Sociologie des crises politiques.

La dynamique des mobilisations multisectorielles by Michel Dobry Review by: Lauri Karvonen Acta Sociologica, Vol. 32, No. 4 (1989), pp. 427-430 Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4200772 . Accessed: 24/01/2014 14:40
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Sage Publications, Ltd. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Acta Sociologica.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 190.144.163.87 on Fri, 24 Jan 2014 14:40:14 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Acta Sociologica1989 (32), 4:427-430

Book Reviews
Michel Dobry: Sociologie des crises politiques. La dynamique des mobilisations

multisectorielles. Pressesde la FondationNationelle des Sciences Politiques, Paris 1986 (319 pp.) If thereis one elementcommonto all the variousdefinitions of 'crisis',it is probably the notion that a crisisis an exceptional,or at least a 'non-routine' state of affairs. In political terms, a crisis is a (potential) turning point, a situation where a fundamentalchange in political relationshipsis a distinct possibility. Quite in accordance withthisview, muchof the theoretically orientedworkhas axiomatically lookedupon crisesas ruptures in politicalbehavior.And sincecrisesare exceptional statesof affairs,theircausesare usuallysoughtoutsidethe routinesphereof political activity. Michel Dobry acceptslittle of this. His study is an ambitiousargumentation for the followingpropositions: 1. Crisesare explicablein termsof social and politicalcontinuity ratherthan drastic change. The actors, arenas and principalstrategies are the same as those that produceand regulateroutine politics. 2. If we wishto gaina properunderstanding of a politicalcrisis,we mustconcentrate on the event of the crisisitself, not on its 'causes', 'preconditions', 'antecedents' or anythingelse thatprecededit. 3. The crucialfactordetermining the outcomeof politicalcrisesis (just as in routine politics)the mobilization of resourceson the part of the involvedactorsin order to attaindesired goals. The specificcharacteristic of a crisisis the 'conjunctural fluidityof social relations'.This uncertaintyand variabilitymakes it difficultto determine the value of the various kinds of resources at the disposal of the involvedactors(economicmeans, coercion, mass action, parliamentary activity, and so on). In fact their value can be expected to fluctuateconsiderablyin the process of the crisis. Chapterone presents the basic rationale behind 'the hypothesis of continuity'. Accordingto Dobry, it is misleadingto refer crisis behaviorto the pathology of politics. Instead, a 'Clausewitzian' perspectivestressingthe strategicand tactical deliberations of involvedactorsis proposed.The basicelementsguidingthe process of a politicalcrisisare the 'moves' (coups) made by the variousactors in order to attain strategicand tacticalgoals. From the point of view of sociologicaltheory, these moves representdifferentwaysof utilizingresources.Typically,crisesinvolve a conflictualresourcemobilization.At the same time, Dobry underlinesthat the cooperative element is often just as important in crisis situations. In fact, the mixedsituation,where cooperativeand conflictualmotives coexist and coincide is characteristic of politicalcrises. Dobry's emphasison strategicaction leads him to 427

This content downloaded from 190.144.163.87 on Fri, 24 Jan 2014 14:40:14 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

add still anotherelement to his hypothesis:there is nothingthat justifiesthe notion that the mobilizationof resourcesin connectionwith a politicalcrisis is primarily to the carriedout by discontented,oppositionalor dominatedgroups('challengers' existing order). Quite the contrary,the crucialresourcemobilizationoften takes place in the best-organizedsegments of the society, inside the 'agents of social control' themselves. Finally, Dobry stresses that his theoreticalperspectivedoes emerge andspread not concernthe specialways in whichthe resourcemobilizations throughoutthe political system. The second chapter contains a critical review of three different orientations (Dobry: 'trois illusions') in the sociological study of political crises. The first of these, termed l'illusion 6tiologique, is characterizedby an orientation towards causality and an emphasis on explanatoryfactors that precede the event of the crisis. In other words, the processof the crisisitself is not at the centerof attention; in relationto the possibilitythat the process of a crisismightevolve autonomously of this its causalantecedentsis not consideredin this tradition.As representatives mode of reasoning, Dobry scrutinizesthe 'theoryof the J-curve'by James Davies and David Easton's idea of a 'zone of transition'.He findsthat both authorsfail to determinethe criticalthresholdvalues of their crucialvariables('tolerablemargin' and 'minimumlevel of support', respectively). They both resort to ex post facto reasoning,which lends their analysisan air of circularity.Neither of the theories of the process of a politicalcrisis, to makes any contributionto the understanding say nothing of the resource mobilizationwhich, accordingto Dobry, is the very essence of a crisis. A shiftof focus from the causes of a crisisto its effects is no solution,either. This
is the implication of Dobry's examination of 'l'illusion de l'histoire naturelle'.

This research orientation is represented by the comparativestudy of the great in the 'march revolutions.It departsfrom the idea that there are certainregularities of history' expressed in the sequence of events and stages leading up to the end method': result.These uniformitiescan be uncoveredwith the aid of the 'regressive one starts from the result itself, the revolution, and works one's way back to the causes.Thistradition the entirechainof intermediate initialcausesby reconstructing of scholarshipis commended by Dobry for its comparativeorientationand for its of historicalevents. On the otherhand,its logicprecludes rejectionof the singularity the study of historical sequences which, despite substantialsimilaritieswith the ones leading up to revolutions, 'had the inelegance'of resultingin somethingelse. Moreover, 'the naturalhistory of revolution'is insensitiveto the fact that major events can have minor causes and vice versa: many a spectacularevent has only marginaleffects on the course of history, whereaschangesof minoramplitudecan triggeroff major turningpoints. the studyof the Finally,'I'illusionheroique'has the shortcomingof disqualifying process of the crisis in structuralterms. This is, in a way, a paradox,because the main works representingthis traditionlay great stress on structuralfactorswhen explainingthe causes of crises. The approachpresented by Almond et al. in the large project on political crisis and political developmentcarriedout at Stanford theories Universityis used as an example. This project used structural-functional to explain periods of political calm, whereas the process of political crisis was studiedin termsof coalitionandleadershiptheoryonly. Dobryfindsthatthe borders 428

This content downloaded from 190.144.163.87 on Fri, 24 Jan 2014 14:40:14 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

between the variousstages from stabilityto crisis were fixed rather intuitivelyin the Stanfordproject. Moreover, he criticizes the idea that a set of explanatory factorsshould simplybe abandonedwhen movingfrom one phase to another:'les
variables "independantes" . . . cessent-elles d'exister A partir du moment oiu l'on passe de la phase II a la phase III ...?' Dobry concludes that the Stanford

model loses on two counts; it fails to graspthe structurescharacteristic of critical conjunctures andit offers no key to the tacticalactivityof the protagonists of crises. The remainder of the book, nearlytwo hundredpages, is devoted to a discourse on the dynamics of multisectoral mobilizations. Accordingto Dobry, a characteristic feature, indeed almost a definition of political crises, is the coincident resource mobilization in severalsectors ('autonomoussocial spheres';this standsin contrast to 'restricted mobilizations' whichoccurwithinone sectorat a time). Thiselaborate theoretical discussion is backed by numerous empirical examples from many countriesand historicalperiods (France 1934, 1947, 1958 and 1968, Japan 1868, Italy 1919-22, Germany1918-23, Bolivia 1952, Iran 1978-79, etc.) It goes without sayingthat only the mainideas can be summarized withinthe confinesof a review. In Dobry's view, complex societies are characterized by the existence of fairly autonomoussectors which define and control the interestsof their members and interactwithothersectorsto pursuesectoralgoals. In routineperiods,the autonomy of these sectors is secured by several mechanisms, ranging from formal legal safeguards to a generalattitudeof non-interference betweenthem. In other words, there is a 'limitedzone of tactical interdependence'between them. The strategic interactionbetween sectors takes place in variousarenas:a sector can be involved in severalarenassimultaneously. In a crisis,the autonomyof sectorsis reducedthrougha multisectoral mobilization of resources.In otherwords,a crisisis a periodof 'enlarged tacticalinterdependence' between societal sectors. The intrinsic logic of interest aggregation and representation withineach sector crumblesas the normallywell-entrenched processof sectoralresourcemobilization is affectedby simultaneous processesin othersectors. a crisisis accompanied Consequently, by a desectorization of socialrelations.Dobry alsospeaksof a 'disobjectivation': the institutional arrangements, rulesand customs which regulate the relations between sectors are no longer considered as given constraintsfor action, an objective expressionof sectorallogic. For the involved actors, a crisis means a period of structuraluncertainty.The normal guidelines which structurepolitical and social action have been pushed aside. The value of the variousresourcesat their disposalis difficultto assess, as the applicabilityand efficiencyof different types of resourcestends to change rapidly. It is, however, not only the structures of action that tend to evaporate.By the same token, human perceptionsof social reality tend to be redefined. In other words, actors tend to the goals and limitsof politicalaction as well as the legitimateways and reappraise means through which this action should be carried out. Thus, the process of of social authority is, contraryto the customaryview in the delegitimatization analysisof crises and revoluttions, a product of the multisectoralmobilizationof resources,not a cause or antecedentof the crisis. Dobry'sworkis highlyoriginalandsuggestive.He is well readin both theoretical and empiricalterms, and he keeps a criticaldistanceto the work of others as well as to his own text. Still, the main contributionof the book lies in its initial focus 429

This content downloaded from 190.144.163.87 on Fri, 24 Jan 2014 14:40:14 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

and a numberof brilliantoccasionalobservationsratherthan a worked-out,readily applicable'Dobry Model' for the study of politicalcrises. It is not difficultto agree with the author on the necessityof a strongerfocus on the part of social scientists on the processand the dynamicsof politicalcrisisitself. Thus far, this has to a large extent been the domain of journalismand historiography.This is all the more imperative as Dobry convincinglydemonstrates that much of the conventional between wisdomin previoustheorizing(e.g. as concernsthe temporalcelationships about the wrong. His criticalremarks differentphenomena)may be fundamentally process of escalation and the role of institutionalsolutions are examplesof novel and theoreticallyhighly valuable observations. At the same time, the bulk of his text containingthe implementationof his theoretical credo remainsabstractand partlyelusive even after a close reading.It does not make thingsbetterthat Dobry ad hoc, ratherthanin the formof intensive has chosen to use empiricalillustrations case studies with clearly operationalizedconcepts. Dobry's examinationof the three theoreticalorientationsis competentand full of keen observations.At the same time, its function in the context of this book is open to criticism. For one thing, Dobry's classificationof these theories appears somewhatartificial.From the point of view of his own theory, all these studiesare in fact 'etiological' in character,since they place a major emphasison the causal antecedents of the crisis. These kinds of classificationswill, however, remain a matterof interpretation and taste. Whatis far more importantis that Dobry, while convincinglycriticizingthese theories on their own premises, is largelybarkingup the wrongtree as concernstheirrelationto his own work.Withthe partialexception of the Stanford model, these theories do not primarilyaim at explaining the off that process. It may be that dynamicsof a process but the factorsthat triggered this is an extremelydifficultand elusivejob, and it may be that muchof the research has failed to produce convincing answers. The fact remains that the dependent variablein these studies is not the same as in Dobry's work. A strongerfocus on the dynamicaspectsof politicalcrisescan in no waycall the relevanceandlegitimacy of 'etiological'studies in question. We need both the fork and the knife. Finally, one might turn Dobry's criticismaround by askingwhetherthe process of resourcemobilizationin a crisiscan be studied in total isolationfrom its causes. Crises are not simply dynamic interactions;they have a content, they are about relatedto the varioussectorsof society. something.This 'something'is differentially Therefore, the kind of resource mobilizationthat takes place and the degree to which different'sectorallogics' are affected can be expected to varydependingon the substanceof the crisis. This substance, in turn, tends to be relatedto the way in which the crisis emerges. Consequently, the content of the crisis provides an intimate link between its antecedentsand its dynamicprocess aspects. In sum, the line drawnby the author between the emergence and the process of crises seems too definite as a guideline for empiricalanalysis. Sociologiedes crisespolitiquesrepresentsa major This criticismnotwithstanding, contributionto the study of political crises. In order to reach the widest possible internationalreadership,it would certainlydeserve an English translation.
Lauri Karvonen

Departmentof Political Science, Abo Academy 430

This content downloaded from 190.144.163.87 on Fri, 24 Jan 2014 14:40:14 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions