Escuzar, Shaira Mae N. Mgt 104 B Article/Topic: Article 1169.

. Concept of Nature and Delay Title of the case: Pedro Martinez vs. Matias Cavives, et al., G.R. No. 7663, October 20, 1913

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Carson and Moreland, JJ., concur. Chan Robles Virtual Library. Martinez v. Matias Cavives, et al. Retrieved December 3, 2013 from http://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw19132.htm#.UqPtt9IW07s

Article/Topic: Article 1169. Concept of Nature and Delay Title of the case: Rufina Causing vs. Alfonso Bencer, G.R. No. L-11328, January 15, 1918 Facts of the Case: Rufina Causing, the plaintiff of this case, owned a land for rice and sugar cane in the Province of Iloilo, having an area of 70 hectares. In the year 1909, negotiations were

made between her and Alfonso Bencer, the defendant, with a view of sale to the land to him and an agreement was formed by which Causing undertook to convey the property to him for the sum of P1, 200. In order for the conveyance to be made, they sought the plaintiffs relative, Casiano Causing, attorney, for legal assistance. Since the plaintiff had nieces of hers who were then minors and whom she seems to have exercised an informal guardianship and who had interest in the property, he informed the parties that the conveyance could not be legalized without judicial sanction. The effort to effect the transfer of the title of the deed was abandoned for the time being but Bencer had already paid her P800 of the purchase price upon August 14, 1909, took possession of the land, with the understanding that he was to pay the balance later and she would have to procure the judicial approval of the sale as regards to the interests of the minors. In 1910, a new engagement was made with regard to the price paid, which was Bencer should pay P600 in addition of the P800 he had already paid or P1, 400 in all, provided that the plaintiff would give him an extension of time to May 1911 to pay the balance. Time went on and neither of the parties performed the engagement; as the plaintiff alleges, Bencers failure may have been due to his lack of ready money or, as the defendant alleges, it may have been due to the plaintiffs reluctance to carry out the engagement, and she also did not appear to collect the money at the place stipulated as the place of payment. However, it also may have been due to the fact that the plaintiff was not yet in position to execute a deed as no steps had been taken to get a judicial approval for the sale of the shares of the minors. However, as the heirs reached majority, the plaintiff successively acquired their respective interests by purchase, and before the action in this case was instituted, she had become possessor of all their shares. The property meanwhile increased in valuepossibly because of the improvements which the defendant claims to have made on the property. In view of the changed contract, the plaintiff appears to have become desirous of rescinding the contract, and brought this suit to annul the contract, recover the property, together with the sum of P3, 850, alleged to be due as damages for the use and occupation of the land by the defendant during the time he has been in possession. The plaintiff also prayed for general relief. Issue: The delay in the part of the plaintiff, which was she never procured the judicial approval for the sale of the land, cancels the delay of the defendant, which was he did not pay the balance per se to the agreement. So, Rufina Causing filed this suit to annul the contract for the sale of a parcel of land, recover the property itself from Alfonso Bencer, and collect the sum of P3, 850 alleged to be due as damages for the use and occupation of the land by the defendant during the time he has been in possession. Decision: The court dismissed the action for the recovery of the land and damages for use and occupation but gave judgment in plaintiffs favor for P600 with interest at 6% from August 14, 1910 until paid. Ratio Decidendi: The court can see no valid reason for the plaintiff to rescind the contract as this has been a case that entailed a mutual obligation. And if either of the party can be said

to have been in default, it was the plaintiff, Rufina Causing, rather than the defendant, Bencer. In Article 1100 of the Civil Code, it is declared that in mutual obligations neither party shall be deemed to be in default if the other does not fulfill, or offer to fulfill his own obligation, and that from the time one person obligated fulfills his obligation, the default begins for the other party. The court finds that the contract contemplated a conveyance of the entire interest of the land and the plaintiff clearly obligated herself to the extent. Therefore, she was not in position to compel Bencer to pay until she could offer to him a deed sufficient to pass the whole legal estate and for the same reason, she cannot now be permitted to rescind the contract on the ground that Bencer failed to pay the purchase price. Also, at the time when Causing accepted the payment of P800 in 1909, she executed a receipt which said that this was an advance payment for the land in case the sale should be effected (anticipo del terreno en caso se effective la venta) and from this could be argued that it was understood that the negotiations were merely provisional and that the sale could be abandoned. The court does not interpret the transaction this way; and it was evidently not so interpreted by the defendant Bencer, who has been continuously in possession claiming as owner by virtue of the original contract. Reduced to its simplest terms the case is presented like this. One of several owners of a piece of property pro indiviso has made a valid contract for the sale thereof with the understanding that she should convey the interest of her coowners or procure the same to be conveyed. Since the contract was executed she has acquired the interest of the coowners by purchase and is now in a position fully to perform the contract. It results that she is, in our opinion, under a legal obligation to transfer the estate, and is not entitled to rescind the contract and recover the property from the person to whom she contracted to convey it. In this situation either party is entitled to enforce performance, and neither will be relieved from his obligation without the consent of the other. There can be no question of the power of a person to bind himself to sell something which he does not yet possess; acquiring title to the thing sold. The most reasonable interpretation of the action of the plaintiff in buying out the minor heirs as they reached majority was that she thereby intended to place herself in a position to comply with the contract which she had made with the defendant Bencer. Of course if she had never acquired these interests an action for damages would have been Bencer's only remedy. Under the prayer for general relief the court gave judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of P600 the unpaid balance of the purchase money. This was proper. The court also allowed interest on this sum from August 14, 1910. The right of the plaintiff to recover interest for the period prior to the institution of the suit is questionable in point of law, but the justice of allowing it is evident, in view of the fact that the defendant has had continuous use of the property. As the defendant has not appealed, or complained of the action of the court, the judgment will be affirmed in all respects, with costs against the appellant.

Reference:

The LawPhil Project. Rufina Causing vs. Alfonso Bencer. Retrieved December 6, 2013 from http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1918/jan1918/gr_l-11328_1918.html

Article/Topic: Article 1170. Non-performance by delay and other obligations Title of the case: De la Cruz vs. El Seminario de la Archdiocesis de Manila, et al., G.R. No. L-5402, Jan. 28, 1911

The appellee, Cayetano de la Cruz, was a member and the president of a Methodist Episcopal religious association at Dinalupijan, Province of Bataan, Philippine Islands. The members of this association, including Cayetano de la Cruz, having decided to lease a building site and erect thereon a chapel, made voluntary contributions for that purpose, Cayetano de la Cruz being among those who contributed. Cayetano de la Cruz, as such member and president, was then authorized by the association to lease a certain building site and to use the funds contributed for the purpose of constructing a chapel. So on the 17th of May, 1907, he leased from one J. C. Miller, the agent of the appellant, His Grace Jeremiah J. Harty, Archbishop of Manila and administrator of the hacienda of Dinalupijan, for a period of two years, a certain lot or parcel of land, being a part of that hacienda and which is fully described in the written contract of lease, agreeing to pay as rental P2 per year, the first year's rent to be paid in advance. On the execution of this lease Cayetano de la Cruz, as member and president of the Methodist Episcopal association, was placed in possession of this lot or building site and proceeded to construct thereon a chapel for the use of the said religious association. About the time this chapel was completed an action of forcible entry and detainer was commenced by one Raymundo Sinsuangco in the justice of the peace court of Dinalupijan, in which Cayetano de la Cruz, as lessee of the lot upon which the chapel was constructed, and J. C. Miller, as agent and representative of the appellants, who, in such capacity executed said lease, as lessor, were made defendants. Judgment was rendered against the defendants in the action. The appellants in the case at bar were duly notified of the judgment of the justice of the peace and were requested to appeal to the Court of First Instance. No appeal was taken and the judgment becoming final was executed in such a manner that the abovementioned chapel was completely destroyed. Subsequently thereto, and on the 21st of October, 1907, Cayetano de la Cruz commenced this action in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila against the appellants to recover the sum of P2,000 as damages for a breach of the rental contract. To this complaint the appellants, through their attorneys, presented a demurrer, based upon the following grounds: (1) That the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila was without jurisdiction to try and determine this action for the reason that damages for injuries caused to real property situated in the Province of Bataan is sought to be recovered; and (2) the complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. This demurrer was overruled, the appellants duly noting their exception. After all the evidence had been submitted by both parties, the appellee, after due notice to the appellants, presented an amended complaint, to conform, as he alleged, with the agreed statement of facts and the admissions made by the appellants in their answer. This amended complaint was admitted by the court without objection on the part of the appellants. The amended complaint is the same as the original complaint, with the following exceptions: (1) A number of unnamed person were made parties plaintiff; (2) in paragraph 2 of the amended complaint it is alleged that Cayetano de la Cruz was the president, agent, and member of the Methodist Episcopal religious association: and (3) a judgment for only P402 was asked. The court below on the 29th of March, 1909, rendered judgment in favor of the appellees and against the appellants for the sum of P402, P2 being the rent for the first year paid in advance, and the P400 being the agreed value of the chapel which was destroyed by the sheriff in executing the judgment rendered by the justice of the peace.

The appellants after noting their exception to the judgment and making a motion for a new trial, which motion was overruled and exception thereto noted, appealed to this court, and now insist: 1. That as this action is one for damages to real estate situated in the Province of Bataan, under the provisions of section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila had no jurisdiction; 2. The court below erred in admitting the amended complaint by which the other members of the religious association, jointly interested with Cayetano de la Cruz, were made parties plaintiff; and, 3. That the appellants are not liable for the consequences of the judgment of the justice of the peace. The demurrer was properly overruled. This is not an action to recover damages to real estate; it is an action for breach of covenant in a lease. The fact that the damages to real estate are involved, as an incident to the breach of the contract, does not change the character of the action. Such an action is personal and transistory. The rule is well stated in the case of Neil vs. Owen (3 Tex., 145), wherein the court said (p. 146): If the action is founded on privity of contract between the parties, then the action whether debt or covenant, is transitory. But if there is no privity of contract and the action is founded on privity of estate only, such a covenant that runs with the land in the hands of the remote grantees, then the action is local and must be brought in the country wherein the land lies. In an action on a covenant contained in a lease, whether begun by the lessor against the lessee, or by the lessee against the lessor, the action is transitory because it is founded on a mere privity of contract. (Thursby vs. Plant, cited in vol. 5, Ency. Plead. & Prac., p. 362.) In general, also, actions which are founded upon contracts are transitory. In an action upon a lease for nonpayment of rent or other breach of covenants, when the action is founded on the privity of contract it is transitory and the venue may laid in any county. (22 Ency. Plead. & Prac., pp. 782-783.) Therefore, section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides, among other things, that actions to recover damages for injuries to real estate shall be brought in the province where the land, or a part thereof, is situated, is not applicable. (Molina vs. De la Riva, 6 Phil. Rep., 12.) The amended complaint clearly states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Sec. 90, Code of Civil Procedure.) The defendants in the second assignment of error assert that the plaintiff ought not to have been allowed to amend his complaint so as to make him the representative of all the persons interested in the subject matter of this action. We are of the opinion that such amendment was properly allowed. Section 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure is exceedingly broad in its term and there is no disposition in this court to narrow its term or meaning. We are also of the opinion that this is particularly the class of action to which section 118 of the Code of Civil Procedure refers. It would be exceedingly difficult and expensive to require that all persons interested be made parties plaintiff. To avoid this was the very purpose in enacting section 118. The plaintiff, as appears from the record, is the person chosen by the members of the association in question to look after and represent their interest and it is correspondingly appropriate that he should represent and act for them in this action. In permitting this court is not thwarting their will or

endangering their interest, but, rather, is carrying out their desires and purposes as they have already expressed them. In the third assignment of error it is insisted that the appellants are not liable for the consequences of the judgment of the justice of the peace, for the reason that according to that judgment the plaintiff, in violation of the rights of Raymundo Sinsuangco, entered upon the lot in question. It is argued that the plaintiff should not have entered into possession of this lot in violation of the rights of Sinsuangco, but that he should have acquired possession by due judicial process, and that having entered into possession in this manner he must suffer the consequences of his illegal acts. In this we can not agree. When this rental contract was executed the lot in question was vacant. The agent, Miller, led the plaintiff to believe that he could place him in legal possession of the lot. It was upon this theory that the plaintiff entered into this contract and paid the rent for the first year. The record does not affirmatively show that Miller placed the plaintiff in possession of this lot, but in the absence of proof to the contrary we think it fair to presume that this occurred. Miller then placed the plaintiff in possession of this lot, but not in the legal possession of same. He himself did not have the legal possession as was shown by the proof before the justice of the peace. Sinsuangco was the person who was in the actual possession and Miller should have known this and he should have known at the time he entered into the contract with the plaintiff that he could not place the plaintiff in legal, peaceful, and quiet possession of this lot. The plaintiff took possession under these circumstances and proceeded to construct the chapel, which was afterwards destroyed in the execution of the judgment of the justice of the peace. In the contract entered into between Miller and the plaintiff, it was Miller's duty to place the plaintiff legally in possession of this lot and maintain him in the peaceful and quiet possession of the same during the entire period of the contract. The rights and obligations of lessor and lessee are treated in articles 1554 to 1574, inclusive, of the Civil Code. Article 1554 provides: The lessor is obligated: xxx xxx xxx 3. To maintain the lessee in the peaceful enjoyment of the premises for the entire period of the contract. Article 1568 is as follows: If the thing leased is lost or any of the contracting parties do not comply with what has been stipulated, the provisions of article 1182 and 1183 shall be respectively observed. Article 1101 provides: Those who in fulfilling their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner whatsoever act in contravention of the stipulations of the same, shall be subject to indemnify for the losses and damages caused thereby. Under this contract of lease it was the duty of the defendants to give the plaintiff the legal possession of the premises. This they did not do. The defendants failed in the performance of their contract, and, as we have seen by article 1101 of the Civil Code, the person who fails in the performance of his obligations shall be subject to indemnify for the losses and damages caused thereby. "The true

measure of damages for the breach of such a contract is what the plaintiff has lost by the breach." (Lock vs. Furze, L. R. 1, C. P., 441; Dexter vs. Manley, 4 Cush. (Mass.), 14.) The sum of P402, in our opinion, not being excessive damages for the injuries caused by the breach of contract on the part of the defendants, the judgment should be and the same is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellants. So ordered. Arellano, C. J., Mapa, Carson and Moreland, JJ., concur. Reference: The Lawphil Project. De la Cruz vs. El Seminario de la Archdiocesis de Manila, et al. Retrieved December 6, 2013 from http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1911/jan1911/gr_l-5402_1911.html