaving Bautzen, he had despatched a confidential officer to Berna dotte, to inform him that, since tho army of the north was too weak to operate alone on the left bank of the Elbe, he would come with the Silesian army, and cross at Elster on Oct. 3 ; ho therefore invited him to cross the Elbe at tho same time, and to advance with him toward Leipsic. Bernadotte not heeding this message, and the enemy occupying "Wartenburg opposite Elster, Blilcher firat dislodged the latter, and then, to protect himself in case Napoleon should fall upon him with his whole strength, began establishing an intrenched encampment from Wartenburg to Bleddin. Thence he ushed forward toward the Mulde. Oct. , in an interview with Bernadotte, it was ar ranged that both armies should march upon Leipsic. On the 9th, while the Silesian army was preparing for this march, Bernadotte, on the news of Napoleons advance on the road from Meissen, insisted upon retreating behind the Elbe, and only consented to re main on its left bank on condition that Blftcher would resolve to cross the Saale in concert with him, in order to take up a j)osition behind that river. Although by this movement tho Silesian army lost anew its lino of communication, Blilcher conaentod, since otherwise tho army of tho north would have been effectually lost for the allies. Oct. 10, the whole Silesian army stood united witii tho army of tho north on tho left bank of tlio Mulde, the bridges over which were destroyed. Bernadotte now declared a retreat upon Bernburg to have become necessary, and BlQcher, with the single view of preventing him from crossing the right bank of tho Elbe, yielded again on the condition that Bernadotto should cross tho Saale at Wettin and take up a posi tion there. Ont. 11, when his columns wero just crossing the high road from Magde burg to Halle, Blilcher being informed that, in spite of his positive promise, Bernadotte had constructed no bridge at Wettin, resolved upon following that high road in forced marches. Napoleon, seeing that the northern and Silesian armies avoided accepting battle, which ho had offered them by concentrating at Duben, and knowing that they could not avoid it without retreating across the Elbe; being at the same time aware that he had but 4 days left beforo he must meet tho grand army, and thus bo placed between two fires, undertook a march on the right bank of the Elbe toward WiMenberg, in order by this simulated movement to draw the northern and Silesian armies across the Elbe, and then strike a rapid blow on the grand army. Bernadotte, indeed, anxious for his lines of communication with Sweden, gove his army orders to cross without delay to the right bank of the Elbe, by a bridge constructed at Aken, while, on the same day, Oct. 18, ho informed BlUcher that the emperor Alexander had, for certain important reasons, put him (Blucher) under his orders. Ho consequently requested him to follow his movements on the right bank of the Elbe with the Silesian army, with tho least possible delay. Had Bliicher shown less resolution on this occasion and fol lowed the army of the north, the campaign would havo been lost, since the Silesian and northern armies, amounting together to about 200,000 men, would not have been present at the battle of Leipsic. He wrote in reply to Bernadotte, that, according to all his informa tion, Napoleon had no intention whatever of removing the theatre of war to the right bank of tho Elbe, but only intended to lead

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them nstray. At the same time Tie conjured Bernftdotte to give up his intended movement across the Elbe. Having, meanwhile, agam and again solicited the grand army to push iorward upon Leipsic, and offered to meet them there, he received at last, Oct. 15, the longexpected invitation. ' He immediately advanced toward Leipsic, while Bernndotte retreated to ward Petersberg. On his inarch from Halle to Leipsic on Oct. 16, ho routed at Mocl<ern the 6th corps of the French army under Marmont, in a hotly contested battle, in which lie cap tured 54 pieces of artillery. "Without dCTny he sent accounts of the issue of this battle to Bernadotte, who was not present on the 1st day of the battle of Leiosic. On its Sd day, Oct. 17, Blttcher dislodged the enemy from the right bank of the Parthe, with the exception of some houses and intrenchments near the Halle gate. On the 18th, at daybreak, he had a conference at Brachenfeld with Bernadotte, who declared he could not ott:ick on the left bank of the Parthe unless BUlcher gave him for that day 80.000 men of the Silesian army. Keeping the interest of the whole exclusively in view, Blacher consented without hesitation, but on the condition of remaining himaelf with these 30.000 men, and thus securing their vigorous coSporatioa in the attack. After the final vic tory of Oct. 19, and during the whole of Napo leons retreat from Leipsic to the Rhin^Blftcher alone gave him an earnest pursuit. While, on Oct. 19, the generals in command met the sov ereigns in tne market-place of Leipsic, and precious time was spent in mutual compliments, lus Silesian army was already marching in pur suit of the enemy to Liltzen. On liis march from Latren to Weissenberg, Prince William of Prussia overtook him, to deliver to him the C(mmission of a Prussian field-marshal. The allied sovereigns had allowed Napoleon to gain a staii, which could never be recovered, but from Eisenach onward, Blilcher found himself every afternoon in the room which Napoleon had left in the morning. When about to march upon Cologne, there to cross the Rhino, he was recalled and ordered to block ade Mentz on its left bank; his rapid pursuit as far as the Rhine having broken up the confeder ation of the Rhine, and disengaged its troops from the French divisions in which they were still enrolled. While the he.'id-quarters of the Silesian army was established at Hdchst, the grand a\-my marched up the upper Rhine. Thus ended the campaign of 1813, whose suc cess was entirely due to Bl&chera bold enter prise and iron energy.The allies were divided as to the plan of operntions now to be followed; the one party proposing to stay on the Rhine, and there to take up a defensive position ; the other to cross the Rhine and march upon Paris. After much wavering on the part of the sover eigns, Biilcher and his friends prevailed, and the resolution was adopted to advance upon Paris in a concentric movement, the*grand army being to start from Switzerland. Balow from Holland, and Blttcher, with the Silesian army, from the middle Rhine. For the new campaign, 8 additional corps were made over to Blticher, viz., IHeists, the elector of Hesses, and the duke of Saxe-Coburgs. Leaving part of Langerona corps to invest Mentz, and the new re enforcements to follow as a second division, Blvlcher crossed the Rhine Jan. 1, 1814, on 3 points, at Mannheim, Caub, and Coblentz, drove Marmont beyond the Vosges and the Sarre, in the valley of the Moselle, posted York's corps between the fortresses of the Moselle, and with a force of 28,000 men, con sisting of Sackens corps and a division of Langerons corps, proceeded by Vaucouleurs and Joinville to Brienne, in order to effect his junction with the grand army by his left. At Brienne, Jan. 29, he was attacked by Napoleon, whose forces mustered about 40,000, while Yorks corps was still detached from the Sile sian array, and the grand army, 110,000 strong, had onlv reached Obaumont. Blacher had con sequently to face the greatly superior forces of Napoleon, but the latter neither attacked him w i^ his usual vigor, nor hindered his retreat to Trannes, save by some cavalry skirmishes. Having token possession of Brienne, placed part of his troops in its vicinity, and occupied Dienville, La Rothidre, and Chammenil,with 8 differ ent corps, Napoleon would, on Jan. 80, have been able to fall upon Blacher with superior mimbcrs, as the latter was still awaiting his re&nforcements. Napoleon, however. Kept up a passive attitude, while the grand army was con centrating by Bar-sur-Aube, and detachments of it were strengthening Blilchers right flank. The emperors inactivity is explained by the hopes from the negotiations of the peace con gress of Ch&tillon, which he had contrived to start, and through the means of which he ex pected to gain time. In fact, after the junc tion of the Silesian army with the grand army had been effected, the diplomatic party insisted that during the deliberations of tne peace con gress the war should be carried on as a feint only. Prince Schwartzenberg sent an oflBcer to Blacher to procure his acquiescence, but Blacher dismissed him with this answer : Wo must go to Paris. N.^poleon has paid his visits to all the capitals of Europe; should we be less polite? In short, he must descend from the throne, and until he is hurled from it we shall have no rest. He urged the great advantages of the allies attacking Nupoleon near Brienne, before he could bring up the remainder of his troops, and offered himself to make the attack.

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if ho were only strengthened in Yorks absence. the weaker Silesian army. Consequently, he The consideration that the army could not sub left 20,000 men under Victor and Oudinot in sist in the barren valley of the Aube, and must face of the 100,000 men of the grand army, retreat if it did not attack, caused his advico to advanced with 40,000 men, the corps of Morprevail. The battle was decided upon, but tier and Ney, in the direction of the Marne, PrincoSchwartzenbcrg, instead of bearing upon took up Marmonts corps at Nogent, and on the enemy with the united force at hand, only Feb. 9 arrived with these united forces at lent Bltlcher the corps of the crown prince of S6zanne. Meanwhile Bltlcher had proceeded 'Wilrtemberg (40,000 men\ that of Gyulay(13,by St. Ouen and Sommepuis on the little road 000), and that of Wrede (12,000). Napoleon, leading to Paris, and established, Feb. 9, his head on his part, neither knew por suspected any quarters at the little town of Vertus. The dispo thing of the arrival of the grand army. When sition of his forces was this: about 10,000 men at about 1 oclock, Feb. 1, it was announced to hishead-quarters; 18,000, under York, posted be liim that Blucher was advancing, he would not tween Dormans and Chateau Thierry, in pur believe it. Having made sure of the fact, he , suit of Macdonald, who was already on the mounted his horso with the idea of avoiding the great post road leading to Paris from Epernay; battle, and gave Berthier orders to this effect. 80,000 under Sacken, between Montmirail and \Vlien, however, between old Briennc and RoLa Fert6-Sous-Jouarre, destined to prevent the thiure, ho reached the young guard, who had intended junction of Sebastiaius cavalry with got under arms on hearing the approaching Macdbnald, and to cut off the passage of the cannonade, ho was recei ved with such enthusiasm latter at La Fert6-Sous-Jouarre; the Russian tliat ho thought fit to improve the opportunity, general, Olsuvieff, cantoned with 5,000 men at and exclaimcd, L'artillerie cn avant/ Thus, Ohampaubert. This faulty distribution, by about 4 oclock, the affair of La Eothidre com which the Silesian army was drawn up in a very menced in earnest. At the first reverse, how extended position, en echelon^ resulted from the ever, Hapole<;in no longer took any personal > contradictory motives which actuated Blilcher. part in the His infantry having thrown On the one hand, he desired to cut off Mac itself into tnewillage of La Rothi^re,<Jije com donald, and prevent his junction'with Sebasbat was long%nd obstinate, and Blficher was tianis cav^ry; on the other'Band, to take up even obliged to b^ing up his reserve. The the corps of Kleist and Kapzewitch, who were iVencb were not didodged from the village advancing from Chalons, and expected to unite till 11 oclock at tiight, when Napoleon ordered with him on the 9th and 10th. The one mo the retreat of his army, which had lost 4,000 or tive kept him back, the other pushed him 6,000 men in killed and wounded, 2,500 prison on. Feb. 9, Napoleon fell upon Olsuvieff, at ers, and 58 cannon. If the allies, who were then Champaubert, and routed him. Bltlcher, withonly 6. days march from Paris, had vigorously Kleist and Kapzewitch, who had i.!nanwhile pushed on, Napoleon must have succumbed be arrived, but without the greater liiyt of their fore their immensely superior numbers; but the cavalry, advanced against Marmont, despatched soverei^s, still apprehensive of cutting Napo by Napoleon, and followed him in his retreat leon off from making his peace at the congress upon La F^re Champenoise, but on the news of of Oh&tillon, allowed Prince Schwartzenberg, Olsuvieffs discomfiture, returned in the same the commander-in-chief of the grand army, to night, with his 2 corps, to Bergdres, there to seize upon every pretext for shunning a decisive cover the road to Chalons. After a successful action. While Napoleon ordered Marmont to combat on the 10th, Sacken had driven Mac return on the right bank of the Aube toward donald across the Marne at Trilport, but hearing Ramern, and himself retired by a flank march on the night of the same day of Napoleons upon Troyes, the allied army split into 2 armies, march to Champaubert, hastened back on the the grand army advancing slowly upon Troyes, 11th toward Montmirail. Before reaching it he and the Silesian army marching to the Marne, was, at Vieux Maisons, obliged to form against where Bltlcher knew he would find York, be the emperor, coming from Montmirail to meet side part of Langerons and Kleists corps, so . him. Beaten with great loss before York could that his aggregate forces would be swelled to unite with him, the two generals effected their about 50,000 men. The plan was for him to pursue junction atViffort, and retreated, Feb. 12, to Cha Marshal Macdonald,who had meanwhile appear teau Thierry, where York had to stand a very ed on the lower Marne, to Paris, while Schwart damaging rear-guard engagement, and with zenberg was to keep in check the French main drew thence to Oulchy-la-VUle. Having order army on the Seine. Napoleon, however, see ed Mortier to pursue York and Sacken on the ing that the allies did not know how to use ^6ad of Fismes, Napoleon remained on the 13th their victory, and sure of returning to the Seine at Chateau Thierry. Uncertain as to the before the grand army could have advanced'far whereabout of York and Sacken and the suc in the direction of Paris, resolved to fall upon cess of their engagements, Bltlcher had, from

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Bergfires, during the 11th and l2th, quietly watched Idivrmont posted opposite him at Etoges. When informed, on the 13th, of tho^ defeat of his generals, and supposing Napoleon to have moved off in search of the grand army, he gave way to the temptation of striking a parting blow upon Mannont, whom he consid ered Kapoleons rear-guard. Advancing on Ohampaubert, he pushed Marmont to Montmirail, where the latter was joined on the 14th by Kapoleon, who now turned against Blttcher, met him at noon at Veauchamps, 20,000 strong, but almost without cavalry, attacked him, turned his columns with cavalry, and threw him back with great loss on Ohampau bert. During its retreat from the latter place, the Silesian army might have reached Etoges before it grew dark, without any considerable loss, if Blftcher had not taken pleasure in the deliberate slowness of the retrograde move ment. Thus he was attacked during the whole of his march, and one detachment of his forces, the division of Prince Augustus of Prussia, was again beset from the side streets of .Etoges, on its passage through that town. About mid night Blttcher reached his camp at Bergdres, broke up, after some hours rest, for Chalons, arrived there about noon, Feb. 15, and was joined by Yorks and Sackens forces on the 16th and 17th. The different aflPiiirs at Ohamp aubert, Montmirail, Oh&teau Thierry, Veau champs, and Etoge^ had cost him 15,000 mjen and 27 guns; Gneisenau and Mtling being alone responsible for the strategeticd faults which led to these disasters. Leaving Marmont and Mortier to front Blttcher, Napoleon, with Ney, returned in forced marches to the Seine, where Schwartzenberg had driven back Victor and Oudinpt, who had retreated across the Yfires, and there taken up 12,000 men under Macdonald, and some refinforoements from Spain. On the 16th they were surprised by the sudden arrival of Napoleon, followed on the 17th by his troops. Affcfer his junction with the marshals he hastened ageunst Schwartz enberg, whom he found posted in an extended triangle, having for its summits Nogent, Montereau, and Sens. The generals under his command, Wittgenstein, Wrede, and the crown prince of Wttrtemberg, being successively attacked and routed by Napoleon, Prince Schwartzenberg took to his heels, retreated toward Troyes, and sent word to Blttcher tojoin him, so that they might in concert give battle on the Seine. Blttcher, meanwhile, strengthened by new reinforce ments, immediately followed this call, and en tered M6ry Feb. 21, and waited there the whole of the 22d for the dispositions of the promised battle. He learned in the evening that an application for a truce had been made to Napoleon, through Prince Lichtenstein, who had met with a flat refusal. Instantly de spatching a confidential oflScer to Troyes, he conjured Prince Schwartzenberg to give battle, and even offered to give it alone, if the grand army would only form a reserve; but Schwartz enberg, still more frightened by the news that Augereau had driven Gen. Bubna back into Switzerland, had already ordered the retreat upon Langres. Blttcher understood at once that a retreat upon Langres would lead to a retreat beyond the Rhine; andj in order to draw Napoleon off from the pursuit of the dispirited grand army, resolved upon again marching straight in the direction of Paris, toward Uie. Marne, where he could now e:^ect to assemble an army of 100,000 men,Wintzingerode having arrived with about 25,000 men in the vicinity of Eheims, Bulow at Laon with 16,000 men, the remainder of Kleists corps being expected from Erfurt, and the rest of Langerons corps, under St. Priest, from Mentz. It was tliis second, separation on the part of Blttcher from the grand army, that turned the scale againsC Napmeon. If the latter had fol lowed the retreating grand army instead of the advancing Silesian one, the campaign would have been lost for the allies. The passage of the Anbe before Napoleon had followed nim, the only difficult point in Blttchers advance, he effected by constructing a pontoon bridge at Auglure on Feb. 24. Napoleon, commanding Oudinot and Macdonald, with about 25,000 men, to follow the grand army, left Herbisse on the 26th, together with Ney and Victor, in pursuit of the Silesian army. On the advice sent by BlUeher, that the grand army had now but the 2 marshals before it, Schwartzenberg stopped his retreat^took heart, turned round upon Oudinot and Macdonald, and beat them on the 27th and 28th. It was Blttchers inten tion to concentrate his army at some point as near as possible to Paris. Marmont, with his troops, was still posted at S6zanne, while Mor tier was at OhAteau Thierry. On Blttchers advance, Marmont retreated, united on the 26th with Mortier at La Fert6-Sous-Jouarre thence to retire with the latter upon Meaux. Blttchers attempt, during 2 days, to cross the Ourcq, and, with a strongly advanced front, to force the 2 marshals to battle, having failed, he was now obliged to march on the right bank of the Ourcq. He reached Oulchy-le-Ohateau March 2, learned in the morning of the 8d the capitu lation of Soissons, which had been effected by Bttlow and Wintzingerode, and, in the course of the same day, crossed the Aisne, and concen trated his whole army at Soissons. Napoleon, who had crossed the Marne at LaFert6-Sous-Jouarre, 2 forced marches behind Blttcher, advanced in the direction of Oh4teau Thierry and Fismes, and, having passed the Vesle, crossed the

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Aisne at Berry-au-Bao, March 6, after the recapture of Rheima by a detachment of hia army. Bltlcher originally intended to oner battle behind the Aisne, on Napoleons passage of that river, and had drawn up his troops tor that purpose. When he became aware that Napoleon took the direction of Fismes and Berry-au-BaCi in order to pass the Silesian army by the left, he decided upon attackmg him from Craone on the flank, in an oblique position, immediately after his debouching from Berry-au-Bac, so that Napoleon would have been forced to give battle with a defile m his rear. Having already posted his forces, with the right wing on the Aisne, with the M t on the Lette, half way from Soissons to Oraone, he resigned this excellent plan on making sure that Napoleon had, on the 6th, been allowed by Wintzingerode to pass Berry-au-Bao unmo lested, and had even pushed a detschment on the road to Laon. He now thought it necessary to accept no decisive battle, except at Laon. To delay Napoleon, who, by Gorbeny on the causeway from Eheims, could reach Laon as soon as the Silesian array from Oraone, Bmcher posted the corps of Woronzoff between the Aisne and the Lette, on the strong plateau of Oraone, while he despatched 10,000 horse un der Wintzingerode, to push on by Fetieux to ward Oorbeny, with the order to iall upon the right flank and rear of Napoleon, as soon as the latter should be engaged in attackmg zoff. Wintzingerod failing to execute tne manoeuvre intrusted to him, Napoleon drove Woronzoff from the plateau on the 7th, but himself lost 8,000 men, while W o ro n z o tf esc^)ed with the loss of 4,700, and proved able R eflect his retreat in good order. On the 8th, Bltlcher had concentrated his troops at Laon, where the battle must decide the fate of both armies. Apart from his numerical superiority, the vast plain before Laon was peculiarly adapted for deploying the 20,000 horse of the Silesian army, while Laon itself, situated on tlio plateau of a detached hill, wliich has on every aide a fall of 12, 16, 20 to 30 degrees, and at the foot of which lie 4 villages, offered great advantages for tho defence as well as the attack. On that day, the left French wing, led by Napo leon himself, was repulsed, while the right wing, under Marmont, surprised in its bivouacs at nightfall, was so completely worsted, that the marshal could not bring his troops to a halt before reaching Fismes. Napoleon, completely Isolated with his wiag, numbering 35,000 men only, and cooped up in a bad position, must have yielded before far superior numbers flush ed with victory. Yet on the following morn ing, a fever attack and an inflammation of tho eyes disabled BUlcher, while Napoleon yet re mained in a provocatbry attitude, in tho same position, which so far intimidated the men who now directed tho operations, that they not only stopped the advance of their own troops which had already begun, but allowed Napoleon to quietly retire at nightfall to Soissons. Still tho battle of Laon had broken his forces, physically and morally. Ho tried in vain by the sudden capture, on March 13, of Rheims, which had fallen into tho hands of St. Priest, to restore himself. So fully was his situation now under stood, that when he advanced, on the 17th and 18th, on Arcis-sur-Aube, against the grand ar my, Schwartzenberg himself, although but 80,000 strong against the 25,000 under Napo leon, dared to stand and accept a battle, which lasted through the 20th and 21st. When Na poleon broke it off, tlie grand army followed IV im up to Vitry, and united in his rear with the Sile sian army. In his despair, Napoleon took a last rehige in a retreat upon St. ]3izier, pretending thus to endanger, with his handful of men, the enormous army of tho allies, by cutting off its main line of communication and retreat between Langres and Ohaumont; a movement replied to on tho part of the allies by their onward inarch to Paris. On Marcii 30 took place tho battle before Paris, in which tho Silesian army stormed Montmartre. Though Bliicher had not recovered since the battle of Laon, ho still ap peared at the battle for a short time, on horse back, with a shade over his eyes, but, after the capitulation of Paris, laid down his command, the pretext being his sickness, and tho real cause the clashing of his open-mouthed hatred against the French with the diplomatic attitude which the allied sovereigns thought fit t^ exhibit. Thus he entered Paris, March 31, iQ tho ca pacity of a private individual. During tho whole campaign of 1814, he alone among the allied army represented the principle of the of fensive. By the battle of La Rothi^re he baf fled the Ohatillon pacificators; by his resolution at Mery he saved the allies from a ruinous re treat ; and by the battle of Laon he decided the first capitulation of Paris.After the first peace of Paris ho accompanied the emperor Alexan der and King Frederic William of Prussia on their visit to England, where he was feted as the hero of tho day. All tho military orders of Europe were showered upon him ; the king of Prussia created for him the order of the iron cross; the prince regent of England gave him liis portrait, and the university of Oxford the academical degree of LL. D. Li 1815 ho again decided the final campaign against Napoleon. After tho disastrous battle of Ligny, June 10, though now 73 y e a rs of age, he prevailed upon his routed army to form anew and march on the heels of their victor, so as to be able to ap lear in the evening of June 18 on the battle field of Water

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loo, aa exploit unprecedented in the history of war. Ilia pursuit, after the battle of Waterloo, of the French fugitives, from Waterloo to Paris, possesses one parallel only, in Nwoleons equal ly remarkable pursuit of the Prusaians from Jena to Stettin. He now entered Paris at the head of his army, and even had MQfBinr, his qnartermaster-general. installed as the miRtary governor-general of Paris. He insisted upon Napoleons being shot, the bi'idge of Jena blown up, and the restitution to their original owners 01 the treasures plundered by the French in the different capitals of Europe. His first wish was baffled by Wellington, and tlie second by the allied sovereigns, while the last was realized. He remained at Paris 8 months, very frequently attending the gambling tables for rovg-9t-noir. On the anniversary of tne battle on the Katzbach, he paid a visit to Rostock, his native place, where the inhabitants united to raise a public monument in his honor. On the occurrence of his death the whole Prussian army went into monrningfor 8 days. Lo ttevx diailt, as he was nicknamed by Napoleon, Marshal Forwards, as he was styled by the Russians of the Silesian army, was essentially a general of cavalry. In this speciality he excelled, because it required tactical acquirements only, but no strategetieal knowledge. Participating to the highest de gree in the popular hatred against Napoleon and the French, he was popular with the multitude for his plebeian passions, his gross common sense, the vulgarity of his manners, and the coarseness of nis speech, to which, however, he knew, on fit occasions, how to impart a touch of fiery eloquence. He was the model of a sol dier. Setting an example as the bravest in bat tle and the most indefatigable in exertion; ex ercising a fascinating influence on the common soldier; joining to his rash bravery _a saga cious appreciation of the ground, a quick reso lution in difficult situations, stubbornness in de fence equal to his energy in the attack, with sufficient intelligence to find for himself the right course in simpler combinations, and to re ly upon Gneisenau in those which were more intricate, he was the true general for the military operations of 1813-15, which bore the charac ter half of regular and half of insurrectionary warfare. died in 1815, leaving 8 children and a distress^ widow, who, in 1816, again married a oommou lighterman. This second marriage proved unhappy, and the family misery rose to a climax in the famine of 181&-17. In 1819 young Robert, belonging to the Catholic confession, obtained an employment as mass-servant; then became apprentice to a gilder, then to a girdler, and, according to the German custom, became a travelling journeyman, but was not up to the requirementspf his handicraft, and, after a short absence, had *to return to Cologne. Here he found occupation in a lantern manofactory, ingratiated himself with his employer, was by him promoted to a place in the counting-house, had to accompany his patron on his journeys through the southern states of Germany, and, in the year 1829--80, resided with him at Berlin. During this period he endeavored, by assiduous exertionj to procure a sort of encyclopeadic knowledge, without however betraying a marked predilection or a signal endowment for dny particukf ftcieooe. Summonedi An_.1830^ to tilft militajry service, to which every Prussian sub ject is bound, his relations with his proteojbor' were broken off. Dismissed from the army after a six weeks service, and finding bis em ployment gone, he returned again to Cologne, in almost the same cirenmstances in which he had twice left it. There the misery of hb parents, and his own helfiiessness, induced him to accept, at the h an ^ of Mr. Ringelhardt, the man ager of the Cologne theatre, the office of man of all work of the theatre. His connection with the stage, although of a subaltern charac ter, drew his attention to dramatic literature, while the p^itioal excitement which the French revolution of July had caused throughout RheniA Prussia^ allowed him to mingle in certaia political circles, and to insert poetry in the local papers. In 1881, Ringelhardt, who had meanwhile removed to Leipsic, appointed Blum cashier 'and secretary of the Leipsic theatre, a piost he held until 1847. From 1881 to 1887 he made contributions to the Leipsio family papets, such as the Comet, the Abendr eeitung, &c, and published a Theatrical Cyclopffidia,? the ^ Friend of the Confftitution, an almanac entitled Voncdrts, &c. His writing are impressed with the stamp of a certain household mediocrity. His later productions were, moreover, spoiled by a superfluity of bad taste. His political activity dates from 1887, when, as the q>okesman of a deputation of Leip^o citizens, he handed over a present of honor to 2 opposition members of the Saxon estates. In 1840 he became one of the found ers, and in 1841 one of the directors of the Schiller associations, and of the association of Gennan aut4o. His contributions to the S d e h aiache Vaterlamdslldttery a pcditical journal.

iH im
~ B L I]^ Robbkt, one of the martyrs of the

German revolution, born at Cologne, Nov. 10,1807, executed in Vienna, Nov. 9,1848. He was tie on of a poor journ^ynton cooper, who

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made him the most popular journalist of Saxony, Rot Ivor y and the particular object of government perse BOLIVAR Y PONTE, S i m o n , the libera cution. German catholicism, as it was called, tor of Colombia, born at Caracas, July 24, found a warm partisan in him. He founded 1783, died at San Pedro, near Santa Mar the German Catholic church at Leipsic, and tha, Deo. 17, 1830. He was the son of one became its spiritual director in 1845. On Aug. of the familias Manituirtas, which, at the time 12 1845, when an immense meetmg of arinea of the Spanish supremacy, constituted the creole citizens and students, assembling before the nobility in Venezuela. In compliance with the riflemens barracks at Leipsic, threatened to custom of wealthy Americans of those times, Btorm it in order to revenge the murderous at the early age of 14 he was sent to Euroj>e. onslaught committed the day before by a com From Spain he passed to France, and resided tor pany of the riflemen, Blum, by his popular some years in Paris. In 1802 he married m Soquence, persuaded the excited masses not to Madrid, and returned to Venezuela, where his deviate from legal modes of resistance, and wife died suddenly of yellow fever. After this he himself took the lead in the proceedings lor visited Europe a second time, and was present leiral redress. In reward for his exertions, the at Napoleons coronation as emperor, in 1804, Saxon government renewed its persecutions and at his assumption of the iron crown of Lom against him, which, in 1847, ended in the sup bardy, in 1805. In 1809 he returned hom e,^d pression of the VaterUndsimter. despite the importunities of Joseph Felix Ribas, break of the revolution of February, 1848 he be his cousin, he declined to join in the revolutioa came the centre of the liberal party of Saxony, which broke out at Caracas, April 19, , founded the Fatherlands Association, which but, after the event, he accepted a mission to soon mustered above 40,000 members, and gener London to purchase arms and solicit the pro ally proved an indefatigable agitator, bent by tection of the British government. the city of Leipsic to the preliminary parlia well received by the marquis ot Wellesley, then ment, he there acted as vice-chairnian, and by secretary for foreign affairs, he obtained nothing preventing the secession en moMe of the oppo- beyond the liberty to export arms for ready gition, contributed to sustain that body. Alter cash with the payment of heavy duties upon I t s dissolution, h became a member of the them. On his return from ^ndon, again committee it left behind, and afterward of the withdrew to private life, until, bept. lo ll, ne Frankfort parliament, in which he was the was prevailed upon by Gen. Miranda, then comleader of the moderate opposition. His poli mander-in-chief of the insurgent land and sea tical theory aimed at a republic as the summit forces, to accept the rank of lieutenant-colonel of Germany, but as its base the different tradi in the staff, and the command of Puerto Cabello, tionary kingdoms, dukedoms, &c.; since, m his the strongest fortress of Venezuela, ihe bpanopinion, the latter alone were able to preserve, ish prisoners of war, whom Miranda used intact, what he considered a peculiar beauty ot laiiy to send to Puerto Cabello, to be confined German society, the independent development in the citadel, having succeeded in overcoming of its different orders. As a speaker he was their guards by surprise, and in seizing the plausible, rather theatrical, and very popular. citadel, Bolivar, although they were unarmed, "When the news of the Vienna insurrection reach while he had a numerous garrison and large ed Frankfort, he was charged, in company with magazines, embarked precipitately in the night, some other members of the German parliament, with 8 of his officers, without giving notice to to carry to Vienna an address drawn up by the his own troops, arrived at daybreak at La G^ayra, parliamentary opposition. As the spokesman and retired to his estate at San Mateo. On be of the deputation, he handed the address to the coming aware-of their commanders flight, the municipalcouncilof Vienna, Oct. 17,1848. Hav garrison retired in good order from the place, ing enrolled himself in the ranks of the students which was immediately occupied by the Span corps, and commanded a barricade during the iards under Monteverde. This event turned the fight, he sat, after the capture of Vienna by Wui- scale in favor of Spain, and obliged Miranda, on dischgratz, quietly conversing in a lotel, when the authority of the congress, to sign the treaty the hotel was surrounded by soldiers, and he him of Vittoria, July 26, 1812, which restored self made prisoner. Placed before a court-mar Venezuela to the Spanish rule. On July 30 tial, and not condescending to deny any of hia Miranda arrived at La Guayra, where he intended speeches or acts, he was sentenced to the gal to embark on board an English vessel. On his lows, a punishment commuted to that of being visit to the commander of the place. Col. Man shot. Tliis execution took place at daybreak, uel Maria Casas, he met with a numerous com pany, among whom were Don Miguel Pefla and in the Brigittenau. Simon Bolivar, who persuaded him to stay, for one niglit at least, in Casass house. At 2 o cloclc

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in the morning, when Miranda was soundly western provinces. The only serious resist sleeping, Oasas, Pena, and Bolivia entered his ance, on tne part of the Spaniards, was directed room, with 4 armed soldiers, oantiously seized against the coliran of Ribas, - who, however, his swo^ and pistol, then awakened. ab-1 routed Gen. Monteverde at los^uanes,^ aa d ; rupUy told him to rise and dress himself put *Torced Hrn^to^^^^^ himself up in Puerto Oahim into irons, and had him finally surrendered bello with the remainder of his troops. On to Monteverde, who dispatched nim to Cadiz, hearing of Bolivars approach, Gen. Fierro, the where, after some years captivity, h died in governor of Caracas, sent deputies to pro|X)se iroi& This act, committed on the pretext that a capitulation, which was concluded at VittoKiraoda had betrayed his country by the capit ria; but Fierro, struck by a sudden panic, and ulation of Vittpria, procured for Bolivar Monte- not expecting tto return of his own emissaries, verdes peouliaV favor, so that when he deriiand- secretly decMaped in the night, leaving more ed his passport, Monteverde declared ^Col. Bo t-hnn 1,600 Spaniards at the discretion of the livars request should be complied with, as a enemy. Bolivar was now honored with a pub reward for his having served the king of Spain lic triumph. Standing in a triumphal <r, by delivering up Miranda. He was thus allowed drawn by 12 young ladies, dressed in white, to sul for Guragoa, where he spent 6 weeks, adorned with the national colors, and all se and proceeded, in company with his cousin lected from the first families of Caracas, Bol Bibas, to the little republic of Oarthagena. Pre- ivar, btffeheaded, in full uniform, and wielding vioas to their arrival, a great number of soldierst,, a small baton in his hand, was, in about half an who had serv^ under Gen. Miranda, had fled hour, dragged from the entrance of the city to to Oarthagena. Ribiw proposed to them to un his residence. Having proclaimed himself dic dertake an expedition against thei Spaniards in tator and liberator of the western provinces of Venezuela, and to accept Bolivar as their com VenezuelaMarillo had assumed the title T of the eastern provinces'he mander-in-chief. The former proportion they of dictatcM of the liberator, estab embraced eagerly; to the latter they demurred, created the lished a cTfwcVcorps^ troops un(Ter the name but at last yielded, on the condition of Ribas 9f his body-guard, and surrounded himself with being the second in command. Manuel Rodriguez the show of a court. But, like most of his Tomces, the president of the republic of Oarcountrymen, he was averse to any prolonged thagena^ added to the 800 soldiers thus enlisted exertion, and his dictatorship soon proved a under Bolivar, 600 men under the command of military anarchy, leaving the most important his cousin, Manuel Castillo. The expedition affaire in the hands of favorites, who squandered starte<l in the beginning of Jan. 1818. Dissen the finances of the country, and then resorted sions as to the supreme command breaking out to odious means in order to restore them. The between Bolivar and Castillo, the latter suddenly now enthusiasm of the people was thus turned decamped with his grenadiers. Bolivar, on his to dissatisfaction, and the scattered forces of part, proposed to follow Castillos exunple, and the enemy were allowed to recover. 'While, in return to Oarthagena, but Ribas persuaded him the beginning of Aug. 1818, Monteverde was at length to pursue his course at least as far as shut up in the fortress of Puerto Oabello, and Bogota, at that time the seat of the congress of New Granada. They were well received, sup the Spanish army reduced to the possession of ported in every way, and were both made gen a small strip of land in the north-western part of Venezuela, 3 montlis later, in December, the erals by the congress, and, after having divided liberators prestige was gon?, and Caracas itself their little army into 2 columns, they marched by threatened, by the sudden appearance in its different routes upon Caracas. The further they neighborhood of tlie victorious bpaniards under advanced, the stronger grew their resources; the cruel excesses of the Spaniards acting every Boves. To strengthen his t>ttcring power, Bolivar assembled, Jan. 1, 1814, a junta of where as the recruiting sergeants for the army the most influential inhabitants of Caracsis, de of the independents. The power of resistance claring himself to be unwilling any longer to on the part of the Spaniards was broken, l>ear tne burden of dictatorship. Hurtado Men partly by the circumstance of f of their army being composed of natives, who bolted on eVery doza, on the other hand, argued, in a long ora tion, the necessity of leaving the supreme encounter to the opposite ranks, partly by the power in tlie hands of Gen. Bolivar, until tlie cowardice of such generals as Tiscar, Oagigal, and Fierro, who, on every occasion, deserted congress of New Granada could meetj and be united under one government. their own troops. Thus it happened that San Venezuela This proposal was accepted, and the dict.atorlago Marifio, an ignorant youth, had con ship was thus invested with some sort of legal trived to dislodge the Spaniards from the prov sanction. The war witli the Spaniards was, inces of Oumana and Barcelona, at the very for some time, carried on in a series of small time that Bolivar was advancing ttowB^h the

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actions, with no decisive aclvantage to either of tijc contending parties. In June, 1814, Boves inarchcd with his united forces from Calabozo on La Pucrta, where the two dictators, Bolivar and Mariflo, had formed a junction, met them, and ordered an immediate attack. After some re sistance, Bolivar lied toward Caracas, while Ma rino disappeared iiv the direction of Cumana. Puerto Cabello and Valencia fell into the hands of Boves, who then detached 2 columns (1 of them under the conmiand of Col. Gimzales), by different roads, upon Caracas. Ribas tried in vain to oppose the advance of Gonzales. On the surrender of Caracas to Gonzales, July 17, 1S14, Bolivar evacuated La Guayra, ordered the vessels lying in the harbor of that town to sail for Cumana, and retreated with the remainder of his troops upon Barcelona. After a defeat in flicted on the insurgents by Boves, Aug. 8,1814, at Anguita, Bolivar left his troops the same night secretly to hasten, through by-roads, to Cumann, where, despite the angry prote.=sts of llibas, he at once embarked on board the Bianchi, together with Marino and some other officers. If liibas, Paez, and other generals liad followed the dictators in iheir flight, every thing would have been lost. Treated by Gen. Arismendi, on their arriviil iit Juan Griego, in the island of Margarita, as deserters, and ordered to depart, they sailed I'ijr Carupano, whence, meeting with a similar reception on the part of Col. Bermudez, they steered tovrard Carthagena. There, to palliate their flight, they pub lished a justificatory memoir, in high-sounding phraseology. Having joined n plot for the overthrow of the government of Carthagena. Bolivar had to leave that little republic, and proceeded to Tunja, where the congress of the federalist republic of New Granada was sitting. At that time the province of Ciindinamarc:i stood at the head of the independent province.s wliich refused to adopt the Granadian federal compact, while Quito, Pasto, Santa Martha, and other provinces, still remained in the power of the Spaniards. Bolivar, wlio arrived at Tunja Nov. 22, 1814, was created by the con gress commander-in-chief of the federalist f^orces, and received the double mission of forcing the president of the province of Cundinamai-ca to acknowledge the authority of the congress, and of then marching against Santa Martha, the only fortified seaport the Spaniards still re tained in New Granada. The first point wa.s easily carried, Bogota, the capital of the disaf fected province, being a defenceless town. In spite of its capitulation, Bolivar allowed it to be sacked during 48 lioiu-s by his troops. At Santa Martha, the Spanish general Montalvo, having a feeble garrison of less tliau 200 men, and a fortress in a miserable state of defence, had already be.spoken a French vessel, in order to secure his own flight, while the inhabitants of the town sent word to Bolivar that on his appearance they would open the gates and drive out the garrison. But instead of marching, as ho was ordered by the congress, against the Spaniards at Santa Martha, he indulged his rancor against Castillo, the commander of Car thagena, took upon liimself to lead his troops against the latter town, which constituted an integral part of the federal republic. Beaten back, he encamped upon La Papa, a large hill, about gun-shot distance from Carthagena, and established a single small cannon as a battery against a place provided with about 80 guns, lie afterward converted the siege into a block ade, Avliich lasted till the beginning of May without any other result than that of reducing his army, by desertion and malady, from 2,400 men to about 700. Meanwhile a great Spanish expedition from Cadiz had arrived, March 25, 1815, under Gen. Morillo, at the island of Mar,iarita, and had been able to throw powerful reciilbrcements into Santa Martha, and soon after to take Carthagena itself. Previously, how ever, Bolivar had embarked for Jamuica, May 10, 1815, with about a dozen of his officers, on an armed English brig. Having arrived at the )lace of refuge, ho again published a procamation, representing liimself as the victim of some secret enemy or faction, and defending his flight before the approaching S laniards as a resignation of command out of deference for the public peace. During his 8 months stay at Kingston, the generals ho had left in Venezuela, and Gen. Arismendi in the isl and of Margaritn, stanchly held tlieir ground against the Spanish arras. But Ribas, from whom Bolivar had derived his reputation, having been sliot by the Spaniards after the capture of Maturin, there appeared in his stead another m.an on the stage, of still greater abili ties, who, being as a foreigner unable to play an independent part in the South American revolution, finally resolved to act under Bolivar. This was Louis Brion. To bring aid to the revolutionists, ho had sailed from London for ,Carthagena with a corvette of 24 guns, equipped in great part at his own expense, with 14,000 stand of arms and a great quantity of military stores. Arriving too late to bo useful in that quarter, he reembarked for Cayes, in Hayti, whither niiiny emigrant patriots had repaired after the surrender of Carthagena. Bolivar, meanwhile, had also departed from Kingston to Porte au Prince, where, on his promise of emancipating the slaves, Ptition, the president of Hayti, offered him large sunplies for a new expedition against the Spaniards in Venezuela. At Cayes he met Brion and the other emigrants, and in a general meeting proposed himself as the chief of the new expeuition, on the condi-

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tioii of uniting tlio civil and military power in liis person until tlio assembling of a general congress. Tho majority accepting Ins terms, the expedition sailed April IG, 1810, with him 09 iti commander and Brion as its admiral. At Margarita the former succecdcd in winning over Arismendi, tlio comtnander of the island, in which he had redncod tho Spaniards to tho single spot of Pampatar. On liolivard fi>rmal promise to convoko a national congress at Ven ezuela, as soon as ho should bo master of tho country, Arismendi summoned a junta in tlio cathedral of La Villa del Korte, and publicly proclaimed him tho commander-in-chicf of tho republics of Venezuela and New Granada. On May 31, 181G, Bolivar landed at Carupano, but did not daro prevent Marifio and Piar from separating from him, and c.nrrying on a war against Cumana imder their own auspices. \Veakencd by this separation, lio set sail, on Brions advice, for Ocumaro, where ho arrived July 3, 1810, with 13 vesselii, of which 7 only were armed. liis army mustered but 050 ivien, swelled, by tho cnrulinent of negroes Avhoso emancipation ho liad proclaimed, to about 800. At Ocnmaro ho again issued a proclamation, promising to exterminate tlio tyrants and to convoke the.people to namo their deputies to congress. On his adv.anco in tho direction of Valencia ho met, not far from Ociimare, tlio Spanish general Morales at tho head of about 200 soldiers and 100 militia men. The skir mishers of Morales having dispersed his ad vanced guard, ho lost, as an eye-witness records, *' all presence of mind, spoko nft a word, turned his horse quickly round, and fled in full speed toward Ocnmaro, passed tho villago at full gal lop, arrived at tho neighboring bay, jumped from his horse, got into a boat, and embarked on tho Diana, ordering tho wliolo squadron to follow him to tho little island of Biien Ayre, uud leaving all liis cominuiions without any means of assistance. On Brions rebukes and admonitions, ho again'joined tlio other com manders on tho coast of Ciunaua, but being harshly received, and threatened by Piar with trial before n coni t-martial as a deserter and a coward, ho quickly retraced his steps to Caves. After months of exertion, Brion at length suc ceeded in persuading a majority of tho Vene zuelan military chiefs, who felt tho want of at least a nominal centre, to recall Bolivar as their general-in-chief, upon tho c.xprcss condition that ho should assemble a congrcss, and not med dle with tho civil administration. Dec. 31, 1816, ho arrived at Barcelona with the .arms, munitions of war, and provisions su|)plied by Potion. Joined, Jan. 2, 1S17, by Arismcndi, ho proclaiined on tho 4tli martial Law and tho union of all powers in his single person ; but 5 days later, when Arismcndi had fallen into an ambush laid by tho Spaniards, tho dictator fled to Barcelona. Tho troops rallied at tho latter placo, whither Brion sent liim also guns and rcunforcomcnts, .so that ho soon mus tered o now corps of 1,100 men. April 15, tho Spaniards took possession of tho town of Barcelona, and tho patriot troops retreated to ward tho charity-house, a building isolated from Barcelona, and intrcnclied on Bolivars order, but uniitto shelter a garrison of 1,000 men from a serious attack, llo left tiio post in the night of April 5, informing Col. Freites, to whom ho transferred his command, that ho was going in searcli of more troo[)s, aiul would soon return. Trusting this promise, Frcitcs declined tho oiler of a capitulation, and, after tho assault, was slaughtered with the whole garristmby the Sp.aniards. Piar, aman ofcolor and native of Curaroa, conceived and executed tho conquest of tho provinces of Guiana; Admiral jirion supporting that cntcrpriso with his gun-boats. July 20, tho wholo of the provinces being evacuated by tho Spaniards, Piar, Iirion, Zea, Marino, Arismendi, and others, assembled a ))rovincial con gress at Angostura, and put at tho head of tho cxecutivo ft triumvirate, of which Brion, hating Piar and deeply interested in l^olivar, in whoso success ho had embarked his largo private for tune, contrived that the latter should be ap pointed a member, notwithstanding his absencc. On theso tidings Bolivar left his retreat for An gostura, where, embuldcned by Brion, he dis solved tho congress and the triumvirate, to rcplaco them by a ' su))remo council of the na tion, with himself as tho chief, Brion and An tonio Francisco Zea as the directors, the former of tho military, tho latter of the political section. However, Piar, tho conqueror of Guiana, who once before had threatened to try him before a court-martial as a deserter, was not sparing of iiis sarcasms against the Napoleon of the re treat, and Bolivar consequently accepted a plan for getting rid of him. On the false accusation of having conspired against tlio whites, ])lotted against Bolivars life, and aspired to tho supremo power, Piar was arraigned before a war council under tho presidency of Brion, convictcd, con demned to death, and shot, Oct. 16, 1817. Uis death struck Marino with terror. Fully awaro of Jiis own nothingness when deprived of Piar, lie, in a most abject letter, publicly calumniated liis murdered friend, dejirecated his ov,n at tempts at rivalry with the liberator, and threw himself upon Bolivars inexhaustible fund of i)i, >;^iiatiiniity. The conniu'st by Piar of (iuiana Iiac! (oriiplijtelv' cliangeii the fiiruation in favor of the n.itr: ts; that, .-in^lo province affording them more resourees than all the other 7 prov inces of Venezuela together. A new cam paign, announced by Bolivar tlirongh a new proclamation,was, therefore, generally expected

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to result ia the fiool expulsioaof the Spiwiards.. Tutga. Aug. 12, Bolivar made a triumphal This fint buUetin, which described some small entry into Bogot^ while the Spaniards, all the Spanlsli foraging parties withdrawing from Granadian provinces having risen against them, Oalabozo os armies flying before our victo shut themselves up in the fortified town of rious troops,** was not calculated to damp these Hompox. Having regulated the Granadian hopes. Against about 4,000 Spaniards whose congress at Bogota, and installed Gen. San junction had not yet been effected by Morillo, tander as commander-in-chief, Bolivar march lie mustered more than 9,000 men, well armed, ed toward Pamplona, where he spent about equipped, and amply furnished with all the 2 m onl^ in festivals atid balls. Nov. 8, he necessaries of war. Kevertheless, toward the arrived at Montecal, in Venezuela whither end of Hay, 1818, he had lost about a dozen he had directed the patriotic chieftains of that battles and all the provinces lying on the territory to assemble with their troops. With a northera dde of the Orinoco. Scatteriog as treasury of about $2,000,000, raised from the he did his superior forces, they were always inhabitants of New Granada by forced contri beaten in detail. Leaving the conduct of the butions, and with a disposable force of about war to Paez and his other subordinates, he re 9,000 men, the 8d part of whom consisted of tired to Angostura. Defection foUoww u^on well disdpiined il^glish, Irish, Hanoverians, and . defection, and everything seemed to be drifting other foreigners, he had now to encounter an to utter ruin. At this most critical moment, a enemy stripped of all rerources and reduced to new iombini^ion of fortunate accidents again a nominal loroe of about 4,500 men, f of whom changed the face of affurs. At An^stura were natives, and, therefore, not to be relied he met with Santander, a native of New upon by the Spaniards. Morillo withdrawing Qranada, who begged for the means of in from San Fernando de Apure to San Oarlos, vading that territory, where the population Bolivar followed him up to Calabozo, so that were prepared for a general rise agaxnst the the hostile head-quartors were only 2 days S panl^s. This request, to some extent, he march from each other. ,lf Bolivar had boldly complied with, while powerful succors in advanced, the Spaniards would have been men, vessels, and munitions of war, poured in crushed by his European troo)[>s alone, but he from England, and English, Freach, German, preferred protracting the war for 6 years longer. and Polish officers, flocked to Angostura. L^tly, In October, 1819, the congress of Ai^ostura Dr. German Boscio, dismapred at the declining had forced Zea, his nominee, to resign his fortune of the South American revolution, step office, and chosen Arismendi in his place. On ped forward, laid hold of Bolivar's mind, receiving this news, Bolivar suddenly marched and induced him to convene, Eeb. 16, 1819, his foreign le^on toward Angostura, surprised a national congress, the mere name of which Arismendi, who had 600 natives only, exiled proved poworuil enough to create a new array ' him to the idand of Margarita, and restored Zea of about 14,000 men, so that Bolivar found to his dignities. Dr. Roscio, fascinating him himself enabled to resume the offensive. The with the prospects of centralized power, led foreign officers suggested to him the plan of him to proclaim the republic of Colombia, making a display of an intention to a tt^ k comprinng New Granada and Venezuela, to ublish a fundamental law for the new state, Caracas, and iree Venezuela from the Spanish rawn up by Roscio, and to consent to the es yoke, and thus inducing Morillo to weaken New tablishment of a common congress for both Granada and concentrate his forces n ^ n Yeoeprovinces. On Jan. 20, 1820 he had again zuela, while he (Bolivar) should suddenly turn to tlie west, unite with Santander's guerillas, returned to San Fernando ue Apure. His and march upon Bogota. To execute this plan, sudden wi^drawal of the foreign le^on, which he left Angosttira l*eb. 24^ 1819, after having -was more dreaded by the Spaniards than 10 nominated- Zea president of the congress and thnes the number of Colombians, had nven vice-president of the republic during, his ab Morillo a new opportunity to collect reenforc^ sence. By the manoeuvres of Paez, Morillo and ments, while the tidings of a formidisible exp^liLa Torre were routed at Aohaguas, and would tion to start from Spain under ODonnell raised have been destroyed if Bolivar had effected a the sinking spirits of the Spanish party. Not junction between Lis own troops and those of withstanding his vastly superior forces, Bolivar Paez and Mariflo. At all events, the victories contrived to accomplish nothing during the of Paez led to the occupation of the province of campaign t f 1820. Meanwhile the news ar Bariraa, which opened to Bolivar the way into rived from Europe that the revolution in New Granada. Every thing being here pre the Isla do Leon had put a forcible end pared by Santander, the foreign troops, consist to ODonnells intended expedition. In New ing mainly of Englishmen, decided the fate of Granada 16 provinces out of 22 had joined New Granada by the successive victories won the gwvemment of Colombia, and the SpanJuly 1 and 28, and Aug. 7, in the province of

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iards'now held there only the fortresses or and Gofiyaqull IhTo CoIomBia," was 'nominally Oarthagena and the isthmus of Panama. In Jed by BfeJiyarxind Gen.Sucre^ but the_few sucr Venezuela 6 provinces out of 8 obeyed the laws cesses of the corps were entirely owed to British of Colombia. Such was the state of things officers, such as CoL Sands. During the cam when Bolivar allowed himself to be inveigled paigns of 1823-fi4, against the Spaniards in by Morillo into negotiations resulting, Nov. 25, upper and lower Peru, he no longer thought it 1820, in the conclusion at Truxillo of a truce necessary to keep up the appearance of generalr for 6 months. In the truce no mention was ship, but leaving the whole military t,ask to Gen. Sufire, limited himself to triumphal entrie^ m a d e 'of the republic of Colombia, although the manifestos, and the proclamation of consti congress had expressly forbidden ainy treaty to be concluded with the Spanish, commander be tutions. Through his Colombian body-guard, fore'iJie acknowledgment o& his part of the he swayed the votes of the congress of independence of the republic. Dec. 17, Morillo, Lima, which, Feb. 10, 1823, transferred to anxious to play his part in Spain, embarked him the dictatorship, while he secured his reat Puerto Cabello, leaving the oommand- election as president of Colombia by a new ten in-ch!ef to Miguel de la Torre, and on March der of resignation. His position had meanwhile 10,1821, Bolivar notified La Torre, by letter, become strengthened, what with the formal re that hostilities should recommenco at the ex cognition of the new state on the part of Eng piration of 80 days. The Spaniards had taken land, what with Sucres conquest of the prov a strong position at Carabobo, a village situated inces of upper Peru, which the latter united about half-way between San Carlos and Valen into an independent republic, under the name cia ; but La Torre, instead of unitmg there d l his of Bolivia. Here, where Sucres bayonets were forces, had concentrated only his 1st division, supreme, Bolivar gave full scope to his propen 2,500 infantry and about 1,500 6avalry, while sities for arbitrary power, by introducing the Bolivar had about 6,000 infantry, among them Bolivian Code, an imitation of the Code the British legion, mustering 1,100 men, and Napoleon. It was his plan to transplant that 8,000 llaneros on horseback, under Paez. The code from Bolivia to Peru, and from Peru to enemys position seemed so formidable to Boli Colombiato keep the former states in check var, that he proposed to his council of war to by Colombian troops, and the latter by tho make a new armistice, which, however, was foreign legion and Peruvian soldiers. By force, rejected by his subalterns. At the head of a mingled with intri^e, he succeeded indeed, for column mainly consisting of the British legion, some weeks at least, in fastening his code upon Paez turned through a footpath the right wing Peru. The president and liberator of Colombia, of the enemy, after the successful execution of the protector and dictator of Peru, and the god which manoeuvre, La Torre was the first of the father of Bolivia, he had now reached the climax Spaniards to run away, taking no rest till he of his renown. But a serious antagonism had reached Puerto Cabello, where he shut himself broken out in Colombia, between the centralists up with the remainder of his troops. Puerto or Bolivarists and the federalists, under Which Cabello" itself must have surrendered on a quick latter name the enemies of military anarchy advance of the victorious army, but Bolivar lost had coalesced with his military rivals. Tho his time in exhibiting himself at Valencia and Colombian congress having, at his instigation, Caracas. Sept. 21, 1821, the strong fortress proposed an act of accusation against Paez, tho ofCarthagena capitulated to Santander. The vice-president of Venezuela, the latter broko l^ t feats of arms in Venezuela, the naval action out into open revolt, secretly sustained and at Maracaibo, in Aug. 1823, and the forced pushed on by Bolivar himself, who wanted in surrender of Puerto Cabello, July, 1824, were surrections, to furnish him a pretext for over both the work of Padilla. The revolution of throwing the constitution and reassuming tho the Isla de Leon, which prevented ODonnells dictatorship. Beside his body-guard, he led, expedition from starting, and the assistance of on his return from Peru, 1,800 Peruvians, osten the British legion, had evidently turned the sibly against the federalist rebels. At Puerto scale in favor of the Colombians.The Colom Cabello, however, where he met Paez, he not bian congress opened its sittings in Jan. 1821, only confirmed him in his command of Vene^ at Cucuta, published, Aug. 80, a new constitu znela, and issued a proclamation of amnesty to tion, and after Bolivar had again pretended to all the rebels, but openly took their part and resign, renewed his powers. Having signed the rebuked the friends of the constitution; - and by new constitution, he obtained leave to under decree at Bogota, Nov. 23, 1826, he assumed take the canmaign of Quito (1822), to which dictatorial powers. In the year 1827, from which province the Spaniards had retired after their the decline of his power dates, he contrived to ejection by a general rising of the people from assemble a congress at Panama, with the ostensithe isthmus of Panama. This campaign, end I ble object of establishing a new democratic inter ing in the incorporation of Quito, Pasto, national code. Plenipotentiaries came from Co-

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loinbia, Brazil, La Plata, Bolivia, Mexico, Guate mala, &c. What he really aimed at was the erec tion of the whole of South Araerica into one federative republic, with himself as its dic tator. While thus, "giving full scope to his dreams of attacMi^^alf a world to his name, his real power % ^^apidly sMppmg from fho ColomWn troops in edof his arraugemcnU for Uie twduc
m a k i n g

broke out at different points. Having resigned for the 5th time, in Jan. 1830, he again accepted the presidency, and left Bogota to wage war on Paez in the nime of the Colonibian congress. Toward the end of March, 1830, he advanced at the head of 8,000 men, took Caracut^ which had revolted, and then turned of Marjicaibo, where Paez awaited him ^vltl^ 12,000 men, in a s t r o n g position. As soon as lie became aware that Paez meant serious

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that an annual pension would be granted to hiin S i t i o n of his departure for foreign Mu^tries. He accordingly senthisresignation to thS coneress, April 27,1830. But lioping to recain power by the influence of his Pr!::V.n .ttmir settinff in ia acainst Joachim Mosinsisting on the n e c ^ tjr of new p riv .i.^ 'f S Z " r K o T o o lo m b i., h.effectfor tho cxccwtivc. lien, * 2d h V tr it \o m Bogota in a very .tow cam evident that the yjntion manner, and contrived, under a vane^ of ^le constitution would conio out of the co ^ quit different from s Vacated their sents, by wh.cTi was left without a quorum, nud thus l ) c c ^ extinct. From a countiy-scat, *' 5 feet 4 inches in height, his visage is long, iiicMnt from Ocafia, tt> winch ho had le treated he published finotlier manifesto, prct4 Midine to be incensed at the step taken by i own Iviencu! but at the ime time attackmg i," giv: s r d i w | tho convention, calling on the cur to extraordinary measures, and declat m Smt he Jiis ready to submit to any l^ d of power which might be heaped "P" Hi'.?.!. Ihe pressure of his bayonets PP' long, but becomes soon fatigued. H lit Caracals. Carthagena, and Bogota, to ''^ 5 f uter ace lie haiUepaired, anew invested him with dictatorial power. An Tifttft him in his sleep ng room at Bogota wmcu h ? ^ a ? e d onl/by e.i|W i the dark from tho s s p i i s i K y of th i window, and lying concealed under a bridge, allowed lum for some inrrodnce a sort of m i l i t a r y terrorism. Ho did not however, lay hands on Santander, a^hough SilT o m w S;o u l"h f : pei; he had participated in the nnt to death Gen. Padill.o, whose guilt was not foptlv free from passion and violence of temper, ilioved at all, but who, as a man of color, was not able to resist. Violent the rcnublic in 1829, m a new appeal to tlio Suzens BoUvar invited them to frankly express S wls O S Is to the modifications to be introidn o s t Asiatic talent for dissimil ation, and duced into the constitution. An nembly_ of i & ^ n ^ " 'i ? y ^ d r e n ^ r . o notables at Carac:is an.swercd his ambition, laying bare the ! administration, dcclarmg thescparatu n ot Vc czuelafrom Colombia, and head of tiiat republic. The senate of Colom bia stood by Bolivar, but other insurrections

rsfre ii":;>.L K ^. I^SSi^s

a n

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par AJphonie T^ZGt (FarU, 1831).' "Memoirs of Gen. John Miller (in the service of the Re public of Peru), Ool. HippJdeyVAccount of fiis Journey to the Orinoco (Loud. 1819). into ^ e s5ar,T6~let fire to oombustible objeots, but it'ii maintained that these pieees are useless, the>explosion shattering them to atoms, and t ^ t the fnoendiary effects of shells without snob oompoiidoare equally great. Bombs are throwck' at *n^es varying from 16 to 46, but generdly 60 to 46; the larger idiells and having the greatest proportional ranges^ at aMttt 48, while smaller sh e^ wHh gi'eatw chains range furthest at about 80. The charges in fiSl instances proportionally BOMABSUND, ft narrow channd between small: a lS4noh bomb weighing 200lbs., thrown the island of Alands and Vardo, at the en out of a mortair at the elevation of 46, w i^ a trance of the gulf of Bothnia. The Russian charge of 8|^ lbs. powder, ranges 1,000 yards, fortifications to the harbor of Bomarsund were and with 20 lbs: or of its weight, 4,200 yards. destroyed by the British and French fleets dur The effects bt such a bomb, coming down fW >m ing the war of 1864. The channels leading up a tremendous height, are very great if it fells on to Bomarsund were blockaded at the end of any thing destructible. It will go through all July by 4 British ships and a few small steam the floors in a house, and penetrate vaulted ers. Shortly afterward strong detachments of arches of oonrfderable strength; and, though a the allied fleets arrived, witli the admirals Na 18-inoh shell only contains about 7 Ibe. of pow pier and Parseval-Deschfines, followe^ Aug. 7, der, yet its bursting acts like the explosion of a by the line-of-battle ships with Gen. Baraguay mine, and the fragments will fly to a distance of dHilliers and 12,000 troops, mostly French. 800 or 1,000 y a r^ if unobstructed. On the con The Russian commander, Gen. Bodisco, was trary, if it fMls on soft soil, it will imbed itself compelled to surrender on Aug. 16, the allies in the earth to a depth of from 8 to 12 feet, and contmuing to occupy the island until tlie end either be extinguished or explode without doing of the month, when the whole of the fortifica any hrm. B<^bs are therefore often used as tion was blown up. The trophies of the victors small mines, or foiigamB, being imbedded in the were 112 mounted guns, 79 not mounted, 8 earth about a foot deep in such places where mortars, 7 field guns, and 2,295 prisoners. The the enemy must pass; to fire them, a slow match principu military interest offered by this siege or train is prepared. This is the first shape in is its setting completely at rest the question as which they occur in history: the Chinese, aoto the emj^oyment of uncovered masonry in 'cording to their chronicles, several centuries befortifications with land-fronts. fbre out ewt ttsed metal balls filled with bursting composition and small pieces of metal, and fired by a dow match. They were employed in the defence of diefiles, being deposited there on the a p ^ a o h of l^e enemy. In 1282, at the siege of feitfong-Ai, the Chinese used, a^inst an as sault, to roll bombs down the parapet among the assailant Mongols. Mahmood Shah of GuzBOMB, or Shbll, a hollow iron shot for heavy erat, in the siege of Ohampaneer, in 1484, threw guns and mortars, filled with powder, and bombs into the town. In Europe, not to mention thrown at a considerable elevation, and intend earlier instances of a more doubtful character, ed to act by the force of its fall and explosion. the Arabs in Spain, and the Spaniards after They are generally the largest of all projectiles them, threw shells and carcasses from ordnance used, as a mortar, being shorter than any other after the beginning of the 14th cwitury, but the class of ordnance, can be made so much larger costliness and difBculties of manufactiuing hol in diameter and bore. Bombs of 10,11, and 18 low shot long prevented their general introduc inches are now of common use; the French, at tion. They have become an important inwedient the siege of Antwerp in 1831, used a mortar and of siege apdllery since the middle of the 17th shells cast in Belgium, of 24 inches calibre. The powder conta,ined in a bomb is exploded by a cwitury only. faze or hollow tube filled with a si6#-burning' composition, which takes fire by the discharge of the mortar. These fuaes are so timed that the bomb bursts as short a thne as possible after it has reached its destination, sometimes just before it reaches the ground. Beside the powder, there are sometimes a few pieoee of Yalenciennes eompo^Hoa put

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Bomb Ktch

BOMB KETOH is now generally used to designate the more old-fashioned sort of mortar vessels {galiotei d l>ombes). They were built strong enough to resist the shock caused by the recoil of the mortar, 60 to 70 feet long, 100 to 150 tons burden; they drew from 8 to 9 feet water, and were rigged usually with 2 masts. They used to carry 2 mortars and some guns. The mailing qualities of these vessels were natur ally very inferior. A tender, generally a brig, was attached to them, which carried the artil lerymen and the ^eater part of the ammu nition, imtil the action commenced.

Bom b-proof
BOMB-PROOF, the state of a roof strong enough to resist the shook of bombs falling upon it. With the enormous calibres now in use, it is almost impossible, and certainly as yet not worth while, to aim at absolute security from vertical fire for most buildings covered in bomb proof. A circular vault 3 -J^ feet thick at the keystone, will resist most shells, and even a single 13-inch shell might not break through; but a second one could in most cases do so. Absolutely ^omb-proof buildings, are therefore confined to powder magazines, laboratories, &c., where a single shell would cause an immense explosion. Strong vaults covered over with 3 or 4 feet of earth, will give the greatest security. For common casemates the vaults need not be so very strong, as the chance of shells falling repeat,edly into the same place is very remote. For temporary shelter against shelly buildings are coA^ered in with strong balks laid close to gether and overlaid with fascines, on which some dung and finally earth is spread. The in troduction of casemated batteries and forts, and of casemated defensive barracks, placed mostly along the inner slope of the rampart, at a short distance from it, has considerably increased the number of bomb-proof buildings in fortresses; and with the present mode of combining violent bombardments, continued night and day, with the regular attack of a fortress, the gaiTison cannot be expected to hold out unless effective shelter is provided in which those off duty can recover their strength by rest. This sort of buildings is therefore likely to be still more ex tensively applied in the construction of modem fortresses.

o n d k BOMB VESSEL, or Moetae Boat, is the expression in use for the more modern class of ships constructed to carry mortars. Up to the Russian war, those built for the British service drew 8 or 9 feet water, and carried, beside their 2 10-inch mortars, 4 68-pounders, and 6 18 lb. carronades. "When the Russian war made naval warfare in shallow waters and intricate channels a necessity, and mortar boats were re quired on account of the strong sea-fronts of the Russian fortresses, which defied any direct attack by ships, a new class of bomb vessels had to be devised. The new boats thus built are about 60 feet long, with great breadth of beam, round bows like a Dutch galliot, flat bottoms, drawing 6 or 7 feet water, and pro pelled by steam. They carry 2 mortars, 10 or 13-inch calibre, and a few field-guns or carro nades to repel boarding parties by grape, but no heavy guns. They were used with great effect at Sweaborg, which place they bombard ed from a distance of 4,000 yards.

io m ^ o rd to r

BOMBARDIER, originally the man having charge of a mortar in a mortar battery, but now retained in some armies to designate a,non commissioned rank in the artillery, somewhat below a sergeant. The bombardier generally has the pointing of the gun for his principal duty. In Austria, a bombardier corps is formed as a training school for non-commissioned officei*s of the artillery, an institution which has contributed much to the effective and scientific mode of serving their guns, for which that branch of the Austrian service is distinguished.

Bom borclm ont

BOMBARDMENT, the act of throwing bombs or-shells into a town or fortress for incendiary purposes. A bombardment is either desultory, when ships, field batteries, or a proportionally small number of siege batteries, throw shells into a place in order to intimidate the inhabi tants and garrison into a hasty surrender, or for some other purpose; or it is regular, and then forms one of the methods of conducting the attack of a fortified place. The attack by regular bombardment was first introduced by the Prussians in their sieges in 1815, after

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Waterloo, of 7tlie Torbesses in ^ north of Franc,e. The army and the Bonapartisfc party being then tntioh dispirited, and the remainder of the inhabitants anxiously wishing for peace, it vras thougHfc that the formalities of the old methodical attack in this casertiightbe dispens ed with, and a short and heavy bombardment substituted, which would create fires and ex plosions of magazines, prevent every soul in t h e place from getting a nights rest, and thus in a short time compel a surrender, either by the moral pressure of the inhabitants on the commander, or by the actual amottnt of devas tation caused, and by out-fatiguing the garrison. The regular attack by direct fire against the defences, though proceeded with, became sec ondary to vertical fire and shelling from heavy howitzers. In some cases a desultory bombard ment was sufficient, in others a regular bom bardment had to be resorted to; but in every in stance the plan was successful; and Tt is now a ' maxim in the theory of sieges, that to destroy the resources, and to render unsafe the interior of a fortress by vertical fire, is as important (if not more so) as the destruction of its outer de fences by direct and riooohet firing. ^ A bombardratent will be most effective against a for tress middling size, with numerous non-mili tary inhabitants, the moral effect upon them being one of the means applied to force the commander into surrender. For the bombard ment of a large fortress, an immense matiriel is required. The best example of this is the siege of Sebastopol, in which quantities of shells formerly unheard of were used. The same war furnishes the most important example of a de sultory bombardment, in the attack upon Sweaborg by the Anglo-French mortar boats, in which above 6,000 shells and the same number of solid shot were thrown into the place. neaTrTy fwice'as hig batteries with em brasures and low gun-carriages. To prevent this, traverses or cross parapets are placed between the ^uns, and have to be construct ed so much higher than the parapet, that they fully cover the gunners while mounted on the platform. This .superstructure is continued from the traverse'Mross the whole thickness of the parapet. It confines the sweep of the guns to an angle of from 90 to 120, if a gun has a bonnet on either side.BoNnrET-A-PEfcTEE, or Queue d H i r s ^ d e l l e (swallow tail), in field fortification, iaan intrenchment having 2 sali ent angles, and a reSntering angle between them. The latter is always 90, the 2 salient angles mostly 60 , so, that the 2 outer faces, which are longer than the inner ones, diverge to the rear. This w'ork is sometimes used for small bridge heada or in other situations where the entrance to a defile has to be defended.

oiint

_____ __

BONNET, in fortification, a transverse elevation of the parapet, or traverse and par apet, used either to prevent the enemy from seeing the interior of a work from _ some elevated point, or, in barbette batteries, to s protect men and guns from fianking fire. "In these latter batteries, the guns firing over the crest of the parapet have to i)e_ placed on high traversing platforms, on which the gun-carriage rests, recoils, and is run forward. The men are, therefore, partly exposed to the fire of the enemy while they serve the gun; and flanking or ricocheting fire is espe cially dangerous, the object to be hit being

BORODINO, ft village on the left bank of the river Kolotcha, in Eussia, about 2 miles above its junction with the Moskva. From this vil lage the Russians name the great battle, in 1812, which decided the possession of Moscow; tlie French call it the battle of ttie Moskva, or of Mozhaisk. The battle-field is on the right bank of the Kolotcha. The Russian right wing was covered by that river froni its junction with the Moskva to Borodino; the left wing was drawn back, en potency, behind a brook and ravine descending from the extreme left, at Utitsa, to ward Borodino. Behind this ravine, 2 liills were crowned with incomplete redoubts, or lunettes, that nearest the centre called the Rayevski redoubt, those on the hill toward the left, 3 in number, called tlie Bagration lunettes. Between these 2 bills, another ravine, called from a village behind it that of Seinionovskoye, ran down from the Russian left toward the for mer ravine, joining it about 1,000 yards beforo it reached the Kolotcha. The main road to Moscow runs by Borodino; the old road by Utitsa, to Mozhaisk, in rear of the Russian posi tion. This line, about 9,000 yards in extent, was held by about 130,000 Russians, Borodino being occupied in front of the centre. Gen. Kutusoff was the Russian commander-in-cliief; Ills troops were divided into 2 armies, the larger, under Barclay de Tolly, holding the riglit and centre, the smaller, under Bagration, occupying the left. The position was very ' badly chosen; an attack on the left, if success' fulj-ilipii'fled. the right and centre completely;

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followed, the Russians regaining ground as their if Mozhaisk had been reached by the French reenforcements arrived, but again driven beyond before the Kussian right had ravine as soon as Davoust engaged his rewas possible enough, they would have been hope the serve division. The losses on both sides were im lessly lost. But Kutusoff, having OTce rejected mense ; almost all the general officers were killed the capital position of Tsarevoye Zaimisht^e, or wounded, and Bagration himself was mor selected by Barclay, had no other choice. The tally hit. Kutusoff now at last took some part French, led by Napoleon in persM, were about in the battle, sending Dokhturoff to take the 125.000 strong: after driving the Kussians, command of the left, and his own chief of the 5,1*812, from some slight intrenchments on their staff. Toll, to superintend the arrangements for left, they were- arranged for battle on the 7th, defence on the spot. A little after 10 the 17 N. S. (Aug. 26, O. S.). Napoleons plan wm battalions of guards and grenadiers, and the based upon the errors of Kutusofif; merely ob division of Vasiltchikoff, arrived at Semionovserving the Kussian centre, he concentrated his the corps of Baggehufvud was divided, forces against their left, which he intended to skoye; one division being sent to Rayevski, another to force, and then cut his way through toward Tutohkoff, and cavalry to the right. Ihe Mozhaisk. Prince Eugene was accordingly or French, in the the mean time, continued their at dered to make a false attack upon Borodino tacks: the Westphalian division advanced m after which Ney and Davoust were to assail the wood toward the head of the ravine, while Bagration and the lunettes named from him, Gen. Friant passed this ravine, without, ho\^vwhile Poniatowski was to turn the extreme er, being able to establish himself there, ihe left of the Eussians by Utitsa; the battle once Russians now were reSnforced past 10) by well engaged, Prince Eugene was to pass the the cuirassiers of Borosdin from the army re Kologa, and attack the Eayevski lunette. serve, and a portion of Korffs cavalry; but they Thus the whole front actually attacked did not were too much shattered to proceed to at exceed in length 5,000 yards, which allowed tack, and about the same time the Frenchan were 26 men to each yard of front, an unprecedented preparing a vast cavalry charge. On the Rus depth of order of battle, which accounts for the sian centre Eugene Beauhariiais had taken isoterrible losses of the Russians by artillery fire. rodino at 6 in the morning, and passed over the About daybreak Poniatowski advanced against Kologa, driving back the enemy; but he soon Utitsa, and took it, but his opponent, T^tchko:^ returned, and again crossed the river higher xip again expelled him; subsequently, Tutchkott in order to proceed, with the Italian guards, the having had to send a division to the support oi division of Broussier (Italians), Gerard, A^rand, Bagration, the Poles retook the village. At and Grouchys cavalry, to the attack on liayev6 oclock Davoust attacked the proper left ot ski, and the redoubt bearing his name. Bo the Bagration intrenchments. Under a heavy rodino remained occupied. The parage of fire from 12-pounders, to which he couia Beauharnaisa troops caused delay; his attacK oppose only 3 and 4-pounders, he advanced.'! could not begin much before 10 o clock. Ine Half an hour later, Ney attacked the prop^, Rayevski redoilbt was occupied by the divi right of these lunettes. They were taken anT sion Paslcie-vritch, supported on its left by Varetaken, and a hot and undecided fight lol- siltchikoff, and having Dokhturoffs corps for a lowed.Bagration, however, well observed the reserve. By 11 oclock, the redoubt was taken great force brought against him, with their by the French, and the Paskiewitch division powerful reserves, and the French guard scattered, and driven from the "eld background. There could be no mistake about completely of battle. Yasiltchikoff and Dokhturoff the real point of attack. He accordingly c^led retook the But redoubt; the division of Prince together what troops he could, sending for a Eugene of W llrtemberg m time, ana division of Kayevskis corps, for another ot now Barclay ordered thearrived corps of Ostermann Tutchkoffs corps, for guards and grwadiers to take position'to the rear as a fresh from the army reserve, and requesting Barclay With this corps the last intact body of ^serye. Russian to despatch the whole corps of Baggehufvud. infantry was brought within range; there These reenforcements, amounting to more than mained now, as a reserve, only 6_battahonsre 30,000 men, were sent at once; from the army the guard. Eugene Beauharnais, J^out ot reserv'd alone, he received 17 battalions oi oclock, was just going to a tta ^ the Rayevski guards and grenadiers, and 2 12-pound batter redoubt a second time, when Russian cavalry ies. They could not, however, be made avail appeared on the left bank of the Kologa. able on the spot before 10 oclock, and before The attack was suspended, and troops were this hour Davoust and Ney made their second sent to meet them. But the Russians could attack against the intrenchments, and^ took neither take Borodino, nor p a s s the marshy them, driving the Russians over the Semionovskoye ravine. Bagration sent hia cuirassiers bottom of the Voina ravine, and had to re forwai-d; an irregular struggle of great violenca treat by Zodock, without any other resul.

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tacked the Rayevski redoubt. "While the in than having to some extent crossed Napo fantry attacked it in front, cavalry was sent leons intentions.In the mean time, Key and from Semionovskoye to its rear. After a hard Davoast, posted on the B^ration hill, had struggle, it remained in the hands of the maintained a hot fire across the Semionoyskoye French; and a little before 3 oclock the Rus ravine on the. Eujsian mMsea._ All_a^^^ sians retreated. A general cannonade from IheTrencii cavalry began to move. To the both sides followed, but the active fighting was riffht of Semionovskoye, Nansouty charged the over. Napoleon still refused to launch his Russian infantry with complete succeM, until guard, and the Russians were allowed to retreat Sievass cavalry took him in flank and drove as they liked. The Russians had their him back. To the left La,tour-Maubourg s ^roopsTn'gagea, excepting the 2 first regunente 3 000 horse advanced in 2 columns, the nrst, of the guards, and even these lost by artil headed by 2 regiments of Saxon cuirassiers, lery fire 17 officers and 600 men. Their total rode twice over 3 Russian grenadier battalions loss was 52,000 men, beside slightly wounded just forming square, but they wwe a ^ taken and scattered men who soon found their way in flank by Russian cavalry; a Polish cuiras back: but on the day after the battle their sier regiment completed the destruction of thd army counted only 52,000 men. The French Russian grenadiers, but thev too were driven had all their troops engaged, with the excep back to the ravine, where the second column, tion of the guards (14,000 infantry, 6,000 cav 2 regiments of Westphalian cuirassiers, and 1 alry and artiUery); they thus beat a decidedly of Polish lancers, repelled the Russians. The superior number. They were, beside, inferior ground thus being secured, the infrotry of Is ey in artillery, having mostly 3 and 4-pounder8, and Davoust passed the ravine. Friant occu while i of the Russian guns were 12-pounders, pied Semionovskoye, and the remainder oi the and the rest 6-pounders. The Frenfch loss was Russians who had fought, here, grenadiers, 80,000 m en; they took 40 guns, and only guards, and line, were finally driven back and about 1,000 prisoners. If Napoleon had thoir defeat completed by the French cavalry. launched his guard, the destruction of the Rus They fled in small disorderly bands toward sian army, according to Gen. Toll, would h ^ e Mozhaisk, and could only be collected late at been certain. He did not, however, risk this niaht: the 3 regiments of guards alone pre last reserve, the nucleus and mainstay ot his served a little order. Thus the French right, army, and thus, perhaps, missed the ehance ot after defeating the Russian left, occupied a po having peace concluded in Moscow.The above sition directly in rear of the Russian centre as account, in such of its details as are at variance early as 12 oclock, and then it was that Da with those commonly received, is mainly based voust and Key implored Napoleon to act up to upon the Memoirs of Gen. Toll, whom his own system of tactics, and complete the have mentioned as Kutusoffs chief of the staff. victory, by launching the guards by Semionov- This book contains the best Russuin account skoye on the Russian rear. Napoleon, however, of the battle, and is indispensable for its correct refused, and Ney and Davoust, themselves appreciation. dreadfully shattered, did not venture to ad vance without reSnforcements.On the Russian side, after Eugene Beauharnais had desisted from the attack on the Rayevski redoubt, Eu gene of Wilrtemberg was sent to Semionovskoye, and Ostermann, too, had to change front in that direction so as to cover the rear S w p s e t of the Rayevski hill toward Semionovskoye. B o s q u e t, Maeie Joseph, a marshal of When Sorbier, the French chief of artillery, France, born in 1810, at Pau, in the department, saw these fresh troops, he sent for 86 12-poundof Basses Pyr6n6es. He entered the polytechnic ers from the artillery of the guard, a n d formed school of Paris in 1829, the military school at a battery of 85 guns in front of Semionovskoye. While these guns battered the Russian masses, Metz in 1831, beciame lieutenant of artillery in Murat drew forward the hitherto intact cav 1833, and in that capacity went to Algeria with alry of Montbrun and the Polish lancers. the 10th regiment of artillery, in 1834. There on Thev surprised Ostermanns troops in the act one occasion, when a small French detachment of cleploying, and brought them into great found itself in a very critical position, the com danger, until the cavalry of Kreutz repelled the manding officer being at a loss how to disengage French horse. The Russian infantry continued his troops, young Bosquet stepped forward and to suffer from the artillery fire; but neither proposed a plati which led to the total discom party ventured to advance. It was now about fiture of the enemy. He was appointed lieuten 2 oclock, and Eugene Beauharnais, reassured ant in 1836, captain in 1839, mwor in 1842, as to the hostile cavalry on hia left, again at lieut.-colonel in 1845, colonel, and soon after.

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under the auspices of the republicau governmenl^ general of brigade, in 1848._ D m M tho. Isampaign of Kabylia in 1851, he was wounded, at the head of his brigade, while storming the defile of Monagal. His promotion to the rank of general of division was put ofiin consequence of his reserve toward Louis Kapoleon, but when troops were sent to the war in Turkey he obtained the command of the second division. At the battle of the Altna he executed the flanking attack of the French right wing upon the Russian loft, with a speed and energy praised by the Russians themselves, and even succeeded in bringing his artillery through path less and apparently impracticable ravines up to the plateau. It must, however, be added that on this occasion his own numerical force greatly surpassed that of the enemy. At Balaklava he hastened to disengage the English right wing, so that the remainder of the Eng lish light cavalry was enabled to retreat under the cover ^of his troops, while the Russians were compelled to stop their pursuit. At Inkerman he was ready early in the morning to support the English with 3 battalions and 2 batteries. This offer being declined, he posted as reserves, in the rear of the English right wing, 3 French brigades, with 2 of which, at 11 oclock, he advanced to the line of battle, thus forcing the Russians to fall back. But for this succor, the English would have been com pletely destroyed, since they had all their troops engaged and no more reserves to draw upon, while the Russians had 16 battalions not yet touched. As chief of the corps destined to cover the allied forces on the slope of the Tchernaya, Bosquet constantly distinguished himself by quickness, vigilance, and activity. He took part in the storming of the Malakoff, and after that event was madeamarshal, and in 1856 a senator. Ijack to Germany. In 1795 he again returned to Paris, and there again met Napoleon, who however treated him coldly; but toward the end of 1796, he applied again to him, and was summoned to headquarters, and installed at once as his private secretary. After the second Italian campaign, Bourrienne received the title of councillor of state, was lodged at the Tuilleries, and admitted to the first consuls family circle. In 1802 the house of Goulon. army contractors, whose partner Bourrienno had secretly become, and for which he had procured the lucrative business of supplying the whole cavalry equipment, failed with a deficit of 3 millions; the chief of the house disap peared, and Bourrienne was banished to Ham burg. In 1805 he was appointed to oversee at Hamburg the strict execution of Napoleons continental system. Accusations of pecula tion rising against hir^ from the Hamburg senate, from which he had obtained 2,000,000 francs, and from the emperor Alexander, whose relative, the duke of Mecklenburg, he had also mulcted, Napoleon sent a commission to inquire into his conduct, and ordered him to refund 1,000,000 francs to the imperial treasu ry. Thus, a disgraced and ruined man, he lived at Paris until Napoleons downfall, in 1814, when he stepped forward, had his mil lion j>aid back by the French provisional gov ernment, was instalTed its postmaster-general, deposed from this post by Louis XVIIL, and at the first rumor of Napoleons return from Elb^ made, by the same prince, prefect of the Paris police, a post he held for 8 days. As Napo leon, in his decree dated Lyons, March 13, had exempted him from the general amnesty, he followed Louis XVIII. to Belgium, was thence despatched to Hamburg, and created, on his return to Paris, state councillor, subsequently minister of state. His pecuniary embarrass ments forced him in 1828 to seek a refuge in Belgium, on an estate of the duchess of Brancas at Fontaine IEv^que, not far from Oharleroy. Here, with the assistance of M. de Villemarest and others, he drew up his Memoirs, (10 vols. 8vo), which appeflred in 1829, at Paris, and caused a great deal of excitement. He died in a lunatic hospital.

B o u rri n M BOURRIENNE, Louis Antoijte Fatjvelet i)E, private secretary of Napoleon, born at Sens, July 9, 1769, died near Caen, Feb 7, 1834. Ho entered the military school of Brienne in 1778, and was there some 6 years as Napoleons school-fellow. From 1789 to 1792, he spent his tima as attache to the French embassy at Vienna, as a student of international law and northern languages at Leipsic, and at the court of Poniatowski, at Warsaw. After his return to Paris, he renewed his intimacy with Napoleon, then a poor and friendless officer; but the decisive turn taken by the revolution ary movement after Jur^e 20, 1792, drove him

re>clq

BRESCIA, a province of Lombardy, bounded N. by Bergamo and Tyrol, W. by Verona and Mantua, S. by Cremona, E. by Lodi and Ber- , gamo. Area, 1,300 sq. m .; pop. 350,000. The fertility of the soil is favorable to the choicest

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p r o iu o n o a s , o s a

branches of industry is the trade la ical garden, a cabinet of antiquities and one which 1,000,000 pounds are annually pro of natural history, an agricultural society, sev duced; the number of eral academies, tiie philharmonic being one ot 27 and of silk weaving establishments the oldest in Italy, a casino, a fine theatre, and a About Y O .O O O lbs. of very superior wool me larce booth outside of the town for the annual raised annually, and there are not faira period of great activity and r^oicing. 46 woollen manufactories, o? of The weekly journal of Brescia is called Giormle woollen and cotton goods, 13 of cloth, 27 oi della prov inda B r e a d a n a . A Roma.n temple of cold silver, and bronze, 12 of hardware and marble was excavated in the vicinity in 1822. lorMlain, 7 printing establishments, 1 ^ man Brescia is connected by railway with Verona, ufactories of iron and other and other Italian cities. The town is sup steel enjoying a world-wide posed to have been founded by the Etrus of fire-arms and weapons, the excellency of cans. After the fall of the Roman empire it which gave to Brescia, in former the was pillaged by the Goths, and eventually p^sname PArmata. Butter, cheese, w h ^ T i n t o the hands of the Traoks Otto tho maize, hay, flax,-chestnuts, od, and wine, afford Great raised it to the rank of a free imperial additional elements of prosperity. The jj^de of city but the contests between the Guelphs and the province is principally earned on in the cap the Ghibellinea became a source of trouble to tee ital of the same name.The town Having been for some time under tn has a population of 40,000, is sit^ te d on the sway of the lords of Verona, it fell in 1878 into rivers MeUa and Garza, at the foot of a hill. The the power of the Milanese. In 1426 it taken strong castle on the top of the tjr S n o ag n o h ; in 1 besieged by Hcinmo; times called the falcon of Lom^rdy. It is a in 1509 it surrendered to the French; in 1612 it well-buUt, pleasant, animated towi^n^dfOT was captured by the Venetian genwal Gntti, but its abundant supply of fountams, of which there eventually liberated by Gaston de F ^ i Subject are not less than 72 in the streets a n d y v re s, ed to 8 more sieges during the 16th century, it beside some 100 in private houses. The an remained in the possession of Venice until the cient cathedral, and the . fall of that republic. During the Napoleonic era many paintings of the great Italian it was the capital of the department of Mella. In The new cathedral, or Duomo Nuovo.yroa begun the revolution of 1849, the Brescians rose in in 1604, but the vaulting of the cupola was only arms against the power of Austri^ to which completed in 1825. The chief ornament of the they had been subjected since p i ^ The church of Santa Afra is The ^^m an taken in town was bombarded, March 80, by Adultery, by Titian. There are, on the whole, Havnaa, and held out until the noon of April over 20 churches, all noted for their trewure^ 2, when it was coiiipelled to surrender, and to of art. Among the remarkable publw buildings, pay a ransom of $1,200,000, in order to avert is the PcOazzo della LoffgiainthQ chia, intended for the town hall, the beauti utter destrucfion. ful facade of which suffered much from the bombLdment in April, 1849. The P a l^ o To^ was presented to the town by Count T ^i, and contains, among many f 0us p i c t ^ th^ celebrated Saviour, hy Eaphael. The galleries in the Palazzo Averoldi, Fenarph, Lee chi, Martinengo, and in other palaces, aDe equal BMDGlTlISrcAET. ^he art of^ construct ing temporary bridges for the passage, by ly noted for their artistic attractions. A street, II Gorsodel Teafro, has the fronts the troons of large rivers and narrow arms of the 2d stories decorated with scriptur^, mytholog f e l w ^ w elf known to the pcients, whose works in this respect are sometimes of surpris ical, and historical paintings. The. Quirinim, founded in the middle of the 18th ing magnitude. Darius passed ^ h e Bosporus century by Cardinal Quinni, contains ap ^a^d and Danube, and Xerxes the HeUesoont, by of 80,000 volumes, beside a vast collection of bridges of boats, the description of winch we curious manuscripts andobjects of antiquity. find in Herodotas. The army of conThe most unique monument of Brepcia is the structed 2 bridges across the Dardanelles, the cemetery (Campo Santo), the finest m Italy, first of 860 vessels, anchored head and stern built in 1810, consisting of a eemi-circular area alongside each other, their keels in the direc in front, surrounded by tombs, pf tion of the current, the vessels connepted with cvpressesr Brescia is the seat of tEe provinci^ each other by strong cables, o v e r which planks were laid, fastened by a rail on cither side, and government, of a bishopric, of a tribunal commerce, and of other courts of law. There

' seminary, 2 gymnasium^ a lyceum, a botan

are various charitaBTe institutions, a theological

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covered in ty a bed of eartli,, Tlie 2d bridge had 314 vessels, and was similarly constructed. According to Arrian, Alexander had a regular pontooQ-train of light boats attached to his araiy. The Romans had wicker-work vessels, covered with the skins of animals, destined to support the timber platform of a bridge; these formed a part of the train of their armies until the nd of the empire. They, however, also knew how to construct a more solid kind of military bridge, whenever a rapid river had to be crossed; witness the famous bridges on piles, on which Cajsar passed the Rhine.Dur ing the middle ages wo find no notice of bridge equipages, but during the 80 years war the various armies engaged carried materials witli them to form bridges across the large rivers of Germany. Tho boats used were very heavy, and generally made of oak. The platform of the bridge was laid on trestles standing in the bottoms of these boats. The Dutch first adopt ed a smaller kind of vessel, flat-bottomed, with nearly vertical sides, pointed head and stern, and both ends projecting, in an inclined plane, above the surface of the water. They consisted of a framework of wood, covered with sheets of tin, and were called pontoons. The French, too, according to Folard, claim the invention of jontoons made of copper, and are said to have lad, about 1672, a complete pontoon train. By the beginning of the 18th century all European armies had provided themselves with this kind of vessels, mostly wooden frames, covered in with tin, copper, leather, or tarred canvas. The latter materi^ Avas used by the Russians. The boats were small, and had to be placed close together, with not more than 4 or 5 feet clear space between them, if the bridge was to have any buQyancy; the current of the water was thoi*^by greatly obstructed, the safety of the bridge endangered, and a chance given to the enemy to destroy it by sending floating bodies against it.The pontoons now employed by the continental armies of Europe are of a larger kind, but similar in principle to those 100 years ago. The French have used, since 1829, a flatbottomed vessel with nearly vertical sides, di minishing in breadth toward the stem, and also, but a little less, toward the stern; the 2 ends rise above the gunwales and are curved like those of a canoe. The dimensions are: length, 31 ft.; breadth, at top, 5 ft. 7 in.; at bottom, 4 ft. 4 in. The framework is of oak, covered with fir planking. Every pontoon weighs 1,658 lbs. and has a buoyancy (weight of cargo which would sink the vessel to the top of the /gun wales) of 18,675 lbs. When formed into a bridge, they are placed at intervals of 14 ft. clear space from gunwale to gunwale, and the road of the bridge is 11 ft. wide. For the ad vanced guard of an army a smaller kind of pon toon is used, for bridging over rivers of less importance. The Austridn pontoons are simi lar to the larger French pontoon, but dirided transversely in the middle, for more conve nient carriage, and put together in the water. Two vessels placed close alongside each other, and connected by short timbers, a longitudinal timber supporting the balks of the i)latform, constitute a floating pier of a bridge. These pontoons, invented by Birago, were introduced in 1823. The Russians have & framework of wood for their pontoons, so constructed that the centre pieces, or tliwarts, may be unship ped ; over this frame is stretched sail-clot i, covered with tar or a solution of India rubber. They are in length, 21 ft. 9 in.; breadth, 4 ft. 11 in.; depth, 2 ft. 4 in., and weigh 718 lbs. each. Breadth of road of bridge, 10 ft.; dis tance from pontoon to pontoon, 8 ft. The Rus sians also have pontoons with a similar frame work, covered over with leather. The Prus sians are said to have been the first to divide their pontoons transversely into compartments, so as to prevent one leak from sinking them. Their pontoons are of wood and flat-bottomed. The spaa or clear distance between the pon toons, in their bridges, varies from 8 to 16 ft., according to circumstances. The Dutch, since 1832, and the Piedmontese, have pontoon trains similar to those in the Austrian service. The Belgian pontoon has a pointed head, but is not contracted at the stern. In all continental ar mies small boats to carry out the anchors ac company the pontoon train.The British and the U. S. armies have entirely abandoned the use of boats for the formation of their pontoon trains, and adopted hollow cylinders of light Tnaterial, closed on all sides, to support their bridges. In England the cylindrical pontoons, with conical, hemispherical or paraboloidal ends, as constructed in 1828 by Col. Blanchard w'ere adopted in 1836 to the exclusion of al. other kinds. The larger British pontoon is 24|ft. long and 2 ft. 8 in. in diameter. It is form ed of sheet tin, framed round a series of wheels constructed of tin, having hollow cylinders of tin for their spokes; a larger tin cylinder, I f in. in diameter, forms their common axis, and runs through the entire length of the pontoon. ^Experiments have been made in the United States with. India rubber cylindrical pontoons. In 1836 Capt. (afterward Col.) Lane construct ed bridges over a deep and rapid river in Ala bama with such pontoons, and in 1839 Mr. Armstrong submitted similar floats, 18 ft. long, 18 in. in diameter when inflated, and weighing 39 lbs. each, 3 to form 1 link of the bridge. Pontoons of inflated India rubber were, in 1846, introduced in the U. S. army, and used

140
in tie war agaiiKt ITexxo'oi They ai e very suppbrta necessary, rafts of timber, floats of easily carried, from their lig h tn ^ and the casks, and other buoyant bodies may be used. small space they take up when folded; but, be- If tho river i shallow, and has a hard and tol Bide bemg liable to be damaged and rendered erably level bottom, standing supports are con useless by friction on gravel, &c., they partake structed, consisting either of pile^ which form the common faults of all cylindrical oontoons. . the most duraHe and the safest kind of bridge, These are, that wlien once sunk ia ta water but require a great deal of time and labor, or of to ^ of their depth, their im nier^n becomes trestles, which may be easily and quickly congreater and greater with every ecmal addition Btructe<l. Sometimes wagons loaded with of load, the reverse of what should bej their fascines, &c., and sunk in the deeper places of ends, moreover, easily catch and lodge floating the river, will form convenient supports for the matter ; and finally, 2 of them must be joined platform f a bridge. Inundations, marshes, to a raft by a platform before tbey can be rnov^^ &c., are bridged over by means of gabions. ed in the water, whereas boat pontoons are as For narrow rivers and ravines, where infantry capable of independent motion in tthe water as only have to pass, various kinds of suspension common boats, and may serve for rowing rap bridges are adopted; they are generally sus idly across the river a detachment- 0^ troops. pended by strong cables.The construction of To compare the buoyant power of the i^lindri- a militaryT)rTdgcxmdor lT > o fictnarfiro of tho cal pontoon with tliat of the boat pontoon, the cuemy is now a matter of but rare occnrroncc; following may suffice; The French. pontoon yet the possibility of resistance must always bo supports about 20 ft. of bridge, and has a buoy l)rovideu for. On this account the bridge is ancy (the weight of the superstructure deduct generally constructed in a reentering bend of ed) of more than 150 cwt. A British raft of 2 the river, so that tho artillery placed right and )ontoons, supporting about the same length of left sweeps tho ground on tho opposite bank )ridge, has a buoyancy, superstructure deduct close to where the bridge is to land, and thus ed, of only 77 cwt., ^ of which is a safe load. protects its construction. The concave bank, moreover, is generally higher tlian tho convex A pontoon train contains, beside the pontoons, the oars, boat-hooks, anchors, cables, & c., one, and thus, in most cases, the advantage of command is added to that of a cross fire. In necessary to move them about in the water, and to fix them in their position, and tho fantry aro rowed across in boats or pontoon.% md established immediately in front of the balks and planks (chesses) to form the plat . form of tho bridge. With boat pontoons, every, bridge. A floating bridge may bo constructed to carry some cavalry and a few light guns pontoon is generally secured in its. piacey and wross. Tho division of tho river into several then the balks and chesses stretched across, branches by islands, or a spot immediately bcwith cylindrical pontoons, 2 are connect^ to a l.w tho junction of some smaller river, also ofraft, which is anchored at tho proper distance lors advantages. In tho latter, and sometimes from the end of the bridge, and connected with ia tho former case, tho several links of the it by balks and chesses. "Where circumstances bridge may be composed in sheltered water, admit of it, whole links, consisting of 8, 4, or 5 .m d then floated down. Tho attacking party, pontoons bridged over, are constructed in shel having commonly to choose between many fa tered situations above the site fixed on for vorable points on a long line of river, may easi the bridge, and floated down successively into ly mislead his opponent by false attacks, and their positions. In some cases, with very ex then effect the real passage at a distant point; perienced pontoniers, tl)e whole bridge has and the danger of scattering tho defending been constructed on one bank of the river and forces over that long line is so great, that it is swung round by the current when the passage nowadays preferred to keep them concen was attempted. This was done by Napoleon trated at some distance from the river, and when crossing the Danube, the day before tho march them in a body against the real point of battle of Wagram. Tho whole of this campaign ]>.issage as soon as it has once been ascertained, is highly instructive with regard to the passing nnd before the enemy can have brought over all of large rivers in the face of the enemy by his army. It is from these causes that in nono military bridges.Pontoon trains are, how of the wars since tho French revolution has tho ever, not always at hand, and the military en construction of a bridge on any of tho largo gineer must be prepared to bridge over a river, rivers of Europe been seriously contested. ia case of need, withont them. For this pur pose a variety of materials and modes of con struction are employed. The larger kind of boats generally found on navigable rivers are made use of for bridges of boats. If ,no boats are to be found, and the depth or configuration of boWom of the river renders the use of fleating

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cial difilcnlties causcd him to become a printer. In the beginning of the revolution, together with Gauthier and Joargniac de St. Hdard, he published the Jowmal gimral de la BRIDGE-HEAD, or TfeTE-DK-PONT, ia forti cbur et de la vilU. He sQon omrbraced the fication, a permanent or field work, thrown up party of the revolution, enlisted in the national at the farther end of a bridge in order to pro guard, and became an ardent member of .the tect the bridge, and to enable the party holding club of the cordelitra. His grand figure, mar it to mancBuvre on both banka of the river. tial air, and boisterous patriotism,rendered The existence of bridge-beads is indispensable him one of the military leaders of the people to those extensive modern fortresses situated ou in tho demonstration of 1791 in the Champ de largo rivers or at the junction of 2 rivers. In such a case the bridge-head is generally formed Mars, which was crashed by Lafayettes na tional f?uards. Thrown into prison, and tlie by a suburb on tlie opposite side and regularly rumor spreading that tho partisans of the court fortified; thus, Castel is the bridge-head of had attempted to get rid of him by odious Mentz, Ehrenbreitstein that of Coblentz, and means, Danton was instrumental in procuring Deutz that of Cologne. No sooner had the liis release. To the of the latter, French got possession, during the revolutionary among whose partisans protection no became prominent, ho war, of Kehl', than they turned it into a bridge owed a military appointment during tho famous head for Strasbourg. In England, Gosport may days of Sept lYW, nd his siddeia promotion, be considered the bridge-head of Portsmouth, in Ooti 12, 1793, to the rank of colonel and although there i&no bridge, and though it has a ^ a ta n t'm i^ . He served nttder Dtimoarlez other and very important functions to fulfil. in Belrium ; was sent against the federalists of As in this latter case, a fortification on the fur OaltadoBi aSvimdng under Gen. Puisaye upon ther side of a river or arm of the sea is often Paris, 'Whom he eadly defeated. He was neort called a bridge-head, though there be no bridge; made a general of brigade, and participated since the fortification, imparting the power of in the battle of Hondsohoote. The committee landing troops under its protection and prepar of public saflSty intrusted him with the mission ing for offensive operations, fulfils the same of putthig down the insurrectionary movements functions, and comes, strategetically speaking, in tiie Gironde, which he did wim the utmost under the same denomination. In speaking of rigor. After Dantons imprisonment^ he was the position of an army behind a large river'all expected to rush to the rescue of his friend Md the posts it holds on its opposite bank are called protector, but keeping prodently aloof daring its bridge-heads, whether they be fortresses, in the first momente of danger, he contrived to trenched villages, or regular field-works, inas shift through the reign of terror. After the 9th much as every one of them admits of the army ^erm idor he again joined the now victories debouching in safety on the other side. Thus, Dantonists, Mid followed Fr6ron to Marseilles when Napoleons retreat from Russia, in 1813, and ATignofr. Oft the 18th Vend6miaire ^Oct. ceased behind the Elbe, Hamburg, Madeburi 6, 1796> he acted as one of Bonapartes under Wittenberg, and Torgau were his bridge-he generals iigsinst the revolted sections of Paris. on the right bank of that river. In field fortifi After having f is te d the directory in putting cation, bridge-hea^ are mostly very similo down the oon^iracy of the camp at Grenoble Vv'oi'ks, consisting of a "bonnet d,pritre^ or some (Sept. 9, 1796), he entered the Italian army in times a horn-work or crown-work, open toward the division of Massena, and distinguished him the river, and with a redoubt close in front of tho self duri&g the whole campaign by great intre bridge. Sometimes a hamlet, a group of farm pidity; Wishing to propitiate the chieft of the houses, or other buildings close to a bridge, may be formed into a sufiicient bridge-head by being cordiliera, ^naparte attributed part of his suc cess at Rivoli to the exertions of Brune, ap properly adapted for defence ; for, with the pointed him general of division on the battle present light-infantry tactics, such objects, when at all capable of defence, may be made to offer field, and induced the directory to instal him as a resistance as great, or greater, than any field commander of the second diviMon of the Italian works thrown up according to the rules of the art. of first lulling the Swiss into security, then dividing their councils, and finally, when an army had b ^ n concentrated for that ^urpow^ falling upon the canton of Bern, and seizing its public treasury; on which occs^on Brune for got to draw up an inventory of the plunder. Again, by dint of manoeuvres, hearing a diplo matic rather than a military character, he

iru n BRUNE, G m LLA .T7M B Mabib Annk, amar$hfll of the Frcnch empire, born at Brives-la-Ga>llardo, March 13, 1768, died in Avignon, Aug. 2 1816. His father sent him to Paris to study tAo law, but ott leaving the university, finan

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dhuies Emmanuel, ^ king of Sardinia, end the apparent ally of France, to ddJVer into Khihands the oita^l of Turin (Joljr 8,1788). Batavian campaign, vhich la st^ about 2 mon(^, fi>rms the great event of BlraJi^a miiitarv liifoi la thto campaign he defeated the oolUbtoed Eiiglish andBasdan for<s, nnder the cnnrtBMi of Sie duke of York, who ea^talated to iikaij Fwroislflg to rest<A all tli Frenoft miaMittNi ti^eft b f the English fh>m the comitte86Bmet of the uiti*Jacobinio wflr. ' After llie of the 16th Brnmaire, Bonaparte sfipolBtedJ^rtUie a member of tlw newljr oreat-' ^ of state, and then dei^toM d him flgaiUBt royf^isto of Brittany. SMit ia 1800 to tiie army of It^y, Brtme'ooettpied 8 hodale oiiiipi^ inteencdjed oA the Volt^ drove the; eeony beyond this xivfflr, and took tneaanres for oKMBi^ it instantJj. Ajtseording to his orders, the array was to efBsct its pMsage at ft points, the r i ^ wiog tmder Gen. Dnpbnt between a ni& Hnated on tiie Yolta and tiie Tilkge f Bonolo, ^ left mider Bnme himdtelf at Monbajton. ^ e second part <rf the opewrttena meeUiffi wlth diffieoltieB, Bnme gv0 <dwa to delay its exieotitioa for 21 hoars, atahoo^ (tie .rigbtwiift wMdh had oomtaeiieed o M b f on the iKrfafe was already *peea with fer sapevlop It was oidy due to Oen.f exer^ons that & < wing was ot destroyed or oaptnred, and- tlM the BQoeess of the whole oaropidgn impevSled. This blunder led to his reoaB to W rom 1802 to 1804 lie ut a soiry figure as ambaaaador at OoitoBiin(mle, where ^ diplotttatto t i ^ t s wre not, as^ in Switzerland and Fiednuxit, l^ k e d by bayonets. On his retoPtt to Ptaria^ in Dec. 10^ Kapoleott created himi iaarslMd in prefiSMaee to generals like Leoorafba; Hviag ^ a wbUe commanded the at Boologoe, he waM^n 18T, sent to Bambtnrg at governor of the temseatio towns, and aa commat^w of the TMi^eof the gvand army. Isthlte<|dality he vlgcffox^y seconded Bottt^enne i& hUi peealaUoDs. In order to settle scaneoontested^potots of a trace c<molnded with Sweden at ftmlaohtow, he had a l o n g personalintervlew with King GustaYTis, who, in ^ p ro p o s e d tohim tobetefy his maater. l^ e manner in which he declinM thiiolfer raised the s<i8picionf K^ioleon, who beeame higblv incensed wheaa Brune, drawing TO & oonventfoa relating to the swrendw of the of Bgett to the French, mentioned simpiy tiie French and the Swedish annies as paortiea tO' ^ e agreement, without any allosion to his imperial and royal mi^eirty. ifonne was instantly recailed by a totter Barthier, in Which the latter, on l3ie exprtss rder of 'mmdiwm. stated that sneh a scandal had never hoVBcmi since the 4 ^ of On Ms rrtnrn to FSfance, ha.ftldlilb^f^^ life. In 1814; be gave his adhesion to t3 acts of the sM Siatilt received the cross of St. Louis from Lonia XVIII. During the Htmdred Davs he b e ^ e Mdn a BcmapartiEft, and received the command o f a eoifw of observati(on the Var, where he to la y e d agbiartj the royaliats the bratalv^or^ei* his Jacobin epoch. After the battle of W-atertop ^e paodaimed the itfng. S tr in g from Touiou for Paris, he Mtivedat Avi^on, on Aug. 2, at a moment when t o t town had for 15 da]^ been doomed to carnage and incendiary lu^s by the rcqraHst mob. B ^ g ree<^[Bdi4 by -thein, he was ahoi^ tto moo seizhig Ma wrpse, dragging it th ro n ^ the streeta, aihd throwing it into the 'Bhdne. Brune, Maasma, Augereau, and many other^ said Hapolecwi at St. Hdena, w ^ mtwW depredt(n>&*' In regaid to his sailUary tdents he remarks ;f^Brane waa not withotti a certain merit, i>n%>oit tie whote, he waa a dt iwiher tbim : ierriMli W n ^ ^^A h m hiaa ia Ua jaiv ; > --r.J

I k y N i o ^ ______ BUDA, or Ofen,

a city on the west bank of the Danube, formerly the capital of Hungary, and now that of the circle of Pesth; pop. of the town and its 7 suburbs, including that of Alt Ofen, which was annexed in 1850, 46,668, ex clusive of the Mrrison and the students. It is distant from Vienna, in a straight line, 135 miles S. E., and from Belgrade 200 miles N. W. It was formerly connected with the city of Pesth, which lies on the opposite side of the river, by a bridge of boato, and since 1849 by a suspension bridge 1,250 feot long; a tuimel to connect tljc bridge with the fortress has been in oourae of con struction since 1863. Budais about 9 miles in circuiit, and built around the Schlossberg, an isolated and shelving rock. Its central and highest part, called the fortress, is the most regular portion of the town, and contains many fine buildings and squares. This fortress is surrounded by walls, from which the several suburbs extend toward the river. The principal edifices of the city < n * o the royal palace, a quadrangular structure 664 feet in length, and containing 208 apartments; the church of the ascension of the virgin, and the garrison church, both Gothic structures; the arsenal, the state palace, and the town hall. Buda contains 12 Human Catholic churches, a Greek church, and a synagogue, several monas teries and convents, a theatre, and many im portant military, educational, and benevolent nstitutions. There are several publishing

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houses and 3 journals established here. Tho observatory, witli the printing establishment of tho university of Pesth, is built upon an emi nence to tho south of the town, 616 feet above the level of the Mediterranean, and no expenso has been spared to furnish it with the best in struments. There are in various parts of tho suburbs sulphurous hot springs, and relics re main .of baths constructed here by the Romans and Turks, the former tenants of the place. The principal trade of the town is in the wines (chiefly red wines, resembling those of Bur gundy) which are produced from tho vineyards upon the neighboring heights, to the amount, it is computed, of 4,600,000 gallons annually. There are also cannon foiinderies, and a few manufactures of silk, velvet, cottons, woollens, and leather. Tho boats of tho Danube steam boat navigation company are built here, giving employment to about 600 persons. Buda is tho usual residence of tho governor of Hungary, and of the public authorities.It has oeen thought that this city occupies the site of the old Aquincum mentioned in the Itinerary of Antoninus. During the Hungpian monarchy, Buda was the residence of its kings, by whom it was enlarged and adorned, especially by Matthi as the Great. It was taken by the Turks under Solyman the Magnificent in 1526, but was re covered the next year. It fell again into tho . hands of the Turks in 1529, and remained in their possession till 1686, when it wj finally re covered by Charles of Lorraine, and in 1784 was again made the seat of government. Buda has been beleaguered not less than 20 times in tho course of her history. The last siege took place in May, 1849, when the Hungarian army under Gdrgey had driven back tlie Austrian troops to the western frontier of the kingdom. Two plans were discussed as to f u r th e r operations: first, to follow up the advantages gained, by a vigor ous pursuit of the enemy on his own ground, to disperse his forces before tho Russians, then marching on Hungary, could arrive, and to attempt to revolutionize Vienna; or, to remain on the defensive in front of Comorn, and to detach a strong corps for the siege of Buda, where the Austriana on their retreat had left a garrison. Gorgey maintains that this lat ter plan was insisted on by Kossuth and Klapka; Klapka professes to knovir nothing of Kossuth having sent such an order, and denies that he himself ever advised this step. From a comparison of Gorgeys and Klapkas writings A ve must, however, confess that there still re mains considerable doubt as to who is to bo blamed for the march on Buda, and that the evideoce adduced by Klapka is by no means conclusive. GOrgey also says that his resolu tion was further determined by the total want of field-gun ammunition and other tore3,_and by his own conviction that the army would re fuse to pass the frontier. At all events, all offensive movements were arrested, and Gorgey xnarched wit^ $0,000 men to Buda. By this move the last chance of saving Hungary was thrown a.wayv The Austrians were allowed to recover from their defeats, to reorganize their forces, and 6 weeks afterward, when the Rus sians appeared on the borders of Hungary, th e y again advanced, 127,000 strong, while 2 I'eserve corps were still forming. Thus, the siege of Buda fonns the turning point of the Hungarian war of 184&-49, and if there 6ver really were tareasonable relations between GOrgey and the*Austrians, they must have taken place about this time.^The fortress of Buda was .but a f^int remnant of that ancient strong hold of the Turks, in which they so often had repulsed all ^itacks of the Hungarian and im perial armies. The ditches and glacis were levelled; there remained but the main ranaparts, a wgrk of considerable height, faced with masonry. It formed in its general putline an oblong square, the sides of which were more or less irregularly broken so as to admit of a pretty effici^t flanking fire. An intrenphment of recent construction led down from the east ern front to the Danube, and protected the waterworks, supplymg the fortress with water. The garrison < 3 0 n8isted of 4 battalions, about a company of i^appers, and the neoess^ allot ment. of gutmers, under M^jor-Gen. Hentzi, a brave and resolute, officer. . Seventy-five guns w ere mounted on the rauaparts. On May 4, after having (Bfifected the investment of the place, a i after a short cannonade frona heavy field-guns, 0 drgey summoned the garrison to surrender. This being refused, hei ordered Kmety to assail the waterworks; under the pro* tection of the fir of all disposable guns, his col umn advanced, but the artillery of the intrenchinent, enfilading its line of march, soon drove it back. It was thus proved that an attack by inain force would never carry tl^ place, and that an artillery attack was indispensable in order first to form a practicable breach. But there were no guns at hand heavier than 12 poundeiis, even for these the ammunition was deficient. , A ft^ some time, however, 4 24-pounders and 1 18-pounder, and subsequently 6 mortars, arrived from Comom. A breaching battery was constructed ona height 500 yards from the K. W. angle of the rampart, and began its fire. May 15.; Previous to that daj*^ Ilentzi had bombarded the town of Pesth without any provocation, or without the chance of de riving any advantage from this proceeding. On the 16th the breach was opened, though scarcely practicable; however, Gdrgey ordered the assault for the following night, one column

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to assault the breach^ 2 others to escalade the walls, and a 4rth, under Kmety, to tek the ^ateiworks., The assault was everywhere anBuocessfal. The artillery attack was resumed. While the breaching battery cottt{>letied its work, the palis^ings around the waterworks were shattered by 12-pouuders, and Ae in terior of the place was bombarded. False at tacks were mad^ every night to alarm the garrison. Late on the evening of ^he pOth another ftsfa^lt was prepared. The 4 columns and the^ objects of attack remained the saJhe, and before daybreak on;Uie 21st they advanced on the foitre^ After a desperate struggle, during which Slentzi hiinself led the defence of the breacdi and fell mortally wounded, the breach waa carried by the 47th Honved bat talion, followed by the 84th, while Kmety storm^ the waterworks, and the troops-of the 8d army corps under Znezich escaped Ae walls near the Vienna gate. - A severe fight in the interior of the fortress ensued, bot soon the garrison'surrendered. Of 8,800 ^neo about no honor from the ijaiaiinef' in~ which he dischai^e^ Ms mission, and became afterward known by the name of the ex-gaoler of Blaye. During the debates of the chamber of deputies on Jan, 10j 1884, M. Larabit complaining, of Soult^s mlhtoy dictatorship, and Bugeaud in terrupting him with the words, Obedience is the soldiers first duty, anqther deputy, M. Dulong, puiigntly aake^ What, if ordered to become a gamer r This incident led to a duel between Biigeand and D along, in which t^e latter was sho^ The consequent exasperation of the Pa^isijins was still hei^tened by his co operation in'imppressing the Paris insurrection of April i8 ^ d 14, 1834. The forces destined to suppress that insurrection were divided into 8 brig44s one of which Bugeaud commanded. In the* rtfe Tramnonain a handful of enthusi asts who stiU held a barricade on the morning of the l4tb, iW^en the serious pa]rt of the affair was over, we^e cruelly slaughtered by an over whelming force. Although this spot lay, wi&out the circninscription made over to Bugeauds b r i^ e , and he, therefore, had not participated in the inasa^e, the hatred x)f the people nailed his nam^ tq t^e deed, and despite all declara tions to the oontrary, ^rsisted in stigmatizing him as thef inan or the rue TranmoTuiiny Sent, Jfune.ll?, 1886, to Algeria, Gen. Bugeaud became invests with a commanding position in the proyinoftof Oran, almost independent of the governorgeneral. Ordered to fight Abd el Kader, and to subdue him by the display of an imposing army, he concluded the treaty of tlie Tafna, allowing the opportunity for miMtary operations to slip away, and placing his army in a oritical state before it had begun to act. Bugeaud fought several battles previous to this treaty. A secret article,- not reduced to writing, stipulate that 80,000 boojoos (about $12,000) should be paid to Gea Bugeaud. Called back to France, he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant-general and appointed grand ofiicer of the legion of honor, when the secret clause of the treaty of the Tafna oozed out, Louis Phil ippe authori;^d Bugeaud to expend the money on certain public roads, thus to increase his popu larity {unong his electors and secure his seat in the o h ^ b er of deputies. At titie commence ment of 1841 he was named governor-general of Algeria, and with his administration te pol icy of Stance in Algeria underwent a complete change. He waa the first gbvemor-general who ha4 an army adequate to its task placed under his command, who exerted an abaolute authority over the generis second in command, and who ke^t his post long enough to act up to a plan needing years for its execution. The bat tle of Isly (Aug. 14, 1844), in which he van quished the of the emperor of Morocco with vastiy Ififerior forces, ^wed its success to

B useow d BUGEAUD DE LA PICONNERrE, Thomas Robbet, duo dIsly, marshal of France, bom at Limoges, in Oct. 1784, died in Paris, June 10, 1849. He entered the French army as a pri vate soldier in 1804, became a corporal doring the cajnpaign of 1805, served as Bub-liOTtesant in the campaign of Prussia and P o la ^ -(1806 - 7), was present in 1811, as sie^s of LeridE, Tortosa, and Tarra^na, and was promoted to the rank of li^tenant-colonel after the battle of Ordal, in Catalonia. After the first return of the Bourbons Col. Bageand cele brated tJie white lily in some doggerel thymes; but these poetical effusions being passed by ra ther contemptuously, he again embraced, during the Hundred Days, the party of Ifapoleon, who sent him to the army or the Alps, at the head of the lith regiment of the line. On the 2d return of the Bourbons he retired to Excidenil, to the estate of his father. At the time of the invasion of Spain by the duke of Angottlime he offered his sword to the Bourbons, but the offer being declined, he turned liberal, and jdnednhe movement which finally led to the re'V'olution of 1830, He was chosen as a membep of the chamber of deputies in 1881, and made a m^orgeneral by Louis Philippe. Appointed govern or of the citadel of Blaye in 1883, he Md dadb^ess of Berry nh <dki^e, lii^ .^ n e d

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his taking tlie Mnsgalmans by swpriM, without any previoas declaration of war, and when negomatioQS were on the eve of being ooncluded. Already raised to the dignity tf, a marshal of France, July 17, 1843. Bugeaud was now created duke oi Isly. Aod el J^iader having, t^ter his return to France, t ^ n collected an army, he was sent back to Algeria,.where he promptly crushed the Arabian revolt. In con sequence of difference between him, and Guizot, occasioned by his ezpeditioi^intQ Kabylia, which he had undertaken against m inist^al orders, he was replaced by the duke of Amnale, and, according \o Guizots expression, enabled to come and enjoy his glory in France. During the night of Feb. 22-23, 1848, he was, on the secret advice ,of Guizot, ordered into the resence of Louis Philippe, who. conferred upon im the supreme command of the whole armed force^the line as well as,the national guard. At noon of the 23d, followed by Gens. Eulhi^res, Bedeau, Lamorici^re, De Sialles, St. Amaud, and others^ he proceeded to the general stalbat the Tuileries, there to be solemnly iavested with the supreme command by the duke of Nemours. He reminded the officers present that he who was about to lead tiiem against the Paris revo lutionists had never been beaten, neither on the battle-field nor in insurrections, and for f.Tiia time again promised to make short ^ork of the rebel rabble. Meantime, the news of his nomination contributed much to give matters a decisive turn. The national guwd, still more incensed by his appointment as supreme com mander, broke out in the cry of Down with BugeaudI Down with the man of the rue Trcmmonain / and positively declared that they would not obey his orders. Frightened by this demonstration, Louis Philippe withdrew his orders, and spent the28d in vain negotia tions. On Feb. 24, alone Louis Philippes council, Bugeaud still urged war to the knife; but the king already considered the sacrifice of the marshal as a means to make his own peace with the national guard. The command was consequently placed in other hands, and Bu geaud dismissed. Two days later he placed, but in vain, his sword at tiie command of the rovisional government. When Loois Niqjoleon ec^me president he conferred the o<Mamand-inchief of the army of the Alps upon Bugeaud, who was also elected by the department of Oharente-Inferieure as represeiitative in the national assembly. He published several lite rary productions, which treat chiefly pf Algeria. In Aug. 1862, a monument was erected to him in Alters, and also one in hia native town.

iurnM ili

BURMAH, or t h e K i n g d o m of Ava, a n extensive state in the S. E. of Asia, beyond the Gauges, formerly much larger than at jresent. Its former limits were between at. 9 and 27 N., ranging upward of 1,000 miles in length, and over 600 in breadth. At present the Burmese territory reaches from lat. 19 25' to 28 15' N., and from long. 93 2' to 100 40' E .; comprising a space measuring 540 miles in len^h from N. to S., and 420 miles in breadth, and having an area of about 200,000 sq. m. It is bounded on the "W . by the proviace of Aracan, surrendered to the British by the Burmese treaty of 1826, and by the petty states of Tiperah, Muunipoor, and Assam, from which countries it is sepai*ated by high moun tain ridges; on the S. lies the newly acquired British province of Pegu, on the N. upper Assam and Thibet, and on the E. China. 'The popula tion, according to Oapt.Henry Yule, does not ex ceed 8,000,000.Since the cession of Pegu to the British, Burmah has neither alluvial plains nor a seaboard, its southern frontier being at least 200 miles from the mouths of the Irrawaddy, and the country rising gradually from this frontier to the north. For about 300 miles it is elevated, and beyond that it is rugged and mountainous. This territory is watered by three great streams, the Irrawaddy, its tributary the Khyen-dwem, and the Salwin. These rivers have their sources in the northern chain of mountains, and run in a southerly course to the Indian ocean. Though Burmah has been robbed of its most fertile territory, that which remains is far from unproductive. The forests abound in valuable timber, among which teak, used for ship build ing, holds a prominent place. Almost every description of timber known in India is found also in Burmah. Stick lac of excellent quali ty, and varnish used in the manufacture of lacquered ware, are produced. Ava, the capi tal, is supplied with superior teak from a forest at 15 days distance. Agriculture and horticul ture are everywhere in a remarkably backwaid state; and were it not for the wealth of the soil and the congeniality of the climate, the state would be very poor. Fruits are not cul tivated at all, and the crops are managed with little skill. Of garden vegetables, the onion and the capsicum are the most generally cultivated. Yams and sweet potatoes are also found, togeth er with inconsiderable quantities of melons, cucumbers, and e^-plants. The young shoots of bamboo, wild asparagus, and the succulent roots of various aquatic plants, supply to the inhabitants the place of cultivated garden iruits. Mangoes, pineapples, oranges, custard-apples, the jack (a species of breadfruit), the papaw, fig, and the plantain (that greatest enemy of

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clvilEzation), are'tHe chief fruits, and alT these grow with little or no care. The chief crops ore rice (which is ia some parts used as a circolating medium), maize, millet, wheat, various pulses, palms, sugar-cane, tobacco, cotton of short staple, and indigo. Sugar-cane is not generally cultivated, and the art of making sugar is scarcely known, although the plant has been long known to the people. A cheo^, coarse sugar is obtained from the juice of the Palmyra palm, of which numerous groves are found, especiaUy south of the capital. Indigo is so badly managed as to be entirely unfit for exportation. Bice in the south, and maize and millet in the north, are the standard crops. Sesamum is univers^dly raised for cattle. On the northern hills the genuine tea-plant of Ohina is cultivated to considerable extent; but, singu larly, the zxatives, instead of steeping it, as they do the Chinese tea, eat the leaf prepared with oil and rarlic. Cotton is raised chiefly in the dry lan^ of the upper provinces.The dense forests of Burmah abound in wild animals, among which the chief are the elephant, tlie one-homed rhinoceros, the tiger and leopard, the wild hog, and several species of deer. Of birds, the wild cock is common; and there are also varieties of pheasants, partridges, and qu^s. The domestic animals are the ox, tiie horse, and the buffalo. The elephant also is used as a draught animal. The camel is not known. A few goats and sheep are found, but the breed is little oared for. Asses are also lit tle used. Dogs are neglected in the Burmese economy, but oats are numerous. Hoi;ihbs used exclusively for riding, and are rarely more than thirteen hands high. Tlie ox is the beast of drau^t and burden in the north; the buf falo in the south.Of minerals, gpld^ carried down in the sands of the mountains, is found in the beds of the various streams. Silver mines are wrought at Bor-twang, on the- Chi nese firontier. The amount of gold and silver ob tained annually has been estimated to iapproach $1,000,000. Iron is abundant in the eastern portion of Laos, but is so rudely wrought that from 80 to 40 per cent, of the metal is lost in the process of forging. The ^troleum pits on the banks ofthe Irrawwdy produce 8,000,000 pounds per annum. Copper, tin, lead, and antimony are known to exist in the Laos country, but it is doubtf\il if any of these metals are obtained in con^derable quantities, o^ing to the i t e rance of the people of the methods of working ores. The mountains near the city of Ava fur nish a superior quality of limestone; fine statuary marble is found 40 miles from the capital, on the banks of the Irrawaddy; amber exists so plentifully that it sells in Ava at the low price of $1 per pound; and nitre, natron, salt, and coid are extensively diffused over the entire country, though the latter is little tised. The petroleum, w H ^ i|produced in such abundance, 3 used by idl classes in Burmah for burning in amps, and as a protection against insects. It is dipped up in buckets from narrow wells sunk to a depth of from 210 to 300 feet; it bubbles up at the bottomlike aiiving spring of water. Turpen tine is found in various portions of the country, and is extensively exported to China. The oriented sapphire, ruby, topaz, and amethyst, beside varieties of the chrysoberyl and spinelle, are found in 2 districts in the beds of rivulets. All, over $60 in value, are claimed by the crown, and sent to the treasury; and no strangers are allowed to search for the stones.^From what has been said, it is evident that the Burmese have made but little advance in the practice of the useful arts. Women carry on the whole )rooess of the cotton manufacture nsin^ a rude oom, and dirolaying comparatively little in genuity or skUl. Porcelain is imported from China; British cottons are impoi^d, and even in the interior undersell the native products; though the Burmese melt iron, steel is brought from Bengal; silks are manufactured at several places, but from raw Chinese silk; and while a very great variety of goods is imported, the ex ports are comparatively insignificant, those to China, with which the Burmese carry on their most extensive commerce, consisting of raw cotton, ornamental feather^ chiefly of the blue jay, edible swallows nests, ivory, rhinoceros and deers horns, and some minor species of precious stones. In return for this, the Biffmese import wrought copper, orpiment, quicksilver, vermil ion, iron pans,btass wire, tin, lead, alum, silver, gold and gold lea^ earthenware, paints, carpets, rhubarb, tea, honey, raw silk, velvets, Chinese spirits, mus^ verdigris, dried fruits, paper, fans, umbrellas, shoes, and wearing appareL Gold and silver ornaments of a very rude description are made in various parts of the country; wea pons, scissors, and carpenters tools are manu factured at Ava; idols are sculptured in consid erable quantities about 40 miles from Ava, where is found a hill of pure white marble. The cur rency is in a wretohed condition. L e ^ silver, and gold, all uncoined, form the circulating medium. A large portion of the commerce is carried on by way of barter, in consequence of the diflSculties attending the making of small paymei^ts. The precious metals must be weighed and assayed at every change of hands, for which bankers charge about s|- per cent. Interest ranges from 26 to 60 per cent, per annum. Petroleum is the most universal article of con sumption. For it are exchanged saltpetre, lime, paper, lacquer wai, cotton and silk fabrics, iron and brass ware, sugar, tamarinds, &c. The yonnet-ni (the standard silver of the coun try) has generally an alloy of copper of 10 or 15 per cent. Below the mixture does not pass current, that degree of fineness being required

147
in te moiiiBy pmd for laxes.TEe revenues of of his musket, his kettle at the other, and his (rice) in a cloth about his waist. the empire proceed from a house tax, 'which is provisions In physical conformation, the Burmese appear levied on the village, the village authoritiM to be of the same race which inhabits the coun afterward assessing householders acoordinj^to tries between Hindostan and China, having their rei^ctive ahufty to pay. This fex varies more of the Mongolian than of the Hindoo irreatly, as from 6 tikals per householder m type. They are short, stout, proportioned, Prome to 27 tikals in Tongho. Those subject fleshy, but active; with largewell cheek-bones, eyes to military duty, the farmers of the royal do obliquely plao^, brown but never very dark main, and artificers employed on the pubho -works, are exempt. The soil is taxed accord complexion, coarse, lank, black hair, abundant, ing to crops. The tobacco tax is paid in money; and more beard than their neighbors, the Siam other crops pay 6 per cent, in kind. The ese. M^jor Allen, in a memoir to the East India farmers of the royal lands pay over one-hali government, gives them credit for frankness, a their crops. Fishing ports on lake and river strong sense of the ridiculous, considerable are let either for a stated term or for a pVopor- readiness of resource, little patriotism, but much tion of dried fish from the catch. These various love of home and family; comparatively little revenues are collected by and for the use of the prejudice against strangers, and a readiness to the knowledge of new arts, if not at oflScers of the crown, each of whom receives, acquire tended with too much mental exertion. They according to his importance, a district greater are sharp traders, and have a good deal of a or less, from the proceeds of which he lives. certain kind of enterprise; are temperate, but The royal revenue xs raised from the sale of mo have small powers of endurance; have more nopolies of the crown, among which cotton is cunning than courage; though not blood the chief. In the management of this monopoly, thirsty by nature, have borne phlegmatically the inhabitants are forced to deliver certain the cruelties of their various kings; and without articles at certain low prices to the crown being naturally liars and cheats, are yet great officers, who sell them at an enormous advance. braggarts and treacherous.The Burmese are Thus, lead is delivered by the producers at ^ e Buddlnsts by faith, and have kept the ceremo rate of 6 tikals per bis, or 860 lbs., and hia nies of their religion freer from intermixture with majesty sells it at the rate of 20 tikals. The other religions than elsewhere in India and China. royal revenues amount, so it is stated, to The Burmese Buddhists avoid, to some extend about 1,820,000 tika^ or 227,600 per annum, the picture worship practised in China, and to which must.be added a further sum ot their monks are more than usually faithful to 4 4 260, the produce of certain to lls levied m vows of poverty and celibacy. Toward particular districts. These moneys keep the their the close of the last century, the Burman state r o y a l household. This system of taxation, religion was divided by 2 sects, or offshoots though despotic, is singulariy simple in its de from tlie ancient The finst of these en tails: and a further exemplification of simpUcity tertained a belief faitli. similar some respects to in government, is the manner in which the army pantheism, believing that in the godhead is dif is made to maintain itself, or, at least, to be fused over and through all the world and its supported by the people. The modes of en creatures, but that it appears in its highest listment are various; in some districts the stages of development in the Buddhists them volunteer system being adhered to, while in selves. The other rejects entirely the doctrine others, every 16 families are forced to fhrmsh 2 of the metempsychosis, and the picture wor men armed and equipped. They are ship and cloister system of the Buddhists; obliged to furnish to these recruits, monthly, considers death as the portal to an everlasting 66 lbs. of rice and 6 rupees. In the province happiness or misery, according to the conduct of Padoung every soldier is quartered upon 3 of the deceased, and worships one supreme and families, who receive 6 acres of tax-free land, all-creating spirit The prwent king, and hiwe to furnish the man of war with half who is a zealous devotee to his faith, has al the crops, and 25 rupees per annum, beside ready publicly burned 14 of these heretics, both wood and other minor necessities. The captain parties of whom are alike outlawed. They of 60 men receives 10 tikals (the tikal is worth are, nevertheless, according to Capt. Yule, very S li, or 2 i rupees) each from 6 families, and numerous, but worship in secret.1 he early half the crop of a 7th. The bo, or centurion, history of Burmah is but little known. The is maintained by the labor of 62 famines, and empire attained its acme of power in the 11th the bo-gyi, or colonel, raises his salary from his century, when the capital was in Pegu. About own officers and men. The Burman solmer the beginning of the 16th century the state was fights well under favoring circumstances, but split into several minor and independent gov-r the chief excellence of a Barman army corps ernments, which made war. upon each other; lies in the absence of the impedimenta; the and in 1564, when t h e king Tshen-byoo Myayen soldier carries his bed (a hammock) at one end

148
took Ava, he had subdued to hiniself all the vallej of the Irrawaddy, and had even subject ed Siam. After various changes, Alompra, the founder of the present dynasty (who died in 1760), once more raised the empire to some thing like its former extent and power. Since then the British have taken from it its most fertile and valuable provinces.The govern ment of Burmah is a pure despotism, the king, one of whose titles is lord of life and death, dis pensing imprisonment, fines, torture, or death, at his supreme will. The details of the gov ernment are carried out by the hlwot-dau, or council of state, whose presiding ofBoer is the pre-nominated heir-apparei^ to the throne, or if there is no heir named, then a prince, of the blood royal. In ordinary times tne council is composed of 4 ministers, who have, however, no distinct departments, but act wherever chance directs. They form also a high court of appeal, before whom suits are brought for final adjudication; and in their individu^ capa city, they have power to give judgment on cases which are not brought up to the collective coun cil. As they retain 10 per cent, of the property in suit for tne costs of the judgment, they de rive very handsome incomes from this source. From this and other peculiarities of the Bur mese government, it is easily seen that justice is rardy dealt out to the people. Every office holder is at the same time a plunderer; the judges are venal, the police powerless, robbers and thieves abound, life ana property are in secure, and every inducement to progress is wanting. Near the capital tlic power of the king is fearful and oppressive. It decreases witA distance, so that in the more distant provinces the people pay but little heed to the behests of the lord of the white ele phant, elect their own governors, who are ratified by the king, and pay but slight trib ute to the govei'nment. Indeed, the provr inces bordering on China display the curious spectacle of a people living contentedly un der two governments, the Chinese and Bur mese taking a like part in the ratification of ^ e rulers of these localities, but, wisely, generally settling on the sam^ men. Not withstanding various British embassies have visited Burmah, and although missionary ope rations have been carried on there more successfully than elsewhere in Asia, the in terior of Burmah is yet a complete Urra incognita^ on which modern geographers and map-makers have ventured some wild guesses, but concerning which they know very little in detail.(See Narrative of tlie Mission sent by the Governor-General of India, to the Court of Ava, 1855, by Capt. Henry Yule. Lon don, 1858.) Cmmp CAMFj d place of repose for troops, whether for one night or a longer time, and whetlier in tents, in bivouac, or with any such shelter as may bo hastily constructed. Troops are cantoned when distributed among villages, or when placed in huts at the end of a campaign. Barracks are permanent military quarters. Tents were deemed unwholesome by Napoleon,' who preferred that the soldier diould bivouac, sleeping with his feet toward the fire, and pro tected from the wind by slight sheds and bowers. Hqjor Sibley, of the American army, has invented a tent which will accommodate 20 cavalry soldiers, with their acoontremenla all sleeping with their feet toward a fire in its centre. Bivonac tents have been introdoced into the Freoehtservice since isa7. They con sist of atissue of cotton cloth impregiarted with caoutdiouo, an4 thus made water-proof* Every man- carries a portion of this cloth, and the difierent pieees are rapidly attached together by meims of cdiasps. In the selection of a camp^ good water within a convenient distance is es sential, as is the proximity of woods for fire wood and m ^ns of shelter. Good roads, canfds, or navigable streams are important to furnish the troops with the necessaries of life, if they are encamped for a long period. The vicinity of swamps or stagnant water is to be avoided. Theground to be suitable for defence must admit of nmnceuvres of troops. As far as possible tho cavalry and infantry should be es tablished on a nngle line, the former npon the wings, the latter in the centre. The shelters or huts are arranged, as nearly as the nature of the ground admits, in streets perpendicular to the front, and extending from one end of the camp to the other. In arranging a camp, howeverj no universal rule can be laid down, but the com mander must decide according to circumstances whether to form his army in 1 or 2 lines, and upon the rola^ve positions of infantry, cavalry, and artillery. The guards of camps are: 1, the camp-gu^rd, whioh serves to keep good order and discipline, prevent desertions, and give the alarm; 2, detiuhraents of infantry and cavalry, denominated pickets, stationed in front and on the flanks, which intercept reconnoitring pai*ties of the enemy, and give timely notice of a hostile approach; and 8, grand guards, or outposts, which are large detachments posted in surrounding vill^es, farm-houses, or small field works, from which they can watch the move ments of the enemy. They should not be so far from the camp as to be beyond snccor in case of attack. Immediately after arriving on the ground, the number of men to be furnished for guards and pickets are detailed; the posts to be occupied by them are designated; the places

149
~!br distribution of provisions mentioned; and, in general, all arrangements made concerning the interior and exterior police and service of the camp.One of the moat ancient camps mentioned in history is that of the Israelites at tlieir exodus from Egypt. It formed a la i^ square, divided for the different tribes, had la the middle the camp of the Levites with the tabernacle, and a principal gate or entrance, which, with an adjacent open space, was at the same time a forum and market-place. But the form, the dimensions, and the intrenchments of the regul&r military camps of the Hebrews, or their enemies, can scarcely bo traced.The camp of the Greeks before Troy was close upon the sea-shore, to shelter their ships drawn upon the land, divided into separate quarters for the different tribes, and fortified with ramparts fronting the city and the sea, and externally with a high rnonnt of earth, sfa'eng^fiened with w ood^ towers against toe sallies of the besieged. The bravest of their chiefe, as Achilles and ed at the extremities. The camp of the Laoe^twnwniftna was cir/sular, and not without the regular preoaations of sentries and videttes. The Roman camp varied according to the season of the year, the length of time it was to be occupiedi &e number of legions, as well as the natare of the ground, and other circumstances. A historian of the time of the empire mentions camps of every shape, circular, oblong, &c.; but the regnliff form of the Roman camp was quad rangular. Its place was determined by augurs and according ^ Uxe 4 quarters, with the front to the rising sun; it was measured with a gnomon; a square of 700 feet was regarded as sufficient for 20,000 men. It was divided into aa upper and lower part, separated by a large open space^ and by 2 chief lines {decumoma and ea/rdo\ run ning from E. to W., and from N. to S., and by several streets. It had 4 gates, the principal of which were the decuman and the prsetorian, which no soldier could pass without leave, under pain of death, and was surrounded with a rampart, separated by a space of 200 feet from the inner camp, a ditch, and a mound of earth. All these intrenchments were made by the soldiers themselves, who handled the pickaxe and the spade as dexterously as the sword or the lance; they levelled the pound, and fixed the palisades, which they carried along, around the Intrenchments into a kind of hedge of irreg ular points. In the middle of the upper di vision was the pavilion of the general (proetorium\ forming a square of 200 feet; around it the auguraculvmy the quceatorium, or quarters of the treasurers of the army, the forum^ serv ing as a market and meeting place, and the tents of the legat% those of the tribunes op posite their respective legions, and of the com manders of foreign auxiliary troops. In the lower division were the tents of the inferior officers and the legions, the Roman horse, the trUirii, the the hoitati, dso.; and on the flanks the companies of foreign horse and foot, carefully kept apart. The tents were covered with skins, each containing 10 soldiers, and their decanus; the centurions and standardbearers at the head of their companies. In the space between the 2 divisions, which was called frineipia, were the platform of the general, for the exercise of justice as well as for harangues, the altar, the sacred images, and the not less sacred military ensigns. In exceptional cases the camp was surrounded with a wall of stones, and sometimes even the quarters of the soldiers were of the same material. The whole camp offered the aspect of a city; it was the only fortress the Romans constructed. Among the most permanent memorials of the Roman occu pation of Britain is the retention of the Latin eatlira (camp), as, in whole or part, the name of u great number of places first occupied by them as military posts, as Doncaster, Leicester, Worcester, O he^r, Winchester, < & c.Th^ camps of the barbarous nations of antiquity were often surrounded with a fortification of wagons and carts, as for instance, that of the Cimbri, in their last battle against the Romans (101 B. 0.), which camp was so fiercely defended, after their defeat, by their wives.An Iittbenohkd C a m p is a camp surrounded by defensive works, which serves also as a fortification, and is intended accordingly for prolonged use.

CcNiipaign
0Ain*AldS7 This term is very often used to denote the military operations which are carried on during a war within a single year; but if these operations take place on 2 or more independent seats of war, it would be scarcely logical to comprise the whole of them under the liead of one campaign. Thus what may be loosely called the campaign of 1800 comprises 2 distinct campaigns, conducted each quite independently of the other; the cam paign of Italy ^arengo), and the campaign of Germany (Hohenlinden). On the other hand, since the almost total disuse of winter quarters, the end of the year does not al ways mark the boundary between the close of one distinct series of warlike operations and the commencement of another. There are nowadays many other military and political considerations far more important in war than the change of the seasons. Thus each of the

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as "regS^^5'quaE$!M campaigns of 1800 consists of 2 ^ tin o t portions: era^itt'^We! a general armistice extending over the time for.Qo: from July to September divides them, and al though the campaign of Germany is broaght to a dose ia Dec. 1800, yet that of Italy oontinues during the first h ^ of Jan. 1801. Olausewitz justly obwrves that the campaign of .1812 does evidently not end "with Dec. 81 of that year, rc rfu lM when the French were stUi on the Niemen, C aOABABIS^ or Caebink, a short barrelled and in full retreat, but with their arrival behind musket adapted to the use of cavalry. In order the Elbe in Feb. 1813, where they again col to admit of its being easily loaded on horseback, lected their forces, the impetus which drove the barrel ought not to be more than 2 feet 6 them homeward having ceased. Still, winter imdies loq^, unless it be bj^eech-loading; and to remtdning always a season during which fatigue be eaaityiJaanaged with one hand only, its weight and exposure will, in our latitudes, red^e ac most be less than that of an iirfantry musket. tive armies at an excessive ral^ a inutfial sus The bore, too, is in most services rather less than pension of (^rations and recruiting of strength that of the itiliftntry fireai-m. The carabine may very often coincide with that time of the year; have either a smooth or a rifled bore; in tho and although a campaign, in the strict sise of first case, its effect will be considerably inferior the word, means a series of warlike operations closely connected together by one strategetical to that of the common musket; in the second, it plan and directed toward one strategetical object, will exceed it in precision for moderate distances. campaigns may still in most caaes very conv^ In the British service, the cavalry carry smoothniently be named by the year ija which their bored carabines; in the Russian cavalry, the light horse all have rifled carabines, while of the deddve actions are fought. cuirassiers i have rifled, and the remaining f smooth barrels to the'ir carabines. The artillery, to^, in some services (French and British e^ecially), c a r r y carabines; those of the British are on the principle of the new Enfield rifle. Oarabine^flringwas at one time the principal mode of cavalty fighting, but now it is principally CJaPTAIH", the rank designating a command used on outpost duty, and with cavalry skirer of a company in infantry, or of- a s^adron mislnng. In F ren ^ military works, the ex or troop in cavalry, or the chief officer of pression MTcAino always means an infantry a ship of war. In most continental armies rifle, while fpr a cavalry carabine the word in Europe captains are considered^ subalterns; mousqueton ia adopted. in the British army they form an inteitaedi&te t&nk b6tiivcii tho fild offioor and iho the latter term comprising those commis^oned officers only whose rank does not imrfy a di rect and constant command. In the U. 8. army the captain is responsible for the arm^ ammu nition, clothing, &c., of tho companjr under his C arcoM a shell filled with inflammable command. The duties of a captain m the navy co OAEOASS, m p o sitio n , the flame of which issues through are very comprehensive, and his post is one of 8 or 4 holes, and is so violent that it can scarce great responsibility. In the British seryice he ly, be extinguished. They are thrown from ranks with a lieut.-colonel in the army, until the mortars, howitzers, and guns, in tlw same way expiration of 3 years from tl\,e date of his com- as common shells, and burn from 8 to 10 min missioiv when he takes rank with a fufl colonel. utes. The composition is either melted over a In the old French service he was forbidden to fire, and poured hot into the shell, or it is leave his ship under pain of death, and was to iato a compact m ^ by the aid of h<jmd blow it up rather than let it fall into the hands worked crease, and then crammed into the shell. Ihe of an enemy. The title of captain is also ap fuse holes are stopped with corks or wooden plied to masters of merchant or passenger ves stoppers, through which a tube, filled with fus^ sels, and to various petty officers on wips of composition, passes into the shdl. Formeily the line, as captain of the forecastle, of the these carcasses were cast with a partititm or hold, of the main and fore tops, &o. The like the present shrapnell shells, word is of Italian origin, meaning a man. diaphragm, the bottom part being destined to receive a who is at the head of something, ^ind in this bursting charge of gunpowder; but this comsense it is often used as sy n o n y rn 6 t with a gen

151
' )lication i s now doae away with. Another iind of carcasses was foinnerly in u s e , construct ed like a l i g l i t b a l l , on two circular iron hoops, crossing each other at right angles, over which canvas was spread, thus forming an im perfectly spheroidal body, which was f i l l e dwith asirailarcomposition, containingmostly gunpow der and pitch. These carcasses, l^owever, have been abandoned, because their great lightness made i t almost impossible to throw them to any distance, or with any precision. The composi tions for f i l l i n g our modern carcasses vary con siderably, but they each and a l l consist chiefly of saltpetre and sulphur, mixed with a resinous or fatty substance. Thus the Prussian service uses 75 parts saltpetre, 25 parts s u l p l u i r , V parts meal^ powder, and 83 parts colophony. The British use saltpetre 100 parts, sulphur 40 parts, rosin 80 parts, antimony 10 parts, tallow 10 parts, turpentine 10 parts. Carcasses aro chiefly used in bombardments, and sometimes against shipping, though iu this latter use they have been almost entirely superseded by redhot shot, which i s easier prepared, of greater precision and of far more incendiary e f f e c t . charge and at low elevations. Thus, i th a s ; been ascertained that the common long guns < ;f the British service have at 2 elevation, a n - the shell guns at 3 , the same range as tho carronades of corresponding calibre at 5 ( v i z . , about 1,200 yards). And, as the chance of hitting decreases as the elevation increases, tho use of carronades beyond 1,200 yards and an elevation of 5 i s completely out of tho ques tion ; whereas, long guns may with consider able effect be used at ranges up to a mile, and even 2,000 yards. Thia was strikiagly exempli fied by the 2 contending squadrons on Lakes Erie and Ontario, during the Anglo-American war of 1812- 14. The American v e s s e l i 4 had long guns, while the British were mainly armed with carronades. The Americans manoeuvred so as to keep just out of range of tho British carronades, while their own long guns told heavily on the hulls and rigging of their op ponents. In consequence of these defe cts, c a rronados have now become almost obtalote. On shore they aro used by tho British, now and then, on the Hanks of bastions and in case mates, where but a short extent of ditch i s to be flanked by grape principally. The I'rench navy possesses a carronade with trunnion;^ ( c a r r o T u x d ed t o u r i l l o n s ); but this i s in reality a powerful gun.

Ccirroncad

C A R R O N A D E , a short piece of iron ord nance, f i r s t constructed at the Carron foundery, Scotland, in 1779, for the use of the British navy, and f i r s t employed against the T J i i i t e d C c rfrld ^ # States. The carronades have no trunnions, but CARTRIDGE, a paper, parchment, or flan a loop under the middle of the piece, by which nel case or bag containing the exact quanrity of they are fastened to tho carriage. The bore gunpowder used for tho charge of a f i i o-arm, has a chamber, and tho muzzle i s scooped out and to which, in some instance?, the p r 'g e c t i l e like a cup. They are very short and l i g h t ,t l i c r e i s attached. Blank c a i t r i d g o , for s v n a l J arms, being about 60 or 70 l b s , of tho gun to 1 l b , of does not contain a bullet; b a ll cartridge does. the weight of the solid shot, the length varying In a l l small-arm cartridge tho paper i s used as from 7 to 8 calibres. The charge, consequently, a wad, and rammed down. The c a r t ii < l g e for cannot but be weak, and ranges from to | tho French Mini6 and British Enfield r i f l ei s the weight of the shot. Carronades, on their steeped in grease at one end, so as to fa i l i t a t e f i r s t introduction, found great favor with naval ramming down. That of the Prussian ;a e e d l o men. Their lightness and insignificant recoil gu contains also tho fuhninating composition allowed great numbers of them to be placed exploded by the action of tho needle. Carlridges on board the small men-of-war of thoso times. for cannon are generally made of flannel or Their ranges appeared proportionably great, other light woollen cloth. In some services, which was caused: 1 , by a reduced windage, those for f i e l d service at least have tho projec and, 2 , by their great angle of dispart, arising t i l e attached to tho cartridge by n i e a i i s of a from the*thickness of metal around the breech, wooden bottom whenever practicable; f i n d the and the shortness of the gun; and the great French have,partially introduced this . = y s t e i n weight of metal projected by them rendered even into their naval service. The British s t i l l them at close quarters very formidable. They have cartridge and shot separated, in f i e l d as were adopted in the U. S. service about 1800, well as in naval and siege a r t i l l e r y . An inge It was, however, soon discovered that this kind niousmethod ofmaking paper cartridges ithout of cannon could not compete with longer and seams has been lately introduced into tho ropl heavier guns, throwing theirprojectiles with f u l l arsenal, Woolwich, England. Metallic cylin

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b6m^aJtfiienTri3''aostlned to receive a bursting drical lioUow moulds, just large enoup> ^ior a charge, the upper one contains leaden musket ; cartridge to slip over, are perforated with a A fastis inserted ooutaining a carefully : multitude of small holes, and being introduc^ balls^ prepared composition, tho accuracy of whose into the soft pulp of which cartridge paper is burning off be depended upon. A compo made, and then connected with an exhausted sition is run can between balls, so as to prevent receiver of an air-pump, are immediately cover them from shaking. the When used in tl^e field, ed with a thin layer of the pulp. This, on being the fuse is cut off to the length required for the dried, ia a complete paper tube. The moulds distance of the enemy, and inserted into the are arranged many together; and lettoh one is shell. At from 60 to 70 yards from tho euemy provide with a worsted cover, like the finger the fuse is burnt to the bottom, and explodes of a glove, upon which tho palp coUectSj and tlie shell, scattering the bullets toward the ene this being taken off with it serves asthe hning my precisely as if common case shot had been with which the best cartridges are provided. fired on the spot where the shell exploded. Tlie A kind of cartridge ia in use for sporting-pieces, precision of the fuses at present attained in made of a network of wire containiDg the several services is very great, and thus tliis now shot only. It is included in an outet* case of projectile enables tho gunner to obtain tho ex paper. The clwirge of shot is mixed with bone act effect of grape at ranges where formerly dust to give compactness. "When the piece is round s W only could bo used. Tho com fired, the shot are carried along to a much mon case is most destructive up to 200 yards, greater dtetanee without scatt^ng than if but may be used \ip to 500 yards; its effect charg^ i any other wiiy. against advancing lines c> f infantry or cavalry at dose quarters is terrible; against skirmishers it is of little use; against columns^ round shot is oftener applicable. Tho spherical case, on the other hand, is most effective at from 600 to 1,400 yards, and with a proper elevation and a long fuse, moy be launched at still greater C M S li^ CASE SHOT, or O a n i s t h b Shot, consists of ranges with probability of effect. From its ex a number of wrought-iron balls, packed in a plosion near the enemy, by which the hailstorm tin canister of a cylindrical shape. The balls of bullets is kept close togetlier, it may success for field service are regularly deposited in lay fully be used against troops iu almost any but ers, but for most kinds of siege and naval ord the skirmishing formation. After the introduc nance they are merely thrown into the case tion of tho spherical case shot, it was adopted until it is filled, when the lid is^ soldered on. in almost all European services as soon as a Between the bottom of tho canister and the proper fuse composition was invented by each, charge a wooden bottom ia inserted. The weights this forming tho only difiiculty; and of the of the balls vary with the different" kinds of great European powers. Franco is the only ono ordnance, and the regulations of each service. which has not yet succeeded in this particular. The English have, for their heavy naval guns, Further experiments, accidonts, or bi-ibes will, balls from 8 oz. to 8 lbs.; for their 9-pound field- however, no doubt soon place this power in gnn, l i f z. and 5 oz. balls, of which respectively possession of the secret. 126 and 41 make up a canister for one discharge. The Prussiana use 41 balls, each weighing A of tho weight of the corresponding round shot. The French had up to 1854 nearly the same system ; how they may have altered it since the introduction of the new howitzer gun, f *(Gr. Kara, against, and naXKa, we are unable to tell. For siege and garrison CotoiM artillery, the balls are sometimes arranged round to CATAPULT hurl), an ancient military en^ne for throwing a spindle projecting from the wooden bottom, stones, darts, and other missiles, invented in either in a bag in the shape of a grape (whence Syracuse, in the reign of Dionysius the elder.the nanie grape shot), or in regular layers It acted upon the principle of tho bow, and with ro ^ d wooden or iron plates betw<^n each consisted of wood frame-work, a part of layer, the whole covered over with a canvas which was elastic, and furnished with tenso bag.-^The most recently introduced kind is the cords of hair or muscle. Catapults were of spherical case shot, commonly called from their various sizes, being designed either for fieldinventor, the British general Shrapnell, shrapservice or bombardments. The largest of them nell shells. They consist of a thin cast-iron shell projected beams 6 feet long and weighing 60 (from -J- to f inch thickneSs xif iron), with a dia lbs. to the distance of 400 paces, and Josephus phragm or partition in the middle. The lower

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gives instances of their tiirowing great stones to the distance of i of a mile. The Romans employed 300 of them at the siege of Jerusa lem. From the time of Julius Oajsar it is not distinguished by Latin authors from the lallista, which was originally used only for throw ing masses of stone. was alone e^loyed ia northern Africa, Asia, and eastern Europe, irregular cavalry. But no sooner had the Greeks so far improved their breed of horses by crosses with the eastern horse, as to fit them for cavalry purposes, than they began to organize the arm upon a new )rinciple. They are the creators of both reguar infantry and regular cavalry. They formed the masses of fighting men into distinct bodies, armed and equipped them according to the pur pose they were intended for, and taught them to act in concert, to move in ranks and files, to keep together in a definite tactical formation, and thus to throw the weight of their concen trated and advancing mass upon a given point of the enemys front. Thus organized, they proved everywhere superior to the undrilled, unwieldy, and uncontrolled mobs brought against them by the Asiatics. We have no in stance of a combat of Grecian cavalry against Persian horsemen before the time the Persians themselves had formed bodies of a more regular kind of cavalry; but there can be no doubt that the result would have been the same as when the infantry of both nations met in battle. Cavalry, at first, was organized by the horsebieeding countries of Greece only, such as Thessalia and Boeotia; but, very soon after, the Athenians formed a body of her.vy cavalry, be side mounted archers for outpost and skirmish ing duty. The Spartans, too, had the elite of their youth formed into a body of horse-guards; but they had no faith in cavalry, and made them dismount ii^ battle, and fight as infantry. From the Greeks of Asia Minor, as well as from the Greek mercenaries serving in their army, the Persians learned the formation of regular caval ry, and there is no doubt that a considerable por tion of the Persian horse that fought against Alexander the Great were more or less trained to act in compact bodies in a regular manner. The Macedonians, however, were more than a match for them. With that people horseman ship was an accomplishment indispensable to the young nobility, and cavalry held a high rank in their army. The cavalry of Philip and Alexander consisted of the Macedonian and Thessalian nobility, with a few squadrons recruited in Greece proper. It was composed of heavy horsemencataphraeti armed with helmet and breastplate, cuisses, and a long spear. It usually charged in a compact body, in an oblong or wedge-shaped column, sometimes also in line. The light cavalry, composed of auxiliary troops, was of a more or less irregular kind, and served like the Cossacks now-a-days for outpost duty and skirmishing.The battle of the Granicus (834 B. 0.) offers the first in stance of an engagement in which cavalry played a decisive part. The Persian cavalry was placed at charging distance from the fords of the river. As

Cavolry
CAVALRY (Tr. cavalerie, from cavalier, a jiorseman, from cJieval, a horse), a body of sol diers on horseback. The use of the horse for rid ing, and the introduction of bodies of mounted men into armies, naturally originated in those countries to wliich the horse is indigenous, and where the climate and gramineous produc tions of the soil favored the development of all its physical capabilities. While the horse in Europe and tropical Asia soon degenerated into a clumsy animal or an undersized po]^, the breed of Arabia, Persia, Asia Minor, Egypt, and the north coast of Africa attained great beauty, speed, docility, and endurance. But it appears that at first it was used in harness only; at least in military history the war chariot long precedes the armed horseman. The Egyptian monuments show plenty of war chariots, but with a single exception no horsemen; and that exception appears to belong to the Roman period. Still it is certain that at least a couple of centuries before the country was conquered by the Persians, the Egyptians had a numerous cavalry, and the commander of this arm is more than once named among the most important officials of the court. It is very likely that the Egyptians became acquainted with cavalry dur ing their war with the Assyrians; for on the As syrian monuments horsemen are often delinea ted, and their use in war with Assyrian armies at a very early j)eriod is established beyond a doubt. With them, also, the saddle appears to have originated. In the older sculptures the soldier rides the bare back of the animal; at a later epoch we find a kind of pad or cushion in troduced, and finally a high saddle similar to that now used all over the East. The Persians and Medians, at the time they appear in history, were a nation of horsemen. Though they retain ed the war chariot, and even left to it its ancient precedence over the younger arm of cavalry, yet the great numerical strength of the mounted men gave the latter an importance it had never possessed in any former service. The cavalry of the Assyrians, Egyptians, and Per sians consisted of that kind which still prevails in the East, and which, up to very recent time> .

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soon as the heads of columns of the ifacedonian infantry had passed the river, and before they could deploy, the Persian horse broke in upon them and drove them headlong down again into the river. This manoeuvre, repeated sev eral times over with perfect success, shows at once that tlie Persians had regular cavalry to oppose to the Macedonians. To surprise infantry in the very moment of its greatest weakness, viz., when passing from one tactical formation into another, requires the cavalry to be well in hand, and perfectly under the control of its commanders. Irregular levies are incapable of it. Ptolemy, who commanded the advanced juard of Alexanders army, could make no leadway until the Macedonian cuirassiers passM_ the river, and charged the Persians in flank. A long combat ensu^, but the Persian horsemen being disposed in one line without reserves, and being at last abandoned by the Asiatic Greeks in their army, were ultimately routed. The battle of Arbela (361 B. 0.) was the most glorious for the Macedonian cavalry. Alexander in person led the Macedonian horse, which formed the extreme right of his order of battle, while the Thessalian horse formed llie left. The Persians tried to outflank him, but in the decisive moment Alexander brought fresh men from the rear so as to overlap them in their turn; they at the same time left a gap be tween their left and centre. Into this gap Alexander at once dashed, separating their left from the remainder of the army, rolling it up completely, and pursuing it for a considerable distance. Then, on being called upon to send assistance to his own menaced left, he rtdlied his horse in a very short time, and passing be hind the enemys centre fell upon the rear of his right. The battle was thus gaine^ and Alexander from that day ranks among the first of the cavalry gener^ of all times. And to crown the work, his cavalry pursued the fugitive enemy with such ardor that its ad vanced guard stood the next day 76 miles in advance of the battle-field. It is very curious to observe that the general principles of cavalry tactics were as well understood at that time as they are now. To attack infantry in the for mation of the march, or during a change of formation; to attack cavalry principally on its flank; to profit by any opening in the enemys line by dashing in and wheeling to the right and left, so as to take in flank and rear the troops placed next to such a gap; to follow up a victory by a rapid and inexorable pursuit of the broken enemythese are among the first and most important rules that every modern cavalry offi cer has to learn. After Alexanders death we hear no more of that splendid cavalry of Greece and Macedon. In Greece infantry again pre vailed, and in Asia and Egypt the mbunted service soon degenerated.The Romans never were horsemen. What little cavalry they had with the legions was glad to fight on foot. Their horses were of an inferior breed, and the men could not ride. But on the southern side of the Mediterranean a cavalry was formed, which not only rivalled, but even outshone that of Alex ander. The Oarthaginian generals, Hamilcar and Hannibal, had succeeded in forming, be side their Numidian irregular horsemen, a body of first-rate re<?nlar cavalry, and thus created an arm which almost everywhere insured them a victory. The Berbers of north Africa are, up to the present day, a nation of horse men, at least in the plains, and the splendid Barb horse which carried Hannibals swords men into the deep masses of the Roman in fantry, with a rapidity and vehemence un known before, stillmountsthe finest regiments of the whole French cavalry, the cTumewn d'AfH;utf, andisy them acknowledged to be the best war-horse in existence. The Carthaginiim infantry was fw inferior to that of the Romans, even after it had been long trained by its two great chiefs ; it would not have had the slightest chance against the Roman legions, had it not been for the assistance of that cavalry which alone made it possible for Hannibal to hold out 16 years in Italy; and when this cavalry had been worn out by the wear and tear of so many) campaigns, not by the sword of the enemy, there was no longer a place in Italy for him. Hannibals battles have that in common with those of Frederic the Great, that most of them were won by cavalry over first-rate infantry; and, indeed, at no other time has cavalry per formed such glorious deeds as under those two great commanders. From what nation, and upon what tactical principles, HamUcar and Hannibd formed their regular cavalry, we are not precisely informed. But as their Numidian light horse are always clearly distinguished from the heavy or regular cavalry, we may con clude that the latter was not composed of Berber tribes. There were very likely many foreign mercenaries and some Carthaginians; the great mass, however, most probably con sisted of Spaniards, as it was formed in their country, and as even in Oaisars time Spanish horsemen were attached to most Roman armies. Hannibal being well acquainted with Greek civilization, and Greek mercenaries and soldiers of fortune having before his time served under the Oarthaginian standards, there can scarcely be a doubt that the organization of the Grecian and Macedonian heavy cavalry served as the basis for that of the Carthaginian. The very first encounter in Italy settled the question of the superiority of the Oarthaginian horse. At the Ticinus{218 B. G.), the Roman consul Publius Scipio,while reconnoitring with his cavalry and light

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Infantry, met witli the Carthaginian cavalry led by Hannibal on a similar errand. Hannibal at once attacked. The Roman light infantry stood in first line, the cavalry formed the second. The Carthaginian heavy horse charged the in fantry, dispersed it, and then fell at once on the Eoman cavalry in front, while the Numidian irregulars charged their Hank and rear. The battle was short. The Romans fought bravely, but they had no chance whatever. They could not ride; their own horses vanquished them; frightened by the flight of the Roman skir mishers, who were driven in upon them and sought shelter between them, they threw off many of their riders and broke up the forma tion. Other troopers, not trusting to their horsemanship, wisely dismounted and attempt ed to fight as infantry. But already the Car thaginian cuirassiers were in the midst of them, while the inevitable Numidians galloped round the confused mass, cutting down every fugitive who detached himself from it. The loss of the Romans was considerable, and Pub lius Scipio himself was wounded. At the Trebia, Hannibal succeeded in enticing the Ro mans to cross that river, so as to fight with this Carrier in their rear. No sooner was this accoinplished than ho advanced with all his troops against them and forced them to battle. The Romans, like the Carthaginians, had their infantry in the centre; but opposite to tlie 2 Roman wings formed by cavalry, Hannibal placed his elephants, making use of his cav alry to outflank and overlap both wings of his opponents. At the very outset of the battle, the Roman cavalry, thus turned and outnumbored, was completely defeated ; but the Ro man infantry drove back the Carthaginian centre and gained ground. The victorious Car thaginian horso now attacked them in front and flank; they compelled them to desist from advancing, but could not break then). Hanni bal, however, knowing the solidity of the Ro man legion, had sent 1,000 horsemen and 1,000 picked foot soldiers under his brother Mago by a roundabout way to their rear. These fresh troops now fell upon them and succeeded in breaking the second line; but tho first line, 10.000 men, closcd up, and in a compact body forced their way through tho enemy, ami marched down tl)o river toward Placentia, where they crossed it unmolested. In tho bat tle of Canna) (210 B. C.), the Romans had 80,000 .infantry and 0,000 cavalry; the Carthaginians, 40.000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry. The cav alry of Latiimi formed tho Roman right wing, leaning on the river Aufidus ; that of the allied Italians stood on tho left, wliilo tho infantry formed tho centre. Hannibal, too, placed his infantry in tho centrc, the Celtic and Spanish levies again forming tho wing.s, while between them, a little further back, stood his African infantry, now equipped and organized on tho Roman system. Of his cavalry, he placed tho Numidians on tho right wing, wherp the open plain permitted them, by tlieir superior mobility and rapidity, to ovado the chargcs of tho Italian heavy horso opposed to them ; whilo the whole oftho heavy cavalry, under Hasdrubal, was stationed on tho left, close to tlio river. On the Roman left, tho Numidians gavo the Italian cavalry plenty to do, but from tlieir very nature as irregular horse could not break up their close array by regular charges. In tho centre, tho Roman infantry soon drove back the Celts and Spaniards, and then formed into a wedge-shaped column in order to attack tho African infantry. These, however, wheeled in ward, and charging tho unwieldy mass in lino, broke its impetus; and there tlio battle, now, be came a standing fight. But Ilnsdrubals heavy horse had, in the mean time, prepared tho de feat of tho Romans. Having furiously charged the Roman cavalry of tho riglit wing, they dis persed them after a stout resistance, passed, like Alexander at Arbela, behind the Roman centrc, fell upon tho rear of tho Italian cavalry, broke it completely, and, leaving it an easy prey to tho Numidians, formed for a grand charge on the flanks and rear of tho Roman infantry. This was decisive. Tho unwieldy mass, at tacked on all sides, gavo way, opened out, was broken, and succumbed. Never was therp such complete destruction of an army. Tho Ro mans lost *r0,000 men; of their cavalry, only 70 men escaped. Tho Carthaginians lost not quite 6,000, f of whom belonged to tho Celtic contingents, which had had to bear the brunt of tho first attack of the legions. Of Hasdrubals 6,000 regular horse, which had won the whole of tho battle, not more than 200 men were killed and wounded. Tho Roman cavalry of later times was not much better than that of the . Punic wars. It was attached to the legions in small bodies, never forming an independent arm. Besido this legionary cavalry, thero were in Cajsars timo Spanish, Celtic, and Ger man mercenary horsemen, all of them more or less irregular. No cavalry serving with the Romans ever performed things \yorthy of mention; and so neglected and ineft't'ctivo was this arm, that the Parthian irregulars Of KhoI'assan renjaincd extreniely formidable to Kt jnan armies. In tho eastern half of tho em pire, however, the ancient ])assion for horses and horsemanship retained its sway ; and By zantium remained, up to its conquest by tho Turks, tho great horso mart and riding acade my of Europe. Accordingly, we find that during tho momentary revival of tho Byzan tine empire, under Justinian, its cavalry was on a comparatively respectable footing; and

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m the battle of Capua, iti A. I). 552, the eunncli Narscs is l eportcd to Imve defeated the Teutonic invaders of Italy principally by means of this ftrni.The establishment, in all countries of western Europe, of a conquering aristocracy of Teutonic origin, led to a new era in the history of cavalry. The nobility took everywhere to the mounted service, under the designation of men-at-arms {geiia d'armcs)^ forming a bodv of horse of the heaviest description, in which not only the riders but also the horses \vero covered with defensive armor of metal. The first battle at which such cavalry appeared was that at Poitiers, where Charles ijlortel, in 732, beat back the torrent of Arab invasion. Tho Frankish knighthood, under Eudes, duke of Aquitania, broke through the, Moorish ranks and took their camp. ]iut such a body was not fit for pursuit; and tho Arabs, accordingly, under shelter of their indefatigable irregular horse, retired unmolested into Spain. From . this battle dates a series of wars in which tho * massive but unwieldy regular cavalry of tho West fought the agile irregulars of the East with varied success. The German knighthood meas ured swords, during nearly tho whole of tho 10th century, with tho wild Hungarian horse men, and totally defeated them by their closo array at Merseburg in 933, and at the Lech in 955. The Spanish chivalry, for several centu ries, fought the Moorish invaders of their country, and ultimately conquered them. But when the occidenial heavies transferred tho seat of war, during the crusades, to tho eastern homes of their enemies, they were in their turn defeated, and, in most cases complete ly destroyed ; neither they nor their horses could stand the climate, the immensely long marches, and tho want of proper food, and forage. These crusades were followed by afresh irruption of eastern horsemen into Europe, that of the Mongols. Having overrun Kussia, and the provinces of Poland, they were met at Wahlstatt in Silesia, in 1241, by a combined Polish and German army. After a long strug gle, tho Asiatics defeated the worn-out steelclad knights, but the victory was so dearly bought that it broke the power of the invaders. The Mongols advanced no further, and soon, by divisions among themselves, ceased to be dangerous, and were driven back. Dur ing the whole of the middle ages, cavalry re mained tho chief arm of all armies: with tho eastern nations the light irregular horse had always held that rank ; with tliose of w estern Europe, the heavy regular cavalry formed by the knighthood was in this period the arm which decided every battle. This preeminence of the mounted arm was not so much caused by its own e.xcellence, for tho irregulars of tho East were incapable of orderly fight, and tho ref^dars of the West were clum.!y beyond be lief in their movements; it was principally caused by the bad quality of tho infantry. Asiatics as well os Europeans held that arm in contempt; it was composed of those who could not afford to appear mounted, princi pally of slaves or serfs. There was no proper organization for i t ; without defensive armor, with a pike and sword for its sole wea pons, it might now and then by its deep for mation withstand the furious but disorderly charges of eastern horsemen; but it was resistlessly ridden over by the invulnerable men-atarms of the West. Tho only exception was formed by the EugUsh infantry, which derived its strength from its formidable weapon, the long-bow. The numerical proportion of tho European cavalry of these times to the re mainder of the army was certJiinly not as strong as it was a few centuries later, nor even as it is now. Knights were not so ex ceedingly numerous, and in many largo battles wo find that not more than 800 or 1,000 of them were present, liut they were generally sufficient to dispose of any number of foot sol diers, as soon as they had succeeded in driving from the field the enemys men-at-arms. Tho general mode of fighting of these mcn-atarms was in line, in singlo rank, the rear rank being formed by tho esquires, who wore, generally speaking, a less complete and heavy suit of armor. These lines, onco in the midst of the enemy, soon dissolved themselves into sin gle combatants, and finished the battle by sheer hand-to-hand fighting. Subsequently, when firearms began to come into use, deep masses were formed, generally squares; but then tho days of chivalry were numbered. During tho 15th century, not only was artillery introduced into the field of battle, while part of the infantry, the skirmishers of those times, were urnicd with mnskets, but a general change took place in the character of inCatitry. This arni began to bo formed by the enlistment of mercenaries who made a profession of military service. The German Landaknechte and tlie Swiss were such professional soldiers, and they very soon intro duced more regular formations and tactical movements. The ancient Doric and Macedonian phalanx was, in a manner, revived; a helmet and a breastplate somewhat protected the men against tho lance and sword of tho cavalry; and when, at Novara (1513), tho S wiss infantry drove the French knighthood actually from tho field, there was no further use for such valiant but unwieldy horsemen. Accordingly, after the insurrection of the Netherlands against Spain, wo find a new class of cavalry, the German Heitera (reitrea of the French), raised by voluntaiy enlistment, like the infantry, and armed with helmet and breastplate, sword ond pistols.

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They wero fully as lieavy as the modern cnirossiers, j'ct far lighter than the knights. They soon proved their superiority over the lieavy men-at-arms. These now disappear, anil with them the lance ; the sword and short firearms now form the general armature for cavalry. About the same time (end of the IGth century) the hybrid arm of dragoons was introduced, first in Franco, then in the other countries of Europe. Armed with muskets, they wero intended to fight, according to cir cumstances, either as inp\ntry or as cavalry. A similar corps had been formed by Alexander the Great under the name of the dimacha^ but it had not yet been imitated. The dragoons of the IGth century liad a longer existence, but toward tho middle of the 18th century they had everywhere lost their hybrid character, except in najne, and were generally used as cavalry. Tho most important feature in their formation was that they wero tho first body of regular cavalry which wns completely deprived of defensive armor. Tho creation of real hybrid dragoons was again attempted, on a largo scale, by tho emperor Nicholas of Russia; but it was soon proved that, before tho enemy, they must always bo used as cavalry, and consequently Alexander II. very soon reduced them to simple cavalry, with no more pretensions to dismount ed service than liussars or cuirassiers. Maurice of Orange, tho great Dutch commander, form ed his lieiters for tho first time in something liko our modern tactical organization. Ho taught them to execute chargcs and evolutions in sep arate bodies, and in more than one line ; to Avheel, break off, form column and line, and change front, without disorder, and in separate squadrons and troops. Thus a cavalry fight was no longer decided by one charge of tho whole mass, but by tho successivo charges of separate sciuadrons and lines supporting each other. His cavalry was formed generally 5 deep. In other armies it fotight in deep bodies, and where a lino formation was adopted it was still from 5 to 8 deep. The 17th century, having completely done away Avith the costly men-atarms, increased the numerical strength of cavalry to an enormous extent. At no other period was there so large a proportion of that arm in every army. In the 30 years war from f to nearly iof each army was generally composed of cavalry; in single instances there were 2 horsemen to 1 foot soldier. Gustavus Adolphus stands at the head of cavalry commanders of this period. His mounted troops consisted of cuirassiers and dragoons, tho latter fighting almost always as cavalry. His cuirassiers, too, were much lighter than those of tlie emperor, and soon proved their incontestable superiority. The Swedish cavalry were formed 3 deep; their orders were, contrary to tho usage of the cuirassiers of most a,rmle3, 'vvfiose chief arm was the pistol, not to lose time in firing, but to charge the enemy sword in hand. At this period the cavalry, which during the middle ages had generally been placed in the centre, was again placed, as in antiquity, on the wings of the army, where it was formed in 2 lines. In England, the civil -war gave rise to 2 distinguished cavalry leaders. Prince Rupert, on the royalist side, had as much dash in him as any cavalry general, but he was almost always carried too far, lost his cavalry out of hand, and was himself so taken tip with what was immediately before him, that the general always disappeared in the bold dragoon. Cromwell, on the other hand, with quite as much dash where it was required, was a far better general; he kept his men well in hand, always held back a reserve for unfore seen events and decisive movements, knew how to manoeuvre, and thus pi'oved generally victo rious over his inconsiderate opponent. He won the battles of Marston Moor and Naseby by his cavalry alone.^With most armies the use of the firearm still remained tho chief employment of cavalry in battle, tho Swedes and English allone excepted. In France, Prussia, and Austria, cavalry was drilled to use tho carabine exactly as infantry used the musket. They fired on horseback, the line standing still all the while, by files, platoons, ranks, fcc.; and when a movement for a charge was made, the lino advanced at a trot, pulled up at a short distance from the enemy, gave a volley, drew swords, and then charged. Tho effective fire of the long lines of infantry had shaken all confidence in the charge of a cavalry which was no longer protected by armor; consequently, riding was neglected, no movements could be executed at a quick pace, and even at a slow pace accidents happened by the score to both men and horses. The drill was mostly dismounted work, and their officers had no idea whatever of the way of handling cavalry in battle. The French, it is true, sometimes charged sword in hand, and Charles XII. of Sweden, true to his national tradition, always charged full speed without firing, dispersing cavalry and infantry, and sometimes even taking field works of a weak profile. But it was reserved for Frederic tho Great and his great cavalry commander, Seydlltz, to revolutionize the mounted service, and to raise it to tho culminating point of glory. The Prussian cavalry, heavy men on clumsy horses, drilled for firing only, such as Frederics father had left them to his son, were beaten in an instant atMollwitz (1741). But no sooner was the first Silesian war brought to a close than Fred eric entirely reorganized his cavalry. ^ Firing and dismounted drill were thrown into the background, and riding was attended to. All

158 3
-Solutions are to gpeed, all wheels things form the men airy officers must above^allth.^^^^^^ into perfect h o r s e b a c k as a hussar, and handy and ^^xpert sword. The well exercised m the use aifacnlt men were to fencing on horseground, across obstacles, an fa * , f ^ f ' t r S w e f firing at d l completely broken, lines of the ene y advances to the Every _ squadron as g^ord in hand, charge, IS to att allowed to let his and nfire undtr pendty troops y of infamoM answerable for the generals of ^ Sade
m
quick S r > n t o

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Austrian took the d i -

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j M ^ X r the c a m p of Boulogne,

his cav^ry m pa , , .^^abie adversary, and -1805 and 1806-T his Tto' f clmpaigDS 1 the 8 horses ^ allowed ^ of the r r s fof 1806 ' Z o i all cavalry to X s ^ t o S m L "d S d e ,re e c Austrian a n d Prussian forced

> excellent cavalry

trot, and feaBy his o f t h e c o n f e d e r a t i o n ^ the ^ well closed; and if they majesty iB ^ e e i - of oavalrj will h w broken. Every o aio always present to his but 2 things greatest possible to charge 1;' outflank him. r ^tirely S ^ r a w " speed and -Frederics instructions " been revolution, was t q These passages revolution he carariny shortly befo heavy cavalry by Bufficiently show ^ vras seconded stored to a P^ ^ t i o organization ried out in always commanded Napoleon. In other the same, exadmirably by ,eh V ^ToTish auxiliaries he received Lis cuirassiers and and order and cept that.with hisP d ^ C s ^ a r m e d with tho troops ot of evolutions, readiness for some regiments of charge, ^aitv in rallying and re flank attacks, cavalry has ever forming after a chaige, ^ years the viiwe At How\r. The fruUs X r ^ m e n t of * hcnfriedberg tho B -whole left A e goons, 10 broke 21 hattal- division or w r p B ; ta t the ling of the odors 5 guns, and 4,000 and fP?'^^^y^Vfor the purpose of striking

fu ll gallop, t a t

srrth T & ^ |.

io n ^ to o k e O B ta n d ^ ^ ^ ^ ^

P n ,,d a n

prisoners. At Z , retreat, Seydlit/., infantry had victorious Russian with 36 squadrons, drove t .^pon the 0T,valry from the new, an ^ fot,;ne it with Russian infantry, ^^ach, Striegau, Kesgreat ^td n 10 other battles, FredselsSorl, Leuthen, and in cavalry.-eric owed Ae ^ w^onary war broke out, 'When the ^ ^ ^ "Vfflor)ted the A^strians had adopted the Prussian system, but not so the ^^en much disorganlatter nation in the beginmng of ized by the Jong proved almost nsothc war the new ^o;j'"-_ntry levies were less. When their new mtam ^ S by the w e darini m i sians, and -beaten.' The cavalry, and 93, almost was alquite unable to cope years campaign-

together a sreat decisive blow, at a favorable moment g o r , in case of need, ot coveru g^^denly aparmy. ^ S n t of the b a t t l e f i e l d , have Toearing on a given p thev never gained often acted decisively ; s t i l l , ^the^ torserSen of such brilliant successes Frederic the Great. ^ ^ tactics of in looked for partly m t^^^^J^"^hiefiy broken tantry, which, . < m d a l w a y s receiving ground for i t s ^ ^ ^ d i f f i c u l t for cavalry m a square, ma victories the latter arm obtained over the as the Prussian their oppon mts.
long, thin , f S ' ' S l r a p r o n f cavalry

But i tI S also certain that Q j e a t , was not equal to that + < > f > t i c s ware not and t h a t Napoleon s ^ v y ^ ^ ^ ^
in every instance a n nPg.^rent ^f the ? U e r c o m p e l k d t h e m t, charge at a c o m -

159
paratively slow pace, at a trot or a collected canter; there are but few instances where they charged at a gallop. Their great bravery and close ranks made up often enough for the cur tailed impetus, but still their charge was not what would now be considered good. The old system of receiving hostile cavalry standing, carabine in hand, was in very many cases re tained by the French cavalry, and in every such instance were they defeated. The last example of this happened at Danigkow (April 6, 1813), where about 1,200 French cavalry thus awaited a charge of 400 Prussians, and were completely beaten in spite of their num bers. As to Napoleons tactics, the use of great masses of cavalry with him became such a fixed rule, that not only was the divisional cavalry weakened so as to be completely use less but also in the employment of these masses lie often neglected that successive en gagement of his forces which is one of the principal points in modern tactics, and which is even more applicable to cavalry than to in fantry. He introduced the cavaliy charge in column, and even formed whole cavalry corps into one monster column, in such formations that the extrication of a single squadron or regiment became an utter impossibility, and that any at tempt at deploying was entirely out of the question. His cavalry generals, too, were not up to the mark, and even the most brilliant of them, Murat, would have cut but a sorry figure if opposed to a Seydlitz. During the wars of 1813, 14, and 15, cavalry tactics had decidedly improved on the part of Napoleons opponents. Though to a great extent following Napoleons system of holding cavalry in reserve in largo masses, and therefore very often keeping the greater portion of the cavalry entirely out of an action, still in many instances a return to the tactics of Frederic was attempted. In the Prussian army the old spirit was revived. Blticherwas the first to use his cavalry more boldly, and generally with success. The am buscade of Haynau (1813), where 20 Prussian squadrons rodo down 8 Fi*encli battalions and took 18 guns, marks a turning point in the mod ern history of cavalry, and forms a favorable contrast to the tactics of Ltltzen, where the al lies held 18,000 horse entirely in reserve until the battle was lost, although a more favorable cavalry ground could not be found.The Eng lish had never adopted the system of forming large masses of cavali'y, and had therefore many successes, although Napier himself ad mits that their cavalry was not so good at that timo as that of tho French. At Waterloo (where, by the way, the French cuirassiers for once charged at full speed), the English cavalry was admirably handled and generally success ful, except where it followed its national weak ness of getting out of hand. Since the peace of 1815, Napoleons tactics, though still preserv^ in the regulations of most armies, have _again made rooB) for those of Frederic. Eiding is bet ter atteB&od. .to, though still not at all to the extent it should be. The idea of receiving the enemy carabine in hand is scouted; Frederic s rule is everywhere revived, that every cavalry commander who allows the enemy to charge him, instead of charging liimself, deserves to be cashiered. The gallop is again the pace of tho charge; and the column attack has jnade way for chorges in successive lines, with di.spo.sitions for flank attack, and with a possibility of manceuvring with single detachments during tho charj;e. Still much remains to be done. A greater attention to riding, especially across country, a nearer approach in tho saddle and the seat to those of tho hunting-field, and above all, a reduction of the weight carried by tho horse, a re improvements called for in every ser vice without exception.From the history of cavalry let us now turn to its present organiza tion and tactics. The recruiling of cavalry, as far as tho men are concerncd, is not different upon the whole from the way the other arms recruit themselves in each country. In some states, however, the natives of particular dis tricts are destined to this service: thus in Kussia, the Malorus.sians (natives of Little Rus sia) ; in Prussia, the Poles. In Austria, the heavy cavalry is recruited in Germany and Uohemia, tho hus-sars exclnsively in H u n g a r y , tho lancers mostly in the Polish province.-j. The recruiting of the horses, however, deserves especial notice. In England, where the whole cavalry does not require in time of war above 10,000 horses, tho government finds no diffi culty in buying them; but in order to insure to the service tho benefit of horses not worked till nearly 5 years old, 3-year-old colts, mostly Yorkshire bred, are bought and kept at gov ernment expense in depots till they arc fit to be used. The price paid for the colts (20 to 25), and the abundance of good horses in tho country, make the Hritish cavciliy cer tainly the best mounted in tho world. In Russia a similar abundance of horses exists, though the breed is inferior to the English. The remount officers buy the horses by whole sale in the southern and western provinces of the empire, mostly from Jewish dealers ; they rc-sell those that nro \infit, and hand over to the various regiments such as arc of its color (.ill horses being of the same color in a Ivu?.inn regiment). The colonel is considered as it wore ])roprietor of the horcs; for a round sum ])aid to him he has to keep tho regiment well mount ed. The horses are expected to last 8 years. Formerly they w'cre taken from the larse breeding establishment of Volliyni.a and the

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Ukraine, whero t l i c y f i i c qiuto wild; but t l i o breaking flicm f i ) r cav ali'v I ' . u r p o s o s %vas so dif f i c u l t that i t Imd to bo given up. In Austria t l i o horses aro pnvlly bought, but tho greater portion have of h \ t c been furnished by tho gov ernment breeding establishnicnts, \ v l i i c h can part every year w i t l i above 5,000 5-ye a r o l ( ' oavah-y l i o r s c s . I m u' a ease of cxtrnordinnry e f f o r t , a country so rich i n horses as Austria ran rely npon l l i o niarkets of tho i n t e r i o r . Prussia, GO years ago, had to buy ahnost n i l her J i o r s c s abroad, but now can mount tho whole of her cavalry, line and landwehr, in tho in t e r i o r . For tho l i n e , tho horses arc bought at 3 years o l d , by remount commissaries, and sent i n to depots until old enough for service; 3,500 are required every year. In caso of n j o b i l i z a ' ti o n of tho landwehr cavalry, a l l horses i n tho country, like tho men, arc l i a b l e to bo taken f o r service; a compensation of from $40 to $70 i s however paid for them. Thei'O are 8 times more serviceable horses i n tho country t l i n n can be required. France, of n i l European countries, i sl i )0 worst o f l f for horses. Tho breed, though often good and even excellent f o r draught, i s generally unfit for tho saddle. Government breeding studs ( h a r a s ) have been long established, but not with tho success they have had elsewhere ;in 1838 these s tuds, and tho remounting depots connected Avith them, could not furnish 1,000 horses to the service, bought or government bred. Gen. Laroche-Aymond considered that there were not altogether 2 0 , 000 horses i n Franco between 4 and 7 years o l d , f i t f o r cavalry i s c r v i c e . Tliough tho depots and studs havo of lato been much improved, tbcy nrc s t i l li n s u f l i c i e n t to f u l l y supply tho army. Algeria furnishes a splendid breed of cavalry ho rses, and tbe best regiments of tho service, the chaaeura( V A f r i q u e ,nrc e.xclnsively mounted with them, but tho other regiments scarccly pot any. Thus in case of a mobilization, tho French aro cojnpclled to buy abroad, sometimes i n England, but mostly in northern Germany, where they do not get tho best cla s s of horses, though each horso costs them nearly $100. Many condemned horses from Gorman cavalry regiments lind their way into tho ranks of tho Frcneli,and allogcthcr the French cavalry, tho c h a s i e u r s iVJfrujue exceptcd, i s tho worst mounted i n Europe (Cavalry i s essentially of 2 kinds: heavy and l i g h t . Tlio real distinctivo chnractor of tho 2 i s in the horses. Largo and powerful h < M s e s cannot well work togetluor w i t l i s mall, active, and quick ones. Tlio for mer in a cliargo act l e s s rapidly, but Avi t h greater weight; t l i ol a t t e r act more by tho speed and impetuosity of tho attack, and arc more over f a r moro l i tf o r single coiubat and skir mishing, for wlncli heavy or largo liorses arc neither handy nor intelligent enough. Thus far tho distinction i s nece.ssary; but fashion, fancy, and tho imitation of certain national costumes, havo created numerous subdivisions and v a r i e t i e s , to noticc Avhich in detail would bo of no i n t e r e s t . Tho heavy cavahy, at least in part, i sin most countricsfurnished with ac u i r a s s , Avhich, however, i s far from being shot proof; in Sardinia, i t sf i r s t rank carries a lance. Light cavalry i s partly armed with tho sword and car abine, partly with tho lance. Tho carabino i s either smooth-bored or r i f l e d . Pistols aro add ed i n most cases to tho armature of tho rider; the United States cavalry alono carries the revolver. Tho sword i s cither st raight, or curved to a greater or l e s s degree; tho f i r s t preferable for thrusts, tho sccond for c u t s . The question as to tho advantages of tho lance over tho sword i ss t i l l imdcr d i s c u s . s i o n . For closo encounter tho sword i s undoubtedly prefera ble; and in a charge tho lance, unless too long and heavy to bo wielded, can scarcely act at a l l , but in tho pursuit of broken cavalry i ti s found most e f f e c t i v e . Of nations of horsemen, almuit a l l trust to tho sword; even tho Cos sack abandons hid lance when he has to fight against the expert swordsmen of Circassia. The p i s t o l i s useless except for a signal shot; tho carabino i s not very e f f e c t i v o , even i fr i f l e d , and never will be of much r ^ ' a l use until a breechloading one i s adopted; tho revolver in s k i l f u l liands i s a formidable weapon for close encoun ter ;s t i l l the queen of weapons for cavalry i sa good, sharp, handy sword. Beside tho saddle, br i d l e , and armed r i d e r , tho cavalry horse has to carry a valise with reserve clothing, camp u t e n s i l s , grooming tackle, and in a ca mpaijj[n also food for tho rider and forago for i t s e l f . The sum tot a l of t his burden varies in dif ferent services and classcs of cavalry, be tween 250 and 300 l b s . for tho heavy march ing order, a weight which will appear enormous wiien compared with what private saddle hcrscs havo to carry. This overweighting the horses i s tho weakest point of a l l cavalry, (ircat reforms are everywhere required in this respcct. Tho weight of tho men and accoutre ments can and must be reduced, but as long as the present system l a s t s , this drag upon tho horses i s always to be taken into account when ever wo .judge of tho capabilities of exertion and endurance of cavalry. Iloavy cavalry, oompo.sed of strong but, i f possible, compara tively light men, on strong l i o r s c s , must act principally by the force of a well-closed, solid chasgo. This r e o , n i r o 3 power, endur ance, and a c e r t a ' u i physical weight, though not as much as would render i t unwieldy. There must bo speed in i t s movements, but no more than i s compatible with tho h igliest de gree of order. Once formed for tho attack, i t nuist chiefly rido straight forward; but what-

161
over conics in its path must bo swept awny by its chargc. Tiio riders need not oe, indi vidually, ns good horsemen as those of light cavalry; but they must have full command over their horses, and bo accustomed to ride straight forward and in a well-closed mass. Their horses, in consequence, must bo less sensible to the leg, nor should they havo their haunches too inuch under them; they should stop out well in their trot, and bo accustomed to keep well together in a good, long hand gnllop. Liglit cavalry, on the contrary, with nimbler men and quicker horset*, has to act by its rapidity and ubiquity. What it lacks in weight must bo made up by speed and activity. It will charge with the greatest vehemenco; but when pref erable, it will seemingly fly in order to fall upon tho enemys flank by a sudden change of front. Its superior speed and fitness for single com bat render it peculiarly fit for pursuit. Its chiefs require n quicker cyo and a greater pres ence of mind tlnn those of heavy norse. Tho men must bo, individually, better horsemen; tiioy must htive their horses perfectly under control, start from a stand into a full gullop, and agaiti stop in an instant; turn quick, and le.ip well; tlio horses should bo hardy and quick, light in the mouth, and obedient to the lug, handy at turning, and especially broken in for working at a canter, having thoir bounches well under them. Beside rapid flank and rear attacks, antbuscndes, and pursuit, the light cav alry has to do the greater part of the outpost and patrolling duty for the whole ormy; optnoss for single combat, the foundation of which is good horsemanship, is therefore ono of its >rincipal requirentents. In lino, tho men ride ess closo together, so as to bo alwavs pre pared for changes of front and other ovolutioni>. Tho English havo nominally 13 light and 13 heavy regiments (dragoons, hussars, lancers; tho 3 regiments of life-guards alone are cuiras siers) ; but in reality all their cavalry, by com>osition and training, aro heavy cavalry, and ittlo different in the size of men and horses. For real light cav.ilry servico they havo always used foreign troopsGermans in Europe, nativo irregvilars in India. Tho French have 8 kinds: light cavalry hussars and chasseurs, 174 squad rons ; lino cavalry, lancers and dragoons, 120 squadrons; reserve cavalry, 78 squadrons, cuir.'issiers and carabineers. Austria has 06 squad rons of heavy cavalry, dragoons and cuirassiers; and 103 squadrons of light, hussars and lancers. Prussia has, of tho line, 80 squadrons of heavy horse, cuirassiers and lancers; and 72 squadrons of light horse, dragoons and hussars; to which m.ay bo added, in case of war, 186 squadrons of lancers of tho first levy of the landwehr. The sccontl levy of tho landwehr cavalry will scarcely ever bo formed separately, Tho Rus sian cavalry consists of 100 lieavy squadrons, cuirassiers and dragoons; and 804 light squad rons, hussars and lancers. Tho formation of the dragoon corps for ulternate mounted and infantry duty has been abandoned, and the dragoons incorporated with tho heavy cavalry. Tho real light c.'valry of the Russians, how ever, aro tho Cossacks, of whonj they always havo more than enough for all the outpost, re connoitring, and irregular duties of their armies. In tho U. S. army there ore 2 regiments of dragoons, 1 of mounted riflemen, and 2 styled cavalry; all of which regiments, it has been recommomled, should bo called regiments of cavalry. Tho U. S. cavalry is really a mounted infantry.Tho tactical unity in cavalry is the squadron, comprising as many men as the voice and immediate authority of one commander can control during evolutions. The strength of a squadron varies from 100 men (in England) to 200 men (In France); those of the other armies also being within theso limits. Four, C , 8, or 10 squadrons form a re^iimcnt. The weakest regiments are tho English (400 to 480 men); tho strongest tho Austrian light horse (1,000 men). Strong regiments are apt to be unwieldy; too weak ones are very soon reduced by a campaign. Thus the British light brigade at Baliuclava,'nbt 2 months after the opening of the campaign, numbered in 5 regiments of 2 squadrons each scarcely 700 men, or Just half as many as one Russian hussar regiment on tho war footing. Peculiar formations are: with the British the troop or half squadron, and with the Austrians the division or double squadron, an intermediate link which alone renders it possible for one commander to control their strong regiments of horse.Until Frederic tho Great, all cavalry was formed at least 8 deep. He first formed his hussars, in 1743, 2 deep, and at the battle of Rossbach had his lieavy horse formed the same way. After the 7 years war this formation was adopted by all other armies, and is the only ono now in use. For purposes of evolution the squadron is divided mto 4 divisions; wheeling from line into open column of divisions, and back into line from column, form the chief and fundamental evo lution of all cavalry manoeuvres. Most other evolutions are only adapted either for the m(xrch (the flank march by throes, &c.), or for extraordinary cases (the close column by di visions or squadrons). The action of cavalry in battle ia ' minently a hnnd-to-hand encoun ter; its fi e ic of subordinate importance; steel either sword or lanceis its chief weapon; and all cavalry action is concentrated in the charge. Thus the charge is tho criterion for all movements, evolutions, and positions of cavalry. Whatever obstructs tho facility of charging Is faulty. The impetus of tho charge

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successful charge at once decides the contest; i sproduced by concentrating the l i i g h e s f c eft o r t but unless followed up by pursuit and single Twth of man and l iorse into i t s cro w n m g mo combat, the victory would be comparatively ment, the moment of actual contact with tho f r u i t l e s s . It i s this immense preponderance ot enemy. In order to eff e c tt i n s ,i ti s neces the party which has preserved i t st a c tical com sary to approach the enemy with a gradually pactness ar.d formation, over the one which has increasing velocity, so that \,ne.horses are put ost i t , which explains the impossibility for i r to their f u l l spe6d at a short distance from regular cavalry, be i t ever so good smd so nu the enemy only. N o w the execution of such merous, to defeat regular cavalry. There i s no a charge i s about tho most d i f f i c u l t matter doubt that 80 far as individual horsemanship that can be asked from cavalry. It i s ex and swordsmanship i s concerned, no regular tremely d i f f i c u l t to preserve perfect order and cavalry ever approached tho irregulars of the s o l i d i t y in an advance at increasing pace nations of horse-warriors of the East; and yet especially i f there i s much not quite level the very worst of European regular cavalries ground to go over. The d i f f i c u l t y and im has always defeated them in the f i e l d . From the portance of riding s t r a i ^ ^ h t forward i s here defeat of the Huns at Ohalons (451) to the se shown; for unless every rider rides straight poy mutiny of 185T. there i s not a smgle in to his point, there arises a pressure in tho stance where the splendid but irregular horse ranks, which i s soon rolled back from the cen men ofthe East have broken a singleregjinent of t r e to the flanks, and from the flanks to the regular cavalry in an actual charge, iheir i r centre; the horses get excited and uneasy, their regular swarms, charging without concert or unequal speed and temper comes into play, and compactness, cannot make any impression upon soon the whole line i s straggling along in any the s o l i d , rapidly moving mass. Their supe thing but a straight allignment, and with any riority can only appear when the tactical l o rthing but that closed solidity which alone can mation of the regulars i s broken, and the com insure success. Then, on arriving in front o t bat of man to man has i t s turn; but tho wild the enemy, i ti s evident that the horses will at racing of the irregulars toward their opponents tempt to refuse running into tho standing or can have no such re s u l t . It has only been moving mass opposite, and that the riders must regular cavalry, in pursuit, have abandoned prevent their doing so ; otherwise the charge i s their lineformation and engaged in single com Bure to f a i l . The r i d e r , therefore, must not only bat, that irregulars, suddenly turning round and have the firm resolution to break into the ene seizing the favorable moment, have deteated my sl i n e , but he must also bo perfectly master them;indeed,thisstratagem has made up almost of bis horse. Tho regulations of different a r - tho whole of the tactics of irregulars against mies give various rules for the mode of advance regulars, ever since the wars of the Parthians of the charging cavalry, but they a l l agree in and the IRomang. Of thisthere i sno better exam t h i s point, that the l i n e ,i f possible, begins tc ple than that of Napoleon s dragoons in Egypt, move at a walk, then t r o t , at from 800 to 150 undoubtedly the worst regular cavalry then yards from the enemy canter, gradually increas e xisting, which defeated in every insta t w j e the ing to a gallop, and at from 20 to 30 yards from most splendid of irregular horsemen, the M a m the enemy f u l l speed. All such regulations,how elukes. N aj)D leon said of them, 2 Mamelukes e ve r , are subject to many exceptions; the state were decid^ly superior to 8 Frenchmen ; 100 of the ground, the weather, the condition of the Frenchmen w e r : ( ^ a match for 100 Mamelukes; horses, &c., must bo taken into consideration in 300 Frenchmen generally beat 800 Mamelukes; every j j r a c t i c a l case. If in a charge of cavalry 1,000 Frenchmen in every instance defeated against cavalry both parties actually meet, l ,500 Mamelukes. However great may be the which i s by far the most uncommon case in superiority in a charge of that body of cavalry cavalry engagements, the swords are of l i t t l e which best preserves i t s ta ctical formation, i ti s a va i l during tho actual shock. It i s the m o evident that even this body must, after the suc mentum of one mass which breaks and scatters cessful charge, bo comparatively disordered. the other. The moral element, bravery, i shere The success of the charge i s not equally deci a t once transformed into material force; the sive on every point; many men are irretrievably bravest squadron will ride on with the greatest engaged iu single combat or pursuit; and i ti s self-c onfidence, resolution, rapidity, e n s e m l l e , comparatively but a small portion, mostly be and s o l i d i t y . Thus i ti s that no cavalry can do longing to the second rank, which remains in great things unless i t has plenty of dash some kind of l i n e . This i s the most dangerous about i t . But as soon as the ranks of one party moment for cavalry; a very small body of fresh are broken, the swords, and with them individ troops, thrown upon i t ,would snatcli the victory ual horsemanship, come intox>lay- A portion from i t shands. To rally quickly after a charge i s a tl e a s t of tho victorious troop has also to give therefore the criterion of a really good cavalry, up i t st a c t i c a l formation, in order to m o w with and i ti s in this point that not only young but the sword the harvest of victory. Thus the

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over comcs in its path must bo swept away by its chargc. TIio riders need not oe, indi vidually, ns good horsemen as those of light cavalry; but they must have full command over their horses, and bo accustomed to vide straight forward and in a well-closed mass. Their horses, in consequence, must bo less sensible to the leg, nor should they have their haunches too niuch imdcr them; they should stop out well in their trot, and bo accustomod to keep well together in a good, long hand gallop. Light cavalry, on tho contrary, with nimbler men and quicker horses, has to act by its rapidity and ubiquity. What it lacks in weight must bo tnado up by speed and activity. It will charge with tho greatest vehemencc; but when pref erable, it will seemingly fly in order to fall upon tho enemys flank by a sudden chanpo of front. Its superior Hpcod and fltness for single com bat render it peculiarly fit for pursuit. Its chiefs roquiro a quicker eye and a greater pres ence of mind tlnn those of hoavy norie. Iho men must bo, individually, better horsemen; thoy must huvo their horses perfectly under control, start from a stand into a full gallop, and again stop in an instant; turn quick, ond leap well; tho horses should bo hardy and quick, light in the mouth, and obedient to the leg, handy at turning, and especially broken in for working at a cauter, having their haunches well under them. Bosido rapid flank and rear attacks, ambuscades, and pursuit, the light cav alry has to do tho greater part of the outpost and patrolling duty for the whole ormy; optfor single combat, tho foundation of which is good Ijorsomauship, is therefore ono of its krincipal requirements. In lino, tho men rido ess closo together, so as to bo alwavs pre pared for changes of front and other ovolutionsi. Tho English havo nominally 13 light and 13 heavy regiments (dragoons, hussars, lancers; tho 2 regiments of life-guards alone are cuiras sier#) ; but in reality oil their cavalry, by coupoiition and training, aro heavy cavolry, and littlo different in tho siae of men and horses. For real light cav.ilry service they have alwoys used foreign troopsGormans in Europe, nativo irregulars in India. Tho French have 8 kinds: light cavalry hussars ond chasseurs, 174 squad rons; lino cavalry, lancers and dragoons, 120 squadrons; reserve cavalry, T8 squadrons, cui rassiers and carabineers. Austria hos 98 squad rons of heavy covalry, dragoons and cuirassiers; nnd 193 squadrons of light, liussars and lancers. Prussia Jiaf, of tho lino, 80 squodrons of heavy horse, cuirassiers and lancers; and 72 squadrons of light horse, dragoons and hussars; to which may bo added, in case of war, 186 squadrons of lancers of tho first levy of the landwohr. Tho second levy of tho landwohr cavalry will scarcely ever bo formed separately. Tiio Rus sian cavalry consists of ICO heavy squadrons, cuirassiers and dragoons; and 804 light squad rons, hussars and lancers. Tho formation of tho dragoon corps for idternote mounted and infantry duty has been abandoned, and tle dragoons incorporated with tho heavy cavalry. Tho real light c.-'valry of the Russians, how ever, aro tho Cossacks, of whom they always havo more than enough for all the outpost, re connoitring, and irregular duties of their armies. In tho U. S. army there oro 2 regiments of dragoons, 1 of mounted riflemen, and 2 styled cavalry; all of which regiments, it has been recommended, should be called regiments of cavalry. The U. S. cavalry is really a mounted infantry.Tho tactical unity in cavalry is the squadron, comprising as many men as the voice and immediate authority of one commander can control during evolutions. The strength of a squadron varies from 100 men (in England) to 200 men (in France); those of the other armies also being within theso limits. Four, C , 8, or 10 squadrons form a repiment. The weakest regiments are tho English (400 to 480 men); th strongest tho Austrian light horso (1,000 men). Strong regiments are apt to be unwieldy; too weak ones are very soon reduced by a campaign. Thus the British light brigade at Baltmavft, not 2 months after the opening of the campaign, numbered in 5 regiments of 3 squadrons each scarcely 700 men, or just half as many as one Russian hussar regiment on tho war footing. Peculiar formations are: with the British the troop or half squadron, and with the Austrians the division or double squadron, an intermediate link which alone renders it possible for one commander to control their strong regiments of horse.Until Frederic the Grea^ all cavalry was formed at least 8 deep. He first formed his hussars, in 1743, 2 deep, nnd at the battle of Bossbach had his lieavy horse formed tho same way. After the 7 years war this formation was adopted by all other armies, and is the only ono now in uso.^ For >urposes of evolution the squadron is divided nto 4 divisions; wheeling from line into open column of divisions, and back into line from column, form the chief and fundamental evo lution of all cavalry manoeuvres. Most other evolutions are only adapted either for tlie m(irch (the flank march by throes, &c.), or for extraordinary cases (the close column by di visions or scaaufons). The action of cavalry in battle i a ^minently j i Imnd-to-hand encoun ter; i t e i. of sabordinote importance; steel either sword or lanceis its chief weapon ; and all cavalry action is concentrated in tho charge. Thus the charge is tho criterion for all movements, evolutions, and positions of cavalry. Whatever obstructs tho facility of charging is faulty. The impetuB of tho chargo

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successful charge at once decides the contest; i sproduced by concentrating the Lighest e f t o r t but unless followed up by pursuit and single Iwth of man and liorse into i t s crowning mo combat, the victory would be comparatively ment, the moment of actual contact with the f r u i t l e s s . It i s this immense preponderance of enemy. In order to eff e c tt h i s ,i ti s neces the party which has preserved i t st a c tical comsary to approach the enemy with a gradually mctness ar.d formation, over the one which has increasing velocity, so that the.horses are put ost i t , which explains the impossibility for i r t o their f u l l spefid at a short distance from regular cavalry, be i t ever bo good and so nu the enemy only. N o w the execution of such merous, to defeat regular cavalry. There i s no a charge i s about the most d i f f i c u l t matter doubt that 80 far as individual horsemanship that can be asked from cavalry. It i s ex and swordsmanship i s concerned, no regular tremely d i f f i c u l t to preserve perfect order and cavalry ever approached the irregulars of tho s o l i d i t y in an advance at increasing pace, nations of horse-warriors of the East; and yet e s p t K s i a l l yi f there i s much^ not quite level the very worst of European regular cavalries ground to go over. The d i f f i c u l t y and im has always defeated them in the f i e l d . From the portance of riding straight forward i s here defeat of the Huns at Ohalops (451) to tho se shown; for unless every rider rides s t r a i g l i t poy mutiny of 185T, there i s not a single in to his point, there arises a pressure in tho stance where the splendid but irregular horse ranks, which i s soon rolled back from the cen men ofthe East have broken a single regiment of t r e to the f l anks, and from the flanks to the regular cavalry in an actual charge. Their i r centre; the horses get excited and uneasy, their regular swarms, charging without concert or unequal epeed and temper comes into plaj% and compactness, cannot make any impression npon soon the whole line i s straggling along in any the s o l i d , rapidly moving mass. Their supe thing but a straight allignment, and with any riority can only appear when the tactical for thing but that closed solidity which alone can mation of the regulars i s broken, and the com insure success. Then, on arriving in front of bat of man to man has i t s turn; but tho wild the enemy, i ti s evident that the borses will at racing of the irregulars toward their opponents tempt to refus^ running into tho standing or can have no such r e s u l t . It has only been when moving mass opposite, and t l i a t the riders must regular cavalry, in pursuit, have abandoned prevent their doing so ; otherwise the charge i s their lineformation and engaged in single com 6UT6 to f a i l . The r i d e r , therefore, must not only bat, that irregulars, suddenly turning round and have the firm resolution to break into the ene seizing the favorable moment, have defeated my sl i n e , but he must also be perfectly mastci' them;indeed, thisstratagem has made up almost of his horse. The regulations of different a r - tho whole of the tactics of irregulars against mies give various rules for the mode of advance regulars, ever since the wars of the Parthians of the charging cavalry, but they a l l agree in and the Bomang. Of thisthere i sno better exam t h i sp oint, that the l i n e ,i f possible, begins to ple than that of Napoleon s dragoons in Egypt, move at a walk, then t r o t , at from 800 to 150 yards from the enemy canter, gradually increase undoubtedly the worst regular cavalry then existing, which defeated in every instance the ing to a gallo p, and at from 20 to 30 yards from most splendid of irregular horsemen, the M a m the enemy f u l l speed. All such regulations, how elukes. Napoleon said of them, 2 Mamelukes e v e r , are subject to many exceptions; tho state were decid^ly superior to 8 Frenchmen ; 100 of the ground, the weather, the condition of the Worses, &c., must bo taken into consideration in Frenchmen wei:e a match for 100 Mamelukes; Fi'enchmen generally beat 300 Mamelukes; every practical cas e. If in a charge of cavalry yoo 1,000 Frenchmen in every instance defeated against cavalry both parties actually meet, which i s by far tho most unconmion case in 1,500 Mamelukes. However great may be the cavalry engagements, the swords are of l i t t l e superiority in a charge of that body of cavalry which best preserves i t s tactical formation, i ti s a v a i l during tho actual shock. It i s the mo evident that even this body must, after the suc mentum of one mass which breaks and scatters tho other. The moral element, bravery, i shere cessful charge, be comparatively disordered. s not equally deci a t once transformed into material force; the The success of tho charge i sive on every point; many men are irretrievably bravest squadron will ride on with the greatest engaged iu single combat or pursuit; and i ti s s e l f c o n f i d e n c e , resolution, rapidity, e n s e m b l e ^ comparatively but a small portion, mostly be and s o l i d i t y . Thus i ti s that no cavalry can do great things unless i t has plenty of dash longing to the second rank, which remains in i n e . This i s the most dangerous about i t . But as soon as the ranks of one party some kind of l moment for cavalry; a very small body of fresh are broken, the swords, and with them individ troops, thrown upon i t , would snatcli the victory ual horsemanship, come into i > l a y . A portion from i t s hands. To rally quickly after a charge i s a tl e a s t of tho victorious troop has also to give therefore the criterion of a really good cavalry, up i t st a c t i c a l formation, in order to m o w with ti s in this point that not only young but the sword the harvest of victory. Thus the and i

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was defeat.^Tho charge may be m ^e alsp otherwise expenenced and "brave troops are result in various Tacticians distinguish deficient. The British cavalry, riding the most the charge formations. en muraille^ when the squadrons spirited horses, are especially apt to get out of of the charging line have none or but very hand, and have almost everywhere suffered se small intervals between each other; the charge verely for it {e. gr., at Waterloo and Balaklava). with intervals, where there are from 10 to The pursuit, on the rally beipg sounded, is gener 20 yards from squadron to squadron; the ally left to some division^ or squadrons, specially charge en kihelon^ where the successive squad or by general regulations designated for this ser rons break off one after the other from one vice ; while the mass of the troops re-form to he wing, and thus reach the enemy not simul ready for all emergencies. For the disorganized taneously but in succession, which form may state, even of the victors, after a charge, is in be much strengthened by a squadron in open ducement enough to always keep a reserve in column on the outward rear of the squadron hand which may he launched in case of failure forming the first khelon / finally, the charge in in the first instance; and thus it is that the first column. This last is essentially opposed to rule in cavalry tactics has always been, never to the whole of the former modes of charging, engage more than a portion of the disposable which are all of tbem but modifications of the . forces at a time. This general application of line attack. The line was the general and funreserves will explain the variable nature of large damentfd form of all cavalry charges up to Na cavalry combats, where the tide of victory ebbs poleon. In the whole of the 18tti century, ^ tv e and flows to and fro, either party being beaten find cavalry charging in column in one case in his turn until the last disposable reserves only, i. e. when it had to break through a sur bring the power of their unbroken order to bear rounding enemy. But Napoleon, whose cavalry upon the disordered, surging mass, and decide was composed of biave men but bad riders, had, the action. Another very important circum to make up for the tactical imperfections of his stance is the ground. No arm is so much con mounted troops by some new contrivance. He trolled by the ground as cavalry. Heavy, deep began to send his cavalry to the charge in deep soil will break the gallop into a slow canter; columns, thus forcing the front ranks to ride an obstacle which a single horseman would clear forward, and throwing at once a far greater without looking at it, may break the order and number of horsemen upon the selected point of solidity of the line; and an obstacle easy to attack than could have been done by a line atr clear for fresh horses will bring down animals tack. The desire of acting with masses, during that have been trotted and galloped about with the .campaigns succeeding that of 1807, became out food from early morning. Again, an un- with Napoleon a sort of monomania. He in foreseen obstacle, by stopping the ad v ice and vented formations of columns which weroi per entailing a change of front and formation, may fectly monstrous, and which, happening to be bring the whole line within reach of the enemys successful in 1809, were adhered to in the later ilank attacks. An example of how cavalry campaigns, aijd helped to lose him many a battle. iittacks should not bo made, was Murats great He formed columns of whole divisions either charge at the battle of Leipsic. He formed 14,- of infantry or of cavalry, by ranging deployed 000 horsemen intoono deep mass, and advanced battalions and regiments one behind tlie other. on the Russian infantry which had just been re This was first tried with cavalry at Eckmtthl, pulsed in an attack on the village of Wachau. in 1809, where 10 regiments of cuirassiers The French horse approached at a tro t; about charged in column, 2 regiments deployed in 600 or 800 yards from the allied infantry they fron^ 4 sinjijajiitopa at distances of broke into a canter; in the deep ground the about 66 yards. 'With infantry, columns of horses soon got fatigued, and the impulse of the whole divisions, one battalion deployed behind charge was spent by the time they reached the the other, were formed at "NVagram. Such squares. Only a few battalions which had suf manuiuvres might not be dangerous against fered severely were ridden over. Passing round tiie slow and methodical Austrians of the the other squares, the mass galloped on through time, but in every later campaign, and with the second line of infantry, without doing any more active enemies, they ended in defeat. harm, and finally arrived at a line of ponds and We have seen what a pitiable end the great morasses which put a stop to their progre^. charge of Miirat at Wachau, in the same forma The horses were completely blown, the men in tion, came to. The disastrous issue of DErlons disorder, the regiments mixed and uncontrol great infantry attack at Waterloo was caused lable ; in this state two Prussian regiments and by its being made with this formation. With the Cossacks of the guard, in all less than 2,000 cavalry the monster column appears especially men, surprised their flanks and drove them all faulty, as it absorbs the most valuable resources pell mell back again. In this instance there was into one unwieldy mass, which, once launched, neither a reserve for unforeseen emergencies, nor is irretrievably out of hand, and, whatever sueany proper regard for pace and distance; the

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cess it may liavo in front, is always at the mercy of smaller bodies well in hand that are thrown, on its flanks. With the materials for ono such column, a second lino and one or two reserves might be prepared, the charges of which might not have such an effect at first, but would certainly by their repetition ultimately obtain greater re sults with smaller losses. In most services, in deed, this charge in column has either been abandoned, or it has been retained as a inero theoretical curiosity, while for nil practical pur poses the formation of largo bodiesi of cavalry is made in several lines at charging intervals, supporting and relieving each other during a prolonged engngement. Napoleon, too, was the first to form hia cavalry into masses of several divisions, callcd corps of cavalry. As Ameans of simplifying the transmission of com mands in a largo army, such an organization of the rescrvo cavalry is eminently necessary ; but when maintained on the field of battle, when these corps had to act in a body, it has never produced any adequate results. In fact, it was one of the main causes of that faulty formation of monster columns which we have already men tioned. In the p re s e n t European armies, the cav alry corps is generally retained, and in the Prus sian, Russian, and Austrian services, there are even establisiied normal formations and general rules for the action of such a corps on the field of battle, all of which aro based on the formation of a first and second line and a reserve, together with indications for the placing of the horse artil lery attached to such a body.We have hitherto spoken of the action of cavalry so far only as it is directed against cavalry. But one of the principal purposes for which this arm is used in battle, in foct its principal use now-a-days, is its action against infantry. Wo have seen that in the 18th century infantry, in battle, scarcely ever'formed square against cavalry. It received the charge in line, and if the attack was direct ed against a flank, a few companies wheeled back, en potencc, to meet it. Frederic the Great instructed his infantry never to form square except when an isolated battalion was suiprised by cavalry; and if in such a case it had formed square, it may march straight against the enemys horse, drive them away, and, never heeding their attacks, procecd to its destination." The thin lines of infantry in those days met the cavalry charge with full confidence in the effect of their fire, and indeed repelled it often enough ; but where they once got broken, tho disaster was irreparable, as at Hohenfriedberg and Zorndorf. A t present, when tho column has replaced tho lino in so many c^es, tho rule is t lat infantry always, where it is practicable, forrii square to receive cavalry. There are indeed plenty of instances in modern wars wherogood airy has surprised infantry in lino and had to fly from its fire ; but they form tho exception. The question noA V is, whether cavalry has a fair chance of breaking squares of infantry! Opinions arc divided ; but it appears to bo generally ad mitted that, under ordinary circumstances, a good, intact infantry, not siiattored by artillery fire, stands a very great chance against cavalry, while with yotmg foot soldiers, who have lost tho edge of their energy and steadiness by a hard days fighting, by heavy losses and long exposure to fire, a resolute cavalry has tho best of it. Thero aro exceptions, such as tho charge of tho German dragoons at Garcia Hernandez (in 1812), where oacli of 3 squadrons broko an intact French square ; but as a rule, a cavalry commander will not find it advisable to launch his men on such infantry. At Waterloo, Neys grand charges with tho mass of tho French re serve cavalry on Wellingtons ccntro, could not break tho English and German squares, because these troops, sheltered a good deal behind tho crest of the ridge, had suffered very little from the preceding cannonade, and were almost all as good as intact. Such chargcs, therefore, aro adapted for the last stage of a battle only, when the infantry has been a good deal shattered and exhausted botli by actual engagement and by passivity under a concentrated artillery fire. And in such cases tlicy act decisively, as at Borodino and Ligny, especially when supported, as in both these cases, by infantry reserves. Wo cannot enter here into the various duties which cavalry m.ay be called upon to perform on outpost, patrolling, and escorting service, &c. A few words on the general tactics of cavalry, however, may find a place. Infantry hav ing more and more become tho main stay of battles, tho manoeuvres of the mounted arm arc necessarily more or less subordinate to those of the former. And as modern tactics aro founded upon tho admixture and mutual support of the 3 arms, it follows that for at let a portion of tho cavalry, all independent action is entirely out of tho question. Thus the cpalry of an army is always divided into 2 distinct bodies: divisional cavalry and reserve cavalry. The first consists of horsemen attached to tho vari ous divisions and corps of infantry, ond under the same commander with them. In battle, its office is to seize any favorable moments which may offer themselves to gain an advan tage, or to disengage its own infantry when attacked by superior force?. Its action is natu rally limited, and its strength is not sufficient to act any way independently. The cavalry of reserve, the mass of the cavdry with the army, acta in the same subordinate position toward the whole infantry of the army as the divisional cavalry does toward the infantry division to which it belong. Accordingly, the reserve

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cavalry will be held in band till a favorable moment for a great blow offers itself, either to repel a grand infantry or cavalry attack of the enemy, or to execute a charge of its own of a decisive nature. From what has been stated above, it will be evident that the proper use of the cavalry of reserve is generally during the lat ter stages of a great battle; but then it may be and often has been decisive. Such immense suc cesses as Seydlitz obtained with his horse are com pletely out of the question now; but still, most great battles of modern times have been very ma terially influenced by the ^ r t cavalry has played in them. But the great importance of cavalry lies in pursuit. Infantry supported by artillery need not despair against cavalry so long as it preserves its order and steadiness; but once broken, no matter by what cause, it is a prey to the mounted men that are launched against it. There is no running away from the horses; even on diflScult ground, good horsemen can make their way; and an energetic pursuit of a beaten army by cavalry is always the best and the only way to secure the full fruits of the victory. Thus, whatever supremacy in battles may have been gained by infantry, cavalry still remains an indispensable arm, and will always remain so; and now, as heretofore, no army can enter the lists with a fair chance of success unless it has a cavalry that can both ride and fight. -the promised rank, and was afterward poaited, Bucceaslvelyi aa general of artUlery, directorgeDetdL'Of^rtjyfici^ons, and gOveimor;bf Flan ders. Hk Wihele life was spent in coimeotion with therdefilcitoeBof the Low Oountries. At the siege of in 1674, he invented aod for the first time made nse of the small mortars, called iCohoms, f(r throwing grenades, and in the succeeding year elicited the applause of Vauban by BuccesefuUy crossmg the Mense, and carrying a bastion which was con^dered as prote<^d the river. After the peace of N im ^ e o (1078), he was employed in strength ening variotu alrady strong places; Nime^en^ Breda, Ma&nheim, since dismantled, and Bergen-opi^m attest the value of his. aystemi The last-named place he considered his masterpiece, although it was taken after a long siege in 1747, by Marshal de LowendaL During tbe c&mpaii^ fpom 1683 to 1691^ he in active service. The siege of Namur, in 1692, gave him am opportunity to test his system against thai of Vambwa, for these' W o great engineers were there opposed to each other, Oodiom in defending a work which he h ^ oon'Btruoted to protect the citadel, and Yanban in attempting to reduce it. Ooehornnmde an obsti nate defence, but being dangerously wounded, was compelled to surrender to hi rival, who handsomuy acknowledged his bravery and skill. H w>as afterward engaged at the attack on Trarba<^vX^^^> dded in retakiog^ Haamr. In the war of the Spanish succession; ha besieged successively Yenk>o, Ste^ensworth^ Btiremonde, Li^ge, and in 1703 took Boon, on the Ehine, after 8 daysVcannonade ci heavyiwtillery aided by a fire of grenades C oehorn from.500^ODl^ea& Next he passed into Butch o6HOBK, or OOHOBN, Menuo van, baron, a Flandergi, where he eained several successes over 'BuAoh general and engineer, born in Friesiand the French, and directed the siege of Huy. This in IM lydiedat the Hague, Magr 17, 004, At was his last service, for he died soon afterward the age of 16 he received a oaptams commission, of apoplexy, while waiting a conference with distiogQi^ed himself at the siege of Maestricht, the duke of Marlborough on the plan of a new and afterward at the battles of ^nef^ Casael, St. campaign. Ooehorns greatest work, Nieuwe DeniS) and Fleurus. Daring the int^vdb of Vettinghouio^ was published at Leeuwarden, in fictive! duty he devoted much attention to tie folio, 1685, and translated into several foreign subject of fortification, with the view of eqnallanguages. His plans are mostly adapted to the ianglh chances b^ween besiegers And besieged, Dutch fortresses, or to those which are similarly the ikew .system of his contanporary ^ ITauban situated on ground but a few feet above water having given great; advantaged to the latter. level. Wherever it was practicable, he encircled Whil>ocBiiparatively a young man he gaioed a his works with two ditches, the outermost full of na!ne, aa an engineer, and by>thdtime he had water; the inner dry, and usually of the width reached mid^e life was recognized as^the best of about 126 feet, serving as tiplace for oflScer of that arm in the Dutch service. The the besieged, and in some cases for detachments prince of Grange promised him a calonelcy, but of cavalry. The theory of his system, both of being rather remiss in fulfilling the |)ledge, he attack and defence, was the superiority of a retiiw itt disgust with the intention of offeriug combined mass over isolated fire. Profession his servHses to the French. His wife and 8 ally, Ooehorn was accused of wasteful expendi ohildr^, however, were arrested by the order ture of life, ill which respect he contrasted un f the prince as hostages for bis return, which favorably with Vauban, who was sparing of men. quickly brought him back, whereon lie received

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Personally, h wns blunt, honest, bmve, and a hater of adulation. Ho refused inducements offered by several foreign governments. Gharles II. of England knighted him. He was buried at Wijkel, near Sneek, in Frieeland, and a mon ument "was dedicated there to his memory. parapet was soon built overhanging, with holes betwden tho prcyecting stones on whicli it rest ed, so as to allow tho besieged to see tho foot of tho wall and reach an enemy who might have got so far by direct missiles from above, fho ditch, no doubt, was also introduced at an early period, surrounding tho whole wall, and serving as the chief obstacle against access to it. Fiiially, the defensive capabilities of mason ry walls were developed to tho highest point by adding at interval* towers which projected from the wall, thus giving it a flanking de F c ^ ^ ic o tiM fence by missiles tlirown from them at such FOS.TlflOATl0lT. This subject ia some troops as assailed the spaco between two times divided into defensive fortification, whMi towers. Being in most c.ises higher tlian tho provides the means of rendering a givea local- wall, and separated from its top by cross para ity," permanently or for a short time Qnly^ ca b pets, they commanded it and formed each a bie of defence; and offensive forti^cfl^tion^w^,i,c^i small fortress, which had to bo taken singly contains the rules for conducting a si^ge. Mo after tho defenders had been driven from the shall, however, treat of it here under the three main wall itself. If wo add to this, that in hads of P eehanknt F oetifioa H O J?, or ^he some cities, especially in Greece, there was a mode of putting a locality, in time f peace, kind of citadel, on some commanding height in in such a state of defence as to com^} tho side the walls (acropolis), forming a reduit and enemy to attack it by a regular siege; the art second line of defence, wo shall have indicated of Sieges ; and Field F oktifioation, or the, con tho most essential points of the fortification of struction of temporary works to strengthen a tho masonry epoch.But from the 14th to tho given point in consequence of the momQntju'y end of tho 16th century the introduction of ar importance which it may acquire u n d e rlie tillery fundamentally changed the modes of peculiar circumstances of a campaign. I. P eb- .T.ttacking fortified places. From this period M A U E N T F obtifioatiox. Tlio oldest form of, dates that immense literature on fortification f o r t i f i c a t i o n appears to be the stockade,* which which has produced .systems and methods in up to the end of the 18th century was stiU the numerable, part of which have lound a more national system with the Turks (^palan^'), and or less extensive practical application, while is even now in full use ia the Indo-Chinese pen- other.s, and not always the least ingenious, have ninsula among the Burmese. It consists of a been passed over as merely theoretical curiosi double or triple row of stout trees, planted up ties, until at later periods the fruitful ideas con right and near each other in the ground, forming, tained in them have been again drawn into a wall all around the town or camp toi)e defend daylight by moro fortunate successors. This ed. Darius in his expedition among the Scythi has been the fate, as wo shall see, of the very ans, Cortes at Tabasco in Mexico, and Oap^ Cook author who forms, if we may say so, the bridge in Few Zealand, all came ii^ contact ^ith s^ch between the old masonry system and the new stockades. Sometimes the space bct'w^n tho system of earthworks merely revetted with rows of trees was fiUcd up witli earth ; in otlicr masonry in those places which the enemy can instances the trees were connected and hekl to not see from a distance. The first effect of tho gether by wicker work. Tho next step was tho introduction of artillery was an increase in tho erection of masonry walls instead of stockades, thickness of the walls and in the diameter of this plan secured greater durabihty, at tho tho towers at the expense of their height. same time that it rendered tho assault far moro ^ These towers were now called roundels (rondifficult i and from tho days of Nineveh and dclli), and were made large enough to hold sev Babylon down to the closc of tho middle ages, eral pieces of cannon. To enable the besieged masonry walls formed tho exclusive means of to work cannon on tho wall too, a rampart of fortification among all tho moro civilized na earth was thrown up behind it so ofi to give it tions. Tho walls wero made so high that ca- the necessary width. We shall soon see how thie colado was rendered difficult; they were made earthwork gradually encroached on the wall, thick enough to offer a lengthened resistance to 60 as in some cases to supersede it altogether., tiie battering ram, and to allow the defenders Albert Dttrer, the celebrated German pointer to movo about freely on the top, sheltered by a developed this system of roundels to its high thinner masonry parapet Avith battlements, est perfection. He made them perfectly inde tlirough tho embrasures of which arrows and pendent forts, intersecting the continuity of other missiles might be shot or thrown against the wall at certain intervals, and with casethe assailants. To increase the defence, tho mated batteries enfilading tho ditch; of hi$

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masonry parapets, not more than 8 feet high ifi uncovereu (visible to the besieger and subiect to his direct fire); anti in order to complete the defence of thoditch, he proposed caponniirea^ CAsematcd works on the solo of th ditch, hidden from the eyes of the besiegers, with enibra8\ires on cither side so as to enfila.le the ditch as far as the next angle of the iK.iygon. Al most all these proposals were now inventions * , and if none except the casemates found favor with his age, wo shall see that in th latest and most nnportant systems of fortification they have all been adopted and developed ac cording to the altered circumstances of modern times.About the same time, a chonge was adopted in the shape of the enkrged towers, from which modern systems of fortification may bo considered to date'. The ronnd shape had the disadvantage that neither the curtain (th piece of wall between two towers) rtor th next adjoining towers could reach with their fire every point in front of an intermediate tower; there were small angles close to the wall, where the enemy, if he once reached them, could not be touched by the fire of the fortress. To avoid this, the tower was changed into an irregalat pentagon', with one side turned toward the in terior of the fortress, and 4 toward the open country. This pentagon was called a bastion. To prevent repetitions and obscurity, we shall now at once proceed to give th description and nomenclature of bastionary defence, based on on of those systems which show, all its essential particulars. Fig. 1 (see next p^e) rep resents 8 fronts of a hexagon fortified ac cording to Vauban's .first system. The left side represents the mere outline as used in the geometrical delineation of th work; the 1 ight gives the ramparts, glacis, &c., in detail. Th entire side of the polygon f f " is not formed by a continuous rampart; dt each end, tlie portions d 'f and "/" are left open, iand tho i?pacc thus arising is closed by th projecting pcntagonfil bastion d' ft' a' c' e'. The lines a' b and a c' form the faces, the lines V d' and e' e the flanks of th bastion. Th points where faccs and flanks meet are called the shoulder points. The line a' which goes from th centre of the circle to tho point of the bastion, is called the capital. The line " <i', forming part of tho original circumference of the hexa gon, is the curtain. Thus every polygon will have as many bastions r.s .sltlo s. Tho bastion maybe either fUll, if tho Avholo p o n to n is filled up with eorth as high as the terreplein of the rampart (th place where the guns stand), or hollow (empty) if the rampart slopes down, immediately behind th gnns, into the interior. In If d h a c e is a full bastion; tho next one to til0 right, of whicli one half only is seen, is a hollow one. Bastions and curtains together constitute the enceinte, or body of the ilace. In them we notice, on th terreplein, irst the parapet, constnicted in front so as to shelter the defenders, and then th ramps, on the intenor slope ( ), by whick th communi cations le~interior are kept up. The. rampart is high enough to cover the houses of th town from direct lire, and tli parai>et thick nooflh to ol^r lengthened resistance to havy artiSery. All round th rampart is th ^ tc h t t t t f and in it are several classes of out works. First, the ravelin or demilune h i vifva. front of th cm-tain, a triangular w6rk with two &aes, h I and I m, each with a rampart and para pet to receive artillery. Th open rear of any work ia called the gorge; thus in the ravelin, ibm,

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the parapet and glacis are called banquettess lalfie bastion d a, is tho gorge. The parapet of and servo as stands for infantry to step on and tlie ravelin is about 3 or 4 feet longer than the fire over the protecting parapet. It will be parapet ^ tl^ body of tho place, so that it ia readily observed from the diagram that th|:uns cotnmaQded by it, and tho guns of the latter raay placed on the flanks of the bastions Bweej) the ift case of need fire away over it. Between whole ditch in front of the adjoining bastion^. ^ 9 eurtaia and r a T e l i n there is ^a long and Thus the face a' V is covered by the fire of the D flT P O 'W detached work in the ditch, the teflank c e'\ and the face a' c' by the flank A mUWif ^ h destined principally to cover tho On the other hand, the inner faces of two iadbreaching f i r e ; it is low and too joining bastions cover tho faces of the ravelitt naatrow for artillery, and its pampet merely between them, by keeping the ditch in flronAof sQrves for infantry to flank the ditch fire into the ravelin aader their fire. Thns ther is itbe lunette in case of a Buccessful assault. Be portion of the ditoll unprotected by a flanking yond the ditch ia the covered way, nop, boundfire; in this oonsiste tho original and great stei> d l on the inner side by the ditch and on tlie in advance by which the bastionary system in crater sid by the interior slope of the glads, rr r, augurates a new epoch in the history of furtifiwhich from its highest inner boundary line or catlon.-*-The inventor of bastions is not known, Qtmt(erMe) dopes very gradually down into the field. crest of the glacis is again 8 feet or nor is tiie precise date at which they were in more lower than the ravelin, so as to allow troduced; the <Hily thing certain is that they were iavented in Italy, and that San Mushele in the gun* of the fortress to fire over it. Of dopes in thes earthworks the exterior one 1527 constructed twt> bastions in the rampart the body of the place and of the outworks of Verona. All statements respecting earlier ia the ditch (soarp), and the exterior one of the bastions are doubtful. The systems of bastion ary fortification are classed under several na ditoh (from the covered way downward) (k tional schools j the first to be mentipnd is j)i . ioaokrscarp, are generally revetted with mason conlrse that which invented ba=ition9, the Itair ry. Th ssdieat and reeatering angles of the covered way form Targe, roomy, sheltered spot^, ian. The fir^ Italian bastions boratha stamp called places of arms; they are called either of their origin; they were nothing but poljrv salient (o) or reentering (n p), according^ to tho gonal towers or roundels; they scarcely altered angles at which they are situated. To prevent the former character of the fortificatioD, e x c ^ as regarded tiie flanking fire. Thd'enceint re^ the covered way from being enfiladed, traverses or cross parapets are constructed across it at in mained a masonry wall, exposed to the direct tervals, leaving only small passages at the end fire of the enemy; the rampart of earth thrown up behind serv^ chiefly to give room to place nearest the glacis. Sometimes there is a small and handle artillery, and its inner slope was alap work constructed to cover the communication across the ditch from the tenaille to the ravelin; revetted with masonry, as in the old town wj^a. it is called a eaponniire, and consists of a narrow I t was not till a later dav that the parapet was pathw^y covered on either side by a parapet, the constructed of earthworks, but even then the fi re exterior surfaces of which elope down gf^ually ^hole of its outer slope up to the top w vetted with masonry exposed to the direct fire like a glacis. There is such a caponniSre between of the enemy. The curtains were very long, the tenaille g h i and the ravdin 1. The section given in fig. 2 will assist in renderin'g from 300 to 550 yards. The bastions were very small, the size of large roundels, the flanks al this description cleaier. A is the terreplein of ways perpendicular to the curtains. Now as it tho body of the place, B is the mrapet, Othe ma is a rnle in fortification that the best flanking sonry revetment of the scarp, D the ditch, E tho eunette, a smaller and deeper ditch drawn across fire always comes from a line peTOendicular to the middle of the larger one, F tbe masonry the line to be> flanked, it is evident that the chief object of the old Italian flank was to cover, revetment of the counterscarp, O the covered Dot the ahort and distant face of the adjoining way, H the glacis. The steps show^S^hlnd Fio. 2.

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bastion, but tbe long stralghtrme of the curtain. "Where the curtain became too long, a flat, ob tuse-angled bastion was constructed on the naiddle of it^ and cdled a platform {fiata forma). The were not constructed on the shoulder point, but a little retired behind the rampart of tbe fa^s, 80 that the shoulder points projected and were supposed to shelter them ; and each flank had two batteries, a lower one, and a higher one a little to the rear; sometimes even a casemate in the scarp wall of the flank on the bottom of the ditch. Add to this a diteh, and you have the whole of the original Italian sys tem; there were no ravelins, no tenailles, no covered way, no glacis. But this system was soon improved. The curtains were shortened, the bastions were enlarged. The length of the inner aide of tlie polygon ( / / " , flg. 1) was fixed ftt from 250 to 800 yards. The flanks were made longer, ^ of the side of the polygon, ^ of the length of the curtain. Thus, though they remained perpendicular to the curtain and had x)ther defects, as we shall see, they now began t6 give more protection to the face of the next bastion. The bastions were made foil, and in their centre a cavidier was often erected, that is, a work with faces and flanks parallel to those of the bastion, but with a rampart and parapet *80 much higher as to admit of its firing over the parapet of the bastion. The ditch was veiy wide and deep, the counterscarp running genefr ally parallel to the face of the bastion; but ab this direction of the counterscarp prevented the part of the flank nearest the shoulder from se^ ing and flanking the whole of the ditch, it was subsequently done away with, and the counter scarp was traced so that its prolongation p a ^ d , through the shoulder point of the next bastion. The covered way was then introduced (first in the citadel of Milan, in the 2d quarter of the 16th century, first described by Tarti^lia in 1554). It served as &place of concentration as *well as of retreat for sallying parties, and from its intro duction the scientific and energetic use of ofiensive movements in the defence of fortresses may be said to date; to increase its utility the places of arms were introduced, which give more room, and of which the reentering angles also give a capital flanking fire to the covered way. To render'the access to the covered way still more difficult, rows of palisades were erected on the glacis, one or two yards from its crest, but in this position they were soon destroyed by the enemys fire; after the middle of the 17th cen tury, therefore, they were placed, at thesugge^ tion of the Frenchman Maudin, on the covered way, covered by the glacis. The gates were ia the middle of the curtain; to cover them, ft crescent-shaped work was placed in the mid dle of the ditch in front of them; but for the same reason that the towers were transformed into bastions, the half-moon {d^mi-lune) was soon changed into a triangular work^the pres ent ravelin. This was still veiy small, but be* came larger when it was found Uiat not only did it serve as a bridge-head across the ditch, but also covered flanks and curtains against the enemys fire, gave a cross fire in front of the capitals tlie bastions, and effectually flanked the covered way. Still tliey were made very small, so that tiie prolongAtiOTi'of their faces reached the b ^ y of the plaae in the curtain point (the extremity of the curtain). The princ pal faults of the Italian mode of fortification were the following: 1. The bad direction of the flank. After the introduc tion of ravelins and covered ways, the curtain be came less and less the point of attack; the faccs of the bastions now were chiefly assailed. To cover these well, the prolongation of the faces should have met the curtaiu at the very point where the flank of the next bastion was erected, and this flank should have been perpendicular or nearly so to this prolonged lino (callcd the lino of dcfence). In that case there would have been an eflfective flanking fire all along the ditch and front of the bastion. As it was, the line of de fence Avas neither perpendicular to the flanks nor did it join the curtain at the curtain point; it intersected the curtain .at i, or ^ of its length. Thus, the dircct fire of the flank was more likely to injurp the garrison of the opposite flank than the assailants of the next bastion. 2. There was an evident want of provision for a prolonged dcfence after the cnceintc had been breachcd and successfully assaulted at one sin gle point. 3. The small ravelins but imper fectly covered the curtains and flanks, and received but a poor flanking fire from them. 4. The great elevation of the rampart, which was all faced or revetted with masonry, exposed, inmost cases, aheight of 15 to 20 feet of masonry to the direct fire of the enemy, and of course this masonry was soon destroyed. We shall lind that it took almost two centuries to eradi cate this prejudice in favor of uncovered mason ry, even after the Netherlands had proved its use* iessness. The best engineers and authors belong ing to the Italian school were: San Michele (died 1559), fortified Napoli di Romania in Greece, and Candia, and built Fort Lido near Venice; Tartaglia (about 1550); Alghisi da Oarpi, Giro lamo Maggi, and Giacomo Castriotto, who about the end of the 16th century all wrote on forti fication. Paciotto of Urbino built the citadels of Turin and Antwerp (15G0-70). The later Italian authors on fortification, Marchi, Busca, Floriani, Rosetti, introduced many improve ments, but none of these were original. They were mere plagiarists of more or less skill; they copied most of their devices from the Ger man Daniel Speckle, and the remainder from the Netherlandcrs. They all belong to the 17th

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ccntury, and were completely eclipsed by the rapid development of fortificatory science which at that time took place in Germany, the Nether lands, and France.The defects of the Italian system of fortification were soon discovered in Germany. The first man to point out the chief defect of the elder Italian scliool, the small bastions and long cnrtains, was a German engi neer, Franz, who fortified for Charles V. the town of Antwerp. In the council lield to try the plan, he insisted upon larger bastions and shorter curtains, but was outvoted by the duko of Alva and the other Spanish generals, who believed in notliing but the routine of the old Italian system. Other German fortresses were distinguished by the adoption of casemated gal leries upon the principle of DtXrcr, as Ktistrin, fortified in 153Y-'o8, and Jfilicli, fortified a few years later by an engineer known under the name of Master John {M(n*Ur Johann). the man who first broke completely thrnuy;h the fettei8 of tho Italian school and Iwd d vn the principles on which the whole of the bubscquent systems of bastiohary fortification are founded, was Daniel Speckle, eBR.>nef to the town of Strasbourg (died 1589). His chief prin ciples were: 1. That a fortress becomes stronger tho more sides there are to tlie polygon which forms the enceinte, tho different fronts being thereby enabled to give a better support to ctwh other; consequently, tho nearer tho outline to bo defended comes to a straight line, tho better. This principle, demonstrated as an ori ginal discovery with a great show of mathe matical learning by Connontaigno, was thus very well known to Speckle 150 years earlier. 2. Acute-angled bastions are bad; so are obtuseangled; tho salient angle should be a right one. Tiiough correct in his opposition to acute sa lients (the smallest admissible salient angle is now generally fixed at G O *), tho partiality of his time for right-angled salients made him hostile to the obtuse salient, which is indeed very vantageous and unavoidable in polygons with many sides. In fact, this appears to have been merely a concession to tho prejudices of his time^ for the diagrams of what he considers his strong est method of fortification all have obtuse-angled bastions. 3. The Italian bastions are far too snifdl; a bastion must bo large. Consequentlyi Speckles bastions are larger than those of Cormontaigne. 4. Cavaliers are necessary in every bastion and on every curtain. This was a con sequence of the system of siege of his time, in which high cavaliers in tho trendies played a great part. But in Speckles intention, tho cavaliers were to do jnoro than resist tliese; they are real coitpurts provided beforehand in the bastion, forming a second line of defence ofter the onceinte has beenbreachcd and storm ed. Tho whole of the credit generally given to Vauban and Cormontaigne for cavaliers forming permanent coupures, is therefore in reality duo to Speckle. 5. A portion, at least, of the flank, and better still the whole of the Hank of ^ b^ion, must be perpendicular to tho line of defence, and tho flank be erected in tho point where tho lino of defence crosses the cur tain. This important principle, tho alleged dis covery of which forms tho greater part of tho glory of the French engineer Pagan, was thus publicly proclaimed 70 years before Pagan. 6. Casemated galleries are necessary for tho defence of tho ditch; consequently Speckle has them both on the faces and flanks of tho bas tion, but only for infantry; if he had m a^ them lai'ge enough for artillery, he would in this respect havo been fully up to tho latest imirovenients. 7. To bo useful, tho ravelin must JO as large as possible; accordingly, Speckles ravelin is the largest ever prom)sed. Now, Vaubans improvements upon Pagan consist partly, and Oormontaignes improvements upon Vauban consist almost entirely, in tho succes sive enlargenient of the ravelin; but Speckles ravelin is a good deal larger than even Cormontaignes. 8. The covered way is to be strength ened as much os possible. Spcdkle was the first to see the immense importance of the covered way, and he strengthened it accord ingly. Tho crests of the glacis and of tho counterscarp were fortned cn crimailUre (like the edge of a saw), so as to render enfilading fire ineffective. Cormontaigne, again, took up this idea of Speckle's; but ho retained tho tra verses (short ramparts across the covered wav against enfilading fire), which Speckle r^ected. Mddern engineers have generally come to the conclusion that Speckles plan is better than Cormontftignes. Speckle, beside, was tho first to place artillery on the placcs of arms of the covered way. 9. No pieco of masonry is to bo exposed to tho eye and direct fire of the enemy, so that his breaching batteries cannot be estab lished before he has arrived on the crest of tho glacis. This most important principle, though established by Speckle in the 16th century, was not generally adopted until Cormontaigne; even Vauban exposes a good deal of his mason ry. (See 0, fig. 2.) In this short abstract of Speckle's ideas the fundamental principles of all modern bastionary fortification are not only contained but plainly stated, and his system, Avhich even now would afford very good defen sive works, is truly wonderful considering the time in which ho lived. There is not a cele brated engineer in the whole history of modern , fortification who cannot bo proved to hoA'e copied some of his best ideas from this great original source of bastionary defence. Speclclos practical engineering skill was shown in the construction of the fortresses of Ingolstadt, Schlettstadt, Hagenau, Uhn, Colmai*, Basel, and Strasbourg, all of which were fortified

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under his direction.About the same epoch, the struggle for the independence of the Nether lands gave rise to another school of fortifica tion. The Dutch town.s, whose old masonry walls could not bo expccted to resist a regular attack, had to be fortincd against the Spaniards; there wa.s, however, neitner time nor money for the erection of the high masonry bastions and cavaliers of the Italian system. But the nature of the ground olFercd other resources in its low elevation above the water horizon, and conseqiicntly the Dutch, expert in canal and diko building, trusted to the water for their defence. Their system was the cxact counter part of the Italian: wide and shallow wet ditch es, from 14 to 40 yards across; low ramparts without any masonry revetment, but covered by a still lower advanced rampart (faMm-lraie) for the stronger defence of the ditch; numerous outworks in tho ditch, such as ravelins, half moons (ravelins in front of tlio salient of tho bastion), horn and crown works;* and finally, a better use of tho accidents of tho ground than with tho Italians, Tho first town fortified en tirely by earthworks and wet ditches was Breda (1538). Subsequently tho Dutch method re ceived several improvements: a narrow zono of the scarp was revetted with masonry, as tho wet ditches, when frozen over in winter, were easily passed by tho enemy; locks and sluices were constructed in tho ditch, so as to let the water in at the moment when the enemy had begun to sap the hitherto dry bottom; and iBnally, sluices and dikes were constructed for a systematic inundation of tho country around the foot of the glacis. The writers on this elder Dutch method of fortification are Marolois (1027), Freitag (1630), VOlker (16G6), Melder (1670). An application of Speckles maxims to the Dutch method was attempted by Scheither, Neubauer, lleidemann, and Heer (all from 1670 to 1690, and all of them Germans).Of all tho different schools of fortification, the French has enjoyed the greatest popularity; its maxims have found practical application ir\ a great er number of still existing fortresses than those of all the other schools put together. Still, there is no school so poor in original ideas. There is neither a new work nor a new principle in tho whole of the French school whic i is not borrow ed from the Italians, the Dutch, or the Germans. But the great merit of the French is the reduc tion of the art to precise mathematical rules, tho symmetrical arrangement of the proportions of the different lines, and the adaptation of tho scientific ^eory to the varied conditions given by the locdity to be fortified. Errard of Barle-Duc (1594), commonly called the father of French fortification, has no claim to the appel lation ; his jBanks form an acute angle with tho curtain, so as to be still more ineffective than those of the Italians. A more important name is Pagan (1646). He was the first to introduce in France, and to popularize, Speckles principle that the flanks should bo perpendicular to tho lines of defence. His bastions are roomy; the proportions between the lengths of faces, flanks, and curtains are very good; the lines of de fence are never longer than 240 yards, so that the whole of the ditch, but not the covered way, is within musket range from the flanks. His ravelin is larger than that of the Italians, and has a reduit or keep in its gorge, so as to admit of resistance when its rampart has already been taken. He covers the faces of the bastions with a narrow detached work in the ditch, called a counter-guard, a work which had already been used by the Dutch (tlie German Dillich appears to have first introduced it). His bastions have a double rampart on the faces, tl^e second to servo as a coupuro; but the ditch between tho two ramparts is entirely without flanl>Ing firo. The man who made the French school the first in Europe was Vauban (1633-1707), marshal of France. Although hia real military glory rests upon his two great inventions in the attack of fortresses (ricochet fire and parallels),.still he is popularly better known as a constructor of them. 'VVhat we have said of tho French school is true of Vaubans method in the highest de gree. We see in his constructions as great a va riety of forms as is compatible with the bastionary system 5 but there is nothing original among them, much less any attempt to adopt other forms than the bastionary. But the ar rangement of the details, the proportions of the lines, the profiles, and the adaptation of tho theory to the ever-varying requirements of tho locality, are so ingenious, that they appear per fection in comparison to the works of his prede cessors, so that scientific and systematic fortifica tion may be said to date from him. Vauban, * A horn work Is ft bastionary front, two half bastions, n . however, did not write aline on his method of for cur(.iin, nn<l ft ravelin mlviinci'il in front of the main ditch tification, but ftom the great number of fortresses and closoil on cach ei<!o by a strr.lgUt i:no of rainpart and flitch, which is alli^ned upon the faces of the bastions of th constructed by him the French engineers have enceinte so as to bo completely flanked by their. Are. A tried to deduce the theoretical rules he follow crown work consists of two such advanced fronts (on# bast'on ed, and thus have been established 8 meth flanked by two half bastions); a double crown work has three friints. In nil these works it is necessary that their rampart ods, called Vaubans first, second, and third should be at least as much lower than that of tho enceinte s systenii. Fig. 1 gives the first system in its the rampart of tho ravelin to malntajn the command of tho CMCcinto over them. The adoption of such outworks, which greatest simplicity. The chief dimensions were: of course wero exceptions, was regulated by tho nature of the outer side of the polygon, from the point of tho ground.

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one Bastion to that of the next, 000 yards (on, an are on the whole good, but still not sufficient fof average): on the middle of this line, a perpen- energetic sallies. The profiles are of a degree dicnbr a B .i of the first; through 4 the lme3 of strength which is still generally adopt^dof d^en6efroma"and a" d\ and d! e^\ From But Yauban still clung to the systeip of re the poiats a" and a\ f of a" a' measured pn the vetting the wliole of the outside of the .ram lines of defence gives the faces a" c' and a o. part with mflsonry, so that at least 15 (eat ;^om the shoulder points o" and h arcs with higlx of masonry was uncovered. This mis th^ W iu 3 c" d' or V e" were dra^n' hetweea take is made in, many of Yaubans fortresses the lined of defence, giving the flanks V df and and once i made can only be remedied^ at C " 6". Draw e" <i!',thQ curtain. The ditch: en*ormou8 expense by widening the ditcji in With radius 80 yards, an arc in front of the front of the faces of the bastions, and coapoint O f the bastion, prolonged by tangents structing e^thwork counterguards to cover the a drawn to this arc from the shoulder points of masonry. 'During the greater part of his Tw Yauban followed his first method; but aft^r the adjoining bastions, gives the counterscarp. The ravelin: from the curtain point is", with 1680 he introduced two other methods, h av i^ radius (v, Q on the^ opposite face 11 for their object to admit of a prolonged defence yar(^ beyona the shoulder-point), draw the aro after the bsistion was breached. For this.pnrr 7 J.Sptil it crosses the prolongation of t^e per pose hetoOlf up an idea of Castriottos, yfhq had pendicular a tins gives the point of the proposed to modernize the old tower and ravelin; the chord to the aro just described fortification "by pacing detached bastions^^isof gives the face, which is continued from the lated, in the 4ltch, in front of the towers. point tmtil it reaches the prolongation of the Yaubans eecpnd and third methods agree m tangent forming the counterscarp of the main this. The ravelin is also made larger, the ra^ditch; the gorge of the ravelin is fixed by this Bonry is a little better covered; the towers a^re line equally, so that the whole of the ditch re- casemated, but badly; the fault that the curtmn niM D S free for the fire of the flanlcs. In front may be breached between bastion and tenajH^ of the curtain, and there alone, Vauban retained is maintained, and renders the detached b^tip^ the Dutch fausse-braie; this had already been partly iUusoiy. Still, Yauban considefed l^is donby the Italian Tloriani before him, and the second aiid third methods as very strong, ^b en newworkhad been called tenailleitenaglia). he handed over to Louis XIY. the plan for the Its faces were in the direction of the lines of fortification of I^andau (second system), said: defence. The ditch4n front of the ravelin was Sire, here is a place that all my art wowd 24 yards wide, the tountersoarj;) parallel to the not suffice to take. This did not prevent Lan^ fades of the ravelin, and the point rounded off. dau from 1>eing taken 8 times during Yau Ih this manner Yauban obtained rtwmy bas bans l i f e ( m S r i ' ^ 8 . a g a i n diortly tions, and kept his flanked salient angles well after his de^th (1713).The errors of Yaubw M vithin musket range; but the simpUcity of were recti^ed by Cormontaigne, whose method these bastions renders the defence of the place may be consid^ered as the perfection of the basr 1752) impossible as soon as the face of ofte bi^stion is tionary system, CJormontaigne (16&6 breached. His flanks are not so good aai Speckles was a generM '6f engineers. His larger bastions permit the construction of permanent coupures or Pagans, forming an acute angle with lines of defence; but he does away with the and secpnd lines of defence; his ravelins were 2 and S tiers of uncovered guns which fig nearly as large as those of Speckle, and fully ure in most of the Italian and early Frejnch covered that portion of the curtain which Yau flanks, and which were never very useful. The ban had left reposed. In polygons of 8 and tenallle is intended to strengthen the defence more sides his ravelins were so far advanced of the ditch by infantry fire, and to cover ,the that their firt took in the rear the besieigers curtain from direct breaching fire from tlw > works against the next bastion as soon as he crest of the glacis; but this is very imperfectly reached the crest of the glacis. In order to done, as the breaching batteries in the re6nter/p avoid this, two'ravelins have to be conquered ingplace of arms (n, fig. 1) have a fuU view of the before one bastion can be breached. This mu piece of the curtain next to the flank at Xais tual support of the large ravelins becomes more IS a great weakness, as a breach there would and more effective the more the line to be de turn all the coupures pi'epared in the bastion as fended approaches a straight one. The reSna second line of defence. It arises from tho tering place of arms was strengthened by a reduit. The crest of the glacis is drawn en cr& mailUre^ as with Speckle, but traverses are maintained. The profiles are very good, and e rsw , liiu u u lu icijiw i. cv/ erses prevent not only the eoemy, but a l^ thp the tnasonry is always covered by the earth defence, from enfilading the covered way^ . Thp works in front. With Cormontaigne the French as the construction of bascommunications between the different work^ school doses, to

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fTonary defences, with outworks within the ditch, is concerned. A comparison of the grad.ual development of bastionary fortification from 1600 to 1750, and of its final results as laid down by Oormontaigne, with the principles of Spec kle, as stated above, will tend to elucidate the wonderful genius of the German engineer; for although outworks in the ditch have been mul- . tiplied to an enormous degree, yet not a single important principle has been discovered during oil these 150 years which had not been already clearly and distinctly enunciated by Speckle. After Oormontaigne, the school of engineers of Mdzifires (about 1V60) made some slight al terations in his system, the principal of which is the return to Speckles old rule that the flanks must be perpend cular to the lines of defence. But the principal point for which the school of M6zidres is remarkable is that they for the first time construct outworks beyond the covered way. On fronts particularly open to attack they place at thd foot of the glacis, on the capital of the bastion, a detached ravelin called a lunette, and thereby approach for the first time to the modern system of permanent in trenched camps. In the beginning of the 19th century Bousmard, a French emigrant who served in Prussia and was killed at Dantzic in 1806, tried still to improve upon Oprmontaigne; his ideas are rather complicated, and the mos[t remarkable is that his ravelin, which is very large, is advanced to the foot of the glacis almost so as to take the place and func tions, to a certain degree, of the lunette just described.A Dutch engineer of* Vaubans time, W h o more than once opposed him in siege warfare with equal honor, Baron Goeliorn, gave a further development to the old Dutch metiiod of fortification. His system gives a stronger defence even than Oormontaignes, by the clever" combination of wet and dry ditches, die great facilities ofiered to sorties, the ex cellent communications between tjie Works, and the ingehioua reduits and coupures in his ravelins and bastions. Coehorn, a great ad mirer of Speckle, is the only engineer of note who was honest enough to acknowledge how much he owed to him.^W e have seen that even before the introduction of bastions, Albert Dtlrer used cmonniSres to aflford a stronger flanking fire.' In his fortified square he even entirely trusts to these caponniferes for the de fence of the ditch; there are no towers on the corner of the fort; it is a plain square with none but salient angles. To make the enceinte of a polygon entirely coincident with its out line, so as to have all salient and no reentering angles, and to flank the ditch by caponni^res, constitutes what is called polygonal fortifica tion, and Darermust be considered as its father. On the other hand, a star-shaped enceinte, in which salient and reSntering angles follow upon each other regularly, and in which each line is both flank and face at once, flanking the ditch of the next line with the portion next to the reen tering angle, and commanding the field with the portion next the salientsuch an outline con stitutes tenaiUe fortification. The older Italians and several of the older Germans had proposed this form, but it was not developed till after ward. The system of George Rimpler (en gineer to the emperor of Germany, killed in de fending Vienna against the Turks in 1683) forms a kind of intermediate stage between the bastionary and tenaille system. "What he calls intermediate bastions constitute in reality a perfect line of tenailles. lie declared him self energeticdly against open batteries with a mere earth parapet in front, and insisted on casemated batteries wherever they could bo erected; especially on the flanks, where 2 or 8 tiers of well covered guns would thus have a far greater effect than the 2 or 3 tiers of guns in open fl^nk batteries, which could never act together. He also insisted on batteries, that is, reduits, in the places of arms of the covered way, wbich Coehorn and Oormontaigne adopted, and especially a double and triple line of de fence behind the salient angles of the enceinte. In this manner his system is remarkably in advance of his tim e; the whole of his enceinte consists of independent forts, each of which has to be taken separately, and large de fensive casemates are used in a manner which reminds us, almost in the details even of their application, of the more recent constructions in Germany. There is no doubt that Montalembert owed as much to Rimpler as the bastionary system of the iTth and 18th century to Speckle. The author who first fully developed the ad vantages of the tenaille over the bastionary system was Landsberg (1712); but it would lead us too far if we were to enter into his arguments or describe his fortificatory outline. Of the long series of skilful German engineers who followed Rimpler and Landsberg, we may name the Mecklenbui^ colonel Buggenhagen (1720), the inventor of blockhouse traverses, or traverses hollowed out and adapted for casemat ed musketry fire; and the Wtlrtemberg major Herbert (1734), inventor of defenave barracks, hvgo barracks in the gorge of salient works, proof against vortical lire, with embrasured casemates on the side facing the enceinte, and barracks and store rooms on the side facing the town. Both these constructions are now very largely used.Thus we see that the German school, with almost the only exception of Speckle, was from its origin adverse to bastions, winch it sought to replace chiefly by tcnaillcs, and that it attempted at the same time to ititroduce a better system of inner defcnce, chiefly

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by Uie use of oaseniatod gallorios, which agaiil trance of Portsmouth harbor (England), and w otconsidered as tlio height of absurdity by most all modern forts for harbor defence against Frcnch engineering authorities. One of the fleets, are constructed according to Montalemffi'eatest engineers, however, that France ever berts principle. The partly uncovered raawni-y produced, the marquis do Montalembert (1713- of tho Maximilian towers at Lintz (Austna) and *99), major-general of cavalry, passed over with of the reduits of the detached forts of Cologne drums beating and colors flying into the camp are imitated from Montalemberts les happy of the German school, to the great horror of the projects. In the fortification of steep heigliU whole French engineering corps, who, up totho (Ehrenbreitstein in Prussia, for instance) the present date, decry every word he has written. uncovered masonry forts have also been wjn* Montalembert severely criticized the defects times adopted, but what resistance they will be of the Wtionary system; the inefFectualil^ of able to make must bo decided by actual experi its flanking fire ; the almost certainty it offered ence.The tenaille system has never, to our to tlie enemy tiiat his shoU if they missed ono knowledge ot least, found practical apphooUon, lino must do harm in another; the want of pro but the polygonal system is in great favor m Ger tection against vertical fare; the perfect useless- many, and has been applied to most modern con nesH of the curtain as to fire; the impossibility structions there; wliile the French tenaciously of having good and large coupures in the gorges cling to Oormontaignes bwtions. The enceint^j of the bastions, proved by the fact that no for in the polygonal system, is generally a plain tress of his time had any of the multifarious earthwork rampart with revetted scarp ana permanent coupures proposed by the theorists counterscarp, with large coponnifires in the mid of the school; and tho weakness,bad connection, dle of the fonts, ond with large defensive bai-racks behind the rampart and covered by it to and want of mutual support of the outworks. Montalembert therefore preferred cither the serve as coupures. Similar defensive barrMka tenaillc or tho polygonal system. In either case have also been erected as coupures in many bastionary works, to close the gorges of tho bas the body of the placo consisted of a row of casomatcs, with one or two tiers of guns, the tions ; the rampart serving as a counterguw-d to masonry of which was covered from direct fire protect tho masonry from distant fire. Of ail by a counterguard or covxre-faa of earthwork Montalemberts proposals, however, tliat of de extending all around and having a second ditch tached forts has had the greatest success, and in in its front; this ditch was flanked by case itiated a new era, not only in fortification, but m mates in tho reftntering angles of tliocouvre-face tho attack and defence of fortresses, and even m strategy. Montalembert proposed to covered by the parapet of the reduit or lunette general surround large fortresses in important situations in tlie reentering placo of arms. The whole by a single or double chain of small forts, on com eystom was based upon tho priiiciple of oppos manding elevations, which, though isolated in ing, by moans of casemated guns, such an over appearance, would still support each other by whelming fire to the enemy the moment he their firo, and, by tho facility they gave for largo reached the crest of tho glacis, or of the couvresorties, would render a bombardment of the face, that he could not possibly succeed in place impossible, and when required form an erecting his breaching batteries. That case intrenched camp for an army. Ytmban hatl mates could do this he maintained against tho already introduced permanent intrenched camps unanimous condemnation of French engineers, xmder tho guns Of fortresses, but their inand ho afterward even compiled systems of trenchments consisted of long continuous lines, circular and tenaillo fortifications in which which, if broken through at one point only, nil earthworks wero rejected and the wliolo were completely at tho mercy of tho enemy. defence intrusted to high casemated batteries But these intrenched camps of Montalembert s with from 4 to 5 tiers of guns, the masonry were capable of a far greater resistance, for of which was to be protected by tlie firo of each fort bad to be taken singly, and before 3 its batteries only. Thus, in his circular sys or 4 at least wero conquered, no enemy could tem, he contrives to concentrate 848 guns on open his trenches against tho place. More any point 500 yards from the fortres^ and ex over, tho siege of each of tho forts could be in pects that such an immense suyeriority of firo terrupted at every moment by the garrison, or wouUl put tho pos^sibility of erccting siege bntrather tho army encamping behind the forts, tei'ws entirely out of tho question. In this, and thus a combination of active campaigning however, he has found no adherents, except in and regular fortress warfare was secured, the construction of tho sea fronts of coast forts; must greatly strengthen the defence. When here the impossibility of broiwhing strong case- Napoleon led his armies hundreds of miles mated walls by tho guns of ships was pretty well through the country, never heedmg demonstrated by tho bombardment of Sebasto tho fortressesenemys which had all boeu constructed pol. The splendid forts of Sebastopol, Oionstadt, according to the old system, and when in return Cherbourg, and the new batteries on tho en

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tho allies (1814 and 1815) marched straight on toward Paris, leaving almost unnoticed in their I'ear the triple belt of fortresses with which Vauban had endo\fred France, it became evident that a system of fortification was antiquated which confined its outworks to the main ditch or at the outside to the foot of the glacis. Such fortresses had lost their power of attraction over tlie large armies of modern times. Their means of doing harm did not extend beyond the range of their cannon. It thus became necessary to find some new means to break the impetuous movement of modern Invading armies, and Montalemberts detached forts were applied on a large scale. Cologne, Coblentz, Mcntx, Rastadt, Ulm, KOnigsberg, Posen, Lintz, l?eschiera, and Verona were severally transformed into large intrenched camps, capable of holding from 60,000 to 100,000 men, but defensible, m case of need, by far smaller garrisons. At tho same time, the tactical advantages of the locality to be fortified were placed in the background by the strategetical considerations which now de(cided the situation of fortresses. Such places only were fortified as might directly or in directly stop tho progress of a victorious army, and which, being large towns in themselves, ofifered great advantages to an army by being the centre of the resources of whole provinces. Situations on large rivers, especially at the points of junction of two considerable rivers, were chosen in preference, as they compelled the attacking army to divide its forces. The cnceinte was simplified as much as possible, and outworks in the ditch were almost entirely done away w ith; it was sufficient to have the en ceinte safe against an irregular attack. Tlie principal battle-field lay around the detached forts, and they wero to be defended not so much by the fire from their ramparts, as by tho sallies of tho garrison of the fortress itself. Tho largest fortress- constructed upon this plan is Paris; it has a simple bastioned enceinte with bastioned forts, almost all squares; there is no outwork, not even a ravelin, in the whole fortification. No doubt, tho defensive strength of Franco has gained 80 per cent, by this new and immense intrenched camp, large enough to afford a refuge for three beaten armies. Tho intrinsic value of the diiferent methods of fortification lias lost a great deal of its importance by this improvement; the cheapest will now bo the best; for the defence is now based, not upon the passive system of awaiting the enemy be hind the walls until he opens his trenches, and then cannonilding them, but upon tho active one of taking the onensive with the concentrated strength of the garrison against the necessarily divided forces of tho besieger. II. Sieges. The art of sieges had been brought to a certain perfection by the Greeks and Romans. They tried to breach tho walls of fortresses by tho battering ram, and approached them under cover of strongly roofed galleries, or in case of need 1)Y a lofty construction which -was to com mand walls and towers by its greater height, and offer a safe approach to the storming col umns. The introduction of. gunpowder did away with these contrivances; tho fortresses having now ramparts of less elevation, but a fire effective at long distances, tho approaches were made by trenches, leading in zigzags or curved lines toward the glacis; batteries being erected at various spots so as to silence if PCS' sible the fire of the besieged and to batter down his masonry. Once arrived on tho crest of tho glacis, a high trench cavalier was erected, with tho intention of commanding the bastions and their cavaliers, and tlien by a crushing fire to complete the breach and prepare for the assault. The curtain was the point generally attacked. There was, however, no system in this mode of attack until Vauban introduced parallels of ricochet firing, and regulated the process of sieges in the manner which is in use even now, and still denominated Vaubnns attack. The besieger, after investing tho place with a suffi cient force on all sides, and choosing the fronts to be attacked, opens the first parallel during the nightfall siege works are chiefly carried on at night) at about 600 yards from the fortress. A trench parallel to the sides of the besieged polygon is drawn around at least 8 of these sides and fronts ; the earth, being thrown up on the side toward tlie enemy and propped upon the sides of the ditch with gabions (willow-work baskets filled with earth), forms a kind of para pet against the fire of the fortress. In this first parallel the ricochet batteries for enfilading the long lines of the attacked fronts are con structed. Taking fot- the object of the siege a bastioned hexngon, there should be ricochet batteries to enfilade the faccs of 3 bastions and 8 ravelins, in all tho batteries, one for each face. These batteries throw their shot so as to pass just over the parapet of the works and along the faces in their whole length, taking them in flank and endangering guns and men. Similar batteries are constructed to enfilade tho branches of the covered way, and mortars and howitzers are placed in battery to throw shells into the interior of tho bastions and ravelin?. All these batteries are covered by earthwork parapets. At the same time, at two or moro places, zigzag trenches are pushed forward toward the place, taking care to avoid all enfi lading fire from the town ; and so soon as the fire of the place shows signs of slacking, tho second parallel, about 350 yards from the woa-ks, is opened. In this parallel the dismounting batteries are constructed. They serve to com pletely destroy the artillery and embrasures on

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the faces of tho fortress; there will be 8 faces to attack (2 bastions and tlicir ravelins, and tlio inner faces of the adjoining ravelins), for each of which there is a battery, constructed parallel to tho attacked faces, and each embrasure ex actly opposite to an embrasure of the. fortress. From the second parallel fresh zigzags are )ushed toward tho to^\'n; at 200 yards the lalf pftrallel is constructed, forming new enlargeirtents of the zigzags armed witti mortar batteries; and at last at the foot of tho glacis, the third parallel. Thid is armed with heavy mortar batteries. By this time the fire of the place will have been nearly silenced, Mid the approachei, in varied forms of curved or angular lines, to avoid ricochet fire, are carried up to the orest of the glacis, which it reaches opposite the )Oints of the two bastions and of the ravelin. A odfment or trench and parapet is then formed Q^ e palient place of arms to enfilade the ditch )yiofa^ry fire. If the enemy is active and dar ing in his sorties, a 4th parallel connepting the salient places of arms across the glacis becomes necessary. Otherwise a sap is pushed firom the 8d pardlel to the re5ntering places of arms, and the crowning of the glacis, or th<6 construction of a trench all along the covered way on the crest of the glacis, is completed. Then the counter batteries are constructed in this emrormefAmt in order to silence the fire of the flank, which enfilades the ditch, and after them the breaching batteries against the point and faces of the bastions and ravelin. Opposite the points to be breached, a mining gallery Is constructed leading down from the trenches throbgh the glads and counterscarp into the ditch; the contttersoarp is blown in, and a fresh trench constructed aciross the ditch to the fo<Jt of the brek(A, covered on the side whence the enfiladingfire of the flank comes by a parapet. As soon as both breach and passage of the ditch are coniplete, the assault takes place. This is in the case of a dry ditch; across a wet djtch, a dike has to be constructedwith fascines, covered equally by a parapet on tne side of the flank of the adjoining bastion. If on taking the bas tion it is found that there is a further intrenchmeat or coupure in the rear, a lodgment has to be effected, fresh batteries to be constructed on the breach, and a fresh breach, descent, and passage of the ditch and assault to be made. The average resistance of a bastioned hexagon of Vaubans first method against such a siege is cdculated to be from 19 to 22 days if there are no coupures, and 27 or 28 days if it is pro vided with coupures. Oormontaignes method is erpeoted to hold out 25 or respectiv^ 85 to 87 days. III. F i e l d FoErrFiCATioir. Tlie con-, struction of fieldworks is as old as the existence of armies. The ancients were even far more expert ifl this art than our modern armiSes; the legions, before an enemy, intrenched their camp e v ^ night. During the 17th and 18th centuries we see also a very great pse of field wrks, and in the wars of Frederic the Great picketi on outpoSt duty generally threw up slightly profiled redans. Yet even then,- and it is still more the case now, the con struction of field works was confined to the strengthening of a few positions selected beforeliand with a view to certain eventualities during a campaign. Thus Frederic the Greats camp at Buiizelwltz, Wellingtons lines at Torres Vedras, the French lines of "WeissehbQ^, abd tlio Austriao intrenchments in fron^ of '^rona in iM ^ TJnder such circumstances, field works may exercise an important influence upon the issue of a campaign by enabling an inferior army successfully to resist a s^pperior one. Fprmerly the totrenched lines, as in V aub^a permanently intrenched camps, were contin uous; but from the defect that if pierced and taken at one point the whole line was tiW >less, they ar9 now universally composed of one or more lines of detached redoubts, flanking each other by their fire, and allowing the army to fall upon the enemy through the intervals as soon as the fire of the redoubts has broken the energy of his assault. This is the principal use of field works; but they are also employed singly, as bridge heads to defend the access to a bridge, or to close an important pa^ to small parties of the enemy. Omitting all the mote fanciful shapes of works which are now out of date, such fortifications should consist of works either open or closed at the gorge. The former will either be redans (two parapets with a ditch in front forming an angle facing the e n ^ y ) or lunettes (redans with short flanks). The latter may be closed at the gorge by palisadings. Theprincipal closed field work now in use is the square redonl^t, either as a regular or an irr^ular quadrangle, closed by a ditch and parapet ail round. The parapet is made as high as in permanent fortification (7 to 8 feet), but not w thick having to resist field artillery only. As none of these works has a flanking fire In itself, they have to be disposed so that they ^ n k eadh other within musket range. To do this effectu ally, and strengthen the whole line, the plan now roost generally adopted is to form an in trenched camp by a line of square redoabts flanking each other, and also a line of simple redans, situated in front of the intervals of the redoubts. Such a camp was formed in front of Comorn, south of the Danube, in 1849, and was defended by the Hungarians for 2 days against a far army?
K om an

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Nifontry
INFANTRY, the foot soldiers of an army. Except among nomadio tribes, the great mass, if not the entire strength of all armies has always consisted of foot soldiers. Thus even with the first Asiatic armies, with the Assyrians, Baby lonians, and Persians, infantry made up, numer ically at least, the main body. With the Greeks at first the whole army was composedof infan try. What little we know of the composition, organization, and tactics of ancient Asiatic in fantry, has already been stated in the article Army, to which we refer for many details which it would be useless to repeat here. In this ar ticle, we shall restrict ourselves to the most im portant tactical features only in the history of the arm; we therefore at once begin with the Greeks. I. Grecian In fa o trt. The creators of Grecian tactics were the Dorians; among them, the Spartans brought to perfection the ancient Doric order of battle. Original