The Inuence of Ibn S na on al-Ghazzal in

Quranic Hermeneuticsmuwo_1373 1..22

Mesut Okumus*
Hitit University
orum, Turkey
Abstract
Al-Ghazzal criticized Muslim philosophers in general and Ibn S na in particular in a
number of matters notwithstanding, he was deeply inuenced by philosophy and Ibn
S nas views as to some issues. Of the contexts in which al-Ghazzal is under the clear
inuence of Ibn S na are the interpretations of some Quran c chapters and verses which
are related to the demonstration of the existence of God and the explanation of some
divine attributes and names. In many of his works, al-Ghazzal reproduces Ibn S nas
interpretation of the verses in harmony with the ontological proof. One can observe Ibn
S nas inuence on al-Ghazzal in relation with the hierarchy of beings, too. However,
the context in which Ibn S nas inuence is most obvious is the interpretation of the 35
th
verse of the Surah Nur. Ibn S nas interpretation of the terms occurring in this verse
as symbols of the human faculties exercised a profound impact on the thought of
al-Ghazzal , which manifests itself in his interpretation of the verse in Mishkat al-Anwar.
Another of such contexts is the topic of human psychology and the interpretations of the
verses related wherewith. Immensely inuenced by the psychological views of Ibn S na,
al-Ghazzal adopted Ibn S nas notion of the simultaneous creation of soul and body,
interpreting some Quranic verses in harmony with this notion. This article is intended
to illustrate that al-Ghazzal , who is opposed to the blind imitation of any school of
thought, did not make a wholesale denouncement of the views of philosophers; on the
contrary, he made an extensive use of Ibn S nas ideas in conformity with his general
attitude of beneting from all schools of thought.
Key words: Ibn S na, al-Ghazzal , Quranic exegesis, hermeneutics, Islamic Philosophy
B
orn around twenty years after the decease of Ibn S na (d.428/1037), al-Ghazzal
(d. 505/1111) points out in his al-Munqidh min al-D

alal that he had from his

childhood onwards endured every kinds of hardships in his quest of truth,
striving to examine all schools of thought without any discrimination.
1
He set accounts
* Mesut Okumus holds a PhD in the Science of Quranic Exegesis and is presently teaching at Theology
Faculty of Hitit University, in orum, Turkey.
1
Al-Ghazzal , al-Munqidh min al-D

alal, in Majmuatu Rasail al-Imam Ghazzal , (Beirut: Dar al-Fikr,

1996), 537.
2011 Hartford Seminary.
Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148
USA.
DOI: 10.1111/j.1478-1913.2011.01373.x
1
with his contemporary currents of thought that he categorized into four groups as the
Theologians, the Philosophers, the Esoterics, and the Sus. Putting each of them through
the sieve of criticism, he wrote separate books of critical character on their views. During
his ofce of teaching at the Nizamiyya Madrasa, he dedicated his three years to the
examination of the views of the philosophers, two years for learning their views and one
year for cogitating them. Afterwards, he rst composed Maqas

id al-Falasifa in which he
described their views and then Tahafut al-Falasifa in which he criticized them. In the
latter one, he leveled serious criticisms at Muslim philosophers in general and at
al-Farab and Ibn S na in particular, who are the greatest representatives of the
Peripatetic philosophy in the Eastern lands of Islam. In the conclusion, he is held to
have charged the Muslim philosophers, though without mentioning their names, of
innovation in connection with seventeen issues and of indelity in relation with three
issues.
2
Al-Ghazzal s criticism of the philosophers has long been conceived of as a hostility
towards and a war on philosophy. For instance, Salomon Munk (d. 1867), wrote that
al-Ghazzal dealt a fatal blow to philosophy in the East.
3
Then Ernest Renan (d. 1892),
characterized al-Ghazzal as a foe of philosophy.
4
But the recent studies have shown that
this judgment is incorrect, and that though al-Ghazzal opposed some philosophical
views, he did not denounce philosophy as a whole. For instance, Griffel states that
though al-Ghazzal tried to refute some philosophical views, he had no hostility towards
philosophy, neither did he refuse it as a whole; on the contrary, he adopted and
championed the philosophical method.
5
The scholars who have recently studied the works of Ibn S na in a serious way hold
that al-Ghazzal was greatly inuenced by Ibn S na, building his own teachings on Ibn
S nas ontology.
6
The realm and extent of this inuence is yet to be studied notwith-
standing, it is now a fact that al-Ghazzal was deeply inuenced by the Muslim
philosophers in general and by Ibn S na in particular, whom he criticized to the extent
of declaring to be unbeliever. Even in his works in which he criticized philosophy,
al-Ghazzal acknowledged that the writings of al-Farab and Ibn S na are the best in
terms of explaining the Aristotelian philosophy, stressing that the works of the writers
2
Al-Ghazzal , Tahafut al-Falasifa, ed. by Sulayman Dunya, (Beirut: Dar al-Maarif, 1987), 307309;
Filozoarn Tutarszlg, Turkish translation by Bekir Karlga, (Istanbul: agr Publishing, 1981),
212.
3
Salomon Munk, Melanges de Philosophie Juive et Arabe, (Paris: Librairie A. Franck, 18571859), 382.
4
Ernest Renan, Averroes et l Averroisme, (Paris: Librairie Auguste Durand, 1852), 133, 135.
5
Frank Griffel, The Relationship Between Averroes and al-Ghazali as it Presents Itself in Averroes
Early writings, Especially in his Commentary on al-Ghazalis al-Mustasfa, in Medieval Philosophy and
the Classical Tradition in Islam, Judaism, and Christianity, edited by John Inglis, (Richmond: Curzon
Press, 2002), 52.
6
Richard Frank, Creation and Cosmic System: Ghazali and Avicenna, Abhandlungen der Heidelberger
Ak. Der Wisp. Heidelberger, 1992, 5262; Bekir Karlga, I

bn Sin, Trkiye Diyanet Vakf I

slam
Ansiklopedisi, (Istanbul: TDV, 1999), XX, 346.
Tnr Mtsii Worir Voitr 2011
2 2011 Hartford Seminary.
other than these two did nothing but distorted and further obscured the philosophical
matters.
7
This shows that he did justice to the two at least in this regard.
A study of al-Ghazzal s works in which he addressed the views of the philosophers
in both descriptive and critical terms show that he is a very careful and meticulous reader
of Ibn S na. His Maqasid al-Falasifa is like an Arabic translation of Ibn S nas Persian
Danishnama-i Ala with brief annotations. He also made an abundance of quotations
from Ibn S nas al-Najat without giving credit to him.
8
The same books chapter on the
denitions is taken from Ibn S nas Risala f al-Hudud with minor changes of the places
of the passages. Again the lengthy chapter on the discussion of praiseworthy traits of
al-Ghazzal s M zan al-Amal is totally taken from Ibn S nas al-Akhlaq with minor
changes of the places of the passages. The summarized version of the same chapter is
included in Ihyau Ulum al-D n, too.
9
All this proves that al-Ghazzal is immensely
inuenced by Ibn S na, making a large use of Ibn S nas works in composing his own
books.
Richard Frank has illustrated that al-Ghazzal made use of the philosophical ideas of
Ibn S na and established his ontology and other philosophical teachings on his
philosophical system.
10
The inuence of Ibn S na on al-Ghazzal is not limited to the
philosophical matters. On the contrary, as Binyamin Abrahamov has demonstrated, this
inuence extends to the non-philosophical issues and realm.
11
Similarly, Jules Janssens
has established that al-Ghazzal built his system of thought on the texts of Ibn S na and
made an extensive use of his ideas.
12
In the same line with these ndings, this present study aims at illustrating that Ibn
S nas inuence on al-Ghazzal holds true in connection with the understanding and
interpretation of the many of the Quranic concepts and verses. We will also try to show
that Ibn S nas interpretation of the Quranic concepts and verses inuenced, supplied a
foundation for, and inspired al-Ghazzal by comparing their interpretations of the same
verses and concepts in their various works and by citing examples of al-Ghazzal s
employment of the explanations of Ibn S na. When doing so, we will depend only on the
works that are certain to belong to al-Ghazzal , excluding the works whose authorship
by al-Ghazzal is dubious. And we will make use of all their authentic works, regardless
of their being philosophical or not. When comparing their interpretations, we will, as a
7
Al-Ghazzal , Tahafut al-Falasifa, 7778; H. Ziya lken, Gazzl ve Felsefe, Ankara niversitesi
I

lahiyat Fakltesi Dergisi, (AI

FD), III-IV (1995), 105.

8
Cf. Ibn S na, Risala f al-H

udud in Tis u Rasail, (Cairo: Dar al-Arab, no date), 72102; Al-Ghazzal ,

Mi yar al- Ilm, (Egypt: Mat

baatu Kurdistan al-Ilmiyya, 1329), 161175.

9
Karlga, I

bn Sina, DI

A, XX, 346; For similar views, consult lken, Gazzl ve Felsefe, AI

FD, 105;
agrc, Gazzl, DI

A, XIII, 496.
10
Richard Frank, al-Ghazalis Use of Avicennas Philosophy, Revue des Etudes Islamiques, LV-LVII,
(198789), 271285.
11
Binyamin Abrahamov, Ibn Sinas Inuence on al-Ghazalis Non-Philosophical Works, Abr-Nahrain,
Peter Press, Louvain, XXIX, (1991), 117.
12
Jules Janssens, Al-Ghazzali and His Use of Avicennian Texts in Problems in Arabic Philosophy,
(Piliscsaba: Avicenna Institute of Middle Eastern Studies, 2003), 3749.
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3 2011 Hartford Seminary.
rule, take into account the meaning, and not the word, as al-Ghazzal emphasized in his
works
13
for he most of the times does not clarify the sources of which he made use and
replaced the terminology of Ibn S na with a religious counterpart. By coining religious
equivalents to the philosophical terms, he intended to earn a religious legitimacy for the
appropriated terms and concepts.
14
Interpretation of the Verses Associated with the Notion of
the Necessary Being
Inspired by al-Farab , Ibn S na builds his ontology on the categorization of beings
into a threefold grouping as the necessary, the contingent, and the impossible.
15
But one
should clarify that this is a conceptual division, not actual, for an impossible thing can
never come into existence or be thought to exist. What cannot be thought to exist cannot
thus be predicated of existence.
16
So the actual things are divided into the necessary and
the contingent in the ontology of Ibn S na.
Ibn S na denes the necessary as the being whose existence is necessary and whose
non-existence entails a contradiction in the mind. Furthermore, the necessary being is
the real being and the ontological principle of the contingent beings. As for the
contingent being, it is that whose existence and non-existence is equal, like the two
empty pans of a scale. So, in order to exist or not to exist, it needs a preponderator that
would prefer one of the two options.
17
For him, to assume the existence or non-existence
of the contingent beings creates no contradiction in the mind.
18
Termed as Wajib al-Wujud in the Arabic philosophical terminology, the Necessary
Being forms the foundation and beginning of Ibn S nas philosophy for It is the source
and principle of all other beings.
19
He holds that Its essence is the same as Its existence,
and vice-versa. Since Its existence is necessary in Itself, It can never be thought to exist
not. When explaining the divine name Real (al-H

aqq), Ibn S na explains this point as

the following: From the name Real, the being itself and everlasting being is
understood . . . The Necessary Being is that which is everlastingly Real in Itself. While
the contingent being is real by other than itself, it is false in itself. So, save the Necessary
Being, who is one, everything is false/perish in itself.
20
13
Al-Ghazzal , al-Mustas

fa, (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyya, 1993), 46, 53; al-Arba n, (Beirut: Dar
al-Kutub al-Ilmiyya, 1988), 151; Iljam al-Awam in Majmuatu Rasail al-Imam Ghazzal , (Beirut: Dar
al-Fikr, 1996), 321.
14
Frank, al-Ghazalis Use of Avicennas Philosophy, 275276.
15
Mehmet Bayrakdar, I

slm Felsefesine Giris, (Ankara: TDV Publishing, 1999), 196.

16
Hseyin Atay, I

bn Sinda Varlk Nazariyesi, (Ankara: Gelisim Matbaas, 1983), 130131. For the
philosophical consequences of the character of this distinction, see Tahir Ulu, Shreverd nin I

bn Sn
Felsefesine Ynelttigi Elestiriler, (Konya: Ideal, 2009), 181 and on.
17
Atay, I

bn Sinda Varlk Nazariyesi, 128, 134.

18
Bayrakdar, I

slm Felsefesine Giris, 196.

19
Atay, I

bn Sinda Varlk Nazariyesi, 159160.

20
Ibn S na, al-Shifa, al-Ilahiyyat, (Tehran: no date), 48.
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4 2011 Hartford Seminary.
In comparing the Necessary Being and the contingent beings, Ibn S na makes the
following remarks: A group of people asserted that the sensible things are existent and
necessary in themselves. But if you remember and consider our remarks on the
conditions of the Necessary Being, you recognize that they are not necessary, reciting the
verse of God, But when it set, he said: I love not things that perish
21
, for an entity which
lies in the realm of contingency is subject to a certain kind of perishing.
22
Ibn S na thus puts in the contingent category all the beings apart from the Necessary
Being, i.e., the beings whose quiddity and existence are not the same, viewing them as
perishable when compared to the Necessary Being. The verse that he mentions as proof
is one of the verses that tell of the Prophet Abrahams debate with his people. These
verses relate that when reasoning about the existence of God, Abraham rst saw a star
at night and said, This is my Lord. But because they set soon, he moved towards God
by saying I love not things that perish.
23
In his al-Maqs

ad, al-Ghazzal adapted Ibn S nas explanations on the Necessary

Being, the contingent as well as the name Real of the Necessary Being to a way consistent
with the Asharite doctrine.
24
He explains the name Real of God as follows: The name
Real is opposite of the false. Things appear with their opposites. Everything is either
absolute false or absolute real or real in one respect and false in the other. That which
is impossible in itself is false in the absolute sense. That which is necessary in itself is real
in the absolute sense. That which is contingent in itself while it is necessary by the other
is real in one respect and false in the other. With respect to itself, the contingent has no
existence and is false, receiving its existence from the other. The contingent is real in the
respect that it receives existence from the Necessary Being while it is false with respect
to itself. Therefore, Everything will perish save His Face.
25
This is so pre-eternally and
post-eternally, and not conditionally. For nothing in itself save the Real deserves to exist
pre-eternally and post-eternally. So all other things are real in relation to that from which
they receive reality as they are false with respect to themselves. From this is known that
the Absolute Real is that which exists really by Itself and from which everything that is
real has received its reality.
26
In his al-Maqs

ad al-Athna, a middle-length work, that he composed as a commen-

tary on the Ninety Nine beautiful names of God, one can observe the inuence of the
explanations of the earlier authors. There one can nd his conformity to the Asharite
tradition, the passages quoted from al-Takhb r by al-Qushayr on one hand and the
21
The Sura al-Anam, 6/76.
22
Ibn S na, al-Isharat wa al-Tanb hat, (Cairo: Dar al-Maarif, no date), III, 103.
23
Fakhr al-D n al-Raz nds no problem with Ibn S nas interpretation of the verse I like not things that
set. See, Fakhr al-D n al-Raz , Mafat h

al-Ghayb, (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyya, 1990), XIII, 45.

24
Frank, al-Ghazalis Use of Avicennas Philosophy, 277.
25
The Sura al-Qas

as

, 28/88.
26
Al-Ghazzal , al-Maqs

ad al-Asna Sharh

u Asmaillah al-H

usna, (Egypt: Matbaa-yi Taqaddum, 1322),

9192. For similar explanations, see Mishkat al-Anwar, 275276.
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explanations quoted as passages from al-Shifa and Risala al-Arshiyya by Ibn S na.
27
Al-Ghazzal thus rests largely on the explanations of Ibn S na when elucidating several
beautiful names of God.
Al-Ghazzal falls back on Ibn S na in connection with the arguments set forth in
relation to the existence of God. For instance, Ibn S na remarks that he exclusively relies
on the concept of existence in his exposition of the existence of the Necessary Being as
well as Its freedom from attributes, totally ignoring the beings as proof with relation to
the demonstration of Its existence.
28
He tries to set forth the existence of God in a
philosophical way on the analysis of the notion of existence itself.
29
He holds that when
being itself is considered, being as being rst indicates It, and only after Him those which
follow It in terms of existence. Ibn S na holds this way of demonstration to be more
reliable and superior. Stating that the Quran also designates this point, he mentions the
following verses as proof: We shall show them Our proofs on the horizons and within
themselves until it will be manifest unto them that He is the Real.
30
I am saying that this
verse is a ruling given for a certain group of people. Does not your Lord sufce, since
He is Witness over all things?
31
I am saying that this verse is a ruling given not for those
who seek proof for Him, but for the veracious people (s

idd qun) who take Him as the

very proof for His existence.
32
Thus, Ibn S na depends merely on the clarity of the concept of existence,
demonstrating the existence of God on the basis of the notion of existence itself, and
seeking no proof from the physical world. This is called the ontological proof in
philosophical terminology.
33
Ibn S na is held to be the founder of this proof but he did
not develop it further.
34
It is also claimed that Ibn S na is the rst in the Muslim world to
employ the method of moving from the cause to the effect, namely, from the Necessary
Being to the universe.
35
In his various works, al-Ghazzal entirely adopts this ontological proof of Ibn S na
as well as his interpretation of the verses he cited in connection with this proof. Posterior
to al-Ghazzal , this notion was taken and worked out mostly by the Sus who embraced
the doctrine of the oneness of being (wah

dat al-wujud). In this process, the part of

intermediacy between the philosophers and the Sus was also played by al-Ghazzal .
Al-Ghazzal dresses Ibn S nas ontological proof and interpretation of the involved
verses in a Su clothing, couching them in the following way:
27
Frank, al-Ghazalis Use of Avicennas Philosophy, 277.
28
Ibn S na, al-Isharat, III, 5455.
29
Bayrakdar, I

slm Felsefesine Giris, 197.

30
The Sura al-Fussilat, 41/53.
31
The Sura al-Fussilat, 41/53.
32
Ibn S na, al-Isharat, III, 55.
33
Atay, I

bn Sinda Varlk Nazariyesi, 161, 164; Bayrakdar, I

slm Felsefesine Giris, 196197; T. J. de

Boer, I

slmda Felsefe Tarihi, Turkish translation by Yasar Kutluay, (Ankara: 1960), 97.
34
Hilmi Ziyalken, I

slm Felsefesi, (Istanbul: Cem Publishing, 1993), 110.

35
Atay, I

bn Sinda Varlk Nazariyesi, 168, 200201.

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6 2011 Hartford Seminary.
The Sus mostly recollect the name Real of God due to their regarding themselves
with respect to their own ontological status as perishable. For they view the actual
entities with respect to their own ontological status as non-existent. But since the
Theologians are occupied with the least useful actions in terms of demonstration, they
mostly utter the divine name al-Bar , meaning creator in their respective languages.
Most of the creatures rst see everything other than Him and take them as proof for His
existence. So, they are the addressee of the verse, Have they not considered the
dominion of the heavens and the earth, and what things Allah has created?
36
But since
the veracious people see nothing other than Him, they take Him as proof for the other
things. So these are the addressee of the verse, Does not your Lord sufce, since He is
Witness over all things?
37
In his explanations, al-Ghazzal employs the terms theologians (mutakallimun)
and the veracious (s

idd qun), calling those who take the creatures as proof for the
existence of God the theologians while referring to those who view God as proof for
the existence of the creatures as the veracious, just as did Ibn S na. He makes similar
explanations in his Mishkat and Ih

ya, too.
Know that the people of insight see nothing but see God at the same time. Some of
them went further and said, I saw nothing but saw God before seeing it. For some of
the people of God see the things through Him, while some others see the things and Him
together. To the rst group is pointed by the following words of God: Does not your
Lord sufce, since He is Witness over all things?
38
, while to the second is pointed by the
verse, We shall show them Our signs on the horizons and within themselves until it will
be manifest unto them that He is the Real.
39
The rst is the people of witnessing while
the second is the people of demonstration through the proofs of God. The rst is the rank
of the veracious whereas the second is that of the scholars who are rmly-rooted in
knowledge. Next comes the rank of the veiled and unaware people.
40
As is seen, in the Ihya, only the verses cited in connection with the people of
demonstration changes whereas in the Mishkat, the second part of the verse is
employed. The termveracious (s

idd qun) is kept as the same in both works of Ibn S na

and al-Ghazzal , while the people of demonstration are mentioned by al-Ghazzal rst
36
The Sura al-Araf, 7/185.
37
Al-Ghazzal , al-Maqs

ad al-Asna, 9293; Mishkat al-Anwar, 279, 292.

38
The Sura al-Fussilat, 41/53.
39
The Sura al-Fussilat, 41/53.
40
Al-Ghazzal , Mishkat al-Anwar, 279; Ih

yau Ulum al-d n, (Egypt: Daru Nahr al-N l, no date), IV, 238.
The term shah d occurring in the verse is interpreted in the exegetical sources as Gods seeing
everything including the human acts, rather than in the sense of proof. Consult al-T

abar , Jami
al-Bayan, (Beirut: Dar al-Fikr, 1988), XXV, 5; Al-Zamakhshar , al-Kashshaf, (Beyrut: Darul Kitabil
Arabi, 1987), IV, 201; Raghib al-Is

fahan , al-Mufradat, (Istanbul: Daru Kahraman, 1986), 394. As

different from his explanations above in connection with the divine name al-Shah d, al-Ghazzal in
al-Maqs

ad explains this term as Gods knowing and awareness. He adds that God is called al-Shah d
in relation to His knowing the outward affairs while He is called al-Khab r with respect to His
knowing the inner and unseen issues. See al-Ghazzal , al-Maqs

ad al-Asna, 91.
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as the theologians and then as the scholars rmly-rooted in knowledge. It follows that
both Ibn S na and al-Ghazzal combined the Su epistemology and general epistemol-
ogy and both claimed for the Su epistemology a relative supremacy over other
epistemologies, and last but not least, Ibn S na is al-Ghazzal s source of inspiration in
this line of thought.
41
Ibn S na thinks that the Necessary Being knows all things in an absolute and
universal manner. He knows all things through their causes. Since the things undergo a
continuous change, the knowledge attained from them will also change. But His
knowledge of things is not dependent on the things. On the contrary, He knows
everything by Itself. Sharing this view of Ibn S na, al-Ghazzal also maintains that the
objects of knowledge are posterior to the knowledge of God, and not vice-versa.
42
Gods
knowledge of the forms of the things is the cause of their coming into existence in reality.
This view of Ibn S na is completely adopted by al-Ghazzal .
43
Ibn S na thinks that both things and their causes stem from Him. He is wise in this
sense. His wisdom is at the same time His knowledge. The Necessary Being is that from
whom everything receives its existence. He gives everything its concomitants. This
meaning occurs in several contexts in the Quran: Our Lord is He Who gave unto
everything its nature, then guided it aright,
44
He measured, then guided,
45
It is He
who created me, and guides me.
46
The philosophers refer to His act of creation as the
rst perfection and to His continuation of the creation as the second perfection. The
Necessary Being is therefore the Absolute Wise.
47
Although Ibn S nas notion of the Necessary Being is in conict with the Islamic
notion of God and his views on the divine attributes are not consistent with the
established interpretation of the Ahl al-Sunna, he tried to express the perfection of the
Necessary Being in the best way possible to him in the nal analysis. In doing so, he
however suffers the failure of explaining Him as in perfect terms as is He. Having
difculty in nding right words to describe the Necessary Being, the philosopher says in
al-Shifa as the following: We have no other names to express these meanings. If one
nds the statements we have used ugly, he can replace them with the better one.
48
Another similarity between Ibn S na and al-Ghazzal appears in the interpretation of
the beautiful names of God. The former explains the divine attributes First and Last
in harmony with his philosophical system. He holds that by the First is meant that His
Essence is unitary, and not compounded, and that He has no cause, and that beings
originate from Him. By the Last is meant that the rise of beings and the spiritual voyagers
41
Abrahamov, Ibn Sinas Inuence on al-Ghazalis Non-Philosophical Works, 3.
42
Ibn S na, al-Risala al-Arshiyya, 9.
43
Al-Ghazzal , al-Maqs

ad al-Asna, 52, 5859.

44
The Sura Ta-ha, 20/50.
45
The Sura al-Ala, 87/3.
46
The Sura al-Shuara, 26/78.
47
Ibn S na, Danishnama-i Ala , Ilahiyyat, (Tehran: Danishgah-i Tehran, 1331 (Solar Hijri), 100.
48
Ibn S na, al-Shifa, al-Ilahiyyat, 369.
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8 2011 Hartford Seminary.
are back towards Him.
49
Al-Ghazzal interprets these two divine names in the same
terms. In his book on the most beautiful divine names, he makes the following remarks
in association with the two names above: He is the First with respect to beings for the
whole emanated from Him one by one in order. He is the Last with respect to the
spiritual voyagers for they keep rising through one spiritual stage after another until they
reach His presence, which is the end of their voyage. He is the Last in terms of being
witnessed and the First in terms of being.
50
Ibn S na thinks that all beings emanated from the Necessary Being. Since He is one
in all respects, only one can emanate from Him. The rst thing to emanate from Him
cannot be corporeal body, for all the corporeal bodies have two essential or relative
causes, i.e., matter and form. So these two cannot emanate from Him. Thus, the rst
thing to emanate from Him is an incorporeal being, i.e. the First Intellect. This is
expressed in Law by the Prophet as The rst thing God created is the intellect
51
and
The rst thing God created is the Pen.
52
While the verse You will nd no substitution
in Gods course of action
53
points to the continuity of creation, the verse You will nd
no change in Gods course of action, either
54
signies the continuity of the divine
command. Considering the fact that God acts through the angels, al-Ghazzal interprets
the word His hand occurring in the saying of the Prophet, God squeezed the clay of
Adam by His hand for forty mornings as an angel. Then he quotes the two sayings of
the Prophet cited above by Ibn S na, namely, The rst thing God created is the
intellect and The rst thing God created is the Pen, claiming that the intellect God
created rst is not an accident, as opposed to the claim of the theologians. So he
interprets the intellect as an angel, who is called the Pen, too.
55
The inuence of Ibn
S na on al-Ghazzal in these interpretations is obvious. The only difference is that
while Ibn S na refers to the rst created thing as intellect, al-Ghazzal describes it as an
angel. Al-Ghazzal takes up Ibn S nas statements in this context with some changing,
as the case with the context of the interpretation of the divine name Real. Even if
some of his explanations are in consistence with the early Asharite doctrine, one can
notice the trace of the Neo-Platonist theory of emanation in his interpretation of the
divine names First and Last.
56
Al-Ghazzal inserts God in the chain of beings and
49
Ibn S na, al-Risala al-Arshiyya, 13.
50
Al-Ghazzal , al-Maqs

ad al-Asna, 98; Ih

ya, IV, 233. Huwa al-awwalu bil-id

afati ila al-mawjudati, idh

s

adara minhu al-kullu ala tart bih wah

idan bada wah

idin. Wa huwa al-akhiru bil-id

afati ila sayri

al-sair n ilayhi. Ih

ya, IV, 233.

51
Ibn Taymiyya claims that the scholars of had th agreed that this saying is fabricated. See Ibn
Taymiyya, al-Radd ala al-Mant

iqiyy n, (Beirut: Dar al-Fikr al-Lubnani, 1993), 198. Consult also Ajlun ,
Kashf al-Khafa, (Beirut: Muassasat al-Risala, 1985), I, 309.
52
Abu Dawud, al-Sunan, Sunna, 16; Tirmidh , al-Sunan, Qadar, 17; Tafs r-i Sura 68; Ah

mad bin
Hanbal, al-Musnad, V, 217.
53
The Sura al-Fatir, 35/43.
54
The Sura al-Ahzab, 33/62.
55
Ibn S na, al-Risala al-Arshiyya, 15.
56
Al-Ghazzal , Fays

al al-Tafriqa, 242.
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presents Him as the source towards which the Su Gnostics aspire to return and rise.
So, though his explanation of the creation of beings and their return seems to be in
harmony with the Asharite and Sunnite Su doctrine, his notion of the chain of being
occurring in some of his works disagrees with the established Sunni conception of the
universe.
57
In connection with the interpretation of the verse And eight will uphold the Throne
of your Lord that day,
58
Ibn S na asserts that many Scriptures inform that God is over
the Throne (al-Arsh), but the Mushabbiha, namely, the Muslim anthropomorphists,
believe that God is set on the Throne, suggesting a touch between Him and the Throne.
Saying that the corporeal beings end with the ninth sphere, the all-encompassing sphere,
Ibn S na argues that the meaning of the verse is that God is over the Throne without a
touch, just as Aristotle explained at the end of his Simaul-Kiyan (Physics), and that the
spheres are referred to as angels in religion. So he interprets the verse along the lines of
the emanationist cosmology. Though al-Ghazzal does not adopt the doctrine of
emanation, he however tends to interpret Gods being set over the Throne as Gods
governing all the universe from the heavens down to the earth through the Throne, and
brings into existence no form in the universe till He creates it rst in the Throne.
59
He
compares Gods governing of the universe to the painters and calligraphers rst forming
the gures and writings in their minds and to the men controlling their bodies through
their minds. He states that God governs the universe through His Throne and Protected
Tablet (al-Lawh

al-Mahfuz

).
60
To recognize that al-Ghazzal is inuenced by Ibn S na in the contexts above, it
sufces to take a cursory look at classic exegetical works which they do not interpret the
names First and Last like al-Ghazzal . For example, Ibn Jar r al-T

abar (d. 310/923)

explains the name First occurring in the verse He is the First and the Last, and the
Outward and the Inward; and He is Knower of all things
61
as He is innite and prior to
everything and explains the name Last as He is innitely posterior to everything. He cites
as proof for this explanation the verse Everything will perish save His Face
62
and
explicates that For when He was, nothing else was and He will be after all things have
perished. Similarly, the way al-Tabar interprets the names Outward (al-Z

ahir ) and
Inward (al-Bat

in) differs from that of Ibn S na and al-Ghazzal . For him, the Outward
means His witnessing everything, His ruling over everything, and that nothing is superior
to Him, while the Inward means that He is immanent to everything and that nothing is
57
Mahmud Qasim points out that no one at that time including al-Ghazzal could remain immune to the
inuence of philosophy and the emanationist cosmology in particular. See Mahmud Qasim, al-Aql wa
al-Taql d f Madhhab al-Ghazzal , in Mihrijan al- Ghazzal f Dimashq, (Cairo: 1961), 201.
58
The Sura al-Haqqa, 69/17.
59
Ibn S na, Risala f Ithbat al-Nubuwwa, ed. by Michael Marmura, (Beirut: Dar al_Nahr, 1968), 5354.
60
Al-Ghazzal , Iljam al- Awam, p. 308; Kimya, 4041.
61
The Sura al-Had d, 57/3.
62
The Sura al-Qasas, 28/88.
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closer to anything than is He. The verse We are nearer to him than his jugular vein
63
points to this meaning, too.
64
Interpretation of the Verses Associated with the
Levels of Being
In his philosophical system, Ibn S na ranks the beings in the superlunary and
sublunary world in accordance with a hierarchical order. He situates the Necessary
Being, the rst and most perfect being, on top, while he puts the matter, the least perfect
one, in the bottom, ranking the rest according to their perfection in the descendant
hierarchy. He set a hierarchy for the sublunary beings that begins from the matter, the
least perfect being, ascending towards the more perfect ones, and ending with the
Acquired Intellect (al-aql al-mustafad). So consider how being descends gradually
from the Most Perfect Being to the less perfect ones, ending with the matter, and how
being similarly ascends gradually from the least perfect back to the more perfect ones,
i.e., to the rational soul and the Acquired Intellect!
65
In his various works, al-Ghazzal adopts this ontological hierarchy of Ibn S na as the
same. While this adoption appears only implicitly in some of his works, it is explicit in
the Mishkat: God brought the generated and created things into existence in accordance
with a certain order. God is so rst that nothing is before Him. The generated and
contingent things all generated from Him. Then, this hierarchical order of creation goes
downwards to the less perfect, ending with the matter, the least perfect of things.
Beginning from the matter, the least perfect of things, this hierarchy goes upwards back
to the more perfect till it ends with the human being. Thanks to the purication of his
lower soul, man assumes the character described as Return unto your Lord, content in
His good pleasure!
66

67
On the top of both philosophers gradation of the sublunary beings, namely, those
which are subject to generation and corruption, is situated the Prophet, in other words,
the holy prophetic soul. The three faculties that Ibn S na thinks to be essential to the
prophets, i.e., the rational power, the imaginative power, and the effective power
(al-quwwa al-aqliyya, al-quwwa al-mutakhayyila, al-quwwa al-muaththira) occur in
the works of al-Ghazzal , too.
68
The conception of the universe is another context in which al-Ghazzal was
inuenced by Ibn S na to the extent that he diverged from the Asharite tradition. For Ibn
S na, the present universe is the best of the possible universes. He also thinks that God
63
The Sura Qaf, 50/16.
64
Al-T

abar , Jami al-Bayan, (Beirut: Dar al-Fikr, 1988), XXVII, 215.

65
Ibn S na, al-Isharat, III, 241242; For similar remarks, see al-Shifa, al-Ilahiyyat, 435436; al-Najat,
334336; al-Mabda wa al-Maad, 9192.
66
The Sura al-Fajr, 89/28.
67
Al-Ghazzal , Mishkat al-Anwar, 277.
68
Ibn S na, Risala f al-Fi l wa al-Inal, 35; al-Ghazzal , Kimya, 29.
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laid down each natural law for an objective. There is no aw, dysfunction and random
in the universe.
69
Ibn S nas approach to the perfect nature of the universe stems from his
conception that good prevails the universe and evil has no essential existence or more
precisely, it is the lack of perfection. The notion of theodicy, i.e., the justice of God, is
closely related to Ibn S nas theory of emanation and the doctrine of provision (inaya).
70
The philosopher explains this doctrine as the following: It must be known that
provision (inaya) means that the First knows by Itself how beings should be in the good
order and He is the cause of what is good and perfect as far as possible and is content
with the way they are, just as described. So the First conceives the best possible order in
the best way and thus that which He conceives as order and good in the best possible
way overows from Him in the best manner to His knowledge. This is the meaning of
provision.
71
The same approach can also be seen in al-Isharat: The provision means
that the knowledge of the First encompasses everything and how everything should be
in accordance with the best order. This is necessary to Him and implied by the compass
of His knowledge. Everything occurs in the best way according to His present
knowledge without the will and intention of the First Real.
72
In conclusion, Ibn S na holds that the First knows the best possible order in the best
possible way and that which He knows as such emanates from Him in the best possible
manner.
73
For him, the beings thus have come into existence in the best possible way.
Similarly, nothing possible of His perfection has remained unfullled. For, if it were
possible for the beings to be better than they are, they would absolutely be that way.
74
Its rudiments going back to al-Farab and Ibn S na, this doctrine was later reduced
into a shorter rhymed formulation: Laysa al-imkan abdau min-ma kan (Nothing can
be more wondrous than it presently is).
75
Ibn S nas conception of emanation and
provision was not welcome by the doctors of religion for it leads to determinism in the
universe and rules out the will of God in particular.
76
Al-Ghazzal quotes this notion of
the philosophers as the same in his Maqas

id.
77
But in the post-Maqasid writings, he
adopts Ibn S nas notion that the present universe is the best possible universe, as
opposed to the established Asharite notion of God as possessing will and acting as He
wills ( faalun l -ma yur d).
78
While he quotes this view of Ibn S na only in descriptive
terms, he explicitly adopts it in his other works. In his Kimya-yi Saadat and al-Arba n,
69
Ibn S na, al-Risala al-Arshiyya in Majmu u Rasail, (Deccan: Dar al-Maarif al-Uthmaniyya, 1353), 10;
Risala f Ajram al-Ulwiyya in Tisu Rasail, (Cairo: Dar al-Arab, no date), 43.
70
Mehmet Aydn, Din Felsefesi, (Ankara: Seluk Publishing, 1992), 121.
71
Ibn S na, al-Shifa, al-Ilahiyyat, 415.
72
I

bn Sin, al-Isharat, III, 298299.

73
Ibn S na, al-Isharat, IV, 298299; al-Risala al-Arshiyya, 10.
74
Ibn S na, al-Risala al-Arshiyya, 16.
75
Aydn, Din Felsefesi, 121122.
76
Atay, I

bn Sinda Varlk Nazariyesi, 204.

77
Al-Ghazzal , Maqas

id al-Falasifa, 296.
78
According to the Asharite doctrine, God acts just as He wills. Consult al-Ashar , Kitab al-Ibana,
(Deccan: Dairat al-Maarif al-Uthmaniyya, 1948), 5152.
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he points out that the universe is like a person whose all parts are in harmony with, and
complimentary to, each other. The parts of the universe are in such good and strong a
manner designed that if the design changes, the whole system collapses. This are all the
manifestation of Gods name Designer (al-Mus

awwir ).
79
It is Him who created everything in the universe. He created His creatures in such
a way that nothing can be thought to be better and ner than its present state. If all the
reasons of the rational beings come together and think hard to nd a better manner for
this kingdom or seek a way better than its present way of governance or want to add or
remove something from it, they fail. It is wrong to think that there can be better than this.
One who fails to understand the mystery of His wisdom and action is like a blind person
who enters into a room where everything is as should be but cannot see. When he
bumps or hits something down, he says, Why is this on the way? In fact, it is not on the
way, but he cannot see the way. God created everything with justice, wisdom, and in the
best way possible. If it were possible that there be better than that which He created and
He did not create it, He would be either incapacitated or stingy, neither of which can be
said of God. So all things that He created like hardships, sickness, poverty, ignorance,
and misery are in conformity with justice. It is impossible that He do injustice because
injustice is to dispose over the domain of another person.
80
As obvious in these examples, al-Ghazzal appropriated Ibn S nas views and
interpretations in connection with the ontological hierarchy and cosmological order,
incorporating them into his own system.
Interpretations of Some Quranic Terms
We nd that al-Ghazzal is under the inuence of Ibn S na in relation with the
interpretation of some ambiguous metaphysical terms, known as mutashabihat in the
tradition of the Quranic exegesis, making an extensive use of his explanations. Ibn S na
interprets some Quranic terms, which were left in vagueness and whose precise imports
were not explained by Law (shar a), in line with his own philosophical system.
81
For
example, one can mention such Quranic terms as the Pen (qalam), the Protected Tablet
(al-Lawh

al-Mahfuz

), the Command (amr ), and the creation (khalq). He interprets these

terms in accord with his own conception of predestination and fate:
Do not think that the Pen is a tool, that the Tablet is a broad surface, and that the
writing is writing with letters. On the contrary, the Pen is an incorporeal angel, and the
Tablet is an incorporeal angel, and the writing is the guring of things. The Pen receives
the meanings that lie in the Command and commit them unto the Tablet in an
incorporeal manner of writing. The fate stems from the Pen while the predestination
comes from the Tablet. The fate contains the import of His command while the
79
Al-Ghazzal , al-Maqs

ad al-Asna, 51.
80
Al-Ghazzal , Kimya, 81; al-Arba n, 13.
81
Hammuda Ghuraba, Ibn S na bayn al-D n wa al-Falsafa, (Egypt: Dar al-T

ibaa wa al-Nashr
al-Islamiyya, no date), 137138.
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predestination contains the contents of the sending-down in measure. Something of
these two is presented to the angels in the heavens. Then, it comes down upon the
angels on the Earth. Finally, what is written in the fate takes place in actuality . . . Every
occurrence has a cause . . . The external causes go back to the order, which goes back
to the fate, which goes back to the predestination, which stems from the command. In
result, everything occurs with a measuring-out.
82
Ibn S nas view of the natural world relies on the chain of causes. He starts
everything from the Necessary Being and extends down to the physical world and then
traces the same chain back to its origin. In doing so, he interprets the related Quranic
verses in conformity with his conception of predestination and fate as implicated by his
philosophical system. The interpretations of the Quranic concepts of which Ibn S na
makes mention when explaining the issue of predestination and fate are found in the
works of his predecessor, al-Farab , too.
Do not think that the Pen is inanimate, that the Tablet is a broad tool, and that the
writing is writing with letters. On the contrary, the Pen is an incorporeal angel, and the
writing is the guring of things. The Pen receives the meanings that lie in the Command
and commit them unto the Tablet in an incorporeal manner of writing. The fate stems
from the Pen while the predestination comes from the Tablet. The fate contains the
import of the command of the One while the predestination contains the contents of that
which is sent down in measure. Some thing whereof is presented to the angels in the
heavens. Then, it ows down upon the angels on the Earth. Finally, that which is written
in the fate takes place in actuality.
83
In the al-Maqasid, al-Ghazzal says that the philosophers take the Protected Tablet
as the souls and as intellects of the heavens, explaining their views on this issue as the
following: What is meant by the Protected Tablet is the celestial souls. The engraving of
the particulars in the world wherein is like the imprinting of the memorized data in the
human memory. But this does not entail that it be a at solid body on which the things
are written like the writing of a child on a blackboard. For this entails that it be multiple
and that the things that are written on it be possible to be encompassed. If those which
are written are innite, those on which are written have to be innite, too. But it is
impossible to imagine an innite body.
84
Al-Ghazzal explains the philosophers views of angels as the following: The
philosophers hold that the heavenly angels are the celestial souls whereas the angels,
who are attendants of God, known as the Cherubim, are the substantial incorporeal
intellects which self-subsist, and are non-spatial, and do not act on the bodies. Particular
forms are diffused from them over the celestial souls. These are superior to the heavenly
angels for the former is benefactor as the latter is beneciary, and the benefactor is
superior to the beneciary. Therefore, the superior party is called the Pen. The verse
82
Ibn S na, Risala f al-Quwa al-Insaniyya wa Idrakatiha (in Tisu Rasail ), 6768.
83
Al-Farab , Kitab al-Fus

us

, (Deccan: Dairat al-Maarif al-Uthmaniyya, 1345), 16.

84
Al-Ghazzal , Tahafut al-Falasifa, 226227.
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reads, Who teaches by the pen
85
for God is like an engraver who is benefactor. God
compared the one who teaches to the Pen whereas He likened the one who is
beneciary to the Tablet.
86
In the same work, al-Ghazzal points out that the philosophers think that it is
possible to get connected with the souls above. For them, we cannot get connected with
the heavenly angels when we are awake because our senses and desires distract us at
that time. But since the distraction of our senses disappears when we are asleep, our
ability to get in connection with them appears. Al-Ghazzal adds that the philosophers
contend that the prophets attain the knowledge of the Unseen in this way and their
spiritual powers are strong enough to see when they are awake what the ordinary
people see when they are in dream. If all the things were not xed in the Protected
Tablet, they could not know the Unseen (al-ghayb) when they are awake or asleep.
87
After quoting the interpretations of the Muslim philosophers on the Pen, the
Protected Tablet, and the angels in the Tahafut, al-Ghazzal remarks as the following:
There is no proof that requires to understand the Pen and the Protected Tablet occurring
in Law as those of you [i.e., the philosophers] understand for the people of Law denitely
did not understand from the Pen and the Protected Tablet what those of you have
understood. So those of you have no footing in Law.
88
Leveling such criticisms at the philosophers, al-Ghazzal , however, sets forth similar
interpretations in his Faysal al-Tafriqa, Kimya-yi Saadat, and al-Mad

nun al-S

agh r.
This shows that he is inuenced by the interpretations of the philosophers to some
extent.
89
One of his explanations on this issue is as follows:
The divine predestination of affairs takes place in this way: They are rst planned
and drawn on the Protected Tablet by the Pen, which performs this drawing according
to a knowledge. The Tablet is a thing that is capable of the forms being written on it,
while the Pen is the thing from which the forms ow onto the Tablet. So the Pen is
dened as that which draws the forms. The Pen and the Tablet are not necessary to be
made of reed and wood . . . On the contrary, they are conditioned not to be of corporeal
body . . .
90
In his Qanun al-Taw l, al-Ghazzal makes the following remarks on a frenzied
person informing of the Unseen: As for the frenzied person informing of the Unseen,
this is due to the fact all the things that occurred and will occur are xed in written form
in the knowledge of God. This is sometimes referred to as the Tablet as in the verse, All
things We have kept in a clear Register
91
and at other times is called Book in the verse,
85
The Sura al-Alaq, 96/3.
86
Al-Ghazzal , Tahafut al-Falasifa, 226; Ibn S na, Risala f al-Quwa al-Insaniyya wa Idrakatiha,
6768; al-Farab , Kitab al-Fus

us

, 16.
87
Al-Ghazzal , Tahafut al-Falasifa, 228.
88
Al-Ghazzal , Tahafut al-Falasifa, 229.
89
Cf. al-Ghazzal , Fays

al, 242; Kimya, 2526, 628; Qanun al-Taw l, 585; Ih

ya, IV, 459460.

90
Al-Ghazzal , al-Madnun al-Sagh r, 367.
91
The Sura Ya-S n, 36/12.
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It is noted in a clear Book.
92
Things lie in it as the Quran lies in the mind of the person
who memorized it.
93
Al-Ghazzal repeats similar explanations on the Tablet and the Pen
in his Kimya-yi Saadat.
94
All this demonstrates that al-Ghazzal is under the clear inuence of Ibn S na in
connection with the interpretation of some Quranic terms. In addition, though he rejects
the theory of emanation as set forth by the philosophers notwithstanding, he appropri-
ates the philosophers interpretations of such Quranic terms as the Tablet and the Pen
that are related to the belief of predestination and fate.
Interpretation of the Verse of Light
Ibn S na seems to have inspired al-Ghazzal in connection with the interpretation of
the 35
th
verse of the Sura al-Nur. The former is of the opinion that this verse symbolizes
the degrees of the perception of the human soul.
95
In his al-Isharat and Ithbat
al-Nubuwwa, he explains this verse in similar terms.
96
Inspired by the commentaries of
Ibn S na, al-Ghazzal makes use of the same verse in his system of thought with minor
changes.
God is the Light of the heavens and the earth. The similitude of His light is as a niche
wherein is a lamp. The lamp is in a glass. The glass is as it were a shining star. (This lamp
is) kindled from a blessed tree, an olive neither of the East nor of the West, whose oil
would almost glow forth (of itself ) though no re touched it. Light upon light. God
guides unto His light whom He will. And God speaks to mankind in allegories, for God
is Knower of all thing.
97
Ibn S na maintains that the term light (nur ) occurring in the verse above is an
equivocal word. As one of its two meanings is essential, the other is analogical. The
former meaning, as pointed out by Aristotle, is the perfection of transparency of
something transparent whereas the latter has two aspects: it is either the good itself or
that which leads to the good. As with the meaning intended in the verse, it is the
analogical meaning in both aspects. The same holds true of the essential and
non-essential meanings. The heavens and earth occurring in the verse are nothing other
than the whole being.
98

So, Ibn S na interprets the term light occurring in the rst phrase of the verse as God
in harmony with his philosophical system. For in his system, the Real Being is that whose
existence is necessary and whose nonexistence cannot be thought of, i.e., the Necessary
92
The Sura al-Anam, 6/59.
93
Al-Ghazzal , Qanun al-Taw l, 585; To compare with Ibn S na, see Ibn S na, al-Isharat, IV, 121124.
94
Al-Ghazzal , Kimya-yi Saadat, Turkish translation by A. Faruk Meyan, (Istanbul: Bedir Publishing,
1979), 628.
95
Al-Raz , Mafat h

al-Ghayb, XXIII, 203205; A. Herbert Davidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averroes on

Intellect, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 130.
96
Ibn S na, al-Isharat, II, 389392; Risala f Ithbat al-Nubuwwa, 4952.
97
The Sura Nur, 24/35.
98
Ibn S na, Risala f Ithbat al-Nubuwwa, 4950.
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Being. In fact, the term being itself suggests Him. As for the contingent beings, they are
in need of Him in their being a fact that places them in the category of the shadow
being, i.e., the quasi being. What is meant by the words heavens and earth are the
whole beings who are contingent in themselves, depending in their existence on the
Real Being, wich is good in Itself and named Light, too. The contingent beings are
non-existent with respect to themselves and existent with respect to the Light. They may
also be referred to as contingent in themselves and necessary by others.
Ibn S na explains the remaining terms in the verse on the grounds of the theory of
intellects. He holds that the human soul has some powers through which it develops its
substance. By making use of these, it can attain to the level of the Active Intellect. The
rst of these powers prepares the soul for perceiving the intelligibles. Some call this
material intellect (al-aql al-hayulan ). This power is like the niche.
99
There is a
superior power that the soul obtains once it acquires the primary intelligibles and it thus
becomes ready to receive the secondary intelligibles. The soul obtains the secondary
intelligibles through its intuitive power (h

ads) if it is strong enough, and if not, through

its cogitative power (al-quwwa al-mufakkira). The former is symbolized by olive tree
(al-shajar al-mubarak) and the latter by olive oil (zayt).
100
In either case, the soul that
has reached the second level has attained to the level of the intellectus in habitu (al-aql
bil-malaka), which is like the glass. As for the exalted soul that has the holy power, to
it corresponds the symbol of whose oil would almost glow forth (of itself ) though no
re touched it. Once passed through this stage, the soul obtains such a power that
through which it perceives the intelligibles in actuality. The engravings of the intelli-
gibles become like light upon light in his mind. Next to this is such a power that
through which the intelligibles, that the soul has already acquired and no longer needs
to re-acquire, become present to it and it beholds them whenever it wishes. This power,
being like glowing forth (of itself ), is analogous to the lamp. This level of perfection
is called the acquired intellect (al-aql al-mustafad) as this power is called the intellect
in actuality (al-aql bil-l ). Once passed through all these stages, the intellect becomes
like the re (nar ) that gives off light.
101
That which brings the intellect from potentiality
into full actuality and from materiality into the state of being in habitu is the Active
Intellect (al-aql al-faal ), which is symbolized by the re.
102
In the Mishkat that he composed as a commentary on the verse of light, al-Ghazzal
interprets the analogies related to the terms in the verse in a manner similar to that of Ibn
S na.
103
To recognize the inuence of Ibn S na on al-Ghazzal in connection with the
interpretation of this verse, it sufces to look at the exegetical literature written before
al-Ghazzal . For his interpretation of the verse differs from the explanations of the Su
99
Ibn S na, al-Isharat, II, 388389.
100
Ibn S na, al-Isharat, II, 390.
101
Ibn S na, al-Isharat, II, 391392.
102
Ibn S na, al-Isharat, II, 392.
103
Davidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averroes on Intellect, 130.
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exegetes. In relation to the interpretation of the verse, al-Ghazzal is thus under the
inuence of Ibn S na, rather than such Su exegetes as al-Tustar (d.283/896), al-Sulam
(d.412/1021), and al-Qushayr (d.465/1073).
104
For he, just like Ibn S na, takes the terms
occurring in the verse as symbolizing the perceptive powers of the human soul.
105
In the Mishkat, al-Ghazzal mentions ve faculties of the human soul in the context
of the interpretation of the verse in question. The rst of themis the sensitive soul (al-ruh

al-h

assas), which receives the sensual perceptions. The second is the imaginative soul
(al-ruh

al-khayal ), which saves the sensual perceptions, keeping them available to the
continuous use of the third soul. The third is the rational soul (al-ruh

al-aql ), which
perceives the meanings that are inaccessible to the perception of the senses and the
imaginative soul. The objects of the perception of the rational soul are the self-evident
knowledge of universal character. The fourth is the cogitative soul (al-ruh

al-kr ). The
function of this soul is to produce new knowledge by making comparisons between the
simple constituents of knowledge. The fth faculty is the holy prophetic soul (al-ruh

al-quds al-nabaw ), which is special to the prophets and the saints. By this soul is
obtained the knowledge related to this world and the Hereafter that cannot be acquired
through the rational and cogitative soul. In other words, this soul attains the knowledge
of revelation and inspiration.
106
Al-Ghazzal suggests the possibility of the existence of
another realm that are beyond and inaccessible to the reason. The level of the holy
prophetic soul is called intuition (dhawq) and inner experience (wijdan). That the
fth level is taken as the level of intuition and inner experience that transcends the
reason suggests that al-Ghazzal regards it as a mystical experience, distinguishing
it from the other levels.
107
Ibn S nas symbolic explanations of the verse of light
are undoubtedly more rened and more philosophical than those of al-Ghazzal .
Al-Ghazzal appropriates the terms used by Ibn S na, in particular such terms as the
cogitative soul, the theoretical soul, and the holy faculty. Al-Ghazzal s parallelism to Ibn
S na in terms of using Ibn S nas general philosophical scheme and terminology is the
result of his earlier acquaintance with the works of Ibn S na.
108
In the Mishkat, al-Ghazzal employs the concept of light as an equivalent of the
concepts of intellect and being.
109
He also explains such terms as spirit, intellect, heart,
and soul in the same meaning.
110
If we follow in the footsteps of al-Ghazzal by focusing
on the meaning rather than the words, we can conveniently say that these two
104
Al-Tustar , Tafs ru al-Tustar , (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyya, 2007), 111; Al-Sulam , H

aqaiq
al-Tafs r, (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyya, 2001), II, 5051; al-Qushayr , Lataif al-Isharat, (Egypt:
Markazu Tah

q q al-Turath, 1981), II, 612613.

105
Al-Raz , Mafat h

al-Ghayb, XXIII, 203205

106
Al-Ghazzal , Mishkat al-Anwar, 285286.
107
Abrahamov, Ibn Sinas Inuence on al-Ghazalis Non-Philosophical Works, 89.
108
Abrahamov, Ibn Sinas Inuence on al Ghazalis Non-Philosophical Works, 1112.
109
Al-Ghazzal , Mishkat al-Anwar, 271; al-Arba n, 151; Davidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averroes on
Intellect, 132.
110
Al-Ghazzal , Kimya, 18; al-Arba n, 151, 155.
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explanations make a common point, proving that al-Ghazzal is inuenced by Ibn
S na.
111
But one should add that this inuence is expressed in allusive language. As
rightly put by Davidson, Mishkat al-Anwar is simply a new version of the Ibn S nan
system adapted to al-Ghazzal s system of thought, partially disguised in allusive
language.
112
Al-Ghazzal sets forth a gradation in which the sensitive soul is posterior to the
imaginative soul, and it is posterior to the cogitative soul, and it is posterior to the rational
soul, and it is posterior to the holy prophetic soul. This gradation reminds of Ibn S nas
gradation of the intellects.
113
The scheme below that shows both Ibn S nas and
al-Ghazzal s allegorical interpretations of the same verse of light more claries the
inuence of the former on the latter.
114
Ibn S na al-Ghazzal
Niche: Material Intellect Sensitive Soul
Glass: Intellectus in Habitu Imaginative Soul
Olive Tree: Cogitative Power Cogitative Soul
Olive Oil: Intuition
Lamp: Intellect in Actuality Rational Soul
Glowing if not touched by re: Holy Power Holy Soul
Fire: Active Intellect Gabriel
Light upon light: Acquired Intellect Prophet with revelation
So it is clear that in his interpretation of the verse of light, al-Ghazzal rested largely
on Ibn S nas analogical interpretation of the verse, rather than the earlier Su
interpretations whereof.
Interpretation of the Verses Associated with the
Conception of the Human Soul
Al-Ghazzal makes an extensive use of the explanations of the Muslim philosophers
like al-Farab and Ibn S na in connection with psychology, too. In this context, he takes
up both their psychological views and their interpretation of some Quranic verses in
harmony with their system.
115
As pointed out by Uthman Najat , it is al-Ghazzal who
incorporated the psychology of Ibn S na into the Asharite theology.
116
Adopting most of
111
Qasim, al-Aql wa al-Taql d f Madhhab al-Ghazzal , 201202.
112
Davidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averoes on Intellect, 180.
113
Ibn S na points out that the holy intellect is the nal end, and that the material intellect, the intellectus
in habitu, and the intellect in actuality serve it. Ibn S na, al-Shifa, al-Ilahiyyat, 168.
114
Ibn S na, al-Isharat, II, 388392; Risala f Ithbat al-Nubuwwa, 4952; Al-Ghazzal , Mishkat
al-Anwar, 286287.
115
M. Uthman Najat , al-Dirasa al-Nafsaniyya inda Ulama al-Muslim n, Cairo: Dar al-Suruq, 1993,
p. 167.
116
Frank Griffel, al-Ghazalis Concept of Prophecy: The Introduction of Avicennan Psychology into
Asharite Thelogy, Arabic Sciences and Philosophy, 14 (2004), pp. 101144.
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Ibn S nas psychological views, al-Ghazzal makes use of the texts and examples of Ibn
S na as the same.
117
He reproduces his predecessors interpretations of the various
Quranic verses that are ascribed with philosophical connotations.
In line with the Aristotelian physics and psychology, Ibn S na denes the soul as the
entelechy (kamal ) of natural body. In consistence with his system, he denes the human
soul as a substance that moves the body to attain its own entelechy. He divides the soul
into three kinds, as the herbal, the animal, and the human soul, setting forth a number
of proofs to establish the existence of the last.
118
He acknowledges that the human soul,
referred also to as the rational soul, has two powers, knowing and acting, called
collectively reason. This division of Ibn S na takes place in al-Ghazzal s al-M zan as
the same.
119
It is from Ibn S na that al-Ghazzal took some of his argumentations in relation with
the existence of the soul. For example, Ibn S na mentions two proofs for the soul. One
is the natural proof (al-burhan al-tab ), and the other is the proof of continuation. The
latter proof is built on the fact that though all the cells of a human being change and
renew, he remains the same person. He also makes mention of his famous analogy of the
ying man (al-rajul al-t

air ) to establish that a man, who is isolated from all physical

things, including his own body and limbs, is to be aware of his own soul. All these
psychological argumentations of Ibn S na occur in the works of al-Ghazzal as the
same.
120
Al-Ghazzal adopts the way Ibn S na explains the creation of the human soul,
interpreting the Quranic verses in harmony with this way. For instance, after mentioning
the stages of the formation of human embryo described in the Quran, the Peripatetic
philosophers argue, relying on the verse And then We produced it as another
creation,
121
that the soul is created after body. They take another creation (khilqa
ukhra) occurring in the verse as the blowing of soul (ifad

at al-ruh

) into the embryo that

has the capacity of receiving it.
122
Accordingly, Ibn S na suggests the idea of the
simultaneous creation of soul and body.
123
In the same way, al-Ghazzal in his Tahafut
points out that Ibn S na and the Enlightened Sus (muhaqqiqun) preferred the view that
the soul came into existence at the same time with the body.
124
Inuenced by this view of Ibn S na, al-Ghazzal , in his al-Madnun al-Sagh r, which
he composed as a commentary on the 75
th
of the Sura Sad, interprets the 172
nd
verse of
117
Qasim, al-Aql wa al-Taql d f Madhhab al-Ghazzal , pp. 200.
118
Ibn S na, Risala f al-Saada wa al-H

ujaj al-Ashara ala anna al-Nafs al-Insaniyya Jawharun,

pp. 511.
119
Al-Ghazzal , M zan al-Amal, pp. 202203.
120
Al-Ghazzal , al-Arba n, p. 167; Kimya, p. 18, 19, 59; al-Maqs

ad al-Asna, p. 101; Qas m, al-Aql wa

al-Taql d f Madhhab al-Ghazzal , p. 200.
121
The Sura al-Muminun, 23/14.
122
Semseddin Gnaltay, Felsefe-i l, Istanbul: I

nsan Publishing, 1994, p. 230.

123
Ibn S na, al-Najat, pp. 222223; al-Risala al-Ad

awiyya, pp. 8990; al-Mabda wa al-Maad,

pp. 157158.
124
Al-Ghazzal , Tahafut, p. 275.
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the Sura al-Araf in a way different from the classic and Su exegetes who advocate the
preexistence of the souls. In contrast to the Su approaches, al-Ghazzal in this work
follows in the footsteps of Ibn S na by claiming that the human soul is not preexistent but
created together with body. So he explicitly interprets the verses at issue in parallel to the
view of Ibn S na.
125
So al-Ghazzal takes up Ibn S nas psychology, interpreting
the related Quranic verses in line with this, and diverging from the notion of the
preexistence of soul, held by the classic and Su exegetes.
Conclusion
Examining the views of almost all the schools in his age, al-Ghazzal is a careful
reader of Ibn S na in philosophy. He composed works to criticize and refute the views
of the philosophers notwithstanding, he was inuenced by philosophy in general and by
some of Ibn S nas views and interpretations of various chapters and verses of the Quran
in particular. The inuence of Ibn S na on al-Ghazzal in the interpretation of the verses
associated with the demonstration of the existence of God and in the explanation of the
divine names and attributes is obvious. Al-Ghazzal reproduces the interpretation of the
verse that Ibn S na suggests to establish the ontological proof of the existence of God.
Another context in which the inuence of Ibn S na on al-Ghazzal is clear is the
interpretation of the verses associated with the notion of the gradation of beings. Though
he does not adopt Ibn S nas theory of emanation completely, al-Ghazzal however
appropriates his gradation, interpreting some verses and sayings of the Prophet along
this line.
One can observe the clear inuence of Ibn S na on al-Ghazzal in the interpretation
of the 35
th
verse of the Sura Nur, too. Ibn S nas interpretation of the terms in the verse,
known as the verse of light, as symbolizing the levels of the perceptive powers of man
inuenced al-Ghazzal deeply. So he interpreted the verse of light in Mishkat al-Anwar,
which he dedicated to the exposition of the verse involved, in terms parallel to the
interpretation of Ibn S na.
Al-Ghazzal is inuenced by Ibn S na in his psychological views and in his
interpretation of the verses associated therewith. He adopted Ibn S nas claim of the
simultaneous generation of soul and body, and not the former existing before the latter.
He took some verses of the Quran as proof for this view, carrying them beyond the
traditional Su lines and closer to the psychology of Ibn S na.
All this shows that al-Ghazzal , who refuses to follow any school of thought blindly,
did not oppose the views of the philosophers as a whole; on the contrary, he made use
of them in his own system of thought. Though he conformed to the conception of the
Ahl al-Sunna in the form of Asharism in most cases, he however went off the Asharite
125
Al-Ghazzal , al-Madnun al-Sagh r, pp. 359360; M zan al-Amal, p. 143. For more information,
consult Mesut Okumus, Kurann ok Boyutlu Okunusu: I

mamGazzali rnegi, Ankara: Ankara Okulu

Publishing, 2006, pp. 223232.
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track at times. His notion that the present universe is the best possible universe and his
view that soul and body are created simultaneously form two conspicuous and palpable
instances of this.
The inuence of Ibn S na on al-Ghazzal in connection with hermeneutics appear in
his works on both the Islamic rules on transactions and on spirituality. The inuence of
Ibn S nas interpretations of the Quranic verses on al-Ghazzal is quite obvious in his
such works as Mishkat al-Anwar, M zan al-Amal, Kimya-yi Saadat, al-Arba n, and
al-Maqs

ad al-Asna. This inuence is far more conspicuous in his al-Madnun al-Sagh r

which he wanted to be prevented from the public circulation. As for the views occurring
in Maarij al-Quds that is attributed to al-Ghazzal , they are set forth entirely along the
lines of Ibn S na. However, since al-Ghazzal s authorship of this work is doubtful, we
ignored the views and interpretations in it.
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