Calder, Norman - Ikhtilaf and Ijma' in Shafi'i 'S Risala

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Ikhtilf and Ijm' in Shfi' 's Risla Author(s): Norman Calder Source: Studia Islamica, No. 58 (1983), pp. 55-81 Published by: Maisonneuve & Larose Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1595342 . Accessed: 09/12/2013 15:19
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IKHTILAFAND IJMA' IN SHAFI'I'S RISALA

The characteristic aspiration of Islamic jurisprudence (1) to encompassall spheresof human activitywas alreadyevident in the structural rubricsof Malik's Muwalla' and was explicitly formulatedby Shafi-i: "There is no event that befalls the people of God's din but that there is an indicator (dalil) in the Book of God as to the path of guidance therein(48)". (2) This depiction of all human acts and activities as worthy of God's interest and object of his commandswas a sacralisation of the human condition;but was also and inevitablya mode of social controland an articulationof authority. The term 'Book of God' as used by Shafi-i referred not simplyto scripture but to all formsof divinereve(Quranic material) ultimately lation. (3) The limits of that revelation,its modes and its valid principlesof interpretation constitutethe subject matter of the Risdla, as indeed of all of Shafi'i's polemical writings. Such epistemological considerations defined, however, not
(1) For the intellectual background to the development of Islamic juristic literature, see Wansbrough, The Sectarian Milieu, Oxford, 1978 and Quranic Studies, Oxford, 1977; fora detailed analysis of early juristic literatureand a survey of Sh.fl'i's achievement, see J. Schacht, The Origins of Muslim Jurisprudence, Oxford, 1950. (2) Figures in brackets refer to paragraph numbers in M. ibn Idrts al-ShWfi't, Al-Risdla, ed., A. M. Sh.kir, Cairo, 1309. See also on this point para. 1326; and Schacht, op. cit., 136, n. 6. (3) In the Risdla paras. 53-78 constitute a preliminaryassessment of what is meant by kitdballdh, but see also 96-100. See, on typology of revelation, Wansbrough, Studies, 51-2, 174-5,
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only the nature and limits of knowledge ('ilm) but defined also its possessorsand the extent of their authority. asserts, is of two types (961). Knowledge ('ilm), Shaffi'i is The firsttype 'ilm 'dmma-the knowledgebelongingto a generality:it is a knowledgesuch that it is not permissible for an adult who is sane to be ignorantof it. Examples of this knowledgeinclude the five daily prayers the fact that zakdion wealth, in Ramadan, the pilgrimage, God exacts fasting the fact that God has forbiddenfornication, killing,stealing and wine,and otherthingsofthiskind (wa-mdfima'ndhddhd), God has charged (taklif) his servants thingsthat is wherewith either to know, or to give, or to abstain from. This type of knowledgeis foundtextually (nassan) in the Book of God or generally ('dmman) amongst the people of Islam (ahl of them ('awdmby the generality al-isldm); it is transmitted it on relate the authority from the muhum) generality;they of the prophetof God and they do not dispute (wa-ld yalandza'dn) as to its being related nor as to its being incumbent on them. This 'general' knowledge(al-'ilm al-'dmm) is that kind of knowledgewhereinerroris not possible neitherwith form(khabar) norinterpretation (ia'wil), respectto its reported nor is dispute permissible therein(wa-la yajiz fihi i-tandzu') (961-965). The second type of knowledgeconsistsof subsidiaryduties and questionsof detail (furd' al-fard'id, khdssal-ahkdm)which concernGod's servants;this is a type of knowledgeon which text (nass kitdb)nor withrespectto most thereis no scriptural of it is there a text of Tradition (nass sunna), though there is Tradition (sunna) on part of it. It consists only of the reportsof the specialists (akhbdral-khdssa), not those of the generality (akhbdr al-'dmma). This type of knowledge is susceptibleto interpretation (ia'wil) and is to be understood by deduction/analogy(qiyds) (966-7). Further, this is a degree of knowledgeto which the generalitydo not attain nor indeed are all of the elite (al-khdssa) charged(taklif) with attaining it. With regard to the elite who can attain this for all of them, in degree of knowledge,it is not permissible a of the but to if, elite, sufficiency (kifdya) ltot, neglect it,
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then those who have neglected attain this degreeof knowledge, it incurno sin; but thereis a reward(fadl) forthosewho attain it over and against those who neglect it (971). (1) was worked Now, this expositionof the natureof knowledge out as part of the dialogue whichconstitutes the basic literary formatof Shriff's Risdla. The functionof the interlocutary of repetition persona in this workwas to provideopportunities and explanation,intendedto enhance or clarifythe argument. Having heard about the two types of knowledge,the interlocutor demanded "somethingof the same kind (ft ma'ndhu) that mightstand as analogy (li-yakan qiydsan'alayhi)" (972). Shafi'f thereupon proceeded-at a tangent-to discuss the nature of the incumbencyof jihdd and nafir (=going forth to strugglein the way of God). The incumbencyof jihdd to Qur'an, Scira9, vv. 111,36, 5, 29 (in was provedby reference that order, the relevant command being expressed by some derivativeof the root qtl) and by a Traditionfromthe prophet (again using the root qtl, qdtala) (973-6, 977). Sh fi'1 then cited Sura 9, vv. 38, 39, 41 which command a 'going forth' (nfr) in the way of God. Now, these dicta, divine and prophetic,may, accordingto Shafi'l, be taken to imply that on every jihdd as a whole and nafirin particularare incumbent obedient servant of God in the same way as prayer and pilgrimage and zakdt are incumbenton every individual. Or, Shafi'l suggests,it may be that the meaning of incumbency fromthat in the case of prayer. (fard) in this case is different That is, the aim of the incumbencymay be a sufficient aim such who that those undertake sufficiently (qasd al-kifdya) jihdd achieve the executionof the incumbencyand the supererogatorybenefits,and they release those who neglectjihdd fromsin (980-1). Scra 4, v. 95 was then adduced to demonstrate that those who avoided jihdd (al-qd'idan as opposed to al-mujdhidan) were not sinners, but achieved a reward even if it was a lesser reward than those who exerted themselves. Lingering doubts on the part of the interlocutor were dispelledby citationof 9, 122:
on thispassage. op. cit.,136 forhis comments (1) See Schacht,
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(forit were better)if of everygroup a party did not go out to fight so that they mightbecome learned in religiouslaw, so as to warn the people when theyreturn, that they might be aware. This shows, says Shafi'l,that naftir is incumbenton some not others, and that tafaqquh-being learned in the law-is incumbent on some not others(988). Thus it is in everyduty where the aim is to achieve a sufficiency (fard) (qasd al-kifdya) in whateverbefalls: i.e. if a sufficiency of Muslimsundertake the business then the rest are free fromsin (990). This expositionof the nature of a kifd'tpromotedthe fard. of in that term its technical development usage opposed to a 'aynt(a termnot foundin Shifi't'swork).(1) Its immefard. diate structuralpurpose, however,was to definethe nature of the second type of knowledge,which was thus a kind of of Muslims attained such that if a sufficiency 'ilm al-kifdya, it the rest were freefromsin in not striving to achieve it. It may be noted that the two types of knowledgewhich werethusdistinguished werenot providedwitha clear objective demarcation:Shifi'l did not immediatelyoffera distribution of juristicknowledgeunder the heads he had suggested. He implied,it is true,that demarcation mightbe based on analysis of sources:what is prescribed in the Book of God or in 'general' Traditionsis part of al-'ilm al-'dmm. But it is not clear that as such: it is analysis 'general' Traditionsare easily identified of incidenceof dispute which reveals whethera Tradition is or is not 'general'. Furtherthe words of the Book of God as 'general' are not always easy to underthough identified stand: the injunction forexample in Scira9 to fight unbelievers its meaningbecame before considerable required interpretation clear. Equally in need of interpretation (takingone example frommany in the Risdla) are the words of the Book of God on wasigya(393-420). But interpretation, Shafi'thas informed is a of characteristic us, specialistknowledge. It would appear unbelievers to be the case thatit is the general to fight injunction that is known 'dmmalan 'inda ahl al-isldm; the conditions
loc.cit.,n. 5. (1) See ibid.,
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and qualification by the elite. It is depend on interpretation the possibility (or general notion) of wasiyya that is clear fromthe Book of God; its conditionsand limitsare part of the featuresof the knowledgeof the elite. The major structural law (prayer,fasting, are known to the generapilgrimage, etc) the details known are to Such at the elite. least would lity; is appear to be what implied. If there is nonethelesssome in demonstrating with precisionwhat ShAfi'l difficulty meant, it may of coursebe because the conceptualdistinction he introduced was a product more of feelingthan analysis, and/or because its explanatory value was directedat a slightly different problem. The 'general'knowledge, does not admit accordingto ShAfi'l, of error, or that of the elite does. The interpretation dispute; is of the elite based on Traditionswhich only the knowledge elite transmitand is open to interpretation (Ia'wil) and qiyds. But the knowledgeof the elite is relevant to all: the 'dmma, it would thus appear, are dependenton the khdssaforinformation as to how to act or refrain from acting. Shafi'l'sdefinition of knowledgein this respect implies a theory of authority. of the law based on the Everyonehas an idea of the structure Book of God and 'general'Traditions, but thereis an elitewhose is preciseand detailedand whoseduty it is to advise knowledge and warn the ordinaryMuslims. The knowledgewhich the elite possesses is subject to interpretation, qiyds and dispute: variationamongstthe 'ulamd' as to the details of the law is not to affect their authority. The effectof this definitionof knowledgeis to guarantee clerical authorityon the one hand and to legitimisedispute on the other. It may be thought that these aims were more pertinent to Shafi'1'smanipulation of logic and concepts than objective descriptionof juristic knowledge. Having asserted a fundamental typology of knowledge it may be shownthat Shafi'idevotedthewholeofthe subsequent part of the Risdla to analysisof the second type,the knowledge of the elite. The interlocutordemands to know the least that constitutes a hujja in the way of khabaral-khdssa(reports of the elite, also isolated reports, akhbdral-ddd), thereby
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conditions, initiatinga lengthydiscussion of the definitions, and reasonsforthe acceptanceof isolated Traditions(998ff.). (1) in para 1250, khabar ofconflicting The problem wdhiid emerges (whereit is confusedwith the problemof a singlekhabarperscheme two possiblemeanings (1251)). A rudimentary mitting would it but whether is broughtforward of preference (1251) the to ensurethat all fuqahd'would always prefer be sufficient of an ambiguous same hadith, (or the same interpretation still puzzled hadith)mightwell be doubted. The interlocutor, is to ask made as a khabar nature of the wdhid juristicproof, by about the meaningof (proof). The problem,it becomes termis applied to 'general'Traditions hu.ujja clear,lies in this that the and to 'isolated' Traditions,thoughthey are clearly different, not least because isolated Traditionsmay give rise to a multithat plicityof views whichhave to be resolved. It transpires thereare two typesof hujja. On the one hand thereis a clear text (nass kildbbayyin)or a sunna on whichconsensus scriptural has been achieved (sunna mujtama''alayhd): these constitute doubt in whichall possibility of excuse ('udhr) is cut off; proofs and anybody as to eitherof these two sourcesis not permissible who refusesto accept a proofof this kind is requiredto repent an isolated (uslulib) (1256-9). But as to a sunna derivedfrom which the a that is, concerning report (khabar) report, sunna may vary, whether because the report (khabar) permits of or because it is transmitted by a unique chain interpretation is the of transmitter in such matters ; hujja different. Neveron scholars to incumbent it in theless, is, Shfi'f's opinion, of revelation a text because theyconstitute accept such reports, even if what is accepted in this mannerdoes (theyare not constitute manss.) certainty (1260). If, in matters of (ihdl.a) this kind, someone doubts then he is not required to repent (lam naqul lahu tub) but: we say to him: you may not, if you are 'dlim doubt in this matter, just as you may not do otherthan judge on the basis of the witnessofjust witnesses, thoughthat witnessis subject, to error:you judge on that basis because of the appearance
see ibid.,50ff. (1) On which,
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on their part; God is responsible (al-zadhir)of truthfulness forwhat you do not know about them(1261). The two types of obviously correspondto the two of first h.ujja The knowledge. type of hujja is fundamental types and serves to definethe basic structure of the law, such that any rejection of this hujja or of the knowledgearising from it necessitates repentance. The other type of that is susceptible to interpretation, h.ujja, based on a khabar variable and does not wdh.id, produce certainty. It is incumbent on a learned man to accept the evidence of a khabar wdhid in spite of the factthat it does not producecertainty. It may seem then that variant opinions are inevitable (though they may be minimisedby systematicanalysis of isndds,etc.) and are built into the system. By arguingfor the acceptance of as a hujja Shifi'i was providingjustification the khabarwdhiid for the incidence of ikhtildf. I would suggest, was intended Shifi'i's conceptof knowledge, to embody a distinction between structural featuresand peripheral or subsidiary features,of definingfeatures and nonfeatures. The usefulnessof such an analysis in an defining era of juristic sectarianismwas that it affordeda principal of unitywhichtranscended, while acknowledging, the incidence of dispute. Abrasive contact between local schools was neutralisedby recognitionthat fundamentally they were all the same (ahl al-isldm) and that such differences as did exist did not affect the bases. The bases were precisely, as it were that which the local schools had in common. by definition, The unitywhich Shafi'i aspired to assert was not an exclusive but an inclusive and tolerantone whose ultimategroundwas the commoninterest and the legitimate of the clerical authority class. The distinctionbetween two types of knowledge and its relationto ikhtilif was impressedupon the interlocutor/reader It by repetition. emerged again in Shafi'l's discussion of qiyds (1321-76). Qiyds and ijlihdd,he asserts,are two words with one meaning (1324). (They represent,in effect,the intellectual process whereby a finitebody of revealed texts of human may be renderedrelevantto the infinite complexity events.)
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Every event that befallsa Muslimhas its necessaryreligious value (hukm Idzim), and there is evidence as to the true path in that matter. It is incumbenton the Muslim if thereis a specificrulingon a matterto followit. If there is no specificrulingthen evidence as to the true path must be sought by ijlihdd. And ijtihddis qiyds (1326). The interlocutor betrays his habitual puzzlementat Shifi'i's statementand raises a whole seriesof highlychargedquestions whichpreparethe way fora comprehensive surveyof the nature of the specialists. of specialistknowledgeand the qualifications Do you consider that '~lims when they excercise qiyds achieve certainty thay they have understoodGod's (ih.dla)forthemto vary in matterssubject truth? Is it permissible to qiyds? Are they obliged (laklif) in every matter to follow one (true) path or are there several different (true) is that What there can exercise they proof qiyds paths? on the basis of surfaceappearance (when they are ignorant duin al-bdfin), or that of) fundamentalrealities (al-yzdhir they may vary in their opinions (yatafarraqd)? Is their from obligation(taklif) with respectto themselvesdifferent that with respect to others? Who may exercise ijtihdd with respect to himselfbut not others,and who and qiydas with respect to himselfand others?(1327). The answer to all this depends-we are no longer surprised that knowledge is essentially to discover--on understanding kinds: here of two as, on the one hand, certainty, expressed both surfaceappearance and underbased on comprehending lying reality fi l-zdhirw'al-bdfin)and, on the other, (ih.d.a truthbased on appearance only (haqq ft l-zdhir)(1328). The firsttype of knowledge,that which constitutesihdta is based on eithera revealed text of God's command certainty, from the generality li-ldh)or on a sunna transmitted (nass hukm to be ignorantof this to the generality. It is not permissible knowledge or to have doubts about it (1329). The other that is a sunna based on khabar type is of course'ilm al-khdssa, a sunna known only to the 'ulama', such that they al-khdassa, alone are obliged (taklif) to know it, a sunna found only
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of amongst them or some of them, based on the truthfulness the individuals who transmit somethingfrom the prophet. on the ahl al-'ilmthat they have recourseto it. It is incumbent It constitutes a truth based on external appearance only, without understandingof inner realities. It is like killing for on the basis of two witnesses:(that too is haqq ft l-.zdhir to err)(1330). Knowledge it is alwayspossiblefortwowitnesses based on ijmd'is also ofthiskind(1331); (1) as is knowledge based This is a on ijtlihdd search for by qiyds. (ijtihdd by qiyds) truth (al-haqq), but it is truth based on what is apparent to the qd'is irrespectiveof what is apparent to the (.dhir) of the 'ulamd'. God alone knows what cannot be generality seen (1332). and if qiyds is (If knowledgeis sought on the basis of qiydts will exercised the on be rightly muqd'isan agreed most matters but we may find them at variance (on others). There are in fact two types of qiyds, one based on essential principles (fi ma'nd l-asl) and one based on mattersof similarity: only the second type permitsof variation. The first type is exclusively arguments a maiore ad minorem,or a minore ad The interlocutor and naturally requires some clarification seems particularlyperturbedby the phenomenonof variant views being equally permissible. The well-established (wellestablished,that is, by Shifi'I in the Risdla) responseto this related to the fact that, forpeople who are out of sightof the all that is required fromthem is that Ka'ba at prayer-time, based on whateverindicators are available they make the effort or knownto themto pray in the rightdirection. But another to marry,to inherit, response is foundin this that permission to act as witness is granted on the appearance of justice, be unjust. Two though a man may inwardly (ft l-badfin) with men different knowledge may be constrained to act with respect to the same individual: "the duty differently incumbenton us with respect to one man is found to differ
(1) See furtheron ijmd', below. see ibid., 120ff. (2) For furtherdiscussion of Shdfl'"Isviews on qiyds/ijtihdd
maiorem.) (2)
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(mukhlalif)dependingon the degreeof our knowledgeand the knowledgeof others" (1350-6). In like manner,with respect to a matteron which thereis no bindingtextual rule, Shifi'i asserts that a learned Muslim must seek the truthby ijlihdd and he is obliged (laklif) to followthe truth (as it appears) continuesto express doubt to him (1358). The interlocutor about this "judging a single matter in various ways" (1359) to silence by a further but is reduced temporarily example another citationof the qibla situation, of court procedure, yet of Quranicquotationswhichassertthe limitations and a number of man's knowledge (1361-76). The main aim of the argument is to establish qiyds as a valid source of (juristic) knowledge but not an infalliblesource: it permits,indeed precipitates ikhtildf. of Shffifl's It is by now clear fromthe structure argument that his real concernis to account for and justifythe phenomenon of ikhtildf. An extended discussionof ijlihdd permits him to make explicit this concern. demands reassurance about the permissiThe interlocutor and of bility ijlihdd promptsShifi'i to adduce yet again the case of facingthe qibla duringprayerwhen out of sightof the actual Ka'ba. Each individual can only act on the basis of such signs (dald'il) as he is familiar with,so that two indiviwithdifferent face in different directions duals familiar signsmay as it The interlocutor were where the perceives (1381). is and is to made forward objections bring argument going as follows: Interlocutor:If I grant you this I grant that in certain circumstancesthere is ikhlildf. Shafi'i: State your opinion on this matter. Int: I say thisis not permissible (i.e. I do not grant ikhlildf). Sh: Imagineit is you and I, and we are both knowledgeable I say: this is as to the means (of finding the Ka'ba). different. Whichone the qibla; and you say something of us must followhis companion? Int: Neither. Sh: What must be done?
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Int: If I say it is not incumbent on them to pray until they attain certain knowledge (ihdafa),(that is impossible) for they can never know for certainwhat they cannot see. Then, they must either neglect prayer, or the duty of facing the qibla is removed. But I cannot maintaineitherof these views. I see no alternative to that in each one whatever direction may pray asserting he considers right, and that they are not charged I may say (laklif) with anythingelse. Alternatively, they are charged with findingthe right answer based on both appearance and inner reality (al-zdhir wa'lbut any error as to the reality as opposed to bdftin) appearance is discounted (wu i'a 'an-humd). Sh: Whateveryou say, it is proofagainst you; foryou have al-bdfinwa'l-zdhir,which distinguishedbetween h.ukm was what you (tried to) deny! (1382-9). This dialogueis nicelyorganisedto serveits particular dramatic is to admit the interlocutor that must there brought purpose: and theremay be no way be in certaincircumstances ikhtildf of reconciling two views which,thoughdifferent, can be neither harmonisednor disproved. inclined to assume The dialogueproceedswiththe interlocutor in a case of ikhlildf that one or both positionsmust be in error is set aside, discounted but the error (1389-93). (khaf.a'), mawd.el', of the dislikes use the termkha.ta'and proceeds Shafi'l clearly is quite inevitable in certain cirthat ikhtildf to demonstrate cumstances. His first example is based on the use of the term in 95 5, Qur'an, (1394-1401). The second example mithl is based on the choice of a 'just' man ('adl) to act as witness,etc.: sucha choicecan onlybe based on external appearance. Sins and good actionsare always both presentin an individual's the necessity of ijlihddas to which lifeso thereis no escape from it is the "this case, quite inevitable that being predominates; in their will at variance be opinions" (1402-1405) mujiahids
one by accepting, example, two judges may judge one affair, one by rejecting;this is ikhlildf, but each one has acted as was
5
(4."
xj
AS UTlIII Or,for
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incumbent thereis a upon him (1406-7). Furthermore, the validity of ijlihdd (1409) (1): h.adith confirming
The interlocutor objects to this on the groundsof its being an isolated Tradition, an objection quickly dismissed; he then points to the propheticuse of the termkhafa'. Int: In the Traditionyou have given the prophetmentions errorand right (khafa', sawdb). Sh: That is proofagainst you. Int: How? Sh: The prophetsaid that one of them was rewardedmore than the other. But there can be no rewardforwhat is not permissible, nor can therebe a reward foran error (even if it is) discounted. The point Shifi'1 desires to make is that 'error'cannot merit 'reward'. He expresses himselfrather clumsily: If a personwere told to exercise ijlihdd,granting the possiof and did as was then he so, commanded,on bility error, the basis ofexternalappearance,thenany error he committed would be set aside-as you (the interlocutor)have said. But ifthatwerethe case thenpunishment, foran error, would be more appropriate(than reward); the best that could be expected (for an error) is that a man might be pardoned his error; and it is inconceivable that he could obtain a for an error(1420). reward, Shifi't's intentionis clear: all decisions based on ijtihdd are equally valid, and there should be, as far as possible,no talk ifone is rewardedforan actionthat actioncannotbe of 'errors'; is not unnaturally still 'wrong' (khat.a'). The interlocutor puzzled: what, he asks, is then the meaning of sawdb and kha.la'?(1422):
similar devices werenotunknown in other (1) As a wayoftranscending dispute Studies,111. areas,cf. Wansbrough,
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One is charged (laklif) with ijlihdd only on matterswhich are not evident. So, if one does that (i.e. exercisesijlihdd) one has done right (asdba) in so far as one has responded to an obligation (takltf). Hence that (action based on ijlihdd?) is 'right' (sawdb) on the basis of appearance (al-zdhir). God alone knows the bdltin. If two people in facingthe qibla,thoughtheyare both 'right'(asdbd) differ in aimingforthe same point, yet,whilethey differ by ijtihdd, with both be they cannot 'right' respect to the point, but they are 'right' with respect to ijlihdd (1425-6). One may be pardoned forthinking Shifi'l is here over-subtle; but it is clear what he is struggling to express: he wishes to all sense of erroror sin. eliminatefromthe incidenceof ikhlildf A variety of views is permissible and acceptable. Paradoxicallyall are 'right'. coined the apophthegmatically satisSucceeding generations a decisive which "kullu slogan obviously fying mujtahid muSib"; but which clearly had not emergedwhile Shcfi'l was writing, derives fromhis thinking. Likewise later generationsdiscovered what Shafi'i lacked, a relevant Tradition: "ikhlildfis a blessing", again obviously in part a result and product of clerical explorationof this theme.(1) ofthe interlocutor It has alreadybeen noted,thatthe function in the Risdla is to provide Shafi'l with the opportunityto with slightvariationthe same points. In particular, reiterate instancesof apparentobtusenesson the part of the interlocutor lead Shifi'l constantlyback to the distinctionbetween two types of knowledgeand to the incidenceof ikhtildf. Indeed the quality of convictionconveyed by the argumentdepends perhaps more on repetitionthan on logical consistency. "I findthe people of knowledgeboth in the past and recently are at variancein certainmatters. Is this permitted?" (1671). related introducesan argumentspecifically So the interlocutor to ikhlildf. The question elicits the by now familiaranswer:
(1) See furtherSchacht, op. cit., 95-7, esp. 96, n. 2; also, Goldziher, The Zahiris, tr. W. Behn, Leiden, 1971, 89ff. Shffl't's argument about the absence of khafa' in the exercise of ijtihdd became a standard theme, taken up e.g. by Mulhammad 'Abduh, see G. Hourani, 'The basis of the authority of consensus', SI, 1964, p. 42.
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Shifi'I explains, has two aspects. From one point ikhtildf, of view ikhtildf is forbiddenbut "I cannot say that about the other" (1672). Ikhlildfis forbidden in all sphereswhere God has provideda hujja in his Book, or on the tongue of his prophet,textuallyand explicity(mansds, bayyin). But with regard to such texts as permit of interpretation (la'wil) or are to be understoodby qiyds in such a way that the interpreteror qd'is accepts what is implied by a khabaror qiyds fromhim in his interpretation: even if anotherdiffers in such a case, "I do not say that variation is forbidden, as it is in continues textually explicit cases." (1675) The interlocutor to doubt; he demandsfurther as to the existence of these proof the one forbidden, two typesof ikhiildf, the othernot forbidden. Shifi'l quotes the Qur'an: 98,4 Those who have been given the Book were not divided except after they were vouchsafed a clear proof. 3,105 Be not like those who were dividedand were at variance after they were granted clear proofs. The relevanceof this is, Shifi'l explains,that God has criticised in matters concerning which thereare clear proofs...! ikhtildf (1679). Shafi'l goes on to give examples of established and to give his own suggestionsfor a possible (but ikhtildf, not definitive?)resolution of various questions (1681-1804). The introductionof a distinctionbetween 'ilm 'dmma and 'ilm khdassa may be seen as directed entirelyat this end, to explain and justifyikhlildf. The argumentis, perhaps inevinot freefrom circularity. In spiteofShafi''s attempts tability, to distinguish the two knowledges to theirsources, by reference in practice, it seems to me they can only be separated by to the existenceof ikhiildf; reference the distinction once establishedis used to explain ikhlildf. SchematicallyShifi'l's position may be summed up thus. The Book of God and 'general' Traditionsgive rise to a type of knowledge, also 'general',whichis knownto all the community. This general knowledge representsthe fundamental unchangingverities of the Islamic juristic system. Around this fundamental structure there is a more nebulous structure of laws and rules, details and particulars, variation, permitting
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even, by new interpretation, change. This is the specialist the of the learned classes, derived from knowledge, monopoly isolated/specialist Traditions, qiyds/ijtihddand ijmdc. In spite of the fact that the general knowledgeis presentedas somehow primary or dominant, the truth is that in every instance specialist knowledge affectsand conditions general knowledge. I have pointed to two examples above-jihdd and wasiyya-where though the legal source is 'general' the of these termsin a juristiccontextdepends precisesignificance on qualification and interpretation by the learnedclass. Such could be examples multiplied very easily. The knowledge of the specialists qualifies,conditionsand judges the general knowledge of the masses. The nature of this knowledge is explained by Shifi'l and its specificsusceptibility to ikhtildf in a lengthy,coherent and well-organisedargument,within whichrepetition is meaningful and varied,never merelyotiose, frompara. 961 (Bab al-'ilm) to the end of the stretching of the coherence of his argument Risdla. Final demonstration his work, and of a for the context depends upon provision his of notion of analysis ijmd'.
Shafi'l's analysis and exposition of Islamic epistemology was in one sense monolithic and totalitarian. All human events could and must findtheir resolutionin God's law. (1) Both psychologically and sociologicallythis was an ennoblement of the human condition:nothingin human lifeor society that it was unworthy was so mean or so insignificant of God's interest and command. This interest and command were mediated to man througha prophet,who left to his (in time universal) communitythe tangible evidence of his mission, the exegeticalsource forthe knowledgeof God's will, scripture and Tradition, both aspects of divine revelation. The (2) firstpart of the Risdla is concernedwith the identification
(1) See note 2, p. 55. oftheseideas in Islam is nowhere better analysedthanin (2) The development Studies,chaps. 1 & 2. Wansbrough,
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CALDER NORMAN
of Qur'an and hadithas aspects of revelationand valid sources for the discoveryof God's law. (1) But perhaps the major in the firstpart of the Risdla was directed intellectualeffort towards the identification of two 'objective' sciences which could be applied to the texts of revelationin orderto discover what they meant: linguisticsand history. The 'scientifically' formerprovided the exegetical principleof 'dmm and khdss (179 ff.),the latter that of al-ndsikhwa'l-mansakh(106 ff.). The second part of the Risdla, which I have analysed in some to the problemsof 'ilm, detail in this essay, is devoted entirely and associated problems deemed to arise out of the ikhtildf nature of the revealed texts, or out of meditationon their 'objective' sciencesare in this context meaning. Two further introducedwhich may be broughtto bear on revealed texts; and biography,as a check on isndds (ad the khabar wdh.id) as of a means of a the text. extending scope given logic (qiyds) The whole work is dedicated to the serviceof a series of ideas which represent the monolithic, totalitarian all-embracing nature of the Islamic juristicimpulse. All events have their resolutionin God's law; all knowledgeis therefore knowledge of God's law, (hence'ilm is defined as relating onlyto knowledge ofthe law;(2)) all sourcesof knowledgeare revealedsources;(3) is clericalauthority, all authority arisingfromclericalcustody and learned interpretation of the revealed sources. Quite remarkablein this context is the complete absence of any referenceto the intellect as itself,independently of God's revelation,a source of knowledgein the moral/juristic continbetween sphere. The characteristic Mu'tazilldistinction and law gent (revealed) non-contingent (rational) may well have found expression by the time of Shafit's writing. If that is the case, the very absence of reference in the Risdla of those who may itselfbe a polemical comment,a refutation asserteda role forreason in this sphere.(4)
(1) See furtherJ. Burton, The Collectionofthe Qur'an, Cambridge, 1977, 21-29; also Wansbrough, Studies, 43-52, 77-8, 148-202; and Milieu, 71-87. (2) Or, 'of the Book', cf. Risdla, paras. 43-5. (3) For ijmd', see below. (4) See on the Mu'tazill position, Schacht, op. cit., 40 and 258-9; Wansbrough,
IKHTILAF AND IJMA IN SHAFI i 'S RISALA
71
Sh fi'I's discussion of ikhlildf,based on his distinction between two types of knowledge,in no wise mitigated the totalitarianaspect of Islamic jurisprudence:quite the reverse, forin the course of that discussionhe repeated and reaffirmed the dogma that all human eventualitieswere subject to God's betweentwo typesof knowledge served law, and his distinction on to confirm that all was based revelation. only knowledge of ikhlildf his defenceand justification established Nevertheless, a kind of flexibility and tolerance (already perhaps implicit in some earlier juristic literature)in so far as the notion of variationwas now built into the systemand its negativeimpliof intellectual cations neutralised. endeavour, (1) The subtlety which are the constant repetition,the consistencyof effort, all demonstrablebehind the scholastic dryness of the text, reflecta considerableconcernto give forceto his contention: is permissibleand to be expected. The motives for ikhtildf the concern though no doubt multivalent,are not obscure. He was clearly respondingto a contemporary need to forge various ancientschools forthe geographically and ideologically a principleof transcendent unitywherebythey could recognise in themselvesa unifiedand catholic body. At the same time scholarsto associate themselves he enabled the contemporary of the Islamic past, going or traditionalfigures with traditions, of recorded back to and includingall of the ashdb, irrespective deviation or divergencein juristic conclusions. This desire for an inclusive catholicity manifestsitself throughoutthe second part of the Risdla. The issue on which there was no compromiseand which representsas it were the common denominator subscribedto by all the ancientschools,the focus of theirloyalty,was that of clerical authority. The articulation of a typologyof 'ilm was also a defenceand justification of a gulf betweenthose who know (the specialists) and those who depended on those who know (the 'generality'). Thus, abdicationof certainty (ikhlildf)went hand in hand with assertion of prerogative.
fora laterperiod,G. Hourani,IslamicRationalism, Oxford, 1971, Milieu, 110-13;
chap. 6. (1) A point already noted by Wansbrough, Milieu, 91.
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NORMAN CALDER
The juristic closing of ranks, evident in the Risdla, was, I have surmised,a responseto the Mu'tazil1challenge. The focusof that challengelay in the denial of the epistemological jurists' monopoly of knowledge/authority: (epistemologyin Islam was always a discussion of authority). Revelation, forthe Mu'tazills,was not the sole sourceor type of knowledge; reason was a parallel and independentsource. Divine law as such had a strictlylim;ted sphere of validity. It was a sphereof knowledge/ partlyat least because theythus defined of from the influence free the fuqahd' that the authority court of the caliphs. found favour at the frequent Mu'tazilis Though not explicitlyenunciated,the Risdla functionsas a refutationof Mu'tazill epistemology:revelation, it asserts, is a necessary, an exclusiveand a sufficient sourceof knowledge is the prerofor all human purposes-and its interpretation gative of the fuqahd'.
and justificationof ikhtildf had a still Acknowledgement in Shafi'l'swriting as a functional it emerged widersignificance: juristic concept which guaranteed the practical infallibility ('isma) of the community. This characteristic('isma) on an ideological or metaphysical level was usually associated with ijmd',(1) but that concept (ijma') in a juristic context was of limited,that is strictlyqualified,value. There was a grand metaphysicalvalue in the assertionthat the Islamic communitycould not unite on an errorand a more prosaic in view of the evidence of recordeddispute,in the usefulness, assertion that the community remained infallibleeven when it did not achieve ijmd', even when it held and promulgated divergentjuristic views. Divergent views emergingwithin the community could all be considered, with appropriatequalifications,to be right. It was this continued rightnessof ofthe community. variantviewsthatguaranteedtheinfallibility in a fact as juristic concept represents principles Ijmd'
(1) See Wansbrough, Milieu, 86 and opera cit. there; the term 'metaphysical' is of course W's.
IKHTILAF
AND IJMA IN
SHAFI'i
'S RISALA
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of rigidity and immutabilitydangerously opposed to the and tolerancewhich, I have suggested,Shafi'ftried flexibility to build into the system by his analysis of 'ilm and ikhtildf. Schacht has demonstratedShVfi''s considerable distate for the concept of ijmd' as used by the ancient schools-that is, and perhaps exclusively as a term indicating pre-eminently the consensusdoctorum (ijmd' al-'ulamd')-(though he continued to resortto that idea on a casual and ad hoc basis). (1) not least This distaste may be related to a numberof factors, local cited were 'ulamd' that, since the 'ulamd' invariably and ijmda al-'ulamd' emergedin polemical contextsas a local ijmdc, it was a concept which tended to foster entrenched positions and irreconcilableopposition between local schools. Regional variation if justifiedby appeal to ijmd' would tend itselfas a self-contained to be divisive,each regionpresenting of alternative views or the the denying validity community, of other communities. status soteriological Shifi'l by accountvariation as a result (a permissible ing forregionaland other of revealedtexts defused and inevitableresult)of interpretation tension and diminished conflict. Ijmd' al-'ulamd' was a concept which he considered so absurd (or dangerous) that he was temptedto deny its existence(cf. 1556-9) as well as its validity. In the Risdla Shafi't'smajor discussionof ijmd8is situated in the middle of his extended discussionof the elementswhich make up 'ilm al-khdssaafter the discussion of khabar wdhid the discussionof qiyds/ijtihdd. I have alreadytried and before is generallyboth coherent to demonstrate that that argument and purposeful: the distinction between the two types of to knowledgeis elaborated and applied with varied reference khabar (all these beingnotions qiyds,ijtihddand ikhtildf to 'ilm al-khdssa)and with cumulative impact. The relatedwdh.id, structureof the argumentis meticulousand the situation of ijmdcwithinthat argumentmakes it clear that we are to take ijmd8as an elementin 'ilm al-khdssa. The ijmdbdiscussed in the Risdla (1309-20) is consensuson
(1) See Schacht, op. cit., 88-95.
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NORMAN CALDER
a matter not referred to in any revealed text (to be distintherefore from a sunna mujiama' 'alayhd--already guished establishedas part of the knowledge of the generality. The (1) interlocutor asks: What is your proofthat you may followthe consensusof the people (md jlama' al-nds'alayhi) in a matteron whichthere is no textof God's command and whichthey do notrelatefrom the prophet? Do you claim what others claim, namely that the ijmd' does not exist except on the basis of a valid sunna even if they do not actuallyrelate it? Shifi'l explains that if the people have achieved consensus on a particularmatter and they specifythat it is based on a hikdya from the prophet, thenwhat theysay mustbe accepted (1310). As to what they do not specifyin this manner(i.e. do not fromthe prophet)then specify as a transmission, the case may be eitherthat.ikdya, what they say is a transmission (hikdya) fromthe prophet (2) or the case may be otherwise. In fact,however,it is not permissible to consider(a matter based on ijmd') to implya transmission (hikdya)(ifthe people do not actually specifythat) because it is not permissible to relatesomething excepton the basis ofwhat one has heard, nor is it permissibleto relate somethingmerelyimagined (1311). Now, this approach to the concept of ijmd' relates clearly to two questions. First, when a problem arises, concerning whichthereare no revealed texts of any kind,is it permissible to turn to the people? And, second, does the existence of an ijmd' amongst the people-an ijmd' devoid of revealed support-imply the existence of a propheticTradition which has somehowgot lost? Both these questions had previously emergedin the Jewishjuristic traditionwith respect to the concept minhag. The question of what to do in cases where
(1) See above, esp. ad Risdla, 1259 and (below) 1815. A (2) The text isgarbled: read either oi l L4 .)i or *t o D: see editor's footnote.
IKHTILAF AND IJMA IN SHAFI'i 'S RISALA
75
texts of revelationprovidedno guidance was answeredin the Talmud, as it was answeredby Shafi't,in termsof turningto the people. ("Go out and see what the action of the people is and act likewise", TJ, Pe'ah, 7:5, 20c.) It would appear to be the case that one way of explaining the validityof custom (minhag) as a source of law was on the grounds that a pretraditionhad in the course of time viously extant transmitted becomeforgotten. Both aspects ofthe debate may be detected in a well-known narrativeconcerning Hillel the Elder. When asked what the law was in a particularcase, he said: Leave it to Israel; iftheyare notprophets, theyare thesonsofprophets. This representsthe assertion and justificationof minhag as a valid source of law. When he had seen how the people acted, Hillel thereupon'recalled' the halakhahand said: Thus have I received the traditionfromShemai'ah and Avtalyon (TB, Pesahim, 66a). This may be taken to representthe assertionthat a customof this kind is due to a 'lost' tradition. discussion of the concept ijmd' echoes this Rabbinic ShAfil'Ts debate. For him it was a question of whetherijmd' (of the definedby him in this context) implied the type specifically existence of a transmission(hikdya) which had subsequently vanished fromthe community. He informsus that he had held thatview but had now changedhis mindbecause previously of his intellectualconvictionthat Traditionsfromthe prophet could not altogether vanish from the community(1312). Ijmd' was a valid source implying nothingabout the existence of a 'lost' transmission. (To have said otherwise would have been to impairthe hierarchical of revelation: ranking community ijmd' if it implieda revealed text would be on a par withrevelation.) The validity of ijmd' derivedfromthe fact that the 'dmma could not unite on somethingopposed to the prophet of God (1312). (1)
The process Rabbinicand otherJudaeo-Christian ideas becameavailable whereby to Muslimscholarshas been extensively discussed two throughout Wansbrough's conviction that no Tradition coulddisappear from books, cit.,note 1. ShAfl't's the community is relatedto his notionof language,Risdla, 133ff., esp. 138-40. His notionof ijmd'was latersubsumed underthejuristic conceptof 'dda.
(1) For the Jewish concept minhag see, Encyclopedia Judaica, 1971, ad minhag.
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Evidence forthat conclusion,revealed proofthat is forthe validity of ijmd8as an independentsource of law, was found in two Traditionsreferring to luzdim al-jamd'a, cleavingto the shall not unite on an error' community. (The 'My community Traditionobviouslyemergedlater than and partly as a result of Sh~fi'l'swork.) The conceptof cleavingto the community, ofrevelation, like the conceptof ijmd' independent immediately remarks which might be interpreted provoked clarificatory a dispute. Shifi'i was quick to point out again as reflecting that by he understood a juristic concept luzrm al-jamd'a and not a physical movementfromplace ("for tahlil tahrim") to place in order to join a particularphysicallydefinedbody to infer of people (jamd'a) (1319). It may thus be legitimate that the concept. been associated had earlier of luzrmal-jamd'a with a context not quite so centrallyjuristic. One might at this pointto that (literary) refer groupor tendency-isolated by Wansbrough-whose dominant notion of soteriologywas membership of the community. (1) In practice however Islamicideology, as a resultofsectarian/ confessional formulated debate, probably associated the notion of cleaving to the with sectarian movements, community specificallyKhariji. (2) Shafi'l's insistencethat he did not mean cleaving physically to a group may representan attempt to dissociate himself from the conventionalvision of Khariji sectarianism. One might in sum see Shafi'I's notion of ijmd' as the integration of a specificjuristic concept (?Judaic) with a metaphysical concept (the soteriological community) which had already emergedin an Islamic context. It may be instructivehere to repeat that there are two distinctions to be bornein mindwhile readingShifi'I on ijmd'. First thereis the distinction, noted by Schacht, betweenijmd' and al-'ulamd' ijmd' al-dmma; then there is the distinction
(1) Wansbrough is inclined to see membershipof the communityas the earliest expressionof Islamic soteriology,interceptedlater by the idea of submissionto the law as the dominant mode of salvation. ShAfl'1'sranking of luzz(m al-jamd'a below revelation as source of law, may be thought to symbolise this change; see Milieu, 87-91, and chap. IV. (2) Cf. Wansbrough's comments, ibid., p. 119-20.
IKHTILAF AND IJMA IN SHAFI'i 1S
RISA^LA
77
between ijmd' on a matterdealt with in a Traditionor in the not dealt with in revelaBook of God and ijmd' on something tion,bothofthesebeingijmd' al-'dmma. Now, ijmd'al-'dmma, if it is based on an elementof revelation,is not only part of featureof that type of know'ilm al-'dmmabut is the defining of it is the absence dispute or presenceof ijmd' which ledge: of an item as 'dmm not permitsthe definition khds. Ijmd' it is a matter not when on however, provided with al-'dmma a textual base, is clearly to be understood as part of 'ilm fromthe context of Shifi't's al-khdssa. This may be inferred discussionof ijmd', but, lest therebe doubts, it may be worth referring again to paras. 1328-32. Shifi'l there definedwhat constitutedcertainty(ihdla) (1329) and what did not, viz., akhbaral-khdssa(1330), ijmd' (1331) and ijlihddbi-qiyds (1332). to ijmd' is laconic, it may not be simply Though the reference dismissed:ijmd' (as a separate source,distinctfrom revelation) is part of 'ilm al-khdssa. A final confirmation and perhaps the last fewparagraphs explanationofthismay be derivedfrom of the Risdla. The discussion of 'ilm and ikhlildf analysed in this essay gave place to a lengthyseries of examples of (1681-1804). To this was added a brief appendage ikhtildf as sourcesof knowon whetheraqdwtlal-ashdbmightfunction ledge (1805-11). Then, anotherappendage was added, constituting a final resume of the argument about two types of knowledge. The interlocutorwas yet again puzzled: So, you make juristic decisions (hakamia) on the basis of kildb and sunna; but on what basis do you make decisions by ijmd', and then make decisions by qiyds? Do you set these two up on a par with kitdband sunna? withanotheropening With thesewordsShifi'tprovidedhimself for his unwearyingreiterationof the same argument. The in each case. basis of the decision is different Decisions may be based on scripture(kildb) or Traditionon-which-there-is-consensus (al-sunna al-mujlama' 'alayhd); and we may say: we have on such mattersthereis no ikhlildf judged the truthwith respect to both external appearance and inner reality (hakamnd bi'l-haqq ft l-zdhirwa'l-bdtin).
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- sunna on which there is no ijmdc (isolated or specialist Traditions), to the knowledgeof the grouptherecorresponds Only the first the knowledgeof the the other constitute sources generality; The relates to a specialists. sunna-on-which-there-is-ijmd' consensus achieved as the result of and specificallyrelated to a propheticTradition. Consensus,eo ipso, is a lower proof a hujja onlyifthereis no revealedtextavailable. and constitutes This consensus,on a matternot dealt with in a revealed text, is, we know (1309-20) a consensus of the 'dmma.(1) Why as part of the then is it defined,as it clearly here is defined, is An not difficult of the explanation khdssa? knowledge to find. Consensus,when it is not based on a revealed text, is a weakersourcethan a revealedtext; but custodyof revealed lies with texts,in particularof specialistor isolated Traditions, the 'ulamd'. Hence it is the 'ulamd', and only the 'ulamd' who are in a position to accept or deny or otherwisequalify a consensus of the people, a consenus, that is, not related must give to a revealed text. A consensusof the generality way beforea text. The point is of course that Shifi'l was concernedto assert revelationas the primarysource of law. Generallyspeaking in the event of conflictbetween custom
(1) Pace, the editor of the Risdla, p. 599, note 10.
- kitdb and sunna-on-which-there-is-ijmc ,
decisions may be based on a sunna related Alternatively, isolated by paths, a sunna upon which the people (al-nds) have not reached consensus. Concerning this we say: we have judged the truthon the basis of externalappearance only ( akamnd bi'l-haqq fi l-zdhir),errorbeing possible on decisionsmay be the part ofthe transmitters. Furthermore, based on ijmd', and qiyds, which are (as sources) weaker than the others, thoughnecessary;forqiydsis not permissible when a report(khabar) is available... (Just as purification when water is not available). using sand is only permissible of sources) So, what comes after a sunna (in the hierarchy a hujja only if a sunna is lacking(1815-18). constitutes of sources would thus appear to be: The completehierarchy
- ijmd' and qiyds.
IKHTILAF AND IJMA IN SHAFI'i 'S RISAkLA
79
(ijmd') and revelationhe desiredthat revelationshouldprevail; revelationshould prevailin factevenwhereit couldnotdecisively remove doubts or ikhlildf. He permitted however, as a residual source, appeal to the practice of the community, if it could be shown to be a universalpractice,in areas where revelation provided no guidance. Custom/consensus was not to prevail over revelation; where an element of revelation could be renderedrelevant by a scholar then revelationtook precedenceover ijmd'. Knowledgeof the area wherecustom might prevail could only belong to the scholar who knew the limits and the finerdetails of revelation. The area of valid ijmd', that is the area not covered by revelation,was knownonly to scholarsand was therefore part of 'ilm al-khdssa. is with consistent with his general dealing fully ijmd' ShifiT1's which to are assert a role forrevealed principles (a) primary texts in the assessment of the law, and (b) to preserveand bolsterthe authority of the 'ulamd'. That Shafi'tderived his notion of ijmd' more froma theoretical traditionof juristic/epistemological debate than fromthe of practicalexigencies juristicdecision-making may be inferred fromthe fact that he gives no examples of knowledgebased on it (in spite of his reference to tahlil and tahzrim(1319)). Its practical usefulnessjuristically(? a Judaic notion) was limited but its metaphysicalimport(? Khriji) was immense -as a tag or slogan reflecting the unity and infallibility of the community. and attractiveidea of marked (1) A powerful relevanceto the sense of community identitywas not rejected it have in view of its been (as might possiblysectarianorigins) but was integrated into a juristicstructure and as it weretaken on board. and ijmd' was a personal one, ShfiT's analysis of ikhlildf social inspired by experience, conditioned by an academic tradition and reflectinghis own intellectual insights and development. His manipulation and definition of these concepts were not final but subject inevitablyto change and interpretation. Later writersfor the most part abandoned
(1) Wansborough, ibid., 70-71, 86, 121ff.
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NORMAN CALDER
The process of creatingor re-creating a sense of unity and within the Islamic was a continuousone, identity community to intellectual necessarily opposed rigidity. Social political and economicfactorsinevitablyimpingedon modes of literary resolution. New intellectual resolutions expression, demanding contained logical or systematicproblemswhich, on a purely intellectuallevel, inspiredreassessments. Given the intellectual conservatismand the group solidarityof the scholarly elite it was perhaps inevitable that change and development should rely very largely on the manipulationor refining of but available whose relevance could be conceptsalready changed or renewed. That is the process evident in Shifi'l's work. and Ikhlildfand ijmdcwere but two notionswhose significance
(1) See the example provided in Calder, 'ZakAt in Imdmt Sht'1 Jurisprudence', BSOAS XLIV, 1981, p. 472.
resolution. (3)
the notion of ijmdcon a matternot dealt with in revelation. They had a larger body of Traditions available and a more developed and more subtle exegetical apparatus. They were less willingto acknowledgea situationthat could not be made relevantto a textual base. Ijmdcin laterworksof us'l al-fiqh was nearly always considered a proof together with and subordinateto revelation-and indeed was frequently understood as ijmdtal-'ulamd'. As a juristicconcept it functioned then as a stabilisingfactordefiuing a permanent body of basic rules ("general knowledge") and acting against change and to assertits existence development. Fuqahd' wereconstrained wheretheywishedto establishor preservea rule, and to deny its existence whentheywishedto changeor adapt an established rule.(1) 'Progressives' and 'conservatives' varied in their of how largean area offurd'was coveredby ijmd.(2) estimation The purelyjuristicuse of ijmdc well-defined and limited (a fairly technical term) subsisted with the emotional/metaphysical and usage and created inevitably problemsof interpretation
(2) Cf.Ibn Taymiyya: )
y .
JYL,.J1
Majm"' faldwt Ibn Taymiyya,30 vols., Riyadh, 1381-3, vol. 20, p. 10. (3) See Hourani, 'The basis of the authority of consensus', SI, 1964.
IKHTILAF AND IJMA IN SHAFI 1 'S RISlALA
81
and charged with a connotationswere developed by ShWfi'l new relevance. His literaryproductions,thereafter, though of a themselves became structure influential, profoundly part and re-interpreted. constantlyelaborated,refined (1) Norman CALDER (Manchester)
to Dr JohnWansborough forreading and (1) I shouldliketo record mythanks on an earlierdraughtof this study; and to Philip Alexanderfor commenting someof the problems raised. discussing

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IKHTILAFAND IJMA' IN SHAFI'I'S RISALA

IKHTILAF AND IJMA IN SHAFIi ''S RISALA

IKHTILAF AND IJMA IN SHAFI

IKHTILAF AND IJMA IN SHAFIi 'S RISALA

IKHTILAF AND IJMA IN SHAFIi 'S RISALA

IKHTILAF AND IJMA IN SHAFIi'IS

IKHTILAF AND IJMAi IN SHAFI'i 'S RISALA

IKHTILAF AND IJMA IN SHAFI i 'S RISALA

IKHTILAF AND IJMA IN SHAFI'i 'S RISALA

IKHTILAF AND IJMA IN SHAFI'i 1S

- kitdb and sunna-on-which-there-is-ijmc ,

- ijmd' and qiyds.

IKHTILAF AND IJMA IN SHAFI'i 'S RISAkLA

(2) Cf.Ibn Taymiyya: )

IKHTILAF AND IJMA IN SHAFI 1 'S RISlALA

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