Realism and the Renegade Putnam: A Critical Study of Meaning and the Moral Sciences Author(s): Michael Devitt

Source: Nos, Vol. 17, No. 2 (May, 1983), pp. 291-301 Published by: Wiley Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2215148 . Accessed: 14/02/2014 20:37
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CRITICAL STUDIES

Realism and the Renegade Putnam: A Critical Study of Meaning and the Moral Sciences
MICHAEL DEVITT OF SYDNEY UNIVERSITY

For many years Hilary Putnam has been an enthusiastic supporter of the cause of realism about the external world (e.g., in [14]). However, he has never been afraid to change his mind. In the paper, "Realism and Reason," the last part (Part Four) of Meaning and the Moral Sciences [16], he abandons the cause. Indeed, he now finds his former position "incoherent" ([16]: 124). He attributes the change in his views partly to new influences from Michael Dummett and Nelson Goodman, and to an old influence from W. V. Quine (pp. viii-ix). Aside from these influences he is led to anti-realism by a model-theoretic argument he propounds in "Realism and Reason" (pp.125-127) and in much greater detail in a recent paper. "Models and Reality" [18]. One aim of this study is to refute that argument. That is the concern of Part II. The issue of realism is not confined to Part Four of [16]: it recurs throughout, particularly in Part One. Until Part Four, Putnam's stance is pro-realist. To assess the bearing of any of Putnam's discussion on realism we need a clear idea of what realism is. Unfortunately, that is something that Putnam does not supply. On the contrary, Putnam casts almost impenetrable darkness on the question. The other aim of this study is to show this. That is the concern of Part I. The chief difficulty in understanding Putnam's discussion of realism is that it is thoroughly entangled with a discussion of truth. Truth is the other major concern of the book. Part One, the 1976John Locke lectures, comprising half the book, is largely devoted to arguing against Hartry Field [7] that we do not need to supplement a Tarskian theory of truth with theories of reference; indeed, Field's view that such theories are possible is "a species of scientific utopianism" (p. 58). And in Part Three, the paper "Reference and Understanding," Putnam argues for a verificationist theory of understanding but for a correspondence notion of truth. (I have discussed these arguments about truth in [4].) Part Two, the paper "Literature, Science, and Reflection," is the most sketchy part of the book. Part One ends with the claim that the social sciences are fundamentally different from physics and must find a place for Verstehen (empathetic understanding). In Part Two this "humanist" line is applied to literature and morality.
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1. Realism and Truth What does truth have to do with realism? I have complained that Putnam entangles the two issues. In this section I shall set out briefly my view of the connection between them.' I shall then consider Putnam's discussion. I seek first a statement of the doctrine of realism that captures its traditional opposition to idealism about common sense entities and its more recent about scientific ones. There are two dimensions of opposition to instrumentalism this doctrine: first, a claim about what exists; second, a claim about the nature of that existence. To capture the first dimension we can say that it is common sense, and scientific, physical entities that exist. Words that frequently occur in attempts to capture the second are 'independent,' 'external,' and 'objective.' The entities must be independent of the mental; they must be external to the mind; they must exist objectively in that they exist whatever anyone's opinion. We can capture both these dimensions well enough in the following doctrine, "Physical Realism" ("PR"): Common sense, and scientific, physical entities objectively exist independently of the mental. A lot more than this could certainly be said to clarify realism. However, I take it that PR fairly obviously, even if a little roughly, expresses the central intuitions of realist doctrines about the external world (see e.g., 112]: 77). We are not entitled to insist that the word 'realism' be used for PR, or something like it, rather than say for some semantic doctrine, but we are entitled to wonder whether in another use it has anything to do with the traditional metaphysical and epistemic disputes between realists and idealists/ instrumentalists. It is clear that Putnam sees his discussion of realism as bearing on those disputes and that he has something like PR at the back of his mind, at least partly, when he talks of "realism" ([16]: 9, 18-20, 102). So, I shall rest with PR as the doctrine of realism. What has truth to do with this doctrine of realism? On the face of it, nothing at all. PR says nothing about truth nor even about the bearers of truth, sentences and beliefs (except perhaps, in its use of 'objective,' the negative point that beliefs do not determine existence). PR says nothing semantic at all. PR does not strictly entail any doctrine of truth at all nor, I would claim, is there any obviouslytrue proposition which, together with PR, entails a (nontrivial) doctrine of truth. There is no inconsistency in being a realist and yet altogether skeptical of truth, as Stephen Leeds has pointed out [13] (drawing on Quine). The most we can expect is that a doctrine of truth is part of the best explanation of the world the realist believes in. So much for the inference from PR to truth. What about the reverse inference? This has even less to be said for it. Mere acceptance of truth entails nothing ontological at all. For one thing there are various notions of truth: disquotational, epistemic, correspondence, etc.. We need to know, at least, whichnotion of truth is accepted before drawing any ontological conclusions. For another thing we need to know whichstatementsthe notion is applied to; truth might be applied to some statements but not others. It is common to link notion of truth applied to physical statements (ones realism to the correspondence containing words like 'tree' and 'electron'). I capture the doctrine that it is appropriate. to apply that notion to those statments as follows:

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Physical statements are true or false in virtue of: (i) their structure; (ii) the referential relations between their parts and reality; and (iii) the objective nature of that reality. Call this doctrine, "CNT." Now even CNT does not entail PR for it saysnothing aboutthenature of therealitythat makes physical statements true or false. So far as CNT is concerned that reality could be an idealist's realm of sense data. In sum no doctrineof truthis in any way constitutiveof a realistdoctrinelikePR.2 Doubtless this brief account of realism and truth, and the relationship between them, is open to objection. My criticism of Putnam is that he gives no clear account of the matter at all. 2. The Boydian Hypothesisand Realism An example of the difficulty occurs early in [16] when Putnam discusses an hypothesis he attributes to Richard Boyd. His stance at this point is pro-realist. Since his discussion first appeared in an article called "What is 'Realism'?" [15] we might hope for some clarity about the nature of realism. Yet the discussion is baffling. Boyd triesto spell out realismas an over-archingempiricalhypothesisby meansof two principles: (1) Terms in a mature science typicallyrefer. (2) The lawsof a theorybelonging to a maturescienceare typicallyapproximately true. Whathe attemptsto show in his essayis that scientistsact as they do becausethey believe (1) and (2) and that their strategyworksbecause (1) and (2) are true.([16]: 20-21) What then, according to Putnam, constitutesrealism at this point? It looks as if (1) and (2) are thought to constitute it and that the part of the following sentence beginning "scientists act as they do" is the empirical hypothesis. And it is because (1) and (2) are mentioned in that sentence that realism is an empirical hypothesis. What is realist about (1) and (2)? Putnam does not say. Yet, as we have seen, the links between truth (and reference) and realism are not that close and require a lot of explanation. Putnam does not even make it explicitthat he has a correspondence notion of the truth in mind in (1) and (2), though he knows as well as anyone that other notions have been proposed (and has indicated as much, without explanation, on the previous page!) Realism as an empirical hypothesis is alleged to explain two things, scientific behaviorand scientific success.Putnam also thinks that Boyd has shown how realism explains the convergence of scientific knowledge (pp. 20-22, 123). It seems, in fact, that this explanation is the same as the one of scientific behavior. Let T' be the successor of T in any mature science. Then convergence of T', the terms of T typically refer and the holds if and only iffrom theperspective laws of T are typically approximately true. So if convergence holds it must be the case the scientists typically choose a T' relative to which, as a matter of fact, reference and approximate truth for T are preserved. Putnam thinks that realism explains this scientific behavior and thus explains convergence (pp. 20-21). Acceptance of convergence is not the same as acceptance of (1) and (2) (let alone realism). Convergence requires only truth and reference relative to theory

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whereas (1) and (2) require "absolute" truth and reference. However acceptance of convergence makes acceptance of (1) and (2) possible. On the other hand, rejection of convergence threatens the collapse of truth and reference, hence (1) and (2), altogether, as Putnam brings out neatly:
the following meta-induction becomes overwhelmingly compelling:just as no terms

usedin thescience of more thanfifty (or whatever)years agoreferred, soit willturnoutno term usednow... refers.(p. 25) Putnam's actual explanation of scientist's choosing theories in the way that they do is that scientists believe(1) and (2). How could this possibly give grounds for realism? It would do so straightforwardly if we identified realism with scientists'believing in (1) and (2). But such an identification is absurd. It seems rather that we are supposed to identify realism with (1) and (2), as I conjectured, and despite the objections to such an identification. This yields an argument for realism that illustrates a highly novel form of inference to the best explanation. Another illustration of this novel form would be what we may call "The Putnam-Boyd argument for the existence of God." Argument: the explanation of the behavior of religious people is that they believe that God exists; so (inference to the best explanation), probably God exists. The trouble with the inference is, of course, that beliefs can explain behavior and yet befalse. So even if Putnam's explanation of convergence in terms of scientists' beliefs is a good one, it could not show that realism explains anything. Aside from that, the explanation is not such a good one. First, at best, the scientists' beliefs could explain them trying to choose theories which, as a matter of fact, converge. It would not explain how they manage to succeed. How does it come about that there is typically a theory of that sort available for choice? Second, the explanation is shallow. The beliefs of scientists are as much in need of explanation as their behavior and could not, in the final analysis, explain convergence. At least that is what a materialist should think. I conclude that Putnam's explanation of scientific behavior is beside the point. If we want an argument for realism we must focus on the explanation of scientific success. Even if (1) and (2) were the explanation of success they would not establish realism because they are compatible with any ontology. Nevertheless there may be a good argument for realism underlying Putnam's discussion. It is not primarily an explanation of success and makes no mention of truth or reference. The realism Putnam is seeking to justify in this discussion is scientific realism (pp. 18-19). Take this doctrine to be that part of PR that concerns unobservables. Then the main argument for it is that only bysupposingthat there are thoseunobservables can we explainthebehaviorand characteristics of theobservables. The test for this explanation, as for all others, is that it is successful in practice: the observable world must be as if there were these unobservables. We can say, if we like, that realism explains this success, but that explanation is trivial. The success does not need explanation. If the supposition that there were these unobservables were not successful we would drop it. What scientific realism primarily explains is the observableworld not observationalsuccess. It might be claimed that we need PR and CNT to explain the success of a person (which is very different): he is mostly successful because his beliefs are mostly in correspondence with the realist's world (cf. pp. 100-103). The need is not compelling (cf. [4]: 403). What matters to a person's success is that his

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beliefs be accurate at the level of evidence whether they are true or not and whatever entities there are. However if we can otherwisejustify realism (as justify CNT in the face of Leeds-Quine skepticism (best above), and otherwise bet: to explain learning and teaching), then these doctrines are further confirmed by their ability to explain personal success along the lines indicated.3 What about convergence? What needs explanation here, primarily, is not the behavior of scientists but that convergence accompanies increasing observational success. PR and CNT4 certainly promise a good explanation of this. T and T' refer to the unobservable entities, parts of the realist's world. T' gives a more truthful and complete account of those entities and so is more successful. On the other hand, we expect to increase our success by finding out more about those entities. What is unclear is how necessary realism or CNT are to atn explanation of convergence. Perhaps other doctrines could do as well. In this section I have demonstrated the confusions in Putnam's discussion of Boyd both about the nature of realism and about what can count as an argument for realism. I have tried briefly to reconstruct a plausible argument for realism from the wreckage. Notion of Truth 3. Putnam and the Correspondence Putnam In his discussion of Boyd, and elsewhere ([16]: 4-5,18-19,30,99-100), often seems to identify realism with acceptance of a correspondence (or realist) notion of truth. I have pointed out (section 1) that this is a mistake even if that notion is the one described by CNT.5 What notion does Putnam have in mind? Not simply one defined d-la-Tarksi because, as Putnam points out (pp. 25-29), an anti-realist could accept that. For Putnam, what has to be added to such a definition to make the notion realist is the requirement that the logical connectives be understood "classically" (and not, e.g., "intuitionistically"). What is it to so understand the connectives? Putnam's initial answer is that it is to accept certain model statements exemplifying the fact (from a realist perspective) that "a statement can be false even though it follows from our theory" (pp. 34-35). But then Putnam allows that phenomenalism, and a Peircean view (truth = "warranted assertability in the ideal limit of scientific investigation"), can also accept these modal statements (p. 36). So far as I can see Putnam leaves us here with no answer to our question about the connectives, hence no answer to the question what makes a notion of truth realist, hence no account of realism. Further it is simply not plausible that mere acceptance of Tarski-defined truth with classical connectives will commit a person to the existence of anything in particular. Accepting this places no constraint on what makesa statement true; even an idealist could accept it. There is nothing here that should shake our faith that the only way a doctrine of truth can be realist aboutx's is by explaining truth in terms of reference to x's. 4. "InternalRealism" The mystery deepens in Part Four. Putnam sees this part of the book as representing a development in his views (pp. viii, 5, 129). The first difficulty is in understanding the nature of the change. The second is in seeing anything realist about his new view, "internal realism." Putnam's account of the change (pp. 5, 123-124, 129-130) is as follows. In Part Three he argued for a verificationist theory of understanding but realist notions of truth and reference. He has now abandoned the latter notions, settling for a full-blown verificationist semantics taken from Dummett (pp.

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127-129). Nevertheless he still sees his notion of truth as a "correspondence" one. In making this move he rejects "metaphysical realism," which he used to hold, as "incoherent." However, this does not amount to abandoning the empirical theory of the earlier part, which is now called "internal realism." "Metaphysical realism" is clear enough. It requires that there bea determinaterelationbetweentermsin L and pieces (or sets of pieces)of of any particular representationwe THE WORLD... THE WORLDisindependent (p. 125) have of it . .. truthis . . . radically non-epistemic. "Metaphysical realism" also "transcends. . . any one theory." Set this alleged transcendency aside until section 6. An example of the view that Putnam now mocks would be a combination of PR with CNT.6 We are told that "internal realism" is the empirical theory in Part Three. As I understand it,7 Part Three argues that the combination of world view and notion of truth that best explains the success of linguistic behavior, preserves certain deductive rules, and explains the reliability of our learning, is a realist one, a combination like PR and CNT. If this empirical theory were "internal realism," all well and good. But then this theory is "metaphysical realism" which he now rejects. I am at a loss to know how we can subtract "metaphysical realism" from this and still be left with anything, let along anything that is appropriately called a "correspondence" notion of truth and "realism" (even if only 'of the "internal" variety). So the references to Part Three cast little light on the nature of "internal realism." We must look to Part Four for this. "Internal realism" consists mainly in the Peircean view that we mentioned in the last section. That view, which Putnam earlier saw as anti-realist, equates truth with warranted assertability in the ideal limit of scientific investigation. Suppose that T1 is a theory at that limit, an "ideal theory." Then T1 meets all "operational constraints," correctly predicts "all observational sentences (as far as we can tell)," is "complete," "consistent," "beautiful," "simple," "plausible," etc. (p. 125). Truth is truth-relativeto-T1, and reference is reference-relative-to-T1. It follows from this that no sense can be made of the idea that T1 might be false. It is this aspect of "internal realism" that Putnam emphasises because he sees it as distinguishing "internal realism" from "metaphysical realism." Other aspects are just as striking: it is not committed to correspondence truth; it is not committed to the objective existence of an external world, so far as one can tell. "Internal realism" is not any sort of realism at all. In this part of the paper I have examined Putnam's view of what realism is and of its relation to doctrines of truth. I have found these views confused and mistaken, with the result that it is often hard to see the bearing of Putnam's discussion on realism. I have made a few brief attempts to rectify this. Part II 5. The Intelligibilityof Realism I shall not attempt to argue for realism here. I think the epistemic arguments Putnam has been urging for years, and the arguments in this book (mentioned above, sections 2 and 4), are very much along the right lines. In any case, given the plausibility of realism, the onus lies on the anti-realist. Putnam accepts the onus, offering a model-theoretic argument for his move away from realism. He claims to show that "the supposition that even an

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'ideal theory' . . . might really be false appears to collapse into unintelligibility" (p. 126). Before considering that argument it will help to see why the supposition should be quite intelligible to a realist (of the PR sort). Consider the ideal theory T1. Its key features are that it is a correct predictor and that it meets all operational constraints: it fits all the possible observational evidence we could gather. From a realist perspective, to say T1 is ideal is therefore to say something about the relationship between T1, us, and independent reality: our sense organs and reality are such that we could never observe anything about that reality inconsistent with, TI. Being ideal is species relative. To suppose that T1 might be false is simply to suppose that there might be features of reality which could not affect us at all or could not affect us in such a way that we come to the right view about them. What we can observe about the world depends not only on the world but also on us and our relationship to that world. Imagine an intelligent organism like a human but with very inferior sense organs. We have no difficulty in understanding how a theory might be ideal for that organism and yet from our superior perspective be clearly false. What the realist believes is that this might be so for any organism including a human being; for the realist believes that reality is altogetherindependentof experience. Nothing I have said here commits me to the supposition that T1 might be false, simply to the view that, sofar as a realismlike PR is concerned,T1 might be false: there is no inconsistency between that supposition and PR. What view we take of the supposition depends first on how it is interpreted; second, on our epistemology. The problem of interpretation concerns T1. What is it to meet all operational constraints? T1 fits all possible observational evidence in what sense of "possible"? The possible evidence might be what humans would have gathered if they were at every point of actual space-time (provided they were awake, sober, good observers, etc.). Or it might be what they would have gathered if they had performed all possible experiments. Or it might be the combination of these. And of course talk of "possible experiments" raises further problems. Are the experimenters in a state of nature or are they allowed to use instruments? If the latter are they allowed instruments actually invented by humans to date, or ones actually invented by humans in the long run, or ones possibly invented by anything? And so on. Suppose it is the case that each aspect of reality is capable of playing some causal role. Then perhaps that aspect would be detectable by humans using some possible instrument. So according to my epistemology, on some very liberal interpretations of "possible evidence," perhaps T1 could not be false. But that is no reflection on my realism. 6. The Model-Theoretic Argument Putnam's model-theoretic argument is aimed at "metaphysical realism." As we have seen (section 4) this doctrine differs from PR, which is what I have called "realism." Nevertheless the doctrines are related. And the part of "metaphysical realism" that the argument rejects-that it is intelligible to suppose that the ideal theory might be false-is what I havejust argued the realist should accept. So Putnam's argument must be refuted. The version of the argument in [16] is brief (pp. 125-127); a much longer version appears in [18] (pp. 471-477; his opponent is there described as the "hard-core" metaphysical realist). I summarize. Pick a model for T1, M. Relative to the interpretation of 'reference' for L that yields M, T1 must come out

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true. How could it not then be true? This interpretation must meet all operational (and theoretical) constraints on reference because T1 is ideal. Therecan model.So, T1 is true in benofurtherconstraintsthatwouldrule out M as the "intended" any "intended" model and so must be true. The idea that T1 might be false is unintelligible. Putnam anticipates a response: according to a "causal"theory of reference the intended referent of a term is whatever stands in the appropriate causal relation to the term; the model we want, the world, is the totality of such referents and T1 may not be true in that model. The problem with this response, according to Putnam, is that at does is add anothertheoryto T1: "How 'causes' can uniquely refer is as much of a puzzle as how 'cat' can on the metaphysical realist picture" ([ 16]: 126); it is not "glued to one definite relation with metaphysical glue" ([18]: 477). There are some obvious truths which may partly underlie Putnam's position.8 We cannot say anything about the relationship between language and the world without saying something, i.e., without using language. One is imprisoned in language in theorizing about anything. The denial of these truths would indeed be unintelligible, but the realist is not committed to denying them. What the realist needs to say is thatat anypoint in our theorizing, even at the point of the ideal theory T1, we can stand back from our theory and raise epistemic and semantic questions. The answer to these questions will be further theory from which we can also stand back. Putnam is not, of course, in any position to object to this procedure, because the above anti-realist argument is an example of it: it is a theory about T1. The realist answer to these questions at any point will see belief in the object theory arising out of a causal interaction between the believers and a reality independent of those beliefs. Related to this it will always seem intelligible to the realist to suppose that the theory might not be true. The realist will also see the reference of the terms in that theory as basically, and in general, determined by these causal interactions; at least he will if he combines a causal theory of reference with his realism (and perhaps this is necessary to resist Putnam's anti-realism; so much the better for causal theories!). So his answer may include a sentence like "Termx is causally related in way A to object and to nothing else" as an explanation of another sentence "x refers to y and to nothing else." In such circumstances he will regard the reference of x as determinate. The realist thinks such circumstances are common. Of course, a critic can then stand back and ask about that answer (as Putnam does). "What determines the reference of 'causally related'?" The realist gives him the same sort of answer (setting aside any nominalist scruples): 'Causally related' is causally related in way B to causal relations and to nothing else. 'Causally related' is "glued to one definite relation" by causal relations not "metaphysical glue." (The suggested form of answer here may well be too crude but that does not affect the point.) Small children soon learn to their delight that there is no end to questions: whatever answer is given to a question can be the subject of another question. A species of this fact, usually discovered later, is that whatever answer is given to a question, another question can be asked about the meaning of that answer. Unfortunately there is no general rule to tell us how long we should tolerate either line of questioning (explanation must stop somewhere). However, one

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in thisdoesnot alone show thing we should insist on: thatan answercan bequestioned it was not a good answer to its question. Putnam asks about the reference of'cat,' 'cow,' etc.. We answer in terms of causal relations. Putnam then asks about the reference of 'causally related.' That such a question can be asked does not show that our answer to the first question was not a perfectly good one; it does not show that we have failed to explain how one model among many is the "intended" one. To show this it would be necessary to show that there is something about our first answer that both needs explanation and that we cannot explain. Putnam has not shown this. In particular he has not shown that our second answer, the explanation of reference for 'causally related,' does not explain, sofar as explanationis necessary, how 'causally related' uniquely refers. He would want to claim that it does nQt, of course, because the words 'causally related' that are used in the second answer do not uniquely refer. But that is what he is supposed to be showing us. He is simply begging the question against the realist. However long he continues his questioning the realist has an answer along the above lines to pick out the desired unique referent. This account does not make realism "transcendent" in any interesting sense (cf. the remark from p. 125 about "metaphysical realism," quoted in section 4 above and so far ignored). The semantic theory applies to all theories, even itself. Such self-reference need not be problematic (e.g., a constitutional law can specify the way in which all constitutional laws can be changed). Indeed, should we reach T1 self-reference is inevitable. The laws of an ideal theory must be both the best available and complete. So of coursewe would apply those laws in theorizing about T1 as in theorizing about anything else. There is no problem, despite the semantic paradoxes, in epistemic and semantic theories being part of the object theory so that when we ask our questions about that theory we have to apply them to themselves. For example, if our semantic theory says that any term of a certain type refers to whatever is causally related in way B to it, and if that semantic theory itself contains such a term (e.g., 'causally related'), then the theory will apply to that term. Putnam, in effect, accuses the realist of begging the question in appealing to a theory to determine reference for a theory. I have accused him of begging the question in claiming that the reference of 'causally related' is not determinate. These mutual accusations may be confusing and so I shall repeat the basis for mine. Putnam claims to be offering an argument against "metaphysical realism." At no point is he entitled to assumethis doctrine false. If the doctrine is true then there will be determinate referential relations between the words of any theory and pieces of the world. This will be true also of the words of any theory of reference used to explain these relations. If such a theory is comprehensive it will of course apply to its own words. Putnam's anti-realist argument depends on there being no answer to the question about what determines reference for T1. Using a theory of reference there is an answer: reference is determined by causal relations of a certain sort. That answer works for 'causally related'just as it does for 'cat.' Putnam begs the question by simply assuming 'causally related' lacks determinate reference. Doubtless he is encouraged in this by the apparent triviality of the answer given for 'causally related.' But the triviality of the answer as an explanation does not show that it is not correct nor does it show that what it is explaining is not real. If you push explanation of any realm far enough you inevitably reach triviality, for explanation must stop somewhere.

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In a sympathetic review of Nelson Goodman's [ 10], Putnam mentions the idea, allegedly held by some realist friends "in places like Princeton and Australia," that we can compare theories with "unconceptualized reality" ([ 17]: 61 1).9 The idea is that realism requires us to step outside all theories to see how the world matches up to them; it requires "direct access" to reality, an "eyeball to eyeball" confrontation. It is surprisingly common for people to suppose that realism (when combined with realist truth) has this absurd requirement.10 The supposition arises out of the long tradition of putting the epistemological cart before the metaphysical horse. To put the cart back where it belongs the realist needs a naturalized, non-foundationalist, epistemology of a Quinean sort. He stands back from theories and theorists and considers, in the usual scientific way, the relations between them and reality. The resulting epistemological theory has no special authority: it is just one theory among many of the world we live in. It does not change our view of what exists. Indeed that view, gained from other sciences, is taken for granted. Further, the theory does not make us question the independence of what exists from theories and theorists, which is the obvious starting point for an epistemology. Rather it confirms that starting point. Finally, epistemic relations are no more inaccessible than other relations. Theorizing about the relation between a theorist and an object no more requires "direct access" to reality than does theorizing about the relation between, say, David Frost and Richard Nixon."1
REFERENCES [1] Louis Althusser and Etienne Balibar, Reading Capital, translated by Ben Brewster (London: NLB, 1970). [2] Roy Bhaskar, A Realist Theoryof Science (Leeds: Leeds Books, 1975). [3] A. F. Chalmers, Whatis this Thing CalledScience? (St. Lucia, Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 1976). [4] Michael Devitt, "Critical Notice" of [16],AustralasianJournal of Philosophy,58(1980: 395-404. , "Dummett's Anti-Realism,"Journal of Philosophy, 80(1983): 73-99. [5] , Realism and Truth, in preparation. [6] [7] Hartry H. Field, "Tarski's Theory of Truth," Journal of Philosophy, 69(1972): 347-375. , "Theory Change and the Indeterminacy of Reference,"Journal of Philoso[8] phy 70(1973): 462-481. , "Quine and the Correspondence Theory," PhilosophicalReview, 83(1974): [9] 200-228. [10] Nelson Goodman, Ways of Worldmaking(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1978). Journal of Philos[11] Bruce W. Hauptli, "Inscrutability and Correspondence," Southern ophy, 17(1979): 199-212. [12] R. J. Hirst, "Realism," in Paul Edwards, ed., Encyclopediaof Philosophy (London: Collier MacMillan Publishers, 1967), vol. 7: 77-83. [13] Stephen Leeds, "Theories of Reference and Truth," Erkenntnis, 13(1978): 1 1 1129. [14] Hilary Putnam, Mind, Language and Reality: PhilosophicalPapers, Volume2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975). "What is 'Realism'?," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (1975-1976): [15] 174-194. [16] , Meaningand theMoral Sciences(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978).

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ANALYTICITY AND TRUTH [17]

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Hilary Putnam, "Reflections on Goodman's Waysof Worldmaking,"JournalofPhilosophy 76(1979): 603-618. "Models and Reality,"Journal of SymbolicLogic, 45(1980): 464-482. [18] NOTES 14 set out my view in more detail in [5] and in much more detail in [6]. 2Those who have been influenced by the current Oxford fashion may be a little outraged by this conclusion. For, "has not Dummett shown how intimately the issue of realism is linked to the view that truth transcends evidence?" I don't think that Dummett has shown any such thing but that argument must be left to another place [5]. 3For more on this see [16] Part Three and [4] sections 2 and 7. 4We will need more than CNT for this explanation: we will need a doctrine of truth and perhaps also of verisimilitude. And the talk of reference may have approximate to be replaced with talk of partial reference (see [8]). 51t seems that Putnam could not accept CNT because it requires that reference be a genuine explanatory notion which is what he denies in his argument against Field in Part One of [16]. 6Putnam seems to suggest that "metaphysical realism" is to be found earlier in the book but, given his early opposition to Field, it is hard to see how it could be. For that opposition seems to undermine the realism about reference that "metaphysical realism," like CNT, requires. 7Once again there is a problem because of the Part One opposition to Field. I do not know how to reconcile the apparent realism about reference of Part Three with that opposition. 81n a passage reflecting the influence of Goodman, Putnam says: If one cannot sayhow THE WORLD is theory-independently, then talk of all these theories as descriptions of "the world" is empty. ([16]: 133) 9My failure to meet any of these benighted Australians makes me doubt this allegation. "'Some other examples: Althusser and Balibar ([1 ]: 51-69): Bhaskar ([2]: 248-250),; Chalmers ([3]: chs. 10 and 11); Hauptil, in a response to [9], ([11]: 208). "Earlier drafts of this paper were delivered at La Trobe University (July, 1980), University of California at Riverside (November, 1980), and San Francisco State University (December, 1980). I am grateful for the comments received on those occasions; also for the members of an informal seminar in Sydney in 1979 and to David Armstrong, Hartry Field, Bill Lycan, J. J. C. Smart, Kim Sterelny, and Wal Suchting.

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