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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EASTERN DISTRICT
JP MORGAN CHASE
v.
Tanuja Murray, JD, MBA
Timothy Patrick Murray
200 S Valley Road Paoli PA 19301
FilmStudios@iCloud.com
Appelantes
Case No: 1205579

"All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.' Amendment XIV

NOTICE OF ERROR
We recently filed an appeal with the Superior Court in the matter of JP MORGAN CHASE v MURRAY, in Chester
County with Judge Griffith.
We just noticed after pleadings we sent to you did not show up on the docket that there is a major error.
What is the error? The docket number listed is 12-05779 instead of the correct one 1205579.
Additionally we filed an appeal in April 2012 for a default judgment that was illegal and improper but we never got
any correspondence for it- we paid the fee and we would like to bring this matter to your attention.
FINALLY, with BOTH appeals, there is one major problem- there was never one hearing- and not one word of one
transcript which exists in this two year case.
THERE IS A RECORD FOR THE CASE BASED ON THE SAME CAUSE OF ACTION WHICH CHASE
ABANDONED WHEN THEIR STANDING WAS PROVED FRAUDULENT.
LASTLY WE HAVE DISCOVERED NEW EVIDENCE OF FRAUD AND LACK OF STANDING RECENTLYAND WE ARE GOING TO SEND THE COURT THIS EVIDENCE AND A MOTION FOR A STAY OF SHERIFF
SALE.
We are sending any requested information you recently requested right away- and once docket error is corrected we
hope it is filed.

Thank you.

Dated this the 5th day of Feb 2014.

____________________________________________
_____________________________________________
Tanuja Murray
Timothy Murray

EXHIBIT

VARIOUS MOTIONS FILED FOR YOUR INFORMATION

_________________________________________________________

IN THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA


SUPERIOR COURT EASTERN DISTRICT
JP MORGAN CHASE
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No.: 12-05579
Tanuja Murray
Timothy Murray

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CIVIL
Defendant.

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EMERGENCY MOTION

MOTION FOR EMERGENCY STAY INJUNCTION RELIEF


Under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1531(a), a court may issue a preliminary or special injunction only
after written notice and a hearing unless it appears to the satisfaction of the court that immediate and irreparable
injury will be sustained before notice can be given or a hearing held, in which case the court may issue a preliminary
or special injunction without a hearing or without notice. Pa. R.C.P. 1531(a).
Although terms preliminary injunction and special injunction are not defined in the Rule, it appears that when
an order is issued ex parte and without notice that order is analogous to the entry of a special injunction. Steel City
Group v. Global Online Direct, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86831, at **5-6 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2006). Eastern
District of Pennsylvania Local Rule of Civil Procedure 7.1(g).
Defendants have hereby demonstrated the existence of PROOF OF FRAUD and PROOF CHASE SOLD THEIR
STANDING (ownership) in 2005, as well as gross due process failures. These are two compelling factors which
warrant reconsideration of a stay, removal or a TRO under Eastern District of Pennsylvania Local Rule of Civil
Procedure 7.1(g).
They are: (1) the presence of additional facts which were not available when the court first considered the TRO; and
(2) to prevent manifest injustice.
ADDITIONAL FACTORS
Judge Griffith is the judge for my brother's foreclosure and he entered a summary judgment which was recently
reversed by appeal. The basis? Standing of Chase in their case as well.
Standing to sue is critical to the proper functioning of the judicial system. It is a threshold issue. If standing is
denied, the pathway to the courthouse is blocked. The plaintiff who has standing, however, may cross the threshold
and seek judicial redress.Saratoga County Chamber of Commerce, Inc. v Pataki, 100 NY2d 801 812
[2003], cert denied 540 US 1017 [2003]).
The spirit of standing allows only aggrieved persons to bring suit. Standing to sue demands that a plaintiff is not
involved in a genuine controversy, and a simple syllogism takes us from there to a jurisdictional dismissal: (1) the
courts have jurisdiction only over controversies; (2) a plaintiff found to lack standing is not involved in a
controversy; and 3) the courts therefore have no jurisdiction of the case when such a plaintiff purports to bring it.
If plaintiff lacks standing to sue, plaintiff may not proceed in the action. Stark v Goldberg, 297 AD2d 203 [1st Dept
2002])
In Campaign v Barba (23 AD3d 327 [2d Dept 2005]), instructed that [t]o establish a prima facie case in an action
to foreclose a mortgage, the plaintiff must establish the existence of the mortgage and the mortgage note, ownership
of the mortgage, and the defendants default in payment. (See Witelson v Jamaica Estates Holding Corp.
I, 40 AD3d 284 [1st Dept 2007]; Household Finance Realty Corp. of New York v Wynn, 19
AD3d 545 [2d Dept 2005]; Sears Mortgage Corp. v Yahhobi, 19 AD3d 402 [2d Dept 2005];
Ocwen Federal Bank FSB v Miller, 18 AD3d 527 [2d Dept 2005]; U.S. Bank Trust Nat. Assn
Trustee v Butti, 16 AD3d 408 [2d Dept 2005]; First Union Mortgage Corp. v Fern, 298 AD2d
490 [2d Dept 2002]; Village Bank v Wild Oaks, Holding, Inc., 196 AD2d 812 [2d Dept 1993]).

Assignments of mortgages and notes are made by either written instrument or the assignor physically delivering the
mortgage and note to assignee. No such evidence was attached to complaint. The chain of title is woefully
unknown.Standing to sue requires an interest in the claim at issue in the lawsuit that the law will recognize as
sufficient predicate for determining the issue at litigants request. Caprer v Nussbaum (36 AD3d 176, 181
[2d De).
REMANDING OR REMOVAL and OTHER ACTIONS
We have appeal pending before the Superior Court of PA, and we are filing in this Federal jurisdiction a lawsuit
against Chase and Phelan for fraud, RICO and usury, as well as filing a PRIVATE CRIMINAL COMPLAINT
against Jaime Dimon, CEO of Chase. The lack of due process, the new evidence we just discovered (as it was
recently filed without notice) and pending actions/appeals create a situation whereby having a sale under such
conditions would further cloud the title, severely injure us (while not affecting Chase one iota) and affirm what is
already a archetype of manifest injustice.
The purpose of such a hearing would be to analyze and dissect the current evidence proffered by Chase (none) and
the new information and confirm the veracity of our allegations of fraud and mistake are the root causation of a
matter that a stay would simply remedy until proper due process can be applied.
Whenever an action is removed from state court to a district court, all injunctions, orders, and other proceedings
had in such action prior to its removal shall remain in full force and effect until dissolved or modified by the district
court. 28 U.S.C. 1450; Vigilante, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12324, at *4.
Upon removal to a federal court, a party may utilize the procedure found in Eastern District of Pennsylvania Local
Rule of Civil Procedure 7.1(g) to move for reconsideration of a special injunction entered in state court prior to
removal. Vigilante, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12324, at *4.
The Third Circuit has held our relief is appropriate where (1) the moving party demonstrates an intervening change
in the controlling law; (2) additional facts are made available, which were not available when the court first
considered the issue; or (3) there is a need to correct a clear error of law or fact or to prevent manifest injustice.
Maxs Seafood v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999).
A party need only show one of the above grounds to establish that removal or reconsideration is appropriate. Id.
Commw. ex rel. Costa, 272 A.2d at 909.
OUR BURDEN OF PROOF HAS BEEN MET
We have established the foundation for factors required to be granted a TRO in our favor, we believe.
If a trial court issues an ex parte special injunction, and fails to provide for a hearing within the five-day time limit
set by Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1531(d), the ex parte special injunction is void on its face. Commw. ex
rel. Costa, 272 A.2d at 909. Rule 1531(d) provides: An injunction granted without notice to the defendant shall be
deemed dissolved unless a hearing on the continuance of the injunction is held within five days after the granting of
the injunction or within such other time as parties may agree or as court upon cause shown shall direct. Pa. R.C.P.
1531(d).
If there is a good reason for why a hearing must be held beyond the five-day period mandated by the Rule, such
reason must appear in the order granting the special injunction. Commw. ex Costa, 272 A.2d at 909.
The averments herein form the foundation upon which we base our Motion seeking the Stay are based upon a
defective writ based upon an improper judgment that was based upon no due process and no appealable order by the
judge, paradoxically, and is thus improper, illegal and without the required verification of standing, specificity,
jurisdiction and proper service of notification.

Defendants respectfully submits to the most Honorable Court this MOTION TO STAY SHERIFF SALE as it was
entered improperly as per PA law, and a timely Petition to Open was paid for with an Answer attached and a New
Matter Counterclaims component as well, but it was not granted nor denied but IGNORED by the court, just as a
MOTION TO STRIKE was ignored, a MOTION TO STAY SHERIFF SALE was ignored, a MOTION FOR
RELIEF FROM ERRORS was ignored, along with certified mailed MEMORANDUM OF MISTAKES AND
ERRORS mailed to the Judge, Prothonotary, Court Administrator, Sheriff, Board of JP Morgan Chase and counsel
for Plaintiff. No one did anything- except the counsel for Plaintiff- they ASKED FOR 100k more money after
judgment, and filed (quietly, so quietly) a "short covering" record of a 2005 assignment not TO Chase but FROM
Chase in the EXACT AMOUNT of consideration that Deed was conveyed to us in 2004 at time of sale.
THIS COURT SHOULD ALLOW MOTION FOR EMERGENCY INJUNCTIVE RELIEF, A STAY OF
SHERIFFS SALE and if needed SCHEDULING OF AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON THE VALIDITY OF
JUDGMENT AND REMEDY OF SHERIFFS SALE UNTIL THE ADJUDICATION AND DETERMINATION OF
APPEAL, PETITION TO OPEN AND OUR FEDERAL ACTION AS PLAINTIFF BASED ON NEW EVIDENCE
OF FRAUD.
This Injunctive Relief on the basis that the defects of the complaint in establishing standing to foreclosure is at the
very heart of what is unconstitutional as it infringements upon, designed and implemented to violate (1) the
constitutional prohibition on impairment of the obligations (and rights) of contracts, (2) the constitutional
prohibition on impairment of the right to petition for redress of grievances, (3) the statutory rights secured by 42
U.S.C. 1981, 1982, relating to the acquisition, maintenance, use, and enjoyment of real and personal property,
especially by and through equal access to courts, (4) the right to be free from the establishment of any titles of
nobility or the creation by state law of any classes of citizens having privileges and immunities superior to and
presiding above all others (such as Banks, Mortgage Foreclosure Servicers, and their Attorneys under various
pedestal procedural privileges)
In Stoesel v. American Home, 362 Sel. 350, and 199 N.E. 798 (1935), the court ruled and determined that, Under
Illinois Law and Federal Law, when any officer of the Court has committed fraud on the Court, the order and
judgment of that court are void and of no legal force and effect. In Sparks v. Duval County Ranch, 604 F.2d 976
(1979), the court ruled and determined that, No immunity exists for co-conspirators of judge.
There is no derivative immunity for extra-judicial actions of fraud, deceit and collusion. In Edwards v. Wiley, 374
P.2d 284, the court ruled and determined that, Judicial officers are not liable for erroneous exercise of judicial
powers vested in them, but they are not immune from liability when they act wholly in excess of jurisdiction. See
also, Vickery v. Dunnivan, 279 P.2d 853, (1955).
In Beall v. Reidy, 457 P.2d 376, the court ruled and determined, Except by consent of all parties a judge is
disqualified to sit in trial of a case if he comes within any of the grounds of disqualification named in the
Constitution. In Taylor v. OGrady, 888 F.2d 1189, 7th Cir. (1989), the circuit ruled, Further, the judge has a legal
duty to disqualify, even if there is no motion asking for his disqualification.
Also, when a lower court has no jurisdiction to enter judgment, the question of jurisdiction may be raised for the
first time on appeal. See DeBaca v. Wilcox, 68 P. 922.
The right to a tribunal free from bias and prejudice is based on the Due Process Clause.
Should a judge issue any order after he has been disqualified by law, and if the party has been denied of any of
his/her property, then the judge has engaged in the crime of interference with interstate commerce; the judge has
acted in his/her personal capacity and not in the judges judicial capacity. See U.S. v. Scinto, 521 F.2d 842 at page
845, 7th circuit, 1996.
Party can attack subject matter jurisdiction at anytime in the proceeding, even raising jurisdiction for the first time
on appeal, State v. Begay, 734 P.2d 278.

A prejudiced, biased judge who tries a case deprives a party adversely affected of due process. See Nelson v. Cox,
66 N.M. 397.
This motion seeks at least obtain a stay and we challenge jurisdiction and motion on new evidence to have this
matter dismissed.
The yellow fringe around the unseen courtroom we were denied any hearing within has the admiralty court flag
which confers not court of common law or equity jurisdiction but only admiralty matters, is that not correct?
Both the Note and Mortgage is not countersigned, so how was it executed, how is it enforceable and where is the
contract?
Where is the contract wherein I knowingly and willingly, with full disclosure, consented or otherwise agreed to be
treated this way?
I believe trial court lacks jurisdiction. I want to see the supposed jurisdiction that was duly placed into evidence.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
We aver plaintiff and attorney misconduct and fraud compounded by judicial negligence and abuse of discretion,
Rooker Feldman should not be applied in the rejection of this Motion.
As articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Greenwood v. Peacock:
"Under 1443 (1), the vindication of the defendant's federal rights is left to the state courts except in the rare
situations where it can be clearly predicted by reason of the operation of a pervasive and explicit state or federal law
that those rights will inevitably be denied by the very act of bringing the defendant to trial in the state court."
Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. at 788-792; Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303. 384 U.S. 808 at 828. 86 S.Ct. 1800
at 1812.
Except in the rare situations where it can be clearly predicted by the operation of a pervasive and explicit state or
federal law that those rights will inevitably be denied by the very act of bringing the defendant to trial in the state
court describes and mandates a FACTUAL and situationally specific analysis of state court application of state
(or Federal) law as a Motion for Emergency Injunctive Relief and Temporary Stay of Sheriffs Sale.
The Supreme Court allows us to invoke the right to remove under 28 U.S.C. 1443(1) and we provider herein what
is required: by the failure of the trial court to hold a hearing, manage discovery, send their order to the right address,
serve us at the right address, reconcile this case with Shenkin's MOOT order, ignore our Petition to Open, ignore
their faulty default judgment and finally ignore the evidence we present herein as the "smoking gun" whereby
standing is PROVEN to not lie within the rights of Chase who sold them in 2005 to a trust managed by Wilmington
Trust and sold a dozen times thereafter, compiles in the aggregate the necessary conclusive showing that the state
trial court will find the defendant" not liable to Chase for this civil judgment "if he is innocent [for civil cases, read
liable rather than not], or that in any other manner the defendant will be denied or cannot enforce in the courts
of the state any right under a federal law providing for equal civil rights. 384 U.S. 827-828, 86 S.Ct. 1812.
As such the Federal court has jurisdiction as we have been denied the due process of law under the 5th Amendment
to the United States Constitution.
The diversity of citizenship jurisdiction allows this court to act.
"In a diversity case, the Court must apply the substantive law of Pennsylvania."
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-79 (U.S. 1938); Ford v. Exel, Inc., No. 08-cv-1735, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

103262, **3-4 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 17, 2008).


The federally guaranteed, mandated, and expressly secured rights upon which Cal. Civ. Code 2924 et seq. infringe,
which federal right cannot be enforced in the PA Courts, are those expressly secured (and phrased, however
irrelevantly, in terms of racial inquality) are those outlined in 42 U.S.C. 1981-1982:
(a) Statement of equal rights
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make
and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings
for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment,
pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
(b) Make and enforce contracts defined
For purposes of this section, the term make and enforce contracts includes the making, performance, modification,
and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual
relationship.
(c) Protection against impairment
The rights protected by this section are protected against impairment by nongovernmental discrimination and
impairment under color of State.
To sustain removal of these prosecutions to a federal court upon the allegations of the petitions in this case would
therefore mark a complete departure from the terms of the removal statute, which allow removal only when a person
is "denied or cannot enforce" a specified federal right "in the courts of [the] State," and a complete departure as well
from the findings of Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, to Kentucky v. Powers, 201 U.S. 1.
Those cases all stand for at least one basic proposition: It is not enough to support removal under 1443 (1) to
allege or show that the defendant's federal equal civil rights have been illegally and corruptly denied by state
administrative officials in advance of trial, that the charges against the defendant are false, or that the defendant is
unable to obtain a fair trial in a particular state court. The motives of the officers bringing the charges may be
corrupt, but that does not show that the state trial court will find the defendant guilty if he is innocent, or that in any
other manner the defendant will be "denied or cannot enforce in the courts" of the State any right under a federal law
providing for equal civil rights. 384 U.S. 808 at 826-28; 86 S.Ct. 1800 at 1812, 16 L.Ed.2d 944 a5 956-7.
FACTS
Chase has filed three actions against us in Chester County for alleged default, dismissing the last one two years ago
despite a recent contradictory ruling by TWO judges in Chester. Judge Shenkin ruled in September 2012 that "all
filings and pleadings regarding this cause of action are MOOT after 2010" and Judge Griffith, the current judge, we
aver has NO JURISDICTION. As per Chester County local rules, should simply have been revived. But it was not,
as it contained in the record incriminating evidence against Chase, who also failed to reference it on the cover page
of this action. After our many preliminary responsive pleadings in June of 2012 explaining the paradox and how
Chase should be estopped for claim preclusion as well as res juditca, the trial Court waited until Thanksgiving to
deny our motions, yet mailed orders to the wrong address in Malvern, not Paoli, where service was also wrongly
executed thereafter (see docket and exhibits). After the initial filing, Chase failed to reply or file any pleading for 10
months. They did not manage the case in good faith and conduct discovery despite a trial notice sent to both of us.
And yet the prothonotary entered default judgment for Plaintiff on 4/17 without 1) any 10 day notice attached and 2)
asking for nearly a million dollars without a shred of supporting documentation. We, contrast, filed praecipe for
default judgment WITH THE 10 DAY NOTICE ATTACHED and claimed $0 and stated we would ask for a damage
assessment hearing. We FEDEXED this last week and the prothonotary ignored it. They docketed our fee for the

appeal however.
1) There is a current IRS lien upon us and our property we are contesting in US Tax Court, and therefore, a sale
would not be proper at this time, regardless of the merits of a legitimate plaintiff with standing who through
evidence rules and due process procedure obtained a judicial (not clerk's) order for judgment.
2) We believe there was massive and systemic fraud involved since misrepresentation was the hallmark of this and
most foreclosure cases in general.
3) New information about the true holder in due course changes everything.
Exhibit A, the new evidence, is the "smoking gun" evidence which prove that Chase has no standing and has been
lying for 5 years and over 3 cases. They violated consumers and they persecuted us, wasted our time and energy and
money and resources in a pro se defense and counter claim and Federal action. This Phelan and Chase conspiracy
continued for 5 years.
They lied. They committed fraud. They entered default judgment improperly. They should be prosecuted, and we
intend to file private criminal complaints against them. Because we found the truth.
4) The opening, striking and barring of the default judgment (improperly entered without 10 day notice attached)
5) No subject matter jurisdiction as per Shenkin paradox, and per claim preclusion by collateral estoppel as well as
the doctrine of res juditca (this is their third foreclosure action). Judge Shenkin declared all pleadings MOOT and
retained subject matter jurisdiction as per his 9/12 order declaring all pleadings on this cause of action MOOT (see
order). The Court mailed it's one order (decided 6 months after filing) but mailed it to the wrong address (see Exhibit
B) and did not reconcile the Shenkin order of 2012, September (see Judge Shenkin order of 9/12)
6) Chester county court judge and prothonotary both were negligent (innocently perhaps, as we aver the county
parties and judge committed no fraud as we do the Plaintiffs and their counsel) but did in fact abused discretion by
ignoring the law, civil procedure, a paid for petition to open, and the smoking gun assignment we attach as
EXHIBIT A that should end this case after 5 years.
"Discretion is abused when no reasonable person would agree with the trial court." Foveaux v. Smith, 843 P.2d 283,
17 Kan.App.2d 685 (92); Rollins v. Department of Transp., 711 P.2d 1330, 238 Kan. 453, 1985. "Asserted denial of
due process of law is to be tested by an appraisal of the totality of facts given in a case." Betts v. Brady, 1942, 62
S.Ct., 1252, 316 U.S. 455, 86 L. Ed. 1595.
7) We aver no due process was afforded us, as NO HEARING was ever conducted about ANY MATTER (not even
the damages assessed if the default judgment were even valid) and everyone just ignored the facts, laws and
evidence presented by us in both the last case record (over 2000 pages of evidence in the record) and in our
preliminary motions and in our responsive pleading in Answer and New Matter Counterclaims and a half dozen
other motions we filed but were ignored like outr timely filed and paid for Petition to Open on 4.28.13.
8) Our conspiracy and fraud claims against Phelan and Chase- and our concern about innocent incompetence at the
Prothonotary and innocent inaction by the Judge- all these concerns were averred in our pleadings and like our
Petition to Open and a half a dozen or more Motions were ignored by both the Trial Court and Phelan, who have a
professional responsibility to not aid and abet fraud- but those billable hours are apparently too tough to resist.
9) We face imminent deprivation of property without due process of law under the 14th Amendment to the United
States Constitution.
HISTORY
We have asked for the honorable trial judge to respond with an order of any kind- granting or denial- of our

inexplicably ignored 90 day plus old timely filed petition to open that neglect in determination placed us in serious
jeopardy to lose our home in less than 30 days. As a result, we appeal here to this Court for relief, as we have
exhausted lower court remedies and with Petitions and Motions being ignored (even those we paid $119 fees for).
That is but one of many problems, errors, omissions and violations of due process that compel a stay and
continuance of not only the scheduled sheriff sale on 8/15/13, but a wholesale intervention to dismiss this based
upon new evidence that proves the Plaintiff Chase has not the ownership go the Note nor the rights to the Mortgage,
and therefore we also have new evidence proving a Fraud Upon The Court, and by the entry of a default judgment
without the requisite attachment of a 10 day notice that was honestly unattached as it was never mailed to us (see the
record for 4.17.13 pleading) yet the prothonotary signed and file a equitable relief default judgment of nearly a
million dollars which is prohibited by law as only a Court may do so.
However, in a classic example of a pro se discrimination that amounts to negligence and abuse of process by the
County, the Prothonotary rejected our praecipe for default judgment for unanswered counterclaims filed with answer
and new matter along with the timely filed Petition to Open on 4.28.13.
PARTIES
As one of us is a former attorney with an MBA who practiced in two states as well as within the Federal jurisdiction,
we are shocked and appalled that "justice" has come to this pathetic point in our history where a corrupt and unjust
financial system has either merged, extorted, bribed or colluded with an indifferent overwhelmed and apathetic legal
system that enjoys immunity from liability in a maelstrom creating a perfect storm whereby families lose their home
without due process within 30 days in some cases.
This is "civil capital punishment" and "the American housing holocoust".
STANDARD FOR REVIEW
In Pennsylvania, the standard for granting a special injunction or TRO is set forth in Pennsylvania Rule of Civil
Procedure 1531(a). Both federal and Pennsylvania courts deem a TRO to be an extraordinary remedy, granted only
in limited circumstances. Vigilante v. Statharos, No. 08-cv-3408, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12324, *9 (E.D. Pa. Feb.
18, 2009). In deciding whether to grant or deny a TRO:
Pennsylvania Courts weigh whether (1) an injunction is necessary to prevent immediate and irreparable harm; (2)
greater injury would result from refusing an injunction than from granting it; (3) an injunction would properly
restore the parties to their status immediately prior to the alleged wrongful conduct; (4) the movant is likely to
prevail on the merits of the action; (5) the requested injunction is reasonably suited to abate the offending activity;
and (6) an injunction would adversely affect the public interest. Id. at **9-10; see also Summit Town Centre, Inc. v.
Shoe Show of Rocky Mount, Inc., 828 A.2d 995, 1001 (Pa. 2003). These factors practically coincide with the factors
a federal court considers in issuing a TRO pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b), a TRO being the
federal equivalent to a special injunction under Pennsylvania law. Vigilante, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12324, at *10;
Steel City Group, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86831, at **5-6.
Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1531(a), which sets forth the procedure governing preliminary and special
injunctions in the underlying state court action, requires notice and a hearing prior to granting or denying a special
injunction. Pa. R.C.P. 1531(a); WPNT, Inc. v. Secret Communication Inc., 661 A.2d 409, 410-11 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1995). The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has further held that it is . . . fundamental that all of the parties are
entitled to a hearing before [a preliminary] injunction should issue. WPNT, 661 A.2d at 411 (quoting Pubusky v.
D.M.F. Inc., 239 A.2d 335 (Pa. 1968)). A special injunction may be granted in the absence of a hearing, but only
upon a demonstration by the moving party that immediate and irreparable injury will be sustained before notice can
be given or a hearing held. Pa. R.C.P. 1531(a); Commw. ex rel. Costa v. Boley, 272 A.2d 905, 909 (Pa. 1971)
THE FIVE FACTORS
In deciding whether to grant or deny a preliminary injunction or stay:

1. Pennsylvania Courts weigh whether (1) an injunction is necessary "to prevent immediate and irreparable harm;
(2) greater injury would result from refusing an injunction than from granting it; (3) an injunction would properly
restore the parties to their status immediately prior to the alleged wrongful conduct; (4) the movant is likely to
prevail on the merits of the action; (5) the requested injunction is reasonably suited to abate the offending activity;
and (6) an injunction would adversely affect the public interest." Vigilante, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12324, at 9-10;
see also Summit Town Centre, Inc. v. Shoe Show of Rocky Mount, Inc., 828 A.2d 995, 1001 (Pa. 2003). Both parties
have asserted that irreparable harm will result from the Courts ruling on the TRO, whichever way the Court rules.
Therefore, the application of the first factor is quite applicable here- they (biggest bank in America) literally lose
nothing by waiting for review/application of due process, and we, if we were to in fact lose our home, would be
permanently scarred and face homelessness, divorce and endanger our two children.
2. The second factor which must be considered by the Court is whether greater injury would result from refusing an
injunction than from granting it. Vigilante, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12324, at *9.
On the factual record here, it cannot be determined if greater injury would result from dissolving the TRO, or
allowing it to remain in place. Both parties contend that the issuance or the absence of the TRO would dramatically
enhance or destroy their financial posture. Because Plaintiff, as the moving party, has the burden to prove that
greater harm would result from dissolving the injunction, and it does not do so, this factor weighs in favor of
dissolution.
Under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1531(a), A Court shall issue a preliminary injunction . . . only after
written notice and a hearing . . . Pa. R.C.P. 1531(a). Under this Rule: [A] preliminary injunction may be granted
without notice and a hearing only when there exists a need for unusual haste so that a clear right may be protected
from immediate and irreparable.
3. The third factor, whether an injunction would properly restore the parties to their status immediately prior to the
alleged wrongful conduct, also weighs in favor of the TRO, as ALL WE SEEK IS A TRIAL!
Defendants were not afforded an opportunity to respond to Plaintiffs allegations, and from the factual and
procedural background of this case, the Judge has sat on the sidelines on this one and he has not even issued an order
upon which the writ was obtained. The prothonotary signed the 4.17 default based solely on Plaintiffs uncontested
assertions in Complaint, Petition, and affidavit- and no notice nor accounting attached.
4. The fourth factor is whether the moving party has "demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of its
underlying claim." Vigilante, 2009 U.S. Dist. 12324, at *10.
See the new evidence, look at the national fraud settlement from 49 states, notice how Chase never mentions the
Note and thus has no claim upon which relief should be granted, examine the Judge Sheknin order, observe the
history of Phelan, examine the forum shopping strategic dismissal, factor in the lack of any replies to our motions or
pleadings, and the result is a very solid case.
Manifest injustice would result if the TRO or stay was denied as the default judgment entered NOT by the court and
was issued without proper notice and a hearing, and (2) it is invalid.
We have already endured FIVE YEARS of manifest injustice because of Chase and their legal muscle. The default
judgment improperly issued by the prothonotary was granted without review, verification or investigation of
damages computation. Nearly a million dollars of real estate was granted to Chase after 5 years of being unable to
win this case so they made an illegal end run and used the ignorance of the Prothontary rather than face the scrutiny
of the judge.
Manifest injustice would result if a TRO is not granted because Chase has not proved standing, obtained an illegal
default judgment, obtained an illegal writ of execution, improperly scheduled a sheriff's sale, improperly served us
and violated so many laws and rules brevity prohibits enumerating them all now as timing is of the essence as we are
facing the loss of our home and the implosion of family because of clerical error which was manipulated by Phelan

at behest of Chase.
The sole basis of damages for example was pulled out of thin air, literally- without any accounting. They were
illegally assessed by PHELAN not the Court by a hearing and are based upon the value of an appraisal. This element
is key- not only is judgment improper, but a Prothonotary cannot sign off on equitable relief.
Thus, the inaccurate, unaccounted for and outrageous allegations contained in Plaintiffs pleadings. No document or
other evidence was provided. Without a hearing no damages can be granted by writ and sale.
The default judgment and the notice of sheriff sale was granted without sufficient notice to Defendant (served to a
disabled man) and without a proper hearing (despite our demand).
5. With respect to the fifth factor, we clearly explain herein what offending activity needs to be abated. Quad erat
demonstratum- the sum of the added weight of the five factors compel that the TRO be granted, or at least the sale
stayed, and so the Court need not determine whether a sixth factor would apply here. IF DENIED WE FACE
INJURY OR FORCED FILING OF BANKRUPTCY TO OBTAIN A STAY.
CONCLUSION
FOR THE RECORD, we hereby re-file the numerous motions we FILED IN MAY which the prothonotary, we
JUST DISCOVERED, did NOT FILE as they asserted in docket that they were UNSIGNED which we do not think
is true- but even if it was- we should have been afforded the chance to amend them or the notification of the
problem- instead we were just ignored, again.
The PREJUDICE is real in this county prothonotary's office as they SIGN JUDGMENTS from attorneys and big
banks without necessary notices and supporting assessment evidence, and then ignore- literally do not even note the
FedEx in the docket- for pro se filers.
The rights enshrined by U.S. Title 42 U.S.C. 1981-1982 would appear to be solely economic rights, but they do
not merely implement the constitutional provisions protecting the obligations and rights of contract from any
impairment by the state or federal governments. Title 42 U.S.C. 1981-1982 also effectuate the more mundane,
practical, but supremely important aspects and elements of the First Amendment Right to Petition for Redress of
Grievances, in the protect of contractual rights to acquire, keep, use, and enjoy private property.
We file this within days of losing our home- and within a fortnight of the entry of a preliminary injunction against
foreclosures by one of the nations (and worlds) largest banks in the USA.

Submitted by:

_________________________________
__________________
TANUJA SINGH MURRAY, J.D., MBA
PRO SE DEFENDANTS
DATE

_____________________________________

TIMOTHY PATRICK MURRAY

IN THE UNITED STATES FEDERAL COURT


FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
THIRD CIRCUIT COURT
CHASE
v.
05579
Murray
Griffith

Case 12Chester /

MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT


The Chester County prothonotary entered default judgment for Plaintiff on 4/17 without a) any 10 day notice
attached and b0 asking for nearly a million dollars without so much as a shred of supporting documentation.
We, contrast, filed our praecipe for default judgment WITH THE 10 DAY NOTICE ATTACHED and claimed $0 as
we stated we would ask for a damage assessment hearing.
We FEDEXED this last week and the prothonotary ignored it.
They docketed our fee for the appeal however.
Lastly, FOR THE RECORD, we hereby re-file the numerous motions we FILED IN MAY which the prothonotary,
we JUST DISCOVERED, did NOT FILE as they asserted in docket that they were UNSIGNED which we do not
think is true- but even if it was- we should have been afforded the chance to amend them or the notification of the
problem- instead we were just ignored, again.
The PREJUDICE is real in this county prothonotary's office as they SIGN JUDGMENTS from attorneys and big
banks without necessary notices and supporting assessment evidence, and then ignore- literally do not even note the
FedEx in the docket- for pro se filers.
Well, I have a JD just like the judge, and an MBA and an engineering degree- and my tax dollars pay ALL OF
YOUR SALARIES- so to the extent that we are allowed by law, we intend to bring suit against this county for
repeated violations of our rights, not limited to discrimination and equal protection violations, negligence and abuse
of process/discretion.

EMERGENCY PRAYER FOR RELIEF


We pray this Court, by order of a stay of sheriff sale or by opening/striking judgment of 4.17.13, prevent that sale
from taking place and immediately grant a stay pending appeal. Alternatively, we ask for the Court to compel a
determination of our Petition to Open by Trial Court for a judgment that was inherently defective in form and
service, and sanction Chase for fraud. We are traveling for work but are available for telephonic hearing if it is so

desired. Also, we will pay any fee required upon the filing of this Motion- we are unable to determine fees as there is
no appeal docket yet.
WHEREFORE, Defendants asks, moves, and requests that this Court stay sale, issue a TRO, remove issue to federal
court, remand to trial with a new judge or dismiss as per new evidence.

Submitted by:

_________________________________
__________________
TANUJA SINGH MURRAY, J.D., MBA
PRO SE DEFENDANTS
DATE

_____________________________________

TIMOTHY PATRICK MURRAY

FEDERAL RELIEF MOTION


Defendants hereby respectfully move the court for the entry of an Order To Dismiss the Complaint on the following
grounds:
1. The Complaint is a civil action in rem, seeking remedy for an alleged default on repayment on a promissory note.
Defendants assert that such an action can and should only be permitted by the court to be filed and proceed with
merit based on a successful in personam judgment for breach of contract, thus establishing the right of remedy
sought in the foreclosure action; that is, repossession of the underlying collateral. By not doing so, the Plaintiff is in
effect presuming default and, in essence, seeking sentencing prior to winning a conviction, in the comparative
illustrative analogy of a criminal action. Complaint reserved the right to bring such an in personam action against
Defendants- illustrating the connection between breach and foreclosure, and supporting Defendants assertion that
Plaintiff has put the proverbial cart before the horse and should have filed a breach of contract action first, and, if
victorious, sue for foreclosure, that is, remedy for breach.
2. Judgment is void as it was issued by Prothonotary for equitable relief with 10 day notice attached as per PARCP.
Furthermore, writ is invalid and expired, and no Judge has spent one minute in any hearing in this case at all.
Therefore, and other reasons such as collateral estoppel (Shenkin case they dismissed) and fraud (assignment to
WaMu undisclosed) and as such entire judgment is void. As Chase has NO STANDING the underlying judgment is
void, and we aver Judge Griffith lacked subject matter jurisdiction to make a decision (despite his failure to actually
do so, depriving us of our due process and equal protection rights) and as such judgment is void in abnito.
VOID JUDGMENT
Void judgments are those rendered by a court which lacked jurisdiction, either of the subject matter or the parties,
Wahl v. Round Valley Bank 38 Ariz. 411, 300 P. 955 (1931); Tube City Mining & Milling Co. v. Otterson, 16 Ariz.

305, 146 P. 203 (1914); and Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 61 S.Ct. 339, 85 L.Ed. 2d 278 (1940).
A void judgment which includes judgment entered by a court which lacks jurisdiction over the parties or the subject
matter, or lacks inherent power to enter the particular judgment, or an order procured by fraud, can be attacked at
any time, in any court, either directly or collaterally, provided that party is properly before the court, Long v.
Shorebank Development Corp., 182 F.3d 548 ( C.A. 7 Ill. 1999).
A void judgment is one which from the beginning was complete nullity and without any legal effect, Hobbs v. U.S.
Office of Personnel Management, 485 F.Supp. 456 (M.D. Fla. 1980). Void judgment is one that, from its inception,
is complete nullity and without legal effect, Holstein v. City of Chicago, 803 F.Supp. 205, reconsideration denied
149 F.R.D. 147, affirmed 29 F.3d 1145 (N.D. Ill 1992).
Void judgment is one where court lacked personal or subject matter jurisdiction or entry of order violated due
process, U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5 Triad Energy Corp. v. McNell 110 F.R.D. 382 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
Judgment is a void judgment if court that rendered judgment lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter, or of the
parties, or acted in a manner inconsistent with due process, Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., Rule 60(b)(4), 28 U.S.C.A.;
U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5 Klugh v. U.S., 620 F.Supp. 892 (D.S.C. 1985).
A void judgment is one which, from its inception, was, was a complete nullity and without legal effect, Rubin v.
Johns, 109 F.R.D. 174 (D. Virgin Islands 1985).
A void judgment is one which, from its inception, was a complete nullity and without legal effect, Lubben v.
Selevtive Service System Local Bd. No. 27, 453 F.2d 645, 14 A.L.R. Fed. 298 (C.A. 1 Mass. 1972).
A void judgment is one which, from its inception, is and forever continues to be absolutely null, without legal
efficacy, ineffectual to bind the parties or to support a right, of no legal force and effect whatever, and incapable of
enforcement in any manner or to any degree Loyd v. Director, Dept. of Public Safety, 480 So. 2d 577 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1985).
A judgment shown by evidence to be invalid for want of jurisdiction is a void judgment or at all events has all
attributes of a void judgment, City of Los Angeles v. Morgan, 234 P.2d 319 (Cal.App. 2 Dist. 1951). Void judgment
which is subject to collateral attack, is simulated judgment devoid of any potency because of jurisdictional defects,
Ward v. Terriere, 386 P.2d 352 (Colo. 1963).
A void judgment is a simulated judgment devoid of any potency because of jurisdictional defects only, in the court
rendering it and defect of jurisdiction may relate to a party or parties, the subject matter, the cause of action, the
question to be determined, or relief to be granted, Davidson Chevrolet, Inc. v. City and County of Denver, 330 P.2d
1116, certiorari denied 79 S.Ct. 609, 359 U.S. 926, 3 L.Ed. 2d 629 (Colo. 1958).
Void judgment is one entered by court without jurisdiction of parties or subject matter or that lacks inherent power to
make or enter particular order involved and such a judgment may be attacked at any time, either directly or
collaterally, People v. Wade, 506 N.W.2d 954 (Ill. 1987). Void judgment may be defined as one in which rendering
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, lacked personal jurisdiction or acted in manner inconsistent with due
process of law Eckel v. MacNeal, 628 N.E. 2d 741 (Ill. App. Dist. 1993).
Void judgment is one entered by court without jurisdiction of parties or subject matter or that lacks inherent power to
make or enter particular order involved; such judgment may be attacked at any time, either directly or collaterally
People v. Sales, 551 N.E.2d 1359 (Ill.App. 2 Dist. 1990). Res judicata consequences will not be applied to a void
judgment which is one which, from its inception, is a complete nullity and without legal effect, Allcock v. Allcock
437 N.E. 2d 392 (Ill. App. 3 Dist. 1982).
Void judgment is one which, from its inception is complete nullity and without legal effect In re Marriage of Parks,

630 N.E. 2d 509 (Ill.App. 5 Dist. 1994). Void judgment is one entered by court that lacks the inherent power to
make or enter the particular order involved, and it may be attacked at any time, either directly or collaterally; such a
judgment would be a nullity People v. Rolland 581 N.E.2d 907, (Ill.App. 4 Dist. 1991).
Void judgment under federal law is one in which rendering court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over dispute or
jurisdiction over parties, or acted in manner inconsistent with due process of law or otherwise acted
unconstitutionally in entering judgment, U.S.C.A. Const. Amed. 5, Hays v. Louisiana Dock Co., 452 n.e.2D 1383
(Ill. App. 5 Dist. 1983).
A void judgment has no effect whatsoever and is incapable of confirmation or ratification, Lucas v. Estate of Stavos,
609 N. E. 2d 1114, rehearing denied, and transfer denied (Ind. App. 1 dist. 1993).
Void judgment is one that from its inception is a complete nullity and without legal effect Stidham V. Whelchel, 698
N.E.2d 1152 (Ind. 1998).
Relief form void judgment is available when trial court lacked either personal or subject matter jurisdiction,
Dusenberry v. Dusenberry, 625 N.E. 2d 458 (Ind.App. 1 Dist. 1993).
Void judgment is one rendered by court which lacked personal or subject matter jurisdiction or acted in manner
inconsistent with due process, U.S.C.A. Const. Amends. 5, 14 Matter of Marriage of Hampshire, 869 P.2d 58 ( Kan.
1997).
Judgment is void if court that rendered it lacked personal or subject matter jurisdiction; void judgment is nullity and
may be vacated at any time, Matter of Marriage of Welliver, 869 P.2d 653 (Kan. 1994).
A void judgment is one rendered by a court which lacked personal or subject matter jurisdiction or acted in a manner
inconsistent with due process In re Estate of Wells, 983 P.2d 279, (Kan. App. 1999).
Void judgment is one rendered in absence of jurisdiction over subject matter or parties 310 N.W. 2d 502, (Minn.
1981). A void judgment is one rendered in absence of jurisdiction over subject matter or parties, Lange v. Johnson,
204 N.W.2d 205 (Minn. 1973).
A void judgment is one which has merely semblance, without some essential element, as when court purporting to
render is has no jurisdiction, Mills v. Richardson, 81 S.E. 2d 409, (N.C. 1954).
A void judgment is one which has a mere semblance, but is lacking in some of the essential elements which would
authorize the court to proceed to judgment, Henderson v. Henderson, 59 S.E. 2d 227, (N.C. 1950).
Void judgment is one entered by court without jurisdiction to enter such judgment, State v. Blankenship 675 N.E.
2d 1303, (Ohio App. 9 Dist. 1996).
Void judgment, may be vacated at any time is one whose invalidity appears on face of judgment roll, Graff v. Kelly,
814 P.2d 489 (Okl. 1991). A void judgment is one that is void on face of judgment roll, Capital Federal Savings
Bank v. Bewley, 795 P.2d 1051 (Okl. 1990).
Where condition of bail bond was that defendant would appear at present term of court, judgment forfeiting bond for
defendants bail to appear at subsequent term was a void judgment within rule that laches does not run against a void
judgment Com. V. Miller, 150 A.2d 585 (Pa. Super. 1959).
A void judgment is one which shows upon face of record a want of jurisdiction in court assuming to render the
judgment, Underwood v. Brown, 244 S.W. 2d 168 (Tenn. 1951).
A Void judgment is one which shows upon face of record want of jurisdiction in court assuming to render judgment,

and want of jurisdiction may be either of person, subject matter generally, particular question to be decided or relief
assumed to be given, State ex rel. Dawson v. Bomar, 354 S.W. 2d 763, certiorari denied, (Tenn. 1962).
A void judgment is one in which the judgment is facially invalid because the court lacked jurisdiction or authority to
render the judgment, State v. Richie, 20 S.W.3d 624 (Tenn. 2000).
A void judgment is one which shows on face of record the want of jurisdiction in court assuming to render
judgment, which want of jurisdiction may be either of the person, or of the subject matter generally, or of the
particular question attempted to decided or relief assumed to be given, Richardson v. Mitchell, 237 S.W. 2d 577,
(Tenn.Ct. App. 1950).
Void judgment is one which has no legal force or effect whatever, it is an absolute nullity, its invalidity may be
asserted by any person whose rights are affected at any time and at any place and it need not be attacked directly but
may be attacked collaterally whenever and wherever it is interposed, City of Lufkin v. McVicker, 510 S.W. 2d 141
(Tex. Civ. App. Beaumont 1973).
A void judgment, insofar as it purports to be pronouncement of court, is an absolute nullity, Thompson v.
Thompson, 238 S.W.2d 218 (Tex.Civ.App. Waco 1951).
A void judgment is one that has been procured by extrinsic or collateral fraud or entered by a court that did not have
jurisdiction over the subject matter or the parties." Rook v. Rook, 233 Va. 92, 95, 353 S.E.2d 756, 758 (1987)
A void judgment is a judgment, decree, or order entered by a court which lacks jurisdiction of the parties or of the
subject matter, or which lacks the inherent power to make or enter the particular order involved, State ex rel. Turner
v. Briggs, 971 P.2d 581 (Wash. App. Div. 1999).
A void judgment or order is one that is entered by a court lacking jurisdiction over the parties or the subject matter,
or lacking the inherent power to enter the particular order or judgment, or where the order was procured by fraud, In
re Adoption of E.L., 733 N.E.2d 846, (Ill.App. 1 Dist. 2000). Void judgments are those rendered by court which
lacked jurisdiction, either of subject matter or parties, Cockerham v. Zikratch, 619 P.2d 739 (Ariz. 1980).
Void judgments generally fall into two classifications, that is, judgments where there is want of jurisdiction of
person or subject matter, and judgments procured through fraud, and such judgments may be attacked directly or
collaterally, Irving v. Rodriquez, 169 N.E.2d 145, (Ill.app. 2 Dist. 1960). Invalidity need to appear on face of
judgment alone that judgment or order may be said to be intrinsically void or void on its face, if lack of jurisdiction
appears from the record, Crockett Oil Co. v. Effie, 374 S.W.2d 154 ( Mo.App. 1964).
Decision is void on the face of the judgment roll when from four corners of that roll, it may be determined that at
least one of three elements of jurisdiction was absent: (1) jurisdiction over parties, (2) jurisdiction over subject
matter, or (3) jurisdictional power to pronounce particular judgment hat was rendered, B & C Investments, Inc. v. F
& M Nat. Bank & Trust, 903 P.2d 339 (Okla. App. Div. 3, 1995). Void order may be attacked, either directly or
collaterally, at any time, In re Estate of Steinfield, 630 N.E.2d 801, certiorari denied, See also Steinfeld v. Hoddick,
513 U.S. 809, (Ill. 1994).
Void order which is one entered by court which lacks jurisdiction over parties or subject matter, or lacks inherent
power to enter judgment, or order procured by fraud, can be attacked at any time, in any court, either directly or
collaterally, provided that party is properly before court, People ex rel. Brzica v. Village of Lake Barrington, 644
N.E.2d 66 (Ill.App. 2 Dist. 1994).
While voidable orders are readily appealable and must be attacked directly, void order may be circumvented by
collateral attack or remedied by mandamus, Sanchez v. Hester, 911 S.W.2d 173, (Tex.App. Corpus Christi 1995).
Arizona courts give great weight to federal courts interpretations of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure governing

motion for relief from judgment in interpreting identical text of Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure, Estate of Page v.
Litzenburg, 852 P.2d 128, review denied (Ariz.App. Div. 1, 1998).
When rule providing for relief from void judgments is applicable, relief is not discretionary matter, but is mandatory,
Orner v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1307, (Colo. 1994).
Judgments entered where court lacked either subject matter or personal jurisdiction, or that were otherwise entered
in violation of due process of law, must be set aside, Jaffe and Asher v. Van Brunt, S.D.N.Y.1994. 158 F.R.D. 278.
A void judgment as we all know, grounds no rights, forms no defense to actions taken thereunder, and is
vulnerable to any manner of collateral attack.
42 USC 1983 Denial of Rights Under Color of Law
Were we denied due process of law under the 5th Amendment to the United States Constitution due to court and
state officials engaging in abuse of discretion, defamation, fraud on the court and outrageous government conduct
for 5 years depriving us of assets?
Were we denied right to counsel under the 6th Amendment, her right to a trial by jury under the 7th Amendment and
excessive fines imposed on her in violation of the 8th Amendment to the United States Constitution?
Were we deprived of property without due process of law and denied equal protection of the laws under the 14th
Amendment to the United States Constitution?
A motion to set aside a judgment as void for lack of jurisdiction is not subject to the time limitations of Rule 60(b).
See Garcia v. Garcia, 712 P.2d 288 (Utah 1986).
A judgment is void, and therefore subject to relief under Rule 60(b)(4), only if the court that rendered judgment
lacked jurisdiction or in circumstances in which the court's action amounts to a plain usurpation of power
constituting a violation of due process. United States v. Boch Oldsmobile, Inc., 909 F.2d 657, 661 (1st Cir. 1990)
Where Rule 60(b)(4) is properly invoked on basis that underlying judgment is void, "'relief is not a discretionary
matter; it is mandatory.'" Orner v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1307, 1310 (10th Cir. 1994) (quoting V.T.A., Inc. v. Airco, Inc.,
597 F.2d 220, 224 n.8 (10th Cir. 1979)).
In order for a judgment to be void, there must be some jurisdictional defect in the court's authority to enter the
judgment, either because the court lacks personal jurisdiction or because it lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the suit. Puphal v. Puphal, 105 Idaho 302, 306, 669 P.2d 191, 195 (1983); Dragotoiu, 133 Idaho at 647, 991 P.2d
at 379.
A court may not render a judgment which transcends the limits of its authority, and a judgment is void if it is beyond
the powers granted to the court by the law of its organization, even where the court has jurisdiction over the parties
and the subject matter. Thus, if a court is authorized by statute to entertain jurisdiction in a particular case only, and
undertakes to exercise the jurisdiction conferred in a case to which the statute has no application, the judgment
rendered is void. The lack of statutory authority to make particular order or a judgment is akin to lack of subject
matter jurisdiction and is subject to collateral attack. 46 Am. Jur. 2d, Judgments 25, pp. 388-89.
"A court cannot confer jurisdiction where none existed and cannot make a void proceeding valid. It is clear and well
established law that a void order can be challenged in any court", OLD WAYNE MUT. L. ASSOC. v.
McDONOUGH, 204 U. S. 8, 27 S. Ct. 236 (1907).
"Jurisdiction, once challenged, cannot be assumed and must be decided." Maine v Thiboutot 100 S. Ct. 250.

"The law requires proof of jurisdiction on record of administrative agency and administrative proceedings." Hagans
v Lavine 415 US 533
Though not specifically alleged, defendant's challenge to subject matter jurisdiction implicitly raised claim that
default judgment against him was void and relief should be granted under Rule 60(b)(4). Honneus v. Donovan, 93
F.R.D. 433, 436-37 (1982), aff'd, 691 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1982).
"A judgment is void if court acted in manner inconsistent with due process and is a nullity and may be vacated
anytime." 261 Kan. at 862
A judgment obtained without jurisdiction over the defendant is void. Overby v. Overby , 457 S.W.2d 851 (Tenn.
1970).
Although Rule 60(b)(4) is ostensibly subject to the "reasonable" time limit of Rule 60(b), at least one court has held
that no time limit applies to a motion under the Rule 60(b)(4) because a void judgment can never acquire validity
through laches. See Crosby v. Bradstreet Co., 312 F.2d 483 (2nd Cir.) cert. denied, 373 U.S. 911, 83 S.Ct. 1300, 10
L.Ed.2d 412 (1963) where the court vacated a judgment as void 30 years after entry. See also Marquette Corp. v.
Priester, 234 F.Supp. 799 (E.D.S.C.1964) where the court expressly held that clause Rule 60(b)(4) carries no real
time limit.
B. Wrongful Foreclosure by a Nonholder of the Deed of Trust
Chase Deception
1. The trial court has IGNORED a timely Petition to Open. Also, despite a timely Notice of Appeal, and the payment
of all fees, to date no Superior Court docket number has been assigned. Many other pleadings have been also
ignored in this case.
2. Therefore, as we cannot obtain the attention of County, we pray for relief, hence the titling of this motion as an
"emergency".
3. Murray's prospect of winning appeal are strong, as NEW EVIDENCE has surfaced (Attached Assignment FROM
Chase to Trustee never discussed or disclosed by Chase)
NEW EVIDENCE
1. We have discovered new evidence which blows this case wide open and should not earn us a stay, but a
dismissal and damages in our Federal lawsuit we are filing.
SEE ASSIGNMENT
NO DUE PROCESS BEFORE DEPRIVATION OF PROPERTY
1. There was never any court process, no court order- just an improper default judgment signed by only a
Prothonotary in this foreclosure.
2. Even if the note was endorsed to and not from Chase until after the lawsuit was filed, still Chase has no standing
at the time the complaint was filed, in which case the trial court should strike judgment and with prejudice dismiss
and impose sanctions for fraud upon Court, perjury, etc.
3. A hearing is required to assess damages unilaterally assessed by Plaintiff illegally, as well as if there is disputed
evidence on an issue (79 So. 3d 170, 172-173) and Country Place, 51 So. 3d at 6 1179 ("Because J.P. Morgan did
not own or possess the note and mortgage when it tiled its lawsuit, it lacked standing".

4. Chase did absolutely nothing to satisfy this element of proof at the non-trial- yet we have the record of the
preceding SHENKIN case with plenty of evidence.
5. We aver the lower court erred by allowing CHASE to submit no evidence of standing, despite the recent rebuke
by the appeal court regarding standing.

CHASE LACKED THE REQUISITE STANDING TO FORECLOSE SO IT EXECUTED AN IMPROPER


BACK CHANNEL DEFAULT JUDGMENT
1. A foreclosure plaintiff's obligation to prove its standing to foreclose at the time it filed its lawsuit, period.
2. The new evidence proves what we only could infer by omission, as the plaintiff must prove that it had standing to
foreclose when the complaint was filed.
3. As per recent ruling in my brother's case, CHASE v. FRANCIS X MURRAY in PA Superior Court, it is a
foreclosure plaintiff's obligation to prove its standing to foreclose at the time it filed its lawsuit- a fact that has been
explained by his recent Superior court victory and many courts in recent years.
4. In other circuits, McLean v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. is a solid example, where the Fourth District
explained: "To summarize, the plaintiff must prove that it had standing to foreclose when the complaint was filed."
County Place Cmtv. Ass'n v. J.P. Morgan, 51 So. 3d 11 76, 11 79. "Because J.P. Morgan did not own or possess the
note and mortgage when it tiled its lawsuit, it lacked standing to maintain the foreclosure action.");
5. Chase did mention the Note in this, their THIRD foreclosure case against us. They of course not attach a copy of
the original note to its complaint,
nor referenced the smoking gun sale of the mortgage as per the new evidence exhibit, as that would be honest but
self-defeating and expose fraud.
6. The record evidence is insufficient to demonstrate that Chase has standing to foreclose anytime after 2005 or at
the time the lawsuit was filed.
7. The mortgage was assigned not to Chase but FROM Chase!
8. Therefore we move this Court for a stay pending appeal and failure to rule upon our Petition to Open the improper
entry of a Default Judgment, who is NOT Trustee of "SASCO 4XS" Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates under the
Pooling and Servicing Agreement Dated Feb 2005 ("CHASE") and therefore not only should the sale be stayed, but
the Court should dismiss it entirely or demand Chase to how cause, and thankfully, this Court did just that in late
July 2013.
As Chase did not own the Mortgage and Promissory Note on the date of execution of the Assignment and had no
authority to assign them to Movant.
By the terms of the two securitized trusts for Lehman Brothers designated 2006-3 registered with the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission, no assignment occurred.
The Assignment was executed and recorded post-petition and may constitute a violation of the automatic stay
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Section 362(a)(4).
4. Movant has not established that on the Petition Date it had physical possession of the original Promissory Note
properly endorsed in its favor.
5. Lehman Brothers or WaMus ability to enforce the Promissory Note or Mortgage was extinguished in 2006 when
it was paid by the Trust for the pool of mortgages which form the Trusts corpus.

6. Title between the Promissory Note and Mortgage were bifurcated, thereby rendering the Mortgage unenforceable.
The Trustee asserts Movant is an unsecured creditor and she has authority to sell the Property free and clear of
encumbrances for the benefit of the estate.
Movant asserts the Note and Mortgage are owned SASCO 4XS, a private securitized trust, and as the asserted owner
and holder of the Note and Mortgage, perhaps and alone has authority to enforce the security interest if this was not
re-conveyed and/or re-hypothecated or paid off by AIG or wrote off by bankruptcy or sold to Phelan, the purported
counsel for pretend lender Chase.
Chases submissions are insufficient to establish it is the owner and holder of the Note and Mortgage or is authorized
to act for whoever holds these documents. In re Relka, No. 09-20806, 2009 WL 5149262, at *5 (Bankr. D. Wyo.
Dec. 22, 2009) (granting stay relief where movant established possession of note through testimony of witness who
personally retrieved note from movants vault); In re Jacobson, 402 B.R. at 370 (denying movants stay relief motion
due to movants failure to establish it was holder of note); In re Hayes, 393 B.R. 259, 270 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2008)
(denying movants stay relief motion and sustaining debtors claim objection due to movants failure to establish it
was holder of note).
Chase has not established it has standing to bring the foreclosure in 2009 and 2012 and thus is due to be denied.
Accordingly, it should be ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Property in Paoli is not to be sold
until final adjudication of all legal matters.
B. Standard of Review and Discussion
Courts have discretion to grant extensions where the movant shows the delay was the result of excusable neglect.
In re Cendant Corp. Prides Lit., 189 F.R.D. 321, 323-324 (D.N.J. 1999).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b)(2) states:
When by these rules or by notice given thereunder . . . an act is required . . . to be done at or within a
specified time, the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion . . . upon motion made after the expiration
of the specified period permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect.
In determining what constitutes excusable neglect, courts are to consider all relevant circumstances surrounding the
delay. In re Cendant Corp. Prides Lit., 189 F.R.D. at 324 (citing Pioneer Invest. Serv. Co. v. Brunswick Assoc. Ltd.
Partnership, 507 U.S. 380, 395 (1993)).
Relevant factors include the following: (1) the danger of prejudice to the non-movant; (2) the length of the delay and
its potential impact on judicial proceedings; (3) the reason for the delay, including whether it was within the
reasonable control of the movant, and whether movant acted in good faith. Id. Other factors include: (1) whether
inadvertence reflected professional incompetence such as ignorance of the rules of procedure; (2) whether an
asserted inadvertence reflects an easily manufactured excuse incapable of verification by the court, and; (3)
complete lack of diligence.
Id. (citing Dominic v. Hess Oil V.I. Corp., 841 F.2d 513, 517 (3d Cir. 1988).
B. Standard Of Review
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint.
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). A court must determine whether the party making the claim would be
entitled to relief under any set of facts that could be established in support of his or her claim. Hishon v. King &
Spalding, 476 U.S. 69, 73 (1984)(citing Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46); see also Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville Corp.,
759 F.2d 271, 271 (3d Cir. 1985). In considering a motion to dismiss, all allegations in the complaint must be
accepted as true and viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Rocks v. City of Philadelphia, 868

F.2d 644, 645 (3d Cir. 1989)(citations omitted).


Abuse of process
The tort of abuse of process is the improper use of legal process after it has been issued. McGee v. Feege, 517 Pa.
247, 255 (1987). The term process has been interpreted inPennsylvania to encompass all of the procedures
incident to the litigation process, including discovery proceedings, the noticing of depositions and the issuing of
subpoenas. Pellegrino Food Products Co., Inc. v. City of Warren, 136 F. Supp. 2d 391, 407 (W.D. Pa. 2000).
To state a cause of action for the tort of abuse of process, the complainant must allege the following:(1) that the
tortfeasor used a legal process against the complainant; (2) that the use of legal process was primarily to accomplish
a purpose for which the process was not designed; and (3) that Complainant suffered harm as a result. Hart v
OMalley, 647 A.2d 542, 551 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994).
The Court of App eal s i n PA j ust rul ed agai nst C hase in a case i nvol vi n g m y brot her and
for ecl osur e (C hase v. Fran ci s X Murr a y) r eversi n g sum m ar y j udgm ent as Chas e was not the
ori gi nal m ort ga ge e and had acquired the loan by assignment rather than by operation of law and thus Chase
was obligated to record the assignment.
The Court of Appeals determined that defendant's failure to record the assignment rendered
the sheriff's sale void ab initio.
When a subsequent mortgagee acquires an interest in a mortgage through a voluntary purchase agreement
with the FDIC, the mortgage has not been acquired by operation of law and that subsequent mortgagee must
comply with the provisions of PARCP and record the assignment of the mortgage before foreclosing on the
mortgage by advertisement.
Any defect or irregularity in a foreclosure proceeding results in a foreclosure that is voidable, not void ab inito.
III. RULE 11 SANCTION
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(c), the Court may impose appropriate sanctions on attorneys who violate
Rule 11(b), which states:
By presenting to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating) a pleading, written
motion, or other paper, an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's
knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances,-(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or
needless increase in the cost of litigation; (2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions
therein are warranted by existing law or by a non-frivolous argument for the extension, modification,
or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law;(3) the allegations and other factual contentions
have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support
after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and(4) the denials of
factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on
a lack of information or belief.
District courts retain broad discretion in determining the appropriate sanctions under Rule 11. Langer v. Monarch
Life Ins.
Co., 966 F.2d 786, 810 (3d Cir. 1992). The range of sanctions include, a warm friendly discussion on the record, a
hard-nosed reprimand in open court, compulsory legal education, monetary sanctions, or other measures appropriate
to
the circumstances. Whatever the ultimate sanction imposed, the district court should utilize the sanction
that furthers the purposes of Rule 11 and is the least severe sanction adequate to such purpose. Id. [T]he purpose of

sanctions is to deter future violations, and [sic] monetary sanctions should not be more severe than those necessary
to deter repeated violations of rule. Giangrasso v. Kittatinny High Sch. Bd. of Educ., 865 F.Supp. 1133, 1141
(D.N.J. 1994).
FEDERAL QUESTIONS
1)
DOES THE PROCEDURE IN PENNSYLVANIA WHICH ALLOWS A CITIZEN WITH DEED OF
TITLE FOR THEIR HOME TO LOSE IT IN A JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE ACTION WHEREBY NO SINGLE
MINUTE OF ORAL ARGUMENT, TESTIMONY, INTRODUCTION OF EVIDENCE OR TRIAL IS AFFORDED
TO THE HOMEOWNER-LITIGANT, AND FURTHERMORE, A JUDGMENT CAN BE OBTAINED WITHOUT
THESE DUE PROCESS CONSIDERATIONS, AND REQUIRING WNOT ONE SINGLE ORDER FROM A
JUDGE, OR ANY MECHANISM OTHER THAN THE AVERMENT OF A BANK WITH NO SUPPORTING
EVIDENCE OF OWNERSHIP OF DEBT NOR EVIDENCE OF DEFAULT OF THAT DEBT, BUT ONLY THE
SIGNATURE OF A CLERK WHO ARE FORBIDDEN BY LAW TO DISPENSE LEGAL ADVICE, MUCH LESS
MAKE A MILLION DOLLAR EQUITABLE RELIEF LEGAL DETERMINATION? IN SHORT, IS THE
DEPRIVATION OF PROPERTY BY THE PEN STROKE OF A NON-JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATIVE
ASSISTANT WITH NO LEGAL DEGREE OR LICENSE A GROSS VIOLATION OF ALL PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO
TRUE AND COMPLETE JUDICIAL DUE PROCESS OF LAW BEFORE A JUDGE AND A PROPER TRIAL
WITH WHATEVER VERDICT THE FACTS SUPPORT AS A MANDATORY PROCESS THAT OCCURS
BEFORE THE INSTANTANEOUS (DEFAULT JUDGMENT TAKING ONE'S HOME IS LITERALLY AN
INHeRENTLY ILLEGAL ACTION BY A NON JURIST WITHOUT LICENSE OR EMPOWERMENT TO
AWARD EQUITABLE RELIEF AND THIS MAJOR LEGAL EVENT IS REDUCED TO A MOMENT- AN ACT
THAT TAKES MERELY SECONDS- NOT MINUTES NOR HOURS- YOU LOSE YOUR HOME AND ALL
THAT OCCURS IS A PERSON AS LEGALLY TRAINED AS AN OFFICE WORKER ALLOWS BY THE MERE
ACT OF SIGNING A SINGLE DOCUMENT WITHOUT ATTACHED EVIDENCE NOR ANY CRITICAL
ANALYSIS WHATSOEVER RESULTS IN THE LOSS OF THE LARGEST ASSET WE EVER OWN IN A
DEPRIVATION PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS. IS THAT A DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS?
2)
DOES THIS ACTION DESCRIBED IN AVERMENT #1 VIOLATE THE FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE?
3)
IF YES, IS THE COUNTY OF CHESTER OR THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA THEN GUILTY AND
LIABLE FOR NEGLIGENCE IN NOT ENFORCING THE MOST FUNDAMENTAL PROTECTION THE
CONSTITUTION AFFORDS US ALL BESIDES FREEDOM AND PRIVACY?
2)
IF THE COURT FINDS THE FIRST QUESTION IN THE AFFIRMATIVE, IS THE ACT OF SALE BY
SHERIFF BY AN ILLEGAL IMPROPER AND INCOMPLETE JUDICIAL ACTION WHICH RESULTS IN
SEVERE INJURY TO A CITIZEN BY DEPRIVING CITIZENS OF PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS
(AND THIS IS INDEPENDENT OF THE BANK'S RIGHT OR LACK OF STANDING TO FORECLOSE) IS THE
BANK PLAINTIFF AND THEIR COUNSEL LIABLE FOR CIVIL AND CRIMINAL PENALTIES IF THEY
WERE AWARE OF THE ILLEGALITY OF THE PROCESS?
3)
FOR THOSE CITIZENS FORECLOSED UPON, WHO, LIKE US, CAN PROVE THE BANK IS NOT
THE OWNER AND IS AWARE OF THIS MISREPRESENTATION, AND HAVE BY THEIR CONSPIRACY
WITH A LAW FIRM TO EXECUTE SHORT CUT ILLEGAL FORECLOSURES EVEN FOR LOANS AND
MORTGAGES THEY SOLD AT INCEPTION TO THE WALL STREET MORTGAGE BACK SECURITIES
DERIVATIVES MARKET WHICH PAID IN THE FULL THE BALANCE OF THE LOAN BY THE
TRANSACTION OF CONVEYANCE TO THE COLLATERALIZED DEBT OBLIGATION ORGANIZATION
CALLED A TRUST WHERE WITHIN A TRANCHE OUR LOAN IS NOW OWNED,. BEEN PLACED IN
FORECLOSURE AND FORCED TO DEFEND A FRIVILUOS AND FRAUDULENT LAWSUIT AT A HIGH
FINANCIAL, PRACTICAL AND EMOTIONAL COST, CREATING AN INJURY THAT SEEK REDRESSED
WITH PAYMENT OF ONE TRILLION DOLLARS TO A NEW 501c3 FOUNDATION TO BOTH DEFEND
FUTURE FORECLOSURES AND AWARD COMPENSATION TO PAST VICTIMS OF BOTH FRAUDULENT
FORECLOSURE TYPE A (BANKS FRAUD) AND B (COURT INDIFFERENCE TO CONSTITUTIONAL

PROCESS, PROTECTION AND RULES OF EVIDENCE) OR COMBINATION OF A + B IN OUR CASE

FEDERAL REFERENCES
QUESTION ONE
How can Pennsylvania allow a judgment for foreclosure without a hearing, much less a trial?
U.S. Constit. Amendment V: "Nor shall any person be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law."
How can Pennsylvania deprive us of our right to have a foreclosure lawsuit adjudicated by a jury of our home
owning peers? Judicial immunity allows for POSSIBILITY (we are not alleging that this scenario is the case here
with Judge Griffith) that a judge who makes a modest salary be, frankly, bribed by banks who print money at a 9 to
1 fractional reserve credit system? Certainly it would be naive to think that 1-5% of trial judges are not at least
approached by banks so corrupt that this action of influence would be akin to a parking ticket, so bereft of morality
they are.
U.S. Constit. Amendment VII: "In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars,
the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court
of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law."
QUESTION THREE
How can Chase NOT be limited in their ability to enjoy legal remedy and judicial recourse when lawsuits silted by
government agencies have proven that with regards to foreclosure, banks have repeatedly committed perjury, fraud
and fraud upon the court, as well as clogged the system with frivalous lawsuits we as pro se litigants be
disadvantaged by laws limiting our legal remedies and literally prohibited from filing suits (Judge Griffith ordered
us, in a separate suit where we were Plaintiff, to NOT FILE any lawsuits against a major carmaker despite the fact
we had never filed a lawsuit before) and dismissed our lawsuit WITH prejudice despite copious amounts of evidence
( we do not aver that the suit would have won if tried- we aver that we were deprived, by this same judge, of the
RIGHT to trial and furthermore prohibited from any further action as it was dismissed with prejudice AFTER
surviving Motions To Dismiss )
RIGHTS TRAMPLED UPON
U.S. Constit. Amendment XIV: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.'

END OF EXHIBITS
CASE # __________________