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United States Foreign Policy Towards Apartheid South Africa 1958-1960 Melissa Waudby Fall 2013

Africa, during the second half of the twentieth century, was not a priority for United States foreign policy. The main focus for top State department officials directly after World War II and continuing into the 1980s was the Cold War and the containment of communism worldwide. As a result, relations between the United States and this part of the world tended to be managed lower down the foreign policy-making hierarchy. However, a partial exception to this diplomatic situation was South Africa. The Union of South Africa was in a unique position because in many respects it appeared to be an ideal partner for the United States, helping the U.S. uphold its interests on the African continent. Pretorias anticommunist stance, its commitment to a liberal trading and investment environment, South Africas location on the Cape sea route and its reserves of important minerals key to the U.S. economy proved to be major benefits in the United States relationship with South Africa.1 The flaw in this ideal partnership was the Unions ongoing program of institutionalized racism or the policy of apartheid. In this way the United States dealings with the Union of South Africa could be characterized as a balancing act. In one aspect the United States held enormous strategic and economic stake in the country and wanted to continue investing in these opportunities. On the other hand, the United States and their commitment to democracy and human rights demanded a response to the apartheid policy. During the Eisenhower administration, this balancing act was at a critical precipice. Prior to 1960 and the Sharpeville Massacre, Eisenhower and his cabinet focused on the economic and strategic relationship with Union of South Africa, however the increasing global and domestic pressure for the Alex Thomson, U.S. Foreign Policy Towards Apartheid South Africa, 1948-1994 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 2.
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United States to address and condemn the racial oppression enforced by apartheid policy put this policy in serious jeopardy. This paper will focus on the years of 1958 to 1960 and how during these years the international and domestic call for a critical approach to the foreign policy with South Africa, specifically investigating the Sharpeville Massacre as a major turning point, forced Eisenhower and other top officials to reverse their position on South Africa, turning their mutual economic relationship into a relationship of humanitarian pressure, which would continue to characterize United States and South African relations until the apartheid policy was removed in the early 1990s. Prior to the 1960 incident at Sharpeville in South Africa, Eisenhower and the State department actively focused on the economic and strategic relationship between the United States and the Union of South Africa, largely ignoring or passively accepting the Unions policy of institutionalized racism, the apartheid. In the postwar years the main interest of U.S. foreign policy officials was the desire to contain communism. South Africa stood out as an ally for the United States based on the Afrikaner governments long anti-communist stance and their strategic importance as a pro-Western bulwark against Soviet bloc penetration into the whole rim of southern Africa.2 Beginning in 1920, anti-communist sentiment in South Africa was propagated and exploited to provide the state with the necessary means to curtail any perceived threat to white supremacy.3 This anti-communist feeling within the government of South Africa and the Afrikaner population in the Henry F. Jackson, From the Congo to Soweto: U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Africa Since 1960 (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1982) 244. 3 Wessel Visser, Afrikaner Anti-Communist History Production in South African Historiography, http://sun025.sun.ac.za, 2-3.
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Union continued to grow. In his 1954 publication on the future of the Afrikaner, G.D. Scholtz, a Afrikaner historian and journalist, pointed out that international Soviet policy posed a danger of Communism in Africa sweeping from Cape Town to the Mediterranean.4 While, South Africas ideological stance against communism reflected that of the United States during this time period, the United States was keenly aware of the still present threat of communism in Africa and the risk that it presented to their South African ally. In a 1958 report prepared by Julius Holmes, the special assistant to Secretary of State John Dulles, the threat of communism in Africa, especially in the Union of South Africa is detailed. The report indicates that the situation in South Africa is of increasing concern because of the growing resistance movement against the Afrikaner government. Holmes indicates, in spite of harassment by the Government, there is growing confidence of the African, Asian and colored leaders.5 The opposition to the Afrikaner government was gaining support both within and outside of the Union from Communists and proCommunists. In an additional report by the Operations Coordinating Board this problem of governmental opposition is further investigated. The report stresses the susceptibility of the racial nationalist and anti-colonial sentiments of indigenous peoples to political exploitation.6 In South Africa the African National Congress is specifically cited as a potential cause for concern for the threat of communist influence. In the State departments journal Problems of Communism, it was stated that due to contacts with Moscow the African National Congress had been
4 5Document

1, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960 Volume XIV, Africa, Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State, p. 1-11. 6 Ibid,. 741. 3

Ibid., 10.

transformed from a nationalist organization dedicated to the pursuit of civil and political rights to a vanguard socialist movement with strong Marxist-Leninist elements.7 Officials in the U.S. government perceived the ANC and other growing government opposition organizations as an extreme threat to their economic interests in South Africa. With this threat of communist influence, the United States government moved forward with a policy backing the official government of South Africa. In recognizing and prioritizing the threat of communism, the United States failed to address the serious problem of institutionalized racism that was present in South Africa. The Unions government used the Cold War fears and concerns of the United States to establish its racial policies and make apartheid palatable to the American government. Americans continued strategic outlook on South Africa as a source of anti-communist influence in the region was in direct contradiction to the human and civil rights ideals that were a rising concern throughout the world. In addition to strategic concerns in South Africa, after World War II American economic investment in the Union increased dramatically. With most of their European trading partners devastated by war and focused on the rebuilding efforts the United States needed to branch out in their economic opportunities. While South Africa was certainly not the largest overseas market for American capitalist investment, it quickly became the most important site for U.S. business in Africa. In 1958 it was reported that total U.S. trade with Africa South of the Sahara equaled

United States Department of State, Problems with Communism, (Washington D.C.: Documentary Studies Section, International Information Administration, 1952).
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more than $1 billion annually.8 This trade relationship was both mutually beneficial and highly profitable for both countries. Although South Africa as a destination for U.S. exports remained relatively low, at 1 to 2 percent of total U.S. worldwide exports, the Union increasingly consumed its share of U.S. imports. In addition, South Africas extensive reserves of valuable raw materials provided a large incentive for United States economic investment. In a National Security Report dated 1958, it was stated that the area was a predominant source for the United States of such strategic materials as asbestos, cobalt, columbite, corundum, industrial diamond, tantalum ore, palm kernel oil, and chemical chromite.9 Despite the massive amount of valuable natural resources, South Africa desperately needed investment in industrial mechanization in order to turn these natural resources into profit.10 American mining companies found South Africa particularly profitable. The United States government supported these commercial investment opportunities by signing a treaty a double taxation treaty with South Africa in 1952, which granted special privileges to American investors making them exempt from taxation within the Union of South Africa.11 By investing in existing South African mines and setting up new operations in the region, American companies were able to access large quantities of metals and minerals. These natural resources were key in the development of the postwar economy in the United States. U.S. transnational Document 8, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960 Volume XIV, Africa, Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State, p. 23-37. 9 Ibid,. 23-37. 10 N. Grant, The Racial Politics of the Cold War: South African Apartheid and the United States, 1948-1960, http://coldwaramericas.wordpress.com/conferencepapers/#_ftnref. 11 Treaties and Other International Acts Series, No. 2510, United States Treaties and Other International Agreement: 3 pg. 3821.
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corporation continued their penetration of the Unions economy that had started prior to World War II. Between 1948 and 1960, 42 U.S. firms set up local subsidiaries in South Africa, taking the total to 160 U.S. businesses directly operating in this market. As a result of this activity, both U.S. private direct investment in the Union, and U.S. exports to South Africa were to double during the 1950s.12 Sydney Redecker, the consul general in Johannesburg, surveying these economic investments, could report back to the State Department that, these developments have greatly strengthened the economic ties between South Africa and the united States and by causing South Africa to look increasingly to the United States for financial assistance and industrial guidance and support, are harbingers of ever-closer economic relations between the two countries in the future. At this time U.S. State Department officials paid little concern to the human rights concerns that colored the rest of the world, especially the domestic concerns of the United States. The economic and strategic moves that the U.S. took in regards to South Africa during this time period was occurring simultaneously with the extreme political and social change in the landscape of the United States brought about by the Civil Right Movement. Events such as the Montgomery bus boycott and the Supreme Court rulings of Shelly vs. Kramer, 1948, and Brown vs. Board of Education, Topeka 1954 signaled the end of state-sanctioned racialism in the United States.13 Alex Thomson, U.S. Foreign Policy Towards Apartheid South Africa, 1948-1994 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 2. 13 Ibid., 15.
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President Eisenhower while initially hesitant to act of segregation and the Civil rights movement eventually bowed to public pressure and participated in supporting the cause of the civil rights. He deployed federal troops in Little Rock, Arkansas, in order to enforce the Supreme Courts opinion on school desegregation and his administration likewise drafter legislation that led to the Civil Rights Act of 1957. The universal freedoms evoked in speeches at the highest level at home played on the minds of those formulating U.S. foreign policy toward the Union. A State Department policy paper of 1951 contends that, It is in our interests to maintain friendly relations with South Africa because of strategic consideration and also because South Africa represents a good market for our products. Yet this document also acknowledged that the National Partys racial policies periodically produce a strain between the two countries, which unfortunately is likely to continue. 14 Although, initially, U.S. officials viewed the apartheid experiment with tolerance, wishing the Prime Ministers plans well, the mood changed as a consequence of the racial tension created by the implementation of heavyhanded policies. Yet the increasing warning sent by the U.S. embassy staff in South Africa went unnoticed because President Eisenhower and top state officials were reluctant to lose their economic and strategic relationship with the Union. Despite the increasing public pressure and support for the Civil Rights movement the United States government was very reluctant to deal with the issue of apartheid because their own domestic legacy of racial discrimination. Many in the international community placed a mirror to the United States and South Africa and Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951 Volume V. The Near East and Africa, Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State, p. 1428.
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made the comparison that the countries were very similar in the treatment of Blacks by the White government. In his article Anthony Sampson makes several comparisons to South Africa and the American South. He argues that tt is not only the obsession with race, with the same shibboleths and slogans, and the same stock phrases about Communists, nigger agitators and would you like your daughter to marry one of them? It is the whole brooding atmosphere of the South- halfcharming, half-terrifying- which is so immediately reminiscent of South Africa.15 This international comparison between the U.S. and South Africa made the top officials in the United States cautious to add fire to the flame and be viewed as hypocritical in the international eye. The result of this belief in the United States government was a policy in which the United States ignored the apartheid. A key moment that signaled a determined shift in American policy toward the apartheid policy in South Africa came as a result of the Sharpeville Massacre on 21 March 1960. This incident sealed the rhetoric and tone that future administrations would use in their dealings with South Africa.16 The events that occurred on that March day developed in an atmosphere of racial hostility and tension. The apartheid was a creation of the nationalist party, headed by Dr. D.F. Malan, elected in 1948. Though apartheid officially began in 1948, South Africas history racial discrimination and oppression began as early as the mid-17th century. By the 19th century Black people had no political rights under British colonial rule and severe racial discrimination continued after 1910 when the British handed the Anthony Sampson, Little Rock and Johannesburg, The Nation, January 10, 1959, pg.23. 16 Alex Thomson, U.S. Foreign Policy Towards Apartheid South Africa, 1948-1994 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 39.
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administration of the country to the White locals. The policy was a combination of three hundred and seventeen laws which, added structure and instructional support to the racial segregation and discrimination that already existed within the nation.17 Under these policies, Black Africans were extremely limited in their personal and public freedoms. Their rights were systematically stripped from them by policies put in place to protect the economic, social and political supremacy of White Afrikaners. Once such policy enforced was The Abolition of Passes and Coordination of Documents Act of 1952, which states, any native to whom a document of identification has been issuedshall produce such document on demand of any authorized officer. Any native who fails to comply with any provisions of sub-section (1) and (2) may be taken into custody by an authorized officer. 18 This law was not the first nor was it the last racist policy the White Afrikaner government put in place to restrict the freedoms of natives or Black Africans. Although the law states that the punishable offense was being taken into custody, the actual reality of punishments for Black Africans who did not obey the rules, or did not carry the passbook at all times was severe, ranging from imprisonment and fines, to a torturous death. It is in this context of extreme racial tension and prejudice that the events of March 21, 1960 unfolded. Under the pretense of nonviolent action, Nelson Mandela, a leader of the African National Congress (ANC), called for his followers to participate in a nonviolent demonstration against these racist policies. On March Mai Noguchi, Apartheid, http://postcolonialstudies.emory.edu/apartheid/ (Fall 2000). 18 Sharpeville Massacre, http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/sharpeville-massacre21-march-1960 (2009).
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21, around five thousand marchers, refusing to carry their passes, surrendered themselves at a police station. Without warning or provocation, White policemen fired on the unarmed marchers, killing 69 and wounding 180 participants. According to the official police account of the day, marchers began to throw stones, which led to a nervous policeman opening fire upon the crowd. However, eyewitness accounts of the day attest to the fact that the people were given no warning to disperse.19 One eyewitness account from Humphrey Taylor, an assistant editor for Drum Magazine, details the shootings. He states: As we drove through the fringes of the township, many people were shouting the Pan-African slogan Izwe Lethu (our land). But they were grinning and cheerful. Some kids waved to the policemen sitting on the trucks and two of the policemen waved back. Then an African approached him saying that he was a local Pan-African leader. He said his organization was against violence and that the crowd was there for a peaceful demonstration.20 In his statement, Taylor makes the assertion that the crowd was peaceful and friendly, demonstrating no open hostility towards the police officers on the scene. Taylor also argues that the marchers were gathered under the banner of the PanAfrican movement, which supported the ideology of nonviolence, or peaceful protest. The extreme measures taken by the police officers was unnecessary and unwarranted in relation to the actions taken by the protestors. While eyewitness accounts are not always a reliable source for information on the actual progress of an event, Taylor as a person in the journalism field with experience in observing events to form an unbiased opinion, can be seen as a reliable source for information.

20

Africans Gaiety Ended By Bullets, New York Times, 30 April 1960, p. 3. 10

In addition to the eyewitness accounts of the actions taken that day, journalists captured the carnage in photographs that ran in newspapers across the globe.21 In the United States, many newspapers were quick to use negative rhetoric to describe the massacre at Sharpeville. They shaped the incident as an evil brought about by the apartheid policy. One editorial to the New York Times stated yesterday saw the horror of dozens of African being mowed down and killed by rifles and machine guns as the result of a protest against one phase of apartheid- the requirement for nonwhites to possess and show a pass.22 The writer of this passage uses harsh and imaginative language such as mowed down to express their extreme negative stance toward the events that occurred in Sharpeville as a result from the apartheid policy. While very blunt and critical, this reaction was not unique. Many condemn the conduct of the police force, calling their actions unprovoked and unwarranted.23 The worldwide public response to the events in Sharpeville was quick condemnation, blaming the police officers for unnecessary force. This hailstorm of media attention quickly transferred from public interest to governmental response. The massacre and the worldwide attention it received brought the apartheid policy of South Africa to the front door of American policymakers. In his response on March 22, to queries from news correspondents, the U.S. Director of the Office of News Lincoln White read the following statement:

George White Jr. Holding the Line: Race, Racism, and American Foreign Policy Toward Africa, 1953-1961 (Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005), 103. 22 The Tragedy at Sharpeville, New York Times, 22 March 1960, p. 36. 23 Michael Morris, Apartheid: Race Versus Reason- South Africa from 1948 to 1994 (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball Publishers, 2012) p. 72.
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The United States deplores violence in all its forms and hopes that the African people of South Africa will be able to obtain redress from legitimate grievance by peaceful means. While the United States, as a matter of practice, does not ordinarily comment on the internal affairs of government with which it enjoys normal relations, it cannot help but regret the tragic loss of life resulting from the measures taken against the demonstrator in South Africa.24 A telegram was sent to the Embassy in Capetown, which expressed the intention behind the United States State Department in issuing the statement about Sharpeville. The telegram noted that the statement made by White was prepared in response to the media attention to the incident and the impossibility of avoiding press questioning.25 Articles, pictures and editorials were flooding the public arena, making the incident that occurred at Sharpeville a matter of international concern. The attention that was placed upon the event was mostly negative and the general conscience by the worldwide public was that the action of the White South African police officers was unnecessary and unjustified. This intense scrutiny placed upon the incident by the world put extreme pressure on the government of the United States to response to the conduct of the White police officers. The United States could no longer ignore or push aside the issues of the apartheid as they had done in the decades leading up to the incident. However, with this statement, the U.S. government officially and publically took a stance on the apartheid, condemning the actions of the White police officers and taking sympathy with the African National Congress (ANC) supported protesters. By making this public statement of admonishment, the United States Editorial Note, Document 344, Foreign Relations of the United States, 19581960 Volume XIV, Africa, Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State, p. 741. 25 Ibid, p. 741.
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moved toward the international opinion of concern over the policy of apartheid in South Africa. While media attention forced the hand of Lincoln White, in reality White acted without the prior approval from the Secretary of State. Top-level officials in the Eisenhower administration saw the statement as improper and rash. They believed that this statement was a grievous error, one in which would change the tone of the policy toward South Africa, without the intentional and deliberate planning of top-level officials. Christian Herter, the Secretary of State under Eisenhower, vehemently rejected the statement and told the president that he was furious that an ally of the United States could have been treated in this way. Herter indicated that the State Department had released the statement based on an internal failure, without checking at the top policy level and without investigating the facts of the matter. 26 These officials including President Eisenhower, and the Secretary of State Christian Herter believed that the statement was an inappropriate response to the actions of a nation that the United States government had declared an ally. A March 24 memorandum from Secretary Herter to Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs Andrew H. Berding contained a very negative reaction to the statement deploring the police violence in South Africa. Herter states that neither he nor his high level associates were consulted about the statement. He continues on to argue that the issuance of a statement of this nature that is outspokenly critical of a government that the United States maintains a friendly relationship is a decision that should only be done at the highest level in the Department of State. In this memo, Secretary Herter also refers to the policy of apartheid in South Africa as
26

Thomson, 39. 13

a domestic political issue, indicating that he was cautious to speak about the domestic policies of another country.27 The United States seldom regarded the issue of the apartheid before the Sharpeville Massacre. In his statement White indicates that the United States had always left the domestic affairs of states to the government of those states, not commenting, positively or negatively on those policies. American policymakers believed that South Africas policy of apartheid belonged to the countrys domestic jurisdiction.28 Despite increasing concerns from the diplomats at the South African embassy about the matter of apartheid, the United States held little leverage to force any change within the domestic policies of South Africa and thus stayed quite on the subject of apartheid policy. Fred Hadsel, the director of the Office of Southern African Affairs in 1956 contended that At the same time, U.S. policy seeks to avoid giving the appearance, in any way, of endorsing or underwriting apartheid29 Not only did the U.S. not want to comment on the internal affairs of South Africa, the United States was also immensely concerned about their economic and strategic investments in South Africa. U.S. industry relied heavily on the natural resources available in South Africa. Top policy officials believed that supporting the ANC and pro-African groups in favor of the Afrikaner government would put a strain on their relationship and ruin the rich and profitable investment market for United States corporations. In addition the United States believed that, the communist resources from within the country and outside of the country supported the ANC and other African nationalist groups. In a memorandum Editorial Note, Document 344, Foreign Relations of the United States, 19581960 Volume XIV, Africa, Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State, p. 742. 28 Jackson, 258. 29 Thomson, 38.
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describing the discussion of the National Security Council meeting in May of 1958 it was reported that the United States is familiar with the situation in the Union of South Africa. While the Ambassador to South Africa noted the catastrophic policy of apartheid, it was stated we are caught on the horns of the dilemma of NATO on the one hand and of a free, non-Communist Africa on the other.30 In this statement it can be seen that the United States firmly believed that any action on this issue would cause a major crisis in the relationship with South Africa. This dilemma between the United States and the stance of countries around the world was brought to a precipice due to the events at Sharpeville. President Dwight Eisenhowers reaction to the statement of Lincoln White also shows the caution used by the United States when dealing with the apartheid policy in South Africa. In a transcript of a meeting held between the President and Secretary of State Herter it was stated the president said the fat is in the fire now. This comment by the President was referring to the unintentional actions of White in regards to the statement on South Africa. Eisenhower believed that while the United States official policy had not changed, the perception of change was already being brought about based on the concerns of the international community. In this essence, the United States had already squeezed the toothpaste out of the container and now could not reverse the media response to the massacre. Eisenhower continues this line of inevitability by stating that all he could to was to call the South African Ambassador and tell him that, although we are distressed by events in South Africa, we do not regard it as our business to make public statements about Document 346, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960 Volume XIV, Africa, Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State, p. 746.
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this, and officially regret having done so. 31 While the international community both governmental and media were publically admonishing the South African government, the United States still held onto the belief that it was not their place nor in their best interest to comment one way or another. The President also believed that the issues brought up by the Sharpeville Massacre, too closely mirrored the racial practices, and tensions within the United States during this time period. He believed that the government should move with caution in approaching the affairs of apartheid South Africa.32 It was because of his hesitation in regards to the civil rights concerns in the United States, that he supported the quite and private, not public, admonishment of the South African government. However, while the initial statement that resulted in this major shift in United States stance on the apartheid policy in South Africa was in fact made in error, the approval from international governments turned the negative attitudes of the top-level officials in the Eisenhower administration, to a genuine concern over the policy of apartheid. In this, it can be seen that through the pressures of the international community and the media, the United States was forced to shift their policy on South Africa. The issuance of the statement of public condemnation by the United States government put the fat in the fire. Once the statement was out there the United States held no other option than to make a stance against the cause of the apartheid policy. It follows that during the a conversation between the United States representative on the U.N. National Security Council Henry Cabot Lodge and Secretary of State Herter, Lodge contends that the Afro-Asian group at the United
31 32

Ibid., 742 Thomson, 40. 16

Nations was requesting an immediate meeting of the Security Council on the matter [of the Sharpeville Massacre]. Lodge continues to report that this Afro-Asian group supports the statement White had made on the subject and sends their unanimous thanks to the United States for the Departments statement. 33 Lodge also comments to Herter that since he has received so many complaints about the issued statements, he should be pleased by the tremendous credit and good which has come out of this in all these countries. 34 In their phone conversation it can be seen that the international community rallied behind the new stance of the United States in regards to the apartheid. This statement that was once believed to be a grievous mistake, was now beginning to be look at like a shining diamond in the rough. The United States could not take back the statement and instead realized the importance the international community had placed on the United States condemnation. The pressures of the international community made the United States shift their policy, rather than the United States acting as a benevolent, saving grace of humanitarian rights. On March 28 of 1960, United States officials met at Camp David with British officials including Prime Minister Harold Macmillian on the issue of the South African problem. President Eisenhower called this meeting in regards to the AfroAsian groups demand that the Security Council place on agenda. In this conversation about the issue the Prime Minister stated that if the British let the meeting go ahead, then maybe the United States should help with the resolution and ensure the passage of a resolution that would benefit both parties. President
33 34

Document 346, 742. Ibid., 742. 17

Eisenhower stated that he hoped that it would be possible for the British to propose they be allowed to protest the procedure orally and then have the chairmans acquiescence in not pushing this protest to a vote. The President wanted the resolution to be debated on in the chambers of the Security Council and not on the floor of the general assembly of the U.N. The President indicates that a moderate resolution should be pushed in the Security Council. In this conversation the President also disclosed his feelings about the Massacre. He contends, One could not sit in judgment on a difficult social and political problem six thousand miles ways. He says that our [the United States] own problem was in mind in this connection and that he suggested that a UN resolution could perhaps just express regret about the disturbances in South Africa and hope that measures would be taken to prevent their recurrence. 35 In this the President shows that while he is willing express regret over the actions of the South African police officers he does not support extreme measures being placed upon South Africa by the United Nations. At the end of March in 1960, United Nations called a special meeting of the General Assembly to discuss the Sharpeville Massacre. At this meeting, Henry Cabot Lodge, the United States representative in the U.N. Security Council, stated that the shootings caused shock and distress beyond the boarders of South Africa. The United States supported elevating the debate on the issue to the Security Council.36 This action to move to the Security Council discussion was done in the hopes that the United States could rein in the more severe language of the resolution. Memorandum of Conversation, Document 346, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960 Volume XIV, Africa, Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State, p. 746. 36 Thomson, 39.
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President Eisenhower wanted to have a moderate resolution passed. During the debate in the Security Council, several versions of a resolution where proposed. The President and Secretary Herter cautioned Lodge to keep the resolutions mild. In a memorandum of a March 30 conversation between the Secretary and the President, the President indicates that he wants to make sure the Secretary has spoken to Ambassador Lodge about keeping the resolution mild. The Secretary states that he had placed a call to the Ambassador but that he had no information about the text of the resolution. 37 The fact that United States top foreign policy officials were working so diligently to keep the resolution less severe speaks to the tension described between the United States acting upon their economic and strategic investments in the country and the public pressure of supporting humanitarian rights. The President acknowledged that the actions of the White in issuing the statement put the United States in the limelight in regards to their response to the actions of South Africa, the President still wanted to keep a semi-neutral position on the policy. However, while the officials of the Eisenhower administration tried to keep the resolution mild to avoid decreased relations with the South African nation, the other countries of the Security Council wanted to pass a resolution fairly condemning the apartheid policy of South Africa as a cause of the atrocities that occurred at Sharpeville. The international community including groups within South Africa wanted to see the government of South Africa publically punished for this Editorial Note, Document 348, Foreign Relations of the United States, 19581960 Volume XIV, Africa, Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State, p. 749.
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extreme abuse of human rights. The media firestorm that surrounded the incident fueled the fire of condemnation. This extreme pressure placed on the United States to act in accordance to others worldwide can be seen by the actions of Henry Cabot Lodge. It seems that while the administration back in Washington wanted a mild resolution, Henry Cabot Lodge supported a firmer stance by the United Nations. In the end the Security Council proposed a draft of a resolution that the President believed was mighty tough. In a memorandum of telephone conversation between Herter and Goodpaster, Goodpaster informed the President, who thought the resolution was mighty tough and suggested additional changes. Later that day, however, the President told Herter that after talking to Henry Cabot Lodge, he understood the difficult conditions under which Lodge was working. He instructed Herter to call Prime Minister Macmillan and tell him the resolution was something we will have to vote for if we can keep it to this tone.38 The Presidents conversation between himself and Herter signals that the President was aware of the public pressure under which Henry Cabot Lodge worked about how the United States must move toward a policy in which aligns with the rest of the world. The United States voted in favor of the Security Council resolution. The resolution recognizes that the situation in the Union of South Africa is one that has led to international friction and if continued might endanger international peace and security; and deplores that the recent disturbances in the Union of South Africa should have led to the loss of life of so many Africans and extends to the families of the victims its deepest sympathies and deplores the policies and actions of the Government of the Union of South Africa
38

Ibid., 749. 20

which have given rise to the present situation;.39 With the United States voting in favor of this Security Resolution that deplored the government of South Africa and called upon the government to abandon its polices of apartheid and racial discrimination, the government took a public stance against the policies of apartheid, signaling a major change in their position of foreign relations with South Africa. In taking a public stance against the apartheid, the United States and top foreign policy makers set the tone that would characterize all future interactions between the United States and South Africa. During the next 5 administrations, each President moved toward a harsher and firmer stance on the policy of apartheid with the passage of numerous economic sanctions against South Africa and finally the passage of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 which imposed sanctions against South Africa and stated that five preconditions for lifting the sanctions that would essentially end the system of apartheid.40 Prior to the Sharpeville Massacre, the United States foreign policy toward South Africa was characterized by the economic and strategic goals of top state officials largely ignoring the issue of apartheid. However, after the events of the Sharpeville Massacre, international public and media pressure forced that United States to shift their stance on the apartheid publically condemning the actions of the Unions government. This turn in foreign policy toward South Africa was carried over into all future administrations until the ending of the apartheid in 1994. UN Security Council, Resolution 134 (1960) of 1 April 1960, 1 April 1960, S/RES/134 (1960). 40 Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986.
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