TMP 6845

YNIMG-10421; No.
of pages: 16; 4C: 2, 5, 6, 7, 9, 11, 13

NeuroImage xxx (2013) xxx–xxx
Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect
NeuroImage
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ynimg
1 Seeing human: Distinct and overlapping neural signatures associated with two forms
2 of dehumanization
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Q1 3 Anthony I. Jack ⁎, Abigail
A A J. Dawson,, Megan
M Norr
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4 Department of Cognitive Science, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, OH, USA
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a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t
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7 Article history: The process of dehumanization, or thinking of others as less than human, is a phenomenon with significant 14
8 Accepted 24 April 2013 societal implications. According to Haslam's (2006) model, two concepts of humanness derive from compar- 15
9 Available online xxxx ing humans with either animals or machines: individuals may be dehumanized by likening them to either an- 16
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12 imals or machines, or humanized by emphasizing differences from animals or machines. Recent work in 17
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cognitive neuroscience emphasizes understanding cognitive processes in terms of interactions between dis- 18
tributed cortical networks. It has been found that reasoning about internal mental states is associated with 19
activation of the default mode network (DMN) and deactivation of the task positive network (TPN); whereas 20
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reasoning about mechanical processes produces the opposite pattern. We conducted two neuroimaging stud-
ies. The first examined the neural bases of dehumanization and its relation to these two brain networks, using
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images and voice-over social narratives which either contrasted or likened humans to either animals or ma- 23
chines. The second study addressed a discrepancy between findings from the first study and prior work on 24
the neural correlates of dehumanization: using a design similar to prior work we examined neural responses 25
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to pictures of humans, animals and machines, presented without any social context. In both studies, human 26
and humanizing conditions were associated with relatively high activity in the DMN and relatively low activ- 27
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ity in the TPN. However, the non-human and dehumanizing conditions deviated in different ways: they dem- 28
onstrated more marked changes either in the DMN or in the TPN. Notably, differences between the animal 29
dehumanizing and humanizing conditions were most evident in regions associated with mechanistic reason- 30
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ing, not in the mentalizing network. Conjunction analysis of contrasts from both paradigms revealed that 31
only one region was consistently more active when participants saw human, a medial parietal region regarded 32
as the central hub of the DMN. These findings provide a neural basis for Haslam's distinction between two 33
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types of dehumanization, and suggest that the DMN and TPN play opposing roles in creating a sense of moral 34
concern. 35
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© 2013 Published by Elsevier Inc. 36

39 38
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40 Introduction that they are lacking in secondary or higher-order emotions (e.g. love, 52
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guilt). Haslam (2006) similarly examines the everyday denial of 53

41 Dehumanization, or the phenomenon of seeing others as less than selected human attributes to others, but chooses the term dehuman- 54
42 human, has important social implications. It has historically been ization to describe the phenomenon. Smith (2011) defines dehuman- 55
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43 a precursor to genocide, is common in wartime propaganda (Smith, ization as seeing another as a sub-human creature, and distinguishes 56
44 2011), and was described by Kelman (1973) as a necessary precondi- it from objectification, where others are seen as objects or ma- 57
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45 tion for sanctioned massacres. Even in more subtle forms, dehumani- chines. Several researchers link dehumanization to essentialism, 58
46 zation has been associated with violence (Bandura et al., 1975; both the belief that humans have a particular essence that can be 59
47 Rudman and Mescher, 2012). The term “dehumanization” has been denied (Costello and Hodson, 2010; Smith, 2011) and essentialist 60
48 used in several different ways. Leyens et al. (2007) reserve the term beliefs about intergroup differences (Haslam et al., 2002; Smith, 61
49 for “complete deprivation of humanity”, and use the term “infra- 2011). Here we use the term dehumanization in a broad and inclu- 62
50 humanization” to refer to the more common perception that out- sive sense, which incorporates both subtle and more severe forms, 63
51 group members are less human than ingroup members — specifically, and which refers to any process that involves viewing people as 64
less than fully human. Dehumanization has been widely discussed 65
as highly socially significant in a variety of contexts, including war, 66
genocide, sexism, racism, and medicine. Nonetheless, to date there 67
⁎ Corresponding author. have been relatively few investigations of the neural and psychological 68
E-mail address: tony.jack@gmail.com (A.I. Jack). processes involved. 69
1053-8119/$ – see front matter © 2013 Published by Elsevier Inc.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2013.04.109
Please cite this article as: Jack, A.I., et al., Seeing human: Distinct and overlapping neural signatures associated with two forms of dehumanization,
NeuroImage (2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2013.04.109
2 A.I. Jack et al. / NeuroImage xxx (2013) xxx–xxx
70 Two senses of humanness and dehumanization cognitive modes are labeled the Phenomenal stance and the Physical 133
stance in our theoretical framework (see Fig. 1). 134
71 Haslam (2006) puts forward two senses of humanness: human We distinguish the Phenomenal and Physical stances from a third 135
72 uniqueness and human nature. Uniquely human characteristics are cognitive mode, the Intentional stance. We hold that the Intentional 136
73 those which separate humans from animals, such as refinement, mo- stance is a blended cognitive mode (Jack et al., 2012) in which limited 137
74 rality, rationality, and maturity. When these attributes are denied, aspects of the two opposing cognitive modes (the Physical and Phe- 138
75 humans are seen as lacking in self-restraint, irrational, and childlike. nomenal stances) are combined. The Intentional stance involves acti- 139
76 Haslam uses the term “animalistic dehumanization” for the denial of vation of both the DMN and TPN (Fig. 1). According to this view, the 140
77 human uniqueness. This sense of dehumanization extends the con- intentional stance involves a (limited) appreciation of the internal 141
78 cept of infra-humanization, the denial of “secondary emotions” such mental states of others (the phenomenal stance) blended with analyt- 142
79 as nostalgia and embarrassment (Leyens et al., 2007), to include addi- ic thinking (the physical stance). This blend both enables us to make 143
80 tional uniquely human characteristics. Human nature characteristics, predictions about others' actions and causes us to adopt a more emo- 144
81 by contrast, are those which separate humans from machines, such tionally detached view of them. This blending of the two cognitive 145
82 as warmth, openness to experience, and depth. When these attributes modes is reflected in ordinary language: when we refer to someone 146
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83 are denied, humans are seen as lacking in individuality, passive, cold, as “calculating” or “manipulative,” we do not literally mean that they 147
84 and inert. Haslam uses the term “mechanistic dehumanization” for are doing sums or using their fine motor skills. We are instead refer- 148
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85 the denial of human nature. These two types of dehumanization are ring to an emotionally distanced and sometimes anti-social mode of 149
86 similar in that they do not promote prosocial feelings toward their tar- social cognition. We likely use these terms because this mode of social 150
87 gets. However, they depend on different metaphors and are associated cognition involves TPN brain areas associated with mathematical 151
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88 with different emotions: Animalistic dehumanization is associated calculation and transitive action, in combination with DMN regions 152
89 with disgust and contempt, whereas mechanistic dehumanization is involved in mentalizing (Jack et al., 2012). For example, when condi- 153
90 associated with indifference and social distancing (Haslam, 2006). tions involving deception are compared with non-deceptive condi- 154
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91 Humanizing depictions of others may emphasize either character- tions, the most consistent differences in brain activity are seen in the 155
92 istics that differentiate humans from animals, for which we use the TPN (Christ et al., 2009). The tendency to Machiavellian (i.e. manipu- 156
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93 term “animalistic humanizing”, or those that differentiate humans lative) thinking is also associated with increased activity during social 157
94 from machines, for which we use the term “mechanistic humanizing.” cognition in parts of the TPN that lie in the mirror neuron network 158
(Bagozzi et al., 2013). 159
95 Anticorrelated networks and dehumanizing D
The Intentional stance involves viewing the other as an agent
whose actions are driven by internal mental states. However, two im-
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96 Recent work in cognitive neuroscience, for instance research in portant aspects of the Phenomenal stance are thought to be missing 162
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97 attention (Corbetta and Shulman, 2011), has emphasized understand- from the Intentional stance: (i) we do not fully share the others' expe- 163
98 ing cognitive processes in terms of interactions between distributed riential point of view, (ii) nor do we have feelings of moral concern 164
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99 cortical networks. Brain imaging has identified two distributed corti- for them. Our hypothesis (Robbins and Jack, 2006) that moral concern 165
100 cal networks which have an antagonistic or mutually inhibitory rela- is specifically tied to the attribution of experiential states (and hence 166
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101 tionship to each other: the default mode network (DMN), a network the Phenomenal stance) is supported by behavioral evidence which 167
102 of regions including areas in medial parietal/posterior cingulate, me- shows that moral concern is linked to attributions of experiential 168
103 dial prefrontal, peri-genual anterior cingulate, lateral inferior parietal, states more than to attributions of agency (Gray et al., 2007, 2011; 169
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104 and superior temporal cortices that tends to be deactivated when par- Jack and Robbins, 2012). Dehumanization is characterized by the sus- 170
105 ticipants are engaged in a variety of goal-directed tasks (Binder et al., pension of moral concern, concomitant with the belief that the indi- 171
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106 1999; Raichle and Snyder, 2007; Raichle et al., 2001; Shulman et al., vidual is limited in terms of the experiential states they are capable 172
107 1997); and the task positive network (TPN), including areas in dorsal of possessing (Leyens et al., 2007). Hence, our model predicts that hu- 173
108 parietal and lateral prefrontal cortices, which becomes activated dur- manizing involves engagement of the Phenomenal stance, whereas 174
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109 ing these same tasks (Fox et al., 2005, 2009). These two networks dehumanizing involves disengagement of the Phenomenal stance. 175
110 have been shown to be anticorrelated at rest: in the absence of any
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111 task, one network tends to be deactivated when the other is activated,
112 analogous to a two-sided seesaw (Fox et al., 2005, 2009). Until recent-
113 ly, researchers had not been able to identify tasks which activate
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114 the DMN while deactivating the TPN. As a result, researchers were
115 uncertain as to how best to cognitively characterize the tension be-
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116 tween the DMN and the TPN. Some researchers tentatively suggest it
117 reflects a tension between external and internal attention (Buckner
118 et al., 2008). However, we recently conducted a neuroimaging study
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119 which demonstrates that the see-sawing activity in these networks

120 can be driven to either extreme using externally directed tasks
121 which engage different cognitive modes. We found that social reason-
122 ing tasks activate the DMN and deactivate the TPN; whereas mechan-
123 ical reasoning tasks with similar attention demands activate the TPN
124 and deactivate the DMN (Jack et al., 2012). These findings are consis-
125 tent with the opposing domains hypothesis (Jack et al., 2012) which
126 holds that the mutually inhibitory relationship between the DMN
127 and TPN reflects a cognitive tension between two cognitive modes:
128 an emotionally engaged form of social cognition which involves a
129 focus on the internal mental states of others, and a more detached
Fig. 1. Three cognitive stances — characteristics and associated brain networks. Anti-
130 analytic cognitive mode which is recruited when we think about correlation between the task positive network (TPN) and the default mode network
131 physical mechanisms, as well as when we engage in a variety of atten- (DMN) activity is theorized to be associated with a tension between the physical and
132 tion demanding nonsocial tasks, e.g. working memory. These two the phenomenal stances.
A.I. Jack et al. / NeuroImage xxx (2013) xxx–xxx 3
176 Haslam's (2006) two-factor model of dehumanization provides a The SCM's dimensions of competence and warmth demonstrate 239
177 fruitful framework for examining the relationship between the three correspondence with Haslam's concepts of uniquely human charac- 240
178 cognitive modes hypothesized by our model and their associated pat- teristics and human nature, respectively. This suggests intriguing 241
179 terns of DMN and TPN recruitment. Mechanistic dehumanizing in- overlap between the models, even though the conceptual schemes 242
180 volves a shift from viewing another as a conscious agent to viewing are distinct and derive from different approaches. However, Harris 243
181 them as an object or machine. In our framework, this would involve and Fiske's (2006, 2007, 2011) findings do not shed light on whether 244
182 a shift away from the Phenomenal stance towards the Physical stance. there are distinct neural responses associated with different forms of 245
183 Therefore, we predict that mechanistic dehumanizing, as compared dehumanization, because their findings only pertain to an out-group 246
184 to humanizing conditions, should involve both a decrease in DMN which is low on both personality dimensions. For example, a drug 247
185 activity and an increase in TPN activity. On the other hand, animalistic addict might be dehumanized in different ways — animalistically 248
186 dehumanizing involves seeing the other as an agent, but one with (if viewed as dirty and immoral) or mechanistically (if viewed as 249
187 a more primitive form of experience and from which we feel socially lacking agency and depth). Our study aims to tease apart the neural 250
188 distanced, i.e. as lacking in moral value. In our framework, this bases of these different forms of dehumanization. 251
189 would involve a shift away from the Phenomenal stance towards the
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190 Intentional stance. Therefore, we predict that animalistic dehuman- Experimental design and predictions 252
191 izing should involve an increase in TPN activity, but no change in
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192 DMN activity. In our primary study, we examined neural responses associated 253
with different depictions of humans: participants viewed images 254
accompanied by voiceover narrations which evoked concepts iden- 255
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193 Stereotyping and dehumanizing tified in Haslam's (2006) model. This study had four conditions, 256
two humanizing and two dehumanizing. Each humanizing (vs. 257
dehumanizing) condition fits with one of Haslam's two dimensions
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194 Harris and Fiske (2006) investigated the neural correlates of de- 258
195 humanization using the well-established and validated Stereotype of humanness, either human nature (vs. mechanistic dehumanizing) 259
196 Content Model (SCM), a four-quadrant model that rates in-group or uniquely human (vs. animalistic dehumanizing). For ease of com- 260
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197 and out-group members on perceived warmth and competence. prehension, we use the category names Mechanistic Humanizing 261
198 They characterize dehumanization as the stance taken toward stereo- and Animalistic Humanizing in place of Haslam's (2006) labels for 262
199 typed out-groups falling in the low-warmth, low-competence quad- humanizing. The social narratives were designed to engage reason- 263
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rant, such as drug addicts and the homeless. They found that of the
emotions of pride, disgust, envy, and pity, participants primarily
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ing about the internal nature of the individuals depicted.
Previous studies have consistently associated externally focused
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202 rated disgust as the emotion they felt toward images of these individ- nonsocial tasks with activation of the TPN and deactivation of the 266
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203 uals, and saw decreased MPFC activation when participants viewed DMN (Buckner et al., 2008; Shulman et al., 1997). This pattern is re- 267
204 images of the low-warmth, low-competence out-groups as compared versed for externally oriented tasks which involve extensive social 268
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205 with the other three quadrants in the SCM (Harris and Fiske, 2006). reasoning (Iacoboni et al., 2004; Jack et al., 2012). Since the stimuli 269
206 Harris and Fiske (2007) replicate their finding of lower mPFC activ- in our primary study predominantly engage externally directed social 270
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207 ity to the low-warmth, low-competence stereotype, and addition- reasoning, we predicted an overall tendency for these stimuli to acti- 271
208 ally show that a task which encourages participants to individuate vate the DMN and deactivate the TPN. Predicted differences for the dif- 272
209 group members (by asking about their food preferences) increases ferent conditions follow from our model (Anticorrelated networks 273
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210 activity in mPFC. They interpret these findings as demonstrating that and dehumanizing section;; Fig. 1; Jack et al., 2012): We did not predict 274
211 social judgments are highly dependent on context. A subsequent any differences between the two humanizing conditions, both of 275
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212 study (Harris and Fiske, 2011) finds that participants used fewer which should be associated with high levels of activity in the DMN 276
213 mentalizing verbs to describe a day in the life of a low-warmth, low- and low levels of activity in the TPN. Relative to the humanizing 277
214 competence target, and that activation in bilateral STS was correlated conditions, the mechanistic dehumanizing was predicted to involve 278
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215 with self-reported ease of mentalizing with a target. both decreased activity in the DMN and increased activity in the TPN 279
216 Harris and Fiske's approach sees stereotyping as a basis for de- (a shift to the physical stance), whereas animalistic dehumanizing 280
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217 humanization. This approach is well motivated, as their findings should only involve increased activity in the TPN (a shift to the inten- 281
218 (Harris and Fiske, 2011) demonstrate that stereotypes can lead to dif- tional stance). 282
219 ferences in the attribution of internal mental states. Nonetheless, our The second study reported here involves a reanalysis of a previous 283
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220 approach adopts a different emphasis, motivated by the theoretical (as yet unpublished) study which allowed us to address a discrepancy 284
221 view that dehumanization is more closely linked to notions of the in- between our findings from the first study and prior work on the neural 285
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222 ternal qualities or ‘essence’ of the individual rather than their external basis of dehumanizing (Harris and Fiske, 2006, 2007). This discrepan- 286
223 appearance or social role (Costello and Hodson, 2010; Haslam et al., cy is discussed further following the results of Study 1. In the second 287
224 2002; Smith, 2011). Anecdotally, this is illustrated by the history of study, we examined neural responses guided by external appearance. 288
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225 the Nazi regime. Nazi propoganda linked human/sub-human status Participants viewed pictures devoid of narrative context and made 289
226 to the ethnic stereotype of blonde Aryans and dark haired Jews, yet an affective judgment. This paradigm is very similar to that employed 290
227 these appearances were not regarded as indicative. Hitler and other by Harris and Fiske (2006, 2007). The major difference is that rather 291
228 Nazi officials had dark hair although they were clearly considered than presenting images of individuals from different social groups, 292
229 part of the Aryan master race. On the other hand, Jews were forced we presented images of categories which are clearly ontologically 293
230 to wear badges so that their sub-human status could be ascertained distinct: humans, non-human animals and machines. Since the second 294
231 more readily than by physiognomy. study of decontextualized images primarily engaged visual process- 295
232 Rather than using stereotyping responses as a route to studying ing, and was unlikely to engage more than cursory social reasoning, 296
233 dehumanization, we adopt the approach of manipulating narrative we predicted an overall tendency for stimuli to activate the TPN and 297
234 depictions of individuals, using descriptions of specific emotionally deactivate the DMN. We predicted that the human conditions would 298
235 salient behaviors to suggest differences in their internal characteris- be associated with greater activity in the DMN and decreased activity 299
236 tics. This approach is modeled directly on dehumanizing propaganda, in the TPN. Our model yields no clear predictions concerning differ- 300
237 such as that used by the Nazi regime, while our specific narratives are ences in activity in the DMN and TPN associated with viewing pictures 301
238 guided by the two families of concepts identified in Haslam (2006). of animals and machines (as opposed to thinking about humans as 302
303 either animals or machines). However, following prior work on an (e.g. fornicating in the middle of a road). 5/8 items involved depic- 363
304 animate/inanimate distinction in ventral occipital/temporal cortex tions which focused on a lone individual, 3/8 depicted interactions 364
305 (e.g. Mahon et al., 2009), we predicted that the contrast of humans between individuals or featured multiple individuals. 365
306 with machines would produce greater activity in lateral ventral cortex Mechanistic humanizing — emphasized the humanity of the indi- 366
307 (fusiform gyrus) and decreased activity in medial ventral cortex vidual(s) described by highlighting human nature traits, such as 367
308 (parahippocampal gyrus). These differences were expected to be warmth and depth of character. 3/8 items involved depictions 368
309 absent or greatly diminished for the comparison between humans and which focused on a lone individual, 5/8 depicted interactions be- 369
310 animals. tween individuals or featured multiple individuals. 370
Mechanistic dehumanizing — undermined the humanity of the in- 371
311 Methods dividual(s) described by highlighting rigid, cold, impersonal be- 372
havior, or by describing human nature in mechanical terms. 4/9 373
312 Study 1 items involved depictions of a lone individual, 2/9 depicted inter- 374
actions between individuals or featured multiple individuals; and 375
313 Participants 3/9 involved abstract depictions of non-identifiable individuals 376
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314 Participants were 47 volunteers (20 male, 27 female) recruited (scientific depictions of human nature). 377
315 from Case Western Reserve University and the surrounding area as
378
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316 part of a larger study of moral judgment. Age range was 19–59 years We conducted an online survey to validate correspondence be- 379
317 with a mean age of 27.3 years. Participants reported no history of neu- tween our stimuli and Haslam's (2006) model. Further details can 380
318 rological or psychiatric disorder. They were compensated for their be found in Supplementary Materials. Correspondence was confirmed 381
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319 time. Due to time constraints, 3 participants were only able to take by the finding of a three way interaction (in the predicted direction) 382
320 part in one of two runs (half the stimuli). between dehumanization (humanizing or dehumanizing), type of 383
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story (animalistic or mechanistic), and type of qualities (animal or 384
321 Magnetic resonance imaging machine) (F = 250.039, p b .001). This shows that our animalistic 385
322 Participants underwent structural and functional magnetic reso- and mechanistic humanizing and dehumanizing stories differentially 386
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323 nance imaging using a 4T Bruker–Siemens hybrid MR scanner. Struc- affected ratings of animal and machine qualities, as predicted. 387
324 tural images included an MPRage high resolution anatomical scan
325 and T2-weighted anatomical scan. Functional images were obtained
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327
using an echoplanar imaging sequence with 38 contiguous slices,
3.8 by 3.8 in-plane resolution, TR = 2000 ms, TE = 20 ms, 90° flip
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Imaging analysis
A scanner specific atlas target was created from the MP-RAGE
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328 angle.). Functional runs for this experiment were collected as part images of 25 young adults (Buckner et al., 2004). The resulting atlas 390
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329 of a sequence of 7 functional runs, 6–10 min in length, designed to represented Talairach space according to the SN method (Lancaster 391
330 test different aspects of moral cognition. et al., 1995). After calculation of parameters for realignment within 392
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each BOLD run, and for coregistration of each BOLD run with the 393
331 Stimuli and task atlas aligned T1 and T2 structural images, BOLD stacks were resampled 394
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332 Stimuli were presented using E-Prime 2.0 software. Images were directly from the raw data into a 3 mm cubic voxel atlas space. Each 395
333 projected using an Avotech projector, and viewed through a mirror BOLD stack was then spatially smoothed with a Gaussian 3D filter 396
334 attached to the head coil. Sound was presented through Avotech inte- with FWHM of 2 voxels (6 mm). Data for each participant was entered 397
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335 grated headphones. Responses were made using Avotech serial response into a general linear model in which baseline and linear trend were 398
336 system by pressing one of four buttons with the index or middle finger estimated alongside an assumed hemodynamic response function 399
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337 of either the right or left hand. (HRF) associated with each condition. The response period associated 400
338 The stimuli of interest here were given as part of two 10-min runs with each condition was modeled using a separate assumed HRF. 401
339 (300 volumes). Stimuli from the four conditions were randomly The assumed hemodynamic response function we used is similar to 402
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340 interspersed with stimuli from 5 other categories, each with 8 stimuli: that used by a variety of common neuroimaging analysis programs 403
341 neutral depictions of individuals, disgusting food, body schema and is based on careful work modeling the HRF to visual stimuli in 404
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342 violation (individuals with deformed bodies), moral violations, V1 (Boynton et al., 1996). All conditions were modeled in the GLM, 405
343 and sexual violations. The task remained the same throughout including conditions listed above which are not of interest for this 406
344 the run. Every trial was preceded by a fixation slide of variable report. Voxel activity was averaged and activity in each given condi- 407
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345 duration, lasting either 100 ms, 3100 ms, or 6100 ms (frequency tion was subtracted from baseline or another condition using the 408
346 weighted 2, 1, 1). Each stimulus consisted of a static image with Washington University of Saint Louis software application fidl. 409
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347 audio voiceover narration and lasted 10–12 s. The image was then Reported activations are associated with the stimulus presentation 410
348 replaced by a text question (“How does this make you feel? Very period only. 411
349 bad–bad–good–very good”) with a 3 s response window. Stories and Statistical inference was made on the basis of random effects anal- 412
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350 images were designed

d to invoke humanizing
h or dehumanizing yses, in which each participant contributed one estimate for each 413
351 modes of thinking in either the animalistic or mechanistic sense, in condition derived from the individual participant GLMs. The degrees 414
352 accordance with Haslam's model. A total of 33 videos were presented of freedom for these analyses were determined by the number of par- 415
353 for the 4 conditions. Examples of the stimuli in each category are illus- ticipants. We performed a voxel-wise, two-way repeated measures 416
354 trated in Fig. 2, and a full list of stories and images can be found in ANOVA of the imaging data with two levels for each of two factors: 417
355 Appendix A of Supplementary Materials. dehumanization (dehumanizing or humanizing) and type (animalis- 418
tic or mechanistic). Paired t-tests were also used to compare corre- 419
356 Animalistic humanizing — emphasized the humanity of the individ- sponding humanizing and dehumanizing conditions, as reported in 420
357 ual(s) described by highlighting
i h uniquely human traits, such as Supplementary materials. 421
358 culture and rationality. 5/8 items involved depictions which fo- The computerized anatomical reconstruction and editing toolkit, 422
359 cused on a lone individual, 3/8 depicted interactions between Caret, (Washington University of Saint Louis software) was used for 423
360 individuals or featured multiple individuals. visualization, and Microsoft Excel was used to generate graphs. All 424
361 Animalistic dehumanizing — undermined the humanity of the indi- statistical maps were whole brain multiple comparison corrected 425
362 vidual(s) described by highlighting
h animalistic or irrational behavior (p b 0.05), using threshold (z > 3) and extent (n ≥ 13 for ANOVA, 426
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Fig. 2. Examples of animalistic and mechanistic, humanizing and dehumanizing conditions used in Study 1. The text is a transcript of the voice-over narration which accompanied
each image. The narratives are broadly modeled on dehumanizing propaganda, and emphasize specific concepts identified in Haslam (2006). The specific examples shown are as-
sociated with neural correlates that are representative of the overall findings we report (see Supplementary Fig. 5).
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427 n ≥ 17 for t-tests) cutoffs based on Monte-Carlo simulations. ANOVA human body may be objectified (Cikara et al., 2011). All faces were 458
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428 statistics were corrected for sphericity. clean and lacked obvious skin marks, deformities or acne. The faces 459
were attractive and Caucasian in appearance. These are qualities that 460
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429 Study 2 should discourage dehumanizing. 461

The machine category consisted of 6 modern personal computers, 462
430 Participants 6 electronic devices with a user interface (e.g. cash register), 6 an- 463
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431 Participants were 40 undergraduates (23 female, mean age 19.9) droids (most humanlike was Honda's Asimo, least humanlike was a 464
432 of Case Western Reserve University reporting no history of neurolog- Dr. Who “dalek”), and 6 functional robots with nonhuman appearance 465
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433 ical or psychiatric disorder, who participated as part of a larger study (e.g. iRobot vacuum). None of these stimuli had all the basic facial fea- 466
434 of perception of the self and others. They were compensated for their tures (eyes, mouth, and nose) in a recognizable configuration, howev- 467
435 time. er 5/24 had a structure likely to be identified as a head, and 2/24 had 468
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structures likely to be identified as eyes. The android robots (6/24) 469

436 Magnetic resonance imaging had structures likely to be identified as bodies. Only one other stimu- 470
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437 FMRI sequences were the same as Study 1, with the following ex- lus had the appearance of a body part, a robotic ‘arm’ used in vehicle 471
438 ceptions: functional runs were collected as part of a sequence of 9 manufacturing. 472
439 functional runs (3 from the present paradigm and 3 from each of The animal category consisted of whole body pictures of mammals 473
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440 two other paradigms). The order of paradigms was interleaved. All with the face visible. Animals included a bat, hyena, tiger, lion, wild 474
441 paradigms involved picture viewing. boar, bison, zebra, and giraffe. Four stimuli depicted simians, 2 mon- 475
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keys and 2 great apes. 476

442 Stimuli and task When the image appeared on the screen, participants had a 6 s win- 477
443 Stimulus presentation and response collection were the same as dow to rate how much they liked the image. Choices were strongly l dis- 478
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444 in Study 1. Participants viewed images of humans, machines, and like, dislike, like, and strongly like. Once a response was made, answer 479
445 animals presented against a black background. A total of 24 stimuli choices would disappear but the image would remain until the 6 s 480
446 were presented in each category. The three categories of interest for had passed. Every trial was preceded by a fixation slide of variable dura- 481
447 this analysis were randomly interleaved with 3 other categories of tion, lasting either 100 ms, 2100 ms, or 4100 ms (equal frequency). 482
448 equal frequency, which featured pictures of houses, children's faces, and
449 young/cute non-human animals. Activations associated with h these cate- Imaging analysis 483
450 gories are not reported here. Each image was unique. Examples of stimuli Image preprocessing, data analysis methods and visualization 484
451 from the conditions of interest are illustrated in Fig. 3. were the same as in Study 1 except: As the image was shown for the 485
452 The human condition consisted of adult faces cropped so the hair entire stimulus and response period, reported activations are associat- 486
453 was not visible. They were 50% female, of various adult ages, main- ed with this entire period. No attempt was made to separately model 487
454 tained direct eye contact, and were neutral in emotional expression. response in this paradigm. The assumed HRF was again based on the 488
455 The face serves as a suitable stimulus to invoke recognition of human- Boyton model, scaled to the duration of the stimulus (Boynton et al., 489
456 ness, as it is the primary means for identifying individuals and repre- 1996). As before, all conditions were modeled in the individual partic- 490
457 sents the primary visual locus for social engagement, whereas the ipant GLMs, including conditions which are not of interest for this 491
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Fig. 3. Examples of stimuli used in Study 2. Images appeared onscreen for 6 s each, during which time participants made a judgment about how much they liked each image. Var-
iable duration fixation periods separated stimuli.
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492 report. Each participant contributed one estimate for each condition tasks as reported in Jack et al. (2012). These social and mechanical 523
493 which was brought forward to the random effects analysis. We regions demonstrate considerable overlap with the DMN and TPN, re- 524
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494 performed a voxel-wise, random effects, one-way, repeated mea- spectively. 1 We conducted two two-way repeated measures ANOVAs, 525
495 sures ANOVA with three levels: human, animal, and machine. Paired looking at mean activity in social and mechanical reasoning areas, 526
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496 t-tests were also computed for the contrasts human – animal, and with two levels for each of two factors: dehumanization (dehu- 527
497 human – machine. These contrasts are presented in Supplementary manizing or humanizing) and type (animalistic or mechanistic). In 528
498 materials and contributed to the conjunction analysis. social reasoning areas, we found a significant main effect of type 529
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(F = 9.90, p b 0.005) and an interaction between dehumanization 530

499 Results of study 1 and type (F = 5.12, p b 0.05). The main effect of dehumanization 531
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was not significant (F = 1.99, n.s.). In mechanical reasoning areas, 532

500 Behavioral results we found a significant main effect of dehumanization (F = 33.95, 533
p b .001) and an interaction between dehumanization and type 534
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501 Mean ratings to the question “How does this make you feel? 1 — (F = 7.39, p b .01). The main effect of type was not significant (F = 535
502 very bad, 2 — bad, 3 — good, 4 — very good” in the scanner for each cat- 1.80, n.s.). We also conducted post-hoc paired t-tests to assess 536
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503 egory were as follows: dehumanizing animal: mean = 1.93, SD = .38; differences between conditions. In social reasoning areas, the mecha- 537
504 dehumanizing machine: mean = 2.14, SD = .25; humanizing animal: nistic dehumanizing condition was significantly different from the 538
505 mean = 3.24, SD = .33; humanizing machine: mean = 3.61, SD = three other conditions (t > 2.55, p b 0.05, two tailed), but none of 539
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506 .32. These results are summarized in a graph in Fig. 1(A) of Supplemen- the other contrasts were significantly different (t b 1.29, n.s.). In me- 540
507 tary Materials. chanical reasoning areas, the animalistic dehumanizing condition 541
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508 We conducted a two-way repeated measures ANOVA on ratings was significantly different from the three other conditions (t > 3.19, 542
509 of affect to images in the scanner with two levels for each of two p b 0.005). In addition, there was a significant difference between 543
510 factors: dehumanization (dehumanizing or humanizing) and type the animalistic humanizing and the mechanistic dehumanizing con- 544
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511 (animalistic or mechanistic). We found significant main effects dition (t = 3.84, p b 0.001), and a marginally significant difference 545
512 of dehumanization (F = 530.78, p b .001) and type (F = 101.76, between animal humanizing and machine humanizing (t = 1.83, 546
513 p b .001), as well as an interaction of dehumanization and type
514 (F = 4.46, p b .05). We conducted post-hoc paired t-tests to assess
515 differences between conditions. These revealed that every condition
516 was significantly different from every other condition (t > 4.12,
517 p b 0.001, two tailed). 1
Correspondence between these task induced regions and representations of the
DMN and TPN derived from resting state functional connectivity are illustrated in Jack
518 Activity in social and mechanical reasoning areas et al. (2012). The reader may also compare the borders shown in Supplementary Figs. i 2
and 4 to 6. IIn general the social and mechanical regions represent a subset of the DMN
519 Fig. 4 (top graphs) illustrates overall activity in regions previously and TPN. The most notable discrepancy is that the representation of the TPN shown in
Fig. 6, which was derived by identifying areas anticorrelated with core social reasoning
520 associated with social reasoning and mechanical reasoning. These re- areas in medial parietal and mPFC using the methods of Fox et al. (2009), includes dor-
521 gions are taken from the random effects strict conjunction of contrasts sal and lateral occipital cortical areas which were not identified in the contrast be-
522 between text-based and video-based social and mechanical reasoning tween social and mechanical reasoning tasks.
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Fig. 4. Magnitudes of activation (percent MR signal change from resting fixation baseline) by condition in Studies 1 and 2, for regions of interest found to be associated with me-
chanical and social reasoning in Jack et al. (2012). In Study 1 (top graphs), animalistic dehumanizing most clearly differentiates from humanizing in mechanical reasoning areas,
while mechanistic dehumanizing most clearly differentiates from humanizing in social reasoning areas. In Study 2 (bottom graphs), clearer differentiation between human and
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nonhuman conditions was seen in mechanical reasoning regions than in social regions.
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547 p = 0.74, two tailed). There was no significant difference between Re-analysis to examine potential confounds 578
548 machine dehumanizing and machine humanizing (t = 0.632, n.s.).
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549 As predicted, the social narratives presented in this study robustly Might the pattern of activity in social and mechanical reasoning 579
550 activated social reasoning areas, with the exception of the mechanical areas be driven by confounds in the stimuli? Here we address a 580
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551 dehumanizing condition, which only demonstrated a trend towards potential confound which relates to the number of identifiable indi- 581
552 activation. In contrast, activity in mechanical reasoning areas was at viduals depicted in the stimuli. The phenomenon of dehumanization 582
553 or below resting baseline for all but the animalistic dehumanizing is clearly linked to the identifiability and individuation of persons. Ex- 583
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554 condition, which produced modest activation in these areas (but treme dehumanization often involves steps designed to de-identify 584
555 also see the subsequent re-analysis of individual conditions, reported or de-individuate individuals, e.g. making them wear similar clothing 585
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556 below). This pattern broadly fits our hypotheses, motivated by the and identifying them by means of a number rather than a name 586
557 model of Jack et al. (2012). The animalistic dehumanizing condition (Zimbardo, 2007). Dehumanized out-groups are often viewed as an 587
558 did not differentiate from the humanizing conditions in terms of ac- homogenous mass whereas in-groups are viewed as collections of 588
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559 tivity in social reasoning areas. Instead, we saw a tendency for social individuals (Quattrone and Jones, 1980). Trope and Liberman 589
560 reasoning areas to be more active in the animalistic dehumanizing (2003) argue that depictions of people that are relatively abstract 590
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561 condition than in either of the humanizing conditions. However, the and decontextualized create increased psychological distance. Szasz 591
562 animalistic dehumanizing condition did clearly differentiate from (1973) suggests that the “mechanomorphic” way of thinking adopted 592
563 the humanizing conditions in terms of activity in mechanical reason- by biological psychiatry, which involves thinking of the person as a “de- 593
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564 ing areas. fective machine”, is similarly dehumanizing. 594

565 We predicted that mechanistic humanizing–dehumanizing would In order to capture different aspects of mechanistic dehumaniza- 595
566 produce differences in both networks, with decreases in social reason- tion, we included in that condition three stimuli (out of nine) where 596
567 ing areas and increases in mechanical reasoning areas. In the event, we the visual stimuli were diagrams rather than photographs of individ- 597
568 saw much clearer differentiation in social reasoning areas (also see the uals in social settings, and where the voiceover elaborated a scientific 598
569 subsequent re-analysis of individual conditions, reported below). depiction of human nature. These stimuli featured a biological depic- 599
570 In summary, relative to humanizing, mechanistic dehumanizing tion of the human heart, a neuroscientific depiction of human brain 600
571 deactivated the social reasoning network while maintaining activation activity, and a psychological depiction of a well-studied attentional 601
572 in the mechanical reasoning network, while animalistic dehumanizing phenomenon (see Appendix A for stimuli). The other stimuli (6/9) in- 602
573 activated the mechanical reasoning network while maintaining activa- volved social narratives more similar to the other conditions. These 603
574 tion in the social reasoning network. These patterns were largely borne scientific descriptions were included because, on one reading, they 604
575 out in the whole brain analysis, except that we observed an unpredicted capture the core concept of mechanistic dehumanization. However, 605
576 dissociation between medial parietal and other mentalizing regions, in- they differed from the other stimuli in a couple of important respects. 606
577 cluding the mPFC. First these stimuli involved no identifiable individuals. Second, they 607
608 encouraged participants not just to view humans as objects/machines, activity of all the conditions, including the humanizing conditions, in 672
609 but also encouraged participants to think about the internal workings two of these regions, the rTPJ and mPFC. However, animalistic dehu- 673
610 of those machines. manizing did clearly deactivate medial parietal cortex below the 674
611 To assess the effect that the number of identifiable individuals
T level for the humanizing conditions. 675
612 had on brain activity in the three networks, we separated out the stim-
613 uli in three categories: no identifiable individuals, one primary identi- Discussion of study 1 676
614 fiable individual, and two or more identifiable individuals. The first
615 of these categories only applied to the three scientific depictions in Based on our model, we predicted that the humanizing conditions 677
616 the machine dehumanizing condition. The other two categories were would produce robust activation in social reasoning areas and deacti- 678
617 distributed across the remaining stimuli/conditions (see Methods). vation of mechanical reasoning areas. Relative to the humanizing 679
618 The results of this analysis can be seen in Supplementary Fig. 3. We conditions, we predicted that the animalistic dehumanizing condition 680
619 found no consistent effect of the number of identifiable individuals would be marked by increased activation in mechanical reasoning 681
620 on activity in social and mechanical reasoning areas with one excep- areas, and that the mechanistic dehumanizing condition would be 682
621 tion: the scientific depictions (featuring no identifiable individuals) marked both by decreased activity in social reasoning areas and by in- 683
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622 produced a clearly distinct pattern. The scientific stimuli produced creased activity in mechanical reasoning areas. Overall, these hypoth- 684
623 clear activation of mechanical reasoning areas, whereas the other eses are well supported by the data, however our reanalysis of the 685
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624 mechanistic dehumanizing stimuli produced deactivation in these different stimulus types used in the mechanistic dehumanizing con- 686
625 areas. The remaining mechanistic dehumanizing stimuli followed dition suggests an important nuance to our hypotheses. It appears 687
626 a pattern very similar to that reported in Activity in social and that social narratives that mechanistically dehumanize identifiable 688
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627 mechanical reasoning areas section,, except that the pattern was individuals are distinct from the humanizing conditions only in 689
628 more straightforward in the following sense: The (non-scientific) terms of reduced activity in social reasoning areas. In contrast, ab- 690
629 mechanistic dehumanizing stimuli demonstrated no trend towards stract scientific depictions of human nature, which actively encourage 691
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630 a difference with the humanizing conditions in mechanical reason- participants to think about mechanism, are distinct from the human- 692
631 ing areas (i.e. activity to these stimuli could not be differentiated izing conditions both in terms of decreased activity in social reason- 693
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632 from the animalistic humanizing condition). ing areas and a marked increase in activity in mechanical reasoning 694
633 In conclusion, the number of identifiable individuals cannot account areas. This finding fits well with our prior work which contrasts social 695
634 for the findings reported in Section 3.2 above, however our re-analysis reasoning about persons with mechanical reasoning about inanimate 696
635
636
does suggest a distinction between the scientific stimuli and the more
social stimuli which comprised the mechanistic dehumanizing condi-
D
objects (Jack et al., 2012). It appears that reasoning modeled on the
human sciences activates the TPN and deactivates the DMN in a sim-
697
698
637 tion. The scientific stimuli not only produced low activity in social ilar way to reasoning modeled on physics. However, these findings do 699
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638 reasoning areas but also, similar to the dehumanizing animal stimuli, not fit well with one hypothesis which guided our mapping between 700
639 produced high activity in mechanical reasoning areas. our model (Jack et al., 2012) and Haslam's model of dehumanizing 701
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(Haslam, 2006). Specifically, we hypothesized that mechanistic dehu- 702

640 Whole brain analysis manizing would correspond to adoption of the physical stance. We 703
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revise that hypothesis in light of the finding that social narratives 704
641 The results of our two-way repeated measures ANOVA of the fMRI that evoke mechanistic dehumanizing concepts does not activate me- 705
642 data are shown in Fig. 5. Among regions showing a significant main chanical reasoning areas to any greater extent than humanizing stim- 706
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643 effect of dehumanization were left temporoparietal junction, bilateral uli. Instead, it appears that there is a neural distinction between the 707
644 middle temporal gyrus, and medial parietal cortex. Regions showing a social process of objectifying others (which does not recruit mechan- 708
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645 significant interaction between dehumanization and type (animalis- ical reasoning areas) and a process more akin to scientific reasoning 709
646 tic or mechanistic) included bilateral precentral sulcus and left which involves thinking the mechanical nature of non-identifiable 710
647 parahippocampal sulcus. Regions showing both a main effect of dehu- humans (which does recruit mechanical reasoning areas and hence 711
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648 manization and an interaction between dehumanization and type in- has a neural signature consistent with switching into the physical 712
649 cluded a left lateral parietal region and medial prefrontal cortex. See stance). The contrast between these two different forms of mechanistic 713
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650 Tables 1–3 of Supplementary materials for complete lists of activation dehumanization is based on a post-hoc analysis, and therefore further 714
651 peaks and z statistics for regions showing main effects of dehumani- experimental work is needed to confirm and validate these findings. 715
652 zation and type as well as interaction between them. The current literature on the neural basis of social cognition consis- 716
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653 From this analysis, we chose regions of interest and calculated tently implicates the mentalizing network of the DMN (Mars et al., 717
654 average magnitudes of activation to each condition in each region, 2012; Schilbach et al., 2008), and points in particular to a key role 718
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655 shown in the graphs surrounding Fig. 5. We also show average mag- for the mPFC in social cognition (Amodio and Frith, 2006; Mitchell, 719
656 nitudes of activation in the right temporoparietal junction, since this 2009). In light of this, an aspect of the present findings may appear 720
657 area is both part of the DMN and is frequently co-activated in social surprising: the observation that the animalistic dehumanizing con- 721
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658 cognition tasks with medial parietal and mPFC. Although the effect dition did not produce a lower activity in the mentalizing network 722
659 in this region did not pass whole brain correction, there was a trend (i.e. social reasoning areas). Instead, the animalistic dehumanizing 723
660 towards an interaction between dehumanization and type (animalis- condition demonstrated the clearest difference from the humanizing 724
661 tic or mechanistic). The pattern was the same as that observed in the conditions due to a marked increase in activity in mechanical reasoning 725
662 social reasoning region of interest analysis (Fig. 4, bottom right). areas. Our whole brain analysis did reveal a consistent preference for 726
663 The trend for TPN and/or mechanical reasoning areas to activate the humanizing conditions in the medial parietal cortex (Fig. 5, C), how- 727
664 most to the animalistic dehumanizing condition can be seen for specif- ever no consistent preference for humanizing conditions was found in 728
665 ic regions highlighted in Figs. 5 (D, E and G), and more broadly in Sup- other parts of the mentalizing network including mPFC (Fig. 5, H). 729
666 plementary Fig. 2, which also shows borders for social and mechanical Harris and Fiske (2006, 2007) found and replicated reduced activ- 730
667 reasoning areas. In DMN and/or social network areas, the greatest de- ity in medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) for a dehumanized outgroup, 731
668 activation was consistently seen for the mechanistic dehumanizing as compared to other stereotyped groups. What might explain the 732
669 condition (Figs. 5, C, H and I; see also Supplementary Fig. 2). The ani- discrepancy between our findings and those of Harris and Fiske? 733
670 malistic dehumanizing condition demonstrated a more complex pat- One possibility is that Harris and Fiske's dehumanizing condition 734
671 tern, which was not predicted. This condition produced the greatest involved mechanical dehumanizing. i However, there are two problems 735
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Fig. 5. Results of two-way repeated measures ANOVA of Study 1 with factors dehumanization (dehumanizing or humanizing) and type (animalistic or mechanistic). (z ≥ 3, extent = > 13 voxels, p(whole brain corrected and sphericity
adjusted) b .05). Red indicates regions that pass for main effect of dehumanizing only, green indicates regions that pass for interaction only, and yellow indicates regions that pass for both main effect and interaction. Graphs A–I: Magnitudes
of activation (percent MR signal change from resting baseline) in selected regions associated with four conditions in Study 1. TPN regions activate most to animalistic dehumanizing condition (graphs D, E, and G). DMN regions deactivate
most to mechanistic dehumanizing condition (graphs C, H, and I). The medial DMN mentalizing regions (graphs C and H) demonstrated an unpredicted dissociation.
9
736 with this account. The first is that behavioral work by Harris and
a Fisk in this paradigm did not modulate activity in social and mechanical rea- 797
737 associates the emotion of disgust with their dehumanized outgroup. soning areas as much as the richer stimuli used in Study 1. Nonetheless, 798
738 However, this emotion is most clearly associated with animalistic there were similarities in the patterns produced. One of the conditions 799
739 dehumanizing (Haslam, 2006), and our behavioral validation of our (the animal condition) could be most clearly distinguished from the 800
740 paradigm confirms that our animalistic dehumanizing stimuli pro- human condition on the basis of activity in social reasoning areas, 801
741 duced the highest disgust ratings (see Supplementary materials). whereas the another condition (the machine condition) could be most 802
742 The second problem is that, extrapolating from our findings, Harris r clearly distinguished from the human condition on the basis of activity 803
743 and Fiske should also have found decreased activity in medial parietal in mechanical reasoning areas. This pattern is further borne out in the 804
744 cortex. A more radical interpretation of the discrepancy is that Harris whole brain analysis. 805
745 and Fiske's (2006, 2007) paradigm does not succeed in identifying a
746 neural basis of dehumanizing, but instead identifies distinct neural Whole brain analysis 806
747 processes which are specific to stereotyping.
748 To address this discrepancy formally, we reanalyzed data from a A one-way ANOVA of fMRI data with levels human, animal, and 807
749 prior (as yet unpublished) study which was methodologically very machine revealed significant modulation of bilateral occipital regions 808
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750 similar to that of Harris and Fiske (2006, 2007). This paradigm also in- including superior middle temporal gyrus, bilateral parahippocampal 809
751 volved viewing pictures followed by a simple affective judgment. The sulcus, medial parietal/posterior cingulate cortex, and left precentral 810
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752 principle difference between the studies was that rather than exam- sulcus (see Fig. 6). See Table 4 of Supplementary Materials for main 811
753 ining a relatively subtle contrast pertaining to the perception of hu- effect of stimulus category (human, animal, or machine) activation 812
754 manness (i.e. pictures of humans belonging to different stereotyped peaks and z statistics. We used this analysis to select regions of inter- 813
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755 groups), we examined neural activity to images of humans, animals est and calculated average response in percent MR signal change in 814
756 and machines (i.e. humans vs. non-humans). each of these regions, shown in bar graphs in Fig. 6. The individual 815
contrasts of (human–animal) and (human–machine) can be found 816
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757 Results of study 2 in Supplementary Fig. 4. 817
A number of regions demonstrated more robust activation to 818
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758 Behavioral results nonhuman categories than to humans, and these effects were gener- 819
ally more pronounced for machines than for animals. Left lateralized 820
759 Mean responses to the question “How much do you like or dislike activity was observed in a number of regions that fall within the 821
760
761
this image? 1 — strongly dislike, 2 — dislike, 3 — like, 4 — strongly
like” were as follows: human: mean = 2.33, SD = 0.32; animal:
D
TPN and the mechanical reasoning network (see borders in Supple-
mentary Fig. 4), including precentral sulcus and intraparietal sulcus.
822
823
762 mean = 2.79, SD = 0.34; machine: mean = 2.35, SD = 0.40. These In addition, pronounced activation associated with nonhuman cate- 824
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763 results are displayed in a graph in Fig. 1(B) of Supplementary Mate- gories was observed in lateral and dorsal occipital cortices. Dorsal vi- 825
764 rials. A one-way repeated measures ANOVA of these responses with sual areas were more strongly associated with the machine condition, 826
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765 levels human, animal and machine revealed a significant main effect whereas lateral visual areas were more strongly associated with the 827
766 of stimulus category (F = 23.94, p b .001). We conducted post-hoc animal condition (Supplementary Fig. 4). While these findings were 828
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767 paired t-tests to assess differences between conditions. These revealed not predicted, they fit with commonly held views of dorsal visual 829
768 that the animal condition was significantly different from the human areas as part of the dorsal visual stream which processes visual infor- 830
769 and machine conditions (t > 5.56, p b 0.001, two tailed) but there mation for the purposes of action (e.g. manual manipulation), and 831
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770 was no significant difference between the human and machine condi- with a view of lateral occipital/temporal cortices as involved in be- 832
771 tions (t = 0.332, n.s.). havioral decoding (e.g. body perception and eye-gaze processing). 833
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772 Activity in social and mechanical reasoning areas Discussion of study 2 834
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773 Fig. 4 (bottom graphs) illustrates overall activity in regions previ- The medial parietal region was the only region for which activation 835
774 ously associated with social reasoning and mechanical reasoning. A to pictures of humans was consistently higher than to nonhumans. We 836
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775 one-way repeated measures ANOVA of these responses with levels did not find evidence of increased activity in mPFC in either of the two 837
776 human, animal and machine revealed a significant main effect of direct contrasts with the human condition (Supplementary Fig. 4). It is 838
777 stimulus category in social reasoning areas (F = 3.6, p b .05), but unlikely that the differences between our findings and those of Harris 839
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778 only a trend in mechanical reasoning areas (F = 2.4, p = 0.098). and Fiske (2006, 2007) are due to lack of power. On the one hand, 840
779 We conducted post-hoc paired t-tests to assess differences between study 2, as compared to Harris and Fiske (2006), involved a higher 841
field magnet, twice as many stimuli per participant, four times as
N
780 conditions. In social reasoning areas, there was a significant difference 842
781 between the machine and animal conditions (t = 2.5, p b 0.05), a many participants, and tested for a more psychologically marked dif- 843
782 marginally significant difference between the human and animal con- ference in the perception of humanness (humans vs. non-humans, as 844
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783 ditions (t = 2.0, p = 0.53), and no difference between the human opposed to stereotypically different humans). On the other hand, 845
784 and machine conditions (t = 0.89, n.s.). In mechanical reasoning Harris and Fiske (2007) replicated the findings of Harris and Fiske 846
785 areas, there was a difference between the human and machine condi- (2006), indicating their findings are robust and reliable. Hence, these 847
786 tions (t = 2.2, p b 0.05) but the other comparisons were not signifi- differences are likely due to more subtle differences in the paradigms. 848
787 cant (t b 1.5). One possibility is that our human condition may have recruited mPFC 849
788 As predicted, none of the conditions in study 2 produced robust acti- less than the pictures representing members of the non-dehumanized 850
789 vation in social reasoning areas, as compared to resting baseline (implic- categories in Harris and Fiske (2006, 2007). Our pictures were close 851
790 itly estimated from variable duration fixation between trials). Activity cropped images of faces, which allowed identification but removed 852
791 was either near or below baseline levels in all the conditions. Surprising- other social signals associated with dress and appearance (i.e. neither 853
792 ly, pictures of machines produced marginally more overall activity in so- clothing nor hairstyle were visible). Other findings support the view 854
793 cial reasoning areas than pictures of adult human faces. In contrast, that socially relevant information about appearance recruits the 855
794 mechanical reasoning areas were clearly above baseline for all but the mPFC (Saxe and Powell, 2006). Hence, it is possible that the Harris 856
795 human condition, which only demonstrated a trend towards activation and Fiske findings reflect a role for the mPFC in interpreting social i 857
796 above the resting baseline. As expected, the decontextualized images signals which are communicated by dress/personal styling. On this 858
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Fig. 6. Results of one-way repeated measures ANOVA of Study 2 with levels for human, animal, and machine. (z ≥ 3, extent > 13 voxels, p(whole brain corrected and sphericity adjusted) b .05). Graphs A–F: Magnitudes of activation (per-
cent MR signal change from resting baseline) in selected regions associated with four conditions in Study 2.
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859 interpretation, activity may be lower for the dehumanized out-group corrected contrasts from Study 1 (animalistic humanizing–animalistic 915
860 because their appearance is not perceived as representing an attempt dehumanizing, mechanistic humanizing–mechanistic dehumanizing) 916
861 to communicate social information, but is instead a product of their and two from Study 2 (human–animal, human–machine). The color 917
862 circumstances. This interpretation is post-hoc and speculative, and key shows regions which pass one, two, three, or all four contrasts 918
863 requires further investigation. in either direction (if a region passed in different directions for differ- 919
864 Whatever accounts for the differences in mPFC observed by Harris ent contrasts, the color key reflects a subtraction of number passed 920
865 and Fiske (2006, 2007), findings from study 1 indicate that it is not in one direction minus the other). Regions shown in warm colors 921
866 driven by social disgust, and findings from study 2 indicate that it is have passed one or more contrasts for humanizing > dehumanizing 922
867 not a general signature of the perception of humanness. Hence, activ- or human > non-human, while regions shown in cool colors have 923
868 ity in the mPFC is not, by itself, indicative of whether the participant passed one or more contrasts for dehumanizing > humanizing or 924
869 is humanizing or dehumanizing the target. non-human > human. Only one region was consistently more active 925
870 Our studies identify only one region which is consistently impli-
O for humanizing/human conditions, in right medial parietal, and only 926
871 cated in the perception of humanness, the medial parietal cortex. one region was consistently more active for dehumanizing/nonhuman 927
872 However, even in this region the differentiation between human conditions, in left middle temporal gyrus. 928
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873 and machine conditions in Study 2 was modest. In general, a clearer We illustrate the correspondence between these regions and 929
874 distinction could be seen between human and non-human conditions anticorrelated networks using borders derived from a resting state 930
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875 in regions which show greater activity for non-human stimuli. This functional connectivity analysis which shows the TPN (i.e. areas 931
876 pattern was borne out for regions which are part of the TPN and anticorrelated with core DMN/social reasoning areas) and the DMN 932
877 which are implicated in mechanical reasoning (Fig. 3 bottom right, (i.e. areas anticorrelated with core TPN/mechanical reasoning areas), 933
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878 Figs. 6 B and C). It was also borne out for regions on the ventral as generated in a previous publication (Jack et al., 2012) following 934
879 surface which have previously been associated with an animate/ the methods of Fox et al. (2009). The upper-right quadrant of Fig. 7 935
880 inanimate distinction (Mahon et al., 2009; Peelen and Downing, shows a flat map of the left hemisphere with our cognitive conjunc- 936
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881 2005). On the basis of prior work, we had predicted that we would tion data, overlaid with borders indicating the DMN (white borders 937
882 see greater activity in lateral ventral areas, in particular the fusiform and hatching) and TPN (black borders and hatching). It is notable 938
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883 gyrus, for the comparison between human faces and machines. Al- that regions positively associated with perceiving humanness fall 939
884 though accurate identification of the FFA requires single-subject anal- mainly within DMN borders and regions negatively associated with 940
885 ysis, previous group studies have been able to identify a significant perceiving humanness fall mainly within TPN borders. 941
886
887
preference for animate (face or body) over inanimate stimuli in fusiform
gyrus (Peelen and Downing, 2005). This was not evident, which is sur-
D
General discussion 942
888 prising given that none of the machine stimuli had faces, only 25% were
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889 anthropomorphic in appearance and we tested a large number of par- The primary hypothesis which guided this investigation was that 943
890 ticipants (see Methods).2 On the other hand, we did see clear differ- the DMN vs. TPN dichotomy (Fox et al., 2005) marks a distinction 944
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891 entiation in medial ventral areas in the predicted direction, such that between persons for whom we feel moral concern and inanimate 945
892 parahippocampal areas activated most to pictures of machines, then objects for which we do not feel moral concern (Jack et al., 2012). An- 946
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893 to animals, and least to human faces (Fig. 6 panel F, see also Supplemen- imalistic dehumanizing is a phenomenon in which we recognize 947
894 tary Fig. 4). Hence we see an asymmetry, such that the animate/ some psychological states of the other (i.e. those relevant to agency) 948
895 inanimate distinction is more evident in areas associated with inani- but at the same time maintain a psychological distance from them 949
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896 mate objects than in areas associated with animate objects. On closer that causes us to withhold moral concern. We speculated that this 950
897 inspection, this asymmetry is also evident in prior work using non- naturally occurring phenomenon involves a blending of the functions 951
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898 visual stimuli (Mahon et al., 2009). It appears that the perception of instantiated by the DMN and TPN (Jack et al., 2012). Our findings pro- 952
899 both humanness and animacy depends in large measure on not activat- vide good initial support for this view. For two of the contrasts exam- 953
900 ing brain regions associated with thinking about mechanism and/or ined (animalistic humanizing–dehumanizing, human–machine), the 954
R
901 inanimate objects. most marked differences between conditions involved increased ac- 955
902 Unlike Study 1, the stimuli in Study 2 did not involve a rich social tivity in TPN regions, including regions associated with mechanical 956
O
903 context. This may explain the stronger differentiation between con- reasoning. For the other two contrasts (mechanistic humanizing– 957
904 ditions in visual areas and the weaker differentiation seen in social dehumanizing, human–animal) we saw more marked differences in 958
905 and mechanical reasoning areas (Fig. 6). Nonetheless, findings from DMN regions associated with social reasoning than in TPN regions as- 959
C
906 Study 2 are consistent with findings from Study 1 in a couple of re- sociated with mechanical reasoning. This supports Haslam's (2006) 960
907 spects: both studies identify the medial parietal cortex as playing a contention that we can distinguish animalistic dehumanizing from 961
N
908 consistent role in the perception of humanness, and both studies mechanistic dehumanization or objectifying. 962
909 suggest that activation of TPN regions marks the perception of non- The association between activity in the DMN and TPN and the per- 963
910 humanness. To explore these similarities more formally we performed ception of humanness is illustrated by our conjunction analysis 964
U
911 a conjunction analysis. (Fig. 7), which shows that the perception of humanness was associat- 965
ed with increased activity in DMN regions, and decreased activity in 966
912 Conjunction analysis TPN regions. At the same time, there were aspects of our findings 967
which were not anticipated and which are worthy of note. 968
913 Fig. 7 illustrates (for the left hemisphere) findings from a conjunc- First, the contrast mechanistic humanizing–dehumanizing re- 969
914 tion analysis of contrasts from both studies. We took two whole brain vealed
l differences which were markedly larger in the h DMN/social rea- 970
soning areas than in the TPN/mechanical reasoning areas, whereas we 971
2
It is not our claim that the machine stimuli activated FFA itself. A prior analysis we predicted changes in both networks for this contrast. Post-hoc analy- 972
conducted in which we identified the FFA in a subset of individual participants indicat- sis revealed that the predicted pattern was present for abstract scien- 973
ed a preference for face over machine stimuli. The machine stimuli likely activated re- tific depictions of human nature, whereas social narratives involving 974
gions near the FFA which cannot be easily distinguished in a group analysis due to identifiable individuals only produced decreased activation of DMN 975
individual variation in the location of FFA. Our claims here are therefore restricted to
the broader animate/inanimate distinction which has been claimed to exist between
regions. These findings suggest there may be an important distinction 976
lateral and medial parts of the ventral visual cortex, and which the paper by Mahon between the literal act of thinking about humans as biological mecha- 977
et al. (2009) indicates is present even in the congenitally blind. nisms (scientific reasoning), and a process of social objectification. 978
F
O
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Fig. 7. Left: Results of conjunction analysis of Studies 1 and 2 displayed on the left hemisphere. Warm colors indicate one or more contrasts passed in either human > nonhuman or
humanizing > dehumanizing. Cool colors indicate one or more contrasts passed in either nonhuman > human or dehumanizing > humanizing. Top Right: Results of conjunction
E
analysis displayed on flat map of the left hemisphere, overlaid with borders denoting DMN (white) and TPN (black), derived from anticorrelations (Fox et al., 2009). Overall,
dehumanizing or nonhuman stimuli were associated with greater activity in the task positive network while humanizing or human stimuli were associated with greater activity
T
in the default mode network. Left middle temporal gyrus, a TPN region, passed all contrasts for dehumanizing. Right medial parietal (not shown), a central node of the DMN, passed
all contrasts for humanizing, in contrast to the pattern seen in other DMN regions.
C
979 Scientific reasoning involves the physical stance; however, in contra- two studies (e.g. decontextualized images vs. social narratives), or 1010
980 diction to one of our initial hypotheses, it appears that social objectifi- the fact that humans are metaphorically, not literally, seen as animals 1011
E
981 cation does not (Supplementary Fig. 3). If the distinction between or machines in dehumanization. 1012
982 these two forms of mechanistic dehumanization is borne out in fur- Fourth, activation of lateral and dorsal occipital areas was consis- 1013
R
983 ther research, then Haslam's (2006) framework will need to be ex- tently associated with less human conditions, with the exception of 1014
984 tended from two to three related phenomena. mechanistic dehumanizing. These regions can be broadly considered 1015
985 Second, we did find a region in which activity was consistently part of the TPN (Fig. 7), because they are anticorrelated in the resting 1016
R
986 associated with the perception of humanness: medial parietal cortex. state with core DMN/social reasoning areas. However, these regions 1017
987 This finding is notable first because it broke with our predictions, and were not found in the contrast between social and mechanical rea- 1018
O
988 second because activity in this region diverged from the pattern seen soning (Jack et al., 2012), hence we did not anticipate that these re- 1019
989 in other DMN/social reasoning areas for two of the contrasts (animal- gions would discriminate so robustly between conditions. 1020
990 istic humanizing–dehumanizing, human–machine). How might we Fifth, the largest and most significant region for the contrast mech- 1021
C
991 account for this unexpected finding? It is notable that medial parietal anistic humanizing–dehumanizing was found in the left posterior su- 1022
992 cortex is viewed as a central node of the default network, because of perior temporal cortex (see Supplementary Fig. 2). This region lies 1023
N
993 its network properties (Hagmann et al., 2008). It also demonstrates largely outside the hypothesized networks, although it overlaps the 1024
994 what may be the most robust anti-correlations with task positive DMN. Reduced gray matter in this region is associated with loneliness 1025
995 regions (Chang and Glover, 2009). Hence, the identification of this and poor social perception skills (Kanai et al., 2012). Loneliness is so- 1026 Q2
U
996 region as playing a central role in the perception of humanness is not in- cially contagious (Cacioppo et al., 2009) and has numerous negative 1027
997 consistent with our emphasis on the interaction between the DMN and consequences for physical and mental health, including decreased so- 1028
998 TPN. In further support of a view that emphasizes interactions between cial function (Hawkley and Cacioppo, 2010). The finding that there is 1029
999 distributed cortical networks over the contribution of individual areas, an overlap in the neural mechanisms underlying loneliness and dehu- 1030
1000 we note that more marked effects were seen in other regions for specific manization suggests a promising avenue for further research. Mecha- 1031
1001 contrasts (e.g. for the contrast human–machine, compare Fig. 6 A with nistic dehumanizing may represent a contagious way of thinking that 1032
1002 Figs. 6 B–F). mediates the spread of loneliness through social networks. 1033
1003 d while the involvement of TPN and DMN networks fits our
Third,
1004 hypotheses for the dehumanizing contrasts, it was surprising i that Relationship to other literature 1034
1005 the pattern observed in study 2 for machines fits more closely with
1006 animalistic dehumanization (i.e. TPN differences were more marked), Our theory and findings support distinct neural patterns in the 1035
1007 whereas the pattern for animals fits more closely with mechanistic DMN
MN and TPN associated with different forms of dehumanization. 1036
1008 dehumanization (i.e. DMN differences were more marked). These dif- To what extent are these findings consistent with other work? 1037
1009 ferent patterns may reflect differences in the tasks involved in the Waytz et al. (2010) investigate one way of humanizing machines, 1038
1039 by making them less predictable, and find that this produces in- Implications 1105
1040 creased activity in a DMN region (ventromedial prefrontal cortex).
1041 Conversely, Cikara et al. (2011) find that sexual objectification of The present work suggests that the phenomenon of dehumanization 1106
1042 women's bodies is associated with deactivation of DMN/social reason- is linked to a neural constraint on cognition, which makes it difficult to 1107
1043 ing areas including MPFC, posterior cingulate, and temporal poles. be both empathetic and analytic at the same time (Jack et al., 2012). The 1108
1044 These experiments ostensibly measure mechanistic humanizing and DMN and TPN tend to suppress each other both during spontaneous 1109
1045 dehumanizing, and involve changes in DMN activity which overlap cognition in the absence of any task (Fox et al., 2005, 2009), and during 1110
1046 those observed here (see Supplementary Fig. 2), hence these findings the performance of a wide range of tasks (Jack et al., 2012; Raichle and 1111
1047 appear consistent with ours. Snyder, 2007; Raichle et al., 2001). There is evidence that the tendency 1112
1048 Does prior evidence also support a role for the TPN in anti-social for these networks to suppress each other is a marker of good psycho- 1113
1049 cognition? Krendl et al. (2006, 2009) find increased activity in TPN logical health: decreased suppression between these networks has 1114
1050 regions associated with viewing images of stigmatized individuals been identified in a broad range of neuro-psychiatric disorders, includ- 1115
1051 who evoke disgust. These findings are consistent with those for our ing disorders marked by social impairment such as autism and schizo- 1116
1052 animalistic dehumanizing condition, which also evoked disgust. In phrenia (for reviews of this extensive literature see, e.g., Broyd et al., 1117
F
1053 addition, as cited in the introduction, both Machiavellian thinking 2009; Buckner et al., 2008). It is intriguing that animalistic dehu- 1118
1054 (Bagozzi et al., 2013) and deception (Christ et al., 2009) are associated manizing, which may be viewed as the most socially damaging form 1119
O
1055 with activity in the TPN. While Machiavellian thinking and deception ap- of dehumanizing (Smith, 2011), involves co-activation of these net- 1120
1056 pear to be partially distinct phenomena from animalistic dehumanizing, works — a phenomenon which also occurs in mental disorders. Recent 1121
1057 these findings do provide broader support for a link between the TPN evidence suggests that not just being ostracized, but also the act of 1122
O
1058 and anti-social cognition. ostracizing others is associated with negative affect and other psycho- 1123
Q3 1059 Majdandžić et al. (2012) examine the neural correlates of humaniz- logical costs including a decreased sense of personal autonomy 1124
1060 ing vs. neutral descriptions of people, and neural responses to moral (Legate et al., 2013). An important implication of these findings is that 1125
R
1061 dilemmas featuring the same individuals. In humanizing trials, partici- there may be a physiologically mediated link between mental health 1126
1062 pants read a description of a target that emphasized his or her thoughts and dehumanization. One possibility is that the tendency for mental 1127
P
1063 and feelings, and were then asked questions that required taking the health disorders to increase violent behavior is partially mediated by 1128
1064 perspective of the target. In neutral trials, descriptions did not include an increased tendency towards dehumanization. Conversely, the phe- 1129
1065 mental states and questions were non-social. Participants were then nomenon of dehumanization may exacerbate mental health. The latter 1130
1066
1067
given a moral dilemma that involved sacrificing the target they had
read about to save several others. Increased activity associated with hu-
D
possibility appears particularly troubling given the claim that biological
psychiatry tends to dehumanize the patient (Szasz, 1973).
1131
1132
1068 manizing was seen in DMN/social reasoning regions in both phases of Our findings suggest a particular challenge for contexts which in- 1133
E
1069 the experiment (during the description phase: medial parietal, dMPFC volve an inherent conflict between analytic and empathetic cognitive 1134
1070 and bilateral TPJ; during the moral judgment phase: medial parietal, styles, such as health care (Haque and Waytz, 2012). Health care pro- 1135
T
1071 ventromedial prefrontal, and middle temporal gyrus/temporal pole). fessionals need to adopt an analytic approach towards the patient, 1136
1072 These findings would be most consistent with our results if the descrip- viewing them as a biological machine, in order to accurately diagnose 1137
C
1073 tions increased the perception of human nature (i.e. mechanistic hu- and treat their disease. Our findings suggest that this cognitive mode 1138
1074 manizing) more than human uniqueness (i.e. animalistic humanizing). has distinct neural correlates from cognitive modes associated with 1139
1075 Our results suggest a special role for medial parietal cortex in the classic forms of dehumanizing (i.e. animalistic dehumanizing and so- 1140
E
1076 perception of humanness. Medial parietal cortex has been found to ac- cial objectification, see Supplementary Fig. 3). Nonetheless, it shares 1141
1077 tivate during the social emotions of admiration (for both skill and vir- overlapping neural signatures. Hence, being trained to adopt this cog- 1142
R
1078 tue) and compassion for pain (Immordino-Yang et al., 2009). This is nitive mode may have unintended consequences. These consequences 1143
1079 consistent with the association between humanizing and compassion, may include tendencies to decreased empathy and to denial of the 1144
1080 versus dehumanizing and lack of concern (Bandura et al., 1975; patient's agency — behaviors which have been identified in medical 1145
R
1081 Costello and Hodson, 2010; Smith, 2011). Medial parietal cortex practice and which are known to have deleterious effects on patient 1146
1082 has also been found to activate more when viewing pictures of per- outcome. While these extrapolations from the current findings are 1147
O
1083 sonally known individuals, particularly family members, as opposed speculative, they are suggestive of the need for training programs 1148
1084 to famous faces or unfamiliar faces (Gobbini et al., 2004; Platek and that can counteract the effects of medical training by encouraging 1149
1085 Kemp, 2009), consistent with the assumed link between humanizing humanizing of the patient. 1150
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1086 and in-group membership.

1087 It is notable that we did not see a consistent role for mPFC in Limitations and future research 1151
N
1088 dehumanizing, as this has been put forward as the core region for so-
1089 cial cognition (Amodio and Frith, 2006; Mitchell, 2009) and identified The stimuli in this study were designed on the basis of our constru- 1152
1090 in earlier work exploring dehumanization through stereotyping (Harris al of Haslam's (2006) two senses of humanizing/dehumanizing, and to 1153
U
1091 and Fiske, 2006, 2007). In an earlier study which examined neural be as ecologically
i valid as possible (e.g. similar to brief and emotional- 1154
1092 activity associated with playing a competitive game against either a ly resonant depictions which might appear in news, gossip and science 1155
1093 human or a machine, we found mPFC to be the only area which differ- sites on the internet). These constraints result in stimuli which are rich 1156
1094 entiated between these conditions (Gallagher, 2002). However, that in content and which have a variety of potential surface confounds. 1157
1095 study involved a competitive social interaction; hence participants We have attempted to control for obvious confounds (e.g. the number 1158
1096 were unlikely to feel moral concern for the human against whom they of identifiable individuals pictured — see Methods and Results). How- 1159 Q4
1097 were playing. It is our view that paradigms designed to examine social ever, it is possible that other confounds
f exist. In our previous work, 1160
1098 cognitive processes have tended to invoke the Intentional stance rather which established the tension between the DMN and TPN as relating 1161
1099 than the Phenomenal stance, in part because competitive interactions to a cognitive tension between social and mechanical reasoning, we 1162
1100 and/or tasks involving explicit social judgments are often more amena- also used ecologically valid stimuli. Reviewers of early versions of 1163
1101 ble to experimental control and/or behavioral analysis. We predict that this prior work (Jack et al., 2012) were skeptical of this approach. As 1164
1102 paradigms that encourage affiliative social cognition and/or feelings a result, we conducted a number of detailed analyses to check whether 1165
1103 of moral concern will activate medial parietal cortex more reliably a variety of potential surface confounds (e.g. number of observable 1166
1104 than mPFC. actions which might drive activity in the mirror neuron network, 1167
1168 differences in visual attention demands) might be driving our results. between inanimate objects, which are viewed as lacking intrinsic 1232
1169 We found that these surface confounds could not account for our find- moral value, and conscious minds, which are regarded as objects of 1233
1170 ings. We also observed that the impact of these potential surface con- moral concern. Here we show that the perception of humanness is as- 1234
1171 founds on activity in social and mechanical reasoning areas was sociated both with increased activity in the DMN (associated with the 1235
1172 minimal (Jack et al., 2012). We suggest that activity in these regions perception of human nature) and with decreased activity in the TPN 1236
1173 is influenced much more strongly by the cognitive set that is induced (associated with the perception of human uniqueness). Across four 1237
1174 (e.g. humanizing vs. dehumanizing) than by surface characteristics of contrasts, activity in just one region was consistently associated 1238
1175 the stimuli (e.g. number of identifiable individuals). This view is con- with the perception of humanness. This region, in medial parietal cor- 1239
1176 sistent with comparisons between studies 1 and 2, such that marked tex, has been identified as a central node of the DMN and demon- 1240
1177 differences in surface appearance (study 2) produced much more strates robust anticorrelations with TPN regions. These findings lend 1241
1178 minimal differences in these regions than stimuli richer in context support to our view of the tension between the DMN and TPN, and 1242
1179 (study 1). Leading researchers (Schilbach et al., in press; Zaki and shed light on the neural mechanisms that underlie dehumanization. 1243
1180 Ochsner, 2012) have noted that the alternative strategy to that which Supplementary data to this article can be found online at http:// 1244
1181 we adopted in Study 1, where stimuli are stripped of elaborative con- dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2013.04.109. 1245
F
1182 tent and lose ecological validity in the interests of maintaining tighter
1183 experimental control of surface characteristics, may not represent a
Author contributions 1246
O
1184 productive method for studying social cognition.
1185 Two of our hypothesized mappings between our model and
AIJ oversaw the project, designed the study, analyzed the data, and 1247
1186 Haslam's were well borne out by our data, namely links between the
O
wrote the manuscript. AJD analyzed the data and wrote the manu- 1248
1187 phenomenal stance and the humanizing conditions, and the inten-
script. MN designed the study and collected the data. 1249
1188 tional stance and the animalistic dehumanizing condition. However,
R
1189 our hypothesized mapping between the physical stance and the
1190 mechanistic dehumanizing condition was not. On the basis of post- Acknowledgments 1250
1191 hoc analysis, we suggest that there is a neural distinction between sci-
P
1192 entific reasoning about the mechanical nature of humans and the We would like to thank Regina Leckie and Rochelle Hudson for 1251
1193 social process of objectifying others. Our data suggests the former pro- their help in experimental design and data collection for Study 2. 1252
1194 cess involves the physical stance, whereas the latter does not. Since Joseph Gabriel and two anonymous reviewers provided helpful com- 1253
1195
1196
the contrast between these two different forms of mechanistic dehu-
manization is based on a post-hoc analysis further experimental
D
ments on prior versions of the manuscript. This work was supported
by funding to AIJ from the Leonard Krieger Fund and the University
1254
1255
1197 work is needed to confirm and validate these findings. Hospitals Case Medical Center Spitz Brain Health fund. 1256
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1198 More generally, we have little doubt that the stimuli we generated 1257
1199 for Study 1 can be refined and improved upon. We also suspect that Conflict of interest 1258
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1200 future work will further subdivide dehumanizing into finer catego- 1259
1201 ries, over and above the three types of dehumanizing which we sug- The authors declare no competing interests. 1260
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1202 gest are present on the basis of our current data (scientific reasoning,
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Supplementary Materials for Jack, Dawson & Norr (2013) Seeing human: Distinct and
overlapping neural signatures associated with two forms of dehumanization. Neuroimage
Validation of Study 1 stimuli

We conducted an online validation of our humanizing and dehumanizing stories and images
using Amazon Mechanical Turk with the purpose of testing whether our stimuli aligned with
Haslam’s model of animalistic and mechanistic dehumanization. For each story and
accompanying image participants were asked to rate the central character(s) on qualities
separating humans from animals (refinement, maturity, rationality, and self-restraint; α = .914)
and qualities separating humans from machines (depth, warmth, open-mindedness, and
uniqueness, α = .774) on a 1-7 scale (1 – Does not describe him/her at all, 7 – Describes him/her
very well). Participants were also asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed with the
statement “I feel disgusted by him/her” on a 1-7 scale (1 – Strongly disagree, 7 – Strongly
agree). After data for participants with incorrect quality control questions was removed, 176
participants remained (81 female, mean age 30.5 years). Each participant rated one story in each
of the four categories, with the exception that 21 participants rated two stories in the Mechanistic
Dehumanizing category.
We performed a three-way repeated measures ANOVA with two levels for each factor:
dehumanization (humanizing or dehumanizing), type of story (animalistic or mechanistic), and
type of qualities (animal or machine). This revealed a three way interaction between these three
factors in the predicted direction (F = 250.039, p < .001), showing that animalistic and
mechanistic humanizing and dehumanizing stories differentially affected ratings of animal and
machine qualities. Mean responses to the statement “I feel disgusted by him/her” for each
category were as follows: Animalistic Dehumanizing: mean = 4.85, SD = 1.72; Mechanistic
Dehumanizing: mean = 3.42, SD = 2.29; Animalistic Humanizing: mean = 1.27, SD = 0.68;
Mechanistic Humanizing: mean = 1.23, SD = 0.70. A two-way repeated measures ANOVA on
ratings of disgust with factors dehumanization (humanizing or dehumanizing) and type
(animalistic or mechanistic) revealed a main effect of dehumanization (F = 567.128, p < .001),
main effect of type (F = 48.424, p < .001), and an interaction between dehumanization and type
(F = 44.349, p < .001).
pg. 1


Appendix A – Stimuli used in Study 1
Animalistic Humanizing (HA) - stimuli emphasized humanity by highlighting “uniquely human”

traits that separate humans from animals
1. Aida started vocal training at 6 years old. She attended Juliard music school,
and is a renowned opera singer. Critics have remarked on the emotional
refinement of her singing.
2. Ophelia is a curator at a small art gallery. She also works part-time as a

restaurant critic for Rhode Island Monthly.
3. This couple’s daughter died in a hit and run accident. After a period of
private mourning, they chose to forgive their daughter’s killer and forget
any feelings of hate.
4. David was a police detective who found out his son was an accomplice
in a series of car thefts. With reluctance, David followed through on his
principles and arrested his own son in order to teach him responsibility.
5. Tim is a letter carrier for the U.S. Postal Service. After a heavy snow
storm, he is not required to deliver. But Tim is proud of his job and does
his route whatever the weather.
6. Judge Phillips was deciding the verdict of a free speech case. He found
the defendant’s remarks extremely distasteful, but he recognized his duty
to uphold the constitution and ruled accordingly.
7. Lauren was unprepared for an upcoming test. When the teacher
accidently left the answer key on her desk, Lauren was tempted to cheat.
Instead, she returned it without looking.
pg. 2


8. Alex promised her parents that she would babysit her brothers. Later,
her friend offered a ticket to see their favorite band that night. Thinking
of her promise, Alex declined.
Mechanistic humanizing (HM) – stimuli emphasized humanity by highlighting “human nature”

traits that separate humans from machines
1. After losing a long and hard-fought game, a basketball player

collapsed. A member of the opposing team helped him up and shook his
hand.
2. Austin is the first cellist with the New York Orchestra, but he has not
forgotten his origins. During his free time he performs in public to raise
money for children’s music programs.
3. Felicia is a pediatric nurse. She works hard, and makes a reasonable

salary. She gets great satisfaction helping sick children and reassuring
their families.
4. When the school board cut funding for art programs, one teacher
started a campaign. She worked to raise money and awareness in the
community, and eventually, an art program was reinstated.
5. Rachel had the idea for a website to help people find long-lost
relatives. Starting from nothing, she worked hard to develop her site and
now runs a small business.
6. Eddie and Sarah share a love of cooking. Their latest fad is Lebanese
cuisine. They are often invited to potlucks where their food is
enthusiastically received.
pg. 3


7. Dave is a recovering meth addict. He has been off drugs for 5 years.
With support from friends and family, he recently started his own organic
bread company.
8. Wesley saw a man have a seizure and fall into the subway tracks. He
jumped down to save the man and held him down while a train passed
over them. They both were safe.
Animalistic Dehumanizing (DA) - stimuli denied humanity by highlighting behavior that

resembles that of animals
1. After a night of heavy drinking a man removed his pants and passed out on
the morning train. Passengers crowded on the other side of the car, until he was
removed by transit security.
2. Sonny is a competitive hotdog eater. He doesn’t mind participating in

contests because he loves the feeling of being stuffed. He can cram 3 hot
dogs in his mouth at once.
3. These people stood for 10 hours waiting to get into a concert. As the
crowd grew impatient they began pushing toward the entrance. People
standing near the front were trampled.
4. After trying crystal meth, Theresa could not get enough of it. She
became addicted and rarely cooked meals or attended to personal
hygiene. The photo on the right was taken after 6 months of drug use.
5. Concert goers started dancing aggressively, pushing and slamming

into each other. Soon a fight broke out, with onlookers cheering and
jeering.
6. Andrea became overly intoxicated while at a music festival. She

defecated in public and had to be asked to leave.
pg. 4


7. This runner had been sweating for hours, running without a water
bottle on a hot day. She became so desperately thirsty that she got down
on all fours and drank from a puddle.
8. This couple met in a bar earlier in the evening. After drinking heavily,
they were both very drunk. When the bar closed, they started having sex
on a busy street.
Mechanistic Dehumanizing (DM) - stimuli denied humanity by highlighting behavior that

resembles that of machines
1. In this factory, all the workers do the same task. Their uniforms prevent dust.
The factory floor is silent while the workers concentrate on their task.
2. Justin was convicted of two murders. The victims were coworkers who
he feared would be promoted ahead of him. In court, he appeared bored
and expressed no remorse.
3. Eric is a mercenary who specializes in sniping. He takes whatever

contract pays the most money. He accepts any target, including children.
4. Jerry is an accountant for a large firm. He has no contact with

customers and hardly any with coworkers. He spends his whole day
working on spreadsheets.
5. Robert works for a health insurance company. His job is to find

reasons to reject claims. He is proud when he can get a high number
rejected.
pg. 5


6. This is a call center where there are 300 people in one room. Each has
enough desk space for a phone, a note pad, and a computer. Their
conversations are scripted.
7. This figure shows how blood flows in and out of the heart. The heart
contains four valves. They ensure blood flows in the correct direction
when the heart muscle contracts.
8. The participants in this experiment looked at complex visual stimuli.

These pictures show how electrical activity in the brain changed over
time.
9. This picture illustrates a phenomenon called the “attentional blink.”

For a short time after a participant responds to a stimulus, detection
accuracy is lower for a second.
Supplementary Figures
Supplementary Figure 1. Graphs of participant responses to stimuli in scanner. A: Mean affect

ratings for four categories of stimuli in Study 1. Participants responded to the question “How
does this make you feel? 1 – Very bad, 2 – Bad, 3 – Good, 4 – Very good”. Error bars indicate
standard error. B: Mean responses to three categories of images in Study 2. Participants
responded to the question “How much do you like or dislike this image? 1 – Strongly Dislike, 2
– Dislike, 3 – Like, 4 – Strongly Like”. Error bars indicate standard error.
pg. 6

Supplementary Figure 2. Contrasts from Study 1 of Animalistic Humanizing - Animalistic

Dehumanizing (left) and Mechanistic Humanizing - Mechanistic Dehumanizing. Red borders
indicate social reasoning regions, blue borders indicate mechanical reasoning regions. Whole
brain corrected paired t-tests (z>3, n=>17)
pg. 7

Supplementary Figure 3. Post-hoc analysis for study 1, breaking down stimuli by number of
identifiable individuals. Only the 44 participants who saw every stimulus are included in this
analysis (see methods). For the social narratives there was no consistent effect of the number of
identifiable individuals. This is best illustrated by the grey bars in the lower panels which
average over all stimuli containing one or more identifiable individuals. However, the scientific
narratives (DM7-9), which contained no identifiable individuals, produced a distinct pattern. For
ease of comprehension, this is best illustrated in the top two panels, which are similar in form to
the top panels of primary Figure 4 except that the mechanistic dehumanizing condition is divided
into scientific and social stimuli.
pg. 8

Supplementary Figure 4. Contrasts from Study 2 of Human – Animal (left) and Human –
Machine (right). Red borders indicate social reasoning regions, blue borders indicate mechanical
reasoning regions. Whole brain corrected paired t-tests (z>3, n=>17)
pg. 9

Supplementary Figure 5. Breakdown of activity in regions of interest for each stimulus, as listed in Appendix A.
Data is from the 44 participants who saw every stimulus. Regions are the social reasoning areas and mechanical
reasoning areas defined on the basis of prior work (Jack et al, 2012), and the right medial parietal and left middle
temporal regions defined by the conjunction analysis from this study.
pg. 10


Tables
Region names were generated by Talairach Client Version 2.4.2
*indicates no information provided by Talairach Client
Table 1 – Main effect of dehumanization (humanizing vs. dehumanizing) in Study 1
Cluster Peak
size Brodmann
x y z (voxels) Region Name area x y z zstat
-13 -40 -42 38
Left Cerebellar Tonsil * -16 -35 -38 4.15
* * -9 -47 -48 3.68
0 -68 13 5280
Left Middle Occipital Gyrus 19 -28 -82 22 7.38
Left Fusiform Gyrus 19 -42 -66 -9 7.22
Left Precuneus 7 -23 -70 40 7.17
Right Precuneus 7 27 -69 38 6.62
Left Declive * -26 -55 -11 6.45
Right Middle Temporal Gyrus 19 34 -80 23 6.44
Left Superior Parietal Lobule 7 -26 -55 47 6.39
Left Inferior Occipital Gyrus 18 -28 -86 -7 6.36
Right Lingual Gyrus 18 11 -75 -5 6.35
Right Middle Occipital Gyrus 18 33 -86 5 5.78
Left Lingual Gyrus 18 -26 -69 -10 5.77
Right Parahippocampal Gyrus 37 28 -45 -8 5.76
Right Fusiform Gyrus 19 27 -62 -5 5.6
Right Middle Occipital Gyrus 18 27 -82 -6 5.52
Right Inferior Temporal Gyrus 37 60 -58 -10 4.99
Right Superior Parietal Lobule 7 34 -52 56 4.89
Left Inferior Parietal Lobule 40 -38 -44 42 4.82
Right Cuneus 17 20 -93 0 4.46
Left Inferior Semi-Lunar
Lobule * -7 -71 -35 4.43
Right Inferior Parietal Lobule 40 52 -34 49 4.38
Left Declive * -9 -74 -18 4.23
Left Cuneus 18 -17 -95 8 4.06
pg. 11


Right Pyramis * 6 -75 -23 3.65
Right Uvula * 30 -68 -23 3.45
1 -52 -32 23
Right Nodule * 1 -52 -31 4.29
30 -1 -12 18
Right Parahippocampal Gyrus * 32 -1 -12 3.72
-32 32 -6 39
Left Inferior Frontal Gyrus 47 -33 31 -5 4.93
2 -31 -1 13
Right Thalamus * 2 -31 -1 3.31
40 9 32 804
Right Precentral Gyrus 6 43 1 35 6.88
Right Middle Frontal Gyrus 46 45 27 20 5.47
Right Sub-Gyral 6 24 -4 55 5.05
Right Inferior Frontal Gyrus 44 57 11 14 3.57
Right Precentral Gyrus 6 44 -5 51 3.1
-42 8 32 847
Left Precentral Gyrus 6 -42 -1 30 7.35
Left Middle Frontal Gyrus 46 -44 30 15 5.48
Left Sub-Gyral 6 -26 -4 55 5.27
Left Inferior Frontal Gyrus 45 -52 11 19 4.85
-52 13 10 53
Left Superior Temporal Gyrus 22 -51 -16 5 3.77
-41 -27 20 101
Left Insula 13 -43 -26 22 4.38
-46 -63 29 251
Left Angular Gyrus 39 -43 -62 33 5.4
Left Middle Temporal Gyrus 39 -57 -68 23 3.97
-2 -61 33 431
Left Cuneus 18 0 -86 24 3.62
52 -62 36 43
Right Superior Temporal
Gyrus 39 56 -62 30 3.45
pg. 12


0 -3 33 77
Left Cingulate Gyrus 24 0 -4 34 5.28
-8 -34 44 40
Left Paracentral Lobule 5 -9 -35 45 4.23
-35 -29 57 224
Left Postcentral Gyrus 40 -35 -33 56 4.58
-5 15 55 26
Left Superior Frontal Gyrus 6 -6 17 58 3.74
pg. 13


Table 2 – Main Effect of Story Type (Animalistic or Mechanistic) in Study 1
Cluster Peak
x y z size Region Name Brodmann area x y z zstat
(voxels)
-6 -45 -41 79
11 -43 -45 28
Right Cerebellar Tonsil * 12 -42 -44 3.7
43 -63 0 1401
Right Inferior Semi-Lunar * 16 -70 -37 4.57
Lobule
Right Uvula * 22 -69 -24 4.41
Right Middle Occipital Gyrus 18 36 -83 -1 3.96
Right Supramarginal Gyrus 40 49 -48 30 3.89
Right Tuber * 49 -56 -25 3.76
Right Uvula * 4 -61 -30 3.24
Right Declive * 35 -64 -20 3.18
52 -19 -9 203
Right Middle Temporal Gyrus 21 49 3 -24 4.4
Right Middle Temporal Gyrus 21 53 -23 -8 3.96
-17 -70 -30 89
Left Uvula * -19 -71 -33 4.29
-38 -51 -17 30
-56 -47 -13 51
Left Inferior Temporal Gyrus 20 -56 -48 -14 4.05
1 -16 3 486
Left Amygdala * -19 -9 -9 4.57
Right Lentiform Nucleus * 22 -15 -7 4.44
Right Thalamus * 3 -32 3 4.35
pg. 14


Left Substantia Nigra * -10 -24 -9 4.03
Left Thalamus * -7 -12 14 3.75
Left Caudate * -12 1 12 3.37
Right Posterior Cingulate 23 6 -30 20 3.11
0 -48 -10 71
Left Culmen * 0 -50 -9 4.06
-50 -61 10 980
Left Supramarginal Gyrus 40 -56 -54 21 4.71
Left Supramarginal Gyrus 40 -63 -45 29 3.72
-24 -53 -7 85
Left Parahippocampal Gyrus 19 -26 -53 -7 4.87
-16 -92 -1 71
Left Cuneus 17 -17 -94 -1 3.94
-5 -81 15 316
Left Cuneus 18 -4 -89 15 4.7
Left Lingual Gyrus 18 -7 -71 3 4.49
Left Cuneus 18 0 -81 25 4.11
Left Cuneus 19 -13 -87 25 3.92
Left Cuneus 19 -6 -83 35 3.69
-42 21 6 23
-28 - 16 25
79
0 46 28 53
Left Medial Frontal Gyrus 9 -1 47 28 3.58
41 13 28 62
55 - 35 59
25
Right Postcentral Gyrus 2 57 -25 36 3.93
-11 - 38 40
51
3 - 42 37
pg. 15


55
-54 2 38 21
Left Precentral Gyrus 6 -55 2 38 3.27
-22 - 40 60
71
35 -1 40 44
Right Precentral Gyrus 6 39 -4 38 3.49
-38 3 46 31
-7 11 62 30
pg. 16


Table 3 – Interaction between dehumanization and type in Study 1
Cluster Peak
size Brodmann
x y z (voxels) Region Name area x y z zstat
-12 -64 4 7724
Right Lingual Gyrus 17 10 -89 0 7.18
Left Lingual Gyrus 17 -10 -92 -3 6.72
Left Cuneus * -20 -94 3 6.63
Left Declive * -13 -81 -12 6.52
Left Middle Occipital Gyrus 19 -48 -77 -6 6.39
Left Declive * -33 -77 -14 6.09
Left Declive * -33 -53 -14 5.99
Left Inferior Semi-Lunar Lobule * -10 -71 -37 5.37
Left Precuneus 31 -27 -72 28 5.32
Left Amygdala * -19 -11 -11 5.1
Right Middle Occipital Gyrus * 50 -76 2 4.88
Left Pryamis * -5 -71 -25 4.72
Left Superior Temporal Gyrus 39 -47 -50 16 4.67
Left Posterior Cingulate 30 -14 -53 10 4.63
Left Inferior Semi-Lunar Lobule * -24 -67 -41 4.59
Right Declive * 35 -60 -16 4.58
Right Cerebellar Tonsil * 1 -54 -36 4.53
Right Culmen * 7 -36 -3 4.32
pg. 17


Left Hippocampus * -29 -30 -3 4.17
Right Inferior Semi-Lunar Lobule * 9 -70 -36 4.13
Left Pyramis * -19 -63 -28 3.92
Left Thalamus * 0 -18 11 3.9
Right Caudate * 4 11 14 3.72
Left Subcallosal Gyrus 34 -26 3 -10 3.72
Left Cingulate Gyrus 31 -15 -31 42 3.57
Right Cuneus 19 27 -81 29 3.44
2 32 -8 191
Right Anterior Cingulate 32 3 36 -7 4.39
Right Medial Frontal Gyrus 11 1 24 -12 4.25
Right Rectal Gyrus 11 8 15 -18 3.24
-
-51 -17 11 23
Left Middle Temporal Gyrus 21 -51 -18 -11 3.8
29 25 -6 34
Right Inferior Frontal Gyrus 47 30 25 -8 3.95
21 -3 -9 22
Right Parahippocampal Gyrus * 22 -2 -9 3.79
-35 -11 -3 28
-10 13 6 22
Left Caudate * -9 13 8 3.62
45 16 25 575
Right Precentral Gyrus 6 42 3 36 5.21
-43 26 12 20
pg. 18


-1 43 21 240
Right Medial Frontal Gyrus 9 10 43 17 4.05
-52 3 16 17
-43 35 23 19
-19 -3 67 27
Left Superior Frontal Gyrus 6 -20 -2 69 3.33
pg. 19


Table 4 – Main Effect of Image Category (Human, Animal, or Machine) in Study 2.
Cluster Peak
x y z size Region Name Brodmann x y z zstat
(voxels) area
-20 -3 -42 28
Left Uncus 20 -21 -4 -43 4.11
28 -45 -9 2524
Right Middle Occipital Gyrus * 49 -75 2 7.38
Right Superior Parietal 7 25 -61 47 4.65
Lobule
Right Declive * 12 -73 -11 4.04
Right Cuneus 17 15 -88 8 3.95
Right Pyramis * 12 -77 -26 3.55
-2 36 -12 121
Left Anterior Cingulate 32 -2 41 -9 4.12
Left Rectal Gyrus 11 -11 39 -22 3.88
Left Medial Frontal Gyrus 25 0 21 -14 3.33
-26 -45 -9 2725
Left Precuneus 31 -25 -72 29 5.49
Left Declive * -14 -78 -12 4.85
Left Lingual Gyrus 18 -2 -78 0 3.79
-50 -9 -12 77
-40 3 30 584
Left Precentral Gyrus 6 -43 2 34 5.1
Left Inferior Frontal Gyrus 45 -47 26 20 5
pg. 20


Left Inferior Frontal Gyrus 47 -48 30 -2 4.27
Left Middle Frontal Gyrus 11 -44 40 -12 4.02
Left Middle Frontal Gyrus * -51 35 13 3.92
-4 -54 27 344
Left Posterior Cingulate 23 -5 -54 13 4.53
Right Cingulate Gyrus 31 7 -53 30 4.38
16 -54 18 25
-8 60 21 53
-46 -66 30 97
Left Angular Gyrus 39 -46 -67 30 4.56
Left Superior Temporal 39 -62 -58 23 4.18
Gyrus
56 21 27 26
-2 -24 36 20
Left Cingulate Gyrus 23 1 -26 32 3.43
-10 21 60 60
-32 15 54 13
pg. 21

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YNIMG-10421; No.

of pages: 16; 4C: 2, 5, 6, 7, 9, 11, 13

Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect

© 2013 Published by Elsevier Inc. 36

guilt). Haslam (2006) similarly examines the everyday denial of 53

1053-8119/$ – see front matter © 2013 Published by Elsevier Inc.

119 which demonstrates that the see-sawing activity in these networks

350 images were designed

429 Study 2 should discourage dehumanizing. 461

structures likely to be identiﬁed as eyes. The android robots (6/24) 469

keys and 2 great apes. 476

(F = 9.90, p b 0.005) and an interaction between dehumanization 530

was not signiﬁcant (F = 1.99, n.s.). In mechanical reasoning areas, 532

564 ing areas. fective machine”, is similarly dehumanizing. 594

(Haslam, 2006). Speciﬁcally, we hypothesized that mechanistic dehu- 702

NeuroImage (2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2013.04.109

NeuroImage (2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2013.04.109

1086 and in-group membership.

1217 be explored in future work. 2008.09.002. 1278

Validation of Study 1 stimuli

Animalistic Humanizing (HA) - stimuli emphasized humanity by highlighting “uniquely human”

2. Ophelia is a curator at a small art gallery. She also works part-time as a

Mechanistic humanizing (HM) – stimuli emphasized humanity by highlighting “human nature”

1. After losing a long and hard-fought game, a basketball player

3. Felicia is a pediatric nurse. She works hard, and makes a reasonable

Animalistic Dehumanizing (DA) - stimuli denied humanity by highlighting behavior that

2. Sonny is a competitive hotdog eater. He doesn’t mind participating in

5. Concert goers started dancing aggressively, pushing and slamming

6. Andrea became overly intoxicated while at a music festival. She

Mechanistic Dehumanizing (DM) - stimuli denied humanity by highlighting behavior that

3. Eric is a mercenary who specializes in sniping. He takes whatever

4. Jerry is an accountant for a large firm. He has no contact with

5. Robert works for a health insurance company. His job is to find

8. The participants in this experiment looked at complex visual stimuli.

9. This picture illustrates a phenomenon called the “attentional blink.”

Supplementary Figure 1. Graphs of participant responses to stimuli in scanner. A: Mean affect

Supplementary Figure 2. Contrasts from Study 1 of Animalistic Humanizing - Animalistic

Table 1 – Main effect of dehumanization (humanizing vs. dehumanizing) in Study 1

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