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Ratio: 1. Court will not decide on a question of fact, one which Penera raises in this petition. 2. The Resolution of the COMELEC are sufficiently supported by substantial evidence. a. OEC, Section 80 i. Election campaign or partisan political activity outside campaign period. It shall be unlawful for any person, whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any party, or association of persons, to engage in an election campaign or partisan political activity except during the campaign period: Provided, That political parties may hold political conventions or meetings to nominate their official candidates within thirty days before the commencement of the campaign period and forty-five days for Presidential and Vice-Presidential election. b. According to Sec. 68, the violation of Sec. 80, if declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of or found by the Commission would be disqualification as a candidate or be prevented from holding office if candidate was already elected. c. In the case at bar, it had been sufficiently established, not just by Andanars evidence, but also those of Penera herself, that Penera and her partymates, after filing their COCs on participated in a motorcade which passed through the different barangays of Sta. Monica, waived their hands to the public, and threw candies to the onlookers. d. The conduct of a motorcade is a form of election campaign or partisan political activity, falling squarely within the ambit of Section 79(b)(2) of the Omnibus Election Code, on [h]olding
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WHEREFORE petition is dismissed. Penera 2009 case: SC discusses ratio of previous decision: the Decision considers the partisan political acts of a person so filing a certificate of candidacy as the promotion of his/her election as a candidate. Thus, such person can be disqualified for premature campaigning for acts done before the start of the campaign period. In short, the Decision considers a person who files a certificate of candidacy already a candidate even before the start of the campaign period. Issue: WON the decision is valid? No. Contrary to existing law. *Eto ang illogical, adopting the Lanot doctrine that there should be an element of a "candidate" but then showing that candidate is not a candidate unless at the start of the campaign period. Tapos hindi pa inaddress kung ano yung mangyayari sa provision regarding premature campaigning. 1. Adopting the ruling in Lanot: (Main question faced by the Court is WON Eusebio was a candidate when he committed those acts before the start of the campaign period?) a. 3 essential elements constituting violation of Sec. 80 of OEC are: (1) a person engages in an election campaign or partisan political activity; (2) the act is designed to promote the election or defeat
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WHEREFORE we GRANT the MR. Chavez v. COMELEC, ABALOS, AMORA-LADRA (acting director), SOLGEN Facts: 1. Petition by Chavez as taxpayer and citizen asking the enjoinment of Sec. 32 of COMELEC Resolution No. 6250 2. Sec. 32: a. Section 32. All propaganda materials such as posters, streamers, stickers or paintings on walls and other materials showing the picture, image, or name of a person, and all advertisements on print, in radio or on television showing the image or mentioning the name of a person, who subsequent to the placement or display thereof becomes a candidate for public office shall be immediately removed by said candidate and radio station, print media or television station within 3 days after the effectivity of these implementing rules; otherwise, he and said radio station, print media or television station shall be presumed to have conducted premature campaigning in violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. 3. Oct & Nov 2003 - Chavez entered into agreements with certain establishments (clothing and video games) to endorse their products. Pursuant to these agreements, three billboards were set up basically showing Chavez with such products. 4. Dec 2003 - Chavez filed his COC for the position of Senator 5. Later on, he was directed by COMELEC's Law Department to comply with the provision of the resolution 6. Chavez sent a letter asking for exemption since these were product endorsements and not election paraphernalia intended for campaigning > Denied. 7. Chavez contention: Sec. 32 is unconstitutional a. a gross violation of the non-impairment clause;
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Issue: 1. Is Section 32 an invalid exercise of police power? NO. 2. WON it was within the powers of the COMELEC to prohibit these billboards? YES. 3. Does such billboards constitute election campaigning? YES. 4. WON such provision is a gross violation of the non-impairment clause? NO. 5. WON Sec 32 is an ex post facto law? NO. 6. WON prohibition of billboards is a violation of the Fair Elections Act? NO. 2. Ratio: 1. To determine the validity of a police measure, two questions must be asked: (1) Does the interest of the public in general, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the exercise of police power? and (2) Are the means employed reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals? a. There is a valid purpose: i. examination of the assailed provision reveals that its primary objectives are to prohibit premature campaigning and to level the playing field for candidates of public office, to equalize the situation between popular or rich candidates, on one hand, and lesser -known or poorer candidates, on the other, by preventing the former from enjoying undue advantage in exposure and publicity on account of their resources and popularity. The latter is a valid reason for the exercise of police power ii. If the subject billboards were to be allowed, candidates for public office whose name and image are used to advertise commercial products would have more opportunity to make themselves known to the electorate, to the disadvantage of other candidates who do not have the same chance of lending their faces and names to endorse popular commercial products as image models.
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WHEREFORE, petition is DISMISSED. Vda De Halili (as administatrix of Fortunato Halili) v. CA, Suntay Facts: 1. Appeal from CA decision holding: a. That four promissory notes and the lease contract executed by Federico Suntay were void because their object or purpose was illegal for being in contravention of sections 47 and 48 of the Revised Election Code which, respectively, deal with prohibited contributions and limit the expenses of candidates in an election campaign. b. Halili liable to pay Suntay P8K as annual rental fee for the latter's fishpond from Oct 1955 until possession is surrendered to Suntay 2. Federico Suntay was the official gubernatorial candidate of the Liberal Party in Bulacan in the 1951 elections. a. Fortunato F. Halili -> the incumbent governor, head of the Liberal Party in Bulacan, Suntay's campaign manager. b. At the same time, Halili was a public utility operator. 3. Halili agreed to make cash advances to Suntay in order for the latter to finance his campaign 4. However they were aware of a prohibition in the Revised Elections Code which made it unlawful for any entity operating a public utility from contributing or making any expenditure in connection with an election campaign. a. Further, another limitation: Candidate for his election campaign cannot spend more than the total amount of the emoluments for one year attached to the office for which he is a candidate (P5K) 5. Laundering scheme: the advances or loans were made in the names of Halili's trusted employees as dummies a. Suntay executed promissory notes in favor of Halili's Ees (5K, 30K, 20K -> 55K)
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Issue: 1. WON Sec. 48 is applicable because Suntay did not prove that Halili knew that the loans and the rental for the lease would be used by Suntay "as would exceed" the governor's salary for one year in the sum of P5,000? NO. Sec. 48 is applicable. 2. WON Sec. 48 applies to a non-candidate (Halili)? YES. 3. WON Sec. 47 applies to a natural person? YES. 4. WON Halili was in pari delicto with Suntay or he was less guilty than him? In pari delicto -> Equal liability Ratio: 1. That factual contention is devoid of merit because Halili admitted the allegations in Suntay's complaint that Halili was aware that Suntay would incur campaign expenses exceeding the governor's annual and that Suntay's disbursements exceeded that amount (pp. 4 and 34, Record on Appeal). Moreover, the Court of Appeals found that "Halili was fully aware of the purpose and objective in consummating the lease contract and the promissory notes, that is, to sustain the campaign funds of plaintiff Suntay" and that "Halili cannot feign lack of knowledge" of that purpose. 2. Appellant's contention is not tenable under section 184 of the Revised Election Code which speaks of principals and accomplices. a. HALILI was no ordinary lender and He knew that the rental and the loans would be spent for Suntay's candidacy. He was not only Suntay's financial backer but, as campaign manager, he had a hand in the expenditure of the funds supplied by him to Suntay. b. He was Suntay's co-principal
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WHEREFORE CA decision is affirmed. PILAR v. COMELEC Facts: 1. Petition assailing resolution of COMELEC 2. Mar 1992 - Pilar filed COC for position as member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Isabela Province 3. Later on (3 days later), he withdrew his COC 4. In 1993 & 1994 - COMELEC imposed upon petitioner the fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) for failure to file his statement of contributions and expenditures -> Filed a petition with COMELEC en banc: DENIED Issue:
Ratio: 1. Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 states that "every candidate" has the obligation to file his statement of contributions and expenditures. a. Well-recognized is the rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. b. As the law makes no distinction or qualification as to whether the candidate pursued his candidacy or withdrew the same, the term "every candidate" must be deemed to refer not only to a candidate who pursued his campaign, but also to one who withdrew his candidacy. c. Resolution by COMELEC -> calls for the submission of such statement by all candidates who filed their certificate of candidacy d. It is notesworthy that Resolution No. 2348 even contemplates the situation where a candidate may not have received any contribution or made any expenditure. Such a candidate is not excused from filing a statement, and is in fact required to file a statement to that effect. e. OEC Sec 73: [t]he filing or withdrawal of certificate of candidacy shall not affect whatever civil, criminal or administrative liabilities which a candidate may have incurred." Petitioner's withdrawal of his candidacy did not extinguish his liability for the administrative fine. f. Purpose: i. The state has an interest in seeing that the electoral process is clean, and ultimately expressive of the true will of the electorate. One way of attaining such objective is to pass legislation regulating contributions and expenditures of candidates, and compelling the publication of the same. Admittedly, contributions and expenditures are made for the purpose of influencing the results of the elections ii. It is not improbable that a candidate who withdrew his candidacy has accepted contributions and incurred expenditures, even in the short span of his campaign. The evil sought to be prevented by the law is not all too remote. * Laws involved: RA 7166, Section 14: Statement of Contributions and Expenditures: Effect of Failure to File Statement. Every candidate and treasurer of the political party shall, within thirty (30) days after the day of the election, file in duplicate
Ratio: 1. To be sure, the right of suffrage ardently invoked by herein petitioners, is not at all absolute. Needless to say, the exercise of the right of suffrage, as in the enjoyment of all other rights, is subject to existing substantive and procedural requirements embodied in our Constitution, statute books and other repositories of law. n light of the foregoing doctrine, we hold that Section 8 of R.A. 8189 applies in the present case, for the purpose of upholding the assailed COMELEC Resolution and denying the instant petitions, considering that the aforesaid law explicitly
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Issue: WON Romualdez voluntarily left the country and abandoned his residence in Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte? NO. Ratio: 1. Court: No evidence of abandonment by Romualdez 2. In election cases, the Court treats domicile and residence as synonymous terms, thus: "(t)he term "residence" as used in the election law is synonymous with "domicile", which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention." 19 "Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. 3. That residence, in the case of the petitioner, was established during the early 1980's to be at Barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. 4. Residence thus acquired, however, may be lost by adopting another choice of domicile. In order, in turn, to acquire a new domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. 21 In other words, there must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. a. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual. 5. The political situation brought about by the "People's Power Revolution" must have truly caused great apprehension to the Romualdezes, as well as a serious concern over the safety and welfare of the members of their families. Their going into self-exile until conditions favorable to them would have somehow stabilized is understandable. Certainly, their sudden departure from the country cannot be described as "voluntary," or as "abandonment of residence" at least in the
Siawan v. Inopiquez (Judge) Facts: 1. Complaint by Datu Siwan against Judge Inopiquez of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Kananga-Matag-ob, Leyte, for gross ignorance of the law, gross abuse of power, and misconduct in connection with the latters handling of a criminal case and two election cases for inclusion of voters. 2. Two identical complaints against the judge were filed. 3. An investigating judge assigned to the administrative matter found the following facts: - found him guilty of grave abuse of official functions and/ or oppression and recommended that he be fined the sum of P15,000.00 and/ or suspended for a period of six months. a. Crim case i. In Crim. Case No. 584 entitled People of the Philippines vs. Julia Enriqua Seco . . ., the accused then was charged of Usurpation of Authority and Official Functions under Art. 177 of the Revised Penal Code, involving as the complaint states, a paquiao contract in which the accused Julia Seco allegedly signed as the Barangay Captain of Brgy. Cansuso, Matag-ob, Leyte; ii. Accused therein filed a motion for inhibition because of the relation of the Judge with people helping the complainant. > Denied by judge iii. Said case was dismissed because of an affidavit of desistance. But after dismissal, the accused in that case sued the person who filed the complaint. And so as a result of that complainant wants to file again against the accused. Accused opposed but herein judge decided to continue.
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WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Aquilino A. Inopiquez, Jr. is hereby ORDERED to pay a fine of P20,000.00 for violation of Rule 137 of the Rules of Court and is SUSPENDED without pay for a period of three months for abuse of authority and ignorance of the law. Mercado v. Judge Dysangco, Clerk of court Facts: 1. In a complaint, petitioners charged judge with grave misconduct. a. Allegations: i. prior to the Barangay Elections of May 12, 1997, fortyeight (48) persons filed with the said court separate petitions for inclusion in the voters list. ii. Of these forty-eight (48) petitioners, nine (9) were supporters of complainant Cirilo I. Mercado, while thirtynine (39) were supporters of his opponent Alejandro Gonzales.
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Issue: 1. WON Judge is guilty? YES. Ratio: 1. We find respondent judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law and grave misconduct constituting violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended. a. Section 143 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, explicitly lays down the procedure governing petitions for inclusion, exclusion, and correction of names of voters* i. The clear mandate of the law is for the municipal judge a) to decide the petition on the basis of the evidence presented, b) to conduct a hearing thereon, and c) to render a decision within 10 days from the filing of the petition. Respondent judge, unfortunately, does not know the above legal provisions. ii. He did not decide the petition on the basis of petitioners evidence. He could not have done so. Extant in the record