INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE vs NLRC Facts: Since 1968, respondent Basiao has been an agent for petitioner company,

and is authorized to solicit within the Philippines applications for insurance policies and annuities in accordance with the existing rules and regulations of the company. In return, he would receive compensation, in the form of commissions. Some four years later, in April 1972, the parties entered into another contract an Agency Manager's Contract and to implement his end of it Basiao organized an agency or office to which he gave the name M. Basiao and Associates, while concurrently fulfilling his commitments under the first contract with the Company. In May, 1979, the Company terminated the Agency Manager's Contract. After vainly seeking a reconsideration, Basiao sued the Company in a civil action . Issue: Whether or not there exist an employer-employee relationship between Basiao and Insular Life. Held: The SC ruled in favor of Insular Life. Not every form of control that the hiring party reserves to himself over the conduct of the party hired in relation to the services rendered may be accorded the effect of establishing an employer-employee relationship between them in the legal or technical sense of the term. A line must be drawn somewhere, if the recognized distinction between an employee and an individual contractor is not to vanish altogether. It is, therefore, usual and expected for an insurance company to promulgate a set of rules to guide its commission agents in selling its policies that they may not run afoul of the law and what it requires or prohibits. Of such a character are the rules which prescribe the qualifications of persons who may be insured, subject insurance applications to processing and approval by the Company, and also reserve to the Company the determination of the premiums to be paid and the schedules of payment. Absent such showing, the Court will not speculate that any exceptions or qualifications were imposed on the express provision of the contract leaving Basiao "... free to exercise his own judgment as to the time, place and means of soliciting insurance." The Court, therefore, rules that under the contract invoked by him, Basiao was not an employee of the petitioner, but a commission agent, an independent contractor whose claim for unpaid commissions should have been litigated in an ordinary civil action.

SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION VS. NLRC Facts: In line with an Innovation Program sponsored by petitioner SMC and under which management undertook to grant cash awards to all SMC employees except ED-HO staff, Division Managers and higher-ranked personnel who submit to the Corporation Ideas and suggestions found to be beneficial to the Corporation, Rustico Vega submitted on 23 September 1980 an innovation proposal. Mr. Vega's proposal was entitled "Modified Grande Pasteurization Process," and was supposed to eliminate certain alleged defects in the quality and taste of the product "San Miguel Beer Grande. Petitioner Corporation, however, did not find the aforequoted proposal acceptable and consequently refused Mr. Vega's subsequent demands for a cash award under the Innovation Program. Issue: Whether or not, SMC commit unfair labor practice? Held: It is obvious from the complaint that the plaintiffs have not alleged any unfair labor practice. Theirs is a simple action for damages for tortious acts allegedly committed by the defendants. Such being the case, the governing statute is the Civil Code and not the Labor Code. It results that the orders under review are based on a wrong premise. The Court notes that the SMC Innovation Program was essentially an invitation from petitioner Corporation to its employees to submit innovation proposals, and that petitioner Corporation undertook to grant cash awards to employees who accept such invitation and whose innovation suggestions, in the judgment of the Corporation's officials, satisfied the standards and requirements of the Innovation Program 10 and which, therefore, could be translated into some substantial benefit to the Corporation. Such undertaking, though unilateral in origin, could nonetheless ripen into an enforceable contractual obligation on the part of petitioner Corporation under certain circumstances. Thus, whether or not an enforceable contract, albeit implied arid innominate, had arisen between petitioner Corporation and private respondent Vega in the circumstances of this case, and if so, whether or not it had been breached, are preeminently legal questions, questions not to be resolved by referring to labor legislation and having nothing to do with wages or other terms and conditions of employment, but rather having recourse to our law on contracts. WEREFORE, the Petition for certiorari is GRANTED.

HOLIDAY INN MANILA VS. NLRC Facts: Elena Honasan applied for employment with the Holiday Inn and was on April 15, 1991, accepted for "on-the-job training" as a telephone operator for a period of three weeks. For her services, she received food and transportation allowance. On May 13, 1992, after completing her training, she was employed on a "probationary basis" for a period of six months ending November 12, 1991. Her employment contract stipulated that the Hotel could terminate her probationary employment at any time prior to the expiration of the six-month period. On November 8, 1991, four days before the expiration of the stipulated deadline, Holiday Inn notified her of her dismissal, on the ground that her performance had not come up to the standards of the Hotel. Issue: Whether or not Ms. Honasan was illegally dismissed? Held: The grounds for the removal of a regular employee are enumerated in Articles 282, 283 and 284 of the Labor Code. The procedure for such removal is prescribed in Rule XIV, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code. These rules were not observed in the case at bar as Honasan was simply told that her services were being terminated because they were found to be unsatisfactory. No administrative investigation of any kind was undertaken to justify this ground. She was not even accorded prior notice, let alone a chance to be heard. The Court finds in the Hotel's system of double probation a transparent scheme to circumvent the plain mandate of the law and make it easier for it to dismiss its employees even after they shall have already passed probation. The petitioners had ample time to summarily terminate Honasan's services during her period of probation if they were deemed unsatisfactory. Not having done so, they may dismiss her now only upon proof of any of the legal grounds for the separation of regular employees, to be established according to the prescribed procedure. The policy of the Constitution is to give the utmost protection to the working class when subjected to such maneuvers as the one attempted by the petitioners. This Court is fully committed to that policy and has always been quick to rise in defense of the rights of labor, as in this case. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED

PAL vs NLRC Facts: The Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL) completely revised its 1966 Code of Discipline. Subsequently, some of the employees were subjected to disciplinary measures for alleged violation of revised code. Philippine Airlines Employees Association (PALEA) filed a complaint before the (NLRC) for "ULP with arbitrary implementation of PAL's Code of Discipline without notice and prior discussion with Union by Management." PALEA contended that PAL was guilty of ULP because the copies of the Code had been circulated in limited numbers; that being penal in nature the Code must conform with the requirements of sufficient publication, and that the Code was arbitrary, oppressive, and prejudicial to the rights of the employees. PAL filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, asserting its prerogative as an employer to prescribe rules and regulations regarding employees' conduct in carrying out their duties and functions. Issue: Whether or not the formulation of a Code of Discipline among employees is a shared responsibility of the employer and the employees. Held: YES. The Court upheld the unions right, and ruled that, the management should see to it that its employees are at least properly informed of its decisions or modes of action, because the implementation of the provisions may result in the deprivation of an employees means of livelihood which is a property right. And the CBA may not be interpreted as cession of employees right to participate in the deliberation of matters which may affects their rights and the formulation of a code of discipline.

LANZADERA VS. AMETHYST SECURITY Facts: To secure their properties and personnel, RICC and PICMW entered into separate service contracts for detailing of security guards with respondent Amethyst Security. Amethyst had been RICC/PICMWs security contractor since 1968.One of the conditions of the service contracts between Amethyst and RICC/PICMW was for Amethyst to supply the latter companies with security guards who must be between 25 to 45 years of age. The aforesaid condition was maintained with every renewal of the service contracts. On January 30, 1998, petitioners who were at that time over 45 years of age received Memorandum/Relief Orders relieving them from their existing postings as security guards of Amethyst with RICC/PICMW, effective February 1, 1998. Petitioners were instructed to report to the main office of Amethyst for reassignment. According to respondent Amethyst, it gave petitioners the option to either continue working for PICMW as firewatchers or be transferred to Cagayan de Oro for new assignments. The respondents alleged that the petitioners chose neither option but instead failed to report for work on February 1, 1998. Issues: Whether or not, the security guards were illegally dismissed? Held: The law recognizes the employers right to transfer or assign employees from one area of operation to another or one office to another or in pursuit of its legitimate business interest, provided there is no demotion in rank or diminution of salary, benefits and other privileges and not motivated by discrimination or made in bad faith, or effected as a form of punishment or demotion without sufficient cause. This matter is a prerogative inherent in the employers right to effectively control and manages the enterprise. Petitioners action not to report for work is a form of defiant action that petitioners failed to justify. Even if it could be argued that their collective action stemmed from their resentment against the age rule being enforced by Amethyst, we find nothing in the circumstances of this case to show sufficient reason to excuse petitioners failure to heed managements exercise of a management prerogative.