OTC 17676 Geohazards: An Overview of Probabilistic Approaches and Application to Engineering Design and Risk Assessment for Offshore

Facilities
R. B. Gilbert, The University of Texas at Austin, and F. J. Puskar, Energo Engineering, Inc.
Copyright 2005, Offshore Technology Conference This paper was prepared for presentation at the 2005 Offshore Technology Conference held in Houston, TX, U.S.A., 25 May 2005. This paper was selected for presentation by an OTC Program Committee following review of information contained in a proposal submitted by the author(s). Contents of the paper, as presented, have not been reviewed by the Offshore Technology Conference and are subject to correction by the author(s). The material, as presented, does not necessarily reflect any position of the Offshore Technology Conference, its officers, or members. Papers presented at OTC are subject to publication review by Sponsor Society Committees of the Offshore Technology Conference. Electronic reproduction, distribution, or storage of any part of this paper for commercial purposes without the written consent of the Offshore Technology Conference is prohibited. Permission to reproduce in print is restricted to a proposal of not more than 300 words; illustrations may not be copied. The proposal must contain conspicuous acknowledgment of where and by whom the paper was presented. Write Librarian, OTC, P.O. Box 833836, Richardson, TX 75083-3836, U.S.A., fax 01-972-952-9435.

Abstract Probabilistic approaches are becoming increasingly popular for managing risks and uncertainties associated with the sea floor in the design of offshore facilities. Through a series of case histories, this paper reviews several types of probabilistic approaches and demonstrates how they are applied in practice on offshore projects. It discusses how these approaches have made a positive effect on projects and what can be done in the future to make the technology more effective and practical. The major conclusions from these case histories are that a sound understanding of the physical problem is required in order to apply probabilistic methods appropriately and that there is significant potential for adding value to offshore engineering with probabilistic approaches. The potential benefit is not necessarily associated with making a design less conservative or with cutting costs; it is in rationally and explicitly considering risks and uncertainties in making decisions. Introduction Continued development of deepwater and of remote offshore regions where there is little or no experience will bring new challenges in offshore facility design. The risks and uncertainties associated with the sea floor, generically referred to as geohazards, can be substantial and are a critical part of the development process. Traditional prescriptive methods may not be applicable or will result in designs that are uneconomical. Probabilistic approaches provide an alternative that may make the difference and allow these types of developments to move forward. In addition, there is always room to improve existing design practice in mature areas through a formal evaluation of how well that practice works based on historical experience. Probabilistic approaches also offer the ability to make these improvements happen.

In this paper, five case histories where probabilistic approaches have been implemented in practice are described. These case histories are presented from the perspective of facility engineering to illustrate how the approaches were applied and what the impact was on practice. They span a variety of methods, including reliability-based design, value of information analysis, design-method calibration, risk assessment, and probabilistic hazard analysis. They also span a variety of applications from pile foundations to pipelines to soil borings and include a variety of hazards such as hurricanes, earthquakes and geologic variability. The objectives in presenting these case histories are to review the types of probabilistic approaches that are available, to show how these approaches have made a positive impact in practice, and to discuss what can be done in the future to make probabilistic approaches more effective and practical in offshore engineering. Reliability-Based Design of Pile Foundation The design of a pile foundation for a tension leg platform (TLP) provides a case history of applying reliability-based design methods in practice. This case history demonstrates that conventional probabilistic analyses should be used with caution and that practical insight can be obtained through a probabilistic analysis. The challenge in designing piles for this facility was that it is located in a frontier area where little was known about the geology and geotechnical properties. Furthermore, the information that was available was confounding and not consistent with seemingly similar offshore soils in other parts of the world. Therefore, there was considerable uncertainty in the axial capacity of driven piles, and a relatively large factor of safety was used to design the piles. During design, several questions arose. First, was the factor of safety high enough? Second, if several different estimates of pile capacity were obtained from different experts, did the factor of safety need to be applied to the minimum or the average of these estimates? Third, how much set-up, in terms of the factor of safety, was required before the facility could be put into operation? In order to answer these questions, a probabilistic analysis was conducted. For the axial capacity, the ultimate axial capacity estimated by various experts ranged over more than a factor of two. Therefore, a wide probability distribution was developed to account for the large uncertainty (Fig. 1). For the axial load, a detailed analysis was conducted on the sources

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and combinations of loads. One significant aspect of the annual maximum axial load for this TLP is that it is dominated by static tension in the tendons compared to the dynamic loads due to extreme environments. Therefore, the probability distribution for the load is very narrow (Fig. 1). In a conventional geotechnical reliability analysis, the load and capacity are both assumed to be lognormally distributed (e.g., Hamilton and Murff1; Tang and Gilbert2; and Bea et al.3). The available data for this project indicated that this assumption was generally reasonable. However, an interesting result was obtained when the reliability of the foundation was calculated. The most probable combination of load and capacity that would lead to a failure corresponded to a capacity that was very far to the left in the tail of the probability distribution (Fig. 2). In fact, the most probable pile capacity leading to failure from this conventional analysis was well below a reasonable estimate for the minimum possible capacity of the pile based on its weight and the remolded shear strength of the soil (Fig. 2). The reason for this result is that the uncertainty in the capacity is significantly greater than the uncertainty in the load and a very high factor of safety was used in design. While this result is specific to this particular project, the significance of a lower-bound foundation capacity is relevant for the design of most floating production systems today. In order to account for the lower-bound capacity, a reliability analysis was conducted where the distribution for the capacity was truncated at the lower bound. In this case, the reliability of the foundation was strongly dependent on the lower-bound capacity and essentially independent of the design factor of safety. In other words, a specified level of reliability could be obtained by making sure that the lowerbound capacity was high enough, regardless of the factor of safety on the estimated ultimate capacity. One interesting aspect of the lower-bound capacity is that the same experts who estimated the ultimate capacity over a very large range estimated the lower-bound capacity within a very small range.

Environmental Load Probability Density Function

Most Probable Failure Point from Conventional Analysis Lower-Bound Capacity based on Remolded Shear Strength Pile Capacity

0.8

1.2

1.4

1.6

1.8

Force/Design Load

Fig. 2 Relationship between Failure Point and Lower-Bound Capacity for Pile Foundation

Annual Probability of Overload

1.E-02 1.E-03 1.E-04 1.E-05 1.E-06 1.E-07 1.E-08 0.9 1 1.1 Ratio of Lower-Bound Capacity to Design Load
Note: Median Load is 80% of Design Load.

Fig. 3 Effect of Lower-Bound Capacity on Probability of Load Exceeding Capacity for Pile Foundation

Probability Density Function

Environmental Load

Pile Capacity

Force/Design Load

Fig. 1 Probability Distributions for the Annual Maximum Axial Load and Axial Capacity for Pile Foundation

The dependence of the reliability on the lower-bound capacity is shown on Fig. 3. In this project, an acceptable level of reliability could be obtained providing that the lower-bound capacity was greater than about 1.0 times the design load or 1.2 times the median load (Fig. 3). The lower-bound capacity was actually 1.3 times the design load, so the annual probability of an overload was essentially zero (Fig. 3). There were several practical consequences of using the lower-bound capacity to check the reliability of the pile foundation in this case history. The estimated lower-bound capacity could be confirmed with pile-driving and data. Even though the capacity during driving was possibly only 20 to 30 percent of the ultimate capacity, this lower-bound value was high enough to provide for an adequate level of reliability without needing to estimate how much the capacity would increase after driving due to set-up. In addition, the driving data showed that the targeted reliability was achieved shortly after driving, meaning that no substantive delay was required before the tendons could be attached and loaded. An important lesson in this case history is that a conventional design approach based on a factor of safety applied to the estimated ultimate capacity could potentially

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Partial FS due to Spatial Variability

provide for an excessively conservative design. An excessively conservative design is not only costly, but it increases the chance of encountering problems during installation, such as an inability to drive the piles to the specified penetration. A probabilistic analysis here provided a rational approach to identify and quantify the conservatism and to balance it with the costs. The probabilistic analysis also highlighted the importance of incorporating a lower-bound estimate for the capacity into the design . Value of Information from Soil Borings A common question in practice is: Are additional soil borings needed for foundation design? This question arises when facilities are moved between the time a boring is drilled and the facility is installed. It arises in requalifying existing platforms that may have been designed with no site-specific boring or with an older, lower quality boring. It arises for floating production systems in deepwater where the anchors may be kilometers apart. The following case histories demonstrate how probabilistic approaches can be used to quantify the value of information. They highlight the significance of geology in geotechnical engineering. Several operators with mature and active fields were interested in quantifying the value of additional soil borings. In each case, numerous soil borings had already been drilled over a period of 20 to 30 years as platforms were installed. For illustrative purposes in this paper, three of the geologic settings encountered will be considered: a marine clay deposit consisting predominantly of normally to slightly overconsolidated clays from the Holocene era; an alluvial deposit with interbedded sands and stiff clays from the Pleistocene era; and a Pleistocene alluvial deposit with deep, surficial valleys that have been filled with normally consolidated marine clays from the Holocene era. These geolgic settings represent the range of typical settings from a homogenous stratigraphy with relatively small spatial variability (the marine clay) to a very heterogeneous stratigraphy with large spatial variability (the mixed marine and alluvial deposit). In order to quantify the value of additional soil borings in these fields, geostatistical models were fit using a Bayesian approach with the available geotechnical, geologic and geophysical data4,5,6. These models were developed in order to predict the design capacity for a pile foundation that would be obtained if a modern soil boring were drilled at a specific location. Vertical and horizontal variations and correlations in the design capacities were included in these models. From these models, the design capacity at a particular location can be estimated together with a probability distribution describing the uncertainty in that estimate. These geostaticial models can be used to develop a design at a site where a modern soil boring is not available5,6. Fig. 4 shows the partial safety factor (FS) required to achieve the same level of reliability for a site in each geologic setting without a modern soil boring. This partial safety factor is multiplied by the conventional safety factor in the design check. For example, if the coefficient of variation due to spatial variability is 0.10 at a site in the marine clay setting, then a partial safety factor of 1.15 would be multiplied by the conventional safety factor for design purposes. The coefficient

of variation depends on the geologic setting and the location within that setting (specifically the distance to nearby borings); it is zero at the location where a modern soil boring exists. The curves on Fig. 4 are shown for typical ranges that correspond to those settings.
2.00 Marine Clay over Alluvial Sand and Clay 1.75

1.50 Alluvial Sand and Clay

1.25

Marine Clay

1.00 0.00

0.05

0.10

0.15

0.20

0.25

0.30

Coefficient of Variation due to Spatial Variability

Fig. 4 Partial Safety Factor for Axial Pile Capacity to Account for Uncertainty in Design Profile due to Spatial Variability

Design Capacity (kN) 0 50 55 Pile Length (m) 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95

Fig. 5 Value of Information for Axial Pile Capacity: Expected Reduction in Pile Length with a Site-Specific Soil Boring for Field with Alluvial Sand and Clay

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

30000

Expected with Site-Specific Boring Required without Site-Specific Boring

Value of Information

The value of information associated with a soil boring can be obtained by comparing the design required without a sitespecific boring with what would be expected if an additional soil boring were drilled (Fig. 5). The expected savings in pile length by drilling a boring for a given design capacity is a measure of the value of information. The expected cost savings in pile length can be compared with the cost of drilling a boring to make project-specific decisions on the need for additional borings. The value of information from a soil boring depends heavily on the geologic setting (Fig. 6). In the most complicated setting, the expected savings in pile length is about five times greater than that in the simplest setting.

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25 20 15 10 5 0 Marine Clay Alluvial Sand and Clay Geologic Setting Marine Clay over Alluvial Sand and Clay

Fig. 6 Value of Information for Axial Pile Capacity: Expected Reduction in Pile Length with a Site-Specific Soil Boring for Fields with different Geologic Settings

The main lesson from this case history is that the value of information from a site investigation program ultimately depends on how useful that information will be in facility engineering. If a 100-m long pile will be used regardless of the information, then additional information essentially has no value. It is also important to consider that there may be multiple uses for the information from a site investigation. For example, the value of the information for pile driving as well as capacity needs to be considered. In these case histories, probabilistic approaches to quantify variability in different geologic settings were helpful in making effective decisions about the need for additional soil borings on a project-specific basis. Foundation Performance in Hurricanes The previous case histories describe the use of probabilistic techniques as part of the project design phase. Probabilistic techniques can also assist in understanding the adequacy of design practice. This case history describes a study that investigated the damage to fixed base platforms that occurred in hurricanes Andrew (1992) and Lili (2002) in order to determine the adequacy of lateral and axial pile design. Hurricanes of large size have historically been infrequent in the Gulf of Mexico. However, in 1992 hurricane Andrew destroyed approximately 25 platforms, and in 2002 hurricane Lili destroyed or damaged 19 platforms. There were fortunately no life safety or environmental consequences associated with these events since the platforms were all evacuated and the wells shut-in prior to the arrival of the hurricanes. These types of incidents are unfortunate in terms of property damage and loss of production, but they provide a unique opportunity to provide the best feedback on the applicability of design standards. Hurricanes or other extreme events that result in no damage only validate design standards up to the level of loading imposed by the event, since the load imposed by the event may not have been as large as the load that the structure was designed for per the standard. However, events that cause structural damage and failures like Andrew and Lili are the real tests to determine if a design standard is

adequate. Did the damage occur because the event loads were larger than the design standard (e.g., 100 plus years) and hence the damage was expected? These types of platforms are called expected failures and may actually indicate that the design standard is adequate. Was the load lower than the design standard and the damage unexpected? These types of results are called unexpected failures and indicate that the design standard is unconservative. Was the damage a result of the jacket structure or foundation resistance part of the standard? Platforms that survived the event undamaged are also of interest. In this case, the platform of most interest is one that was expected to fail per the design standard but in fact survived. These types of platforms are called unexpected survivals and indicate that the design standard is conservative. With this in mind, the industry funded an extensive Joint Industry Project (JIP) to study the results of hurricane Andrew to determine in a quantitative manner how API RP2A7 is performing (Puskar et. al.8 and Aggarwal et. al.9,10). A similar study was conducted in 2003 for Lili, funded by the U. S. Minerals Management Service (Puskar et. al.11). The Lili study also combined the results of Andrew and Lili into a single set of data for Gulf of Mexico hurricanes. The studies used a probabilistic Bayesian updating approach to determine the adequacy of API. In simple terms, the computed performance of the platform in the hurricane survive or fail - was determined according to an analytical method, in this case API. This was then compared to the observed performance - survive or fail - based upon posthurricane inspections of the platform. The computed and observed failure modes were also tracked in terms of jacket or foundation failure. The probabilistic aspect of the approach used a Bias factor, B, to correct the API computed performance of the platform compared to the observed performance. In this case, performance is defined as the safety factor, which is the traditional ratio of platform resistance (R) to load (S):

Value of Boring in Pile Length (m)

?R ? ?R ? ? B ?? ? ? ? ? S ?observed ? S ?computed
A value of B = 1.0 means that API predicts the performance of a platform in a hurricane exactly. A value of B > 1.0 means that API is conservative, in that it predicts that a platform would fail in a hurricane when it in fact did not. A value of B < 1.0 means that API is unconservative in that it predicts that a platform should survive in a hurricane when in fact it failed. Obviously the desired outcome is a bias factor of 1.0 or greater. The bias factor was computed by removing all known safety factors in the API formulations with the intent to start with an unbiased API performance level, and then determine the amount of unknown bias, if any. The computed [R/S] was determined using API formulations to determine platform resistance (R) and platform load (S). The resistance (R) was computed as the global platform lateral resistance (in terms of kips of base shear) as determined using nonlinear pushover analysis, as described in API RP2A7 Section 17. In this case, all of the normal material and design safety factors were removed so that this value is an ultimate strength value and

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represents the lateral load at which the platform would collapse. The load (S) was computed as the global load (in terms of base shear) that is acting on the platform during the storm (e.g., Andrew or Lili), computed according to the API wave load recipe, using hindcast data for the hurricane at the platform site. There were a total of 16 platforms evaluated for Andrew and Lili combined.
2.0 Probability Density 1.5 Prior 1.0 0.5 0.0 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 Bias Factor for Axial Foundation Capacity

Posterior

Bea et al.3 to calibrate foundation design methods with hurricane experience. The conclusion of this work indicates that the API pile design method is conservative both for axial and lateral capacity. While this is the desired result (versus unconservative), the amount of conservatism may be as high as 30% and perhaps there is room for improvement in terms of more cost-effective foundation design. Future studies could focus on what is causing the conservatism in foundation design soil strengths, pile-soil relationships, etc. Such an effort would of course have to be supported with additional studies beyond the limited platform performance cases used here. Comparative Risk Analysis with Pipelines A comparative risk analysis of oil spills from pipelines versus shuttle tankers provides a case history of implementing a probabilistic analysis in policy making. This case history demonstrates that it is important to include the stakeholders in the analysis and that careful thought is needed in how probabilistic results are developed and presented. Several years ago, the U. S. Minerals Management Service issued a Record of Decision 12 paving the way for the use of Floating Production, Storage, and Offloading (FPSO) systems for deepwater production in the Gulf of Mexico. A comparative risk analysis (Gilbert et al.13) was conducted to provide information to the policy makers in arriving at this decision. The major objective of this study was to assess and compare the oil-spill risks for FPSOs with those for existing deepwater production systems. An example set of results from this study is shown on Fig. 8. This figure highlights differences between the two alternatives, particularly for large spills that dominate the risk. Spill sizes between 1,000 and 100,000 bbl are more frequent from a pipeline compared to a shuttle tanker. Concerning geohazards, wave-induced mudslides represent a major contributor to the risk of large spills from pipelines in the Gulf of Mexico. Conversely, spills greater than 100,000 bbl are not considered possible from a pipeline due to operational and physical constraints, yet they dominate the risk of oil spills for the FPSO. For comparison purposes, the risk of oil spills was measured by the average volume of oil spilled in a 20-year design life (Fig. 9). Because these results were to be used in the development of public policy, it was important that the measure of risk be tractable and quantifiable. Since oil spill occurrences are currently tracked and recorded in the Gulf of Mexico, available data could be used as input to the risk analysis and future data can be used to validate and calibrate the results. Due to relatively limited experience with both pipelines and shuttle tankers in deepwater production systems, it was not possible to obtain average values directly from actuarial data on oil spills. Therefore, a series of workshops with technical experts was held to extrapolate from available information a prediction of future performance if each study system were hypothetically installed and operated for 20 years in the Gulf of Mexico. These workshops were populated with experts from industry, including operators, contractors and

Fig. 7 Prior and Posterior Functions for Foundation Axial Bias Factor for Hurricane Andrew and Hurricane Lili Combined

The Bayesian approach used in these studies is described in detail in Puskar et al.8 and 11 and is only summarized here. First and second-order reliability methods were used for the calculations. The bias factor was initially defined as a normal distribution with a mean of 1.0, indicating that API was doing an exact job of determining platform performance. The initial coefficient of variation (c.o.v.) for the bias factor was set at a reasonable value of 0.3. Fig. 7 shows the prior distribution of the bias for the axial capacity of pile foundations. The prior bias distribution was then updated using Bayesian calculations by using a likelihood function for each of the observed platform survivals or failures. The likelihood function modifies the bias distribution based upon the observed platform performance. The likelihood function is then used to shift the prior bias distribution to the posterior distribution, which incorporates the results of the platforms performance observations. Observations of expected failures keep the prior distribution the same in terms of the mean, unexpected failures reduce the mean, and unexpected survivals increase the mean. The influence of the c.o.v. is included in the calculations and is incorporated into the posterior distribution. Fig. 7 shows the resulting posterior distribution for axial pile capacity for an example platform. The results indicate that the mean of the bias shifts to about 1.3 (with a c.o.v. of 0.18), indicating that the API design method has about a 30% builtin conservatism in terms of pile axial design. As previously mentioned, the evaluation removed all known factors of safety in API, such as the 1.5 factor of safety for pile axial capacity, so this 30% conservatism is in addition to the design factor of safety. The results for pile lateral capacity also indicted approximately a 30% level of conservatism. In contrast, the results for the structural jacket indicate only an 18% level of conservatism. These results are consistent with other efforts by

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class societies. In addition, representatives from the Minerals Management Service participated in all of the workshops. In order to quantify the degree of confidence in the predictions, the results were expressed in terms of confidence bounds rather than a point estimate (Fig. 9). If a large number of these pipeline or shuttle tanker systems are operated for 20year design lives, then this study predicts that the average total volume of oil spilled from each facility will be somewhere in the range on Fig. 9 with 90-percent confidence. Based on these results, it was not possible to distinguish between the oil spill risks for a pipeline versus a shuttle tanker (Fig. 9). One lesson from this case history is the importance of care in using data and representing uncertainty in predictions. The two points labeled Anderson and LaBelle14 on Fig. 9 illustrate this lesson. First, these points represent point estimates and apparently show a significant difference in the risk between pipelines and shuttle tankers. However, if the magnitude of uncertainty in these estimates were shown, it would be difficult to discern between the two systems. Second, the estimates by Anderson and LaBelle14 represent a direct extrapolation of available data without considering its applicability, which is why they contain substantial bias and uncertainty. For pipelines, the spill frequency in Anderson and LaBelle14 was scaled on the basis of the volume of oil produced. This approach yields a relatively high frequency when applied to a deepwater facility with substantial oil production. In the Gilbert et al.13 study, oil spill frequencies from pipelines were scaled on the basis of the length of the pipeline and the time of exposure. For shuttle tankers, Anderson and LaBelle6 used oil-spill data extending back to 1974 for all U.S. coastal and offshore waters. In the Gilbert et al.13 study, data before 1992 were discarded due to improvements in operating procedures caused by implementation of OPA 9015. Also, data from outside the Gulf of Mexico were not used directly due to differences in environmental and regulatory conditions.
1.E+01 1.E+00 1.E-01 1.E-02 1.E-03 1.E-04 1.E-05 1.E-06 10-100 1,000-10,000 10,000-100,000 100,000-500,000 1-10 100-1,000

Average Total Volume of Oil Spilled in Lifetime (bbl)

50000

40000 Point Estimates Extrapolated from 30000 Anderson and LaBelle (1994)
14

20000 90% Confidence Intervals from Gilbert et al. (2001) 0 Pipeline Shuttle Tanker
13

10000

Oil Transportation System

Fig. 9 Comparative Risk Assessment Results for Pipeline versus Shuttle Tanker

A second lesson from this case history is that participation by policy makers in the analysis from the beginning was a key to having the results be used in formulating policy. The policy makers had a clear understanding of how the results were developed and what could and could not be concluded from them. The policy makers also had the ability early in the project to guide how the results were presented so that they would be most useful to them in their deliberations. Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis (PSHA) Seismic design is a common application of probabilistic methods in facility engineering. The Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis (PSHA) allows quantification of uncertainties to be incorporated into the seismic hazard criteria. The terminology and techniques of PSHA were originally developed in the nuclear industry (e.g., SSHAC16 and Stepp et al.17); a PSHA is now conducted on most major offshore facilities in seismic regions. A PSHA uses a series of probabilistic computations to combine the uncertainties in earthquake source (where and how big), occurrence frequency (how often), and ground motion attenuation relationships (how strong at a particular site). This formal consideration of uncertainty is important because the uncertainty in predicting ground motion at a site for rare seismic events is substantial. The probabilistic computations allow the PSHA to predict a relationship between a ground motion value such as the peak ground acceleration (PGA) and the annual probability that the value will be exceeded. In comparison, a more traditional deterministic approach determines the PGA or other seismic criteria from a single or several earthquakes that are expected to have maximum impact at the site. The PSHA and deterministic approaches use the same data sets, however, the PSHA addresses the chance of ground motions being exceeded based upon all possible earthquakes. Both natural uncertainty (natural processes) and modeling

Pipeline Shuttle Tanker

Annual Frequency

Expected Value 90% Confidence Interval

Spill Size (bbl)

Fig. 8 Oil Spill Frequencies for Pipeline versus Shuttle Tanker

500,000-1,000,000

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uncertainty (e.g., attenuation relationships) can be incorporated into the PSHA. Modeling uncertainty is typically addressed using a logic tree approach that allows the use of alternative seismic models, each of which is assigned a weighting factor that reflects the relative confidence that the model is correct. An example logic tree from one case history is shown on Fig. 10. The output from a PSHA is a seismic hazard curve, which shows the annual frequency of exceedance versus the ground motion. An example hazard curve from a case history is shown on Fig. 11; in this case, the ground motion of interest is the 5-percent damped spectral horizontal acceleration at a structural period of 1 second. The heavy curve labeled Mean on Fig. 11 is the annual probability that a particular acceleration will be exceeded at the site. The PSHA approach fits nicely into offshore structure design, where criteria are typically specified based upon return periods in the range of 200 years for strength design and 1,000 to 3,000 years for ductility design. The ductility design in the case history on Fig. 11 was based on a 3,000-year return period, which corresponded with a design acceleration of about 0.3 g. There are challenges in applying PSHA in practice, particularly in working with practitioners who are experienced with deterministic approaches. Because the PSHA criteria are developed from probabilistic calculations, the results have no clear meaning in terms of the often asked question: What size earthquake is my platform designed too? Deaggregation analysis of the PSHA can help answer this question in terms of the main contributors to the seismic risk, but the answer is often still fuzzy in terms of a specific representative earthquake that represents the seismic risk. In contrast, a deterministic approach allows specification of a specific earthquake and distance upon which the design is then based. Difficulty also extends to the selection of time-history records to be used for design based upon the PSHA, since the seismic hazard was developed using a large number of earthquake sources. It is therefore sometimes difficult to select representative time history records that adequately cover the range of the PSHA results. However, these same challenges are implicit in the deterministic approach because there is considerable uncertainty in selecting a scenario earthquake; since this uncertainty is just not formally addressed or represented in a deterministic approach, there is no way to know how conservative or unconservative this approach is in an actual project. The application of a PSHA in practice requires both an understanding of probability theory as well as an expertise in seismic source and fault displacement and ground motion. The logic tree on Fig. 10 from a case history illustrates this point. The logic tree was set up so that for a given source there was an associated attenuation model. In this way, when multiple sources were combined, the appropriate attenuation model for each source was considered independently. The consequence of this approach was that uncertainty in the attenuation model was effectively eliminated because it was averaged out over multiple potential sources. It required an understanding of probability theory to identify the issue and an understanding of ground motion to then address it. Abrahamson18 identifies and discusses many of the common mis-steps in applying PSHA in practice.

The potential to fully use the results from a PSHA has not yet been realized in practice. Currently, it is used primarily as a tool to develop the design ground motions from the mean hazard curve. However, deaggregation of the results into individual sources, which is not always included in a PSHA and not often used even when it is included, can provide useful insight into the frequency content and time history for design purposes. In addition, the probabilistic information in the hazard curve provides useful information about the value of additional information in characterizing a source. For example, in the case history on Fig. 11, there is a 50-percent chance that additional information could reduce the design ground motion to less than 0.2 g (the 50th percentile curve). Finally, the establishment of the target return period for a particular design is not always explicitly stated in codes and regulations and is not always consistent with other risks that are accepted in offshore facility design; a detailed analysis of consequences on a project-specific basis would provide additional information in establishing an appropriate return period for design purposes.

Source Type

Recurrence Frequency

Maximum Magnitude

Fault Type

Attenuation Model

Fig. 10 Example Logic Tree for Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis

0.01 Annual Frequency of Exceedance
Mean 75th Percentile

0.001
Ductility Level Event

95th Percentile

0.0001

5th Percentile 25th Percentile 50th Percentile

0.00001 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 1-Second Spectral Acceleration

Fig. 11 Example Results from Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis

Conclusions This paper consists of a series of case histories that illustrate current applications of probabilistic approaches to manage uncertainties and risks associated with the sea floor in offshore engineering related. There are two major themes throughout these case histories. The first theme is that a fundamental understanding of the physical problem is required in order to apply probabilistic methods appropriately. The mathematics of probability theory are intended to represent the real world; mathematical

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assumptions about distribution types and dependence between variables require careful consideration. The case histories on reliability-based design for a pile foundation and probabilistic seismic hazard analysis illustrate this point. In addition, realworld data need to be incorporated into an analysis to the greatest extent possible and in a manner that is realistic and appropriate. The case histories on design-code calibration from hurricane events and comparative risk assessment for pipelines illustrate this point. The second theme from these case histories is that there is significant potential for adding value to facility engineering by applying probabilistic methods. All five case histories illustrate this potential: 1. A decision about how much time was required between pile installation and TLP hook-up in a frontier region was based upon the probability of foundation overload. 2. The value of additional site investigation data for foundation design and installation on a project-specific basis was explicitly related to the variability in geology and expressed in terms of the expected savings associated with reducing uncertainty in the geotechnical properties. 3. The industry-wide design method for pile foundations on platform jackets was calibrated with actual hurricane performance and can now be updated to reflect this experience. 4. The risks associated with the use of new technology for oil transport in the Gulf of Mexico (i.e., shuttle tankers) were quantified probabilistically and compared to those associated with existing technology (i.e., pipelines) in order to develop public policy for the new technology. 5. Probabilistic seismic hazard analyses have become common place in establishing design ground motions for major offshore facilities. An important point from these case histories is that the potential of probabilistic approaches is not always associated with making a design less conservative or with cutting costs. The potential benefit is in rationally and explicitly considering risks and uncertainties in making design decisions. While these case histories illustrate the potential, much of it has not yet been realized in the daily practice of facility engineering and there is ample need and room for future growth in this area. References
1. Hamilton, J. M. and Murff, J. D. (1992), Selection of LRFD Resistance Factors for Pile Foundation Design, Proc. of Structural Congress 92, ASCE, San Antonio, Texas, 788-795. 2. Tang, W. H. and Gilbert, R. B. (1993), Case Study of Offshore Pile System Reliability, Proc. Offshore Tech. Conf., Houston, Texas, OTC Paper No. 7196. 3. Bea, R. G., Jin, Z., Valle, C. and Ramos, R. (1999), Evaluation of Reliability of Platform Pile Foundations, J. Geotech. and Geoenvir. Engrg., ASCE, 125(8), 696-704. 4. Gambino, S. J. and Gilbert, R.B. (1999), Modeling Spatial Variability in Pile Capacity for Reliability-Based Design, Proc. Analysis, Design, Construction and Testing of Deep Foundations, ASCE Geotechnical Special Publication No. 88, 135-149.

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