Enrile vs Salazar G.R. No.

92163 June 5, 1990

Facts: In the afternoon of February 27, 1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested by law enforcement officers led by Director Alfredo Lim of the National Bureau of Investigation on the strength of a warrant issued by Hon. Jaime Salazar of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City Branch 103, in Criminal Case No. 9010941. The warrant had issued on an information signed and earlier that day filed by a panel of prosecutors composed of Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe, State Prosecutor Ferdinand R. Abesamis and Assistant City Prosecutor Eulogio Mananquil, Jr., charging Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan with the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder allegedly committed during the period of the failed coup attempt from November 29 to December 10, 1990. Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight at the NBI headquarters on Taft Avenue, Manila, without bail, none having been recommended in the information and none fixed in the arrest warrant. The following morning, February 28, 1990, he was brought to Camp Tomas Karingal in Quezon City where he was given over to the custody of the Superintendent of the Northern Police District, Brig. Gen. Edgardo Dula Torres. On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile, through counsel, filed the petition for habeas corpus herein (which was followed by a supplemental petition filed on March 2, 1990), alleging that he was deprived of his constitutional rights. Issue: (a) Whether the petitioner has committed complex crimes (delito compleio) arising from an offense being a necessary means for committing another, which is referred to in the second clause of Article 48, Revised Penal Code? Held: There is one other reason and a fundamental one at that why Article 48 of the Penal Code cannot be applied in the case at bar. If murder were not complexed with rebellion, and the two crimes were punished separately (assuming that this could be done), the following penalties would be imposable upon the movant, namely: (1) for the crime of rebellion, a fine not exceeding P20,000 and prision mayor, in the corresponding period, depending upon the modifying circumstances present, but never exceeding 12 years of prision mayor, and (2) for the crime of murder, reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, depending upon the modifying circumstances present. In other words, in the absence

of aggravating circumstances, the extreme penalty could not be imposed upon him. However, under Article 48 said penalty would have to be meted out to him, even in the absence of a single aggravating circumstance. Thus, said provision, if construed in conformity with the theory of the prosecution, would be unfavorable to the movant. The plaint of petitioner's counsel that he is charged with a crime that does not exist in the statute books, while technically correct so far as the Court has ruled that rebellion may not be complexed with other offenses committed on the occasion thereof, must therefore be dismissed as a mere flight of rhetoric. Read in the context of Hernandez, the information does indeed charge the petitioner with a crime defined and punished by the Revised Penal Code: simple rebellion. Petitioner finally claims that he was denied the right to bail. In the light of the Court's reaffirmation of Hernandez as applicable to petitioner's case, and of the logical and necessary corollary that the information against him should be considered as charging only the crime of simple rebellion, which is bailable before conviction, that must now be accepted as a correct proposition. But the question remains: Given the facts from which this case arose, was a petition for habeas corpus in this Court the appropriate vehicle for asserting a right to bail or vindicating its denial? The criminal case before the respondent Judge was the normal venue for invoking the petitioner's right to have provisional liberty pending trial and judgment. The original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail rested with said respondent. The correct course was for petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by filing a petition to be admitted to bail, claiming a right to bail per se by reason of the weakness of the evidence against him. Only after that remedy was denied by the trial court should the review jurisdiction of this Court have been invoked, and even then, not without first applying to the Court of Appeals if appropriate relief was also available there. The Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in People vs. Hernandez, the questioned information filed against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio must be read as charging simple rebellion only, hence said petitioners are entitled to bail, before final conviction, as a matter of right. The Court's earlier grant of bail to petitioners being merely provisional in character, the proceedings in both cases are ordered remanded to the respondent Judge to fix the amount of bail to be posted by the petitioners. Once bail is fixed by said respondent for any of the petitioners, the corresponding bail bond flied with this Court shall become functus oficio. No pronouncement as to costs.

Santiago vs Garchitorena G.R. No. 109266 December, 2 1993 Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Puno, JJ., concur.

Facts: On May 1, 1991, petitioner Santiago was charged by the Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, allegedly committed by her favoring "unqualified" aliens with the benefits of the Alien Legalization Program. On May 24, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with criminal case on the ground that said case was intended solely to harass her as she was then a presidential candidate. She alleged that this was in violation of Section 10, Article IX-C of the Constitution which provides that "(b)ona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination." The petition was dismissed on January 13, 1992. On October 16, 1992, petitioner filed a motion for inhibition of Presiding Justice Garchitorena, which motion was set for hearing on November 13, 1992. ten days after, the Sandiganbayan (First Division), of which Presiding Justice Garchitorena is a member, set the criminal case for arraignment on November 13, 1992. On November 6, 1992, petitioner moved to defer the arraignment on the grounds that there was a pending motion for inhibition, and that petitioner intended to file a motion for a bill of particulars. However, on November 9, 1992, the Sandiganbayan (First Division) denied the motion to defer the arraignment. More so, the petitioner cannot accept the legal morality of Sandiganbayan Justice Francis Garchitorena who would her from going abroad for a Harvard scholarship because of graft charges against her. It appears that petitioner tried to leave the country without first securing the permission of the Sandiganbayan, prompting it to issue the hold-departure order which. The letter of Presiding Justice Garchitorena, written in defense of the dignity and integrity of the Sandiganbayan, merely stated that all persons facing criminal charges in court, with no exception, have to secure permission to leave the country. The court issued the Resolution dated March 25, 1993, ordering Presiding Justice Garchitorena "to CEASE and DESIST from sitting in the case until the question of his disqualification is finally resolved by this Court and from enforcing the resolution dated March 11, 1993, ordering petitioner to post bail bonds for the 32 Amended Informations and from proceeding with the arraignment on April 12, 1993. Issue:

(a) Whether the petitioner is charged with continued crime (delito continuado) under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code? Held: The 32 Amended Informations charged to the petitioner is known as delito continuado or "continued crime" and sometimes referred to as "continuous crime." In fairness to the Ombudsman's Office of the Special Prosecutor, it should be borne in mind that the concept of delito continuado has been a vexing problem in Criminal Law difficult as it is to define and more difficult to apply. The concept of delito continuado, although an outcry of the Spanish Penal Code, has been applied to crimes penalized under special laws, e.g. violation of R.A. No. 145 penalizing the charging of fees for services rendered following up claims for war veteran's benefits (People v. Sabbun, 10 SCRA 156 [1964] ). Under Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code, the Code shall be supplementary to special laws, unless the latter provide the contrary. Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code may be applied in a supplementary capacity to crimes punished under special laws. In the case at bench, the original information charged petitioner with performing a single criminal act that of her approving the application for legalization of aliens not qualified under the law to enjoy such privilege. The original information also averred that the criminal act : (i) committed by petitioner was in violation of a law - Executive Order No. 324 dated April 13, 1988, (ii) caused an undue injury to one offended party, the Government, and (iii) was done on a single day, i.e., on or about October 17, 1988. The Resolution dated March 3, 1993 in Criminal Case No. 16698 of the Sandiganbayan (First Division) is affirmed and its Resolution dated March 11, 1993 in Criminal Case No. 16698 is modified in the sense that the Office of the Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman is directed to consolidate the 32 Amended Informations (Criminal Cases Nos. 18371 to 18402) into one information charging only one offense under the original case number, i.e., No. 16698. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on March 25, 1993 is lifted insofar as to the disqualification of Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena is concerned. People vs Dela Torre G.R. No. 137953-58 April 11, 2002

Facts: Appellee WILFREDO DELA TORRE had three (3) children with his common-law wife Melinda Torre, namely: M1, M2 and M3. Melinda left her family when M1 was about seven (7) years old bringing with her M3. The victim lived with her father and brother M2 in Sta. Cruz, Zambales.

In January of 1997, Felita Sobrevilla, teacher of M1, noticed sudden changes in her behavior and when confronted, the latter admitted that she was sexually abused by her father. Her head teacher informed her Aunt Elpidia Balindo about the sexual abuses. They referred the case to the DSWD who took her under its custody. M1 testified that her father committed sexual abuses on her on the following dates: September 30, 1996, October 10, 1996, October 18, 1996, November 01, 1996, November 12, 1996 and December 23, 1996. A medical examination conducted by Dr. Milagrina Mayor, Rural Health Physician of Sta. Cruz, Zambales, on Mary Rose revealed that her hymen was broken with healed lacerations at the 3:00, 6:00 and 9:00 nine oclock positions. The girl also suffered from urinary tract infection. Issues: (a) Whether appellee should be penalized with reclusion perpetua in each of the four indictments for rape, instead of imposing the supreme penalty of death as mandated by R.A. No. 7659? (b) Whether an increase in the penalty imposed by the lower court will violate the right of the accused against double jeopardy. Held: The RTC ruled that "it was duly established that accused Wilfredo committed acts of lasciviousness against M1 on 30 September 1996 and 10 October 1996, and had carnal knowledge [of] M1 on 18 October 1996, 01 November 1996, 12 November 1996 and 23 December 1996." Further, the trial court added that the moral ascendancy of appellee over the victim was equivalent to intimidation. It did not give any probative value to his uncorroborated and unsubstantiated defenses of denial and alibi. However, the court refused to impose the supreme penalty of death on appellee. It maintained that there were circumstances that mitigated the gravity of the offenses. The prosecution asks this Court to modify the RTC Decision by imposing the supreme penalty of death on the accused. It argues that it has proven that the victim is the daughter of the accused, and that she was below eighteen (18) years old when the rapes took place. As a consequence, the trial court should have imposed the penalty of death pursuant to Section 11 of RA 7659. Under Section 1, Rule 122 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, any party may appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the accused will be placed in double jeopardy. This provision is substantially the same as that provided by the 1985 Rules. In several cases, this Court has already definitively ruled on this issue. Recently, in People v. Leones, it unmistakably declared that "[w]hile it is true that this Court is the Court of last resort, there are

allegations of error committed by a lower court which we ought not to look into to uphold the right of the accused. Such is the case in an appeal by the prosecution seeking to increase the penalty imposed upon the accused for this runs afoul of the right of the accused against double jeopardy." The ban on double jeopardy is deeply rooted in jurisprudence. The doctrine has several avowed purposes. Primarily, it prevents the State from using its criminal processes as an instrument of harassment to wear out the accused by a multitude of cases with accumulated trials. It also serves the additional purpose of precluding the State, following an acquittal, from successively retrying the defendant in the hope of securing a conviction. And finally, it prevents the State, following conviction, from retrying the defendant again in the hope of securing a greater penalty. "While certiorari may be used to correct an abusive acquittal, the petitioner in such extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the lower court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice. On the other hand, if the petition, regardless of its nomenclature, merely calls for an ordinary review of the findings of the court a quo, the constitutional right against double jeopardy would be violated. Such recourse is tantamount to converting the petition for certiorari into an appeal, contrary to the express injunction of the Constitution, the Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence on double jeopardy."

CRISTOBAL VS. LABRADOR Pardon Restoration of Civil & Political Rights Santos was convicted of the crime of estafa. He was given pardon by the president but even prior to his pardon he was already holding the position as the municipality president of Malabon notwithstanding his conviction. Cristobal, on the other hand, averred that Santos should be excluded from the list of electors in Malabon because he was already convicted of final judgment for any crime against property. This is pursuant to CA 357 of the New Election Code. The lower court presided by Labrador ruled that Santos is exempt from the provision of the law by virtue of the pardon restoring the respondent to his full civil and political rights, except that with respect to the right to hold public office or employment, he will be eligible for appointment only to positions which are clerical or manual in nature and involving no money or property responsibility. ISSUE: Whether or not Santos should not be excluded as an elector. HELD: It should be observed that there are two limitations upon the exercise of this constitutional prerogative by the Chief Executive, namely: (a) that the power be exercised after conviction; and (b) that such power does not extend cases of impeachment. Subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative action. It must remain where the sovereign authority has placed it and must be exercised by the highest authority to whom it is entrusted. An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed, but removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction. In the present case, the disability is the result of conviction

without which there would be no basis for disqualification from voting. Imprisonment is not the only punishment which the law imposes upon those who violate its command. There are accessory and resultant disabilities, and the pardoning power likewise extends to such disabilities. When granted after the term of imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon removes all that is left of the consequences f conviction. In the present case, while the pardon extended to respondent Santos is conditional in the sense that he will be eligible for appointment only to positions which a e clerical or manual in nature involving no money or property responsibility, it is absolute insofar as it restores the responde nt to full civil and political rights. Upon other hand, the suggestion that the disqualification imposed in par (b) of sec 94 of CA 357, does not fall within the purview of the pardoning power of the president, would lead to the impairment of the pardoning power of the president, not contemplated in the Constitution, and would lead furthermore to the result that there would be no way of restoring the political privilege in a case of this nature except through legislative action. Monsanto vs. Factoran G.R. No. 78239 February 9, 1989 Case Digest

Facts of the Case: Salvacion Monsanto, an assistant treasurer of Calbayog City, and three other accused; was convicted by the Sandiganbayan of the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents and sentenced them to imprisonment of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum and a fine of P3,500. Petitioner Monsanto appeared her conviction to the Court which affirmed the same. She filed a motion for reconsideration but while said motion was pending, she was given absolute pardon by President Marcos which she accepted on December 21, 1984. By reason of the said pardon, petitioner wrote the Calbayog City treasurer that she be restored to her former position as assistant city treasurer since the same post was still vacant. Her letter- request was then referred to the Ministry of Finance for resolution in view of the provision of the Local Government Code transferring the power of appointment treasures from the city governments to the said Ministry. The Finance Ministry ruled that petitioner may be reinstated to her position without the necessity of a new appointment not earlier than the date she was extended the absolute pardon.

However, she also claims that the full pardon bestowed upon her by the President has already wiped out the crime which, according to her, also implies that her government service has never interrupted and therefore, she is entitled to backpay for the entire period of her suspension; and that she should not be required to pay the proportionate share of the amount of P4,892.50

The Ministry of Finance referred the issue to the Office of the President and Factoran, Deputy Executive Secretary; which denied Monsantos request averring that Monsanto must first seek appointment and that the pardon does not reinstate her former position. Issue: Whether or not Monsanto should be reinstated to her former position.

Court Ruling: A pardon looks into the future. It makes no amend for the past. It affords no relief for what has been suffered by the offender. It does not impose on the government any obligation to make reparation to what has been suffered. On the other hand, civil liability arising from crime is governed by RPC.

Concurring Opinions:

J. Feliciano Article 36 of the Revised Penal Code states that A pardon shall not work the registration of the right to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon. It shall in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed by him on the sentence. The same rule of Article 36 was also reiterated four (4) times by the Revised Penal Code in Articles 40, 41, 42 and 43. The December 17, 1984 pardon granted to petitioner written on standard and printed words was that it was an absolute andunconditional pardon which restored to petitioner full civil and political rights. While the right of suffrage and the right to hold public office are full political rights, it must be noted that there are other political rights and the pardon did not expressly stated restoration of petitioners particular right to hold public office. It must be noted that nature of public office is a public trust.

In conclusion, the pardon extended to the petitioner does not restore to her the right to hold public office. Hence, petition for review is denied and the assailed resolution of the Executive Secretary Fulgenio Factoran is affirmed. J. Padilla

Applying Article 36 of the Revised Penal Code makes it clear that the pardon extended by the President to the petitioner did not per se entitle her to again hold public office or to suffrage, nor did such pardon extinguish her civil liability for the criminal conviction, subject to the matter of pardon.