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"The hydroelectric plant is set into the current of the Rhine... The Rhine itself appears to be something at our command.. The word expresses here something more, and something more essential, than mere "stock." The word "standing-reserve" assumes the rank of an inclusive rubric... hatever stands by in the sense of standing-reserve no longer stands over against us as an ob!ect... The words "setting--upon," "ordering," "standing-reserve," obtrude and accumulate in a dry, monotonous, and therefore oppressive way " this fact has its basis in what is now coming to utterance.# $artin %eidegger described in 1&'& the idea of a (Technological $indset#. This criti)ue of the technik mindset gave way the modern day policy debate criti)ue. $any current debaters cannot grasp the nuances of the %eidegger argument. This has lead to a hate of the %eidegger criti)ue. *t has been run so badly +ill +atterman, ,-R creater and oodword .oach, has stated in his /udge iki, (* have engaged in meditation on your 0, it reveals itself to me, and it still sucks. work harder.# To rectify this problem you must learn the kritik from the ground up. 1top being la2y and stupid. 3earn it. To begin with, you must understand %eidegger4s idea of phenomenology. 5ccording to 1tanford 6ncyclopedia of 7hilosophy (phenomenology# is described as, (the study of structures of consciousness as experienced from the first-person point of view.# The idea of phenomenology was created by 8erman philosopher %usserl. %usserl was a professor at the 9niversity of :reiburg where %eidegger was a good friend and a student. %ere had a revolutionary idea. %usserl thought that the being of things, the essence and what they are, is defined and found by the phenomenon in this world. These phenomenon are everything we sense. ;ur sights, feelings, smells. 6verything that is observed by us is a phenomenon. %usserl stated that these phenomenon, these observations by the viewer, allow us to find the things true being. <et, after the end of * %eidegger began to doubt %usserl4s view that there was a true (+eing# =5 god in the sense of a absolute truth.> +ecause of this doubt, %eidegger began to redefine the view of phenomenology on the world. %e described that there was no true (+eing# to things, and that everyone4s (+eing# is based off people4s sub!ective perception of phenomenon. %e proposed that our perception changed the essence of people. -ow * shall explain my awesome paint drawing showing a visual representation of phenomenology. 5 is being shown as the sun. *t is shining onto + which is our orange. This casts a shadow =:> onto the wall which is 6. Then sitting in front of wall . is our little %eidegger =?>. The shadow is our perceptions within the word. %eidegger is us. alls . and 6 are the world. The ob!ect is any ob!ect in the world. 3astly, the sun is our senses allowing for perception. -ow our sense, the sun, sense this the ob!ect, the orange. This produces our perception of the ob!ect, the shadow. This process of our perceptions take place ;- and *- the world, the walls . and 6. e sit in and on the world like lil4 %eidegger and observe our perceptions with our mind. These perceptions make us see the being of the ob!ect, in this case an orange. *t is our perceptions, the shadow, that allow this ob!ect to become an orange. *f we saw the characteristics of a dog, we would believe the essence was a dog. +ut because we perceived this way it is this way. <ay for paint. -ow that we understand %eidegger4s view on ontology, let us look at the kritik@ %eidegger believed that the world today is seen in the (technological mindset#. This mindset is when we begin to (order things about#. hen a hydroelectric damn was put into the Rhine river, it was no longer seen as a river. *t was now !ust a power source waiting for us to use it. This makes the river become a (1tanding Reserve# waiting for human4s to use it. *t looses it4s ontological status as an ob!ect because of it. *t is no longer seen as an ob!ect or a river in any poetic or lived sense, but it4s merely a resource for us to gather. +ecause humans began to become so attached to this mindset, they began to view everything in this light. oods are now seen as waiting timber, mountains are seen as mineral deposits and even soldiers are seen as foot units and numbers to be calculated. 6veryone begins to be seen as an ob!ect and we lose all of our relationships with other

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people. Bimmerman describes this in 4&' as an (;ntological ?amnation.# This card sucks. ?on4t read it. +ut what Bimmerman is meaning by this is that we4ll reach a point where no one has an ontological relationship with anyone else. This makes it so we shall never again come back to a point where we will have ontology. ;nce we reach the point where everyone has this mindset, no one will be able to go back because they no longer see the value of people other than ob!ectifying them, and we will, as the human species, get back to a point where we have a form of ontology. (;ntological ?amnation... %ell on 6arth... $as)uerading in a material paradise.# *n the context of a debate round, the kritik is simple. The 5ffirmative provides a plan which uses this technik mindset. 5s the negative you say this is bad. e should oppose this mindset so as we do not lose out ontological valuing of the 6arth and 7eople. *t is the root cause of all their impacts and your impacts will out weight theirs =8o Ct3>. * can not stress enough. <ou don4t care about technology. *t rules. *t rocks. <ou love it. <ou want to have sex with it. <ou want to bring it to your house, make love to it and be there in the morning to cook it breakfast and drive it to work. <ou concede technology rocks, in the sort of way that you want to rock it all night long. <ou are kritiking the technological mindset, not technology. There is a large difference. The technological mindset is order things about and making things (standing reserves#. Technology is not that. <ou kritik technik not technology. * can4t stress this enough. ;ne last thing * can4t stress enough. Read the fucking literature. *t will better your understanding so much. *t will make everything make sense. *t will make the terms become clear and every nuanced argument gold. Read the cards, read the literature. %opefully now that you understand the basics of the %eidegger kritik you will be able to understand the picture at the top. :or more fun and help go toD httpDEEen.wikipedia....ianFterminology httpDEEen.wikipedia....artinF%eidegger :or )uestionsD !oncookdebateGgmail.com ;ne last thing, he was totally a -a2i.

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Heidegger K Page (4/247)


Long 1NC

Space exploration makes forces humans to view the world in a copernican mannerism, and obliterates our ontological connection to the Earth and forces us into the technological mindset. Turnbull '06
[Neil, Senior Lecturer in Philosophy and Social Theory at. Nottingham Trent University, The Ontological Conse uences o! Copernicus", Theory, Culture # Society, $%&'((.) *ssentially, Niet+sche,s claim is that Copernicanism and -ar.inism !orce us to uestion the signi!icance o! /oth the 0ree1 2umanist and the [end o! page '$3) 4udeo5Christian conceptions o! humanity and its .orld &that is, to thin1 /eyond the territoriali+ation o! 6estern philosophy as some.here /et.een 78thens, and 74erusalem,(. 9n Niet+sche,s vie., modern metaphysics is /oth 7groundless, and 7simian, /ecause, a!ter Copernicus and -ar.in, 7the earth does not stand !ast, &Niet+sche, '::;< $( and 7man is more o! an ape than any ape, &Niet+sche, ':=:< >$(. 9n such a conte?t Niet+sche,s madman is not a prophet o! lost archaic theological certainties, /ut a ne. voice o! sanity, castigating, .arning and e?horting his 7metaphysically somnam/ulant, audience to .a1e up to the truly !rightening placelessness o! modernity,s Copernican and -ar.inian !orms o! li!e. 8nd many .ho have !ollo.ed Niet+sche in this regard have noted that the 1ey to understanding the signi!icance o! modernity,s unheimlich ontology resides .ithin a /roader appreciation o! the .ay in .hich the ne. cosmology has undermined traditional conceptions o! earth.

s Niet+sche,s heir @artin !eidegger !amously claimed, when seen in "opernican planetar#$cosmological terms, the earth is no longer the earth in an# vital or lived sense but simpl# an object comprised of %purel# technological relationships& and an ob'ect, moreover, that is sub'ectivi(ed into a representation, a vorstellung, that %stands before us& rather than as something in %our midst& &2eidegger, '::%< 'A35 =(. )or !eidegger, once perceived and conceived as a visual representation of a planetar# bounded whole, the earth becomes %deworlded&* appearing as 'ust one more casual s#stem within a much wider cosmological causal order. nd this is wh# for !eidegger 5 in his muchB cited re!lections on this matter 5 the interplanetar# images of the earth from space are not simpl# the end product of a rather complex and powerful set of technological process that enframe the earth as a mass industriali(ed ob'ect, but are images that radicall# diminish the meaning of the earth, rendering humanit# without a world within which to dwell &a theme that 9 return to later(. 6hen seen in 2eideggerian terms, "opernicanism reduces the earth to mere %planetar# matter&+ an absurd and inhuman cosmic accident devoid of an# ultimate sense or significance. 9n such a conte?t .e can no longer spea1 o! a meaning!ul .orld at all, /ecause when the earth is %reduced& to a visual representation, it ceases to be a context of significance but stands as something that %transcends all tacitl# shared assumptions&. 8s such, it is 7/eyond all !rame.or1s 5 an a/yss, &6ood, $AA$< '3(. 9t
/ecomes a 7spectral earth, 5 a mere !lic1er o! light in the cosmological void. 8s Lyotard claimed, as a Copernican technologi+ed o/Cect the earth 7isn,t at all originary, /ut merely a 7spasmodic state o! energy, an instant o! esta/lished order, a smile on the sur!ace o! matter in a remote corner o! the cosmos, &Lyotard, '::'< 'A(.

***SHELLS***

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Space Exploration is a s#mptom of ,estern desire to enframe the Earth and understand ever# being as standing reserve. -immerman './
[@ichael *., Ph-, Tulane, ':D> is Pro!essor o! Philosophy and !ormer -irector o! the Center !or 2umanities and the 8rts at CU Eoulder, Contesting earth,s !uture< radical ecology and postmodernity", UT Li/rary Catalog, @E) Li1e many deep ecologists, Capra critici+es modernity /ecause it inter!eres .ith the smooth !unctioning o! the *arthFs ecosystem hence, he suggests that systems theory is not intrinsically domineering, any more than uantum theory, .hich is so use!ul !or the computers and other electronic e uipment on .hich systems theory applications are so dependent. -eep ecologists .arn that despite supercomputers, scientists cannot !ully predict the conse uences o! their actions.

"haos theor#, though not mentioned /y Capra in The Turning Point, argues that this lack of predictive capacit# is due to the fact that most natural phenomena, including weather, are nonlinear s#stems , .hich are in principle unpredicta/le /eyond the short term. 0er# small scale perturbations can trigger off a vast, s#stem altering event. 2ence, although some people ma# wish to use s#stems theor# and c#bernetics to support schemes !or domination, chaos theor# shows the limits to such aspirations . The de/ate a/out photographs o! *arth ta1en !rom outer space also re!lects the de/ate /et.een Ne. 8gers and deep ecologists. The technical accomplishments re1uired to build the spacecraft !rom .hich to ta1e those photos, regarded /y some ecological activists as inspiring images o! the living *arth, were made possible b# the same ob'ectif#ing attitude that discloses Earth as a stockpile of raw materials !or enhancing human po.er. 2ence, Gaa1ov 0ar/ has argued that although those photos may seem to disclose the interconnectedness o! li!e, they ma# also be read as s#mptoms of ,estern 2man's2 drive to escape from his dependence on Earth .=3 Ey achieving a perspective that reduces Earth to an image reproducible on a postcard, 2man2 gains the illusion of control over the planet. 3ecoiling against his organic origins and his mortalit#, man begins conceiving of himself as godlike and as radically other than nature. Satellite photos of Earth ma# be instances of that 2high altitude thinking2 &@erleauPonty( which conceives of itself as pure spirit rising above the natural world . 9n such photos, .e see *arth re!lected in the rearvie. mirror o! the
spaceship ta1ing us a.ay !rom our home in order to con uer the universe. 2eidegger .arned that in the technological era, !or something Hto /eH means !or it to /e an HimageH &Bild( proCected /y and constrained in accordance .ith the demands o! the po.ercraving su/Cect.== 9n ':==, he remar1ed that H9 .as !rightened .hen 9 sa. pictures coming !rom the moon to the earth. 6e donFt need any atom /om/. The uprooting o! man has already ta1en placeI. This is no longer the earth on .hich man lives.H=D 0ar/ argues that the same environmentalists .ho charge that the o/Cecti!ying technological attitude

highaltitude photos of Earth also erase difference and reduce the planet to two dimensions. 0ar/ notes that immersing oneself in wild nature !or an e?tended period lets one experience the multila#ered complexit# and specificit# of the living Earth, as well as one's dependence on it . Though deep ecologists, Ne. 8gers, and many
that reduces natural phenomena to indistinguisha/le ra. material sometimes !ail to notice that postmodern theorists e?tol the virtues o! the local, the particular, and the di!!erent, the very idea o! the HlocalH /ecomes pro/lematic as the socioeconomic .orld /ecomes increasingly interdependent. Consider the !ollo.ing scenario< rising glo/al oil prices ma1e coo1ing !uel too e?pensive !or many Third 6orld people, .ho then cut trees !or !uel. The !elled trees no longer a/sor/ car/on dio?ide and give o!! o?ygen, thus e?acer/ating the glo/al .arming that may trigger climate changes that devastate mid.estern 8merican agriculture, .hile at the same time melting polar ice caps and thus !looding Ne. Orleans and @iami. Jurther, !elled trees may contri/ute to local topsoil erosion, /ut may also cause erosion that silt up rivers, there/y causing massive !looding do.nstream. Comple? socioeconomic events thus can set o!! a chain o! events .ith catastrophic conse uences at local and glo/al levels.

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ll attempts to think global politics presuppose an ontolog# which inform all following action 4 53 and world order studies inherentl# follow a calculatative and technolog# mindset6 ll the aff claims are premised on an ontolog# of calculation which must be confronted before we can enact change. Swa(o '07
[pro!essor o! philosophy at university o! 8las1a, Jair/an1s, $AA$ [Norman K, Crisis Theory and 6orld Order< 2eideggerian Le!lections p.D>BD=)

To the extent that world order studies are steeped in a strategic rationalit#, in calculative thinking, the# do not concern themselves with the task of having a reflective insight into the fundamental features of the age. The# do not concern themselves with the ground that enables an# thinking and doing such as is pursued b# a science, natural or social. Get, it is this enabling ground that is reall# determinative of that science, inasmuch as all positing of a domain of in1uir# presupposes an ontolog#. ,orld order studies, as a development o! contemporary social science, li1e.ise are dependent upon one or another ontological commitment. Speci!ically, 9 shall argue, the# are determined b# the ontological positions that prevail in the modern period of ,estern philosoph#+ for these are the positions fundamentall# decisive for the profound change taking place in humanit#'s self$understanding, in our conception of all that is content of our world, and our relation to this world. 8/out this 9 shall concern mysel! in section $. Ee!ore doing this it is important that this relation /et.een
a positive science and ontology /e stated in /road outline. Jor this 9 turn to 2eidegger. H8ll nonBphilosophical sciences,H remar1s 2eidegger, Hhave as their theme some /eing or /eings, and indeed in such a .ay that they are in every case antecedently given as /eings to those sciences.H; Continuing, 2eidegger .rites< They are posited /y them in advanceM they are a positum !or them. 8ll the propositions o! the nonBphilosophical sciences, including those o! mathematics, are positive propositions. 2ence, to distinguish them !rom philosophy, .e shall call all nonBphilosophical sciences positive sciences. Positive sciences deal .ith that .hich is, .ith /eingsM that is to say, they al.ays deal .ith speci!ic domains, !or instance, nature. 6ithin a given domain scienNti!ic research again cuts out particular spheres< nature as physically material li!eless nature and nature as living nature. 9t divides the sphere o! the living into individual !ields< the plant .orld, the animal .orld. 8nother domain o! /eings is historyM its spheres are art history, political history, history o! sciNence, and history o! religion. . . . The /eings o! these domains are !amiliar to us even i! at !irst and !or the most part .e are not in a position to delimit them sharply and clearly !rom one another. 6e can, o! course, al.ays name, as a provisional description .hich satis!ies practically rhe purpose o! posiB tive science, some /eing that !alls .ithin the domain 6e can al.ays /ring !or.ard and picture ourselves some /eing /elonging to any given domain. ... 8 /eingOthatFs something, a

,orld order studies are, properly spea1ing, nonphilosophical. 6hile concerned with a num/er o! domainsOpolitical, economic, historical, etc.Oit is the political domain that is central to these in1uiries, presupposing the classical architectonic claims of the science of politics fot thinking and doing.'A 9nso!ar as the political domain is primary, world order studies deal with beings that are said to be political, ho.ever e?plicitly or am/iguously this denomination is to /e understood.
ta/le, a chair, a tree, the s1y, a /ody, some .ords, an action.: Such /eings are things o! vatious 1inds< humans ua citi+ens, o!!ice holders, rulers, legislatotsM .ords such as pu/lic or o!!icial documents, codes o! la., tteaties o! reciprocal o/ligation, spo1en discoutseM actions in all modes o! pu/lic /eingB .ithBoneBanotherM things mote or less !amiliar /ut not so .ell delimitedOregimes, states, constitutions, organi+ations, associaNtionsM in short, things that have theit /eing in thought, .otd, and deed.

ll beings of the political domain become the proper concern of this thinking 1ua world order studies, despite the division o! this domain into particular spheres &domestic politics and international relations( and

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individual !ields &!oreign policy, legislation, pu/lic la., pu/lic administration, state and municipal or provincial and local government, party politics, etc.(.

)or world order studies, politics presents itself as global. 8olitics so conceived, as .ell as patterns o! /ehaviot and practice /et.een levels o! government, matter insofar as the# bear upon and contribute to the overall condition of our common planetat# existence. 9ndeed, properly spea1ing, where global identit# and global interdependence are determinative of outlook concerning political existence, the distinction of domestic and international spheres becomes rather anachronistic, remaining useful onl# for purposes of anal#ses and investigations proper to the science of politics in its present empiricall#$oriented methodolog#. 9t is important to undetstand that political science posits in advance the various political things that constitute its ob'ects of investigation. 5n this posit, an ontolog#O.hat these things are, ho. they are, their .ay o! /eingO is implicit, if not explicit. This ontolog#, insofar as it is the ontology o! the speci!ic domain or region o! /eings that politics is, grounds the science of politics. That is, political science can be said to be dependent on, or to derive !rom, a regional ontolog#, vi(., political ontolog#. 9ntolog# as such is a theoretical in1uir#, i.e., in uiry He?plicitly devoted to the meaning o! entities,H this meaning being articulated b# wa# of basic concepts. 8olitical ontolog#, too, is a theoretical in1uir# devoted to the meaning of those entities that provide the sub'ect matter of empirical political science 1ua positive science. Consider 2eideggerFs !ollo.ing comments concerning such a
relation< Scienti!ic research accomplishes, roughly and naively, the demarcation and initial !i?ing o! the areas o! su/CectB

The basic structures of an# such area have already /een worked out after a fashion in our pre$scientific wa#s of experiencing and interpreting that domain of :eing in which the area of sub'ect$matter is itself confined. The F/asic conceptsF .hich thus arise remain our pro?imal clues !or disclosing this area concretely !or the !irst time. ... :asic concepts determine the wa# in which we get an understanding beforehand of the sub'ect$matter underl#ing all the ob'ects a science takes as its theme, and all positive investigation is guided b# this understanding. 9nl# after the area itsel! has /een e?plored /e!orehand in a corresponding manner do these concepts become genuinely demonstrated and 'grounded'. Eut since every such area is itsel! o/tained !rom the domain o! entities themselves, this preliminar# research, !rom .hich the /asic concepts are dra.n, signifies nothing else than an interpretation of those entities with regard to their basic state of being. n 9t is in ta1ing the Hstep /ac1,H so to
matter. spea1, !rom the positing o! a domain and the research underta1en /y a positive science to the ontology implicit in this Hdemarcation and initial !i?ing o! the areas o! su/CectBmatterH that one /egins to ma1e the move !rom calculative thin1ing to meditative thin1ing. 9nasmuch as meditative thin1ing is concerned .ith the HmeaningH that reigns in things and thus .ith the ground that ena/les scienti!ic in uiry, the orientation o! such thin1ing is primarily ontological rather than positive &scienti!ic(. 2ere .e have the distinction /et.een philosophy and scienceO speci!ically, /et.een philosophy ua metaphysics and science. 6e can no. /egin to ma1e our .ay through the uestions initially set !orth at the /eginning o! this chapter, and to clari!ying the need !or and Custi!ication o! meditative thin1ing as it /ears upon contemporary .orld order thin1ing.

,e are doomed to complete ontological damnation if we allow calculative master# over the world to continue. This results in ecological destruction, nuclear war, a complete loss of meaning, the end of

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thinking, the end of politics and the end of ever#thing. Thiele &.;
[Leslie, Pro!essor o! Political Science at the University o! Jlorida, Timely @editations< @artin 2eidegger and Postmodern Politics, pg $A%B$A>)

The age of planetar# master#, technological dominance, and the end of metaph#sics, 2eidegger speculates, will likel# endure for a long time &*P :3(. 9ndeed, there
is no certainty that, !rom humanityFs point o! vie., a succession to some other mode o! revealing truth is ordained. The uest may reach its clima?, as it .ere, .ithout us. 5n the absence of an ontological reorientation, humanit# would then be 2left to the gidd# whirl of its products so that it ma# tear itself to pieces and annihilate itself in empt# nothingness2 &*P ;D(. *stimating the li1elihood o! this apocalyptic conclusion is not 2eideggerFs concern. 9n any case, it is fair to sa# that the ph#sical annihilation of humanit# is not !eidegger's most proximate worr#. )oremost in his mind is the on$ tological meaning of this potential self$annihilation. 5f, as !eidegger put it, 2the will to action, which here means the will to make and be effective, has overrun and crushed thought,2 then our chances of escaping the catastrophic whirlwind of enframing are slim indeed &6CT$3(. The danger is that intensive technological production ma# simpl# overpower human being's capacit# for manifold modes of disclosure, displacing the freedom inherent in philosophic thought, artistic creativit#, and political action. Undenia/ly technology !osters thin1ing, creating, and acting o! sorts. technological Calculation, cognition, innovation, and engineering are highly valued .ithin technological society, though even here it is not clear that computers and ro/ots might not eventually displace more o! these capacities than their production demands.

social engineering would obviate political action, endlessl# innovative production would leave artistic creativit# to atroph#, and utilitarian cognition would full# displace philosophic 1uestioning.2
The real menace, ho.ever, is that Eecause the human capacity !or thought is the !oundation !or artistic creativity and political action, 2eidegger indicates that its loss is his most pressing concern. 2e .rites, H 5n

this dawning atomic age a far greater danger threatens<precisel# when the danger of a third world war has been removed. ... the approaching tide of technological revolution in the atomic age could so captivate, bewitch, da((le, and beguile man that calculative thinking ma# someda# come to be accepted and practiced as the onl# wa# of thinking2 &-T 3=(. 9n the .a1e o! this revolution .e !ind ourselves desperately in need o!
Han education in thin1ingH &TE D$(. Such an education .ould, at a minimum, allo. us to discern .hy calculative thought could never ade uately su/stitute !or philosophic thought. 9n the a/sence o! such learning, and in the continued thrall o! en!raming, our capacity !or philosophic thought may .ither /eyond resuscitation.

=ost disturbing and dangerous, ho.ever, this situation need not disturb or appear dangerous at all. Technological calculation and innovation ma# satisf# both our intensified material needs and our diminished spiritual demands . 8s 2eidegger .arns< HThe devastation of the earth can easil# go hand in hand with a guaranteed supreme living standard for ma n, and 'ust as easil# with the organi(ed establishment of a uniform state of happiness for all men2 &6CT %A(. >evastation need not mean discontent. 5ndeed, technological

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devastation ma# consist in humanit#'s creation of a brave and exciting new world. ?topia and oblivion, as Euc1minster Juller prophesied, ma# well coincide. -evastation, 2eidegger states, His the highBvelocity e?pulsion o! @nemosyneH &6CT %A(. =nemos#ne, or remembrance, designates not simpl# a recollection of what was, but also a 2steadfast intimate concentration2 on and a 2devotion2 toward worldl# things and affairs. Lemem/rance is the Hconstant concentrated a/iding .ith somethingO not Cust .ith
something that has passed, /ut in the same .ay .ith .hat is present and .ith .hat may come. 6hat is past, present, and to come appears in the oneness o! its o.n present /eingH &6CT '>A(.

The ex$pulsion of memor#, therefore, is the loss of the capacit# to abide b# , rather than challenge forth, the world. 9nce the fourfold is reduced to an extension of our cerebral computations and technical orderings our capacit# to dwell within its hori(ons vanishes. ,e sit complacent in homelessness. The devastation is complete The technological age places humans and nature in standing reserve$ Standing reserve is to be ob'ectified, counted and calculated$ the impact is #ou are assigned no value to #our life =itchell '0;
[8ndre. 4. @itchell, PostB-octoral Jello. in the 2umanities at Stan!ord University, H2eidegger and Terrorism,H Lesearch in Phenomenology, Polume %3, Num/er ', $AA3 , pp. ';'B$';)QQCrc) Opposition is no longer an operative concept !or 2eidegger, since technology has served to eradicate the distance that .ould separate the supposedly opposed parties. The analysis o! technology in 2eideggerFs .or1 is guided /y the &phenomenological( insight that H8ll distances in time and space are shrin1ingH &08 D:< %M c!. GA D< 157/PLT, '=3(.'%

irplanes, microwaves, email, these serve to abbreviate the world, to be sure, but there is a metaph#sical distance that has likewise been reduced, that between sub'ect and ob'ect. This modern dualism has been surpassed /y .hat 2eidegger terms the standing$reserve (Best nd!, the eerie companion o!
technological dominance and Hen!raming.H 9nso!ar as an o/Cect (Gegenst nd! .ould stand over against (Gegen! a su/Cect,

2,hat stands b# in the sense of standing$reserve, no longer stands over against us as ob'ect2 (GA 7" $AQRCT, 'D(. present ob'ect could stand over against another+ the standing$reserve, however, precisel# does not stand+ instead, it circulates, and in this circulation it eludes the modern determination of thinghood. 5t is simpl# not present to be cast as a thing. 6ith en!raming, .hich names the dominance o! position, positing, and posing (stellen! in all o! its modes, things are no longer .hat they .ere. Ever#thing becomes an item for ordering (#estellen! and delivering ($ustellen! ever#thing is 2read# in place2 ( u% der &telle $ur &telle!, constantly availa/le and replacea/le &08 D:< $;(. The standing$reserve 2exists2 within this c#cle of order and deliver#, exchange and replacement. This is not
o/Cects can no longer /e !ound. merely a development e?ternal to modem o/Cects, /ut a change in their /eing. The standingBreserve is !ound only in its circulation along these supply channels, .here one item is Cust as good as any other, .here, in !act, one item is identical

3eplaceabilit# is the being of things toda#. 2Toda# being is being$ rephlceable2 ('&, 'ADQ=$(, 2eidegger claims in ':=:. The trans!ormation is such that .hat is here no. is not
to any other. does not operate serially, since .e are no longer dealing .ith discrete, individual o/Cects. 9nstead,

really here no., since there is an item identical to it some.here else ready !or delivery. This cycle o! ordering and delivery

there is onl# a

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stead# circulation of the standing$reserve, which is here now just as much as it is there in storage. The standing$reserve spreads itself throughout the entiret# of its' replacement c#cle, without being full# present at an# point along the circuit. Eut it is not merely a matter o! mass produced products /eing replacea/le. To complete !eidegger's view of the enframed standing reserve, we have to take into consideration the global role of value, a complementar# determination of being < HEeing has /ecome valueH (GA 3< $3;Q':$(. The
Niet+schean legacy !or the era o! technology &Niet+sche as a thin1er o! values( is evident here. Eut the preponderance o! value is so !ar !rom preserving di!!erences and esta/lishing order o! ran1, that it only serves to !urther level the ran1s and

,hen ever#thing has a value, an exchangeabilit# and replaceabilit# operates laterall# across continents, languages, and difference, with great homogeni(ing and globali(ing effect. The standing$reserve collapses opposition. The .ill that dominates the modem
esta/lish the identity o! everything .ith its replacement. era is personal, even i!, as is the case .ith Lei/ni+, the ends o! that .ill are not completely 1no.n /y the sel! at any particular time. Nonetheless,

the will still expresses the individualit# of the person and one's perspective. 5n the era of technolog#, the will that comes to the fore is no longer the will of an individual, but a will without a restricted human agenda. 9n !act, the .ill in uestion no longer .ills an o/Cect outside o! itsel!, /ut only
.ills itsel!M it is a .ill to .ill. 9n this .ay, the .ill need never leave itsel!. This sel!Ba!!irming character o! the .ill allo.s the .ill an independence !rom the human. @ani!est in the very .or1ings o! technology is a .ill to po.er, .hich !or 2eidegger is al.ays a .ill to .ill. Eecause the .ill to .ill has no goal outside o! it, its .illing is goalless and endless.

The human is 'ust another piece of a standing$reserve that circulates without purpose. 8ctually, things have not yet gone so !arM the human still retains a distinction, ho.ever illusive, as Hthe
most important ra. materialH &08 D< ((/)P, 'A>(. This importance has nothing to do .ith the personal .illing o!

2The human is the 'most important raw material' because he remains the sub'ect of all consumption, so much so that he lets his will go forth unconditionall# in this process and simultaneousl# becomes the 'ob'ect' of the abandonment of being2 (GA 7" ;;Q*P, 'A>(. ?nconditioned willing transcends the merel# human will , which satis!ies itsel! .ith restricted goals and accomplishments. ?nconditioned willing makes of the sub'ect an agent of the abandonment of being, one whose task it is to ob'ectif# ever#thing. The more the world comes to stand at the will's disposal, the more that being retreats from it. The human will is allied with the technological will to will. Jor this reasonBand the !ollo.ing is something o!ten overloo1ed
conditional goals, as 2eidegger immediately ma1es clear, in considering 2eideggerFs political position /et.een the .arsB2eidegger is critical o! the very notion o! a JLFhrer, or leader, .ho .ould direct the circulation o! the standingBreserve according to his o.n personal .ill.

The leaders of toda# are merel# the necessar# accompaniment of a standing$reserve that, in its abstraction, is susceptible to planning. The leaders' seeming position of 2sub'ectivit#,2 that the# are the ones who decide, is again another working of 2ob'ectification,2 where neither of these terms 1uite fits, given that beings are no longer ob'ective. The .ill!ulness o! the leaders is not due to a
personal .ill< One /elieves that the leaders had presumed everything o! their o.n accord in the /lind rage o! a sel!ish egotism and arranged everything in accordance .ith their o.n .ill *)igensinn+, 9n truth, ho.ever, leaders are the necessary conse uence o! the !act that /eings have gone over to a .ay o! errancy, in .hich an emptiness e?pands that re uires a single ordering and securing o! /eings. (GA D< ;:Q*P, 'A3M tin( The leaders do not stand a/ove or control the proceedings, the proceedings in uestion a!!ect /eings as a .hole, including the leaders. Leaders are simply points o!

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convergence or conduits !or the channels o! circulationM they are needed !or circulation, /ut are no.here outside o! it. No leader is the sole authorityM instead, there are numerous HsectorsH to .hich each leader is assigned. The demands o! these sectors .ill /e similar o! course, organi+ed around e!!iciency and productivity in distri/ution and circulation. 9n short,

leaders serve the standing$reserve.

loss of value to life precedes all other impacts 4 death is preferable to a valueless life =itchell '0;
[8ndre. 4. @itchell, PostB-octoral Jello. in the 2umanities at Stan!ord University, H2eidegger and Terrorism,H Lesearch in Phenomenology, Polume %3, Num/er ', $AA3 , pp. 'D'B$'D)

>evastation &Per.istung( is the process b# which the world becomes a desert &6!iste(, a sand# expanse that seemingl# extends without end , .ithout landmar1s or
direction, and is devoid o! all li!e.$A 9! .e !ollo. the dialogue in thin1ing an ancient 0ree1 notion o! Hli!eH as another name

the lifeless desert is the being$less desert. The world that becomes a lifeless desert is conse1uentl# an unworld from which being has withdrawn. The older prisoner ma1es this connection e?plicit, HThe /eing o! an age o! devastation .ould
!or H/eing,H then then consist in the a/andonment o! /eingH &08 DD< $'%(. 8s .e have seen, this is a process that /e!alls the .orld, slo.ly dissolving it o! .orldliness and rendering it an Hun.orldH &c!. 08 D< ;;, :$!.Q*P, 'A>, 'AD!., etc.(. Get this un.orld is not simply the opposite o! .orldM it remains a .orld, /ut a .orld made desert. The desert is not the complete a/sence o! .orld. Such an a/sence .ould not /e reached /y devastation &Per.isiung(, /ut rather /y annihilation &Pernichtung(M and

annihilation is far less of a concern than devastation < H-evastation is more uncanny than mere annihilation [/lo!le Pernichtung). =ere annihilation sweeps aside all things including even nothingness, while devastation on the contrar# orders and spreads ever#thing that blocks and prevents H &62-, ''Q$:B%AM tin(.
!or 2eidegger, 8nnihilation as a thought o! total a/sence is a thought !rom metaphysics. 9t is one .ith a thin1ing o! pure presence< pure presence, pure a/sence, and. purely no contact /et.een them. -uring another lecture course on 2=lderlin, this time in ':>$ on the hymn HThe 9ster,H 2eidegger claims that annihilation is precisely the agenda o! 8merica in regards to the Hhomeland,H .hich is here e uated .ith *urope< H6e 1no. today that the 8ngloBSa?on .orld o! 8mericanism has resolved to annihilate [+u vernichten) *urope, that is, the homeland, and that means< the inception o! the 6estern .orld. The inceptual is indestructi/le [un+erstoFr/ar)H &08 3%< =;Q3>M tm(. 8merica is the agent o! technological devastation, and it operates under the assumptions o! presence and a/sence that it itsel! is so e?pert at dissem/ling. 8merica resolves to annihilate and condemns itsel! to !dilure in so doing, !or the origin is Hindestructi/le.H 6e could ta1e this a step !urther and claim that only /ecause the origin cannot /e annihilated is it possi/le to destroy it. This possi/ility o! destruction is its indestructi/le character. 9t can al.ays /e !urther destroyed, /ut you .ill never annihilate it. 8mericanism names the endeavor or resolution to drive the destruction o! the .orld ever !urther into the un.orld. 8merica is the agent o! a malevolent /eing. This same reasoning e?plains .hy the older manFs original conception o! evil had to /e rethought .

Evil is the 2devastation of the earth and the annihilation of the human essence that goes along with it2 &08 DD< $AD(, he said, /ut this annihilation is simply too easy, too
much o! an H8mericanism.H The human essence is not annihilated in evilB.ho could care a/out thatS 9nstead it is destroyed

>evastation does not annihilate, but brings about something worse, the unworld. ,ithout limit, the desert of the unworld spreads, ever worsening and incessanti# urging itself to new expressions of malevolence. nnihilation would bring respite and, in a perverse sense, relief. There .ould /e nothing le!t to protect and guard, nothing le!t to concern ourselves .ithBnothing le!t to terrori+e. >evastation is also irreparable+ no salvation can arrive for it . The
and devastated /y evil. younger man is a/le to voice the monstrous conclusion o! this thin1ing o! devastation< HThen malevolence, as .hich devastation occurs [sich ereignet), .ould indeed remain a B/asic characteristic o! /eing itsel!H &08 DD< $'%, $'3M em(. The older man agrees, H/eing .ould /e in the ground o! its essence malevolentH &08 DD< $'3(. Eeing is not evilM it is something much .orseM /eing is malevolent.

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!ere's our alterntive text* 3e'ect the aff and their technological 'ump to solve problems and instead open up this space for meditative thinking. 9ur alternative grounds our thinking and dwells$upon the earth. 5nstead of pursuing the rigid confines of calculative thought, we instead take root to allow the human spirit to flourish and allow thinking about thinking. !eidegger '66
[@artin. The $Ath century,s SlavoC. -iscourse on Thin.ing. ':==. pp. >DB>:)

There are, then, two kinds of thinking, each Custi!ied and needed in its o.n .ay< calculative thinking and meditative thinking. This meditative thinking is what we have in mind when we sa# that contemporar# man is in flight$from$thinking . Get
you may protest< mere meditative thin1ing !inds itsel! !loating una.are a/ove reality. 9t loses touch. 9t is .orthless !or dealing .ith current /usiness. 9t pro!its nothing in carrying out practical a!!airs. 8nd

#ou ma# sa#, !inally, that mere meditative thinking, persevering meditation, is @aboveA the reach of ordinar# understanding. 9n this e?cuse only this much is true, meditative thinking does not 'ust happen b# itself an# more than does calculative thinking. t times it re1uires a greater effort. 5t demands more practice. 5t is in need of even more delicate care than an# other genuine craft. :ut it must also be able to bide its time, to await as does the farmer, whether the seed will come up and ripen. Get anyone can !ollo. the path o! meditative thin1ing in his o.n manner and .ithin
his o.n limits. 6hyS Eecause man is a thin1ing, that is, a meditating /eing. Thus meditative thin1ing need /y no means /e

5t is enough if we dwell on what lies close and meditate on what is closest+ upon that which concerns us, each one of us, here and now+ here, on this patch of home ground+ now, in the present hour of histor# . 76hat does this cele/ration suggest to us, in case .e are ready to meditateS Then we notice that a work of art has flowered in the ground of our homeland . 8s .e hold this simple !act in mind, .e
highB!lo.n." cannot help remem/ering at once that during the last t.o centuries great poets and thin1ers have /een /rought !orth !rom the S.a/ian land. Thin1ing a/out it !urther ma1es clear at once that Central 0ermany is li1e.ise such a land, and so are *ast Prussia, Silesia, and Eohemia. 6e gro. thought!ul and as1< does not the !lourishing o! any genuine .or1 depend upon its roots in a native soilS 4ohann Peter 2e/el once .rote< ,e

are plants which whether we like to admit it to ourselves or not$ must with our roots rise out of the earth in order to bloom in the ether and to bear fruit " &6or1s, ed. 8lt.egg 999, %'>.( The poet means to say< )or a trul# 'o#ous and salutar# human work to flourish, man must be able to mount from the depth of his home ground up into the ether. Ether here means the free air of the high heavens, the open realm of the spirit .
6e gro. more thought!ul and as1< does this claim o! 4ohann Peter 2e/el hold todayS -oes man still d.ell calmly /et.een heaven and earthS -oes a meditative spirit still reign over the landS 9s there still a li!eBgiving homeland in .hose ground man may stand rooted, that is, /e autochthonicS @any 0ermans have lost their homeland have had to leave their villages and to.ns, have /een driven !rom their native soil. Countless others .hose homeland .as saved, have yet .andered o!!. They have /een caught up in the turmoil o! the /ig cities, and have resettled in the .astelands o! industrial districts. They are strangers no. to their !ormer homeland. 8nd those .ho have stayed on in their homelandS O!ten they are still more homeless than those .ho have /een driven !rom their homeland. 2ourly and daily they are chained to radio and television. 6ee1 a!ter .ee1 the movies carry them o!! into uncommon, /ut o!ten merely common, realms o! the imagination, and give the illusion o! a .orld that is no .orld. Picture maga+ines are every.here availa/le. 8ll that .ith .hich modern techni ues o! communication stimulate, assail, and.drive manBall that is already much closer to man today than his !ields around his !armstead, closer than the s1y over the earth, closer than the change !rom night to day, closer than the conventions and

,e grow more thoughtful and ask* ,hat is happening here$with those driven from their homeland no less
customs o! his village, than the tradition o! his native .orld.

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than with those who have remainedB nswer* the rootedness, the autochthon#, of man is threatened toda# at$its core . *ven more< The loss$of$ rootedness is caused not merel# b# circumstance and fortune, nor does it stem onl# from the negligence and the superficialit# of man&s wa# of life. The loss of autochthon# springs from the spirit of the age into which all of us were born. ,e grow still more thoughtful and ask* 5f this is so, can man, can man&s work in the future still be expected to thrive in the fertile ground of a homeland and mount into the ether, into the far reaches of the heavens and the spiritB 9r will ever#thing now fall into the clutches of planning and calculation, of organi(ation and automation S cts of will cannot transform bad forms of thinking. ,e have to deepl# reflect and meditate with our alternatives meditative thought to allow meaning to reveal itself to us. This allows us to rediscover our worldl# home and choose how we want to be in the world. Thiele &.;
[Leslie, Pro!essor o! Political Science at the University o! Jlorida, Timely @editations< @artin 2eidegger and Postmodern Politics, pg $'%B$'>) 2eidegger o!!ers a hint a/out the nature o! the thin1ing that might loosen the grip o! technology. 2e .rites that H the

coming to presence of technolog# will be surmounted Tvenvunden) in a wa# that restores it into its #et concealed truth. This restoring surmounting is similar to what happens when, in the human realm, one gets over grief or pain2 &RT %:(. 9mportantly, one gets over grief not through a willful overcoming. Such self$master# onl# displaces grief , with the likelihood of its resurgence at some other time, in an invidious form . Li1e moods in general, grief is overcome not b# master#, intellect, or will, but onl# b# another mood &6P8
::(. 8nd moods, 2eidegger insists, cannot /e created, only summoned &ST 'A3(. The mood that allo.s our overcoming o!

9ne gets over grief b# once again coming to feel one's belonging in a world that , because of to its cruel deprivations, had for a time become alien. 2annah 8rendt o!ten called to mind 9sa1 -inesenFs saying that Hall sorro.s can /e /orne i! you put them into a story or tell a story a/out them.H -inesenFs point is that we get over grief b# reflecting on our grief$stricken selves and becoming interpretivel# reintegrated in the world. Cooking back on our grieved selves allows us to surmount grief not b# den#ing our misfortune but b# finding meaning in the stor# of our sorrow. To look back on ourselves in time is to gain distance, and, at the same time, a nearness to the ongoing and often tragic saga of worldl# habitation. 2omelessness is the mood o! the technological 2progress.H 2eideggerFs admonition to thin1 the nature o! technology, though !ar !rom a resigned musing, is not the devising o! a countero!!ensive. 6e are as1ed to respond !irst to the uestion H ,hat shall we thinkB2 rather than the uestion H6hat is to /e doneSH Eut the point is not simpl# that we must think before we act. The needed thinking of what we are doing and how we are being is not solel# a strategic preparation for more informed and
grie! might /est /e descri/ed as one o! rediscovered sanctuary.

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effective behavior. Thought must first save us from our typical modes o! /ehaving, namely those oriented to possessive master#. 2eidegger .arns that Hso long as .e represent technology as
an instrument, .e remain held !ast in the .ill to master itH &RT %$(. The more .e !ail to e?perience the essence o! technology as en!raming, persevering in the mista1en notion that comple? machinery is the danger, the more .e .ill

!eidegger explicitl# states that he is 2not against technolog#,2 nor does he suggest an# 2resistance against, or condemnation of, technolog#H &@2C >%O>>D. 5ndeed, the development of complex machines and techni1ues< technolog# as it is commonl# understood<has enormous benefits that must not be depreciated. 5t would be shortsighted to condemn such technolog# out of hand. 8part !rom our o/vious dependence on technical devices, their development also o!ten Hchallenges us to ever greater advancesH &-T 3% D. )rom political, social, cultural, and environmental standpoints, technolog# demonstrates man# virtues. 5ndeed, given the unrelenting extension of human power and population, technological developments that buffer the earth from our predaceousness seem both urgent and indispensable . 8 good /it o! the destruction humanity presently visits on the earth and itsel! ma1es sophisticated technological remedies necessary. !aving machines efficientl# serve our needs is neither evil nor regrettable. :ut this service must be grounded on our discover# of what needs we trul# have. =ore importantl#, it must be grounded on our discover# of what transcends human need.FU These, decidedly, are not technological 1uestions, and our capacit# to answer them largel# rests on our recover# of the capacit# to think be#ond the criterion of instrumental service . $'%B$'>
/elieve that salvation lies in our mastering technology /e!ore it masters us. 6ith this in mind,

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S"ort 1NC

Space exploration makes forces humans to view the world in a copernican mannerism, and obliterates our ontological connection to the Earth and forces us into the technological mindset. Turnbull '06
[Neil, Senior Lecturer in Philosophy and Social Theory at. Nottingham Trent University, The Ontological Conse uences o! Copernicus", Theory, Culture # Society, $%&'((.) *ssentially, Niet+sche,s claim is that Copernicanism and -ar.inism !orce us to uestion the signi!icance o! /oth the 0ree1 2umanist and the [end o! page '$3) 4udeo5Christian conceptions o! humanity and its .orld &that is, to thin1 /eyond the territoriali+ation o! 6estern philosophy as some.here /et.een 78thens, and 74erusalem,(. 9n Niet+sche,s vie., modern metaphysics is /oth 7groundless, and 7simian, /ecause, a!ter Copernicus and -ar.in, 7the earth does not stand !ast, &Niet+sche, '::;< $( and 7man is more o! an ape than any ape, &Niet+sche, ':=:< >$(. 9n such a conte?t Niet+sche,s madman is not a prophet o! lost archaic theological certainties, /ut a ne. voice o! sanity, castigating, .arning and e?horting his 7metaphysically somnam/ulant, audience to .a1e up to the truly !rightening placelessness o! modernity,s Copernican and -ar.inian !orms o! li!e. 8nd many .ho have !ollo.ed Niet+sche in this regard have noted that the 1ey to understanding the signi!icance o! modernity,s unheimlich ontology resides .ithin a /roader appreciation o! the .ay in .hich the ne. cosmology has undermined traditional conceptions o! earth.

s Niet+sche,s heir @artin !eidegger !amously claimed, when seen in "opernican planetar#$cosmological terms, the earth is no longer the earth in an# vital or lived sense but simpl# an object comprised of %purel# technological relationships& and an ob'ect, moreover, that is sub'ectivi(ed into a representation, a vorstellung, that %stands before us& rather than as something in %our midst& &2eidegger, '::%< 'A35 =(. )or !eidegger, once perceived and conceived as a visual representation of a planetar# bounded whole, the earth becomes %deworlded&* appearing as 'ust one more casual s#stem within a much wider cosmological causal order. nd this is wh# for !eidegger 5 in his muchB cited re!lections on this matter 5 the interplanetar# images of the earth from space are not simpl# the end product of a rather complex and powerful set of technological process that enframe the earth as a mass industriali(ed ob'ect, but are images that radicall# diminish the meaning of the earth, rendering humanit# without a world within which to dwell &a theme that 9 return to later(. 6hen seen in 2eideggerian terms, "opernicanism reduces the earth to mere %planetar# matter&+ an absurd and inhuman cosmic accident devoid of an# ultimate sense or significance. 9n such a conte?t .e can no longer spea1 o! a meaning!ul .orld at all, /ecause when the earth is %reduced& to a visual representation, it ceases to be a context of significance but stands as something that %transcends all tacitl# shared assumptions&. 8s such, it is 7/eyond all !rame.or1s 5 an a/yss, &6ood, $AA$< '3(. 9t
/ecomes a 7spectral earth, 5 a mere !lic1er o! light in the cosmological void. 8s Lyotard claimed, as a Copernican technologi+ed o/Cect the earth 7isn,t at all originary, /ut merely a 7spasmodic state o! energy, an instant o! esta/lished order, a smile on the sur!ace o! matter in a remote corner o! the cosmos, &Lyotard, '::'< 'A(.

ll attempts to think global politics presuppose an ontolog# which inform all following action 4 53 and world order studies inherentl# follow a calculatative and technolog# mindset6 ll the aff claims are premised on

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an ontolog# of calculation which must be confronted before we can enact change. Swa(o '07
[pro!essor o! philosophy at university o! 8las1a, Jair/an1s, $AA$ [Norman K, Crisis Theory and 6orld Order< 2eideggerian Le!lections p.D>BD=)

To the extent that world order studies are steeped in a strategic rationalit#, in calculative thinking, the# do not concern themselves with the task of having a reflective insight into the fundamental features of the age. The# do not concern themselves with the ground that enables an# thinking and doing such as is pursued b# a science, natural or social. Get, it is this enabling ground that is reall# determinative of that science, inasmuch as all positing of a domain of in1uir# presupposes an ontolog#. ,orld order studies, as a development o! contemporary social science, li1e.ise are dependent upon one or another ontological commitment. Speci!ically, 9 shall argue, the# are determined b# the ontological positions that prevail in the modern period of ,estern philosoph#+ for these are the positions fundamentall# decisive for the profound change taking place in humanit#'s self$ understanding, in our conception of all that is content of our world, and our relation to this world. 8/out this 9 shall concern mysel! in section $. Ee!ore doing this it is important
that this relation /et.een a positive science and ontology /e stated in /road outline. Jor this 9 turn to 2eidegger. H8ll nonB philosophical sciences,H remar1s 2eidegger, Hhave as their theme some /eing or /eings, and indeed in such a .ay that they are in every case antecedently given as /eings to those sciences.H; Continuing, 2eidegger .rites< They are posited /y them in advanceM they are a positum !or them. 8ll the propositions o! the nonBphilosophical sciences, including those o! mathematics, are positive propositions. 2ence, to distinguish them !rom philosophy, .e shall call all nonBphilosophical sciences positive sciences. Positive sciences deal .ith that .hich is, .ith /eingsM that is to say, they al.ays deal .ith speci!ic domains, !or instance, nature. 6ithin a given domain scienNti!ic research again cuts out particular spheres< nature as physically material li!eless nature and nature as living nature. 9t divides the sphere o! the living into individual !ields< the plant .orld, the animal .orld. 8nother domain o! /eings is historyM its spheres are art history, political history, history o! sciNence, and history o! religion. . . . The /eings o! these domains are !amiliar to us even i! at !irst and !or the most part .e are not in a position to delimit them sharply and clearly !rom one another. 6e can, o! course, al.ays name, as a provisional description .hich satis!ies practically rhe purpose o! posiB tive science, some /eing that !alls .ithin the domain 6e can al.ays /ring !or.ard and picture ourselves some /eing /elonging to any given domain. ... 8 /eingOthatFs something, a ta/le, a chair, a tree, the s1y, a /ody, some .ords, an action.: properly spea1ing, nonphilosophical. 6hile etc.Oit is

,orld order studies are,

concerned with a num/er o! domainsOpolitical, economic, historical, the political domain that is central to these in1uiries, presupposing the classical architectonic claims of the science of politics fot thinking and doing.'A 9nso!ar as the political domain is primary, world order studies deal with beings that are said to be political , ho.ever e?plicitly or am/iguously this denomination is to /e
understood. Such /eings are things o! vatious 1inds< humans ua citi+ens, o!!ice holders, rulers, legislatotsM .ords such as pu/lic or o!!icial documents, codes o! la., tteaties o! reciprocal o/ligation, spo1en discoutseM actions in all modes o! pu/lic /eingB.ithBoneBanotherM things mote or less !amiliar /ut not so .ell delimitedOregimes, states, constitutions, organi+ations, associaNtionsM in short, things that have theit /eing in thought, .otd, and deed.

ll beings of the political domain become the proper concern of this thinking 1ua world order studies, despite the division o! this domain into particular spheres &domestic politics and international
relations( and individual !ields &!oreign policy, legislation, pu/lic la., pu/lic administration, state and municipal or

)or world order studies, politics presents itself as global. 8olitics so conceived, as .ell as patterns o! /ehaviot and practice /et.een levels
provincial and local government, party politics, etc.(.

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matter insofar as the# bear upon and contribute to the overall condition of our common planetat# existence . 9ndeed, properly spea1ing, where global identit# and global interdependence are determinative of outlook concerning political existence, the distinction of domestic and international spheres becomes rather anachronistic, remaining useful onl# for purposes of anal#ses and investigations proper to the science of politics in its present empiricall#$oriented methodolog# . 9t is important to undetstand that political science posits in advance the various political things that constitute its ob'ects of investigation. 5n this posit, an ontolog#O.hat these things are, ho. they are, their .ay o! /eingO is implicit, if not explicit. This ontolog#, insofar as it is the ontology o! the speci!ic domain or region o! /eings that politics is, grounds the science of politics. That is, political science can be said to be dependent on , or to derive !rom, a regional ontolog#, vi(., political ontolog#. 9ntolog# as such is a theoretical in1uir#, i.e., in uiry He?plicitly devoted to the meaning o! entities,H this meaning being articulated b# wa# of basic concepts. 8olitical ontolog#, too, is a theoretical in1uir# devoted to the meaning of those entities that provide the sub'ect matter of empirical political science 1ua positive science.
o! government, Consider 2eideggerFs !ollo.ing comments concerning such a relation<

The basic structures of an# such area have already /een worked out after a fashion in our pre$scientific wa#s of experiencing and interpreting that domain of :eing in which the area of sub'ect$matter is itself confined. The F/asic conceptsF .hich thus arise remain our pro?imal clues !or disclosing this area concretely !or the !irst time. ... :asic concepts determine the wa# in which we get an understanding beforehand of the sub'ect$matter underl#ing all the ob'ects a science takes as its theme, and all positive investigation is guided b# this understanding. 9nl# after the area itsel! has /een e?plored /e!orehand in a corresponding manner do these concepts become genuinely demonstrated and 'grounded'. Eut since every such area is itsel! o/tained !rom the domain o! entities themselves, this preliminar# research, !rom .hich the /asic concepts are dra.n, signifies nothing else than an interpretation of those entities with regard to their basic state of being.n 9t is in ta1ing the Hstep /ac1,H so to spea1, !rom the positing o! a domain and the research underta1en /y a
naively, the demarcation and initial !i?ing o! the areas o! su/CectBmatter. positive science to the ontology implicit in this Hdemarcation and initial !i?ing o! the areas o! su/CectBmatterH that one /egins to ma1e the move !rom calculative thin1ing to meditative thin1ing. 9nasmuch as meditative thin1ing is concerned .ith the HmeaningH that reigns in things and thus .ith the ground that ena/les scienti!ic in uiry, the orientation o! such thin1ing is primarily ontological rather than positive &scienti!ic(. 2ere .e have the distinction /et.een philosophy and scienceO speci!ically, /et.een philosophy ua metaphysics and science. 6e can no. /egin to ma1e our .ay through the uestions initially set !orth at the /eginning o! this chapter, and to clari!ying the need !or and Custi!ication o! meditative thin1ing as it /ears upon contemporary .orld order thin1ing.

Scienti!ic research accomplishes, roughly and

This Technik =anagerial approaches to ecolog# and the Earth constitutes a mode of concealing that pushes us into a spiral of meanginglessness that robs all beings of value. =c,horter '.7 [Ladell, Pro!. o! Philosophy V Univ. o! Lichmond, 2eidegger and the *arth< *ssays in *nvironmental
Philosophy, p. vii)

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The danger of a managerial approach to the world lies not, then, in .hat it 1no.s B not in its penetration into the secrets of galactic emergence or nuclear !ission B but in what it forgets, what it itself conceals. 5t forgets that an# other truths are possible, and it forgets that the belonging together of revealing with concealing is forever be#ond the power of human management. ,e can never have, or know, it all+ we can never manage ever#thing. 6hat is no. especially dangerous a/out this sense of our own managerial power , /orn o! !orget!ulness, is that it results in our vie.ing the .orld as mere resources to /e stored or consumed. @anagerial or technological thinkers, 2eidegger says, view the earth, the .orld, all things as mere Eestand, standing$ reserve. ll is here simpl# for human use. Eo plant, no animal, no ecos#stem has a life of its own, has an# significance, apart from human desire and need. Nothing, .e say, other than human /eings, has any intrinsic value. ll things are instruments for the working out of human will . 6hether .e /elieve that 0od gave @an
dominion or simply that human might &sometimes called intelligence or rationality( in the !ace o! ecological !ragility ma1es us al.ays right, .e managerial, technological thin1ers tend to /elieve that the earth is only a stoc1pile or a set o!

Even people have become resources, human resources, personnel to be managed, or populations to be controlled. This managerial, technological mode of revealing, 2eidegger says, is embedded in and constitutive of ,estern culture and has been gathering strength for centuries. Eow it is well on its wa# to extinguishing all other modes of revealing, all other wa#s of being human and being earth. 5t will take tremendous effort to think through this danger, to thin1 past it and /eyond, tremendous courage and resolve to allo. thought o! the mystery to come
commodities to /e managed, /ought, and sold. The !orest is tim/erM the river, a po.er source. !orthM thought o! the inevita/ility, along .ith revealing, o! concealment, o! loss, o! ignoranceM thought o! the occurring o! things and their passage as events not ultimately under human control. 8nd o! course

even the call to allow this thinking B couched as it so o!ten must /e in a grammatical imperative appealing to an agent B is itself a paradox, the first that must be faced and allowed to speak to us and to shatter us as it scatters thinking in new directions, directions of which we have not #et dreamed, directions of which we ma# never dream. loss of value to life precedes all other impacts 4 death is preferable to a valueless life =itchell '0;
[8ndre. 4. @itchell, PostB-octoral Jello. in the 2umanities at Stan!ord University, H2eidegger and Terrorism,H Lesearch in Phenomenology, Polume %3, Num/er ', $AA3 , pp. 'D'B$'D)

>evastation &Per.istung( is the process b# which the world becomes a desert &6!iste(, a sand# expanse that seemingl# extends without end , .ithout landmar1s or
direction, and is devoid o! all li!e.$A 9! .e !ollo. the dialogue in thin1ing an ancient 0ree1 notion o! Hli!eH as another name

the lifeless desert is the being$less desert. The world that becomes a lifeless desert is conse1uentl# an unworld from which being has withdrawn. The older prisoner ma1es this connection e?plicit, HThe /eing o! an age o! devastation .ould
!or H/eing,H then then consist in the a/andonment o! /eingH &08 DD< $'%(. 8s .e have seen, this is a process that /e!alls the .orld, slo.ly dissolving it o! .orldliness and rendering it an Hun.orldH &c!. 08 D< ;;, :$!.Q*P, 'A>, 'AD!., etc.(. Get this un.orld is not simply the opposite o! .orldM it remains a .orld, /ut a .orld made desert. The desert is not the complete a/sence o!

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.orld. Such an a/sence .ould not /e reached /y devastation &Per.isiung(, /ut rather /y annihilation &Pernichtung(M and !or 2eidegger,

annihilation is far less of a concern than devastation < H-evastation is more uncanny than mere annihilation [/lo!le Pernichtung). =ere annihilation sweeps aside all things including even nothingness, while devastation on the contrar# orders and spreads ever#thing that blocks and prevents H &62-, ''Q$:B%AM tin(.
8nnihilation as a thought o! total a/sence is a thought !rom metaphysics. 9t is one .ith a thin1ing o! pure presence< pure presence, pure a/sence, and. purely no contact /et.een them. -uring another lecture course on 2=lderlin, this time in ':>$ on the hymn HThe 9ster,H 2eidegger claims that annihilation is precisely the agenda o! 8merica in regards to the Hhomeland,H .hich is here e uated .ith *urope< H6e 1no. today that the 8ngloBSa?on .orld o! 8mericanism has resolved to annihilate [+u vernichten) *urope, that is, the homeland, and that means< the inception o! the 6estern .orld. The inceptual is indestructi/le [un+erstoFr/ar)H &08 3%< =;Q3>M tm(. 8merica is the agent o! technological devastation, and it operates under the assumptions o! presence and a/sence that it itsel! is so e?pert at dissem/ling. 8merica resolves to annihilate and condemns itsel! to !dilure in so doing, !or the origin is Hindestructi/le.H 6e could ta1e this a step !urther and claim that only /ecause the origin cannot /e annihilated is it possi/le to destroy it. This possi/ility o! destruction is its indestructi/le character. 9t can al.ays /e !urther destroyed, /ut you .ill never annihilate it. 8mericanism names the endeavor or resolution to drive the destruction o! the .orld ever !urther into the un.orld. 8merica is the agent o! a

Evil is the 2devastation of the earth and the annihilation of the human essence that goes along with it2 &08 DD< $AD(, he said, /ut this annihilation is simply too easy, too
malevolent /eing. This same reasoning e?plains .hy the older manFs original conception o! evil had to /e rethought . much o! an H8mericanism.H The human essence is not annihilated in evilB.ho could care a/out thatS 9nstead it is destroyed and devastated /y evil.

>evastation does not annihilate, but brings about something worse, the unworld. ,ithout limit, the desert of the unworld spreads, ever worsening and incessanti# urging itself to new expressions of malevolence. nnihilation would bring respite and, in a perverse sense, relief. There .ould /e nothing le!t to protect and guard, nothing le!t to concern ourselves .ithBnothing le!t to terrori+e. >evastation is also irreparable+ no salvation can arrive for it . The
younger man is a/le to voice the monstrous conclusion o! this thin1ing o! devastation< HThen malevolence, as .hich devastation occurs [sich ereignet), .ould indeed remain a B/asic characteristic o! /eing itsel!H &08 DD< $'%, $'3M em(. The older man agrees, H/eing .ould /e in the ground o! its essence malevolentH &08 DD< $'3(. Eeing is not evilM it is something much .orseM /eing is malevolent.

!ere's our alterntive text* 3e'ect the aff and their technological 'ump to solve problems and instead open up this space for meditative thinking. cts of will cannot transform bad forms of thinking. ,e have to deepl# reflect and meditate with our alternatives meditative thought to allow meaning to reveal itself to us. This allows us to rediscover our worldl# home and choose how we want to be in the world. Thiele &.;
[Leslie, Pro!essor o! Political Science at the University o! Jlorida, Timely @editations< @artin 2eidegger and Postmodern Politics, pg $'%B$'>) 2eidegger o!!ers a hint a/out the nature o! the thin1ing that might loosen the grip o! technology. 2e .rites that H the

coming to presence of technolog# will be surmounted Tvenvunden) in a wa# that restores it into its #et concealed truth. This restoring surmounting is similar to what happens when, in the human realm, one gets over grief or pain2 &RT %:(. 9mportantly, one gets over grief not through a willful overcoming. Such self$master# onl# displaces grief , with the likelihood of its resurgence at some other time, in an invidious form . Li1e moods in general, grief is

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overcome not b# master#, intellect, or will, but onl# b# another mood
grie! might /est /e descri/ed as one o! rediscovered sanctuary. &6P8 ::(. 8nd moods, 2eidegger insists, cannot /e created, only summoned &ST 'A3(. The mood that allo.s our overcoming o!

9ne gets over grief b# once again coming to feel one's belonging in a world that , because of to its cruel deprivations, had for a time become alien. 2annah 8rendt o!ten called to mind 9sa1 -inesenFs saying that Hall sorro.s can /e /orne i! you put them into a story or tell a story a/out them.H -inesenFs point is that we get over grief b# reflecting on our grief$stricken selves and becoming interpretivel# reintegrated in the world. Cooking back on our grieved selves allows us to surmount grief not b# den#ing our misfortune but b# finding meaning in the stor# of our sorrow. To look back on ourselves in time is to gain distance, and, at the same time, a nearness to the ongoing and often tragic saga of worldl# habitation. 2omelessness is the mood o! the technological age. 3ediscovering our worldl# home &as threatened( signals the 2restoring surmounting2 of technolog#. This rediscovered sense of &threatened( sanctuar# is chiefl# summoned, 2eidegger indicates, b# memor# or recollective thought. 3ecollecting our worldl# habitat not onl# fosters resistance to enframing, but also provides guidance in negotiating relations with the products of technolog#, namely machines and techni ues. 2eidegger acB1no.ledges that .e should neither
reCect nor do .ithout technological arti!acts or s1ills as a .hole. 2e neither advocates nor accepts a retreat to a pretechnological state o! /eing. Nor, despite much misinterpretaBtion /y his commentators, does he suggest that .e !atalistically resign ourselves to the victory o! en!raming. 9ts victory, he emphatically states, is not inevita/le &O0S ='(. H6e cannot, o! course, reCect todayFs techBnological .orld as devilFs .or1, nor may .e destroy itOassuming it does not destroy itsel!,H 2eidegger maintains. HStill less may .e cling to the vie. that the .orld o! technology is such that it .ill

To confuse our destined relation to :eing as if it were a fate, particularl# one that leads to the inevitable decline of our civili(ation because of technological rule, is itself a historicall# determinist, and therefore metaph#sical and technological, understanding. 8ccording to 2eidegger, H8ll attempts to rec1on e?isting reality morphologically, psychologically,
a/solutely prevent a spring out o! itH &9- >AO>'(. in terms o! decline and loss, in terms o! !ate, catastrophe, and destruction, are merely technological /ehaviorH &RT >;(.'>

)atalism is no answer because fatalism reflects the same absence of thought that is evidenced in a naive complacenc# with technological 2progress.H 2eideggerFs admonition to thin1 the nature o! technology, though !ar !rom a resigned musing, is not the devising o! a countero!!ensive. 6e are as1ed to respond !irst to the uestion H ,hat shall we thinkB2 rather than the uestion H6hat is to /e doneSH Eut the point is not simpl# that we must think before we act. The needed thinking of what we are doing and how we are being is not solel# a strategic preparation for more informed and effective behavior. Thought must first save us from our typical modes o! /ehaving, namely those oriented to possessive master#. 2eidegger .arns that Hso long as .e represent technology as
an instrument, .e remain held !ast in the .ill to master itH &RT %$(. The more .e !ail to e?perience the essence o! technology as en!raming, persevering in the mista1en notion that comple? machinery is the danger, the more .e .ill /elieve that salvation lies in our mastering technology /e!ore it masters us. 6ith this in mind,

!eidegger explicitl# states that he is 2not against technolog#,2 nor does he suggest an# 2resistance against, or condemnation of, technolog#H &@2C >%O>>D. 5ndeed, the development of complex machines and techni1ues< technolog# as it is commonl# understood<has enormous benefits that

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must not be depreciated. 5t would be shortsighted to condemn such technolog# out of hand. 8part !rom our o/vious dependence on technical devices, their development also o!ten Hchallenges us to ever greater advancesH &-T 3% D. )rom political, social, cultural, and environmental standpoints, technolog# demonstrates man# virtues. 5ndeed, given the unrelenting extension of human power and population, technological developments that buffer the earth from our predaceousness seem both urgent and indispensable . 8 good /it o! the destruction humanity presently visits on the earth and itsel! ma1es sophisticated technological remedies necessary. !aving machines efficientl# serve our needs is neither evil nor regrettable. :ut this service must be grounded on our discover# of what needs we trul# have. =ore importantl#, it must be grounded on our discover# of what transcends human need.FU These, decidedly, are not technological 1uestions, and our capacit# to answer them largel# rests on our recover# of the capacit# to think be#ond the criterion of instrumental service . $'%B$'>

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#gric$%t$re
=odern agriculture uses technolog# to maximi(e efficienc# b# manipulating nature. This results in the technological, managerial mindset6 3o'cewic( '06
This [Lichard, Pro!essor o! Philosophy at Point Par1 University $AA=, The Gods /e ding o% 0eidegger Page DD) nd Technology" A

is a clear and vigorous paragraph that scarcely needs commentary. The main point is unmistakeable, as illustrated in the example of traditional farming versus modern agriculture. The farmer of old submitted, tended, and nurtured. These are the uintessential activities o! poiesisM the old .ar o! !arming is mid.i!ery, and .hat it /rings !orth is that .ith

=odern agriculture, on the other hand, hardl# brings forth crops+ it produces @foodstuffsA or, perhaps .e should rather say, ingesta. =odern agriculture does not submit seeds to the forces of growth M on the contrary, it interferes with the seeds, genericall# manipulating them. The forces of growth are now in the farmer's own hand, whichis to sa# that she imposes the conditions that determine growth. The end product , in the e?treme case, to .hich .e may /e heading ine?ora/ly, is astronautsF !ood. 9t .ould /e a travest# to say grace /e!ore eating" a meal" o! such !oods." They are not gi!tsM they are human creations. The# are not grown+ the# are s#nthesi(ed. They are created /y someone pl ying God, and it .ould ma1e no sense to pr y to God /e!ore
.hich nature is already pregnant. ingesting them.

***L&NKS***

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#%ternati'e Energ(
The rhetoric of alternative energ# furthers a purel# technological mindset 4 ever#thing in our surroundings, ever# part of nature, is something to be exploited and violentl# controlled. :eckman '7F
G*meritus Pro!essor o! Philosophy 2umanities and Social Sciences 2arvey @udd College B 00 &Tad, @artin 2eidegger and *nvironmental *thics," $AAA, http<QQ...$.hmc.eduQWt/ec1manQpersonalQ2eidart.html( QQ4LC) Perhaps it is not di!!icult to understand the separate paths o! the !ine arts, cra!tsmanship, and modern technology. *ach seems to have !ollo.ed di!!erent human intentions and to have addressed di!!erent human s1ills. 2o.ever, .hile the !ine arts and cra!tsmanship remained relatively consistent .ith techne in the ancient sense, modern technology .ithdre. in a radically di!!erent direction. 8s 2eidegger sa. it, H the

revealing that rules in modern technolog# is a challenging [2eraus!ordern), which puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it suppl# energ# that can be extracted and stored as such.2 X[D), p. '>Y @odern technolog# sets$upon nature and challengesforth its energies, in contrast to techne which was alwa#s a bringing$forth in harmon# with nature. The activit# of modern technolog# lies at a different and more advanced level wherein the natural is not merel# decisivel# re$directed+ nature is actuall# 2set$upon.2 The rhetoric in which the discussion is couched conve#s an atmosphere of violence and exploitation. &=( To uncover the essence of modern technolog# is to discover wh# technolog# stands toda# as the danger. To accomplish this insight, we must understand wh# modern technolog# must be viewed as a 2challenging$ forth,2 what affect this has on our relationship with nature, and how this relationship affects us. 9s there really a di!!erenceS 2as technology really le!t the domain o! techne in a
signi!icant .ayS 9n modern technology, has human agency .ithdra.n in some .ay /eyond involvement and, instead, ac uired an attitude o! violence .ith respect to the other causal !actorsS

!eidegger clearl# saw the development of 2energ# resources2 as s#mbolic of this evolutionar# path M .hile the
trans!ormation into modern technology undou/tedly /egan early, the !irst de!initive signs o! its ne. character /egan .ith the harnessing o! energy resources, as .e .ould say. &D(

s a representative of the old technolog#, the windmill took energ# from the wind but converted it immediatel# into other manifestations such as the grinding of grainM the .indmill did not unloc1 energy !rom the .ind in order to store it !or later ar/itrary distri/ution. =odern wind$generators, on the other hand, convert the energ# of wind into electrical power which can be stored in batteries or otherwise. The significance of storage is that it places the energ# at our disposal+ and because of this storage the powers of nature can be turned back upon itself. The storing of energ# is, in this sense, the s#mbol of our over$ coming of nature as a potent ob'ect. H...a tract o! land is challenged into the putting out o! coal and ore. The earth now reveals itself as a coal mining district, the soil as a mineral deposit.2 X[D), p. '>Y This and other examples that !eidegger used throughout this essa# illustrate the difference between a technolog# that diverts the natural course cooperativel# and modern technolog# that achieves the unnatural b# force. Eot onl# is this achieved b# force but it is achieved b# placing nature in our sub'ective context, setting aside natural processes entirel#, and conceiving of all revealing as being relevant onl# to human sub'ective needs. The essence of technolog# originall# was a revealing of life and nature in which human intervention deflected the natural course while still regarding nature as the teacher and, for that matter, the keeper. The essence of modern technolog# is a

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revealing of phenomena, o!ten !ar removed !rom anything that resem/les Hli!e and nature,H in which human intrusion not onl# diverts nature but fundamentall# changes it. s a mode of revealing, technolog# toda# is a challenging$forth of nature so that the technologicall# altered nature of things is alwa#s a situation in which nature and ob'ects wait, standing in reserve for our use. ,e pump crude oil from the ground and we ship it to refineries where it is fractionall# distilled into volatile substances and we ship these to gas stations around the world where the# reside in huge underground tanks, standing read# to power our automobiles or airplanes. Technolog# has intruded upon nature in a far more active mode that represents a consistent direction of domination. Ever#thing is viewed as 2standing$reserve2 and, in that, loses its natural ob'ective identit#. The river, for instance, is not seen as a river+ it is seen as a source of h#dro$electric power, as a water suppl#, or as an avenue of navigation through which to contact inland markets. 9n the era o! techne humans .ere relationally involved .ith other o/Cects in the
coming to presenceM in the era o! modern technology, humans challengeB!orth the su/Cectively valued elements o! the universe so that, .ithin this ne. !orm o! revealing,

ob'ects lose their significance to an#thing but their sub'ective status of standing$read# for human design. &;(

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#strona$ts
Space exploration depends upon an astronautic condition of modernit# that abandons a sense of home and distances us from lived realit#. 5t forces us to into the technological mindset. Turnbull '06
[Neil, Senior Lecturer in Philosophy and Social Theory at. Nottingham Trent University, The Ontological Conse uences o! Copernicus", Theory, Culture # Society, $%&'(()

the modern astronaut is seen as one of the primar# agents of modern worldlessness in !eideggerian philosoph# &and one is immediately struc1 /y the
Thus phenomenological similarities /et.een the spatial nihilism o! Niet+sche,s madman and the !reeB!loating placeless e?perience o! the modern astronaut(. Jor

when the earth is seen from an astronautic point of view, all traditional human concerns are deterritoriali(ed and strangel# diminished to the extent that interplanetar# representations of the earth threaten to sever the connection between humanit# and its traditional ontological supports. 2eideggerian scholars such as Lo/ert Lomanyshyn have developed this idea and used it as the /asis !or an e?istential criti ue o! 7 the mad astronaut&< the uintessentially modern avatar that stands as the highest expression of modernit#&s unheimlich rootlessness. Lomanyshyn,s is a criti ue o! .hat might /e termed 7the astronautic condition of modernit#& &':;:M $AA(, as, in Lomanyshyn,s vie., the modern astronaut 5 .hat so many modern 6estern children .ant to 7gro. up to /e, 5 is a metaphor for a h#permodern cultural$ ps#chological dream of distance, departure and escape from matter that reveals a world of pure %spectacular wonder&, and that disguises and perhaps even obliterates those deep and emotional connections to the earth that maintain a sense of ontological securit# and lived realit#.

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#steroids
The narratives surrounding asteroid detection and deflection rel# upon the notion of technological mindset which allow us to use technolog# to manage and control space and asteriods. =ellor '0H
[Jelicity, lecturer in the -epartment o! 2umanities V 9mperial College in London, Colliding 6orlds < 8steroid Lesearch and the Legitimi+ation o! 6ar in Space," 8ugust $AAD, Social Studies o! Science %D<>::, http<QQsss.sagepu/.comQcontentQ%DQ>Q>::.a/stract)

,ith the s.arming asteroids filling space, space itsel! .as also resigniB !ied. 6hat had /een an a/stract mathematical space became a narrative place , the location .here particular and contingent events occurred. lthough the scientists continued to appeal to the predictabilit# of celestial d#namics 5 it .as this that .ould ena/le a survey o! nearB*arth o/Cects to identi!y any that might pose a threat 5 the# also noted that chaotic processes disturbed the orbits of comets and also, to a lesser degree, aster$ oids &!or e?ample, Geomans # Chodas, '::>M @ilani et al., $AAA(. The inherent unpredictabilit# of the orbits was enhanced b# the current state of scientific uncertaint#. These chaotic and uncertain processes were pro$ 'ected onto space itself, construed as a place of random violence. 9n the popular /oo1s, the Solar System /ecame a 7dangerous cosmic neigh/ourB hood,
&Sumners # 8llen, $AAA/< %(, 7a capricious, violent place, &Perschuur, '::=< $'D(, a place o! 7mindless violence, &Perschuur, '::=< ';( and 7.anB ton destruction, &Levy, '::;< '%(. *ven in a peerBrevie.ed paper, Chapman &$AA>< '( descri/ed space as a 7cosmic shooting gallery,.

>espite the agenc# attributed to the asteroids themselves, in the narra$ tives of technological salvation it was the human agents, acting through new technologies, who moved the narratives forward. Earrative progression was thus generated through an assumption of technological progress. Through technolog#, humans intervene in space and become agents of cosmic events. The scientists& promotion of the impact threat shared this assumption of technological progress. Li1e the US 8ir Jorce study, their technical papers on mitigation s#stems considered speculative technologies such as solar sails and mass drivers as well as more established explosive technologies &!or e?ample, 8hrens # 2arris, '::$M @elosh # Nemchinov, '::%M 9vash1in # Smirnov, '::3M 0rit+ner # Kahle, $AA>(. Even those scientists who warned that it was too earl# to draw up detailed blueprints of interception technologies accepted the narratival implication that there .as a pro/lem that needed addressing, that the problem could be addressed b# human action, and that this action would involve a technological solution. Technolog#, in this picture, was configured as inherentl# progressive. 8s @orrison # Teller &'::>< ''%D( put it< 7The development of technolog# in the past few centuries has been towards increasing understanding and con$ trol of natural forces in an effort to improve human life., Those scientists who argued against the immediate development of mitigation technolog# shared with its proponents a belief in the inexorable progress of technolog#. Juture generations, they argued, .ould /e /etter e uipped than .e are at the moment to meet the

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technological challenge o! an impacting asteroid &!or e?ample, 8hrens # 2arris, '::$(. 9n contrast to traditional astronomical systems, .hich passively .atched the s1ies, asteroid detection systems .ere to /e surveillance systems that actively hunted the s1ies !or o/Cects o! human import. The Spaceguard Survey .as predicated on a .ill to action in a .ay in .hich the earlier Space.atch Survey .as not. Similarly, .hen it !ired its impactor at Comet Tempel ', N8S8,s -eep 9mpact mission too1 a !ar more active intervenB tion in space than did earlier generations o! pro/es. This .as not !ar !rom *d.ard Teller,s call !or 7e?perimentation, .ith nearB*arth o/Cects to test de!ence technologies &Tedeschi # Teller, '::>M Teller, '::3(, an idea disB missed at the time as e?treme /y some civilian scientists &Chapman, '::;(. Li1e.ise, one o! the recommendations o! the $AA> Planetary -e!ense Con!erence .as that de!lection techni ues should /e demonstrated on an

The technologi(ation of space promoted in both the fictional works and the scientists& technical proposals, also formed an integral part of the imager# and rhetoric that surrounded S>5, as its detractors highlighted when the# re$named the pro'ect Star ,ars. S-9 .as al.ays premised on a vision of space as a technologi(ed theatre of war. 5n the hands of a techno$ enthusiast such as *d.ard Teller, S>5 was configured as a space$based technological extravagan(a with few limits .$: 5n S>5, as in asteroid research and science fiction, space became a d#namic arena through which our tech$ nologies would move, in which our weapons would be placed, and across which our wars were to be waged. %A
actual asteroid &8ilor, $AA>< 3(.$;

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)io*o%itics+ )iogenetics and ,ost-H$.anis.
Engagment in the technological age aims to @take$control$of$one&s$selfA b# controlling the densest and most occluded aspects of nature and human life creating the a %second nature& and new humans that autonomousl# dominates first nature$ This coming new age will supplant the technological age and result in catastrophe more dangerous than pollution or nuclear war -i(ek %I [Lady 1illing suave machine, 9n de!ense o! lost causes" p.>%>B>%D 4COOK) Ericsson phones are no longer, Swedish, To#ota cars are manufactured 60 percent, in the ?S , !oll#wood culture pervades the remotest parts of the globe ... )urthermore, does the same not, go also for all forms of ethnic and sexual identit#B Should .e not supplement @ar?Fs description in this sense, adding<
9s this not, more than ever, our reality todayS that also se?ual one sidedness and narro.Brnindedness /ecomes more and more impossi/le,H that concerning se?ual practices, it also true thatH all that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is pro!aned,H so that

capitalism tends to replace standard normative heterosexualit# with a proliferation of unstable shifting identities andJor orientationsB 8nd today, with the latest biogenetic developments, we are entering a new phase in which it is simpl# Eature itself which melts into air* the main conse1uence of the scientific breakthroughs in biogenetics is the end of nature. 9nce we know the rules of its construction, natural organisms are transformed into ob'ects amenable to manipulation, Eature, human and inhuman, is thus 2desubstantiali(ed,2 deprived of its impenetrable densit#, of what !eidegger called 2earth.2 This compels us to give a ne. t.ist
to JreudFs title Un/ehagen in der Kultur W discontent, uneasiness, in culture.': 6ith the latest developments, the discontent shi!ts !rom culture to nature itsel!< nature is no longer Hnatural,F< the relia/le HdenseH /ac1ground o! our livesM it no. appears as a !ragile mechanism, .hich, at any point can e?plode in a catastrophic manner.

:iogenetics, with its reduction of the human ps#che itself to an ob'ect of technological manipulation, is therefore effectivel# a kind of empirical instantiation of what !eidegger perceived as the 2danger2 inherent$in modern technolog#. "rucial here is the interdependence of man and nature* b# reducing man to 'ust another natural ob'ect whose properties can be manipulated, what we lose is not Konl#D humanit# but nature itself. 9n this sense, Jrancis Ju1uyamais right< humanit# relies on some notion of 2human nature2 as what we have inherited, as something that has simpl# been given to us, the impenetrable dimension inJof ourselves into which we are bornJthrown. The paradox is thus that there is man onl# insofar as there is impenetrable inhuman nature &2eideggerFs HearthH(< with the prospect of biogenetic interventions opened up b# the access to the genome, the species freel# changesJredefines itself its 9wn coordinates+ this prospect effectivel# emancipates humankind from the constraints of a finite species, from its enslavement to 2selfish genes.A This emancipation, however, comes at a price* ,ith interventions into man's genetic inheritance, the domination over nature reverts into an act of taking$control$over$one&s self, which changes our generic$ethical self$understanding and can disturb the necessar# conditions for an autonomous wa# of life and universalistic understanding of morals. 2o., then, should .e react to this threatS 2a/ermas,s logic is here < since the results of science pose a threat to our Kpredominant notion ofD autonom# and freedom, one should curtail

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science. The price we pa# for this solution is the fetishistic split between science and ethics L 25 know ver# well what science claims, but, nonetheless, in order to retain Kthe appearance ofD m# autonom#, 5 choose to ignore it and act as if 5 don't know it.2 This prevents us from confronting the true 1uestion* how do these new condition compel us to transform and reinvent the ver# notions of freedom, autonom#, and ethical responsibilit#. Science and technolog# toda# no longer aim onl# at understanding and reproducing natural processes, but at generating new forms of life that will surprise us+ the goal is no longer 'ust to dominate nature Kthe wa# it isD, but to generate something new, greater, stronger than ordinar# nature, including ourselves$exemplar# here is the obsession with artificial intelligence, which aims at producing a brain more powerful than the human brain. The dream that sustains the scientific$ technological endeavor is to trigger a process with no return, a process that would exponentiall# reproduce itself and go on and on autonomousl#. The notion o! 2second nature2 is therefore toda# more pertinent than ever, in both its main meanings. )irst, literall#, as the artificiall# generated new nature* monsters of nature, deformed cows and trees, or$a more positive dream$geneticall# manipulated organisms, 2enhanced2 in the manner that suits us then, 2second nature2 in the more standard sense of the autonomi(ation of the results of our own activit#* the wa# our acts elude us in their conse1uences, the wa# the# generate a monster with a life of its own. 5t is thru horror at the unforeseen results of our own acts that causes shock and awe, not the power of nature over which we have no control+ it is thru horror that religion tries to domesticate. ,hat is new toda# is the shortcircuit between these two senses of 2second nature2* 2second nature2 in the sense of ob'ective )ate, of autonomi(ed social process, is generating 2second nature2 in the sense of artificiall# created nature, of natural monsters, namel#, the process which threatens to run out of control is no longer 'ust the social process of economic and political development, but new forms of natural processes themselves, from unpredictable nuclear catastrophes to global warming and the unimaginable conse1uences of biogenetic manipulation . Can one even imagine .hat .ould /e the unprecedented
result o!

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)od( Co$nts
The aff's cost$benefit anal#sis is exactl# the t#pe of technological thought that leads to our impacts6 Shrader$)rechette '.H
[O,Neill Jamily Pro!essor at -epartment o! Philosophy at the University o! Notre -ameM Pro!essor *merita o! Philosophy at the University o! 6indsor. Technology nd ' lues, Lo.man # Little!ield Pu/lishing.) 8s his thin1ing develops, ho.ever, 2eidegger does not deny these are serious pro/lems, /ut he comes to the surprising and provocative conclusion that !ocusing on loss and destruction is still technological.

ll attempts to reckon risking realit#Min terms of decline and loss, in terms of fate, catastrophe, and destruction, are merel# technological behavior ." Seeing our situation as posing a problem that must be solved b# appropriate action turns out to be technological too* The instrumental conception of technolog# conditions ever# attempt to bring man into the right relation to technolog#MThe will to master# becomes all the more urgent the more technolog# threatens to slip from human control. " 2eidegger is clear this approach cannot work. Eo single man, no group of men, no commission of prominent statesmen, scientists, and technicians, no conference of leaders of commerce and industr#, can brake or direct the progress of histor# in the atomic age.A 2is vie. is /oth dar1er and more hope!ul. 2e thin1s there is a more
dangerous situation !acing modern man than the technological destruction o! nature and civili+ation, yet a situation a/out

The threat is not a problem for which there can be a solution but an ontological condition from which we can be saved. 2eidegger,s concern is the human distress caused /y the technologic l underst nding o% #eing, rather than the destruction caused /y speci!ic technologies. Conse uently, !eidegger distinguishes the current problems caused b# technolog#<ecological destruction, nuclear danger, consumerism, etc.<from the devastation that would result if technolog# solved all our problems. 6hat threatens man in his very nature is theIvie. that man, /y the peace!ul
.hich something c n /e doneOat least indirectly. release, trans!ormation, storage, and channeling o! the energies o! physical nature, could render the human conditionI tolera/le !or every/ody and happy in all respects." The greatest danger" is that the approaching tide o! technological

calculative thinking ma# someda# come to be accepted and practiced as the only wa# of thinking.A
revolution in the atomic age could so captivate, /e.itch, da++le, and /eguile man that

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Co%oni/ation
=odern pro'ections and pushes for the coloni(ation of planets in the Solar S#stem cause these planets to be commodified as a standing reserve 4 sitting resource waiting on human construction and control 4 all resulting from the technological mindset6 Nerkins '0.
[4ae, Pro!essor at Jlorida State University, 2eidegger,s Eridge< the Social and Phenomenological Construction o! @ars," Jlorida Philosophical Levie., :&$(.)

,hen =odernit#&s ga(e upon the world calls forth the pro'ect of coloni(ation, this causes the process of enframing to begin, whereupon we mark the world for our own usage until the da# comes when humanit# itself ma# be commodified as a standing$reserve. 2eidegger e?plains, =an becomes that being upon which all that is, is grounded as regards the manner of its :eing and its truth. =an becomes the relational center of that which is as such.A s ob'ects in nature are relegated to standing$reserve , 2eidegger e?plains, ever#thing man encounters exists onl# insofar as it has his construct.A Since nothing exists outside of humanit#&s construction, we end up onl# ever encountering ourselves. Oet because we do not reali(e that the phenomena before us are of our own construction, a distortion caused b# enframing, 2eidegger contends that we fail to grasp an important existential truth <we can never trul# encounter ourselves, our world, or =ars for that matter.3A ,hen humanit# ga(es out at the world, @he fails to see himself as the one spoken to."3'The di++ying rise in modern technology has precipitated a !undamental change in
This is a central point o! concern 9 have over the issue o! coloni+ation. our perception o! o/Cects and, inevita/ly, in ourselves. Ey turning the .orld into technology, human1ind turns itsel! into the .orld,s technicians.

,e reassemble and reconfigure the natural world for our own use, pla#ing the part of the self$made, frontier$forging individual< the modern man. Technology unloc1s the energy in nature, trans!orming the rushing .ater o! the Lhine into
energy, storing up that energy, distri/uting it to 0erman po.er outlets, and thus revealing the concealed po.er in nature. This challenge to nature, to stop /eing and to /ecome a resourceQcommodity !or modern human /eings, is ho. modern technology serves as revealer.

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Cos.o*o%itanis.01"inking 2%o3a%%(

"osmopolitanism and representations of a Plobal "ommunit# rel# upon a technological view of the world as picture. These globalisms compete over totali(ing views of Earth and ultimatel# leave our planet as a barren hori(on.
Ca(ier 'QQ
[EenCamin, is 8ssociate Pro!essor o! 2istory and 2umanities at Leed College. ,*arthriseM or, The 0lo/ali+ation o! the 6orld Picture The 8merican 2istorical Levie. Pol. ''=, No. % &4une $A''(, pp. =A$B=%A Pu/lished /y< The University o! Chicago Press on /ehal! o! the 8merican 2istorical 8ssociation 8rticle -O9< 'A.'A;=Qahr.''=.%.=A$ 8rticle Sta/le ULL< http<QQ....Cstor.orgQsta/leQ'A.'A;=Qahr.''=.%.=A$B@E)

0iews of Earth are no. so u/i uitous as to go unremarked. :ut this makes them all the more important, and their effects historicall# novel. 9ur ideas and intuitions about inhabiting the world are now mediated through images that displace local, earthbound hori(ons with @hori(onsA that are planetar# in scope<the distinction /et.een earth and sk# surmounted b# that between Earth and void. These intuitions have dovetailed with new habits of speech, a voca/ularyOand a second 1ey development o! the *arthrise era. Eut there is something peculiar a/out this voca/ulary. 5t is 'ust as @globalA as @Earthl# ," i! not more so, and it is peculiar /ecause the Earth as seen from space is o!ten perceived as the natural or organic antithesis of an artifactual globe. Still, there is no avoiding the !act that as common expressions, the .ord @globali(ation" and the phrases glo/al environment," @global econom#,A and @global humanit#A simply did not e?ist /e!ore the *arthrise era , and this explosion of globe talk is part and parcel o! changes in the 6estern pictorial imagination that at first glance seem unsuited to it.'$ To ma1e sense o! these developmentsOthe com/ination o! *arthly vision .ith glo/al voca/ulary<we might think of the Earthrise era as a stage in a longer histor#, a @globali(ation of the world picture ." 6orld picture" is the *nglish
e uivalent o! 6elt/ild, a philosophical term o! art coined /y 6ilhelm -ilthey /ut no. associated .ith @artin 2eidegger. 2eidegger did not use it to re!er literally to images o! the planet. Lather, he meant that

the wa#s we comport ourselves visRvis our natural and humanbuilt worlds are pre structured b# a grasp of the world and ever#thing in it as a picture , as something to surve# and frame for our pleasure and use . Consider in this conte?t the
.ords o! 8pollo ; astronaut Jran1 Eorman< Loo1 at that picture over thereZ" The !irst human to lay eyes on an *arthrise made intuitive appeal to a language that is the staple o! tourists every.hereOto descri/e not the sight itsel!, /ut the conditions in .hich the sight could !irst /e disclosed or come into vie., its !rame. 9t may /e the most de!initive con!irmation possi/le o! 2eideggerFs claim, made thirty years /e!ore, that the !undamental event o! the modern age is the con uest o! the .orld as picture."'% Thin1ers in the phenomenological tradition, .hich attends to pre cognitive .ays o! /eing in the .orld, help us see that this .as no !ailure o! imagination on EormanFs part. 2is remar1 voiced something more li1e the condition !or modern human e?perience in the !irst placeOand i! 2eidegger .as right, our condition in this alleged age o! the .orld picture.'> So .e are le!t .ith several uestions a/out the *arthrise era< the scope o! its vision, the peculiarity o! its voca/ulary, and the changes it inaugurated in the conditions !or human e?perience, or .hat some philosophers call the human condition." To address these uestions, it helps, !irst, to situate the reactions o! these philosophers to the vie. o! *arth !rom space alongside those o! their non philosophical contemporaries, on the premise that philosophers and 0ru/ Street pamphleteers ali1e re!lect on the shared events o! the day. They do so, o! course, .ith di!!erent voca/ularies, and at times philosophical discourse can come o!! as alien indeed. This is a di!!erence to ac1no.ledge. 9t is also a di!!erence !or historians to e?ploit. 8rendt and company .rote .ith enormous depth, and so it

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can help, second, to thin1 .ith them, on the premise that philosophers have something to say even to those o! us .ho do not ans.er to the name. 8t the very least, they provide us .ith a repository o! conceptual tools .ith .hich to reassess the era o! .hich they .ere themselves a part. This approach is openly eclectic. 9t s.ings /et.een the registers o! intellectual history, cultural history, environmental history, and the history o! science. 9t also a!!ords returns, a/ove all in ne. 1inds o! stories a/out the *arthrise era. Jor e?ample, .e typically include the *arthrise" photograph in a congratulatory story a/out the rise o! environmentalism. There is something to this.

Cike globe talk, the language of environmentalism is an invention of the Earthrise era .'3 Eut there is a more so/er and .ideranging story to /e told. The e?amples o! 2eidegger, 8rendt, and Elumen/erg help us see ho. the histor# of the ,hole Earth icon is part of a histor# of competing globalisms, and still more of technologicall# complicit ones <commercial and environmental glo/alisms a/ove all. Their e?ample there!ore prompts us to as1 .hether the visions and vocabularies of the Earthrise era have inadvertentl# accelerated our planetar# emergenc# as much as the# have inspired us to slow it down. They also help reveal the structural
tensions /et.een organism and arti!act at the core o! canonical environmental te?ts o! the *arthrise era &such as Ste.art ErandFs 6hole *arth Catalog and 4ames Loveloc1Fs 0aia( that desta/ili+e the concept o! a glo/al environment" itsel!. 9! this approach supplements traditional conte?ts &the Cold 6ar, environmentalism( .ith ne. ones &the history o! organisms

it also calls attention to categories often excluded from historical consideration in the !irst place, b# sub'ecting to historical anal#sis .hat philosophers such as 8rendt call the human condition or, in a di!!erent 1ey, .hat 2eidegger means /y world picture. 2ere is .here the e?pression glo/ali+ation o! the .orld picture" can help. 9t opens 2eideggerFs
and arti!acts in the modern era(, totali+ing vie. o! the modern age to the s.erve o! historicity, so that .e might spea1 o! reversals, ruptures, and heterogeneous erasOan *arthrise era, !or e?ample, or a post *arthrise condition in .hich the vie. o! the .hole *arth e?erts its most su/tle and .ideranging e!!ects precisely .hen its novelty !ades. Stated a /it di!!erently, the e?pression illuminates the historical predicament in the inCunction to Thin1 glo/ally, act locallyZ" The !irst hal! o! this phrase is not so much a moral directive, .hich .e may or may not opt to !ollo., as it is one description o! the human condition in the *arthrise era.

There now holds swa# a world picture in which the condition of @earthlinessA is con'ured b# wa# of a view from the most unearthl# of places<the voidM in .hich the hori(ons of earthbound experience compete with hori(ons that are planetar# , or capital* *arthly, in scopeM and in .hich the vision o! the na1ed *arth is also the vie. o! a glo/e in disguise, the greatest o! organisms< a man made planet. Thinking globall# is pro/a/ly now less our choice than our lot. histor# of the Earthrise era can help us understand what this means and how it came to be.

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C(3orgs
The desire to achieve c#borg sub'ectivit# represents a state of being where the ontic swallows the ontological, closing the circle of technological enframing. The ontic will fail at preserving humanness and ultimatel# 'ustif# human destruction. -i(ek '0I
[SlavoC Lady1iller. 1n -e%ense o% Lost 2 uses. $AA;. pp. >>DB>>:)

Toda#, with the prospect of the biogenetic manipulation of human ph#sical and ps#chic features, the notion of @dangerA inscribed into modern technolog#, elaborated b# !eidegger, becomes a commonplace . 2eidegger emphasi+es ho. the true danger is not the ph#sical self$destruction of humanit#, the threat that something will go terribl# wrong with biogenetic interventions, but, precisel#, that nothing will go wrong, that genetic manipulation will function smoothl#<at this point, the circle will, in a certain manner, be closed and the specific openness that characteri(es being$human abolished. That is to say, is the !eideggerian danger &0e!ahr( not precisel# the danger that the ontic will @swallowA the ontological &.ith the reduction o! man, the da
6hat the ecology o! !ear o/!uscates is thus a !ar more radical dimension o! terror. [here) o! Eeing, to Cust another o/Cect o! science(S -o .e not encounter here again the !ormula o! the !ear o! the impossi/le< .hat .e !ear is that that .hich cannot happen &since the ontological dimension is irreduci/le to the ontic( .ill nonetheless happenI The same point is made in a cruder !ashion /y cultural critics !rom Ju1uyama and 2a/ermas to Eill @cKi//en, .orried a/out ho. the latest technoBscienti!ic developments &.hich potentially give the human species the capacity to redesign and rede!ine itsel!( .ill a!!ect our /eing humanOthe call .e hear is /est encapsulated /y the title o! @cKi//en,s /oo1< *nough." 2umanity as a collective su/Cect has to set do.n limits and !reely renounce !urther progress" in this direction. @cKi//en endeavors to speci!y such limits empirically< somatic genetic therapy is still this side o! the tipping point, one can practice it .ithout leaving /ehind the .orld as .e 1no. it, since it simply involves intervention in a /ody !ormed in the old natural" .ayM germline manipulations lie on the other side, in the .orld /eyond meaning.>3

,hen we manipulate ps#chic and bodil# properties of individuals before the# are even conceived, we pass the threshold into full$fledged planning, turning individuals into products, preventing them from experiencing themselves as responsible agents who have to educateJform themselves b# the effort of focusing their will, thus obtaining the satisfaction of achievement<such individuals no longer relate to themselves as responsible agents .. . The insu!!iciency o! this reasoning is dou/le. Jirst, as 2eidegger .ould have put it, the survival of the being$human of humans cannot depend on an ontic decision of humans . *ven i! .e try to de!ine the limit o! the permissi/le in this .ay, the true catastrophe has alread# taken place * we alread# experience ourselves as in principle manipulable+ we 'ust freel# renounce the possibilit# of full# deplo#ing this potential. @5n the technological age, what matters to us most is getting the %greatest possible use& out of ever#thing.">= -oes this not thro. a ne. light on ho. ecological concerns, at least in their predominant mode,
remain .ithin the hori+on o! technologyS 9s the point o! using the resources sparingly, o! recycling, and so !orth, not precisely to ma?imi+e the use o! everythingS Eut the crucial point is that, .ith /iogenetic planning, not only .ill our

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universe o! meaning disappearOin other .ords, not only are the utopian descriptions o! the digital paradise .rong, since they imply that meaning .ill persistO/ut the opposite, negative, critical descriptions o! the meaningless" universe o! technological sel!Bmanipulation also !all victim to a perspectival !allacy, !or they too measure the !uture /y inade uate presentBday standards. That is to say, the !uture o! technological sel!B manipulation only appears as deprived o! meaning" i! measured /y &or, rather, !rom .ithin the hori+on o!( the traditional notion o! .hat a meaning!ul universe is. 6ho 1no.s .hat this postBhuman" universe .ill reveal itsel! to /e in itsel!"S 6hat i! there is no singular and simple ans.erM .hat i! the contemporary trends &digitali+ation, /iogenetic sel!B manipulation( open themselves up to a multitude o! possi/le sym/oli+ationsS

,hat if the utopia<the perverted dream of the passage from hardware to software of a sub'ectivit# freel# floating between different embodiments<and the d#stopia<the nightmare of humans voluntaril# transforming themselves into programmed beings<are 'ust the positive and the negative sides of the same ideological fantas# S 6hat i! it is only and precisely
this technological prospect that !ully con!ronts us .ith the most radical dimension o! our !initudeS>D

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C(3orgs0)iotec"

transhuman biolog# recalls both the practice of eugenics and expresses the culmination of technicit# as ever#thing becomes reduced to an ob'ectless ob'ect read# for manipulation. Froker '0S
[8rthur. Pro!essor o! Political Science at the University o! Pictoria. The 3ill to Technology 2ulture o% 4ihilism" 0eidegger, 4iet$sche nd 5 r6. $AA%. http<QQctheory.netQ.illQcodes.html 8l.ays a dou/le movement, nd the

the will to technolog# is a data cannibal feeding on itself, simultaneousl# disappearing the actual referents of societ# $ knowledge, sex, power, econom#, politics $ into nodes on the circuit of electronic production and furiousl# throwing itself into the future as digital destin#. 8 hyperBreligion, the .ill to technology re uires an act o! !aith in the e!!icacy o! technology itsel!
as the ritual o! admission into its a?iomatic procedures. 8 hyperBideology, the .ill to technology is historically reali+ed in

h#per$science, the will to technolog# transforms the scientific imagination into a database for harvesting the residues of human and non$human nature . 8 hyperBmyth, the .ill to technology presents itsel! in the ancient language o! the gods, spea1ing in the more enduring terms o! destiny. 8 hyperBeugenics, the will to technolog# ushers in a biotech future written under the sign of transgenic determinism. Transgenic determinismS ThatFs the dominant tendency in glo/al cultural politics. 8!ter a long sleep during the interregnum years o! the Cold 6ar, the language of eugenics stirs again* here articulating itself in the vivisectionist visions of genetic experimentation+ there pushed forward b# a newl# emergent form of transgenic capitalism intent on coding, classif#ing, manipulating, and harvesting the genetic histor# of humanit#, animals, and plants + now working in the laborator# procedures of stem cell research, clonal propagation, gene se1uencing, organ growing, and tissue replacement+ later expressing itself in the con'unction of bio$socialit# and artificial intelligence to produce artificial life$forms+ never acknowledging its historical precedents in the first wave eugenics of the h#giene movement of the earl# 70th centur# or the political fascism of Eational Socialism+ alwa#s mas1uerading itself in the cloak of a science of completed genetics. 9mmuni+ed !rom its historical genealogy cleansed o! its political history, speaking the scientific language of molecular biolog# and the economic language of the 2life industries,2 transgenic determinism limits for now its discourse to the preservation of 2life2 and the genetic improvement of 2health .H Later,
the material !orm o! the triumph o! the virtual class. it .ill reveal that the cultivation o! genetically improved species /eing is its essence. -eterminist /ecause it is po.er e?pressing itsel! in the predatory language o! harvesting human !lesh, and transgenic /ecause it involves the capricious recom/ination o! hereto!ore distinct speciesBB!ire!ly mon1eys, Celly!ish ra//its, headless organ Hdonors,H transgenic determinism vivisects li!e into nothingness. Physics may have /een the privileged language o! the atomic age, /ut

biolog# is now the ruling vernacular of the era of completed technolog# .


@ore than a technical language o! the li!e sciences, /iology e?pands no. to /ecome the dominant discourse o! /ioBpolitics< the !raming language o! capitalism, culture, politics, and media. No longer simply technological determinism, the order o!

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5n genetic engineering, the order of the transgenic expresses itself in molecular freebase experiments where the genetic heritage of different species$t#pes is capriciousl# recombined as primal models of the post$human. Streaming the genetic codes of animals, humans and plants, the first inhabitants of post$human culture suddenl# made their appearance* h#brid humans with the e#es of migrator# birds capable of detecting invisible magnetic polarities in the sk#+ chip enhanced bodies with slaved nervous s#stems centrall# processed for better social control, alwa#s on standb# for upgrading and virus protection+ insect robots programmed with warrior genes, predator# instincts and 2perverse2 intelligence. 5f molecular biolog# can adapt so 1uickl# to the epistemological possibilities of the order of the transgenic, it ma# be because the specter of transgenics originate less in the order of science than in culture . Jor uite some time, we have alread# lived within a deepl# transgenic culture* in a culture of h#brid media images, streamed marketing practices, recombinant fashion, blended genders, a global skin of culture . Transgenic imagery< that is the H/ioBvisionH o! special
the transgenic re!lects something more su/tle, e uivocal, uncertain and undecided. e!!ects cinema or television ads playing .ith the digital re!erentials o! space and speed to produce a visual universe o! stretched vision, compressed s1in, hy/rid icons, per!orming cy/orgs. Transgenic capitalism< that is the most recent !ashion edition o! 08P and Clu/ @onaco .here, pro/a/ly responding to the !ear o! ethnic di!!erence in the air, the privileged color is .hite accompanied /y the ideological slogan< HJinally have the courage to /e the same.H

8ilgrims of the future, we are alread# deepl# habituated to the culture of the post$ biological, to the language of post$human culture. ,e are onl# now in the infant stages of the order of the transgenic. The will to technolog# reveals itself under the sign of post$biologics

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C(3orgs04'erco.ing 5eat"
!uman beings need an ontological limit to ground meaning in their experience of realit#, which includes the existential limit of death. 9vercoming >eath untethers us from dwelling in the world and signals the end of creativit# and poetr#. Thiele &.;
[Leslie, Pro!essor o! Political Science at the University o! Jlorida, Timely @editations< @artin 2eidegger and Postmodern Politics, pg 'D:B';A)

The world is the web of our social and cultural relations , our relations to arti!acts, and our relations to nature. 3elationships are defined as much b# their boundaries as b# their content . 6ith this in mind, 2eidegger de!ines the .orld as a H!our!oldH &0cuicrte) that
encompasses and limits these relationships. HThe unitary !our!old o! s1y and earth, mortals and divinities,H 2eidegger states, H.e callOthe .orldH &'FLT '::(.

The sk# serves as a limit to the earth, as the earth does to the sk#. =ortals, in turn, are defined in their timel# limitations in contrast to the &immortal( divinities. :eing at home in the world, then, is not tantamount to gaining securit# for one's status or station. 5t does not mean securing our self$preservation, and certainl# not the preservation of ourselves from eventual death. Ruite the opposite< in discovering our place in the world we gain acceptance of a 2good death. H Not security /ut /elonging is .hat characteri+es /eing at home.
The sense o! /elonging consists o! a 1no.ledge and acceptance o! the /oundaries o! the place, or o! the relationships, that

The world as home is less a place of securit# than a relationship in need of securing, a set of boundaries in need of tending. 5t is a place of limits* limits to perception, limits to knowledge, and , most salient, limits to life itself. :eing at home in the world is a self$reflective exploration of and living within limits. The essence o! human d.elling is the ac1no.ledgment o! that .hich human /eing
one inha/its. is not, in the conte?t o! .hat is. The !our!old o! earth and s1y, mortals and divinities, de!ines the .orld o! human /eings in the same sense that the !lo.ing .ater and impervious /an1s de!ine the river. The river is neither the .ater .ithout the /an1s, nor the /an1s .ithout the .ater. The /oundaries o! each allo. the identi!ication o! the .hole. 9n /eing an issue !or itsel!, human /eing ma1es the .orld its issue. 6ith the .orld in !ocus, the uestion o! /oundaries arises, including those

human being discovers its home in the world primaril# b# means of poetic thinking, the thoughtful disclosure of :eing through language. 2e .rites that Hpoetry is .hat !irst /rings man onto the
/oundaries mortals never transgress. 2eidegger insists that earth, ma1ing him /elong to it, and thus /rings him into d.ellingH &PLT $';(. 2eidegger !re uently invo1es and discusses this verse /y 2olderlin< HJull o! merit, yet poetically, man Q -.ells on this earth.H 2uman li!e is !ull o! merit !or its .ondrous deeds and accomplishments, yet our capacity to d.ell, to !ind a home in the .orld, is de!ined not /y our productivity /ut /y our poetry.

To dwell is to discover and accept the world as a fourfold marking the human hori(on. Such discover# and acceptance is a poetic actOthat is, an act of thank$ful and thoughtful disclosure. To d.ell in the !our!old is to shepherd Eeing poetically in the company o! !ello. humans, preserving its .orld and a.aiting death. To sa# that humans dwell poeticall# on earth is not a 1uestion of geograph#, ethnicit#, or technical master#, but of on$tological disclosure . Eeing homeless, in
this sense, signi!ies the a/sence o! a poeticOa thought!ully disclosiveOcapacity. To /e truly homeless, !or 2eidegger, is to lose oneFs a/ility to reveal the .orld as the place o! human d.elling. To /e truly at home is to e?ercise oneFs ontologically disclosive capacities. Eeing at home in the .orld and /eing !ree are the same. To /e at home every.here is to e?perience the !reedom that allo.s our disclosure o! the Eeing o! our .orld.

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5istance 6ro. t"e 4t"er

Tr#ing to control and manage our relationship with the 9ther manages it into a @standing reserveA to be control and waiting on our control over it. 5t is an example of technological enframing of the 9therness and it forces a technological mindset on the world. )urther, an authentic relationship with the other is not based onl# of nearness, but distance. The Qac dream of encountering new worlds is an act of ontological coloni(ation<an ethical relationship can onl# begin in that gap between m#self and the other. n# other relation will onl# produce a non$being. Puenther '07
[Lisa, 8ssistant Pro!essor o! Philosophy V Pandy, To.ards a Phenomenology o! -.elling" Canadian 4ournal o! *nvironmental *ducation, D&$(, Spring)

The dwelling of human beings<our essential character, our ever#da# habits, and the ver# root of our ethics< exists not onl# in the nearness of, but at a distance from, an other that both surpasses me and makes me what 5 am. 6e can thin1 o! this other as a spirit or intermediary, or as the human communityM /ut we can also think of the other as the entire human and more$than$human world < the plants, animals, elements, and people .ith .hom .e inha/it the earth. n ethics of dwelling emerges from the preservation of a tension between this nearness to others, and the distance which keeps us distinct from others. The gap between m#self and the other is the space which makes ethical dwelling possible+ in keeping us apart, it also preserves the difference which makes an ethical relation possible. Jor this is the parado? articulated /y !ragment '':< that 9 am only mysel! in
*thos anthropoi daimon. 9n light o! 2eidegger,s translation, 9 propose that .e interpret these .ords as !ollo.s< /eing divided, that 9 can only /ecome mysel! /y ris1ing my identity in pro?imity to others. 9n e!!ect, the /oundary that separates me !rom a /lade o! grass, or !rom the moose across the river, is precisely that .hich grants me the possi/ility o!

9ften we are tempted b# the romantic idea of @fusing consciousnessA with the natural world, den#ing that there is a difference which keeps us apart from others and, precisel# in keeping us apart, also directs us towards them . Eut the very possi/ility o! an
approaching, addressing, and giving to these others. environmental ethics o! d.elling rests upon the t.o!old nearness and distinction !rom others .hom .e need and !or .hom .e are responsi/le. 9n the pages that !ollo., 9 .ill re!lect more concretely on this relation /et.een nearness and distance, or relation and otherness, .hich emerges !rom my reBtranslation o! 2eidegger,s translation o! ethos anthropoi daimon. 9 shall argue that

an ethical relation with the natural world is onl# possible given the gap of difference or otherness which is maintained b# setting a boundar# or limit to our dwelling$space. This boundar#, far from alienating us from the natural environment, actuall# forms the basis for an environmental ethics of dwelling. Consider also an apartment in the city. Cities are more li1e
/eehives. 6hen 9 loo1 out a city .indo. &turning a.ay !rom the television, opening the curtains and /linds, and peering out over the /ac1 o! the couch(, 9 see houses Cust li1e my o.n, arranged into ro.s li1e cells in a honeycom/. They are inha/ited /y people more or less li1e me< people .ho .or1, come home, ma1e spaghetti !or dinner, !all asleep during the

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ne.s. 8nd yet 9 can .al1 through this city and see things that surprise me< a man .ith green hospital pants tied around his head, calmly .al1ing his dog. 8 cat stal1ing a /ird. Jire.eed pushing through a crac1 in the side.al1. Jor cities lea1 too, even in spite o! themselves. The air conditioning may /e on, the stereo may /e /laringM /ut a storm outside can 1noc1 this out in less than a minute. Thus cities tend to sho. themselves most clearly Cust there, .here they !ail< a ro/in,s nest in the mail/o?M a lea1ing tapM the sound o! an argument ne?t door. 9n these moments o! disruption .e reali+e .hat the city tries most to conceal< that .e d.ell in relation to others, and that .e can only /e there i! others are there, too. 6hile the ca/in and the apartment are undou/tedly very di!!erent sorts o! d.ellingBspace, /oth o!!er a glimpse into the ethical signi!icance o! d.elling. 6hile there is much to say here, 9 .ant to !ocus on one aspect in particular< the relation /et.een inside and outside in a home. The inside o! a place can e?ist only than1s to the /oundary &the .alls, !loor, and roo!( .hich separates it !rom the outside. 6ithout this sense o! a place hollo.ed out !rom the .orld at large, there could /e no d.elling, no intimacy, no home in .hich 9 .elcome !riends and strangers. The /oundary that separates inside !rom outside need not /e visi/le or materialM !or even among people .ho d.ell under the open s1y, there is the sense o! a socially interior space, a space .hich is descri/ed more /y trails and hunting grounds than /y .alls and !loor/oards. -.elling re uires a sense o! the inside< an intimate space .here 9 /elong .ith others .ho do not, properly spea1ing, /elong to me. 9! the /oundary .hich creates this interior space .ere a/solute and impermea/le, then li!e .ithin its /ounds .ould /e impossi/le. 6e need .indo.s and doorsM .e need .ood !or the stove and air to /reathe. Thus

dwelling occurs neither inside nor outside but in the tension between the two* in the interaction of spaces which have something to give one another precisel# because the# are not the same. The dwelling of human beings, the root of our ethics and the ver# character of our existence, occurs in the nearness of, but distinction from, an other, an outside, a complex of human and more$than$human beings who both transcend me, and let me become who 5 am. Though our contemporary cities have largely neglected this tension /et.een inside and outside, ancient Preek cities were founded upon the principle of a boundar# or cit# wall, which both sets limits on the cit#&s proper sphere, and establishes a connection between the human communit# and the cosmos in which it dwells. 9n his /oo1, 2$O and the 6aters o! Jorget!ulness, 9van 9llich &':;3( descri/es the .ay
0ree1 cities .ere ritually traced out upon the earth in relation to heavenly /odies, the !light o! /irds, or the movement o! clouds. Jor the 0ree1s, a city could only /e !ounded in relation to that .hich e?ceeds it, that .hich is not the city /ut nevertheless is the condition !or its very e?istence. 8n ethos o! ritual and custom inaugurated the city once a site >$ Lisa 0uenther had /een divinedM a team o! one !emale and one male o? pulled a plough around the cosmic shape o! the city, the driver li!ting the plough at intervals to ma1e thresholds or city gates, places .here the interior .ould meet and interact .ith the e?ternal .orld. 9llich &':;3( calls this ritual o! inauguration a sacred marriage o! heaven and earth" &p. '3(, an opposition and .edding o! right and le!t," inside and outside, animal and human &p. '>(. 6ithout this colla/oration o! moreBthanBhuman othersOthe stars, the clouds, the o?en, the /irds, and the ground into .hich the template is etchedO the human city could not come into /eing. 8nd yet this relation /et.een the city and the moreBthancity only comes into vie. .hen the cityBspace is mar1ed o!! !rom that .hich e?ceeds it and !rom .hich it emerges .

The Preeks, we might sa#, had an ethos of cit#$dwelling* an understanding that human beings need to dwell with one another, but that we can onl# do so b# dwelling within the limits of a boundar# which both separates us from and aligns us with an exterior which is other$than$human and more$ thanhuman. One could argue, o! course, that the 0ree1s /uilt .alls around their cities not /ecause o! their deep
sensitivity to the nature o! ethical d.elling, /ut rather to protect themselves !rom armies and /ar/arians" and /easts !rom the .ild. Jor it is also trueOand especially true in the history o! the 6estOthat /oundaries have /een erected in the spirit o! e?clusion and sel!Bprotection rather than in pursuit o! harmonious d.elling. Thus .e must turn to the past not in order to repeat its mista1es, /ut rather to learn ho. not to repeat themM .e need the retrospective ga+e o! history not only to !ind inspiration !or the !uture !rom the past, /ut also to mar1 the line .hich separates past !rom !uture, and opens a di!!erent hori+on. The 0ree1s may not have conceived the city .all as a /oundary .hich separates and connects humanity .ith the moreBthanBhuman .orldM and 2eraclitus may not have understood his .ords as the startingBpoint !or environmental ethics. 8nd yet, .hen .e remem/er these ancient .ords and customs, .e are given the responsi/ility to hear /oth .hat has /een said in the past, and ho. this saying resonates !or the !uture. Jor 2eidegger, to remem/er is not to ma1e the past present" through reBpresentation, /ut rather to preserve !rom the past a meaning .hich e?ists ecstatically in relation to the !uture. Ey letting an ethical sense o! the /oundary address the traditional history o! the /oundary as an instrument o! e?ploitation and sel!Bassertion, .e open up the possi/ility o! ne. meanings !or old .ords.

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6e need to remem/er the history o! 6estern culture in this .ay in order to understand .hy our o.n cities are the .ay they are, and ho. they could /e other.ise.

,e cannot change the wa# we dwell simpl# b# wiping the slate clean and starting over+ an# change in habits must arise first from an examination of our current habits and the conditions under which the# were formed. Jor 9van 9llich &':;3(, To d.ell means to inha/it the traces le!t /y one,s o.n
living, /y .hich one al.ays retraces the lives o! one,s ancestors" &p. ;(. 6hat does this sense o! d.elling mean !or the !uture o! our citiesS -rive into Pancouver or Toronto To.ards a Phenomenology o! -.elling >% O!or one cannot help /ut drive thereOand .itness the hundreds o! 1ilometres o! occupied space spra.ling out o! our megaBcities.

This is no longer dwelling space, but rather .hat 9llich calls garages for living,A storage$ space for human enterprise. Eow, more than ever, we need to recuperate a sense of dwelling within limits* not in order to protect ourselves from the wilderness &as perhaps the ancient 0ree1s .ere concerned to do ( but rather to protect the wilderness from ourselves. ,e must do this not onl# because our ph#sical existence depends upon it, but also because without this relation to, and distinction from, others we cannot become who we are* namel#, human beings whose character is our ethos . 8nd yet .e cannot stop here. Jor ultimately, and more essentially, we must set a limit to human dwelling not for our own sake, but for the sake of the other, making room for an other not out of enlightened self$interest, but out of respect and hospitalit# . 9 propose, arising
!rom this /rie! e?ploration o! d.elling as thought and as e?perience, an environmental ethics grounded in these gestures o! respect and hospitality. To respect someone is to hold her in regard .hile still letting her remain at a distance !rom me, giving her room to move.

3espect thrives onl# where this distance and difference is maintained in the ver# midst of m# regard and concern for the other. Cikewise to offer hospitalit#Oa notion .hich 9 have inherited !rom the Jrench philosopher *mmanuel Levinas &':=:(Ois to open one&s dwelling space to an other, a stranger whom 5 cannot grasp or comprehend but for whom 5 am nevertheless responsible. To be hospitable is, like the gift of respect, to take a step back so that the other can step forth+ it is to set limits on m# own dwelling so that the other has room to come and go . The genius o! human /eing is not only that .e can /e ourselves" only in relation to an other .hich /oth surpasses and constitutes us. Lather, the genius of the human character, and the root of our ethics, is in our propensit# to give space, or make room for, an other who exceeds our grasp. 8n ethics o! respect and hospitality has political, social, and intellectual implications. 9n concrete terms, it
means that .e ought to set aside .ilderness spaces that have no human !unction, not even the relatively /enign !unction o! providing recreation !or people li1e you and me. 9t means that .e ought to rethin1 our cities in terms o! density rather than spra.l, and to preserve .ithin them spaces o! otherness and ecological diversity< par1land spaces .ithout mo.ed la.ns and /ar/e ue pits. 8nd it means that in our everyday lives, as .ell as in our municipal and territorial planning, .e must cultivate ha/its o! respect !or those .ith .hom .e d.ell, and .ithout .hom .e could not e?ist .

n ethics of dwelling based on hospitalit# and respect demands that we resist the temptation to believe, even in a spirit of generosit#, that we are the same as the other, that there is no difference between a person and a tree and a l#nx across the river. Jor although .e are /y no means indi!!erent to these others, it is precisely our di!!erence !rom them, our not knowing who the# are from the inside out, that lets us be ethical towards them. The 9talian philosopher 0iorgio 8gam/en &'::'( ends his /oo1, Language
and -eath, .ith the !ollo.ing .ords, and this is .here 9, too, .ill conclude these re!lections upon the ethos o! d.elling< 6e .al1 through the .oods< suddenly .e hear the !lapping o! .ings or the .ind in the grass. 8 pheasant li!ts o!! and then

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disappears instantly among the trees, a porcupine /uries in the thic1 under/rush, the dry leaves crac1le as a sna1e slithers a.ay. Not the encounter, /ut this !light o! invisi/le animals is thought. No, it .as not our voice. 6e came as close as possi/le to language, .e almost /rushed against it, held it in suspense< /ut .e never reached our encounter and no. .e turn /ac1, untrou/led, to.ard home. So, language is our voice, our language. 8s you no. spea1, that is ethics. &p. 'A;(

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Econo.(
The ffirmative&s use of the economic control, with its use of production and profit, are a prime example of neo$technik mindset set on controling the world. This will make it 5=89SS5:CE to E0E3 have a different mindset infused with the plan. de :eistegui '.H
[Pro!essor o! Philosophy at the University o! 6ar.ic1 &@iguel, 2eidegger and the Political, ed. /y K. 8nsellBPearson and S. Critchely, p.D', 8S0(4LC) 6hat monstrousness does 2eidegger have in mind hereS 9n .hat sense can technology /e declared monstrous"S 8nd .hy associate technology .ith nihilismS 8t this stage, and that is as a phenomenon linked to the effects produced b# global technolog#. Jollo.ing 4unger,s descriptions o! the age o! the 6or1er, 2eidegger provides his most economic description o! the actuality o! nihilism in section [[P9 o! Overcoming @etaphysics."

nihilism can onl# be envisaged

in the most simple sense,

Technolog# defines the wa# in which the @world,A perceived solel# as extended space, is mobili(ed, ordered, homogeni(ed and used up so as to enhance man&s will to hegemon#. The ordering ta1es the !orm o! a total planning or an e uipping /ustung!, which consists in the division of the whole of being into sectors and areas, and then in the s#stematic organi(ation and exploitation of such areas. Thus, each domain has its institute o! research as .ell as its ministry, each
area is controlled and evaluated .ith a vie. to assessing its potential and eventually cali/rated !or mass consumption.

3esources are endlessl# extracted, stocked, distributed and transformed, according to a logic which is not that of need, but that of inflated desires and consumption fantasies artificiall# created b# the techni1ues of our post$ industrial era. Eeings as a .hole have /ecome this stu!!" a.aiting consumption. Eothing falls outside of this technological organi(ation* neither politics, which has become the wa# to organi(e and optimi(e the technological sei(ure of beings at the level of the nation+ nor science which, infinitel# divided into ultra$speciali(ed sub$sciences, rules over the technical aspect of this sei(ure , nor the arts &.hich are no. re!erred to as the culture industry"(M nor even man as such, who has become a commodit# and an ob'ect of highl# sophisticated technological manipulation &.hether genetic, cosmetic or cy/ernetic(.
The hegemony o! technology, .hich can ta1e various !orms according to the domains o! /eing it rules over, seems to /e limited only /y the po.er o! its o.n completion.

5t is, !or technology, a 1uestion of organi(ing the conditions of its optimal performance and ultimate plan<whether these be the totalitarian or imperialistic politics of #esterda#, the global economics and the new world order of toda#, or the uniformali(ed culture and ideolog# of tomorrow. Oet behind this seemingl# ultra$rational organi(ation rules the most nihilistic of all goals* the absence of goals. Jor .hy is such an ordering set upS ,hat are all those plans forB )or the sole sake of planning. )or no other purpose than the artificial creation of needs and desires, which can be fulfilled onl# b# wa# of an increase in production and further devastation of the earth. ?nder the swa# of technolog#, man<the man of metaph#sics, the rational animal<has become the working animal. )or such a man, there is no other truth than the one that produces results, no other realit# than that of use and profit. !is will, this ver# will that constitutes his pride and that he erects as an instrument of his domination over the whole of the earth, is nothing but the expression of the will to will. Oet what this man does not reali(e is that his labor and his will spin in a

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vacuum, moving him ever more forcefull# awa# from his provenance and his destination, from his position amidst beings and from the relation to being that governs it. Eusy as he is at using up and producing, at manipulating and consuming, toda#&s man no longer has the e#es to see what is essential &namely presence in its epochal con!iguration( and can no longer greet the discrete echo of presencing which resounds in thinking and poetici(ing alone. 8t /est is he in a position to accumulate e?periences" ()rle#nisse!, .hich he !launts as
his truths."

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E66icienc( 7o'e.ents
=odern efficienc# movements are the worst application of technological development and lead us to view Eature solel# as standard reserve$ we must incorporate the fourfold -i(ek %0I [Lady 1illing suave machine &9n de!ense o! lost causes" p.>>;B>>:(QQCollinQQCrc) the survival of the being$human of humans cannot depend on an ontic decision of humans. Even if we tr# to define the limit of the permissible in this wa#, the true catastrophe has alread# taken place* we alread# experience ourselves as in principle manipulable+ we 'ust freel# renounce the possibilit# of full# deplo#ing this potential. 25n the technological age, what matters to us most is getting the 'greatest possible use' out of ever#thing .,,>= -oes this not
The insu!!iciency o! this reasoning is dou/le. Jirst, as 2eidegger .ould have put it, thro. a ne. light on ho. ecological concerns, at least in their predominant mode, remain .ithin the hori+on o! technologyS

5s the point of using the resources sparingl#, of rec#cling, and so forth, not precisel# to maximi(e the use of ever#thingB Eut the crucial point is that,
.ith /iogenetic planning, not only .ill our universe o! meaning. disappearBin other .ords, not only are the utopian descriptions o! the digital paradise .rong, since they imply that meaning .ill persist B /ut the opposite, negative, critical descriptions o! the HmeaninglessH universe o! technological sel!Bmanipulation also !all victim to a perspectival !allacy, !or

the future of technological self$manipulation onl# appears as 2deprived of meaning2 if measured b# &or, rather, !rom .ithin the hori+on o!( the traditional notion of what a meaningful universe is. ,ho knows what this 2post$human2 universe will reveal itself to be 2in itself2B ,hat if there is no singular and simple answer+ what if the contemporar# trends &digitali+ation, /iogenetic sel!Bmanipulation( open themselves up to a multitude of possible s#mboli(ationsB 6hat i! the utopiaBthe
they too measure the !uture /y inade uate presentBday standards. That is to say, perverted dream o! the passage !rom hard.are to so!t.are o! a su/Cectivity !reely !loating /et.een di!!erent em/odimentsBand the dystopiaBthe nightmare o! humans voluntarily trans!orming themselves into programmed /eingsBare Cust the positive and the negative sides o! the same ideological !antasyS 6hat i! it is only and precisely this technological prospect that !ully con!ronts us .ith the most radical dimension o! our !initude S 2eidegger himsel! remains am/iguous

5t is true that !eidegger's answer to technolog# is not nostalgic longing for 2former ob'ects which perhaps were once on the wa# to becoming things and even to actuall# presencing as things H &HThe ThingH(, but rather allowing ourselves to be conditioned b# our world, and then learning to 2keep the fourfold in things2 b# building and nurturing things peculiarl# suited to our fourfold. ,hen our practices incorporate the fourfold, our lives and ever#thing around us will have importance far exceeding that of resources, because the# and onl# the# will be geared to our wa# of inhabiting the world.>;
here.

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Ending 4i% 5e*endenc(
The ff's attempt to @freeA the ?.S. from oil dependenc# merel# shifts the technological mindset towards new venues, saniti(ing practices that reduce the world to a standing reserve. Finsella &06
[6iiliam, Ph.- 8ssistant Pro!essor at North Carolina State University, 2eidegger and Eeing at the 2an!ord Leservation< Lin1ing Phenomenology, *nvironmental Communication, and Communication Theory", http<QQ....allacademic.comQQmetaQp\mla\apa\research\citationQAQ:QAQ:Q;Qpages:A:;$Qp:A:;$B'.php)

!eidegger&s concept of pro'ection indicates that nature is alwa#s disclosed in light of its usefulness for >asein&s practical activities. This characteristic of disclosure is fundamental and inevitable, and !eidegger is not critical of this human propensit# to utili(e the world. The technological attitude that he calls enframing , however, is a specific and problematic mode of utili(ation in which nature becomes a @standing reserveA &2eidegger, ':DDc( or a @gigantic gasoline station, an energ# source for modern technolog# and industr#A &2eideggger, ':==, p. 3A(. 2eidegger &':DDc( illustrates this concept .ith a series o! poignant e?amples< The revealing that rules in modern technolog# is a challengingMwhich puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it suppl# energ# that can be extracted and stored as such. Eut does this not hold true
!or the old .indmill as .ellS No. 9ts sails do indeed turn in the .indI.Eut the .indmill does not unloc1 energy !rom the air currents in order to store it.

tract of land is challenged into the putting out of coal and ore. The earth now reveals itself as a coal mining district, the soil as a mineral deposit. 8griculture is no. the mechani+ed !ood industry. ir is set upon to #ield nitrogen, the earth to #ield ore, ore to #ield uraniumMuranium is set upon to #ield atomic energ#. The coal that has /een hauled out in some mining district has not /een
supplied in order that it may simply /e present some.here or other. 9t is stoc1piledM that is, it is on call, ready to deliver

The sun&s warmth is challenged forth for heat, which in turn is ordered to deliver steam whose pressure turns the wheels that keep a factor# running. The h#droelectric plant is set into the current of the 3hineM.5n the context of the interlocking processes pertaining to the orderl# disposition of electrical energ#, even the 3hine appears as something at our commandM. ,hat the river is now, namel#, a water power supplier, derives from out of the essence of the power stationI.Eut, it .ill /e replied, the Lhine is still a river in the landscape, is it notS Perhaps. Eut ho.S 9n no other .ay than as an o/Cect on call !or inspection /y a tour group ordered there /y the vacation industry &pp. '>B'=(. These examples do not re!lect mere nostalgia. 9nstead, they illustrate a radical break in >asein&s relationship with the earth. That relationship is now characteri(ed b# calculation, control, and deliberate disruption of the natural order. 9ndeed, in
the sun,s .armth that is stored in it. the last t.o o! these e?amples the natural order is displaced .hen steam and a tour group are ordered," and am/iguously, this ordering can /e understood as a calculated physical arrangement /ut also as an imperative command. 9 suspect that this same am/iguity is present in the original 0erman te?t, and that 2eidegger .as .ell a.are o! its presence.

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Energ( Storage
The act of extracting and storing the earth&s energ# renders the world in standing reserve leading to inevitable violence and exploitation6 :eckman '7F
[*meritus Pro!essor o! Philosophy 2umanities and Social Sciences 2arvey @udd College &Tad, @artin 2eidegger and *nvironmental *thics," $AAA, http<QQ...$.hmc.eduQWt/ec1manQpersonalQ2eidart.html( QQ4LC)

2Technolog# Gin its essenceT is a mode of revealing. Technolog# comes to presence G,estT in the realm where revealing and unconcealment take place, where aletheia, truth, happens.2 X[D), p. '%Y &>( ,hat !eidegger wanted us to recogni(e b# bringing technolog# to the concept of revealing is that technolog#'s essence is to be found in the most basic realm of experience. That realm is the realm of 2truths happening.2 9t could /e argued, o!
Eoth paths o! interpretation lead to the same thing. course, that all o! this analysis ta1es ancient 0reece as its !ocal point and that modern technology has little or nothing to do .ith ancient 0reece. This is true, o! course, in the sense that technology has o/viously developed !ar /eyond its origins in 0reeceM ho.ever, it is also misguided i! it tries to convince us that technologyFs essence has /een !undamentally changed. 2eideggerFs point is precisely the assertion that

the basic essence of technolog# has remained unchanged and that this essence is most readily o/served in the 0ree1 origins o! our thin1ing a/out these things. The problem remaining, then, is to understand how modern technolog# has evolved within this essential nature as a mode of revealing. ,e have arrived at the opening of the essence of modern technolog#. Technolog# is a mode of the fundamental wa# in which things happen in the universe and we, as agents, are involved in this happening within the cooperative elements of causation. Eut technology has evolved through the intervening three millenniaM .hat .as previously called FtechneF
and .as a !orm o! the general process o! /ringing!orth has separated into di!!erent modes o! revealing. 6hat .e understand as modern technology can scarcely /e recogni+ed as having a common origin .ith the !ine arts or cra!tsM indeed, modern technology is distinguished in having made its HallianceH .ith modern physical science rather than .ith the arts and cra!ts. &3( There!ore, to understand technology as it is today and in its complete essence, .e must understand the course o! that separate and uni ue evolution. Perhaps it is not di!!icult to understand the separate paths o! the !ine arts, cra!tsmanship, and modern technology. *ach seems to have !ollo.ed di!!erent human intentions and to have addressed di!!erent human s1ills. 2o.ever, .hile the !ine arts and cra!tsmanship remained relatively consistent .ith

techne in the ancient sense, modern technology .ithdre. in a radically di!!erent direction. 8s 2eidegger sa. it, H the

revealing that rules in modern technolog# is a challenging [2eraus!ordern), which puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it suppl# energ# that can be extracted and stored as such.2 X[D), p. '>Y @odern technolog# sets$upon nature and challengesforth its energies, in contrast to techne which was alwa#s a bringing$ forth in harmon# with nature. The activit# of modern technolog# lies at a different and more advanced level wherein the natural is not merel# decisivel# re$directed+ nature is actuall# 2set$upon.2 The rhetoric in which the discussion is couched conve#s an atmosphere of violence and exploitation. &=(

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En'iron.ent
)ear of environmental catastrophe separates our relationship from the earth, turns the case. 5t is the technological mindset which caused their impacts, and the technological mindset which the# act through. =c,horter '.7
0ail [8ssistant Pro!essor o! Philosophy at Northeast @issouri State University &Ladelle, 2eidegger and the *arth, ed. /y Ladelle @c6horter(4LC)

StenstadFs essay, HSinging the *arth,H takes us further along t.o o! the paths that =al#'s thinking indicates* earth as dark &the sel!concealing that is /oth sheltering and !rightening( and our longing to be with the earth. She suggests that it is our be$longing to the earth that is at stake. 9!, when we fear the dark, our desire or longing moves awa# from what 5S earth#, we live disconnected from the earth, with disastrous conse1uences. 2o.ever, if we allow ourselves to be moved b# and with the revealing and concealing of earth and earth# things, our longing is also our be$longing. This /eB
longing .ill play itsel! out in, as 2eideggerFs thin1ing hints, our language &not Cust .ords /ut also< song, dance, art, /uildings, ritual( and our .ays o! d.elling.

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En'iron.enta%is. 81029
ttempts to manage environmental catastrophe lock us into a calculative mindset that perpetuate the root cause of #our impacts =c,horter '.7
[8ssistant Pro!essor o! Philosophy at Northeast @issouri State University &Ladelle, 2eidegger and the *arth, ed. /y Ladelle @c6horter(QQ4LC)

Thinking ecologicall# $ that is, thinking the earth in our time means thinking death+ it means thinking catastrophe+ it means thinking the possibilit# of utter annihilation not Cust !or human /eing /ut !or all that lives on this planet and !or the living planet itsel!. Thinking the earth in our time means thinking what presents itself as that .hich must not /e allo.ed to go on, as that .hich must be controlled, as that .hich must /e stopped. Such thinking seems to call for immediate action. There is no time to lose. ,e must work for change, seek solutions, cur/ appetites, reduce e?pectations, find cures now, before the problems become greater than anyoneFs a/ility to solve them 5 i! they have not already done so. 2o.ever, in the midst of this urgenc#, thin1ing ecologically, thinking !eideggerl#, means rethinking the ver# notion of human action. 5t means placing in 1uestion our typical 6estern managerial approach to problems, our propensit# for technological intervention, our belief in human cognitive power, our commitment to a metaph#sics that places active human being over against passive nature . Jor it is the thoughtless deplo#ment of these approaches and notions that has brought us to the point of ecological catastrophe in the first place . Thinking with !eidegger, thin1ing 2eideggerly and ecologically, means, parado?ically, acting to place in uestion the acting su/Cect, willing a displacing of our will to actionM it means calling ourselves as selves to rethin1 our very selves, inso!ar as sel!hood in the 6est is constituted as agent, as actor, as controlling ego, as 1no.ing consciousness. !eidegger's work calls us not to rush in with 1uick solutions, not to act decisively to put an end to deli/eration, /ut rather to thin1, to tarr# with thinking unfolding itself, to release ourselves to thinking without provision or predetermined aim.

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En'iron.enta%is. 82029
The aff&s engagement in technological thought and mandating the order of natural resources culminates in stripping of the needJdesire to help others and culminates in the technological understanding of being >re#fus '.S
[Pro!essor o! Philosophy at the University o! Cali!ornia at Eer1eley &Charles E., 2eidegger on the connection /et.een nihilism, art, technology, and politics" 5 chapter o! The Cam/ridge Companion to 2eidegger," ed. Ey Charles E. 0uignon, p. %A=(4LC)

5n this technological perspective, ultimate goals like serving Pod, societ#, our fellows or even ourselves no longer make sense to us. !uman beings, on this view, become a resource to be used$but more important, to be enhanced$like an# other* @an, .ho no longer conceals his character o! /eing the most important ra. material, is also dra.n into this process" &*P 'A>M P8 :A(. 5n the film 700Q, the robot ! C, when asked if he is happ# on the mission, sa#s* @5&m using all m# capacities to the maximum. ,hat more could a rational entit# wantBA This is a brilliant expression of what an#one would sa# who is in touch with our current understanding of being. ,e peruse the development of our potential simpl# of the sake of further growth. ,e have no specific goals. The human potential movement perfectl# expresses this technological understanding of being, as does the attempt to better organi(e the future use of our natural resources. 6e thus /ecome part o! a system that no one directs /ut that moves to.ard the total mo/ili+ation and enhancement o! all /eings, even us. This is wh# !eidegger thinks the perfectl# ordered societ# dedicated to the welfare of all is not the solution to our problem but the culmination of the technological understanding of being.

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:iat

>ebate relies upon an assumption of givenness which creates a faUade of knowabilit# related to empirical events, but this knowledge causes us to reward our own narcissism and encounter the world as @read#$madeA for our consumption. The theoretical foundations of fiat simplif# create a technological mindset in the round. Seigfried '.0
[2ans, pro!essor in the -epartment o! Philosophy at. Loyola University Chicago, 8utonomy and Ruantum Physics< Niet+sche, 2eidegger and 2eisen/erg", Philosophy o! Science 3D, pp. =':B=%A) Eut, o! course, 2eideggerFs &early( analyses do not disprove the Niet+schean claim that .e ourselves are not such that .e al.ays already are and remain .hat .e are, nor that the .hole .orld o! e?perience is the product o! our organi+ation and

the whole point of his lengthy phenomenological, existential, and fundamental$ontological anal#ses is to demonstrate concretel# that the received notions of both ourselves and the world are phenomenall# inade1uate abstractions and that all forms of givenness whatsoever, together .ith the corresponding !orms o! intuition and understanding, are functions of the care for our own being. !eidegger describes this care as the attempt at 2ac1uiring power2 over our being and 2dispersing all fugitive self$concealment2 &':=$, p. %'A(Bin the Niet+schean idiom< giving ourselves laws and thus becoming ourselves$ with the understanding that we can never have such power 2from the ground upH &':=$, p. $;>( and there al.ays remains the vast pro!usion o! impenetra/ility descri/ed /y Niet+sche. 5t is this care, 2eidegger argues, which not onl# determines what we ourselves are at an# given time, but also what all other things are which we encounter as read#$made and given in our concernful dealings and in our most ob'ective observations and theoretical explorations. ppearances of detached and absolute givenness arise onl# when we give in to the 2tendenc# to take things easil# and make them eas#2 b# concealing from ourselves the responsibilit# for the care of our being
grounded in our !orm o! li!e and H/ehaviorH. On the contrary, &':=$, pp. '$DB'$;(, .hich is most o! the time, and .hen the success o! such determinations ma1es us !orget their origin. Only under such conditions does it loo1 as i! .e had no hand in the ma1ing o! the la.s that seem to /e the dictates o! alien !orces &inside and outside o! us( .hich determine .hat .e are and regulate our !orm o! li!e. 9n short, 2eidegger tries to do .hat he critici+es Cassirer and neoKantians !or !ailing to do, namely, to e?plicitly demonstrate that all !orms o! dealing, intuition, understanding, and the givenness o! things have their origin in our !orm o! li!e &':D=/, p. >$(.

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The affirmative attempt to liberate humanit# from our earthl# imprisonment provides a framework for violent domination of the universe and disposabilit# of planet earth. =acaule# '.6
[-avid, teaches philosophy and literature classes at several colleges in Ne. Gor1 City. @inding nature< The philosophers o! ecology", @arch $:, '::=, 0uil!ord Pu/lications) Earth Alienation 6hy has man rooted himsel! thus !irmly in the earth, /ut that he may rise in the same proportion into the heavens a/oveS OT2OL*8U, 3 lden 9n the prologue to The !uman "ondition, 8rendt .rites o! the launching in ':3D o! the !irst satellite, an event, she asserts /oldly, that is Hsecond in importance to no other, not even to the splitting o! the atom.H ,ith the pro'ection of this man$made, earth$born, and once earthbound ob'ect into the depths of outer space, she locates /oth a s#mbolic and an historic step toward reali(ing the hubristic dream of 2liberating2 us from nature , /iological necessity, and earthl# 2imprisonment.2 This desire to escape the earth &and our success in so doing( signifies to 8rendt a fundamental rebellion against the human condition, of

which the earth is the 2ver# 1uintessence ,2 and marks our departure into the

universe and a universal standpoint taken deliberatel# outside the confines and conditions in which we have lived from our genesis. This
monumental action, too, can /e vie.ed as a prelude to and encapsulation o! 8rendtFs o.n thin1ing a/out the realm o! nature, !or it is here that she esta/lishes a star1 distinctionOor, more e?actly, oppositionO/et.een earth and world and calls attention to an alienation .hich, she claims, .e e?perience !rom /oth spheres. 8rendt also sho.s an early concern .ith the su/Cect o! dwelling<onBtheBearth and inBtheB.orldOan activity she spea1s o! else.here as homelessness and rootlessness, and she signals a pre!erence !or turning to.ard or returning to an older conception o! the natural and the political, namely, a 0ree1 one. Thus, she announces her intention to Htrace /ac1 modern .orld alienation, its t.o!old !light !rom the earth into the universe and !rom the .orld into the sel!, to its origins.H > 9n the initial pages o! The !uman "ondition, 8rendt reveals a penchant !or resorting to phenomenological, historical, and, later, etymological accounts o! politics and H.hat .e are doingH .ithin and to the .orld and earth, and !or employing spatial metaphors and descriptions in the process. 9n !act, the satellite which carries us from our home and earthl# place

into a cosmic space and new

rchimedean point is merel# the first such vehicle

8rendt invo1es to launch us into consideration o! a politics o! the spatial and placial. She e?amines pu/lic and private space, spaces o! appearance &the polisD and places o! disappearance &the death camps(, the inner space and li!e o! the mind, and outer space and its con uest /y modern science and technology. 9n assessing such thoughts on nature and the earth and their relevance !or contemporary ecological and political thought, it is necessary to situate her vie.s historically /y positioning them against the 0ree1s &to .hom she loo1s(, @ar? &.hom she critici+es(, 2eidegger &!rom .hom she /orro.s(, and the Jran1!urt School and its heirs &.hom she neglects(. 9n this .ay, one can perhaps /etter measure her contri/utions and !ailings, her /lindnesses and insights . The phenomenon of earth alienation, as 8rendt conceives o! it, is an interesting but curious and problematic notion. 9t is typi!ied strangely /y an historical e?pansion o! 1no.n geographic and physical space .hich, ironically, /rings a/out a closingBin process that shrin1s and a/olishes distance. *arth alienation stands in contrast, though not complete opposition, to .orld aliena tion. Eoth originate, in her vie., in the si?teenth and seventieth centuries. 8ccording to 8rendt, there .ere three great events .hich inaugurated the modern age and led to the .ithdra.al !rom and loss o! a cultural rootedness in place and estrangement !rom the earth. Jirst, the most spectacular event .as the discovery o! 8merica and the su/se uent e?ploration, charting, and mapping o! the entire earth .hich /rought the unintended result o! closing distances rather than enlarging then. 9t ena/led humans to ta1e H!ull possession o! [their) mortal d.elling placeH and to gather into a glo/e the once in!inite hori+ons so that Heach man is as much an inha/itant o! the earth as he is o! his o.n country.H 3 Second, through the e?propriation o! chi?ch property, the Le!ormation initiated individual e?propriation o! land and .ealth .hich, in turn, uprooted people !rom their homes. Third, the invention o! the telescope, the least noticed /ut most important event, ena/led humans to see the earth not as separated !rom the universe /ut as part o! it and to ta1e a universal standpoint in the process. Jrom this /ell.ether moment, 8rendt traces our abilit# to direct cosmic processes

into the earth, the reversal of the historic privileging of contemplation over

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action, a resultant distrust of the senses, and a marked tendenc# on the part of science to dominate nature.= The telescope, in short, H!inally !orced nature, or rather the universe, to yield
its secrets.HD The roots o! earth and .orld alienation seem to /e related !or 8rendt, though t.o o! themOthe charting o! the earth and the invention o! the telescopeOare more closely lin1ed .ith her conception o < earth alienation than the third. To these events, .e can add the rise o! Cartesian dou/t, !or .ith it our earth/ound e?perience is called into uestion .ith the discovery that the *arth revolves around the sun, a phenomenon .hich is contrary to immediate sense e?perience. Cartesian dou/t is mar1ed /y its universali+a/ility, its a/ility to encompass everything &-e omnibus dubitandumD, and to leave the isolated mind alone in in!inite, ungrounded space. @odern mathematics and particularly Cartesian geometry anM also indicted /ecause they reduce all that is not human to numerical !ormulas and truths. The# free us from

finitude, terrestrial life, and geocentric notions of space, replacing them with a science 2purified2 of these elements . 9n e!!ect, they ta1e the geo &the earth( out o! geometry. This movement from natural to universal science and the creation of a new rchimedean point in the human mind &a metaphor -escartes employs in the Second @editation(, .here it can /e carried and moved a/out, is at the heart of her conception of earth alienation , a distinguishing !eature o! the modern .orld. ; 5t is this historic process which has enabled us to handle and control nature from outside the earth< to reach speeds near the speed o! light .ith

the aid o! technology, to produce elements not !ound in the earth, to create li!e in a test tu/e and to destroy it .ith nuclear .eapons. 9n 8rendtFs vie., this process is responsible for estranging us so radicall# from our given home. 9n !act, she appears to ta1e a step even !urther in the direction o! pessimism .hen she claims that the earth is, in a sense, dispensable and obsolete< H6e have !ound a .ay,H she says, Hto act on the earth and .ithin terrestrial nature as though .e dispose, o! it !rom outside, !rom the 8rchimedean point.H : 9n her essay HThe Con uest o! Space and the Stat are o! @an,H 8rendt ela/orates on these themes and sho.s the !utility o! humans ever con uering space and reaching an 8rchimedean point, .hich .ould constantly /e relocated upon its discovery. She suggests that .e recogni+e limits to our search !or 1no.ledge and that a ne., more geocentric .orldBvie. might emerge once limitations are ac1no.ledged and accepted. 8rendt is not especially optimistic a/out such an occurB rence , /ut !eels that we must recover the earth as our home and begin to reali(e that mortalit# is a fundamental condition of scientific research . 9t is not only modern science .hich she !inds culpa/le, though, !or it .as philosophers, she assertM, .ho .ere the !irst to a/olish the dichotomy /et.een earth and sk# &/y .hich she might also mean space since the earth includes the s1y 'A( and to situate us in an un/ounded cosmos. 8nd so the task of reconceiving our relation to the universe also rests on

the shoulders of philosophers.

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This is a s#mptom of ,estern desire to enframe the Earth and understand ever# being as standing reserve. -immerman './
[@ichael *., Ph-, Tulane, ':D> is Pro!essor o! Philosophy and !ormer -irector o! the Center !or 2umanities and the 8rts at CU Eoulder, Contesting earth,s !uture< radical ecology and postmodernity", UT Li/rary Catalog, @E) Li1e many deep ecologists, Capra critici+es modernity /ecause it inter!eres .ith the smooth !unctioning o! the *arthFs ecosystem hence, he suggests that systems theory is not intrinsically domineering, any more than uantum theory, .hich is so use!ul !or the computers and other electronic e uipment on .hich systems theory applications are so dependent. -eep ecologists .arn that despite supercomputers, scientists cannot !ully predict the conse uences o! their actions.

"haos theor#, though not mentioned /y Capra in The Turning Point, argues that this lack of predictive capacit# is due to the fact that most natural phenomena, including weather, are nonlinear s#stems , .hich are in principle unpredicta/le /eyond the short term. 0er# small scale perturbations can trigger off a vast, s#stem altering event. 2ence, although some people ma# wish to use s#stems theor# and c#bernetics to support schemes !or domination, chaos theor# shows the limits to such aspirations . The de/ate a/out photographs o! *arth ta1en !rom outer space also re!lects the de/ate /et.een Ne. 8gers and deep ecologists. The technical accomplishments re1uired to build the spacecraft !rom .hich to ta1e those photos, regarded /y some ecological activists as inspiring images o! the living *arth, were made possible b# the same ob'ectif#ing attitude that discloses Earth as a stockpile of raw materials !or enhancing human po.er. 2ence, Gaa1ov 0ar/ has argued that although those photos may seem to disclose the interconnectedness o! li!e, they ma# also be read as s#mptoms of ,estern 2man's2 drive to escape from his dependence on Earth .=3 Ey achieving a perspective that reduces Earth to an image reproducible on a postcard, 2man2 gains the illusion of control over the planet. 3ecoiling against his organic origins and his mortalit#, man begins conceiving of himself as godlike and as radically other than nature. Satellite photos of Earth ma# be instances of that 2high altitude thinking2 &@erleauPonty( which conceives of itself as pure spirit rising above the natural world . 9n such photos, .e see *arth re!lected in the rearvie. mirror o! the
spaceship ta1ing us a.ay !rom our home in order to con uer the universe. 2eidegger .arned that in the technological era, !or something Hto /eH means !or it to /e an HimageH &Bild( proCected /y and constrained in accordance .ith the demands o! the po.ercraving su/Cect.== 9n ':==, he remar1ed that H9 .as !rightened .hen 9 sa. pictures coming !rom the moon to the earth. 6e donFt need any atom /om/. The uprooting o! man has already ta1en placeI. This is no longer the earth on .hich man lives.H=D 0ar/ argues that the same environmentalists .ho charge that the o/Cecti!ying technological attitude

highaltitude photos of Earth also erase difference and reduce the planet to two dimensions. 0ar/ notes that immersing oneself in wild nature !or an e?tended period lets one experience the multila#ered complexit# and specificit# of the living Earth, as well as one's dependence on it . Though deep ecologists, Ne. 8gers, and many
that reduces natural phenomena to indistinguisha/le ra. material sometimes !ail to notice that postmodern theorists e?tol the virtues o! the local, the particular, and the di!!erent, the very idea o! the HlocalH /ecomes pro/lematic as the socioeconomic .orld /ecomes increasingly interdependent. Consider the !ollo.ing scenario< rising glo/al oil prices ma1e coo1ing !uel too e?pensive !or many Third 6orld people, .ho then cut trees !or !uel. The !elled trees no longer a/sor/ car/on dio?ide and give o!! o?ygen, thus e?acer/ating the glo/al .arming that may trigger climate

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changes that devastate mid.estern 8merican agriculture, .hile at the same time melting polar ice caps and thus !looding Ne. Orleans and @iami. Jurther, !elled trees may contri/ute to local topsoil erosion, /ut may also cause erosion that silt up rivers, there/y causing massive !looding do.nstream. Comple? socioeconomic events thus can set o!! a chain o! events .ith catastrophic conse uences at local and glo/al levels.

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2%o3a% <ar.ing
ttempts to reduce global warming is futile 4 The 1uick fix actions are rooted in the technological mindset which initiall# produced the problem6 !ill '0H
[0lenn,-*S90N 69T2OUT C8US8L9TG< 2*9-*00*L,S 9@POSS9EL* C28LL*N0* JOL *COLO09C8LLG SUST89N8EL* 8LC29T*CTUL*", http<QQepress.li/.uts.edu.auQdspaceQhandleQ$'AAQ>D>)

the implications for ecological sustainabilit# and for design also become clear. ,ith modernit#&s belief that causalit# in nature could be understood and there!ore controlled, technologies have been increasingl# deplo#ed with the confidence that their outcomes can be predicted. ,hile the design of each individual technologicall# mediated intervention would have been intended to cause a KlocalD beneficial outcome for some portion of humanit# &grounded in 7care, in 2eidegger,s terms(, their cumulative impact on the ecological s#stems of the planet is now considered b# man# to be potentiall# catastrophic. 9! this scenario is accepted, then design could be characterised as the well$intentioned engine driving the proliferation of technologies that now threatens the planet. -esigners, and not least architects, are
8t this point, en!ramed .ithin a vie. o! causality .hich instils con!idence that designed outcomes have predicta/le e!!ects. Tellingly,

this confidence is no less evident in the responses to the perceived ecological crisis, where design is confidentl# being advocated to develop solutions to overcome the ver# problems that confident designing has created. Con!irming such a vie. o! the designer, 2eidegger re!ers to the 7engineer in his dra!ting room, &.hich could
e ually /e the architect in hisQher studio( as /eing part o! an en!ramed system, 7an e?ecuter, .ithin *n!raming, &Ruestion, $:(. @odernity,s understanding that the entities constituting our universe are particular .ay and operate under the rule o! causality, mar1s a momentous shi!t< in preBmodernity nature is apprehended as mysterious and marvellousM in

This shift is, for me, no better illustrated than in the surreal K#et 1uite seriousD design for a solar umbrella consisting of trillions of satellites launched from earth and intended to stop global warming K:rahicD. The pre$modern understanding of the m#ster# and wonder of the sun&s warmth granting life to all beings on earth Kfor man# pre$modern cultures the sun and Pod were oneD, has shifted to a modern understanding where the sun&s warming of the earth is a calculable s#stem that we do not merel# believe we can understand, but have the hubris to believe that we can control.
modernity nature is apprehended as systematic and opera/le.

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2$i%t0Li6est(%e C"anges07ora%it(
ppeals to guilt and lifest#le changes or moralit# are the link 4 the# seek to accomplish the perfect life and are the ultimate form of managerial control =c,horter '.7
[8ssistant Pro!essor o! Philosophy at Northeast @issouri State University &Ladelle, 2eidegger and the *arth, ed. /y Ladelle @c6horter(4LC) Some men !eel guilty a/out se?ismM many .hite people !eel guilty a/out racismM most o! us !eel guilty a/out all sorts o! ha/its and idiosyncracies that .e tell ourselves .e !irmly /elieve should /e changed. Jor many o! us guilt is a constant constraint upon our lives, a seemingly permanent state. 8s a result, guilt is !amiliar, and, though some.hat uncom!orta/le

5t is no surprise, then, that whenever caring people think hard about how to live .ithQinQon the earth, we find ourselves growing anxious and, usually, feeling guilt# a/out the .ay .e conduct ourselves in relation to the natural .orld. Puilt is a standard defense against the call for change as it ta1es root .ithin us. :ut, if we are to think with !eidegger , i! .e are to heed his call to re!lect, we must not respond to it simpl# b# deploring our decadent life$st#les and indulging ourselves in a fit of remorse. !eidegger's call is not a moral condemnation, nor is it a call to ta1e up some politically correct position or some privileged ethical stance. ,hen we respond to !eidegger's call as if it were a moral condemnation, we reinstate a discourse in which active agenc# and its pro'ects and responsi/ilities take precedence over an# other wa# of being with the earth. 9n other .ords, we insist on remaining within the discourses, the power configurations, of the modern managerial self. Puilt is a concept whose heritage and meaning occur within the ethical tradition of the ,estern world. Eut the histor# of ethical theor# in the ,est &and it could /e argued that ethical theory only occurs in the 6est( is one with the histor# of technological thought. The revelation o!
at times, it comes to !eel almost sa!e. things as toB/eBmanaged and the imperative to /e in control .or1 themselves out in the history o! ethics Cust as surely as they .or1 themselves out in the history o! the natural and human sciences. 9t is pro/a/ly uite true that in many di!!erent

human beings have asked the 1uestion* !ow shall 5 best live m# lifeB Eut in the ,est, and in relatively modern times, we have reformulated that 1uestion so as to ask< 2o. shall 9 conduct mysel!S 2o. shall 9 /ehaveS !ow shall 5 manage m# actions, my relationships, my desiresS 8nd ho. shall 9 ma1e sure my neigh/ors do the sameS >8longside
cultures, times, and places technologies o! the earth have gro.n up technologies o! the soul, theories o! human /ehavioral control o! .hich current ethical theories are a signi!icant su/set. *thics in the modern .orld at least very !re uently !unctions as Cust another !ield

when we react to problems like ecological crises b# retreating into the familiar discomfort of our ,estern sense of guilt, we are not placing ourselves in opposition to technological thinking and its ugly conse uences. On the contrary, we are simpl# reasserting our technological dream of perfect managerial control. 2o. soS 9ur guilt professes our enduring faith in the managerial dream b# insisting that problems B pro/lems li1e oil spills, acid rain, ground.ater pollution, the e?tinction o! .hales, the destruction o! the o+one, the rain !orests, the .etlands B lie simpl# in mismanagement or in a failure to manage &to manage ourselves in this case( and /y rea!!irming to ourselves that i! .e had used our
o! scienti!ic study yielding Cust another set o! engineering goals. There!ore,

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po.er to manage our /ehavior /etter in the !irst place .e could have avoided this mess. 9n other .ords,

when we

respond to !eidegger's call b# indulging in feelings of guilt a/out ho. .e have /een treating the o/Cect earth, we are reall# 'ust telling ourselves how trul# powerful we, as agents, are. ,e are telling ourselves that we reall# could have done differentl#M .e had the po.er to ma1e things .or1, i! only .e had stuc1 closer to the principles o! good
management. 8nd in so saying .e are in yet a ne. and more stu//orn .ay re!using to hear the real message, the message that human /eings are not, never have /een, and never can /e in complete control, that the dream o! that sort o! managerial omnipotence is itsel! the very danger o! .hich 2eidegger .arns. Thus guilt B as a!!irmation o! human agential po.er over against passive matter B is Cust another .ay o! covering over the mystery. Thus guilt is Cust another .ay o! re!using to !ace the !act that .e human /eings are !inite and that .e must /egin to live 7ith the earth instead o!

Thinking along !eidegger's paths means resisting the power of guilt, resisting the desire to close ourselves off from the possibilit# of being with our own finitude.
trying to maintain total control. 0uilt is part and parcel o! a managerial approach to the .orld. 9t means !inding Hthe courage to ma1e the truth o! our o.n presuppositions and the realm o! our o.n goals into the things uestion.H 5t means holding ourselves resolutel# open for the shattering power of the event of thinking, even if what is shattered eventuall# is ourselves. that most deserve to /e called in

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Hege.on(
The aff&s world$ordering engages in a t#pe of thinking that reduces all life on earth to a tool to be instrumentali(ed, further disconnecting ourselves from what it means to be. Swa(o '07
[Pro!essor o! Philosophy at the University o! 8las1a &Norman K., Crisis Theory and 6orld Order< 2eideggerian Le!lections, p. ''AB'') The inevita/ility o! such a !ight issues !rom the pathology o! nihilismO all political thought and practice in our time cannot

The attraction to 2rational design2 of the world order is toda# motivated b# a Sense of imminent catastrophe and, thus, b# the human impulse to self preservation. 2ere, ho.ever, it is li!e itsel! that compelsM and precisely in this attraction to rational design o! the world order is there /etrayed .hat Niet+sche recogni+es in 6estern moralism< 9t is pathologicall# conditioned. 8nd .hat is this pathologyS 5t is nothing other than the strife of sub'ective egoisms as #et unmastered. Such is the essence o! po.erBpolitics. Eut this, presuma/ly, is li!e &.ill to po.er(M and, as Niet+sche puts it, H life itself forces us to posit values+ life itself values through us when we posit values H &T.ilight o! the 9dols, H@orality as 8ntiBNature,H note 3(. 9n .orld order thin1ing, 9 su/mit, the ,est discharges the energ# of its moral essence, doing so as author of the prevailing moralit# and as the locus of the dominant sub'ective egoisms which have been inevitabl# diffused to determine all political cultures, the latter of which are now bound to the ,est's hegemon# over world political culture . The contemporar# world order in structure and value orientation is instituted on the basis of ,estern reaso n, and as such it is characteri+ed /y an Horder o! ran1H in .hich
/ut /e Hpathologically conditionedH &T.ilight o! the 9dols, HThe Pro/lem o! Socrates,H note 'A(. *uropean values have primacy, i.e., are hegemonous visBaBvis all HotherH &8sian, 8!rican, Latin 8merican, etc.( plausi/ly autochthonous valuations.

,orld order thinking, thus, compelled /y li!e itsel! in all its prevalent pathology, posits its values$peace, 'ustice, economic well$being, ecological balance$ over against all that shows itself as the contemporar# patholog# of 2pett# politics2 and all that is countervaluation in the strife motivated b# the re1uirements of global hegemon#. 5n this positing of primac# to the ,estern valuation, the 9ccident reveals its near exhaustion , i! not its desperation, in the face of competing modes of sub'ectivit# as manifest b# a fragmented and antagonistic 2s#stem2 of nation$states, each with its 2splinter$will.2 0iven that this .orld order movement is transnational, the 6est coBopting sympathetic !orces in the developing .orld, t.it her this e?haustion nor this desperation is restricted to the 6est< The 2crisis2 is effectivel# planetar#. Niet+sche .as not amiss in his articulation o! the great tas1 that .ould de!ine the
t.entieth century, i.e., the pro/lem o! glo/al governance. Neither .as he amiss in appreciating its hesitant approach, despite its ine?ora/ility. That is, Niet+sche recogni+es the persistent, though declining, in!luence o! the Christian ideal .ith respect to the pro/lem o! glo/al governance, anticipating that this ideal .ould yet issue in the call !or a moral .orld order< Not.ithstanding the death o! 0od, Christian value Cudgments .ould /e transmuted into the political domain. The t.entieth centuryFs emerging order .ould /e a Hhy/ridH o! sic1ness, the .ill to po.er heightening the demands o! modern manFs sel!Bdetermination, the Christian conscience yet restrainingBin short, a H!etteredH moment in humanityFs movement to.ard total sel!Ba!!irmation, total sovereignty in the a/sence o! 0od and transcendent norms. HThey are rid o! the Christian 0od,H .rites Niet+sche in his T.ilight o! the 9dols &HS1irmishes o! an Untimely @an,H note 3(, yet Hno. /elieve 8l the more !irmly

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that they must cling to Christian morality.H 9t is not yet reali+ed, o/serves Niet+sche, that H.hen one gives up the Christian !aith, one pulls the right to Christian morality out !rom under oneFs !eet.H 8ccordingly, the contemporary .orld order movement e?presses a commitment to trans!orming the philosophic orientation &values( as .ell as trans!orming institutional structures and patterns o! /ehavior. 6orld order thin1ing is, thus, normative.

That world order thinking is value thinking is evidence of its essential debt to the Eiet(schean metaph#sic, to thinking the world order from the vantage of sub'ectness, for it is onl# with Eiet(sche that value thinking comes to predominate in the twentieth centur#. HF 8s 2eidegger puts it, HPalues stem !rom valuationM valuation corresponds to the .ill to po.er.H That is, insofar as the creation of secureness is grounded in value$positing and world order thinkers on their own essential authorit# &understood metaphysically, not personally( seek to secure a world order, then world order thinking cannot but be so grounded. 5t is precisel# this ground, i.e., a self$grounded value$posit, that entails the technocratic conception of world order and, thus, eliminates a meaningful distinction between the normative and technocratic approaches. 2o. soS 2eidegger ans.ers in .ords that indict all value thin1ing< 2thinking in terms of values is a radical killing. 5t ... strikes down that which is as such, in its being$in itself. . . .2 Ever#thing which is 2is transformed into ob'ect2 and 2swallowed up into the immanence of sub'ectivit#. HHF Commensurate .ith this
su/Cectivity is that o/Cectivity .hich, in the essence o! the technological, is total, and .hich !inds its instrument in technocracy.

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H$33%e 1e%esco*e

The !ubble is a prime example of managerialism in space. 5nternational Space organi(ations reframe the meaning of telescopes to account for malfunction and maintenance, which simpl# exports technological enframing to the domain of outer space. Egan &0.
[Pro!essor o! @anagement at Leicester University, 2u//le, Trou/le, Toil, and Space Lu//le< The @anagement 2istory o! an O/Cect in Space, @anagement # Organi+ational 2istory Polume >, pg $D$B$D%) 8ppro?imately t.o months a!ter launch, the 2u//le Space Telescope ProCect @anager declared there .as a critical !la. in one or /oth o! the mirrors in the Optical Telescope 8ssem/ly, and this incident /ecomes the second part o! the o/Cects

!istorical biographies can suddenl# reappear, as previousl# forgotten pieces of e1uipment return to the concern of management. 9b'ects are often implements taken for granted, existing in a vast subterranean backdrop supporting the surface la#er of practice and place of explicit management activit#. There!ore things often onl# come into the sight of management as technolog# comes into view through malfunction. The /ro1en mirror escaped the telescopeFs assem/lage, erupting into the management landscape, and compelling the organi+ation o! N8S8 to ta1e stoc1 o! this ne. contingent realm. !istor# is often made b# failure, breakage or fiasco. mirror's pathwa# into the totalit# of the technological s#stem was disturbed and made visible b# its fault+ creating a new ontological depth and enrolment of management attention. 2o.ever, the chance of redemption for E S came in the guise of !ubble's breakdown not being aberrant but as a normal condition of the ob'ect's existence &Petros1i ':;3(. 2ere the third stage in the life of the ob'ect is the credit E S gained through recover#, which was not 'ust a reactionar# derivative of failure, but an intended part of the ob'ects biograph#+ service was built into design . The repair illustrated the importance of human space labour and ingenuit# where management learning occurred through maintenance &Orr '::=(M /ut it ostensi/ly allo.ed N8S8 to regain
manBagement history. credi/ility and capture the pu/lic imagination .ith televised record /rea1ing space .al1s displaying a ne. level o! per!ormance !rom astronauts.

The concluding episode in the biograph# of the !ubble Telescope examines its recent oscillation between worth and eventual demise. 5n this period, the value of an ob'ect is inseparable from managerial motive. Throughout the lifespan of the telescope manVagement strived to fend off deca# through service, and failure through repair+ eventuall# allowing E S to decide and control the fate of its most sublime technological ob'ect in space.

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H(dro*ower
!#dropower essentiali(es the river into a standing reserve $$$ perpetuating the notion that the world is nothing more than a resource for humanit# :rassington 'H [CS*P, School o! La., University o! @anchester &9ain,On 2eidegger, medicine, and the modernity
o! modern medical technology, @edicine, 2ealth Care and Philosophy,'A, pg. ':$B':%) 9nasmuch as an item .ould not have /rought itsel! into presence .ithout human intervention, such a /ringing !or.ard is, in a sense, violent &/iai( 5 /ut, o! course, all /ringingB!or.ard 5 including truth, inasmuch as aletheia .rests !rom leth e 5 is violent any.ay, and this is simply a /ullet that .e have to /ite &and, appropriately, 2eidegger does associate te1hn e

,hat is important is that !eidegger can claim that non$modern technolog# does not encroach on the world in the same manner as might modern technolog#, for it does not see the world as a mere standing$reserve from which it might manufacture things. :ecause production is not conceived metaph#sicall#, enframing is not likel#. The windmill certainl# does capture the energ# within the bree(e, but the millwheels are responsive to the wind , revealing the wind as wind. The suppl# of energ# to the watermill is, perhaps, more constant 4 however, it, too, is responsive to the world around it. This sort o! technolog# retains its essence as /ringingB!orth in the sense o! poi
.ith violence in the 9ntroduction to @etaphysics &2eidegger, $AAA, p. '=A!!((. esis, inasmuch as it retains the essence o! the .ind or the river as .ind or river and, in a sense, simply ta1es advantage o! the a/undant energy latent therein. This is .hat 2eidegger is driving at in his idea that

the water mill %%preserves&& the river. :# contrast, the modB ern h#droelectric plant &or .ind!arm( does not respond to, but %%challenges&& the world around it+ it transforms the essence of the river into a %%standing$reserve&&* The revealing that rules in modern technolog# is a challenging, which puts to nature the unreason$ able demand that it suppl# energ# which can be extracted and stored as such... [*)ven the Lhine itsel! appears to /e something at our command. The hydroBelectric plant is not
/uilt into the Lhine Liver as .as the old .ooden /ridge that Coined /an1 .ith /an1 !or hundreds o! years. Lather, the river

,hat the river is now, namel#, a water$ power supplier, derives from the essence of the power station . &2eidegger, ':::a, pp. %$A5 '( 9n e!!ect, the watermill takes advantage of a river that can suppl# power, while the h#dro$electric plant takes advantage of a power suppl# , the %%riverness&& of which is incidental. &8dmittedly, the di!!erence is not so pronounced in the Letter on
is dammed up into the po.er plant. 772umanism,,, .hich appears to /e more generally antiBtechnological< .hile it concedes that technolB ogy is a !orm o! truth, it insists that it is 77grounded in the history o! metaphysics,,. There is no distincB tion /et.een metaphysical and preB metaphysical te1hn e here, and 9 am admittedly unsure a/out ho. .ell this claim s uares .ith the remainder o! 2eidegger,s thought.( 2ence, .hile the essence o! technology in its /roadest sense is causative, there is still a signi!iB cant di!!erence /et.een modern technology and nonBmodern te1hn e. This is .hy 77the correct instrumental de!inition o! technology still does not sho. us technology,s essence,, &2eidegger, ':::a, p. %'%(. Technology cannot /e separated !rom

while modern technolog# is enframing, non$ modern technolog# is %%poetic&& . 8s !ar as 2eidegger is concerned, GiTnstrumentalit# is considered to be the funda$ mental characteristic of technolog#. 9! .e in uire
production and instrumentality, /ut, step /y step into .hat technology, represented as means, actually is, then .e shall arrive at revealB ing. The possi/ility o! all productive manu!acturing lies in revealing. Technology is there!ore no mere means.

Technolog# is a wa#

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of revealing... 9t reveals .hatever does not /ring itsel! !orth and does not yet lie here /e!ore us, .hatever can loo1
and turn out no. one .ay and no. another... Thus .hat is decisive in te1hn e does not at all lie in ma1ing and manipulating, nor in the using o! means, /ut rather in the revealing mentioned /eB !ore. 9t is as revealing, and not as manu!acturing, that te1hn e is a /ringingB!orth. &2eidegger, ':::a, p. %';5:( Technology reveals the .orld in a certain manner, although this manner is varia/le.

=odern technolog# reveals the world as a standing$reserve+ the revealing that belongs with non$modern technolog# is such that things are allowed to come to presence without thereb# challenging or enframing the worldness of the world !rom .hich they come to presence. To /e sure, we might want to sa# that the h#dro$electric plant %%preserves&& the forces of the river , and this could /e correct. 2eidegger never seems to con!ront this possi/ility. :ut he does not have to, !or human >asein, as 9 have pointed out, ek$sists and dwells in a world of things, not onta*a world of rivers, not fluid d#namics and force.

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&nd$str(
The development of industr# and tech renders the world into standing reserve6 !eidegger 'HH [@artin, The Ruestion Concerning Technology and Other *ssays, translated /y 6illiam Lovitt, p';,
8S0Q4LC)

9nl# to the extent that man for his part is alread# challenged to exploit the energies of nature can this ordering revealing happen. 5f man is challenged, ordered, to do this, then does not man himself belong even more originall# than nature within the standing$reserveB The current tal1 a/out human resources, a/out the supply o! patients !or a clinic, gives evidence o! this. The forester who, in the wood, measures the felled timber and to all appearances walks the same forest path in the same wa# as did his grandfather is toda# commanded b# profit$making in the lumber industr#, whether he knows it or not. !e is made subordinate to the orderabilit# of cellulose, which for its part is challenged forth b# the need for paper, which is then delivered to newspapers and illustrated maga(ines. The latter, in their turn, set public opinion to swallowing what is printed, so that a set configuration of opinion becomes available on demand. Oet precisel# because man is challenged more originall# than are the energies of nature, i.e., into the process
o! ordering, he never is trans!ormed into mere standingBreserve. Since man drives technology !or.ard, he ta1es part in ordering as a .ay o! revealing. Eut the unconcealment itsel !,

within which ordering unfolds, is never a human handiwork, an# more than is the realm through which man is alread# passing ever# time he as a sub'ect relates to an ob'ect.

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&nternationa% ;e%ations
ll attempts to think global politics presuppose an ontolog# which inform all following action 4 53 and world order studies inherentl# follow a calculatative and technolog# mindset6 ll the aff claims are premised on an ontolog# of calculation which must be confronted before we can enact change. Swa(o '07
[pro!essor o! philosophy at university o! 8las1a, Jair/an1s, $AA$ [Norman K, Crisis Theory and 6orld Order< 2eideggerian Le!lections p.D>BD=)

To the extent that world order studies are steeped in a strategic rationalit#, in calculative thinking, the# do not concern themselves with the task of having a reflective insight into the fundamental features of the age. The# do not concern themselves with the ground that enables an# thinking and doing such as is pursued b# a science, natural or social. Get, it is this enabling ground that is reall# determinative of that science, inasmuch as all positing of a domain of in1uir# presupposes an ontolog#. ,orld order studies, as a development o! contemporary social science, li1e.ise are dependent upon one or another ontological commitment. Speci!ically, 9 shall argue, the# are determined b# the ontological positions that prevail in the modern period of ,estern philosoph#+ for these are the positions fundamentall# decisive for the profound change taking place in humanit#'s self$understanding, in our conception of all that is content of our world, and our relation to this world. 8/out this 9 shall concern mysel! in section $. Ee!ore doing this it is important that this relation /et.een
a positive science and ontology /e stated in /road outline. Jor this 9 turn to 2eidegger. H8ll nonBphilosophical sciences,H remar1s 2eidegger, Hhave as their theme some /eing or /eings, and indeed in such a .ay that they are in every case antecedently given as /eings to those sciences.H; Continuing, 2eidegger .rites< They are posited /y them in advanceM they are a positum !or them. 8ll the propositions o! the nonBphilosophical sciences, including those o! mathematics, are positive propositions. 2ence, to distinguish them !rom philosophy, .e shall call all nonBphilosophical sciences positive sciences. Positive sciences deal .ith that .hich is, .ith /eingsM that is to say, they al.ays deal .ith speci!ic domains, !or instance, nature. 6ithin a given domain scienNti!ic research again cuts out particular spheres< nature as physically material li!eless nature and nature as living nature. 9t divides the sphere o! the living into individual !ields< the plant .orld, the animal .orld. 8nother domain o! /eings is historyM its spheres are art history, political history, history o! sciNence, and history o! religion. . . . The /eings o! these domains are !amiliar to us even i! at !irst and !or the most part .e are not in a position to delimit them sharply and clearly !rom one another. 6e can, o! course, al.ays name, as a provisional description .hich satis!ies practically rhe purpose o! posiB tive science, some /eing that !alls .ithin the domain 6e can al.ays /ring !or.ard and picture ourselves some /eing /elonging to any given domain. ... 8 /eingOthatFs something, a ta/le, a chair, a tree, the s1y, a /ody, some .ords, an action.:

,orld order studies are, properly spea1ing, nonphilosophical. 6hile concerned with a num/er o! domainsOpolitical, economic, historical, etc.Oit is the political domain that is central to these in1uiries, presupposing the classical architectonic claims of the science of politics fot thinking and doing.'A 9nso!ar as the political domain is primary, world order studies deal with beings that are said to be political, ho.ever e?plicitly or am/iguously this denomination is to /e understood.
Such /eings are things o! vatious 1inds< humans ua citi+ens, o!!ice holders, rulers, legislatotsM .ords such as pu/lic or o!!icial documents, codes o! la., tteaties o! reciprocal o/ligation, spo1en discoutseM actions in all modes o! pu/lic /eingB .ithBoneBanotherM things mote or less !amiliar /ut not so .ell delimitedOregimes, states, constitutions, organi+ations, associaNtionsM in short, things that have theit /eing in thought, .otd, and deed.

ll beings of the political

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domain become the proper concern of this thinking 1ua world order studies, despite the division o! this domain into particular spheres &domestic politics and international relations( and
individual !ields &!oreign policy, legislation, pu/lic la., pu/lic administration, state and municipal or provincial and local government, party politics, etc.(.

)or world order studies, politics presents itself as global. 8olitics so conceived, as .ell as patterns o! /ehaviot and practice /et.een levels o! government, matter insofar as the# bear upon and contribute to the overall condition of our common planetat# existence. 9ndeed, properly spea1ing, where global identit# and global interdependence are determinative of outlook concerning political existence, the distinction of domestic and international spheres becomes rather anachronistic, remaining useful onl# for purposes of anal#ses and investigations proper to the science of politics in its present empiricall#$oriented methodolog#. 9t is important to undetstand that political science posits in advance the various political things that constitute its ob'ects of investigation. 5n this posit, an ontolog#O.hat these things are, ho. they are, their .ay o! /eingO is implicit, if not explicit. This ontolog#, insofar as it is the ontology o! the speci!ic domain or region o! /eings that politics is, grounds the science of politics. That is, political science can be said to be dependent on, or to derive !rom, a regional ontolog#, vi(., political ontolog#. 9ntolog# as such is a theoretical in1uir#, i.e., in uiry He?plicitly devoted to the meaning o! entities,H this meaning being articulated b# wa# of basic concepts. 8olitical ontolog#, too, is a theoretical in1uir# devoted to the meaning of those entities that provide the sub'ect matter of empirical political science 1ua positive science. Consider 2eideggerFs !ollo.ing comments concerning such a
relation< Scienti!ic research accomplishes, roughly and naively, the demarcation and initial !i?ing o! the areas o! su/CectB

The basic structures of an# such area have already /een worked out after a fashion in our pre$scientific wa#s of experiencing and interpreting that domain of :eing in which the area of sub'ect$matter is itself confined. The F/asic conceptsF .hich thus arise remain our pro?imal clues !or disclosing this area concretely !or the !irst time. ... :asic concepts determine the wa# in which we get an understanding beforehand of the sub'ect$matter underl#ing all the ob'ects a science takes as its theme, and all positive investigation is guided b# this understanding. 9nl# after the area itsel! has /een e?plored /e!orehand in a corresponding manner do these concepts become genuinely demonstrated and 'grounded'. Eut since every such area is itsel! o/tained !rom the domain o! entities themselves, this preliminar# research, !rom .hich the /asic concepts are dra.n, signifies nothing else than an interpretation of those entities with regard to their basic state of being. n 9t is in ta1ing the Hstep /ac1,H so to
matter. spea1, !rom the positing o! a domain and the research underta1en /y a positive science to the ontology implicit in this Hdemarcation and initial !i?ing o! the areas o! su/CectBmatterH that one /egins to ma1e the move !rom calculative thin1ing to meditative thin1ing. 9nasmuch as meditative thin1ing is concerned .ith the HmeaningH that reigns in things and thus .ith the ground that ena/les scienti!ic in uiry, the orientation o! such thin1ing is primarily ontological rather than positive &scienti!ic(. 2ere .e have the distinction /et.een philosophy and scienceO speci!ically, /et.een philosophy ua metaphysics and science. 6e can no. /egin to ma1e our .ay through the uestions initially set !orth at the /eginning o! this chapter, and to clari!ying the need !or and Custi!ication o! meditative thin1ing as it /ears upon contemporary .orld order thin1ing.

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Kritika% #66ir.ati'es 84**ression and &ne=$a%it(9
Engaging one facet of ine1ualit# or oppression onl# replicates the harm$ onl# the re$examination of >asein can prevent spirit murder and extinction. Tr#ing to engage in onl# one facet kills all thoughts of :eing$ in$the$world and is an example of the managerial mindset of technik. Spanos '7F [Pro!essor
o! *nglish at SUNG5Einghamton( $1 &The Ruestion o! Philosophy and Poiesis in the Posthistorical 8ge< Thin1ingQ 9magining the Shado. o! @etaphysics, 6illiam P. Spanos, /oundary $, $D.' &$AAA( '=:(QQ4LC) 8nd in thus !ocusing this indissolu/le relay, .hich could /e collectively su/sumed under the silence that /elongs to the totali+ed saying privileged /y a metaphysical representation o! /eing as Eeing,

this reconstellation also points the wa# that the rethinking or retrieval of thinking &and poiesis( must take when histor# has come to its end in the age of the world picture , .hich is to say, in the @posthistoricalA age of transnational capitalism. 5n the interregnum, which bears witness to the massive displacement of human lives precipitated b# the globali(ation of the idea of liberal capitalist democrac#<and the utter inade1uac# of the ,estern interpretation of human rights<it is not enough to engage capitalist economics or politics, or patriarch#, or racism, or classism, and so on. ll these pursued independentl# remain trapped within the strategic disciplinarit# of the dominant discourse. 9n the interregnum, rather, the thinker and the poet must think the pol#valent manifestations of the spectralit# released b# the consummation of the Pax Metaphysica if the# are to prepare the wa# for a politics that is ade1uate to the task of resisting the impending Pax Americana and, be#ond that, of establishing a polis that, in its alwa#s open$ended agonistics, precludes what rendt, far more clearl# than !eidegger and all those postmodern critics of the cit# of modernit#, recogni(ed as the banalit# of evil incumbent on the reduction of being at large to a territor#, planetar# in scope, to be con1uered, compartmentali(ed, and administered. ,hich is to sa# on all self$ righteous proclamations of universal peace that 'ustif# the ph#sical and spiritual slaughter and maiming of human life.

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Kritika%0#nt"ro*ocentris. #66ir.ati'es
ll life is not e1uall# valuable$$certain species are inherentl# more important6 )urther, to manage ever# :eing to be e1ual is den#ing their being and simpl# an example of the managerial mindset on the control of :eings. >eCuca '0; [8ssociate Pro!essor o! Speech Communication and adCunct in the 9nstitute o! *cology at the University
o! 0eorgia 5 [Kevin @ichael -eLuca, *thics # the *nvironment, HThin1ing .ith 2eidegger< Lethin1ing *nvironmental Theory and Practice,H 9ssue 'A.', p=DB;D, @use)

The first stasis point revolves around humanit#'s relation to nature. To put it plainl#, in environmental circles it is still a "artesian world, wherein the founding act is human thinking &cogito ergo sum( and the [*nd Page D') earth is o/Cect to humanityFs su/Cect. This position is clear in mainstream environmentalism, where humans act to save the ob'ect earth and , fundamentall#, this action is motivated b# the sub'ect's self$interest. So, .e must save the rain !orests
/ecause they contain potential medical resources and /ecause they alleviate glo/al .arming. No. certainly this /ase anthropocentrism has come under attac1 !rom various radical environmentalisms that posit /iocentrism or ecocentrism. 9

these anti$anthropocentric positions have not escaped the gravit# of "artesianism. This is evident at both theoretical and practical levels. Theoretically, in the e!!ort to avoid the stain o! anthropocentrism all beings are posited as having e1ual intrinsic worthJvalue and difference is leveled. The banana slug is e1ual to homo sapiens. There are problems with this. =ost obviousl#, the concept of intrinsic worthJvalue is philosophicall# incoherent<worthJvalue b# definition is alwa#s relational . @ore signi!icantly !or this discussion, to posit intrinsic worthJvalue is to den# the ecological insight that all beings are constituted in relation to other beings and their environment. Jurther, to deny di!!erence is to /lunt analysis o! our current situation and to deny the di!!erential
.ould argue, ho.ever, that levels o! e!!ects di!!erent species have. 2omo sapiens is not another type o! slug and must /e analy+ed .ith that a.areness.

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7ars 81029
=ars "oloni(ation is onl# valuablt when unders#ood through the lens of the aff's discourse and narrative. This discourse of =ars "oloni(ation is 'ust an example and 'ustification of the drive for technological efficienc# and the technological mindset. Nerkins '0.
[4ae, Pro!essor at Jlorida State University, 2eidegger,s Eridge< the Social and Phenomenological Construction o! @ars," Jlorida Philosophical Levie., :&$(.) Today, scientists studying @ars use the tools o! the narrative o! colonialismO.ith the enthusiasm o! nationalism, the promises o! corporate success, and the desire to dominate ne. !rontiersOall to legitimate the proCect o! going to @ars. 6hen one legitimates an activity, they are promoting said activity as authori+ed, validated, or normative.%% Eoth scienti!ic and governmental discourses are legitimated /y narrative, and yet scienti!ic discourse tends to push narrative aside as an in!erior method o! conveying 1no.ledge. There also e?ists a vague correlation /et.een legitimation and truth. 4eanB Jran]ois Lyotard e?plains, The language game o! science desires its statements to /e true /ut does not have the

The state tends to render science @understandableA b# relating @scientific knowledge to %popular& knowledge,A doing so b# @spendGingT large amounts of mone# to enable science to pass itself off as an epic.A %3 Scienti!ic documentaries li1e @8LS< -ead or 8live are
resources to legitimate their truth on its o.n."%> saturated .ith narratives, !rom the anthropomorphic rovers to the hostile" land, /ecause scienti!ic 1no.ledge cannot 1no. and ma1e 1no.n that it is the true 1no.ledge .ithout resorting to the other, narrative, 1ind o! 1no.ledge, .hich

This paradoxical viewpoint of scientific narratives threatens to render scientific accounts of =ars unchallengeable. Scientists attempt to explain what =ars is like, but then use colonialist narratives, modernist narratives, and !egelian narratives of progress to induce the public into funding scientific pro'ects. Thus, it becomes cumbersome to engage in dialogue concerning the legitimac# of =artian endeavors when scientists utili(e narrative to legitimate what the# do, while dismissing narrative as non$science. 9nstead, the scientific discourse of =ars should be seen for what it is Oa changing, su/Cective, and comple? exchange of the narrative and the empirical , influenced b# historical context, bureaucratic powers, and the technological drive toward efficienc#.
!rom its point o! vie. is no 1no.ledge at all."%=

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Heidegger K Page (7!/247)


7ars 82029
Enframing =ars with a technological mindset constrains its forms which haven't been revealed to us #et and ma# cause permanent damage to it. 5t further pushes us to see the Earth in a technological mindset and ever#thing around us. Nerkins '0.
[4ae, Pro!essor at Jlorida State University, 2eidegger,s Eridge< the Social and Phenomenological Construction o! @ars," Jlorida Philosophical Levie., :&$(.)

)or =ars, the prospect of enframing is extremel# problematic, given its phenomenological nature. s interpretive discourse directs the narratives of =ars &scienti!ic and other.ise(, enframing comes rather easil# and often appears as a benign force in the media and pu/lic discourse, as1ing, 6hat can @ars do !or usS" Eecause the
interpretation o! @ars precedes any o/Cective 1no.ledge, as illustrated /y Lo.ell,s once popular canal theories, .e must proceed in the a.areness that @ars is, in the pu/lic mind, .hat is said o! it. 2eidegger .arns, The rule o! *n!raming threatens man .ith the possi/ility that it could /e denied to him to enter into a more original revealing," adding his some.hat romantic call to modernity, and hence to e?perience the call o! a more primal truth."3$ 2eidegger,s point is .ellBta1enOwhat

is damaging to our participation in the world is the exclusivit# technolog# brings to bear as a form of modern revelation. 2eidegger e?plains that when technological enframing takes place, @it drives out ever# other possibilit# of revealing ."3% ,hen technological ordering comes to be the onl# wa# we perceive the world, then the world becomes revealed to us onl# through the banal act of securing natural resources, no longer allowing what !eidegger calls the @fundamental characteristicsA of our resources to appear to us .3> The Earth becomes minerals, the sk# becomes gases, and the =artian surface becomes whatever those with means will it to be . ,hen we ga(e at =ars with an e#e toward technologicall# enframing it, we den# ourselves the possibilit# of other forms of revelation which , given the great passage of time, ma# come to ma1e our generation appear uite nearBsided and audaciousOor .orse, cause permanent damage to a planet we are far from grasping in its sublime entiret#. 2eidegger descri/es the en!raming o! a tract o! earth as a coal5mining district"M can the en!raming o! @ars as a natural resource /e !ar !rom 2eideggerian thoughtS33 To appreciate full# the meaning in this world and of the @red planet,A we must come to terms with our modern predilection for technological enframing and be accepting of other, more long$term, open$minded and inclusive perspectives of place$ making.

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7ining
=inging is an example of enframing and the technological view over the universe. =odern mining is exactl# like the process of mining !eidegger saw in Q.66. 5t is used to store energ#, making nature and the world into a standing reserve. bsher 'Q0 [ErandonB, Pro! o! Philosophy http<QQimagineno/orders.orgQ/logQ/randonQto.ardBaBconceptBo!BecoBviolenceQ)
practically signi!icant entities. at University o! Kentuc1y,

To sum up, human e?istence is constituted /y its dynamic engagement in practical possi/ilities .hich disclose a .orld o!

Traditional philosoph#, then, undul# reifies human existence and the world in which it is involved 4 it treats both as mere @thingsA only contingently related to one another. 2eidegger intensi!ied this criti ue o! the 6estern philosophical tradition in his later re!lections on technology. )or !eidegger, technolog# is not so much a particular Kperhaps more complicatedD kind of apparatus or instrument as it is a wa# of being$in$the$world. s such, technolog# is distinctive in the manner in which it uncovers or reveals beings. 2eidegger calls it *nB!raming &0eB stell(. The En$framing is a wa# of disclosing the world in which ever#thing appears as a mere resource &Eestand( for production &2erBstellung( and representation &PorB stellung(. Technolog#, that is, is a wa# of life that treats humans and the world in which the# are involved as mere sources of @powerA to be exploited in accordance .ith the independent /elie!s, intentions, or values o! individuals. 8s 2eidegger .rites, The revealing that rules in modern technology is a challenging [2eraus!ordern), .hich puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it suppl# energ# that can be extracted and stored as such." % 6hereas in previous ages /eings .ere mani!est in their intricate involvement in a .e/ o! socialQnatural signi!icance, technological modernit# dissem/les this .e/ and treats beings as abstract, 1uantifiable units of @power ." PreBtechnological .ays o! li!e, in 2eidegger,s vie., are distinctive in their responsiveness to the independent sel!Bsho.ing o! /eings. The En$framing, on the other hand, sets out to a/olish this independence and to disclose beings in accordance with a calculable ordering of human devising . *very.here," 2eidegger .rites, everything is ordered to stand /y, to /e immediately at hand, indeed to stand there Cust so that it may /e on call !or a !urther ordering." % 2e o!!ers the mining o! coal as an e?ample, The coal that has been hauled out of some mining district has not been supplied in order that it ma# simpl# be present somewhere or other. 5t is stockpiled+ that is, it is on call, read# to deliver the sun&s warmth that is stored in it. The sun&s warmth is challenged forth for heat, which in turn is ordered to deliver steam whose pressure turns the wheels that keep the factor# running .% 3ather than responding to the independent self$showing of the mountains or the coal beneath them, modern technolog# demands of the mountains and the coal the# hold that the# conform to a @rational orderingA and that the# be on hand for whatever use people ma# make of them .

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Heidegger K Page (72/247)


7ora%it(
=oral discourse is a link 4 it reaffirms power over the Earth and people6 5t forces a technological mindset because we tr# to calculate morals and ethics and ever#thing, in the process, becomes a standing reserve. =c,horter '.7 [8ssistant Pro!essor o! Philosophy at Northeast @issouri State University &Ladelle, 2eidegger and
the *arth, ed. /y Ladelle @c6horter(4LC) The !irst essay, H0uilt as @anagement Technology< 8 Call to 2eideggerian Le!lection,H gives an overvie. o! 2eideggerFs thin1ing on technology and discusses 2eideggerFs call !or re!lection as opposed to instrumental or calculative thin1ing a/out the earth. 9t care!ully distinguishes re!lection, in 2eideggerFs sense, !rom moral stoc1Bta1ing or ethical Cudgment. 9n

moral discourse and practice are themselves !orms o! technology, sets of techni1ues for maintaining control over self and other. s such, moralit# shows itself as a danger, as part of the technological, calculative, managerial thinking that currentl# endangers the earth itself. The essay closes
!act, it suggests that .ith a 1ind o! .arning. 9! it is the case that morality is part o! technological discourse and practice rather than a separa/le discourse .hose purpose is criti ue, then

moral condemnation and moral guilt are reinstantiations of the calculative. Thus, our tendenc# to feel guilt# about our treatment of the earth is not a change of heart but is rather a perpetuation of human domination.'

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Nanotec"no%og(
Eanotechnolog# reduces nature to a standing reserve and destro#s our relationship to :eing. Feekok Cee '..
[UUPisiting Chair in Philosophy at the 9nstitute !or *nvironment, Philosophy and Pu/licPolicy at Lancaster University The Natural and the 8rte!actual< The 9mplications o! -eep Science and -eepTechnology !or *nvironmental Philosophy, p. %AB%%. http<QQ/oo1s.google.comQ/oo1sS printsec^!rontcover#vid^9SENAD%:'AA='A#vid^LCCN::A$A%$3::A$A%$3)

nanotechnolog# ma# be seen as an instance of the long awaited fulfillment of the ultimate promise given b# modern science at its inception in the
9n other .ords, seventeenth century, /ut, .hich it has ta1en !our centuries to ma1e good. 8s .e have seen, according to the metaphysics o! Scienti!ic Naturalism, matter isuni!ormly dead or inert, consisting o! mere e?tension, and is itsel! devoid o! !orm or telos.

Such metaph#sicsis in 1eeping .ith the vie. that there is a general process o! production .hich consists ultimately o! there arrangement o! the elements o! such matter to serve solel# human ends. !ence modern science and its technolog# become the stud# of the manipulation of nature. Eanotechnolog# cannot, and does not, dispense.ith elementary matter
as atoms o! the various elements .hich e?ist in nature, the analogue o! .hat 8ristotle called !irst or prime matter. 9nstead, its implied

claim amounts to being able onl# to dispense with second matter , abiotic kinds,
they

that is to say, natural kinds, /e these /iotic li1e species o! plants and animals, or a/iotic li1e diamondor granite. These are !orms o! lo. entropic structures .hich are scarce /ecause humans may render e?tinct or use /iotic 1inds !ar !aster than they can replace themselves. 9n the case o! certain

are

simply

nonrenewable, at least in the timeBspan .hich could /e relevant to the sustaina/ility o! our industrial civili+ation. :ut in a nanotechnological world, such scarcit# would not be worr#ing . Nanotechnology appearsto /e a/le to /ypass most, if not all, abiotic natural kinds, b# rendering them irrelevant to the process of production . 9n their place, it .ill /e a/le to construct ne. !orms o! second matter, ne. synthetic 1inds. Ey this maneuver, not onl# is the scarcit# of natural kinds rendered irrelevant to the industrial processes o! production /ut the arte!actual 1inds may /e said to supersede them. Such supersession, in turn, as we shall see, would lead to both the ontological and the ph#sical elimination of natural kinds .
Natural 1inds are entities .hich come into e?istence and continue to e?ist independent o! human volition and agencyM arte!actual 1inds, in contrast, are entities .hose e?istence and maintenance are the intended outcome o! human volition

Technological products are arte!acts, and arte!acts are the material embodiment of human intentional structures. Eanotechnolog#, /y allo.ing humans to assem/le o/Cects &or to disassem/le them(, atom /y atom, .ith a/solute precision, embodies the perfect techni1ue for the manipulation of nature. Such manipulationamounts to near per!ect, i! not per!ect, control and, there!ore, near per!ect or per!ect
and agency. They come into, or go out o!, e?istence entirely at human /idding. mastery o! nature. 6hether such control and mastery are considered as domination is immaterial. 9! the notion o! domination conCures up physical con uest, such as disem/o.eling the earth as in current mining, tearing out part o! theearth as in uarrying, dis!iguring the earthFs landscape as in sur!ace .aste disposal, cutting do.n trees anddestroying ha/itats and .hole ecosystems as in massive de!orestation, then such images o! laying .aste theland through the e uivalent o! scorchBearth policies are clearly irrelevant in the conte?t o! nanotechnology .Eut i! domination is to /e understood in terms o! a relationship /et.een t.o parties .here one party &thedominator( totally and success!ully imposes

!umans in possession of nanotechnolog# are in a position s#stematic all# tore place natural abiotic b# artefactual kinds i! and .hen it suits their purposes to do soB humans are
its .ill on the second party &the dominated(, then the notioncould /e said to /e appropriate.

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in total charge, the master o! their o.n destinies, whereas natural kinds are, powerless, at their mercies. Such a situation 'ustifies the political image of domination with which modem science has been associated. This image is reinforced b# another matter, that of the ultimate humani(ation of nature.7S ?nder extant technologies, the process of humani(ation is, relativel# speaking, not as profound as it could be when compared with nanotechnolog#.

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Heidegger K Page (75/247)


Niet/sc"e 8Eterna% ;et$rn9

Eiet(sche&s concept of the eternal return attempts to control and master the unfolding of experience through space and time. 5t refuses an authentic relationship with beings and lies about the possibilities of human master#. This forces us into a technological mindset of control of infinit# and eternit#. Thiele &.;
[Leslie, Pro!essor o! Political Science at the University o! Jlorida, Timely @editations< @artin 2eidegger and Postmodern Politics, pg $$$B$$>)

The intent, Eiet(sche stipulates, is for the present never to be depreciated as a mere means to the future* each moment is to be self$fulfilling . 6ere it not an
So conceived, the thought o! the eternal recurrence appears as the greatest vindication o! the here and no.. end in itsel! /ut only a means to some other end, each moment .ould not merit eternal repetition. 9nstrumentality must disappear altogether in the /rilliance o! per!ormance. Niet+scheFs vision is enticing. Eut

2eidegger gives us pause to re!lect on the meaning o! Niet+scheFs thought e?periment. Trul# to live in the here and now is resolutel# to will that what is, is. To live in the here and now is to let being be. Cetting being be, however, entails letting time be, for being is onl# in time. Jull participation in the timely disclosure o! .hat is, then, is the greatest cele/ration o! li!e and /eing. Eiet(sche's effort to will the eternal return , in other .ords, signifies not the living of one's being in time but the attempt to administer its unfolding. Get as thro.n, human /eing neither sets this un!olding in motion nor overcomes
its contingency. Psychologically and philosophically &no less than socially and politically( to !lee the hori+ons o! oneFs

Eiet(sche's effort to will life's endless repetition does not full# trans$late into an affirmation of life, for it implicitl# denies and deprecates 2that aspect of human life which it seeks to overcome* its timel# and bounded nature. The !reedom .on is not the !reedom to disclose
historical !initude is to give up the tas1 o! d.elling in time. .hat is, /ut the !reedom to control and con uer the &psychological or spiritual( e!!ects o! historical and .orldly d.elling.

)reedom becomes a possessive master# of time . :ut herein the slave's basic antipath# toward time is not reall# overcome. 5t is simpl# redirected, time is no. !orced to s.allo. its tail. *!!ectively, Eiet(sche exchanges the resentment of the slave for that of the master. !e fails to discern the spirit of revenge inherent in the drive to overcome temporal hori(ons. The attempt to con1uer time b# willing the eternal return, to undo time's 25t was2 b# wa# of a voluntaristic imposition of ultimate value on the endless repetition of its component parts, is perhaps the most sublime resentment #et achieved. :ut it is resentment nonetheless. !eidegger offers an alternative. !uman being, he agrees .ith Niet+sche, is not the na#sa#er who resentfull# pro'ects life as a punishment. :ut neither is human being the #ea$sa#er whose willful affirmation is 2a highl# spirituali(ed spirit of revengeH &*LS $$;(. 2uman /eing is the H.hy as1er.H The 1uestioner is neither slave nor master of time. The 1uestioner seeks neither to escape this world for the

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next, nor to dominate this world in lieu of an# next . Lather, the uestioner lives in time, in an?ious and a.eB!ull interrogation o! the very medium o! her .orldBliness. The 1uestioner thinks :eing as time, as an unfolding disclosure in which she is privileged to participate but will never full# control. To practice this 1uestioning is to gain wisdom, as an acceptance of limits. 8nd it is .isdom, 2eidegger .rites, that teaches us ho. to d.ell in the here and no. o! the Hpermanent every.here.H> mong the man# t#pes of refusal that humankind has ingeniousl# invented, onl# interrogative refusal does not reduce itself to resentment. 9nl# in profound 1uestioning, which is neither complacent nor rebellious, is chagrin at existence altogether eschewed. 9nl# for the 1uestioner are mundane and historical limits encountered not as constraints on an .insatiable will, but as the ver# conditions for a freedom manifest in their disclosure. $$$B$$>

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N$c%ear ,ower 81029
Euclear power engages in calculative thought kills value to life 4 it turns nature and humanit# into standing reserve and is a result of the technological mindset6 =c,horter '.7 [8ssistant Pro!essor o! Philosophy at Northeast @issouri State University
&Ladelle, 2eidegger and the *arth, ed. /y Ladelle @c6horter(QQ4LC)

The danger of a managerial approach to the world lies not, then, in .hat it 1no.s B not in its penetration into the secrets of galactic emergence or nuclear fission B but in what it forgets, .hat it itsel! conceals. 5t forgets that an# other truths are possible, and it !orgets that the /elonging together o! revealing .ith concealing is !orever /eyond the po.er o! human management. ,e can never have, or know, it all+ we can never manage ever#thing. ,hat is now especiall# dangerous about this sense of our own managerial power, /orn o! !orget!ulness, is that it results in our viewing the world as mere resources to /e stored or consumed. =anagerial or technological thinkers, 2eidegger says, view the earth, the world, all things as mere Best nd, standing$reserve. ll is here simpl# for human use. Eo plant, no animal, no ecos#stem has a life of its own , has any signi!icance, apart !rom human desire and need. Eothing, we sa#, other than human beings, has an# intrinsic value. ll things are instruments for the working out of human will. 6hether .e /elieve that
0od gave @an dominion or simply that human might &sometimes called intelligence or rationality( in the !ace o! ecological

we managerial, technological thin1ers tend to believe that the earth is onl# a stockpile or a set of commodities to be managed , /ought, and sold. The !orest is tim/erM the river, a po.er source. Even people have become resources, human resources,
!ragility ma1es us al.ays right, personnel to /e managed, or populations to /e controlled.

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N$c%ear ,ower 82029
Euclear science ob'ectifies nature$ ob'ects cease to occur in the world and become meaningless6 !odge '.;
'::3, pg. =$) [4oanna 2odge, Pro!essor o! Philosophy at @anchester @etropolitan University, 0eidegger nd )thics,

The nuclear age is special as a planetar# epoch of human beings in so far as the power of this enormously po.er!ul principle, the principle of the giveabilit# of reasons &principium reddendae rationis( develops, indeed is let loose in an unsettling [unheimliche) manner in the domain which provides measure for the determinate existence of human beings [des -aseins des @enschen). !e goes on* 5t is to be thought in .ord and matter that the uni1ue letting loose of the claim of presenting and providing reasons threatens ever#thing which is settled [alles 2eimische) for human beings and robs them of ever# ground and basis for having a sense of groundedness, robs them of that from which for a long time has grown ever# great epoch of humanit#, ever# intellectual activit#, opening up of worlds, ever# stamping of a human image [@enschengestalt). &S0< =A( 2e then remar1s ho. few people seem to be aware of this as an issue, and here recurs the theme that the most obvious is the least thought about, raised, as noted, in the first lecture in relation to the principle of sufficient reason itself, but also applicable here in the context of the naming of the current historical epoch. 9n conclusion to this lecture he sa#s* '5t is important to notice in what region we find ourselves, when we think about the principle o! su!!icient reason reflectivel#F &S0< ='(. 6ith this clue, !eidegger proceeds in the ne?t lecture to consider the e!!ect o! this principle on conceptions o! ob'ectivit#. !e makes connections between atomic energ#, nuclear science and a particular 1ind o! ob'ectivit# in the following wa#* ' The reason whose production is re1uired accomplishes at the same time what it is to be ade1uate as a ground, that is to suffice as full# given. )or whatB 5n order to place an ob'ect firml# in its placeF &S0< =>(. !eidegger goes on to point out that in fact in nuclear ph#sics there are no ob'ects an# more, at least in the Eewtonian sense* '3igorousl# thinking, we cannot reall# an# more, as will be shown, speak of ob'ects. ,e alread# move in a world , i! .e loo1 care!ully, in which ob'ects, as things which stand over against, no longer occur. F 2e
suggests that there is a connection here to the nonBrepresentational character o! modern art.

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N$c%ear <ar
The aff's language of nuclear GwarJcatastropheJsufferingT reveals a world of a bureaucrati(ed science 4 ob'ective descriptions of impact scenerios rob death of meaning and replace human existence with a railwa# timetable. 5t is an example of the technological mindset set in controling humans and politics. 0isvanathan 'II

[Shiv. Jello., Center !or the Study o! -eveloping Societies. 8nthropologist. ':;;. 8tomic Physics< The Career o! an 9magination." 4COOKF 4ung1 sensiti+es us in particular to the language o! the discourse. The language o! nuclear catastrophe as apocalypse is

The literature on plagues, famines, floods, each has in its own wa# contributed to the expansion of language, reflected cosmolog#, mediated between man and nature and the natural and the supernatural. They have
marred /y an inade uate voca/ulary. added to the ver/al uality o! our deepest imaginings on pain, death and de!ormity. The FscenariosF on nuclear catastrophe seem aridly secular. -enied the availa/ility o! /oth the sacred and the humanist voca/ulary,

the# reflect the

terminolog# of a bureaucrati(ed science.

The /ureaucratic normality o! the genocidal scenario, its cloc1.or1 predicta/ility, the timeta/le o! deaths, the e?trapolated statistics, all hide the ina/ility o! science to tal1 meaning!ully o! death and genocide. So lac1ing in poetry is this !uturology that it is !orced to mimic the style o! 2olly.ood and @adison 8venue. This mimicry serves as an ersat+ s ubstitute

for the metaphors of the sacred, and also of humanism. The language o! the scenarios is homologous to the machine. Science represents the disembodied mind, the scenario mirroring the disembodied future, and the computer programme provides the decisional calculus. >eath and destruction sound woefull# banal. Oet the structure of evil lies in this ver# banalit#. 5n the banalit# of bureaucratic science, genocide becomes an office memo and the census, a death warrant. The nuclear future as catastrophe has the ever#da# 1ualit# of a railwa# timetable. 4ung1 then uestions even the /asic claims o! these scientists to dispassionate o/Cectivity.
6ol! 2a!eleFs advocacy o! !astB/reeder plutonium technology scares even such ardent supporters o! nuclear energy as *d.ard Teller. The scientist has /egun to .allo. in his o.n po.er. To 2a!ele, the o/Cection that such /reeder technology is in its in!ancy is irrelevant. 2e s.eeps aside the timeBhonoured practice o! painsta1ing trial runs !or ne. technical installations as irrelevant. 8ccording to 4ung1, 2a!ele is not alone in these departures !rom the un.ritten ground rules o! technological innovation< repeated prior testing o! a prototype. FToday, ne. reactors are put into operation in densely populated areas .ithout e?perimental 1no.ledge a/out the unpredicta/le interplay /et.een thousands o! components .hich ma1e up these gigantic systems. Computer simulations and game theory su/stitute !or trial runs.F := These

the scientist is plugged into these verbal machines. nd these machines provide a substitute for the human encounter .ith danger, pain, error. 5t is not truth but images that one is concerned with+ the necromantic fantasies o! Kahn and 2a!ele mas1uerade as theories without experimental verification. Seen in this light, the scientist's belief in the ob'ectivit# of these simulations is trul# remarkable. 8gain, it
scenarios !unction as the e uivalent o! ver/al machines. Li1e EettelheimFs 4oey, reminds one o! 4oey .hose Fpantomime .as so contagious that those .ho .atched him seemed to suspend their o.n e?istence and /ecome o/servers o! another realityF. :D Get, 4ung1 re!uses to caricature these scientists. 2e sho.s that

the problem lies in their expertise, that man# are individuals with

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intelligence and sensitivit#. The structure of their expertise, however, desensiti(es them, draws them into 'ob'ective acts' whose conse1uences are evil. 9t is this evil, this /anal evil that 4ung1 sensiti+es us to.

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4'erco.ing H$.an 2rowt"
To overcome human growth is to treat humans as standing reserves6 5t forces us into the technological mindset6 =oreover, The idea of overcoming limits and growth is precisel# the problem that turns the case6 Thiele '.; [Pro!essor o! Political Science at University o! Jlorida &Leslie Paul, Timely @editations, p.':'() in postmodern times largel# as a result of the increasingl# apparent limits to human growth. The more these limits are ignored B or .orse, viewed as obstacles to be overcome $ the graver the crisis becomes. 2eidegger develops a philosophy o! limits. @ore to the point, !eidegger describes our freedom as dependent on rather than curtailed b# our worldl# boundaries. 9nce the boundaries of human being are experienced neither as a threat to human freedom nor as an affront to human dignit#, the tragic attempt to con1uer the earth might be abated and the opportunit# for its caretaking approached.
*cological concerns have erupted

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,ri'ati/ation
8rivate actors fail 4 the codes of @business ethicsA under which the# act perpetuate the ob'ectification criti1ued b# !eidegger and are meaningless in the post$modern world. This @business ethicA is used to order about ethics onl# when usable b# humans want them too forcing humans into a technological mindset. Cadkin '06 [-onna, Ph-Pro!essor in Leadership and *thics V Cran!ield School o! @anagement
6hen -eontology and Utilitarianism 8renFt *nough< 2o. 2eideggerFs Notion o! H-.ellingH @ight 2elp Organisational Leaders Lesolve *thical 9ssues" 4ournal o! Eusiness *thics, Pol. =3, No. ' &8pr., $AA=(, pp. ;DB:;( 4@)

business ethics has largel# come to mean adherence to codes o! practice, or the development of those codes of practice. 8ccordingly, business ethics has come to be associated with beureaucrac#, s#stems whose intent is to control, delineate, or prescribe behaviors. 8s Cummings &$AAA( points out, these conceptions of business ethics have their legac# in the Enlightenment&s pro'ect of ob'ectification, rationalit#, and the pursuit of meta$narratives unaffected b# context. Ethics born of this approach are, parado?ically, in opposition to what man# of us know the modern world of oganisations to be 5 that is, postBmodernM in which meanings are constantl# shifting, in which we are encouraged to acknowledge the pluralit# of stories informing organi(ational life, and wherein no one is believed to have an undisputed corner on @truthA. 2e notes the irony o! the gro.th o!
Limitations o! current approaches to Eusiness *thics" 9n contemporary times, /usiness ethics literature, and the proli!eration o! codes o! conduct" .hich are ever more lac1ing in meaning !or the .orld in .hich .e operate. *la/orating on this idea he .rites< I man#

now regard the current codes that constitute people&s appreciation of what business ethics amounts to , as so general as to be meaningless as a guide to practical action in a !ast changing .orld
characteri+ed /y uni ue situations, .hy ethics is o! little use in the development o! company strategy &e?cept in the

man# see business ethics as onl# being c#nicall# or instrumentall# adhered to on an %as needed& basisA &$'%(. This vie. is supported /y the
restrictive sense( .hy 1ind o! response o!ten evo1ed /y organi+ational leaders encountering the topic o! /usiness ethics. Jrom their perspective, initiatives to ma1e them more a.are o! the need to adhere to certain codes o! practice can seem irrelevant in the !ace o! those situations .hich truly test their ethical sensi/ilities. The !ollo.ing case study illustrates such a scenario and the issues it raises. The details o! this actual case have /een altered in order to preserve the anonymity o! those involved.

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Sate%%ites

Satellites represent a human desire to coloni(e space and mentall# leave the Earth. These assumptions produce a foundation for the technological mindset because man feels he should redefine and redesign Earth. Earth becomes a standing reserve for our use. Ca(ier 'QQ
[EenCamin, 8ssociate Pro!essor o! 2istory and 2umanities at Leed College. *arthriseM or, The 0lo/ali+ation o! the 6orld Picture The 8merican 2istorical Levie. Pol. ''=, No. % &4une $A''(, pp. =A$B=%A ULL< http<QQ....Cstor.orgQsta/leQ'A.'A;=Qahr.''=.%.=A$B@E) 9n '::A, the 0erman astronomers Jreimut E_rngen and Lut+ Schmadel named an asteroid a!ter one o! the !oremost

rendt .ould have appreciated the gesture is uncertain.$ 8!ter all, she opened her philosophical masterpiece The !uman "ondition &':3;( b# voicing grave concerns about a second satelliteOSputnik. 9n ':3D, man had for the first time propelled his artifacts into the be#ond, and he was likel# to follow b# propelling himself as well. Eut to desire to depart from the scene o! the world, she !elt, meant also to think of the world as something worth leaving. To emancipate ourselves from its ph#sical limitsOgravityOmeant also to emancipate ourselves from the gravity o! its existential claims upon us. Sputnik there!ore embodied an impulse alread# much in evidence on Earth<to create an artificial planet. 9n Sputni1 the am/itions o!
political philosophers o! the t.entieth century, the 0erman 4e.ish `migr` 2annah 8rendt.' 6hether modern man lay revealed.% These am/itions .ere ominous. They had also in part /een reali+ed. The 2uman Condition appeared not long a!ter 8rendtFs !amous study The Origins o! Totalitarianism &':3'(, and she advanced through Sputni1

Totalitarianism, it turns out, shared something with the 3ussian satellite. Sputnik embodied a desire to fabricate an artificial substitute for the living Earth. Totalitarianism, in turn, distinguished itself !rom every other !orm o! rule in its ambition to create a new world !it to compete .ith
some o! the themes /roached in that earlier e!!ort. important this one, the nontotalitarian .orld, and its success .as to /e measured in the consistency o! its art!ul !iction.

Totalitarian regimes create an @artificiall# fabricated insanit#, " and @their art consists in using and at the same time transcending the elements of realit#.A> TotalitarianismFs art!ul !iction, ho.ever, had its all too real apotheosis in the concentration camp universe, a realm inha/ited /y a population o! t.ilight creatures that 8rendt called the living dead." 9n her vie., we did not need to depart from the surface of the Earth to create a death star. ,estern civili(ation had alread# managed it , right here. 8ll o! this is curious. Only the
morally maladroit .ould thin1 to compare the death camps .ith a metal /all called Companion." Not.ithstanding the Cold 6ar conte?t in .hich it .as launched or the shoc1 it unleashed, Sputni1 .as !or some Cust a harmless piepende Kunstmond, as the 0erman philosopher 2ans Elumen/erg descri/ed it.3 9t .as a /eeping, diminutive moon man u`, a stimulus to re!lection, /ut hardly to panic. Nonetheless, 8rendt appealed to the same voca/ulary to ma1e sense o! them

Sputnik and totalitarianism, modern science and modern politics shared a common patholog#. Each testified to the modern displacement o! the gro.n /y the made, of living organisms b# technical artifacts.
/oth. Jor all their di!!erences,

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Science 81029
The use and drive of science seperates humans from the world $ valuing and devaluing the world ,einberger '.7
[4erry 6ein/erger, Pro!essor o! Political Science at @ichigan State University, Politics and the Pro/lem o! Technology< 8n *ssay on 2eidegger and the Tradition o! Political Philosophy", The 8merican Political Science Levie., Pol. ;=, No. ' &@ar. '::$(, pp. ''$B'$D, 4STOL(KLQ4LC)

modern science and technolog# are rooted con'ointl# in the metaph#sical worldview. 8ccording to this vie., the .orld is conceived o! as a spatial .hole made up o! three
Jor 2eidegger, parts. These three parts are the demonstra/ly 1no.a/le and eternal ground &o/Cective la.s o! matter( o! every particular entityM all the particular entitiesM and the human su/Cect .ho discovers the o/Cective ground and lives among the various

5n discovering the ground, human beings become able completel# to manipulate and transform the various things in nature. 5n doing so the# endow the things with values. Science tells us that onl# humans, not other entities, have value, and that humans give the world its meaning or value as their knowing discloses the world's manipulabilit#. Science is thus humanistic to its core. 5n its light ever# particular entit# stands neutrall# Knot as natureD between the necessit# of its ob'ective ground &matter in motion, e?tension, etc.( and the freedom of sub'ective human art, between fact and value. ,hen understood as the indubitable vantage point for universal, scientific &mathematical( knowledge, sub'ectivit# is the certain and fixed beginning point for discovering the ob'ective ground of manipulable things. :ut when experienced as the animus of the individual soul, sub'ectivit# is merel# arbitrar#. Thus, facts are taken to be ob'ective, and values are taken to be merel# sub'ective, thus revealing the essential kin$ ship of sub'ectivit# and manipulable entities , /oth o! .hich have no !i?ed
entities. character or nature. 6e cannot hope !or salvation !rom Kant, says 2eidegger, /ecause KantFs account o! su/CectivityBas transcendental unity o! apperception and as the !ree legislation o! the a/solute moral la.Bitsel! assumes dogmatically a metaphysical conception o! the su/Cect. Thus, !ree su/Cectivity and the manipula/ility o! entities turn out to /e the same in comparison to the necessity o! o/Cective ground. 9n !act,

for modern science there are no essential differences between sub'ectivit#, ob'ectivit#, freedom, and manipulabilit#. These aspects of 2realit#2 are actuall# united in a technological understanding of being* su/Cectivity is the 8rchimedean point !or uncovering o/Cectivity &-escartes(M the doctrine o! moral !reedom
dogmatically presumes that very su/Cectivity &Kant(M and the identi!ication o! /eing .ith the 1no.a/le and changeless entity &o/Cectivity( gre. out o! the pro/lem o! !i?ing sta/le grounds !or the ar/itrary manipulations o! human art &Plato and 8ristotle(.

Even for pure natural science 2to be2 is 2to be the ground of the manipulable.2 Science is humanistic and humanism is technological. &See 2eidegger
[':$D) ':D$, ;:B'A', $A$B$A;, %'DB$'M ':=$, '$$B %>, $>=B3$, %=>B=;M ':;$, ''$B'DM SchUrmann ':;D, D3M aimmerman '::A, '3DB=%, ':=, $$$B $%.(

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Science 82029
The metaph#sical worldview established b# science makes ever# entit# the standing reserve of an endless industrial business transaction6 ,einberger '.7
[Pro!essor o! Political Science at @ichigan State University &4erry, @arch '::$, Politics and the Pro/lem o! Technology< 8n *ssay on 2eidegger and the Tradition o! Political Philosophy", The 8merican Political Science Levie., Pol. ;=, No. ', ''$B''%, 4stor QQPL)

modern science and technolog# are rooted con'ointl# in the metaph#sical worldview. ccording to this view, the world is conceived of as a spatial whole made up of three parts. These three parts are the demonstra/ly knowable and eternal ground Kob'ective laws of matterD of ever# particular entit#+ all the particular entities+ and the human sub'ect who discovers the ob'ective ground and lives among the various entities. 9n discovering the ground, human beings become able completel# to manipulate and transform the various things in nature. 9n doing so they endo. the things .ith values. Science tells us that onl# humans , not other entities, have value, and that humans give the world its meaning or value as their knowing discloses the world's manipulabilit#. Science is thus humanistic to its core. 9n its
Jor 2eidegger, light every particular entity stands neutrally &not as nature( /et.een the necessity o! its o/Cective ground &matter in motion, e?tension, etc.( and the !reedom o! su/Cective human art, /et.een !act and value. 6hen understood as the indu/ita/le vantage point !or universal, scienti!ic &mathematical( 1no.ledge, su/Cectivity is the certain and !i?ed /eginning point !or discovering the o/Cective ground o! manipula/le things. Eut .hen e?perienced as the animus o! the individual

facts are taken to be ob'ective, and values are taken to be merel# sub'ective, thus revealing the essential kinship of sub'ectivit# and manipulable entities, both of which have no fixed character or nature. 6e cannot hope !or salvation !rom Kant, says 2eidegger, /eB cause KantFs account o! su/CectivityBas
soul, su/Cectivity is merely ar/itrary. Thus, transcendental unity o! apperception and as the !ree legislation o! the a/solute moral la.Bitsel! assumes dogmatically a metaphysical conception o! the su/Cect. Thus, !ree su/Cectivity and the manipula/ility o! entities turn out to /e the same in comparison to the necessity o! o/Cective ground. 9n !act, !or modern science there are no essential di!!erences /et.een su/Cectivity, o/Cectivity, !reedom, and manipula/ility. These aspects o! HrealityH are actually united in a technological understanding o! /eing< su/Cectivity is the 8rchimedean point !or uncovering o/Cectivity &-escartes(M the doctrine o! moral !reedom dogmatically presumes that very su/Cectivity &Kant(M and the identi!ication o! /eing .ith the 1no.a/le and changeless entity &o/Cectivity( gre. out o! the pro/lem o! !i?ing sta/le grounds !or the ar/itrary manipulations o! human art &Plato and 8ristotle(.

Even for pure natural science 2to be2 is 2to be the ground of the manipulable.2 Science is humanistic and humanism is technological. &See 2eidegger
[':$D) ':D$, ;:B'A', $A$B$A;, %'DB$'M ':=$, '$$B %>, $>=B3$, %=>B=;M ':;$, ''$B'DM SchUrB mann ':;D, D3M aimmerman '::A, '3DB=%, ':=, $$$B $%.( Eut our vie. o! the .orld &including human /eings( as manipula/le, as the o/Cect o! control, is not itsel! .ithin our control. @odern technology is rooted in the metaphysical conception o! /eing that /egan long ago .ith Plato.

=etaph#sics conceived of being in terms of one particular kind, or 2domain,2 of being$ob'ects permanentl# present before knowing. The tas1
o! metaphysics .as thus epistemology, .hich aimed to esta/lish the conditions !or certain 1no.ledge o! the o/Cects located in the e?ternal .orld. Eut metaphysics .as dogmatic /ecause it merely assumed that .e have access to a privileged position outside the presuppositions o! a given practical .orld, /ecause it assumed and thus missed the character o! H/eingBinBtheB.orld,H and /ecause it assumed that /eing is an entity or thing.

=etaph#sics assumed an impossible independence of theor# from practice and confused one domain of being with being itself, forgetting that being neither is an entit# or thing nor is identifiable with one or another or even all of its domains , .hich include
o/Cects o! 1no.ledge, tools, human /eings, the earth, the heavens, and the gods. Under the s.ay o! metaphysics, the

domains of being are so conceived as ultimatel# to produce the domination of all b# one$b# ob'ective manipulabilit#. Thus, metaph#sics comes to a peak in

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modern technolog#, for whose conception of being$which !eidegger calls the enframing &0estell(B ever# entit#, whether theoretical ob'ect, human being, earth, sk#, or god, is taken as the manipulable stuff$the standing reserve &Eestand( B of an endless industrial business transaction &2eidegger ':DD, 'DB$;(. ' 5n the full$ blown age of technolog#, the phenomena of art, politics, and the gods are flattened in /eing
underB stood as the o/Cects o! scienti!ic 1no.ledge, in the light o! .hich they /ecome merely use!ul. 9n such an age

genuine creativit#, reverence, lo#alt#, rootedness, and the full possibilities of astonishment and estrangement are obliterated in a c#bernetic swirl that spares nothing, that annihilates ever#thing. The age of technolog# is the age of the last man, for whom the whole of nature and ever# human being is the stand$ ing reserve of a plethora of industries < pu/lishing, .ar, travel, entertainment, agriculture, concentration camps, education, and so on. 8nd in this age there are no differences among the great competing social and political s#stems, all of which are bound together in the embrace of global technolog#. Get despite technologyFs /eing the dar1 night o! the .orld, 2eidegger
tells us that it is a Hdanger that savesH &':DD, $;B%3(M !or the result o! technology is nihilism, the !rame o! mind that !orgets completely the di!!erences among the domains o! /eing and /et.een /eing and its domains.

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Sec$rit(
Securit# necessitates endlessl# expanding threats in order to 'ustif# its own existence. "alculative thought leads to increasingl# large$scale war on difference. =itchell '0; [8ndre. 4. @itchell, PostB-octoral Jello. in the 2umanities at Stan!ord University, H2eidegger and
Terrorism,H Lesearch in Phenomenology, Polume %3, Num/er ', $AA3 , pp. ';'B$';)

The uniformit# of beings arising from the emptiness of the abandonment of :eing, in which it is onl# a matter of the calculable securit# of its order, an order which it sub'ugates to the will to will, this uniformit# also conditions ever#where in advance of all national differences the uniformit# of leadership *8iihrersch Al9, !or .hich all !orms o! government are only one instrument o! leadership among others. (GA D< :%M )P, 'A;M tm( Povernment and politics are simpl# further means of directing wa#s of life according to plan M and no one, neither terrorist nor
politician, should /e a/le to alter these care!ully constructed .ays o! li!e. 6ays o! li!e are themselves e!!ects o! the plan, and the predominant .ay o! li!e today is that o! an allBconsuming 8mericanism. National di!!erences !all to the .ayside. The homeland, .hen not completely outmoded, can only appear as commodi!ied uaintness. 8ll governments participate in the eradication o! national di!!erences. 9nso!ar as 8mericanism represents the attempt to annihilate the Hhomeland,H then under the aegis o! the a/andonment o! /eing, all governments and !orms o! leadership /ecome 8mericanism.

The

loss of national differences is accordant with the advent of terrorism , since terrorism knows no national bounds but, rather, threatens difference and boundaries as such. Terrorism is ever#where , .here Hevery.hereH no longer re!ers to a collection o! distinct places and locations /ut instead to a HhereH that is the same as there, as every Hthere.H The threat of terrorism is not international, but antinational or, to strain a !eideggerian formulation, unnational. !omeland securit#, insofar as it destro#s the ver# thing that it claims to protect, is nothing opposed to terrorism, but rather the consummation of its threat. 9ur leaders, in their attempt to secure the world against terrorism, onl# serve to further drive the world towards its homogeni(ed state. The elimination of difference in the standing$reserve along with the elimination of national differences serve to identif# the threat of terrorism with the 1uest for securit#. The
a/sence o! this threat .ould /e the a/sence o! /eing, and its consummation .ould /e the a/sence o! /eing as .ell. Security is only needed .here there is a threat. 9! a threat is not perceived, i! one /elieves onesel! invulnera/le, then there is no need !or security.

Securit# is for those who know the# can be in'ured, for those who can be damaged. >oes merica know that it can be damagedB 5f securit# re1uires a recognition of one's own vulnerabilit#, then securit# can onl# be found in the acknowledgment of one's threatened condition, and this means that it can onl# be found in a recognition of being as threat. To /e secure, there must /e the threat. Jor this reason, all o! the planned securities that attempt to a/olish the threat can never achieve the security they see1. Securit# re1uires that we preserve the threat, and this means that we must act in the office of preservers. 8s preservers, .hat .e are charged to preserve is not so much the present /eing as the concealment that inha/its it. 8reserving a thing means to not challenge it forth into

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technological availabilit#, to let it maintain an essential concealment.
That .e participate in this essencing o! /eing does not ma1e o! it a su/Cective matter, !or there is no isolated su/Cect in preservation, /ut an opening o! /eing. 2eidegger .ill name this the clearing o! the truth (3 hrhet! o! /eing, and it is this clearing that -asein preserves (#e7 hrt!, 6hen a thing trutl%ulyl is, .hen it is .hat it is in truth, then it is preserved. 9n

The truth of being is being as threat, and this threat onl# threatens when >asein preserves it in terror. -asein is not innocent in the terrori+ation o! /eing. On the contrary, -asein is complicit in it. -asein re!uses to a/olish terrorism. Jor this reason, a !eideggerian thinking of terrorism must remain skeptical of all the various measures taken to oppose terrorism, to root it out or to circumvent it. These are so many attempts to do a.ay .ith .hat threatens, measures that are themselves in the highest degree .ill!ul. This will can onl# impose itself upon being, can onl# draw out more and more of its wrath, and this inward wrath of being maintains itself in a never$ending suppl#. The will can onl# devastate the earth. 3ather than approaching the world in terms of resources to be secured, true securit# can onl# be found in the preservation of the threat of being. 5t is precisel# when we are bus# with securit# measures and the frantic organi(ation of resources that we directl# assault the things we would preserve. The threat of being goes unheeded when things are restlessl# shuttled back and forth, harried, monitored, and surveilled. The threat of being is onl# preserved when things are allowed to rest. 9n the notes to the H*vening Conversation,H security is thought in Cust such
preserving /eings, -asein participates in the truth &preservation( o! /eing. terms< &ecuri:y &.hat one understands /y this( arises not !rom securing and the measures ta1en !or thisM security resides in rest *in der /uhe+ and is itsel! made super!luous /y this. (MA DD< $>>($%

The rest in 1uestion is a rest from the economic c#cling and circulating of the standing reserve. The technological unworld, the situation of total war, is precisel# the era of restlessness &HThe term FtotalityF says nothing moreM it names only the spread o! the hitherto 1no.n into the
FrestlessHF *GA =:< ';')(. Security is super!luous here, .hich is only to say that it is unnecessary or useless. 9t is not !ound in utility, /ut in the preserved state o! the useless.

?tilit# and function are precisel# the dangers of a c'vil that has turned antagonistic towards nature. 5n rest, the# no longer determine the being of the thing. 5n resting, things are free of securit# measures, but not for all that rendered insecure. 9nstead, they
are preserved. There is no securityM this is .hat .e have to preserve. 2eideggerian thin1ing is a thin1ing that thin1s a.ay

5t thinks what !eidegger calls 2the between2 (d s ;7ischen!, This between is a world of nonpresence and nonabsence. nnihilation is impossible for this world and so is securit#. The terror experienced toda# is a clue to the withdrawal of being. The world is denatured, drained of realit#. Ever#thing is threatened and the danger onl# ever increases. -asein !lees to a metaphysics o! presence to escape the threatened .orld, hoping there to !ind security. Eut security cannot do a.ay .ith the threat, rather it must guard it. >asein guards the truth of being in the experience of terror. 6hat is perhaps repugnant to consider in all this is that /eing calls !or terrorism nd %or terrorists, ,ith the enframing of being and the circulation of standing$reserve, what is has alread# been destro#ed. Terrorism is merel# the ugl# confirmation of this point. 8s .e have seen, /eing does not linger /ehind the scenes /ut is !ound in the staging itsel!. 5f being is to terrori(e$if, in other
!rom simple presence and a/sence.

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words, this is an age of terrorism$then being must call for terrorists.
are not. 0ranting this o/Cection despite its o/vious nalvet=, .e can nonetheless see that They are simply more Hslaves o! the history o! /eyngH &08 =:< $A:( and, in 2eideggerFs eyes, no di!!erent !rom the politicians o! the day in service to the cause o! 8mericanism. Eut someone might o/Cect, the terrorists are murderers and the politicians

both politicians and terrorists are called for b# the standing$reserve, the one to ensure its nonabsence, that the plan will reach ever#one ever#where , and the other to ensure its nonpresence, that all /eings .ill no. /e put into circulation /y the threat o! destruction. 9n this regard, 2human resources2 are no different from 2livestock,2 and with this, an evil worse than death has alread# taken place. !uman resources do not die, the# perish.

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So%ar ,ower 81029
Cink Turn 4 Solar energ# has devastating environmental impacts6 !uesemann '07
[@ichael 2. 2uesemann, Ph. -. @arine Science La/oratory, Paci!ic North.est National La/oratory Leceived< '= 8ugust $AA$ 8ccepted< $: Octo/er $AA$ Pu/lished online< '> -ecem/er $AA$ The limits o% technologic l solutions to sust in #le development http<QQ....springerlin1.comQcontentQ/d=t/1?;r>vaA%rcQ!ullte?t.htmlbContactO!8uthor') 9t has /een commonly assumed that rene.a/le energy generation is more environmentally !riendly than the use o! nonrene.a/le energy sources such as !ossil !uels or nuclear po.er &2ayes ':DD, Lovins ':DD, Ero.er '::$, Eoyle '::=(. 6hile this assumption may /e correct, it must /e reali+ed

that the capture and conversion of solar energ# will have significant negative environmental impacts, especiall# if the# are emplo#ed on such a large scale as to suppl# nearl# Q00W of the ?.S. energ# demand &8//asi et al. '::3, Trainer '::3a(. Ee!ore discussing some o! the
potential negative impacts o! di!!erent solar energy technologies, it is use!ul to revie. the implications o! the second la. o!

environmental impacts of renewable energ# generation are inherentl# unavoidable. This is because the flux of solar energ# Kor neg$entrop#D onto Earth is used to create highl# ordered Ki.e., low entrop#D so$called 2dissipative structures2 in the environment &Nicolis
thermodynamics in order to sho. that and Prigogine ':DD, 8t1ins ':;>, 8yres '::;a(. *vidence o! such structures can /e seen in the comple?ity o! organisms, ecosystems, /iodiversity, and car/on and nitrogen cycles, all o! .hich are maintained /y the constant inB!lo. o! solar

5f the flow of solar energ# were to stop, as it ultimatel# will in a few billion #ears, all these complex structures would deca# and reach a final e1uilibrium state where entrop# is maximi(ed. Similarly, if humans divert a fraction of solar energ# awa# from the environment to create ordered structures for their own purposes &i.e., houses, appliances, transportation in!rastructure, communication systems, etc.(, less energ# is available to maintain highl# ordered dissipative structures in nature. The disturbance of these structures translates into the various environmental impacts that
energy &8yres and @artinas '::3(. are associated .ith rene.a/le energy generation. 8s sho.n in Jig. %, the total amount o! solar energy &c* s( that is received on *arth can /e vie.ed as the sum o! energy diverted !or human purposes &c* h( and energy that remains availa/le to maintain HorderH in the environment &c* e(< 8ccording to the second la. o! thermodynamics, energy &c*( is used to decrease the entropy &cS( &increase the order( o! a system at temperature T [K) according to &Ja/er et al. '::3(< Com/ining * s. &$( and &%( yields< .here cS e and cS h are the change in entropy &order( in the environment and humanBdominated su/Bsystem, respectively. Com/ining * s. &$( and &>(, it !ollo.s that a change o! entropy in the environment is related to a change o! entropy in the humanBdominated su/system according to< Since the total !lo. o! solar energy &c* s( is constant, it !ollo.s that, !or each unit o! HorderH &negBentropy( created /y the diversion o! solar energy in the humanBdominated su/system, at least one unit o! HdisorderH &entropy( is caused in the environment as evidenced /y a .ide range o! di!!erent environmental distur/ances>. Thus, the second la. o! thermodynamics dictates that it is impossi/le to avoid environmental impacts &disorder( .hen diverting solar energy !or human purposes.This prediction, /ased on the second la. o! thermodynamics, should /e no surprise considering the numerous roles solarB/ased energy !lo.s play in the environment &2oldren et al. ':;A, 2ae!ele ':;', Clar1e '::>(. Jor e?ample, direct solar energy radiation is responsi/le !or the heating o! land masses and oceans, the evaporation o! .ater, and there!ore the !unctioning o! the entire climatic system. 6ind transports heat, .ater, dust, pollen, and seeds. Livers are responsi/le !or o?ygenation, transport o! nutrients and organisms, erosion, and sedimentation. The capture o! solar energy via photosynthesis results in /iomass that provides the primary energy source !or all living matter and there!ore plays a vital role in the maintenance o! ecosystems &Clar1e '::>(. 8ccording to energy e?pert 4ohn 2oldren, the potential environmental pro/lems .ith solar

2=an# of the potentiall# harnessable natural energ# flows and stocks themselves pla# crucial roles in shaping environmental conditions* sunlight, wind, ocean heat, and the h#drologic
energy generation can /e summari+ed as !ollo.s<

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c#cle are the central ingredients of climate+ and biomass is not merel# a potential fuel for civili(ation but the actual fuel of the entire biosphere.
Clearly, large enough interventions in these natural energy !lo.s and stoc1s can have immediate and adverse e!!ects on environmental services essential to human .ellB/eingH

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So%ar ,ower 82029
The ff's attempt to @freeA the ?.S. from oil dependenc# merel# shifts the technological mindset towards solar technolog# reducing the world to a standing reserve. Finsella &06
[6iiliam, Ph.- 8ssistant Pro!essor at North Carolina State University, 2eidegger and Eeing at the 2an!ord Leservation< Lin1ing Phenomenology, *nvironmental Communication, and Communication Theory", http<QQ....allacademic.comQQmetaQp\mla\apa\research\citationQAQ:QAQ:Q;Qpages:A:;$Qp:A:;$B'.php)

!eidegger&s concept of pro'ection indicates that nature is alwa#s disclosed in light of its usefulness for >asein&s practical activities. This characteristic of disclosure is fundamental and inevitable, and !eidegger is not critical of this human propensit# to utili(e the world. The technological attitude that he calls enframing , however, is a specific and problematic mode of utili(ation in which nature becomes a @standing reserveA K!eidegger, Q.HHcD or a @gigantic gasoline station, an energ# source for modern technolog# and industr# A K!eideggger, Q.66, p. ;0D. !eidegger KQ.HHcD illustrates this concept with a series of poignant examples* The revealing that rules in modern technolog# is a challengingMwhich puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it suppl# energ# that can be extracted and stored as such. :ut does this not hold true for the old windmill as wellB Eo. 5ts sails do indeed turn in the windM.:ut the windmill does not unlock energ# from the air currents in order to store it. tract of land is challenged into the putting out of coal and ore. The earth now reveals itself as a coal mining district, the soil as a mineral deposit . 8griculture is no. the mechani+ed !ood industry. ir is set upon to #ield nitrogen, the earth to #ield ore, ore to #ield uraniumMuranium is set upon to #ield atomic energ#. The coal that
has /een hauled out in some mining district has not /een supplied in order that it may simply /e present some.here or other. 9t is stoc1piledM that is, it is on call, ready to deliver the sun,s .armth that is stored in it.

The sun&s warmth is challenged forth for heat, which in turn is ordered to deliver steam whose pressure turns the wheels that keep a factor# running. The h#droelectric plant is set into the current of the 3hineM.5n the context of the interlocking processes pertaining to the orderl# disposition of electrical energ#, even the 3hine appears as something at our commandM.,hat the river is now, namel#, a water power supplier, derives from out of the essence of the power station I.Eut, it .ill /e replied, the Lhine
is still a river in the landscape, is it notS Perhaps. Eut ho.S 9n no other .ay than as an o/Cect on call !or inspection /y a

These examples do not re!lect mere nostalgia. illustrate a radical break in >asein&s relationship with the earth. That relationship is now characteri(ed b# calculation, control, and deliberate disruption of the natural order. 9ndeed, in the last t.o o! these e?amples the
tour group ordered there /y the vacation industry &pp. '>B'=(. 9nstead, they natural order is displaced .hen steam and a tour group are ordered," and am/iguously, this ordering can /e understood as a calculated physical arrangement /ut also as an imperative command. 9 suspect that this same am/iguity is present in the original 0erman te?t, and that 2eidegger .as .ell a.are o! its presence.

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S*ace E>*%oration 81029
Space exploration makes forces humans to view the world in a copernican mannerism, and obliterates our ontological connection to the Earth and forces us into the technological mindset. Turnbull '06
[Neil, Senior Lecturer in Philosophy and Social Theory at. Nottingham Trent University, The Ontological Conse uences o! Copernicus", Theory, Culture # Society, $%&'((.) *ssentially, Niet+sche,s claim is that Copernicanism and -ar.inism !orce us to uestion the signi!icance o! /oth the 0ree1 2umanist and the [end o! page '$3) 4udeo5Christian conceptions o! humanity and its .orld &that is, to thin1 /eyond the territoriali+ation o! 6estern philosophy as some.here /et.een 78thens, and 74erusalem,(. 9n Niet+sche,s vie., modern metaphysics is /oth 7groundless, and 7simian, /ecause, a!ter Copernicus and -ar.in, 7the earth does not stand !ast, &Niet+sche, '::;< $( and 7man is more o! an ape than any ape, &Niet+sche, ':=:< >$(. 9n such a conte?t Niet+sche,s madman is not a prophet o! lost archaic theological certainties, /ut a ne. voice o! sanity, castigating, .arning and e?horting his 7metaphysically somnam/ulant, audience to .a1e up to the truly !rightening placelessness o! modernity,s Copernican and -ar.inian !orms o! li!e. 8nd many .ho have !ollo.ed Niet+sche in this regard have noted that the 1ey to understanding the signi!icance o! modernity,s unheimlich ontology resides .ithin a /roader appreciation o! the .ay in .hich the ne. cosmology has undermined traditional conceptions o! earth. !amously

s Niet+sche,s heir @artin !eidegger claimed, when seen in "opernican planetar#$cosmological terms, the earth is no longer the earth in an# vital or lived sense but simpl# an object comprised of %purel# technological relationships& and an ob'ect, moreover, that is sub'ectivi(ed into a representation, a vorstellung, that %stands before us& rather than as something in %our midst& &2eidegger, '::%< 'A35 =(. )or !eidegger, once perceived and conceived as a visual representation of a planetar# bounded whole, the earth becomes %deworlded&* appearing as 'ust one more casual s#stem within a much wider cosmological causal order. nd this is wh# for !eidegger 5 in his muchB cited re!lections on this matter 5 the interplanetar# images of the earth from space are not simpl# the end product of a rather complex and powerful set of technological process that enframe the earth as a mass industriali(ed ob'ect, but are images that radicall# diminish the meaning of the earth, rendering humanit# without a world within which to dwell &a theme that 9 return to later(. 6hen seen in 2eideggerian terms, "opernicanism reduces the earth to mere %planetar# matter&+ an absurd and inhuman cosmic accident devoid of an# ultimate sense or significance. 9n such a conte?t .e can no longer spea1 o! a meaning!ul .orld at all, /ecause when the earth is %reduced& to a visual representation, it ceases to be a context of significance but stands as something that %transcends all tacitl# shared assumptions&. 8s such, it is 7/eyond all !rame.or1s 5 an a/yss, &6ood, $AA$< '3(. 9t
/ecomes a 7spectral earth, 5 a mere !lic1er o! light in the cosmological void. 8s Lyotard claimed, as a Copernican technologi+ed o/Cect the earth 7isn,t at all originary, /ut merely a 7spasmodic state o! energy, an instant o! esta/lished order, a smile on the sur!ace o! matter in a remote corner o! the cosmos, &Lyotard, '::'< 'A(.

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S*ace E>*%oration 82029
Space Exploration is a s#mptom of ,estern desire to enframe the Earth and understand ever# being as standing reserve. -immerman './
[@ichael *., Ph-, Tulane, ':D> is Pro!essor o! Philosophy and !ormer -irector o! the Center !or 2umanities and the 8rts at CU Eoulder, Contesting earth,s !uture< radical ecology and postmodernity", UT Li/rary Catalog, @E) Li1e many deep ecologists, Capra critici+es modernity /ecause it inter!eres .ith the smooth !unctioning o! the *arthFs ecosystem hence, he suggests that systems theory is not intrinsically domineering, any more than uantum theory, .hich is so use!ul !or the computers and other electronic e uipment on .hich systems theory applications are so dependent. -eep ecologists .arn that despite supercomputers, scientists cannot !ully predict the conse uences o! their actions.

"haos theor#, though not mentioned /y Capra in The Turning Point, argues that this lack of predictive capacit# is due to the fact that most natural phenomena, including weather, are nonlinear s#stems , .hich are in principle unpredicta/le /eyond the short term. 0er# small scale perturbations can trigger off a vast, s#stem altering event. 2ence, although some people ma# wish to use s#stems theor# and c#bernetics to support schemes !or domination, chaos theor# shows the limits to such aspirations . The de/ate a/out photographs o! *arth ta1en !rom outer space also re!lects the de/ate /et.een Ne. 8gers and deep ecologists. The technical accomplishments re1uired to build the spacecraft !rom .hich to ta1e those photos, regarded /y some ecological activists as inspiring images o! the living *arth, were made possible b# the same ob'ectif#ing attitude that discloses Earth as a stockpile of raw materials !or enhancing human po.er. 2ence, Gaa1ov 0ar/ has argued that although those photos may seem to disclose the interconnectedness o! li!e, they ma# also be read as s#mptoms of ,estern 2man's2 drive to escape from his dependence on Earth .=3 Ey achieving a perspective that reduces Earth to an image reproducible on a postcard, 2man2 gains the illusion of control over the planet. 3ecoiling against his organic origins and his mortalit#, man begins conceiving of himself as godlike and as radically other than nature. Satellite photos of Earth ma# be instances of that 2high altitude thinking2 &@erleauPonty( which conceives of itself as pure spirit rising above the natural world . 9n such photos, .e see *arth re!lected in the rearvie. mirror o! the
spaceship ta1ing us a.ay !rom our home in order to con uer the universe. 2eidegger .arned that in the technological era, !or something Hto /eH means !or it to /e an HimageH &Bild( proCected /y and constrained in accordance .ith the demands o! the po.ercraving su/Cect.== 9n ':==, he remar1ed that H9 .as !rightened .hen 9 sa. pictures coming !rom the moon to the earth. 6e donFt need any atom /om/. The uprooting o! man has already ta1en placeI. This is no longer the earth on .hich man lives.H=D 0ar/ argues that the same environmentalists .ho charge that the o/Cecti!ying technological attitude

highaltitude photos of Earth also erase difference and reduce the planet to two dimensions. 0ar/ notes that immersing oneself in wild nature !or an e?tended period lets one experience the multila#ered complexit# and specificit# of the living Earth, as well as one's dependence on it . Though deep ecologists, Ne. 8gers, and many
that reduces natural phenomena to indistinguisha/le ra. material sometimes !ail to notice that postmodern theorists e?tol the virtues o! the local, the particular, and the di!!erent, the very idea o! the HlocalH /ecomes pro/lematic as the socioeconomic .orld /ecomes increasingly interdependent. Consider the !ollo.ing scenario< rising glo/al oil prices ma1e coo1ing !uel too e?pensive !or many Third 6orld people, .ho then cut trees !or !uel. The !elled trees no longer a/sor/ car/on dio?ide and give o!! o?ygen, thus e?acer/ating the glo/al .arming that may trigger climate changes that devastate mid.estern 8merican agriculture, .hile at the same time melting polar ice caps and thus !looding

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Ne. Orleans and @iami. Jurther, !elled trees may contri/ute to local topsoil erosion, /ut may also cause erosion that silt up rivers, there/y causing massive !looding do.nstream. Comple? socioeconomic events thus can set o!! a chain o! events .ith catastrophic conse uences at local and glo/al levels.

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S*ace E>*%oration 8,"i%oso*"ica%9
=entall# distancing ourselves from our Earth home forces us into new ontological modalities of reduction and control. Ca(ier 'QQ
[EenCamin, is 8ssociate Pro!essor o! 2istory and 2umanities at Leed College. ,*arthriseM or, The 0lo/ali+ation o! the 6orld Picture The 8merican 2istorical Levie. Pol. ''=, No. % &4une $A''(, pp. =A$B=%A Pu/lished /y< The University o! Chicago Press on /ehal! o! the 8merican 2istorical 8ssociation 8rticle -O9< 'A.'A;=Qahr.''=.%.=A$ 8rticle Sta/le ULL< http<QQ....Cstor.orgQsta/leQ'A.'A;=Qahr.''=.%.=A$B@E) The re!lections o! 2eideggerFs teacher *dmund 2usserl attest to the importance o! this point. 2usserl, the !ounder o! the phenomenological movement, did not live to see photographs o! the *arth !rom space. 2e did, ho.ever, consider the possi/ility in a thought e?periment /roached in an unpu/lished essay le!t /ehind in his papers. 9ts title, Joundational 9nvestigations o! the Phenomenological Origin o! the Spatiality o! Nature," is a /it misleading. 8 note scra.led on the envelope in .hich the manuscript .as discovered revealed his true aim< Overthro. o! the Copernican theory in the usual interpretation o! a .orld vie.." 6hy on earth .ould 2usserl have .ished to contest the Copernican turnS 6hy on earth<

Taken to its logical conclusion, he !eared, the "opernican theor# dislodged man from his earthl# hori(on . Eotwithstanding our post "opernican knowledge that the Earth revolves around the sun , 2usserl insisted
that, precisely, .as the pro/lem. that our everyday e?perience is preCopernican through and through. This held as much !or ancient cave d.ellers as !or his students at the university in Jrei/urg. Or as he had .ritten on his envelope, The original ar1 [archd), earth, does not move."$A 2usserl there!ore recommended that .e recall an e?perience Copernicanism had suppressed< nature as it is intuitively !elt and lived. 2eidegger .ould consider something o! the same. 2e .ould as1 a!ter the prospect o! retreating !rom mathematical !ormalism" in !avor o! an immediate return to intuitively given nature" &i! never .holly to em/race it(. 2e .ould loo1 .ith dis!avor on the tendency o! modern astronomical science to ma1e o/solete the distinction /et.een earthly and celestial /odies /y reducing all natural /odies to specimens o! a single 1ind. 2e .ould dispute the e?clusive truth claims made /y postCopernican science< 0alileo," he once .rote, is not more true than 8ristotle."$' 2e too .ould insist that the planet as such could not /e the proper scene !or human /eing. Or at least not the 1ind he had in mind. The

!eidegger's word for human being, >asein, means being there. 5t presumes local, situated, and finite, not global or planetar#, hori(ons. To enter into a relation with something of such si(e therefore demands a form of management and radical reduction, and a mode of beinghuman especiall# suited to the process < hence his tal1 in a later essay o! the planetary imperialism" o! technologically organi+ed man."$$ The rise of the planetar# in the modern imagination was s#non#mous !or 2eidegger with the demise of the earthl# and the worldl#, and these images !rom space only consolidated a processO a globali(ation of the world pictureOalready long in the ma1ing.
planet .as simply too /ig.

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S*ace Hege.on(
Space militari(ation is the ultimate representation of technological enframing. Space !eg pro'ects full spectrum dominance into the @/th >imensionA, which results in a process of annihilation as merica pro'ects itself into the cosmos. Froker '0S
[8rthur, Canada Lesearch Chair in Technology, Culture and Theory at the University o! Pictoria, Canada, The 6ill to Technology and the Culture o! Nihilism<2eidegger, Niet+sche and @ar?," /oo1 availa/le online V http<QQ....ctheory.netQ.illQinde?.html)

the age of rtificial ,ar has begun. 9n its mani!esto !or the !uture o! cy/erB.ar, 0ision 7070, the newl# created ?nited States Space "ommand theori(es a future battlefield of 2full spectrum dominance.2 bandoning the earth$ bound dimensions of land, sea air, ?SS8 "E"9= pro'ects a new era of artificial war in which the battlefield occurs in the 2/th dimension2 of space. :efitting a 2space$faring nation2 such as the ?nited States, third$ dimensional warfare is surpassed b# a vision of future war in which 2battle managers2 are, in essence, computeri(ed editing s#stems running on automatic, absorbing fluctuating data fields concerning attacks and responses, monitoring satellite transmissions from 70,000 miles in deep space, se1uencing missile launches, integrating 2dominant maneuvers2 in space with 2precision engagement H on the ground, sea and air, providing 2full$ dimensional protection2 to 2core national assets2 and focusing logistics2 for a virtual battlefield that stretches into an indefinite future. 8s USSP8C*CO@
6ith this, theori+es< the control o! the seas in de!ense o! commercial economic interests and the .ar o! the .estern lands in de!ense o! the e?pansion o! the 8merican empire to the shores o! Cali!ornia has no. migrated to a .ar !or the Hcontrol o! spaceH /e!itting a HspaceB!aring nationH li1e the United States, this spearhead o! technology.

"onse1uentl#, a future of artificial warfare in which space itself is weaponi(ed. /th >imensional warfare is the technical language b# which the merican empire now pro'ects itself into a future of rtificial ,ar* a /th >imensional rhetoric of 2global engagement ,H H!ullB!orce integration,H Hglo/al partnerships,H weaponi(ed space stations, tracking satellites, reusable missile launchers, and on$line, real$time remotel# controlled anti$missile s#stems. 9 emphasi+e this story /ecause it is revelatory o! the meaning o! the .ill to technology. !ere, technolog# is not onl# the chosen aim of technological instrumentalit# Kweaponi(ing spaceD, but also involves technologies of m#tholog# Kthe well$ rehearsed stor# of the unfolding merican frontier where wagon trains evolve into 8redator >rones, and seaB!aring navies migrate into spaceB/ound automated /attle!ield manager systems(, technologies of thinking &the !our!old HtacticsH o! space .ar< dominant maneuver,
precision engagement, !ullBdimensional protection, !ocused logistics(, and technologies o! &aggressive( Cudgment &Hmultinational corporationsH are also listed in Pision $A$A as potential FenemiesF o! USSP8C*CO@(. @ore than !uturist military doctrine !or the $'st century, Pision $A$A represents the essence o! the .ill to technology. 2ere ,

technolog# is both a space$faring means to the successful prosecution of

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artificial warfare and its sustaining ethical 'ustification . The will to technolog# folds back on itself BBa closed and sel!Bvalidating universe o! thin1ing, .illing, Cudging, and destiningBBthat brooks no earthl# opposition because it is a will, and nothing else. 8s Niet+sche re!lected in advance< Hit is a .ill to nothingness.H Or, as 2annah 8rendt elo uently argues in her last
/oo1, The Li!e o! the @ind, Hthe !amous po.er o! negation inherent in the 6ill and conceived as the motor o! history &not only in @ar? /ut also, /y implication, already in 2egel( is

an annihilating force that could Cust as .ell

result in a process of annihilation

as o! 9n!inite Progress.H[') Could it /e that the .orldBhistorical

vision of merica as the historical spearhead of the will to technolog#$$ represent s that .hich is pro/a/ly unthin1a/le /ut conse uently very plausi/le, a contemporar# expression of the metaph#sics of 2not$beingB2 9! Hpermanent annihilationH is the sustaining &military( creed o! Pision $A$A, then this also
movement captured /y the military logic o! Pision $A$ABB this command indicates that the .orldBhistorical movement, .hich it so po.er!ully strategi+es, is driven on.ards /y the seduction o! negation, another suicide note on the .ay to the .eaponi+ing o! space. Conse uently, i! the 8merican novelist, -on -eLillo, can .rite so elo uently in his recent essay, H9n the Luins o! the Juture,H that F&T(echnology is our !ate, our truthH this also implies that in lin1ing its !ate .ith the Htruth o! technology,H the United States, and /y implication the culture o! glo/ali+ation, may have, ho.ever inadvertently, in!ected its deepest political logic .ith the .ill to nihilism .

5n the sometimes utopian, alwa#s militaristic, language of technological experimentalism, 2Eot$being2 finall# becomes a world historical pro'ect .
Those .ho are only passive /ystanders to the un!olding destiny o! the contemporary 8merican descendents o! the Puritan

the 2 merican pro'ect2 embraces not onl# the weaponi(ing of space but also genetic experimentation with the 1uestion of evolution itself . 6hile -eLillo goes on to say that &technolog#D 2is what we mean when we call ourselves a superpower ,H his pragmatism sells short the point he really .ants to ma1e< namely, that b# linking its fate, its truth, with the 1uestion of technolog# the ?nited States has also enduringl# enucleated itself within the larger historical , indeed i! USSP8C*CO@ is to /e /elieved, postB historical, pro'ect of technolog#. *nucleated not as something other than the technological destiny
!ounders can only loo1 on .ith ama+ement coupled .ith distress as .hich is its pro!ession o! !aith, o! truth, /ut enucleated in the more classical sense o! the term, o! /eing someho. interior to the un!olding destiny o! the .ill to technology.

The larger cultural conse1uence of this bold act of willing remains deepl# enigmatic. 9n this case, is the .ill to technology an intensification of the pragmatic spirit upon which the merican experiment was foundedS Or has the .ill to technology, at the ver# moment of its historical self$reali(ation, alread# reversed its course, becoming its own negation* rendt's prophec# of 2not$being2 as a 2process of annihilation. H On the ultimate resolution of this 1uestion depends the merican fate , the merican truth, as the spearhead of technolog#. On the pu/lic evidence, .hat ma1es the
8merican proCect truly distinct today is its enthusiastic a/andonment o! the pragmatic .ill !or the uncharted metaphysical territory o! HnotB/eing.H The .ill to the con uest o! empty spatiali+ation and the vivisectioning o! the code o! li!e itsel! has a/out it the negative energy o! suicidal nihilism. 2ere,

the language of 2not$being2$$the desiccating logic of what !eidegger memorabl# termed, 2Eothingness nothings2 as the historical form of the technological pro'ect of 2permanent annihilation2 $$expresses itself vividl# in t.o master commands< Space "ommand and 0enetic Command. The first operates in the language of weaponi(ed astroph#sics where the curvature of space is manipulated for strategic purposes, and the other se uences the human genetic code itsel!. Thus, control o! space is

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Heidegger K Page (
ine?trica/ly lin1ed .ith control o! time.

/247)

The dynamic will to technolog# pro'ects itself doubl# in the macroph#sics of a 2space$faring nationH and the microphysics o! a /odyB!aring cellular
/iology. This is a collective demonstration o! hu/ris that 0ree1s in the classical age .ould only admire, and then !ear, !or its &technical( audacity and stunning &metaphysical( innocence. 9ronically, USSP8C*CO@ proCects an imperialist military !uture

at the ver# instance that of 2full spectrum dominance,2 .JQQ occurs and we are suddenl# time$shifted into the age of viral terrorism .
Similar to the incommensura/ility o! technology itsel! .here the reality o! Hpermanent annihilationH is sometimes o!!set /y

the human imagination does not begin, cannot begin, with tactics of 'dominant maneuver' and 'precision engagement' and 'full$dimensional protection' and 'focussed logistics' but, with the terrorist side of fluid, earth$bound, real material warfare.
other .ays o! thin1ing technology,

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S*ace ,ict$res 81029
The pictures taken of outer space represent a political sphere seduced b# technological enframing that has alread# predetermined space as a standing reserve. :all '0;
[Karyn, teaches critical and literary theory V University o! 8l/erta, Paranoia in the 8ge o! the 6orld Picture< The 0lo/al HLimits o! *nlightenmentH", Cultural Criti ue =' &$AA3( ''3B'>D, @US*)

The Q.I. photographs of Eeptune are an artifact of the collaboration between political econom# and scientific authorit# < the modes of production that are sym/iotically harnessed to research in the extraction of resources, the design of machines, and the disclosure of the intrinsic properties of ob'ects and materials. This colla/oration wields a far$reaching power not onl# to secure diverse fields of belief and action but also to transform and petrif# the visual contents of the cultural imaginar#. To capture Eeptune in photographic light is thus to seal its fate as an image of our knowledge .hile !orgetting its 0reat -ar1 SpotOa natural metaphor !or the possi/le and !or all that
remains unthought or unseen. *mmanuel Levinas has !oregrounded the HtotalitarianH character o! this imperialism o! the visi/le that he associates .ith metaphysical reason<

a violent light that encloses transcendence in immanence and thereb# establishes the ob'ect as a manageable stasis &a de!inition that stri1es me as pro!oundly resonant .ith photographic technology itsel!(. Eut this last poeticism enCoins a dou/leBedged uestion. The photographs of Eeptune presuma/ly
per!orm a service !or us [*nd Page '';) /y replacing our naive inner visions .ith a more accurate description, /ut do they not also &under the ru/ric o! democratic !reedom o! the press(, hence e!!ecting a contraction rather than an e?tension o! imagination and !antasyS 8nd does this very uestion not !all prey to a romantic nostalgia !or HpureH e?pression, a paranoid reaction !ormation against moderni+ationS @y introduction is intended to raise the issue o! paranoia /y per!orming a prototypically
romanticist or humanist reaction against the

ensure the homogeneit# of representations

HadvancesH o! modernity. 9t conse uently treats the photographs of Eeptune and the redemptive political rhetoric the# inspired as a tableau of the global confluence of technolog# and the mass media to encompass the invisible. 9n this ta/leau, the invisi/le retains its traditional !unction as a !igure !or epistemological transcendence and !or thought /eyond episteme. The combined technologies of newsprint, photograph#, and space exploration overdetermine the organi(ation and transmission of pictures of the solar s#stem , which can onl# thereafter certif# the value of the pregiven frame . Certainty .ould then /e the sensation a!!ected /y this indisputa/le con!irmation o! the rigor o! mathematical science that produces the ground of what !eidegger calls 3elt#ild, or Hworld picture,2 to mark the closure of modern thought. 2eidegger .rites that Hthe fundamental event of the modern age is the con1uest of the world picture,2 /y .hich he means a 2structured image2 [Ge#ild) 2that is the creature of man's producing which represents and sets before.2> 2e adds that this process of producing and structuring provides a venue through which man strives to give the measure and draw up the guidelines 2for ever#thing that is2 and thus occup# a position of master# over 2the whole.H This observation leads him to argue that the emergence

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of the world as picture coincides with the constitution of man as su#9ectum< the center of all relation, the Cartesian cogito that onl# grants being to 2life experience2 and that 2explains and evaluates whatever is in its entiret#, from the standpoint of man and in relation to man .H3 The historical conCuncture that
inaugurates this solipsism is earmar1ed /y the o?ymoron o! an a historical su/Cect .ho misrecogni+es his o.n moment as !irmly and e?pressly Hne..H

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Heidegger K Page (1!2/247)


S*ace ,ict$res 82029
8ictures and representations of Earth as a @blue globeA replace old forms of ontolog# with a technik mindset6 Turnbull '06
[Neil, Cool -ude, The Ontological Conse uences o! Copernicus", Theory, Culture # Society 4ournal, $AA=, Pol. $%&'(< '$3B'%:, -O9< 'A.''DDQA$=%$D=>A=A=%$%$, Page '$DB'$;, 4COOK) 2o.ever, .hat Niet+sche and 2eidegger 5 and their !ollo.ers 5 could not !oresee is the e?tent to .hich

planetar#

representations of the earth have been mass produced and redeplo #ed as a

s#mbolic resource bearing a di!!erent 5 more critical, that is aesthetic, ethical and political 4 sense and significance. 6hen seen !rom space, the earth appears as much more than mere cosmological detritus or icon o! glo/al capitalism. 8s many have commented, it strikes us as a rather remarkable planet* redolent with ethical and aesthetic significance and more like a %planetar# home& than a substellar geological ob'ect &see Lussell, ':;$(. 8s humanity reconceives itsel! through its movement across %another sk#&, ' representations of the earth become suggestive of a new cosmopolitan ontolog# of worldl# co$presence and integral to what has become known as %banal globalism& &S+ser+yns1i [end o! page '$D) and Urry, $AA$< >=D(. The satellite representation of the earth as the %blue globe& connotes a world with potentiall# no formal political boundaries, revealing itself as a rhi(ome of meteorological, oceanic and technoscientific flows whose indeterminate geometr# coordinates a new s#mbol to rival the religious and political s#mbols of the past b# exposing the futilit# of nationalistic strife &see
Elumen/erg, ':;DM 2oyle, ':=A< ':(.

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Heidegger K Page (1!3/247)


1ec"no%og(
Sub'ecting the world and people to science and technolog# results in its destruction and the hollowing of :eing >eCuca %0;
GKevin @ichael -eLuca, 8ssociate Pro!essor o! Speech Communication and adCunct in the 9nstitute o! *cology at the University o! 0eorgia, Thin1ing 6ith 2eidegger< Lethin1ing *nvironmental Theory and Practice", *thics # the *nvironment 'A.' &$AA3( =DB;D, ProCect @use(QQ4LCOno change)

=achination is unconditional controllabilit#, the domination of all beings, the world, and earth through calculation, acceleration, technicit#, and giganticism. "alculation represents a reduction of knowing to mathematics and science and a reduction of the world and earth to what is calculable , a step ta1en decisively /y -escartes &':::, ;>5:=(. =achination is the 2pattern of generall# calculable explainabilit#, b# which ever#thing draws nearer to ever#thing else e1uall# and becomes completel# alien to itself2 &':::, :$(. The unrestrained domination o! machination produces a totali(ing worldview that enchants* 2,hen machination finall# dominates and permeates ever#thing, then there are no longer an# conditions b# which still actuall# to detect the enchantment and to protect oneself from it. The bewitchment b# technicit# and its constantl# self$surpassing progress are onl# one sign of this enchantment, b# [*nd Page D3) virtue of which ever#thing presses forth into calculation, usage, breeding, manageabilit#, and regulation2 &':::, ;=5 ;D(. 2eidegger prophetically predicts that machination .ill produce Ha gigantic progress o! sciences in the !uture. These advancements will bring exploitation and usage of the earth as well as rearing and training of humans into conditions that are still inconceivable toda#2 &':::, 'A;(. nimals and plants are reduced to various forms of use value and, more signi!icantly, are banished from :eing$in$the$world with us* 2,hat is a plant and an animal to us an#more, when we take awa# use, embellishment, and entertainment2 &':::, ':>(. HNatureH su!!ers a similar !ate< H ,hat happens to nature in technicit#, when nature is separated out from beings b# the natural sciencesB The growingOor /etter, the simple rolling unto its endOdestruction of 'nature'.... nd finall# what was left was onl# 'scener#' and recreational opportunit# and even this still calculated into the gigantic and arranged for the masses2 &':::, ':3(. ?nder the unrestrained domination of machination, humans suffer a 2hollowing out2 &':::, :', %>;( and :eing$in$the$world is replaced b# 2adventures.2 &9 am here translating *rle/nis
as adventure. Others translate it as livedBe?perience.(

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1e%esco*es 81029
Space Telescopes are historicall# rooted in political and technological calculation. The desireabilit# of telescopes derives not from meditation or revealing, but from the attempt to use telescopes to control the political and scientific field. Egan &0.
[Pro!essor o! @anagement at Leicester University, 2u//le, Trou/le, Toil, and Space Lu//le< The @anagement 2istory o! an O/Cect in Space, @anagement # Organi+ational 2istory Polume >, pg $D$B$D%) 9t .as the astronomer Lyman Spit+er .ho !irst committed the idea of a Space Telescope to paper. 9n an audacious ':>= pu/lication entitled the F8stronomical 8dvantages o! an *?traBterrestrial O/servationF &Spit+er '::A(, he

initiall# offered a proposal !or the development o! a space telescope claiming 'it would uncover new phenomenon not #et imagined, and perhaps modif# profoundl# our basic concepts of space time.F &aimmerman $AA;, ''(. Others /e!ore had shared his desire to transcend *arthFs !irmaments. 8revious enterprising designs to exploit the inert and image friendl# environment of space had included the strapping of balloons to a scientific pa#load and the science fiction fuelled fanc# of moon telescopes. 8lthough there .ere certain /old aspects to the report !or the time
O the proposed space telescope /eing three times /igger than anything ground /ased in e?istence O his proposal /egan to !orge crucial alliances that gave his idea momentum.

The delineation of Spit(er's proposal into a government funded publication was a significant translation of his vision into a material realm+ imbued with the vigour of substance, the idea could now forge a potential tra'ector# into design where the dreams of astronomers could be reali(ed. 2o.ever the early stages o! a proCects li!e, /e!ore prospective support is augmented, can contain its most unsettling moments &Latour '::=( and the mutabilit# of endorsement in the immediate period after the Second ,orld ,ar demonstrated the capricious nature of an ob'ect residing in the stages of conception. Spit+erFs am/itious thin1ing .as greeted .ith derision !rom colleagues .ho regarded the proCect
Fha+ardous and pro/a/ly undesira/leF &aimmerman $AA;, '3(. This opposition continued in ':3; .hen the eminent astronomer Jred 2oyle insisted Fthe cart .as /eing put /e!ore the horseF his /elie! centred on the argument any or/iting o/servatory should /e o!!ered as an ancillary to the space programme, and not /ecome the principal !igure, complaining

the case for space based observation had been 'promulgated with almost =adison venue techni1ues' &aimmerman $AA;, $A(. Such opposition !rom .ithin oneFs
!urther o.n community .as a di!!icult o/stacle !or the proCect to surmount. Colleagues may have /een unconvinced o! its merit /ut their

opposition was rendered insignificant against the development of a more serious political concern+ an ob'ect in space not of merica's making.

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Heidegger K Page (1!5/247)


1e%esco*es 82029
Telescopes will inevitabl# malfunction. The# are created with the assumption that the# will be repaired and maintained, which converts space into a construction (one for human affairs. Egan &0.
[Pro!essor o! @anagement at Leicester University, 2u//le, Trou/le, Toil, and Space Lu//le< The @anagement 2istory o! an O/Cect in Space, @anagement # Organi+ational 2istory Polume >, pg $D$B$D%) 2eidegger .ants to highlight incidents that allo. us to glimpse at the .orld F6hat is it that ma1es this .orld light upF &2eidegger ':=$, D3(.

n important aspect for understanding the narrative of !ubble's malfunctioning mirror is that our ac1uaintance with an entit# is born from its failureM it is .hen they /ecome unusa/le that .e gain 1no.ledge o! their e?istence. 2eidegger
develops three di!!erent modes in .hich e uipment /ecomes unusa/leM conspicuousness O .hen something is damagedM

'we discover its unusabilit#, however not b# looking at it and establishing its properties, but rather b# the circumspection of the dealings in which we use it . 6hen its
o/trusiveness O something is missingM o/stinacy O something stands in the .ay. Jor 2eidegger
unusa/ility is thus discovered, e uipment /ecomes conspicuousF &2eidegger ':=$, 'A$(. 9n 2eideggerFs voca/ulary the e uipment that is the mirror /ecomes presB enceBatBhand &Porhandenheit(. The mode o! conspiciousness has the !unction o! /ringing to the !ore the characteristic o! presenceBatBhand. The mirror .as once part o! the re!erential .hole amongst a totality .here it .as Fconstantly sighted /e!orehand in circumBspectionF &2eidegger ':=$ ,

when there is malfunction we are forced to recogni(e the mirror for what it is 'the assignment has been disturbed < when something is unusable for some purpose < then the assignment becomes explicit' &2eidegger ':=$, 'A3(. 9nce breakdown has occurred '8ure presence$at$hand announces itself in such e1uipment &2eidegger ':=$, 'A%(. The customar# action is now for repair where the e1uipment becomes available to us once more and reverts 'to the read#$to$hando&something .ith .hich one concerns onesel! &2eidegger ':=$, 'A%(. The /ro1en mirror /ecomes presenceBatBhand /ut
'A3(, /ut
the relation to the mirror once more /ecomes readyBtoOhand once it is under repair. 6ith the incident o! the !aulty mirror, Fthe drama o! things themselvesF &2arman $AA3( erupted into the vie. o! management .

,ith malfunction ac1uaintance was renewed with the forgotten mirror, which had become concealed as part of the referential whole of the telescope, compelling management to engage with the conse1uences of past mishandlings, averting attention to back to the crucial time frames of !ubble's construction + what had become hidden in the totalit# of !ubble's e1uipmentalit# now ruptured into view . The .orld o! management is o!ten peripheral to the actual .or1ings o! e uipment. 5t is onl# through failure that what was once a tangential piece of e1uipment becomes the focus of an organi(ations full consideration . The !ully assem/led 2u//le ta1es on an essence o! its o.n, /ecoming an autonomous o/Cect, sharing the goals o! management. ,hen the blurred images are revealed for the first time, the relationship between organi(ation and ob'ect is disturbedM di!!erent circumstances are thrust into the a.areness o! management, as1ing to /e dealt .ith, a di!!erent management goal is no. revealed, that o! repair. The mirror came into view through management's concernful dealings 'entities become accessible when we put ourselves into the position of concerning ourselves with them in some such wa#' &2eidegger ':=$, :=(. 5t was not until the telescope was pointed towards a constellation of stars and re1uired to take an image

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that its fault came into view. ',e discover its unusabilit#, however not b# looking at it and establishing its properties, but rather b# the circumspection of the dealings in which we use it' &2eidegger ':=$, ;3(. 9t is there!ore di!!icult !or management to /e !ully e?pectant and there!ore prepared !or mal!unction. 9ur primar# interaction with e1uipment comes from use, and in this sense it is not until the telescope is full# operational that things burst into management praxis and arrest the attention of E S 's organi(ation. 2eidegger suggests there are ready .ays
o! coping .ith the distur/ance, and the ne?t section .ill discuss N8S8Fs .ays o! coping .ith the !aulty mirrorM through the servicea/le nature o! 2u//leFs design and human endeavour in space.

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Heidegger K Page (1!7/247)


1erra6or.ing
Terraformation of other planets is anthropocentric because it elevates human use value over all other values of land. 5t makes us the managers us the world. This managerial approach forces us into the technological mindset where planets, the earth and even humanit# is waiting on us as a @standing reserveA. =arkle# '.H
[Lo/ert, 4ac1son distinguished chair o! Eritish Literature V 6est Pirginia University, '::D, Jalling into Theory< simulation, terra!ormation, and ecoBeconomics in Kim Stanley ro/inson,s @artian Trilogy", @odern Jiction Studies >%.%)

t stake in 8nnFs comments is the moral relationship of humankind to the land . Jor her, the =artian landscape itself challenges androcentric and biogenic 'ustifications for terraforming the planet M creating the conditions !or li!e is purposeless in her mind /ecause the geolog# of the planet is inherentl# valuable as a 2record2 of planetary and solar systemic histor# that dwarfs human technologies, intentions, and desires. 9! Led @ars is Hpure,H ho.ever, its purity can /e appreciated only through .hat are ultimately anthropocentric
perceptions and values, through an aesthetic appreciation o! its /eauty and an intellectual, and even spiritual, recognition o! the 1no.ledge it o!!ers. 9n response to 8nn, Sa? emphasi+es our ina/ility to imagine /eauty, or 1no.ledge, or use!ulness .ithout giving in to a mystical anthropocentrism. 2is scienti!ic de!ense o! rapid terra!ormation ma1es heroic the irrevoca/le imposition /y humans o! a metaphysics o! order on physical reality< HFThe /eauty o! @ars e?ists in the human mind,F [Sa?) said in that dry !actual tone, and everyone stared at him ama+ed. F6ithout the human presence it is Cust a collection o! atoms, no di!!erent than any other random spec1 o! matter in the universe. 9tFs .e .ho understand it, and .e .ho give it meaningFH &'DD(. Sa?Fs pronouncements suggest something o! the attraction and limitations o! his traditional scienti!ic outloo1, a .orldvie. .hich itsel! .ill evolve throughout Green 5 rs and Blue 5 rs. 9! 8nnFs de!ense o! a HpureH @ars provo1es a uestioning o! /iocentrism, Sa? identi!ies 1no.ledge rather than the e?ploitation o! resources as the ultimate rationale !or terra!ormation. 9n this regard, his response to 8nn /ecomes a 1ind o! philosophical oneBupmanshipM it is precisely human intervention that produces the HmeaningH that structures even her cele/ration o! an aesthetics and science o! HpureH o/servation, an ideal o! nonintervention.

''

Get Sa?Fs insistence on the anthropocentric nature o!

meaning in the universe ironically reveals the accuracy o! 8nnFs criticism *

the basis of terraformation , o! Eaconian science itself, is an adolescent faith in human significance, a will$to$pla# Kand pla# PodD with the universe . Jor Sa?, at least in /ed 5 rs, science may /e
unpredicta/le and modeling techni ues limited, /ut the mind remains capa/le o! constructing 1no.ledge /y the inductive method, o! organi+ing e?perimental programs and then using the results to generate rather than simply recogni+e meaning in the cosmos.

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Heidegger K Page (1!8/247)


1erroris. 81029
8olitical responses to terrorism are destined to fail 4 a thinking of terrorism is a prior 1uestion. =itchell '0;
[8ndre. 4. @itchell, PostB-octoral Jello. in the 2umanities at Stan!ord University, H2eidegger and Terrorism,H Lesearch in Phenomenology, Polume %3, Num/er ', $AA3 , pp. ';'B$';) This does not mean that /eing e?ists unpertur/ed some.here /ehind or /eyond these /eings. The .ithdra.al o! /eing is

!eideggerian thinking, then, allows us to ask the 1uestion of our times and to think terrorism. @y contention in the !ollo.ing is that the withdrawal of being shows itself toda# in terrorism, where beings exist as terrori ed. Terrorism, in other .ords, is not simpl# the sum total of activities carried out b# terrorist groups, but a challenge directed at beings as a whole .Terrorism is conse1uentl# a metaph#sical issue, and it names the .ay in .hich /eings sho. themselves today, i.e., as terrori+ed. This 2ontological2 point demands that there be the 2ontic2 threat of real terrorists. Jurther, this metaphysical aspect o! terrorism also indicates that a purely political response to terrorism is destined to !ail. 8olitical reactions to terrorism, which depict terrorism from the outset as a political problem, miss the fact that terrorism itself, 1ua metaph#sical issue, is coincident with a transformation in politics . That is to say, political responses to terrorism fail to think terrorism . 9n .hat !ollo.s 9 .ill
!ound in these a/andoned /eings themselves and is determinative !or the .ay they e?ist. ela/orate some o! the conse uences o! thin1ing terrorism as a uestion o! /eing and s1etch a !e. characteristics o! the politicotechnological landscape against .hich terrorism ta1es place.

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Heidegger K Page (1! /247)


1erroris. 82029
5t's the aff's technological enframing that makes terrorism inevitable 4 we should recogni(e that true securit# is impossible and not look at the metaph#sical issue of terrorism in a technological view. =itchell '0;
9nso!ar as [8ndre. 4. @itchell, PostB-octoral Jello. in the 2umanities at Stan!ord University, H2eidegger and Terrorism,H Lesearch in Phenomenology, Polume %3, Num/er ', $AA3 , pp. ';'B$';)

!eideggerian thinking is a thinking of being , then it must be able to think terrorism, !or the simple reason that terrorism names the current countenance of being for our times, and .ithout such a correspondence to /eing, 2eideggerian thin1ing is nothing. The issue is not one of appl#ing a preestablished !eideggerian doctrine to an ob'ect or situation that would remain outside of thought. 3ather, the issue is one of recogni(ing that the ob'ects and situations of our world themselves call for thought , and that in thin1ing the .orld, .e enter into a correspondence .ith /eing. Eut what sort of correspondence can be achieved between the thinking of being and terrorismB 2eideggerFs articulation o! the age o! technology already contains in germ !our routes o! access !or the thin1ing o! terrorism. Jirst, !eidegger himself witnessed a transformation in the making of war, such that he was led to think be#ond the "lausewit(ian model of modem warfare and to open the possibilit# for a 2warfare2 of a different sort. This thought /eyond .ar is itsel! an opening to terrorism. Second, !eidegger prioriti(es terror ()rschrec.en! as a fundamental mood appropriate to our age of technological enframing. Terror is a positive mood, not a privative one, and it corresponds to the .ay that /eing gives itsel! today. Third, !eidegger thinks threat and danger in an 2ontological2 manner that calls into 1uestion traditional notions of presence and absence. Terrorism attends this trans!ormation in presence. Jinally, and !ollo.ing !rom all o! this, !eidegger rethinks the notion of securit# in a manner that alerts us to the ox#moronic character of 2homeland securit#2 and the impossibilit# of ever achieving a condition of complete safet# from terrorism. 9n each o! these
.ays, 2eideggerian thin1ing responds to this most uncommon o! challenges.

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Heidegger K Page (11!/247)


<ar C%ai.s
The ver# act of war depends on technological thought$ 5ts ver# nature is based on the foundation of the technological mindset. 5t's the use of force and violence to control and manage other nations and peoples to follow our will6 :urke %0H [8nthony Eur1e, Senior Lecturer in Politics and 9nternational Lelations at UNS6, Sydney, Ontologies o!
6ar< Piolence, *?istence, and Leason", The 4ohns 2op1ins University Press, $AAD, ProCect @use)

war and existence are intertwined. 2o.ever .ithin such e?istential imperatives to .ar lies a performative Kand thus rationalisticD discourse< that once it is deemed necessar# to use force in defence of one's right to exist it is possible to do so, to translate militar# means into political ends in a controlled and rational wa#. This is the second, rationalist form of state reason that most commonl# takes the name of 'strateg#'. 9ts !undamental tenet .as most !amously e?pressed in Carl Pon Clause.it+Fs argument that war 'is a mere continuation of polic# b# other means...a pulsation of violent force...sub'ect to the will of a guiding intelligence'.'A That this is a textbook model of instrumental reason , one that imports Ne.tonian physics into human relations, is clear in Clause.it+Fs in!luential de!inition< F ,ar is an act of force to compel our enem# to do our willF.
Thus more technical,

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<ind ,ower
,ind Turbines are the worst manifestations of the device mentalit# and the technological mindset :rittain %07
tur/ine"(QQCP) Eorgmann,s interpretation o! technology and the character o! contemporary li!e can /e critici+ed in a num/er o! .ays. Still, [pro!essor o! philosophy &0ordon 0. 4r. , Jitting 6ind Po.er to landscape< a placeB/ased .ind

the distinction between @thingsA and @devicesA reveals , 9 thin1, the essence of our inabilit# to develop a landscape aesthetic on which contemporar# wind turbines are or might be beautiful and thereb# explains the widespread resistance to placing them where the# might be seen. The fact of the matter is that contemporar# wind turbines are for most of us merel# devices. There is therefore no wa# to go be#ond or beneath their conventionall# uncomfortable appearance to the discover# of a latent mechanical or organic or what$have$#ou beaut#. The attempt to do so is blocked from the outset b# the character of the machine. Think about it for a moment* Except for the blades, virtuall# ever#thing is shielded, including the towers of man# turbines, hidden from view behind the same sort of stainless steel that sheathes man# electronic devices. =oreover, the machiner# is located a great distance awa# !rom anyone, save the
mechanic .ho must !irst don clim/ing gear to access it and o!ten, !or lia/ility reasons, /ehind chainBlin1 !ences and loc1ed gates.The

lack of disclosure goes together with the fact that the turbines are merel# producers of a commodit#, electrical energ#, and interchangeable in this respect with an# other technolog# that produces the same commodit# at least as cheapl# and reliabl#. The onl# important differences between wind turbines and other energ# generating technologies are not intrinsic to what might be called their @design philosophies.A That is, while the# differ with respect to their inputs, their @fuels,A and with respect to their environmental impacts, the same sort of description can be given of each. There is, as a result, but a single standard on the basis of which wind turbines are to be evaluated < efficienc#. 5t is not to be wondered that the# are, with onl# small modifications among them, so uniform. 9n terms o! this uni!ormity, .ind tur/ines are very much
unli1e other architectural arrivalsO!or e?ample, houses and traditional .indmills. -i!!erent styles o! architecture developed in di!!erent parts o! the .orld in response to local geological and climatic conditions, to the availa/ility o! local materials, to the spiritual and philosophical patterns o! the local culture. 8s a result, these /uildings create a conte?t.

5n !eidegger&s .onder!ul, dar1 expression, these buildings @gather.A :ut there is nothing @localA or @gatheringA about contemporar# wind turbines. The# are ever#where and anon#mousl# the same, whether produced in >enmark or Napan, placed in 5ndia or Spain< alien ob'ects impressed on a region and in no deeper wa# connected to it. The# have nothing to sa# to us, nothing to express, no @inside.A The# @concealA rather than @reveal.A

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The sense of place that the# might eventuall# engender cannot, therefore, be uni1ue. 5n addition, wind turbines are 1uintessential @devicesA in that the# preclude engagement. 9r rather, the onl# wa# in which the vast ma'orit# of people can engage with them is visuall# &and occasionally /y ear(. 8eople cannot climb over and around them, the# cannot get inside them, the# cannot tinker with them. The# cannot even get close to them. There is no larger and non$trivial ph#sical or biological wa# in which the# can be appropriated or their beaut# grasped. The iron#, of course, is that, precluded from an# other sort of engagement with wind turbines, most people find them visuall# ob'ectionable, though the# might be willing to countenance their existence as the lesser of evils.

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#nt"ro*ocentris.
Technological 0iew of Earth 8ushes ?s 5nto nthropocentrism because we see ever#thing as having no inherent relationship. 9ther species and animals become less than ob'ects to us allowing the 'ustification of an anthropocentric view of the world. Turnbull '06
Thus, [Neil, Cool -ude, The Ontological Conse uences o! Copernicus", Theory, Culture # Society 4ournal, $AA=, Pol. $%&'(< '$3B'%:, -O9< 'A.''DDQA$=%$D=>A=A=%$%$, Page '%' B '%$, 4COOK)

for the later !eidegger worlds are onl# conceivable as such 5 such that the s 7orld 5 only when the# framed b# the sk# above and the earth beneath &see @alpas, $AAA< $$D(. Clearly, !or the later 2eidegger, the idea of %the world& is conceptuall# inseparable from that of %the earth& &and in many .ays, !or the later
.orld is attained 2eidegger, the idea o! the .orld .ithin .hich 7 - sein is, is replaced /y the idea o! the !our!old .ithin .hich 7man d.ells,(.

The close relationship /et.een earth and .orld !or 2eidegger can again /e seen in the
2eidegger recogni+es that

<rigins o% the 3or. o% Art , .here

%GwTorld and earth are essentiall# different from one another and #et never separated. The world grounds itself in the earth and the earth 'uts through the world& &':D;/< 'D>(.$ ,hen seen in this wa#, the earth is viewed as forming the ontological basis for .hat 2eidegger terms 7the .or1, 5 o! /oth artist and artisan 5 and its corollar# the %thingl# character of the world& &':D;/< ';A(. @ore generally, !eidegger conceives the earth as the ground of all appearance and the physys out of which the world emerges &a ground that supports the nomos o! the .orld(. Jor, in 2eidegger,s vie., onl# a world supported b# the earth can give things their proper measure* and without this relation, things have no %true& measure Kand in such a case, the measurement of the world in terms of an abstract [end o! page '%$) mathematici(ed facticit# 4 re1uired for the efficient maintenance of purel# technological relationships 4 becomes the anthropocentric measure of all thingsD.

***&7,#C1S***

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)io*ower
The technological mindset manifests itself in the form of biopower that renders all life to standing reserve >ean '7k
[Sociologist at @ac uarie University &@itchell, H8l.ays Loo1 on the -ar1 Side< Politics and the @eaning o! Li!eH, http<QQapsa$AAA.anu.edu.auQcon!papersQdean.rt!(.4LC) 8ristotle said that .hile the polis 7comes into e?istence !or the sa1e o! li!e, its e?ists !or the good li!e, &':=D, :, 9.i.;(. Today the good li!e has come to re uire a politics 7!or the sa1e o! li!e,. 8t the /eginning o! the t.entyB!irst century, .e appear to /e crossing everBne. thresholds to.ards learning the secrets o! the creation o! li!e itsel!.

3arel# a week goes b# when there is not a new biotechnological discover# or application which allows us to use and manipulate the processes of life itself for an# number of ends. PostBmenopausal .omen can no. /ear children. 9n!ertile .omen and
men can /ecome parents. The genes !rom an animal can /e implanted into a vegeta/le. Sheep and other animals can /e cloned. *vidence o! criminality or innocence can /e discovered through -N8 testing. 6ith the 2uman 0enome ProCect 5 in competition .ith private companies 5 engaged in completing the map o! the human genome, .e are issued .ith e?traordinary promises in disease detection, prevention and eradication. 6e are also issued .ith .arnings concerning 7designer /a/ies,, the ne. eugenics, and the uses o! genetic in!ormation /y governments, private companies and

the manipulation of the ver# biological processes life are not limited to what has been called the %genetic age& made possible b# molecular biolog# and human genetics. There are advances in organ transplantation and in our medical capacities to sustain life. ll of these processes of the manipulation of life contain what we like to think of as %ethical& 1uestions. Notions o! 7/rain death, and the ensuing 7!utility, o! !urther attempts to restore normal li!e
employers. The possi/ilities !or !unctioning rede!ine pro/lems o! euthanasia. Parious !orms o! prenatal testing and screening o! pregnant .omen rede!ine the conditions o! accepta/ility o! a/ortions.

9ther such ethical 1uestions concern the harvesting of organs for transplantation, or of the maintenance of the integrit# and diversit# of biological species in the face of geneticall# modified crops and seeds, etc. The capacit# to manipulate our mere biological life, rather than simpl# to govern aspects of forms of life, implies a bio$politics that contests how and when we use these technologies and for what purposes. 9t also implies a redra.ing o! the relations /et.een li!e and
death, and a ne. thanatoBpolitics, a ne. politics o! death. 8t some distance !rom these advances in /iomedicine and /iotechnology are the issues o! li!e and death that are played in various arenas o! international politics and human rights. These concern the e!!ects o! the /rea1Bups o! nationBstates !rom Gugoslavia and the Soviet Union to 9ndonesia, the su/se uent movement, detention and mass death o! re!ugees and illegal immigrants, and the conditions and !orms under .hich military action, 7peace1eeping, and 7humanitarian intervention, are accepta/le. -etention camps are /ecoming a !eature o! modern li/eralBdemocratic states. On the one hand, the t.entieth century gave us a name !or the death o! a .hole people or 7race,, genocide. On the other, it sought to promote the universal rights o! individuals /y virtue o! their mere e?istence as human /eings. Eiopolitics and thanato$politics are played out in .ar, in torture, and in /iological, chemical and atomic .eapons o! mass destruction as much as in declarations o! human rights and United Nations, peace1eeping operations. The potentialities !or the care and the

manipulation of the biological processes of life and of the powers of death have never appeared greater
than they do today. Eut ho. do .e consider this pro/lem as a political pro/lemS 2o. are issues o! li!e and death related to our conceptions o! politics and to the .ay in .hich .e thin1 a/out states and societies, and their !uturesS 8re the ideas o! po.ers o! li!e and death peculiarly modern, or do they lie at a deeper strataS

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Ca*ita%is. 81029
Technological enframing is the ideological basis for capitalist production and power relations. Noronen 'QQ [@i11o, -ept. o! 0eography, U. o! Tur1u, Jinland, -.elling in the Sites o! Jinitude< Lesisting the
Piolence o! the @etaphysical 0lo/e," 8ntipode, A&A(.)

s a self$strengthening metaph#sical imperative, machination is not 'ust structured to further maximise the utilit# and control of beings under the pre$delineating framework of calculation it imposes, but also to extend its control over the earth and thus to use the whole planet as its product . Cike the planetary earth, human beings are also set up into this positioning of machination so that ever#thing appears, as 2eidegger &$AA3<$:5%A( points out in -as0estell, to have the @potential to be set up for orderings and profit makingA. !ence, the contemporar# globe$wide economic sub'ugation and commodification of beings under the profit$seeking and utilisation of markets evidentl# rise out of the ontological foundation of machination < within machination all beings are positioned &gestellt( under the power &@acht( that unfolds ever#thing as makeable &mach/ar( in the calculationBdriven procedures o! command
&eg 2eidegger '::;<>D, $AAA<;;5:>M see *ldred $AAAM 2aar '::%<;AM 2eidegger ':D%<'AD(. Thus, machination does not imply a mere levelling o! the space o! the earth .here space /ecomes amena/le to the manipulative orderings.

=achination also promotes an ever expanding and enhancing power that orders the globe through the pervasive calculations capable of operating in different disguisesO disguises such as the contemporary capitalBled promotion o! the all em/racing
mar1etBglo/e through e?panding pro!itBsee1ing activities and increasing consumption o! things as a usea/le resource su/Cugated under the calculated mar1et value.

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Ca*ita%is. 82029
The technological, planetar#$cosmological view of space is onl# a s#mbol of ,estern capitalism's ever expansive nature. The technological mindset onl# furthers this expanse. Turnbull '06
[Neil, Cool -ude, The Ontological Conse uences o! Copernicus", Theory, Culture # Society 4ournal, $AA=, Pol. $%&'(< '$3B'%:, -O9< 'A.''DDQA$=%$D=>A=A=%$%$, Page '$D, 4COOK)

the %planetar# earth& is a s#mbol of ,estern capitalism&s domination of nature and global exploitation of cultural life. Seen thus, the image of the earth from space can be seen as the aesthetic core of the ideolog# of the expansionar# 4 neo$liberal 4 phase of global capitalism and the sublime ob'ect of the post$ideological ,est . 5t is an o/Cect that conveys a new %satellite geograph#& &see Led!ield, '::=( and a placeless map that is the representational condition of possibilit# for the establishment of global surveillance and communication s#stems K,estern capital&s command$and$control s#stemD. This placeless space o! the planet is seen as challenging traditional notions o! space and perhaps even traditional conceptions o! the real itsel!. 8nd according to Paul Pirilio, the interplanetar# idea of the earth is not onl# internall# related to the idea of limitless capitalist expansion &see Pirilio, $AA$< =%( because, in his vie., planetar# technologies are bringing about an %exotic reorganisation of sight enabling perception to escape from the @real space of our planetA& into .hat he terms %a hori(onless perception under a vanished sk#& &see Pirilio, '::D< $, $AAA< =%(. 2ere, as .ith more orthodo? 2eideggerian analyses, the representation of the earth as planet is seen as a s#mbol of the deterritoriali(ing technological power of global capitalism* a po.er that renders the 7sphere o! e?perience, as 7a synthesis o! home and nonBplace, a
These 2eideggerian concerns are echoed in the claim that no.here place, &Eec1, $AA$< %A(.

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En'iron.enta% 5estr$ction 81029

Technological enframing 'ustifies a totali(ing worldview that encourages the domination and elimination of animals, plants and natural environments. >eluca '0; [Kevin, 8ssistant
Pro!essor o! Speech Communication and an adCunct in the 9nstitute o! *cology at the University o! 0eorgia, Thin1ing 6ith 2eidegger< Lethin1ing *nvironmental Theory" *thics and the *nvironment 'A.')

=achination is unconditional controllabilit#, the domination of all beings, the world, and earth through calculation, acceleration, technicit#, and giganticism. "alculation represents a reduction of knowing to mathematics and science and a reduction of the world and earth to what is calculable, a step ta1en decisively /y -escartes &':::, ;>5:=(. @achination is the pattern o! generally
calcula/le e?plaina/ility, /y .hich everything dra.s nearer to everything else e ually and /ecomes completely alien to

The unrestrained domination of machination produces a totali(ing worldview that enchants* @,hen machination finall# dominates and permeates ever#thing, then there are no longer an# conditions b# which still actually to detect the enchantment and to protect oneself from it. The
itsel!" &':::, :$(. /e.itchment /y technicity and its constantly sel!Bsurpassing progress are only one sign o! this enchantment, /y virtue o! .hich everything presses !orth into calculation, usage, /reeding, managea/ility, and regulation" &':::, ;=5;D(. 2eidegger

machination will produce @a gigantic progress of sciences in the future. These advancements will bring exploitation and usage of the earth as well as rearing and training of humans into conditions that are still inconceivable toda#A &':::, 'A;(. nimals and plants are reduced to various forms of use value and, more significantl#, are banished from :eing$in$the$world with us< ,hat is a plant and an animal to us an#more, when we take awa# use, embellishment, and entertainment " &':::, ':>(. Nature" su!!ers a similar !ate< ,hat happens to nature in technicity, when nature is separated out from beings b# the natural sciencesB The growing Oor /etter, the simple rolling unto its endOdestruction of %nature&. . . . 8nd !inally .hat .as le!t .as only 7scenery, and recreational opportunity
prophetically predicts that and even this still calculated into the gigantic and arranged !or the masses" &':::, ':3(. Under the unrestrained domination o! machination, humans su!!er a hollo.ing out" &':::, :', %>;( and EeingBinBtheB.orld is replaced /y adventures." &9 am here translating )rle#nis as adventure. Others translate it as livedBe?perience.(

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En'iron.enta% 5estr$ction 82029
ttempts to manage environmental catastrophe lock us into a calculative mindset that perpetuate the root cause of #our impacts =c,horter '.7
[8ssistant Pro!essor o! Philosophy at Northeast @issouri State University &Ladelle, 2eidegger and the *arth, ed. /y Ladelle @c6horter(QQ4LC)

Thinking ecologicall# $ that is, thinking the earth in our time means thinking death+ it means thinking catastrophe+ it means thinking the possibilit# of utter annihilation not Cust !or human /eing /ut !or all that lives on this planet and !or the living planet itsel!. Thinking the earth in our time means thinking what presents itself as that .hich must not /e allo.ed to go on, as that .hich must be controlled, as that .hich must /e stopped. Such thinking seems to call for immediate action. There is no time to lose. ,e must work for change, seek solutions, cur/ appetites, reduce e?pectations, find cures now, before the problems become greater than anyoneFs a/ility to solve them 5 i! they have not already done so. 2o.ever, in the midst of this urgenc#, thin1ing ecologically, thinking !eideggerl#, means rethinking the ver# notion of human action. 5t means placing in 1uestion our typical 6estern managerial approach to problems, our propensit# for technological intervention, our belief in human cognitive power, our commitment to a metaph#sics that places active human being over against passive nature . Jor it is the thoughtless deplo#ment of these approaches and notions that has brought us to the point of ecological catastrophe in the first place . Thinking with !eidegger, thin1ing 2eideggerly and ecologically, means, parado?ically, acting to place in uestion the acting su/Cect, willing a displacing of our will to actionM it means calling ourselves as selves to rethin1 our very selves, inso!ar as sel!hood in the 6est is constituted as agent, as actor, as controlling ego, as 1no.ing consciousness. !eidegger's work calls us not to rush in with 1uick solutions, not to act decisively to put an end to deli/eration, /ut rather to thin1, to tarr# with thinking unfolding itself, to release ourselves to thinking without provision or predetermined aim.

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La$ndr( List 81029
,e are doomed to complete ontological damnation if we allow calculative master# over the world to continue. This results in ecological destruction, nuclear war, a complete loss of meaning, the end of thinking, the end of politics and the end of ever#thing. Thiele &.;
[Leslie, Pro!essor o! Political Science at the University o! Jlorida, Timely @editations< @artin 2eidegger and Postmodern Politics, pg $A%B$A>)

The age of planetar# master#, technological dominance, and the end of metaph#sics, 2eidegger speculates, will likel# endure for a long time &*P :3(. 9ndeed, there
is no certainty that, !rom humanityFs point o! vie., a succession to some other mode o! revealing truth is ordained. The technological uest may reach its clima?, as it .ere, .ithout us. 5n the absence of an ontological reorientation, humanit# would then be 2left to the gidd# whirl of its products so that it ma# tear itself to pieces and annihilate itself in empt# nothingness2 &*P ;D(. *stimating the li1elihood o! this apocalyptic conclusion is not 2eideggerFs concern. 9n any case, it is fair to sa# that the ph#sical annihilation of humanit# is not !eidegger's most proximate worr#. )oremost in his mind is the on$ tological meaning of this potential self$annihilation. 5f, as !eidegger put it, 2the will to action, which here means the will to make and be effective, has overrun and crushed thought,2 then our chances of escaping the catastrophic whirlwind of enframing are slim indeed &6CT$3(. The danger is that intensive technological production ma# simpl# overpower human being's capacit# for manifold modes of disclosure, displacing the freedom inherent in philosophic thought, artistic creativit#, and political action. Undenia/ly technology !osters thin1ing, creating, and acting o! sorts. Calculation, cognition, innovation, and engineering are highly valued .ithin technological society, though even here it is not clear that computers and ro/ots might not eventually displace more o! these capacities than their production demands. The real menace, ho.ever, is that

social engineering would obviate political action, endlessl# innovative production would leave artistic creativit# to atroph#, and utilitarian cognition would full# displace philosophic 1uestioning.2
Eecause the human capacity !or thought is the !oundation !or artistic creativity and political action, 2eidegger indicates that its loss is his most pressing concern. 2e .rites, H 5n

this dawning atomic age a far greater danger threatens<precisel# when the danger of a third world war has been removed. ... the approaching tide of technological revolution in the atomic age could so captivate, bewitch, da((le, and beguile man that calculative thinking ma# someda# come to be accepted and practiced as the onl# wa# of thinking2 &-T 3=(. 9n the .a1e o! this revolution .e !ind ourselves desperately in need o!
Han education in thin1ingH &TE D$(. Such an education .ould, at a minimum, allo. us to discern .hy calculative thought could never ade uately su/stitute !or philosophic thought. 9n the a/sence o! such learning, and in the continued thrall o!

=ost disturbing and dangerous, ho.ever, this situation need not disturb or appear dangerous at all. Technological calculation and innovation ma# satisf# both our
en!raming, our capacity !or philosophic thought may .ither /eyond resuscitation.

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intensified material needs and our diminished spiritual demands . 8s 2eidegger .arns< HThe devastation of the earth can easil# go hand in hand with a guaranteed supreme living standard for ma n, and 'ust as easil# with the organi(ed establishment of a uniform state of happiness for all men2 &6CT %A(. >evastation need not mean discontent. 5ndeed, technological devastation ma# consist in humanit#'s creation of a brave and exciting new world. ?topia and oblivion, as Euc1minster Juller prophesied, ma# well coincide. -evastation, 2eidegger states, His the highBvelocity e?pulsion o! @nemosyneH &6CT %A(. =nemos#ne, or remembrance, designates not simpl# a recollection of what was, but also a 2steadfast intimate concentration2 on and a 2devotion2 toward worldl# things and affairs. Lemem/rance is the Hconstant concentrated a/iding .ith somethingO not Cust .ith
something that has passed, /ut in the same .ay .ith .hat is present and .ith .hat may come. 6hat is past, present, and to come appears in the oneness o! its o.n present /eingH &6CT '>A(.

The ex$pulsion of memor#, therefore, is the loss of the capacit# to abide b# , rather than challenge forth, the world. 9nce the fourfold is reduced to an extension of our cerebral computations and technical orderings our capacit# to dwell within its hori(ons vanishes. ,e sit complacent in homelessness. The devastation is complete.

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La$ndr( List 82029
Technological enframing is the root cause of militarism, geopolitics, economic exploitation and ecological destruction. 5t locks us into discursive constraints which do not allow us to think in other wa#s. ,e must stop the technological mindset to stop the root of the impacts. :urke '0H [8nthony, Senior Lecturer in Politics and 9nternational Lelations at UNS6, Sydney. Ontologies o!
6ar< Piolence, *?istence and Leason, 4ohn 2op1ins University Press, ProCect @use)

5 have sought to extend b# anal#(ing the militaristic power of modern ontologies of political existence and securit# BB is a vie. that the challenge is posed not merel# b# a few varieties of weapon, government, technolog# or polic#, but b# an overarching s#stem of thinking and understanding that la#s claim to our entire space of truth and existence. @any o! the most destructive features of contemporar# modernit# BB militarism, repression, coercive diplomac#, covert intervention, geopolitics, economic exploitation and ecological destruction $$ derive not merel# from particular choices b# polic#makers /ased on their particular interests, but from calculative, 'empirical' discourses of scientific and political truth rooted in powerful enlightenment images of being . Con!ined .ithin such an epistemological and cultural universe, polic#makers' choices become necessities, their actions become inevitabilities, and humans suffer and die. Pie.ed in this light, 'rationalit#' is the name we give the chain of reasoning which builds one structure of truth on another until a course of action, however violent or dangerous, becomes preordained through that reasoning's ver# operation and existence. 5t creates /oth discursive constraints BB availa/le choices may simply not /e seen as credi/le or legitimate BB and material constraints that derive from the mutuall# reinforcing cascade of discourses and events which then preordain militarism and violence as necessar# polic# responses, ho.ever ine!!ective, dys!unctional or chaotic.
6hat 9 ta1e !rom 2eideggerFs argument BB one that

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Neo%i3era%is.
0iewing ever#thing in a calculable, manageable and technological mindset is mearl# s#mbolic for the exploitation and expanse of neo$ liberalism6 8ushing things into a calcuable position is used to expand neo$liberalism and capitalism and is a result of ,estern enframing or the world through the technological mindset6 Turnbull '06
[Neil, Cool -ude, The Ontological Conse uences o! Copernicus", Theory, Culture # Society 4ournal, $AA=, Pol. $%&'(< '$3B'%:, -O9< 'A.''DDQA$=%$D=>A=A=%$%$, Page '$D, 4COOK)

the %planetar# earth& is a s#mbol of ,estern capitalism&s domination of nature and global exploitation of cultural life. Seen thus, the image of the earth from space can be seen as the aesthetic core of the ideolog# of the expansionar# 4 neo$liberal 4 phase of global capitalism and the sublime ob'ect of the post$ideological ,est. 5t is an o/Cect that conveys a new %satellite geograph#& &see Led!ield, '::=( and a placeless map that is the representational condition of possibilit# for the establishment of global surveillance and communication s#stems K,estern capital&s command$and$control s#stemD. This placeless space o! the planet is
These 2eideggerian concerns are echoed in the claim that seen as challenging traditional notions o! space and perhaps even traditional conceptions o! the real itsel!. 8nd according to

the interplanetar# idea of the earth is not onl# internall# related to the idea of limitless capitalist expansion &see Pirilio, $AA$< =%( because, in his vie., planetar# technologies are bringing about an %exotic reorganisation of sight enabling perception to escape from the @real space of our planetA& into .hat he terms %a hori(onless perception under a vanished sk#& &see Pirilio, '::D< $, $AAA< =%(. 2ere, as .ith more orthodo? 2eideggerian analyses, the representation of the earth as planet is seen as a s#mbol of the deterritoriali(ing technological power of global capitalism * a po.er that renders the 7sphere o! e?perience, as 7a synthesis o! home and
Paul Pirilio, nonBplace, a no.here place, &Eec1, $AA$< %A(.

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Ni"i%is.

The assumption that the universe is intelligible and knowable erases creative revealing in the world. The result is the worst form of nihilism and meaninglessness imaginable. Seigfried '.0
[2ans, pro!essor in the -epartment o! Philosophy at. Loyola University Chicago, 8utonomy and Ruantum Physics< Niet+sche, 2eidegger and 2eisen/erg", Philosophy o! Science 3D, pp. =':B=%A) 8!ter pointing out that to Hthe one great Cyclops eye o! Socrates . . . .as denied the pleasure o! ga+ing into the -ionysian

pollinian tendenc# becomes disastrous b# insisting that the world is completel# intelligible and comprehensible &':=Da, p. :'(, that is, Hthat thought, using the thread o! causality, can penetrate the deepest a/ysses o! /eing, and that thought is capable not onl# of knowing being but even of correcting it H &':=Da, p. :3(. 5t is this kind of excessive optimism and faith in the universal applicabilit# of the principle of causalit# that terminates Preek traged# &':=Da, pp. ;:B:'( .hich is also dangerous in science and technology. Jor unless the# remain conscious of the volatilit# of the world /e!ore andQor apart !rom our cultivation, scientists will, li1e Socrates, necessarily overlook the creative transformation in their work. The# will then end in despair and nihilism whenever the# reach limits from which the# 2ga(e into what defies illumination2 &':=Da, pp. :DB:;( and come to reali(e that nature cannot be transformed into a purel# logical world &':;>, p. %>(. 8nd the# will inevitabl# reach such limits because in their drive to penetrate the ab#sses of being and uncover its truths, the# will again and again be forced to acknowledge that what the# formerl# took to be its truths were actuall# appearances, that is, a web of configurations which the genius of people &in preBscienti!ic ages mainly in the name o! religion( has spread over an aimlessl# shifting world, covering it b# imposing on it the appearance of as much law$ and order as was necessar# for cultivating certain forms of life. They
a/yssesH &':=Da, p. ;:(, Niet+sche argues that .hen in his rationalist method Socrates .ithdra.s Hinto the cocoon o! logical schematismH .ill come to recogni+e that nature is a creature o! our needs and reali+e that instead o! pure /eing .e encounter only a proCection o! ourselves. O! course,

the

such discoveries must lead to despair onl# as long as scientists keep forgetting the bewildering character of the undeveloped world and overlook its creative organi(ation and cultivation in and through our constructive work &':=Da, p. :;(.

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N$c%ear <ar 81029
The forgetting of being makes all acts of destruction not events in and of themselves but rather merel# signs of a new age defined b# technological comportment<an unworld that 'ustifies nuclear annihilation. =ilchman and 3osenberg '.6
[8lan, 8lan. Pro!essor o! Political Science at Rueens College and 8ssistant Pro!essor o! Philosophy at Rueens College. 2eidegger, Planetary Technics, 2olocaust." 5 rtin 0eidegger nd the 0oloc ust. *d. @ilchman and Losen/erg. '::=. pp. $$3B$$=)

The !olocaust can provide insight into the meaning of the danger that threatens the ,est. ,e are not suggesting that the !olocaust constitutes that danger, but rather that it is a sign of that danger. )or !eidegger the danger was that, as a result of the reduction of nature and humans to standing reserve, the oneness o! the !our!old .ould /e de!initively shattered and modern man would cease to be a mortal and would henceforth perish but not die . Jor 2eidegger, such a condition would be marked not simpl# b# the forgetting of :eing, but<far worse<b# a forgetting of the forgetting of :eing+ the essential distress of modernit# would be immeasurabl# heightened b# the inabilit# of humans to an# longer @feelA that distress. 5n place of a world, humankind would inhabit an un$world &Un.elt(. 6hile 2eidegger is elo uent
concerning the danger in his later .ritings, the !ashion in .hich man,s !actical e?istence .ould /e actually trans!ormed /y the gro.ing specter o! an unB.orld, the stages /y .hich such an Un.elt .ould emerge, as the danger loomed, .as never

the @realA danger, was less the atomic bomb than the technological understanding of :eing that tendentiall# reduced all beings to standing reserve, has concluded that the unB.orld that 2eidegger sa. emerging might /e a per!ectly ordered society
clearly spelled out. 2u/ert -rey!us, /asing himsel! on 2eidegger,s o.n insistence that .hat threatened man, dedicated to the .el!are o! all.">' This vie., that the Un.elt might /e a smoothly !unctioning, consumerist society, though one in .hich man no longer !elt distress and no longer mani!ested a concern !or Eeing, a society in .hich there .ould

5f !eidegger was determined to show that what threatens man was not the atomic bomb but the reign of das Pe$Stell, it was not to den# the threat posed b# the bomb, but rather to make clear that the bomb was the culmination of a process that began with the technological understanding of :eing . 8s 2eidegger asserts in The Thing"< =an stares at what the explosion of the atom bomb could bring with it. !e does not see that the atom bomb and its explosion are the mere final emission of what has long since taken place, has alread# happened.">$ 2eidegger does not deny the threat posed /y the /om/, or the train o! destruction that
seem to /e no place !or 8usch.it+ and its deathB.orld, seems uestiona/le to us. .ould characteri+e such an unB.orld, so much as insist on its source, and identi!y .hat he sees as its 0rund. @oreover, .hat is implied in -rey!us,s position is that the smoothly !unctioning society and the deathB.orld are mutually e?clusive, that the manBmade mass death sym/oli+ed /y 8usch.it+ cannot /e !actored into the unB.orld. Eut .hy is the e?termination o! those designated as the Other, those .ho are the em/odiment o! alterity, incompati/le .ith this image o! a per!ectly ordered society"S 9t seems to us that the horror o! the deathB.orld can all too easily /e routini+ed and normalili+ed in an Un.elt, .here humans have /een turned into standing reserve. Jinally, the image o! the unB.orld as a site .here everyone might simply /ecome healthy and happy," even as they !orget their !orgetting o! Eeing,>% overloo1s 2eidegger,s

insistence, in his Overcoming @etaphysics," that< The %world wars& and their character of %totalit#& are alread# a conse1uence of the abandonment of

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:eing.">> 5t is precisel# this character of the ?nwelt as a site of miser# and devastation which seems to stamp !eidegger&s thinking. Thus , in his 2eraclitus lecture course o! ':>%, !eidegger raises the 1uestion of the @progressA to which humankind can look forward under the reign of planetar# technics* @)orwardB ,here to, pleaseB To the shattered cities on the 3hine and the 3uhrS">3 This imagery o! /ro1en cities and people seems to us to /etter accord .ith 2eidegger,s vision o! the unB.orld than that o! a consumer society. Thus, .e /elieve that uschwit( constitutes a grim sign of what it would mean for the oneness of das Peviert to be shattered, for the dwelling &6ohnung( of mortals to be destro#ed, and of 'ust how close that threat is. 8t 8usch.it+ the 2eideggerian imagery /ecame real< Eehind its /ar/ed .ire .e can see, in all its horror,
.hat in 2eideggerian terms might constitute the end o! the .orld. The 2olocaust there/y provides an indication o! .hat an Un.elt .ould loo1 li1e. The lin1age o! the 2olocaust to the image o! the unB.orld ma1es it possi/le to /ring out .hat is latent in the 2eideggerian te?t.

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N$c%ear <ar 82029
Enframing of the world turns all of existence to standing$reserve, an ontological contradiction that makes nuclear annihilation possible. :eckman '7F
The threat o! [Tad, 2arvey @udd College, Claremont, Cali!ornia, @artin 2eidegger and *nvironmental *thics," http<QQ...$.hmc.eduQWt/ec1manQpersonalQ2eidart.html.)

nuclear annihilation is, currentl#, the most dramatic and ironic sign of technolog#'s 2success2 and of its overwhelming power+ mass itself has been grasped as a standing$reserve of enormous energ# . On the one hand we consider ourselves, right!ully, the most advanced humans that have peopled the earth but, on the other hand, we can see , .hen .e care to, that our wa# of life has also become the most profound threat to life that the earth has #et witnessed. &'>( @edical science and technology have even /egun to suggest that .e may
learn enough a/out disease and the processes o! aging in the human /ody that .e might e?tend individual human lives inde!initely. 9n this respect,

we have not onl# usurped the gods' rights of creation and destruction of species, but we ma# even usurp the most sacred and terrif#ing of the gods' rights, the determination of mortalit# or immortalit#. The gods, it is true, have /een set aside in our timeM they are merely anti uated conceptions. The Hwithdrawal of the gods2 is a sign of our pervasive power and our progressive 2ego$centrism.2 The human ego stands at the center of ever#thing and, indeed, sees no other thing or o/Cect .ith .hich it must rec1on on an e ual !ooting. ,e have become alone in the universe in the most profound sense. Cooking outward, we see onl# ourselves in so !ar as we see onl# ob'ects standing$in$ reserve for our dispositions. 9t is no .onder that .e have Hethical pro/lemsH .ith our environment
/ecause the .hole concept o! the environment has /een pro!oundly trans!ormed. 8 maCor portion o! the environment in .hich modern 6esterners live, today, is the product o! human !a/rication and this ma1es it ever more di!!icult !or us to discover a correct relationship .ith that portion o! the environment that is still given to us. 9t is all there to /e ta1en, to /e manipulated, to /e used and consumed, it seems. Eut .hat in that conception limits us or hinders us !rom using it in any

There is nothing that we can see toda# that reall# hinders us from doing an#thing with the environment , including i! .e .ish destro#ing it completel# and for all time. This, 9 ta1e it is the challenge of environmental ethics, the challenge of finding a wa# to convince ourselves that there are limits of acceptable human action .here the environment is involved. Eut .here can .e loo1
.ay that .e .ishS !or the concepts that .e need to !a/ricate convincing argumentsS

the creative and destructive powers of technolog# have begun to frighten us because we can begin to see our real limitations as knowledgeable managers and organi(ers of the world. 8nd the concept o! a human !a/ricated immortality
The contemporary criti ue o! technology has ta1en the !orm o! attac1ing these and other sensitive issues. Eoth staggers us /ecause it places us, no., in the position o! having to ma1e the !undamental decision o! .hether .e humans are /etter o!! as mortals or as immortals. These are matters that nature once dictated and that demanded no human consideration. 6e have to as1 .hether human intelligence is really capa/le o! addressing themS Can .e trust our Cudgment in matters o! this scopeS 6hat 2eidegger pointed out in HThe Ruestion Concerning TechnologyH is, !irst o! all, that this criti ue is !undamentally misplaced. 9t is misplaced in time and it is misplaced in scope. 9t is misplaced in time /ecause .e assume that technology has /een pro/lematic !or us only in the last t.o centuriesM it is misplaced in scope /ecause

we assume that technolog# is merel# a neutral instrument in our

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hands and with which we can do as we will. Eoth o! these erroneous assumptions tend to render us less effective in working out our problems with technolog# and with ourselves. Ey limiting the era o! technology to the last t.o centuries, .e
create the hidden assumption that the historical path o! 6estern development is essentially independent o! technology. Thus, .e assume that 6estern civili+ation is !ounded !irmly on various roots that can /e called !orth to deal .ith technology. Seeing technology as a relative ne.comer, .e assume that .e are anchored in something else that can ta1e HspiritualH command o! technology and turn it into a more constructive agency o! design. Our mista1en assessment o! the

Technolog# must be understood in its essence and not merel# as industrial machiner#, space$ age refrigerators, and computer$directed guidance s#stems .
li!etime o! technology is really caused /y our !ailure to understand its essence.

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1erroris. 81029
The aff's technological enframing that makes terrorism inevitable 4 we should recogni(e that true securit# is impossible and see the metaph#sical issue of terrorism. =itchell '0;
9nso!ar as [8ndre. 4. @itchell, PostB-octoral Jello. in the 2umanities at Stan!ord University, H2eidegger and Terrorism,H Lesearch in Phenomenology, Polume %3, Num/er ', $AA3 , pp. ';'B$';)

!eideggerian thinking is a thinking of being , then it must be able to think terrorism, !or the simple reason that terrorism names the current countenance of being for our times, and .ithout such a correspondence to /eing, 2eideggerian thin1ing is nothing. The issue is not one of appl#ing a preestablished !eideggerian doctrine to an ob'ect or situation that would remain outside of thought. 3ather, the issue is one of recogni(ing that the ob'ects and situations of our world themselves call for thought , and that in thin1ing the .orld, .e enter into a correspondence .ith /eing. Eut what sort of correspondence can be achieved between the thinking of being and terrorismB 2eideggerFs articulation o! the age o! technology already contains in germ !our routes o! access !or the thin1ing o! terrorism. Jirst, !eidegger himself witnessed a transformation in the making of war, such that he was led to think be#ond the "lausewit(ian model of modem warfare and to open the possibilit# for a 2warfare2 of a different sort. This thought /eyond .ar is itsel! an opening to terrorism. Second, !eidegger prioriti(es terror ()rschrec.en! as a fundamental mood appropriate to our age of technological enframing. Terror is a positive mood, not a privative one, and it corresponds to the .ay that /eing gives itsel! today. Third, !eidegger thinks threat and danger in an 2ontological2 manner that calls into 1uestion traditional notions of presence and absence. Terrorism attends this trans!ormation in presence. Jinally, and !ollo.ing !rom all o! this, !eidegger rethinks the notion of securit# in a manner that alerts us to the ox#moronic character of 2homeland securit#2 and the impossibilit# of ever achieving a condition of complete safet# from terrorism. 9n each o! these
.ays, 2eideggerian thin1ing responds to this most uncommon o! challenges.

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1erroris. 82029
Terrorism the result of technological domination of the world 4 it is an attempt to break free from the standing reserve which the aff creates through their technological mindset. =itchell '0;
[8ndre. 4. @itchell, PostB-octoral Jello. in the 2umanities at Stan!ord University, H2eidegger and Terrorism,H Lesearch in Phenomenology, Polume %3, Num/er ', $AA3 , pp. ';'B$';)

Terror takes a situation that looks hopelessly doomed and finds the essential within it, but terror contains its own demise, too. ,e flee from it. ,e respond to it with a hardening of our own wa#s+ we reaffirm the identit# of being instead of opening ourselves to others. The merican response to terror has been one of mericanism , there can /e no dou/t
Nothing sta/le, this Cuncture in /eing itsel! must /e !ollo.ed and traced. 9t trem/les. a/out that. Terror ends in this, and there is no commemoration, Cust a !orgetting. The commemorative aspect o! terror allo.s us to remem/er the !allen and understand ho. they can still /e .ith us today in our 8merican .ay o! /eing.

Terrorism will take place in the withdrawal of being, in the unworld of machination. The modem configuration of war is surpassed b# the technological plan of homogeni(ed circulation, and the distinction between war and peace falls awa# in their mutual commitment to furthering the c#cle of production and consumption. The abandonment of being that forms this unworld b# draining the world of its being does not occur without a trace, however, and terror in its trembling corresponds to that trace. Terrorism necessarily results !rom such a devastationBor, H/ecomingBdesert,H Cendiistung-of the .orldM terrorism is al.ays /orn in the desert. Terrorism is metaph#sical because it touches ever#thing, every particular being, all of which may be attacked and annihilated. The circulation of the standing$reserve sets an e1uivalence of value among things with a resulting worldlessness where existence is another name for exchangeabilit#. The e?changed and replacea/le things are already replaced and e?changed, not serially,
/ut essentially. They are not !ully present .hen here. Terrorism names this a/sence, or rather is the e!!ect o! this a/sence, .hich is to say it is that a/sence itsel!, since here .e are not dealing .ith an a/sence that could /e the e!!ect o! any loss o! presence. The a/sence in uestion is not an a/sence o! presence, /ut an a/sence in and through presence.

5t would be ridiculous to think that such a change in being would lack a corresponding change in beings. This change inF the nature o! /eing sho.s itsel! in the !act that all beings toda# are terrori(ed. They all stand under a very real threat o! destruction via Bterrorist acts. There would be no terrorist threat were it not for these terrorists , yet there .ould /e no possi/ility o! a threat .ere it not !or /eing. Certainly terrorism is not the onl# 2effect2 of this absence in presenceM 2eidegger !re uently re!ers to the atomic /om/ in precisely this regard. Terrorism4s claim, however, is distinct from that of atomic war. 3ike the atomic bomb, terrorism operates at the level of threat. 5nsofar as it calls into 1uestion all beings, terrorism is itself a metaphysical determination of being. Terrorism ma1es everything a possi/le o/Cect o! terrorist attac1, and this is the very terror o! it. Ever#thing is a possible target, and this now means that all beings exist as possible targets, as possibl# destro#ed. Eut this should not /e ta1en to mean that there are discrete /eings, !ully present, no.

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The ineradicable threat of destruction transforms the nature ofthe being itself. The being can no longer exist as indifferent to its destruction+ this destruction does not reside outside of the being. 5nstead, destruction inhabits the being and does so, not as something superadded to the being, but as the essence of the being itself. :eings are henceforth as though destro#ed. Terror /rings a/out an alteration in the very mode o! /eing o!
threatened .ith destruction. reality, the real is no. the terrori+ed. Leality is already terrori+edM the change has already ta1en place, Band this regardless o! .hether an attac1 comes or not.

:eings exist as endangered, as terrori(ed, and this means as no longer purel# self$present. 5t means that, in terms of pure presence, /eings e?ist asalready destroyed. -estruction is not something that comes at a later date,
nor is it something that may or may not already have ta1en place. -estruction e?ists no. as threat. The e!!ectiveness o! terror lies in the threat, not the attac1.

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1r$.*
A world subsumed by technological thought destroys our ontological relationship in such a way that things cease to be things in any meaningful way. The alue in human li es are lost as we lose our connection with the world and other !eings. The "#tanding $eser e" obliterates the essential !eing of all things ma%ing e en total planetary destruction a radically less important issue and a li%ely ine itability& turning your e'tinction scenarios. (aputo )*+ [John. Professor of Religion and Humanities at Syracuse University. Also published a bunch of wor
!un . "o. #emythologi$ing Heidegger% p. &'()*&. J+,,-. s on a bunch of philosophers and

/he essence of technology is nothing technological0 the essence of language is nothing linguistic0 the essence of starvation has nothing to do with being hungry0 the essence of homelessness has nothing to do with being out in the cold. 1s this not to repeat a most classical philosophical gesture% to submit to the oldest philosophical desire of all% the desire for the pure and uncontaminated% not to mention the safe and secure2 345 1n his essay 6/he /hing6 Heidegger remar s upon the prospect of a nuclear conflagration which could e7tinguish all human life8 ,an stares at what the e'plosion of the atom bomb could bring with it. He

does not see that what has long since ta%en place and has already happened e'pels from itself as its last emission the atom bomb and its e'plosion 9not to mention the single nuclear bomb% whose triggering% thought through to its utmost potential% might be enough to snuff out all life on earth. 3:A% &(;<P=/% &((5. 1n a parallel passage%
he remar s8 ... [>an finds himself in a perilous situation. ?hy2 Just because a third world war might brea out une7pectedly and bring about the complete annihilation of humanity and the destruction of the earth2 @o. -n this dawning atomic age a far greater danger threatens9precisely when the danger of a third world war has been removed. A strange assertionA Strange indeed% but only as long as we do not meditate. 3B% 4C<#/% ;(5. The thin%er is menaced by a more radical threat% is endangered by a more radical e'plosi eness% let us say by a more essential bomb% capable of an emission 3hinauswerfen5 of such primordiality that the e'plosion 3D7plosion5 of the atom bomb would be but its last e.ection . 1ndeed% the point is even stronger8 even a nuclear bomb% or a wholesale e7change of nuclear bombs between nuclear megapowers% which would put an end to "all life on earth&6 which would annihilate every living being% human and nonhuman% is a derivative threat compared to this more primordial destructiveness. /here is a prospect that is more dangerous and uncanny9unheimhcher9than the mere fact that everything could be blown apart 3Auseinanderplat$en von allem5. /here is something that would bring about more homelessness% more not)beingat)home 3un)Heimlich5 than the destruction of cities and towns and of their inhabitants. ?hat is truly unsettling% dis)placing 3ent)set$en5% the thing that is really terrifying 3das Dntset$ende5% is not the prospect of the destruction of human life on the planet% of annihilating its places and its settlers. Eurthermore% this truly terrifying thing has already happened and has actually been around for Fuite some time. /his more essential e7plosive has already been set off0 things have already been destroyed% even though the nuclear holocaust has not yet happened. ?hat then is the truly terrifying2 /he terrifying is that which sets everything that is outside 3heraussit$l5 of its own essence 3?esen5G. ?hat is this dis)placing [Dntset$endel2 1t shows itself and conceals itself in the way in which everything presences 3anwest5% namely% in the fact that despite all conFuest of distances the nearness of things remains absent. 3:A% &(;<P&./% &((5 The truly terrifying e'plosion% the more essential destruction is that which dis)places a thing front its ?esen% its essential nature% its ownmost coming to presence. /he essential destruction occurs in the !eing of a thing% not in its entitative actuality0 it is a disaster that befalls !eing % not beings. /he destructiveness of this more essential destruction is aimed not directly at man but at 6things6 3#irge5% in the distinctively Heideggerian sense. /he ?esen of things is their nearness% and it is nearness which has been decimated by technological pro7imity and speed. Things

ha e ceased to ha e true nearness and farness& ha e sun% into the indifference of that which& being a great distance away% can be brought close in the flash of a technological instant. /hereby% things ha e ceased to be things& ha e sun% into indifferent nothingness. #omething profoundly disrupti e has occurred on the level of the Heing of things that has already destroyed them % already cast them out of 3herauswerfenI5 their Heing. Heings have
been brought close to Us technologically0 enormous distances are spanned in seconds. Satellite technology can ma e events occurring on the other side of the globe present in a flash0 supersonic !ets cross the great oceans in a few hours. "et% far from bringing things 6near%6this massive technological remo al of distance has actually abolished nearness% for nearness is precisely what withdraws in the midst of such technological fren$y. /earness is the nearing of earth and heavens% mortals and gods% in the handmade !ug% or the old bridge at Heidelberg% and it can be e'perienced only in the 0uiet meditati eness which renounces haste. /hus the real destruction of the thing& the one that abolishes its most essential !eing and ?esen% occurs when the scientific determination of things prevails and compels our assent. /he thingliness

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of the !ug is to serve as the place which gathers together the fruit of earth and sun in mortal offering to the gods above. Hut all that is destroyed when pouring this libation becomes instead the displacement of air by a liFuid0 at that moment science has suc ceeded in reducing the !ug)thing to a non)entity 3@ichtige5. Science% or rather the dominion of scientific representation% the rule of science over what comes to presence% what is called the ?esen% which is at wor in science and technology% that is the truly e7plosive)destructive thing% the more essential dis)placing. /he gathering of earth and s y% mortals and gods% that holds sway in the thing9for 6gathering6 is what the ,ld High Berman thing means9is scattered to the four winds% and that more essential annihilation occurs e en if the bomb ne er goes off1 ScienceGs nowledge% which is compelling within its own sphere% the sphere of ob!ects% already had annihilated things long before the atom bomb e7ploded. The bomb)s e'plosion is only the grossest of all gross confirmations of the long 2since accomplished annihilation of the thing. 3:A% &(J<P=/% &CKJ5 3hen

things ha e been annihilated in their thingness& the mushroom clouds of the bomb cannot be far behind. So whether or not the bomb goes off is not essential% does not penetrate to the essence of what comes to presence in the present age of technological pro7imities and reduced distances. 3hat is essential is the loss of genuine nearness & authentic and true nearness& following which the actual physical annihilation of planetary life would be a "gross"confirmation& an unrefined& e7ternal% physical destruction that would be but a follow2up& another afterthought& a less subtle counterpart to a more inward% profound% essential% authentic% ontological destruction.

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1r( or 5ie E>tinction
Technological thought makes extinction inevitable 4 tr# or die for the neg Thiele '.; [Pro!essor o! Political Science at University o! Jlorida &Leslie Paul, Timely @editations, pg. $A%(QQmar1o!!)
The age o! planetary mastery, technological dominance, and the end o! metaphysics, 2eidegger speculates, .ill li1ely endure !or a long time &*P :3(. 9ndeed, there is no certainty that, !rom humanityFs point o! vie., a succession to some

5n the absence of an ontological reorientation, humanit# would then be 2left to the gidd# whirl of its products so that it ma# tear itself to pieces and annihilate itself in empt# nothingness2 &*P ;D(. *stimating the li1elihood o! this apocalyptic
other mode o! revealing truth is ordained. The technological uest may reach its clima?, as it .ere, .ithout us. conclusion is not 2eideggerFs concern. 9n any case, it is !air to say that the physical annihilation o! humanity is not 2eideggerFs most pro?imate .orry. Joremost in his mind is the ontological meaning o! this potential sel!annihilation.

5f, as 2eidegger put it, 2the will to action, .hich here means the .ill to ma1e and /e e!!ective, has overrun and crushed thought,2 then our chances of escaping the catastrophic whirlwind of enframing are slim indeed &6CT $3(. The danger is that intensive technological production ma# simpl# overpower human being's capacit# for manifold modes of disclosure , displacing the !reedom inherent in philosophic thought, artistic creativity, and political action. Undenia/ly technology !osters thin1ing, creating,
and acting o! sorts. Calculation, cognition, innovation, and engineering are highly valued .ithin technological society, though even here it is not clear that computers and ro/ots might not eventually displace more o! these capacities than their production demands.

The real menace, ho.ever, is that social engineering would obviate political action, endlessl# innovative production would leave artistic creativit# to atroph#, and utilitarian cognition would full# displace philosophic 1uestioning.'

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1(rann(

?nderstanding the world through the lens of human need and demand feeds a t#rann# that tempts us to forget about our agenc# and responsibilit# as human beings. Seigfried '.0
[2ans, pro!essor in the -epartment o! Philosophy at. Loyola University Chicago, 8utonomy and Ruantum Physics< Niet+sche, 2eidegger and 2eisen/erg", Philosophy o! Science 3D, pp. =':B=%A) 8s a descriptive name and catch.ord !or .hat is at .or1 in the ne. situation 2eidegger coins the admittedly clumsy &':D=a, p. $D;( 0erman neologism F0eBstellF &':DD, p. ':(. Jor us the per!ectly ordinary *nglish term FsetupF .ill do.

The new situation arises when ever#thing is set up for inspection in terms of human interests, needs, and demands. 5n this setup of demand &2eraus!orderung, ':DD, p. '=( ever#thing must appear as suppl# and resource &Eestand, ':DD, p. ';(. Such a setup becomes destructive only when it goes into business for itself and turns into blind t#rann# &2errscha!t, ':DD, p. $;(M for then we would have to encounter ever#thing onl# in terms of suppl# and demand. 9n Niet+schean terms, we would /e caught in the SocraticB8pollinian trap , become the slaves of the laws of suppl# and demand, and no longer have the possibilit# to 2become those we are$human beings who are new, uni1ue, incomparable, .ho give themselves la.s, who create themselvesH &Niet+sche ':D>, p. $=3(. 2eidegger tries to sho. that the power of this setup is such that it alwa#s tends toward such t#rann#. Jor the more triumphant the success of the setup, the greater will be the temptation to forget our reasons for it and see in its demand something that is be#ond us and in which we have no sa#$ and thus we become mere supplies to be used up in its service &':DD, p. $D(. nd since the nature and organi(ation of the things which we encounter is a function of this setup, under its t#rann# things would appear to be what the# alread# are and remain &':DD, p. ':( and the world we encounter would be 2what it is or the .ay that it isH without us &':D=a, p. $D;(. 9n short, under the t#rann# of the setup we nowhere an# longer encounter ourselves as 2becoming those we are2.

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?a%$e to Li6e 81029
This Technik =anagerial approaches to ecolog# and the Earth constitutes a mode of concealing that pushes us into a spiral of meanginglessness that robs all beings of value. =c,horter '.7 [Ladell, Pro!. o! Philosophy V Univ. o! Lichmond, 2eidegger and the *arth< *ssays in *nvironmental
Philosophy, p. vii)

The danger of a managerial approach to the world lies not, then, in .hat it 1no.s B not in its penetration into the secrets of galactic emergence or nuclear !ission B but in what it forgets, what it itself conceals. 5t forgets that an# other truths are possible, and it forgets that the belonging together of revealing with concealing is forever be#ond the power of human management. ,e can never have, or know, it all+ we can never manage ever#thing. 6hat is no. especially dangerous a/out this sense of our own managerial power , /orn o! !orget!ulness, is that it results in our vie.ing the .orld as mere resources to /e stored or consumed. @anagerial or technological thinkers, 2eidegger says, view the earth, the .orld, all things as mere Eestand, standing$ reserve. ll is here simpl# for human use. Eo plant, no animal, no ecos#stem has a life of its own, has an# significance, apart from human desire and need. Nothing, .e say, other than human /eings, has any intrinsic value. ll things are instruments for the working out of human will . 6hether .e /elieve that 0od gave @an
dominion or simply that human might &sometimes called intelligence or rationality( in the !ace o! ecological !ragility ma1es us al.ays right, .e managerial, technological thin1ers tend to /elieve that the earth is only a stoc1pile or a set o!

Even people have become resources, human resources, personnel to be managed, or populations to be controlled. This managerial, technological mode of revealing, 2eidegger says, is embedded in and constitutive of ,estern culture and has been gathering strength for centuries. Eow it is well on its wa# to extinguishing all other modes of revealing, all other wa#s of being human and being earth. 5t will take tremendous effort to think through this danger, to thin1 past it and /eyond, tremendous courage and resolve to allo. thought o! the mystery to come
commodities to /e managed, /ought, and sold. The !orest is tim/erM the river, a po.er source. !orthM thought o! the inevita/ility, along .ith revealing, o! concealment, o! loss, o! ignoranceM thought o! the occurring o! things and their passage as events not ultimately under human control. 8nd o! course

even the call to allow this thinking B couched as it so o!ten must /e in a grammatical imperative appealing to an agent B is itself a paradox, the first that must be faced and allowed to speak to us and to shatter us as it scatters thinking in new directions, directions of which we have not #et dreamed, directions of which we ma# never dream.

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?a%$e to Li6e 82029
The technological age places humans and nature in standing reserve$ Standing reserve is to be ob'ectified, counted and calculated$ the impact is #ou are assigned no value to #our life =itchell '0;
[8ndre. 4. @itchell, PostB-octoral Jello. in the 2umanities at Stan!ord University, H2eidegger and Terrorism,H Lesearch in Phenomenology, Polume %3, Num/er ', $AA3 , pp. ';'B$';)QQCrc) Opposition is no longer an operative concept !or 2eidegger, since technology has served to eradicate the distance that .ould separate the supposedly opposed parties. The analysis o! technology in 2eideggerFs .or1 is guided /y the &phenomenological( insight that H8ll distances in time and space are shrin1ingH &08 D:< %M c!. GA D< 157/PLT, '=3(.'%

irplanes, microwaves, email, these serve to abbreviate the world, to be sure, but there is a metaph#sical distance that has likewise been reduced, that between sub'ect and ob'ect . This modern dualism has been surpassed /y .hat 2eidegger terms the standing$reserve (Best nd!, the eerie companion o!
technological dominance and Hen!raming.H 9nso!ar as an o/Cect (Gegenst nd! .ould stand over against (Gegen! a su/Cect, o/Cects can no longer /e !ound.

2,hat stands b# in the sense of standing$reserve, no longer stands over against us as ob'ect2 (GA 7" $AQRCT, 'D(. present ob'ect could stand over against another+ the standing$reserve, however, precisel# does not stand+ instead, it circulates, and in this circulation it eludes the modern determination of thinghood. 5t is simpl# not present to be cast as a thing. 6ith en!raming, .hich names the dominance o! position, positing, and posing (stellen! in all o! its modes, things are no longer .hat they .ere. Ever#thing becomes an item for ordering (#estellen! and delivering ($ustellen! ever#thing is 2read# in place2 ( u% der &telle $ur &telle!, constantly availa/le and replacea/le &08 D:< $;(. The standing$reserve 2exists2 within this c#cle of order and deliver#, exchange and replacement. This is not
merely a development e?ternal to modem o/Cects, /ut a change in their /eing. The standingBreserve is !ound only in its circulation along these supply channels, .here one item is Cust as good as any other, .here, in !act, one item is identical to any other.

3eplaceabilit# is the being of things toda#. 2Toda# being is being$ rephlceable2 ('&, 'ADQ=$(, 2eidegger claims in ':=:. The trans!ormation is such that .hat is here no. is not
really here no., since there is an item identical to it some.here else ready !or delivery. This cycle o! ordering and delivery

there is onl# a stead# circulation of the standing$reserve, which is here now just as much as it is there in storage. The standing$reserve spreads itself throughout the entiret# of its' replacement c#cle, without being full# present at an# point along the circuit. Eut it is not merely a matter o! mass produced products /eing replacea/le. To complete !eidegger's view of the enframed standing reserve, we have to take into consideration the global role of value, a complementar# determination of being < HEeing has /ecome valueH (GA 3< $3;Q':$(. The
does not operate serially, since .e are no longer dealing .ith discrete, individual o/Cects. 9nstead, Niet+schean legacy !or the era o! technology &Niet+sche as a thin1er o! values( is evident here. Eut the preponderance o! value is so !ar !rom preserving di!!erences and esta/lishing order o! ran1, that it only serves to !urther level the ran1s and

,hen ever#thing has a value, an exchangeabilit# and replaceabilit# operates laterall# across continents, languages, and difference, with great homogeni(ing and globali(ing
esta/lish the identity o! everything .ith its replacement.

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effect. The standing$reserve collapses opposition. The .ill that dominates the modem era
is personal, even i!, as is the case .ith Lei/ni+, the ends o! that .ill are not completely 1no.n /y the sel! at any particular

the will still expresses the individualit# of the person and one's perspective. 5n the era of technolog#, the will that comes to the fore is no longer the will of an individual, but a will without a restricted human agenda. 9n !act, the .ill in uestion no longer .ills an o/Cect outside o! itsel!, /ut only .ills itsel!M it is a
time. Nonetheless, .ill to .ill. 9n this .ay, the .ill need never leave itsel!. This sel!Ba!!irming character o! the .ill allo.s the .ill an independence !rom the human. @ani!est in the very .or1ings o! technology is a .ill to po.er, .hich !or 2eidegger is al.ays a .ill to .ill. Eecause the .ill to .ill has no goal outside o! it, its .illing is goalless and endless.

The human is 'ust another piece of a standing$reserve that circulates without purpose. 8ctually, things have not yet gone so !arM the human still retains a distinction, ho.ever illusive, as Hthe
most important ra. materialH &08 D< ((/)P, 'A>(. This importance has nothing to do .ith the personal .illing o!

2The human is the 'most important raw material' because he remains the sub'ect of all consumption, so much so that he lets his will go forth unconditionall# in this process and simultaneousl# becomes the 'ob'ect' of the abandonment of being2 (GA 7" ;;Q*P, 'A>(. ?nconditioned willing transcends the merel# human will , which satis!ies itsel! .ith restricted goals and accomplishments. ?nconditioned willing makes of the sub'ect an agent of the abandonment of being, one whose task it is to ob'ectif# ever#thing. The more the world comes to stand at the will's disposal, the more that being retreats from it. The human will is allied with the technological will to will. Jor this reasonBand the !ollo.ing is something o!ten overloo1ed in
conditional goals, as 2eidegger immediately ma1es clear, considering 2eideggerFs political position /et.een the .arsB2eidegger is critical o! the very notion o! a JLFhrer, or leader, .ho .ould direct the circulation o! the standingBreserve according to his o.n personal .ill.

The leaders of toda# are merel# the necessar# accompaniment of a standing$reserve that, in its abstraction, is susceptible to planning. The leaders' seeming position of 2sub'ectivit#,2 that the# are the ones who decide, is again another working of 2ob'ectification,2 where neither of these terms 1uite fits, given that beings are no longer ob'ective. The .ill!ulness o! the leaders is not due to a
personal .ill< One /elieves that the leaders had presumed everything o! their o.n accord in the /lind rage o! a sel!ish egotism and arranged everything in accordance .ith their o.n .ill *)igensinn+, 9n truth, ho.ever, leaders are the necessary conse uence o! the !act that /eings have gone over to a .ay o! errancy, in .hich an emptiness e?pands that re uires a single ordering and securing o! /eings. (GA D< ;:Q*P, 'A3M tin( The leaders do not stand a/ove or control the proceedings, the proceedings in uestion a!!ect /eings as a .hole, including the leaders. Leaders are simply points o! convergence or conduits !or the channels o! circulationM they are needed !or circulation, /ut are no.here outside o! it. No leader is the sole authorityM instead, there are numerous HsectorsH to .hich each leader is assigned. The demands o! these sectors .ill /e similar o! course, organi+ed around e!!iciency and productivity in distri/ution and circulation. 9n short,

leaders serve the standing$reserve.

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?a%$e to Li6e 4$tweig"s E'er(t"ing E%se
loss of value to life precedes all other impacts 4 death is preferable to a valueless life =itchell '0;
[8ndre. 4. @itchell, PostB-octoral Jello. in the 2umanities at Stan!ord University, H2eidegger and Terrorism,H Lesearch in Phenomenology, Polume %3, Num/er ', $AA3 , pp. 'D'B$'D)

>evastation &Per.istung( is the process b# which the world becomes a desert &6!iste(, a sand# expanse that seemingl# extends without end , .ithout landmar1s or
direction, and is devoid o! all li!e.$A 9! .e !ollo. the dialogue in thin1ing an ancient 0ree1 notion o! Hli!eH as another name

the lifeless desert is the being$less desert. The world that becomes a lifeless desert is conse1uentl# an unworld from which being has withdrawn. The older prisoner ma1es this connection e?plicit, HThe /eing o! an age o! devastation .ould
!or H/eing,H then then consist in the a/andonment o! /eingH &08 DD< $'%(. 8s .e have seen, this is a process that /e!alls the .orld, slo.ly dissolving it o! .orldliness and rendering it an Hun.orldH &c!. 08 D< ;;, :$!.Q*P, 'A>, 'AD!., etc.(. Get this un.orld is not simply the opposite o! .orldM it remains a .orld, /ut a .orld made desert. The desert is not the complete a/sence o! .orld. Such an a/sence .ould not /e reached /y devastation &Per.isiung(, /ut rather /y annihilation &Pernichtung(M and

annihilation is far less of a concern than devastation < H-evastation is =ere annihilation sweeps aside all things including even nothingness, while devastation on the contrar# orders and spreads ever#thing that blocks and prevents H &62-, ''Q$:B%AM tin(.
!or 2eidegger, more uncanny than mere annihilation [/lo!le Pernichtung). 8nnihilation as a thought o! total a/sence is a thought !rom metaphysics. 9t is one .ith a thin1ing o! pure presence< pure presence, pure a/sence, and. purely no contact /et.een them. -uring another lecture course on 2=lderlin, this time in ':>$ on the hymn HThe 9ster,H 2eidegger claims that annihilation is precisely the agenda o! 8merica in regards to the Hhomeland,H .hich is here e uated .ith *urope< H6e 1no. today that the 8ngloBSa?on .orld o! 8mericanism has resolved to annihilate [+u vernichten) *urope, that is, the homeland, and that means< the inception o! the 6estern .orld. The inceptual is indestructi/le [un+erstoFr/ar)H &08 3%< =;Q3>M tm(. 8merica is the agent o! technological devastation, and it operates under the assumptions o! presence and a/sence that it itsel! is so e?pert at dissem/ling. 8merica resolves to annihilate and condemns itsel! to !dilure in so doing, !or the origin is Hindestructi/le.H 6e could ta1e this a step !urther and claim that only /ecause the origin cannot /e annihilated is it possi/le to destroy it. This possi/ility o! destruction is its indestructi/le character. 9t can al.ays /e !urther destroyed, /ut you .ill never annihilate it. 8mericanism names the endeavor or resolution to drive the destruction o! the .orld ever !urther into the un.orld. 8merica is the agent o! a malevolent /eing. This same reasoning e?plains .hy the older manFs original conception o! evil had to /e rethought .

Evil is the 2devastation of the earth and the annihilation of the human essence that goes along with it2 &08 DD< $AD(, he said, /ut this annihilation is simply too easy, too
much o! an H8mericanism.H The human essence is not annihilated in evilB.ho could care a/out thatS 9nstead it is destroyed

>evastation does not annihilate, but brings about something worse, the unworld. ,ithout limit, the desert of the unworld spreads, ever worsening and incessanti# urging itself to new expressions of malevolence. nnihilation would bring respite and, in a perverse sense, relief. There .ould /e nothing le!t to protect and guard, nothing le!t to concern ourselves .ithBnothing le!t to terrori+e. >evastation is also irreparable+ no salvation can arrive for it . The
and devastated /y evil. younger man is a/le to voice the monstrous conclusion o! this thin1ing o! devastation< HThen malevolence, as .hich devastation occurs [sich ereignet), .ould indeed remain a B/asic characteristic o! /eing itsel!H &08 DD< $'%, $'3M em(. The older man agrees, H/eing .ould /e in the ground o! its essence malevolentH &08 DD< $'3(. Eeing is not evilM it is something much .orseM /eing is malevolent.

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<ar and ?io%ence
Technological thought allows humans themselves to become standing$ reserve. 5t is the root cause of war and genocide. Thiele &.;
[Leslie, Pro!essor o! Political Science at the University o! Jlorida, Timely @editations< @artin 2eidegger and Postmodern Politics, pg ':DB':;)

Technolog# has the =idas touch, and a particularl# contagious one at that. Ever#thing with which it comes in contact becomes uniforml# subsumed into a framework of efficientl# exploited resources. 9ndeed,
technology recon!igures human society itsel! to accommodate the e?igencies o! its !urthest e?tensions and intrusions. 6hat is essential to modern technology is its re!usal o! limits, its reCection o! /oundaries and di!!erence. 9n the end,

humanit# itself becomes part and parce l, indeed a most crucial element, of technological ordering. This is true in a number of respects. )irst, humankind is, b# and large, the onl# producer of technolog#. Second, the efficient and endless production of technological artifacts re1uires their e1uall# efficient and endless consumption. 9nce again, humankind is, b# and large, technolog#'s onl# consumer. :ut the circle is only fully completed when humanity becomes not simply the primary producer and consumer of technology! but that which technology primarily produces and consumes. The novelty o! the postmodern .orld, in this light, is not that .e live in a consumer society, /ut that society itsel! has /ecome the consumed. 2eidegger lays out in detail the rami!ications o! this total ordering< The 2world wars2 and their character of 2totalit#2 are alread# a conse1uence of the abandonment of :eing. The# press toward a guarantee of the stabilit# of a constant form of using things up. =an, who no longer conceals his character of being the most important raw material, is also drawn into this process. =an is the 2most important raw material2 because he remains the sub'ect of all consumption. 2e does this in such a .ay that he
lets his .ill /e unconditionally e uated .ith this process, and thus at the same time /ecome the Ho/CectH o! the a/andonment o! Eeing. The .orld .ars arc the antecedent !orm o! the removal o! the di!!erence /et.een .ar and

,ar has become a distortion of the consumption of beings which is continued in peace. Contending .ith a long .ar is only the already outdated !orm in .hich .hat is ne. a/out the age o! consumption is ac1no.ledged. . . . Since man is the most important raw material, one can reckon with the fact that some da# factories will be built for the artificial breeding of human material based on present$da# chemical research. &*lF 'A%B=( 6ritten a!ter 2itlerFs rise to po.er and /e!ore the .ar had revealed its !inal
peace. . , . devastations, 2eidegger indicates in the a/ove passage, though only /ac1handcdly and .ithout assuming personal responsi/ility, that he has glimpsed the terri/le error in his support !or Na+ism. Once in po.er, the Na+is uic1ly displayed

Eo more horrific and ruthless example of the total ordering of humanit# as standing$reserve has ever been constructed than that of the Ea(i concentration camps. !ere technolog#'s limitless scope and capacit# for summoning horror was made evident in the unbridled exploitation of and experimentation with human raw material , the literal
their technological demon.

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using$up of human bodies and minds. 5n the Ea(is' 2final solution,2 technolog#, understood not as a neutral tool or techni1ue but as an overpowering ontological condition, came most dangerousl# to the fore .
Get presentBday genetic research, .hich /ears out 2eideggerFs prediction o! the arti!icial /reeding o! human material, is ultimately no less dangerous !or all its humanistic appeal. 8nd presentBday politics generously pays its dues to the

The success of contemporar# political candidates largel# rests on their abilit# to promote themselves as efficient managers of the growth of the forces of production and consumption. ,ars are won and lost because of this same proficienc#, and in large part with the singular purpose of deciding which state is to control what share of the global market. Get amidst intense and occasionally /loody competition, the signi!icance o! national /oundaries actually
technological demon. diminishes as states /ecome e ually su/Cect to the same technological !orces. 2eidegger concludes that the distinction /et.een national and international is /ecoming increasingly untena/le &*P 'AD(.

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@ero ,oint o6 t"e Ho%oca$st

The Q " is e1ual to the (ero point to the holocaust. >illon '..
8pril ':::) [@ichael -illon, pro!essor at the University o! Lancaster, H8nother 4ustice,H Political Theory, Pol. $D No. $,

9therness is /orn&e( .ithin the sel! as an integral part o! itsel! and in such a .ay that it al.ays remains an inherent stranger to itsel!.H 9t derives from the lack, absence, or ineradicable incompleteness which comes from having no securit# of tenure within or over that of which the self is a particular hermeneutical manifestation M
namely, /eing itsel!. The point a/out the human, /etrayed /y this a/sence, is precisely that it is not sovereignly sel!B possessed and complete, enCoying undisputed tenure in and o! itsel!. @odes o! Custice there!ore reliant upon such a su/Cect lac1 the very !oundations in the sel! that they most violently insist upon seeing inscri/ed there. This does not, ho.ever, mean that the dissolution o! the su/Cect also entails the dissolution o! 4ustice. Ruite the reverse. The su/Cect .as never a !irm !oundation !or Custice, much less a hospita/le vehicle !or the reception o! the call o! another 4ustice. 9t .as never in possession o! that sel!Bpossession .hich .as supposed to secure the certainty o! itsel!, o! a sel!Bpossession that .ould ena/le it ultimately to adCudicate everything. The very inde?icality re uired o! sovereign su/Cectivity gave rise rather to a commensura/ility much more amena/le to the e?penda/ility re uired o! the political and material economies o! mass

The value of the sub'ect became the standard unit of currenc# for the political arithmetic of States and the political economies of capitalism. The# trade in it still to devastating global effect. The technologisation of the political has become manifest and global . *conomies o! evaluation necessarily re uire calcula/ility. Thus no valuation without mensuration and no mensuration without indexation. 9nce rendered calculable, however, units of account are necessaril# submissible not onl# to valuation but also, of course, to devaluation.
societies than it did to the singular, invalua/le, and uncanny uni ueness o! the sel!. -evaluation, logically, can e?tend to the point o! counting as nothing. 2ence, no mensuration .ithout demensuration either.

There is nothing abstract about this* the declension of economies of value leads to the (ero point of holocaust. !owever liberating and emancipating s#stems of value$rights$ma# claim to be , for example, the# run the risk of counting out the invaluable . Counted out, the invalua/le may then lose its
purchase on li!e. 2ere.ith, then, the necessity o! championing the invalua/le itsel!. Jor .e must never !orget that, H.e are dealing al.ays .ith .hatever e?ceeds measure. Eut ho. does that necessity present itsel!S 8nother 4ustice ans.ers< as the surplus o! the duty to ans.er to the claim o! 4ustice over rights.

That dut#, as with the advent of another Nustice, is integral to the lack constitutive of the human wa# of being.

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@i..er.an

XX>on't use this. 5 will rape #ou if #ou do. 5t's a 'oke more than an#thing.XX
The loss of being signals the arrival of ontological damnation, an existential meaninglessness that is more destructive than an# nuclear war. -immerman '.H [@ichael, Pro!essor o! Philosophy and !ormer -irector o! the Center !or
2umanities and the 8rts V CU Eoulder, Contesting *arthFs Juture< Ladical *cology and Postmodernity, Eer1eley, Cali!. University o! Cali!ornia Press, '::D. p.'':B'$A)

!eidegger asserted that human self$assertion, com/ined .ith the eclipse of being, threatens the relation between being and human >asein . Coss of this relation would be even more dangerous than a nuclear war that might 2bring about the complete annihilation of humanit# and the destruction of the earth.H This controversial claim is compara/le to the Christian teaching that it is /etter
;S 3>

to !or!eit the .orld than to lose oneFs soul /y losing oneFs relation to 0od. 2eidegger apparently thought along these lines<

it is possible that after a nuclear war, life might once again emerge, but it is far less likel# that there will ever again occur an ontological clearing through which such life could manifest itself. Jurther, since modernityFs oneBdimensional disclosure o! entities virtually denies them any H/eingH at all, the loss of humanit#'s openness for being is alread# occurring.33 =odernit#'s background mood is horror in the face of nihilism, which is consistent with the aim of providing material 2happiness2 for ever#one b# reducing nature to pure energ# . The unleashing of vast 1uantities of energ# in nuclear war would be e1uivalent to modernit#'s slow$motion destruction of nature* unbounded destruction would e1ual limitless consumption . 5f humanit# avoided nuclear war onl# to survive as contented clever animals , !eidegger believed we would exist in a state of ontological damnation* hell on earth, mas1uerading as material paradise. >eep ecologists might agree that a world of material human comfort purchased at the price of ever#thing wild would not be a world worth living in, for in killing wild nature, people would be as good as dead. Eut most o! them could not agree that the loss of humanit#'s relation to being would be worse than nuclear omnicid e, for it is wrong to suppose that the lives of millions of extinct and unknown species are somehow lessened because the# were never 2disclosed2 b# humanit#.
3=

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Heideggerian ;esistance 81029

!ere is the alternative text* 3e'ect the aff's managerial approach to issues and instead enact in a !eideggerean resistance of letting$be. Cetting the Earth be is a form of !eideggerean resistance that recovers the Earth as a site of open possibilities and allows us to follow the Earth without manipulating it.
Noronen 'QQ
[@i11o, -ept. o! 0eography, U. o! Tur1u, Jinland, -.elling in the Sites o! Jinitude< Lesisting the Piolence o! the @etaphysical 0lo/e," 8ntipode, A&A(.) The am/iguity /et.een the overcoming and incorporation o! metaphysicsOthe overcoming o! the metaphysical constitution o! /eing through an incorporation o! the originary a/yssality o! /eing .ith a hope o! its trans!ormation into .hat 2eidegger calls the other /eginning"O is a/ove all connected .ith the !act that 2eidegger, especially in his later thought, aims to

all human dwelling, including our contemporar# metaph#sical so'ourning in the planetar# machination, takes place through the sites of unfolding. 2ence, in order to overcome the metaph#sics of planetar# machination, the violent manipulation of the earth into a planetar# globe, we need not 'ust to recover the hidden event that appropriated machination from the @ab#ssal plenitudeA in the first place, but also to show how this fundamental ab#ssal realm of openness is connected to the earth$site aspect of the unfolding. s an alliance between non$violent letting$be of the earthOthe realm o! sel!emerging thingsOand thinking that @remembersA the originar# ab#ssal groundlessness of being Othe anBar1he underneath all metaphysical groundsO incorporation of being into non$metaph#sical dwelling is obligated to provide more than a plain nihilation of all groundings, .hich is nothing /ut praise !or a negative nothingness a!!ording a/solute emptiness and the nihilist nomadism o! the &late( modern .ay o! li!e. 9nstead o! total nihilation , this incorporation of ab#ssal being follows the earth without violentl# manipulating it* @!eideggerean resistanceA developed herein is a criti1ue of prevailing world$disclosure, the manipulative grounding of planetar# machination, that attempts explicitl# to rationalise and capture the earth, bind, control and secure it &de Eeistegui $AAD<'DM -rey!us '::%<$::5%AA(. Such resistance of the world$disclosure of machination, then, marks another !orm o! po.er, a !orce other than the .ill to po.er, a !orce that comes !rom
sho. ho. the !undamental source o! /eing itsel!, and thus, /ecause o! the alliance /et.een /eing and earth, sho.s itsel! as a po.er o! a/yssal openness o! the earth, as

a site of non$violent letting$be of the open and

ab#ssal earth.
9n other .ords,

@oreover, i! the !undamental resistance comes !rom the united !orce o! earth and a/yssal /eing, instead o! ma1ing ne. human e!!orts that underline the mastery o! machination, the .illBcentred manipulative ma1ing, ordering and mastering o! the earth, resistance re uires that .e let the unity o! earth and /eing ma1e the trans!ormation.

the overcoming of the contemporar# epoch of planetar# master# of machination re1uires a @power$free letting$beA of the violence machination implicatesM that is to say, a .ay o! thin1ing that eventually ena/les nonBmetaphysical d.elling
in the earthBsites o! a/yssal /eing.

***#L1E;N#1&?ES***

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Heideggerian ;esistance 82029
Cetting the Earth be acts as a radical re'ection of technological enframing, opening possibilities for new modes of dwelling in the world. Noronen 'QQ
[@i11o, -ept. o! 0eography, U. o! Tur1u, Jinland, -.elling in the Sites o! Jinitude< Lesisting the Piolence o! the @etaphysical 0lo/e," 8ntipode, A&A(.)

letting$be, refers to human @releaseA from the manipulative moulding of things, and thus, to the recognition and re'ection of the rule of the prevailing ground o! /eing, the power of machination &eg Keau!er $AA3<>;;M aimmerman '::%<$>'(. Through its letting$be the calculative power of machination, its oneBtrac1 course o! manipulative and everBmoreBe?ploiting handling o! nature &the earth" o! things(, and ourselves, becomes simpl# re'ected . Nevertheless, as Scheurmann &':D;<'=( reminds us, in
9n its most /asic sense, the .ord 0elassenheit, the 0erman the lassen" o! 0elassenheit means only secondarily to a/andon", to reCect" or to ignore", and primarily to let" or to let /e". 2ence ,

it is not 'ust the re'ection and abandonment of the power of machination, but also letting$of$the$transformation$of$being into such @other beginningA where being unfolds as power$free, as a modalit# other than violence and power, and thus, where the earth is not forced under our orderings and calculations /ut rather .here earth,s leading strings are !ollo.ed. Our
po.erB!ree lettingB/e there/y indicates a dou/le sense, a dou/le.ay o! resisting< /y reCecting the .ill!ull po.er and /y permissive letting o! !undamental trans!ormation /ased on a/yssal /eing and sel!Bemergence o! things on earth. 8ccording to the !irst sense o! reCecting,

letting$be indicates a radical negation of the domain of the power of machination, a negation that interrupts its total and perfectl# functioning unfolding &c!. -avis $AAD<%A%(. 9n its !irst sense, then, 0elassenheit means a leap that /rea1s open in the midst o! the planetary po.er o! machination through negation, /y reCecting. 5t happens as a breaking open into the primordial freedom of ab#ssal being, into the openness prior to the freedoms and acts of a sub'ect. Thus, this comportment of re'ecting eventuall# brings out the ab#ssal groundlessness of being, which according to 2eidegger .or1s as an a/undant reservoir that grants us the possibilit# of dwelling [. . .) in a totall# different wa#A &':==a<33(.
9n its second sense, then, 0elassenheit intimates a possi/ility o! a mode o! /eing radically other than .illing, a release !rom the grasp o! limitless po.erB and pro!itsee1ing, a !utural !orce o! trans!ormation that eventually o!!ers .hat 2eidegger calls the other /eginning" /ased on a/yssal timeBspaceplay" o! the *vent o! /eing &see 2eidegger ':3;<';;, $AAA<>, =A5=', ';', $AA=<;>5;=(.

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Her.ene$tics
!ere is the alternative text* 3e'ect the aff and their technological views of the world and being. 5nstead vote negative to embrace a mindset and politics of hermeneutics in interpreting the world the world in all of its possible wa#s and forms6 =odern modes of thought overlook how the world pla#s into the creation of entities in order to understand how entities behave we must take a hermeneutic approach to the world. >re#fus Y ,rathall '0;
[2u/ert L. Pro! o! Philosophy V Eer1eley, Original 0angsta. @ar1, 8ssoc. Pro! o! Philosophy V Erigham Goung Univ. A 2omp nion to 0eidegger, Elac1.ell Pu/lishing p.>)

philosophical tradition has overlooked the character of the world, and the nature of our human existence in a world. >asein, !or instance, is not a sub'ect, for a sub'ect in the traditional sense has mental states and experiences which can be what the# are independentl# of the state of the surrounding world . Jor 2eidegger, our wa# of being is found not in our thinking nature, but in our existing in a world. nd our being is intimatel# and inextricabl# bound up with the world that we find ourselves in . 9n the same .ay that the tradition has misunderstood human /eing /y !ocusing on su/Cectivity, it also !ailed to understand the nature o! the .orld, because it tended to focus exclusivel# on entities within the world, and understood the world as merel# being a collection of inherentl# meaningless entities. :ut attention to the wa# entities actuall# show up for us in our ever#da# dealings teaches us that worldl# things cannot be reduced to merel# ph#sical entities with causal properties. "orldly things, in other words, have a different mode of being than the causall# delineated entities that make up the universe and which are the concern of the natural sciences. To understand worldl# entities 4 entities, in other words, that are inherentl# meaningfull# constituted 4 re1uires a hermeneutic approach
Using his account o! .hat is involved in human e?istence so understood, 2eidegger argues that the &see La!ont, this volume, chapter '=(

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7editati'e 1"inking 81029
!ere's our alterntive text* 3e'ect the aff and their technological 'ump to solve problems and instead open up this space for meditative thinking. 9ur alternative grounds our thinking and dwells$upon the earth. 5nstead of pursuing the rigid confines of calculative thought, we instead take root to allow the human spirit to flourish and allow thinking about thinking. !eidegger '66
[@artin. The $Ath century,s SlavoC. -iscourse on Thin.ing. ':==. pp. >DB>:)

There are, then, two kinds of thinking, each Custi!ied and needed in its o.n .ay< calculative thinking and meditative thinking. This meditative thinking is what we have in mind when we sa# that contemporar# man is in flight$from$thinking . Get
you may protest< mere meditative thin1ing !inds itsel! !loating una.are a/ove reality. 9t loses touch. 9t is .orthless !or

#ou ma# sa#, !inally, that mere meditative thinking, persevering meditation, is @aboveA the reach of ordinar# understanding. 9n this e?cuse only this much is true, meditative thinking does not 'ust happen b# itself an# more than does calculative thinking. t times it re1uires a greater effort. 5t demands more practice. 5t is in need of even more delicate care than an# other genuine craft. :ut it must also be able to bide its time, to await as does the farmer, whether the seed will come up and ripen. Get anyone can !ollo. the path o! meditative thin1ing in his o.n manner and .ithin
dealing .ith current /usiness. 9t pro!its nothing in carrying out practical a!!airs. 8nd his o.n limits. 6hyS Eecause man is a thin1ing, that is, a meditating /eing. Thus meditative thin1ing need /y no means /e highB!lo.n."

5t is enough if we dwell on what lies close and meditate on what is closest+ upon that which concerns us, each one of us, here and now+ here, on this patch of home ground+ now, in the present hour of histor# . 76hat does this cele/ration suggest to us, in case .e are ready to meditateS Then we notice that a work of art has flowered in the ground of our homeland . 8s .e hold this simple !act in mind, .e cannot help
remem/ering at once that during the last t.o centuries great poets and thin1ers have /een /rought !orth !rom the S.a/ian land. Thin1ing a/out it !urther ma1es clear at once that Central 0ermany is li1e.ise such a land, and so are *ast Prussia, Silesia, and Eohemia. 6e gro. thought!ul and as1< does not the !lourishing o! any genuine .or1 depend upon its roots in a native soilS 4ohann Peter 2e/el once .rote <

are plants which whether we like to admit it to ourselves or not$ must with our roots rise out of the earth in order to bloom in the ether and to bear fruit " &6or1s, ed. 8lt.egg 999, %'>.( The poet means to say< )or a trul# 'o#ous and salutar# human work to flourish, man must be able to mount from the depth of his home ground up into the ether. Ether here means the free air of the high heavens, the open realm of the spirit. 6e gro. more thought!ul and as1< does this claim o! 4ohann Peter 2e/el hold todayS -oes man still d.ell calmly /et.een
heaven and earthS -oes a meditative spirit still reign over the landS 9s there still a li!eBgiving homeland in .hose ground man may stand rooted, that is, /e autochthonicS @any 0ermans have lost their homeland have had to leave their villages and to.ns, have /een driven !rom their native soil. Countless others .hose homeland .as saved, have yet .andered o!!. They have /een caught up in the turmoil o! the /ig cities, and have resettled in the .astelands o! industrial districts. They are strangers no. to their !ormer homeland. 8nd those .ho have stayed on in their homelandS O!ten they are still more homeless than those .ho have /een driven !rom their homeland. 2ourly and daily they are chained to radio and television. 6ee1 a!ter .ee1 the movies carry them o!! into uncommon, /ut o!ten merely common, realms o! the imagination, and give the illusion o! a .orld that is no .orld. Picture maga+ines are every.here availa/le. 8ll that .ith .hich modern techni ues o! communication stimulate, assail, and.drive manBall that is already much closer to man today than his !ields around his !armstead, closer than the s1y over the

,e

earth, closer than the change !rom night to day, closer than the conventions and customs o! his village, than the

,e grow more thoughtful and ask* ,hat is happening here$with those driven from their homeland no less than with those who have remainedB nswer* the rootedness, the autochthon#, of man is
tradition o! his native .orld.

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threatened toda# at$its core. *ven more< The loss$of$rootedness is caused not merel# b# circumstance and fortune, nor does it stem onl# from the negligence and the superficialit# of man&s wa# of life. The loss of autochthon# springs from the spirit of the age into which all of us were born. ,e grow still more thoughtful and ask* 5f this is so, can man, can man&s work in the future still be expected to thrive in the fertile ground of a homeland and mount into the ether, into the far reaches of the heavens and the spiritB 9r will ever#thing now fall into the clutches of planning and calculation, of organi(ation and automationS

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7editati'e 1"inking 82029
cts of will cannot transform bad forms of thinking. ,e have to deepl# reflect and meditate with our alternatives meditative thought to allow meaning to reveal itself to us. This allows us to rediscover our worldl# home and choose how we want to be in the world. Thiele &.;
[Leslie, Pro!essor o! Political Science at the University o! Jlorida, Timely @editations< @artin 2eidegger and Postmodern Politics, pg $'%B$'>) 2eidegger o!!ers a hint a/out the nature o! the thin1ing that might loosen the grip o! technology. 2e .rites that H the

coming to presence of technolog# will be surmounted Tvenvunden) in a wa# that restores it into its #et concealed truth. This restoring surmounting is similar to what happens when, in the human realm, one gets over grief or pain2 &RT %:(. 9mportantly, one gets over grief not through a willful overcoming. Such self$master# onl# displaces grief , with the likelihood of its resurgence at some other time, in an invidious form . Li1e moods in general, grief is overcome not b# master#, intellect, or will, but onl# b# another mood &6P8
::(. 8nd moods, 2eidegger insists, cannot /e created, only summoned &ST 'A3(. The mood that allo.s our overcoming o! grie! might /est /e descri/ed as one o! rediscovered sanctuary.

9ne gets over grief b# once again coming to feel one's belonging in a world that , because of to its cruel deprivations, had for a time become alien. 2annah 8rendt o!ten called to mind 9sa1 -inesenFs saying that Hall sorro.s can /e /orne i! you put them into a story or tell a story a/out them.H -inesenFs point is that we get over grief b# reflecting on our grief$stricken selves and becoming interpretivel# reintegrated in the world. Cooking back on our grieved selves allows us to surmount grief not b# den#ing our misfortune but b# finding meaning in the stor# of our sorrow. To look back on ourselves in time is to gain distance, and, at the same time, a nearness to the ongoing and often tragic saga of worldl# habitation. 2omelessness is the mood o! the technological age. 3ediscovering our worldl# home &as threatened( signals the 2restoring surmounting2 of technolog#. This rediscovered sense of &threatened( sanctuar# is chiefl# summoned, 2eidegger indicates, b# memor# or recollective thought. 3ecollecting our worldl# habitat not onl# fosters resistance to enframing, but also provides guidance in negotiating relations with the products of technolog#, namely machines and techni ues. 2eidegger acB1no.ledges that .e should neither
reCect nor do .ithout technological arti!acts or s1ills as a .hole. 2e neither advocates nor accepts a retreat to a pretechnological state o! /eing. Nor, despite much misinterpretaBtion /y his commentators, does he suggest that .e !atalistically resign ourselves to the victory o! en!raming. 9ts victory, he emphatically states, is not inevita/le &O0S ='(. H6e cannot, o! course, reCect todayFs techBnological .orld as devilFs .or1, nor may .e destroy itOassuming it does not destroy itsel!,H 2eidegger maintains. HStill less may .e cling to the vie. that the .orld o! technology is such that it .ill

To confuse our destined relation to :eing as if it were a fate, particularl# one that leads to the inevitable decline of our civili(ation because of technological rule, is itself a historicall# determinist, and therefore metaph#sical and technological,
a/solutely prevent a spring out o! itH &9- >AO>'(.

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understanding. 8ccording to 2eidegger, H8ll attempts to rec1on e?isting
reality morphologically, psychologically, in terms o! decline and loss, in terms o! !ate, catastrophe, and destruction, are merely technological /ehaviorH &RT >;(.'>

)atalism is no answer because fatalism reflects the same absence of thought that is evidenced in a naive complacenc# with technological 2progress.H 2eideggerFs admonition to thin1 the nature o! technology, though !ar !rom a resigned musing, is not the devising o! a countero!!ensive. 6e are as1ed to respond !irst to the uestion H ,hat shall we thinkB2 rather than the uestion H6hat is to /e doneSH Eut the point is not simpl# that we must think before we act. The needed thinking of what we are doing and how we are being is not solel# a strategic preparation for more informed and effective behavior. Thought must first save us from our typical modes o! /ehaving, namely those oriented to possessive master#. 2eidegger .arns that Hso long as .e represent technology as
an instrument, .e remain held !ast in the .ill to master itH &RT %$(. The more .e !ail to e?perience the essence o! technology as en!raming, persevering in the mista1en notion that comple? machinery is the danger, the more .e .ill /elieve that salvation lies in our mastering technology /e!ore it masters us. 6ith this in mind,

!eidegger explicitl# states that he is 2not against technolog#,2 nor does he suggest an# 2resistance against, or condemnation of, technolog#H &@2C >%O>>D. 5ndeed, the development of complex machines and techni1ues< technolog# as it is commonl# understood<has enormous benefits that must not be depreciated. 5t would be shortsighted to condemn such technolog# out of hand. 8part !rom our o/vious dependence on technical devices, their development also o!ten Hchallenges us to ever greater advancesH &-T 3% D. )rom political, social, cultural, and environmental standpoints, technolog# demonstrates man# virtues. 5ndeed, given the unrelenting extension of human power and population, technological developments that buffer the earth from our predaceousness seem both urgent and indispensable . 8 good /it o! the destruction humanity presently visits on the earth and itsel! ma1es sophisticated technological remedies necessary. !aving machines efficientl# serve our needs is neither evil nor regrettable. :ut this service must be grounded on our discover# of what needs we trul# have. =ore importantl#, it must be grounded on our discover# of what transcends human need.FU These, decidedly, are not technological 1uestions, and our capacit# to answer them largel# rests on our recover# of the capacit# to think be#ond the criterion of instrumental service . $'%B$'>

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,oetr( 81029
)orgotten 8lanet >orph '7F 9 as1 my daughter to name the planets. HPenus ...@ars ...and PlunisZH she says. 6hen 9 .as si? or seven my !ather .o1e me in the middle o! the night. 6e .ent do.n to the playground and lay on our /ac1s on the concrete loo1ing up !or the meteors the tv said .ould sho.er. 9 donFt remem/er any meteors. 9 remem/er my /ac1 pressed to the planet *arth, my !atherFs /ul1 li1e gravity ne?t to me, the occasional rum/le !rom his throat, the apartment /uildings dar1B.indo.ed, the s1y close enough to po1e .ith my !inger. No., 1no.ledge erodes .onder. The niggling voce reminds me that the sun does shine on the dar1 side o! the moon. @y daughterFs ignorance is my /liss. Through her eyes 9 spy li1e a voyeur. 9 travel in a roc1et ship to the planet Plunis. On Plunis 9 no longer long !or the past. On Plunis there are actual surprises. On Plunis 9 am happy. !ere is the alternative text* 3e'ect the aff and their use of fallen language and instead vote for the acceptance and use of poetic language to enframe beings in positions that are other than standing reserves6 8rose alwa#s technologicall# enframes nature and reduces it to the position of standing reserve $ 8oetr# allows us to break down our metaph#sical assumptions about the world and people, and allow us to disclose its :eing in an authentic wa#. ,e must make language a process of listening as well as speaking. 3oss '0H
[8ndre. Peter, Pro!essor at Rueen,s University, Lethin1ing *nvironmental Lesponsi/ility< 2eidegger, Pro!ound Eoredom and the 8lterity o! Nature", Septem/er $AAD) Since 2eidegger,s theory o! language &logos( is comple?, !or present purposes 9 only o!!er a /rie! caricature o! it in order to illustrate the .ay in .hich it has /een appropriated .ithin environmental philosophy. Put simply, the later

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!eidegger draws a distinction between @ fallenA and @poeticA language. The former sense of language refers to an @inauthenticA mode of language that treats language as a tool, subse1uentl# restricting the disclosure of :eing and beings. The latter sense o! language, the poetic, does not view language as a tool or instrument, but as something that can enable a less restricted disclosure of both :eing and beings. @ore speci!ically, poetic language does not simpl# acknowledge the existence of beings in the world+ rather it makes beings manifest b# allowing them to come forth and linger of their own accord, drawing our attention not onl# to the wa# in which the# are revealed, but to the wa#s in which the# remain concealed and withdrawn. @odern -asein remains entrapped .ithin the use o! !allen languageM
language today, according to 2eidegger, has /een de/ased to a means o! commerce and organi+ation" &*CP $'>(. The deterioration o! language .ithin modernity !acilitates the 0estell,s restrictive disclosure o! /eings /y preventing language

poetic language<what we might think of as @authenticA or @primordialA language< resists the conceptual entrapment of :eing in a world of words, allowing beings to come forth of their own accord. 9n paying heed to our .ords in this manner, language becomes more a form of @listeningA than a wa# of speaking. 9n light o! this contrast /et.een !allen" and poetic" language , it has /een argued that this !orm o! poetic language is one wa# in which ph#sis might be enabled to manifest itself &Langer ''>M Taylor
!rom disclosing /eings in a more original or primordial sense. 9n contrast, $3DM aimmerman *thos"''3(.

the poetic refers to a form of expression that attempts to make evident the revealing and concealingOthe play o! truth &aletheia(Othat occurs within ever# disclosure. 8oetic expression can, for example, also be accomplished in works of art < van 0ogh,s painting o! the peasant shoes, lets us 1no. .hat shoes are in truth"< the shoes are disclosed in their @thing$hoodA presenting them not as solel# functional ob'ects, but as beings that can be contemplated for what the# reveal and hide &O68 '='(. Charles Taylor, !or e?ample, argues that paying heed to language in the manner that !eidegger proposes will dictate a certain wa# of talking about beings* a wa# that restores their thingness and sense of meaning . 9n this sense, natural entities will demand that we use the t#pe of language that discloses them as things rather than as standing reserve &$=D(. 9n other .ords, .e can thin1 o! the demands o!
conte?t does not necessarily re!er to verse, rhyme, or meter &though it can(M rather, language as a demand put upon us /y natural entities themselvesOa demand moreover, that amounts to the

8s a point o! clari!ication, it should /e noted that poetry" or the poetic" .ithin this

!eidegger&s philosoph# of language, or so Taylor argues, ma# form the basis of an ecological politics founded on something other than instrumental calculations. 8dditionally, @ichael aimmerman argues that !eidegger&s sense of authentic language can lead to a profound understanding and respect for the :eing of all beings &*thos"'ADB '%'(. Signi!icantly, poetic language has a wa# of formulating matters which can help to restore thingness to natural beings and subse1uentl# facilitate 2eidegger,s notion o! dwelling &TT 'D$(. 9n /eing disclosed .ithin their thingBhood, /eings coBdisclose their place in
ac1no.ledgement o! the natural .orld as having certain meanings &$=D(. the clearing< -asein,s !ield" o! disclosure, its understanding o! Eeing. @ore speci!ically, in /eing disclosed as things, /eings ma1e one,s .orldhood evident or in 2eidegger,s later terminology, things gather together the elements that ma1e

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up the !ourB!old"< earth, s1y, gods and mortals. To illustrate this, 2eidegger uses the e?ample o! an ordinary Cug &'=DB 'D>(.

The 'ug<as it shows up in the world of the peasant, untarnished b# modern technolog#<is embedded with the human activities in which it pla#s a part, such as the pouring of wine at the common table. The 'ug draws together the earth which provides the water and the grapes of the wine, the sk# in the sunshine that ripens the grapes, the gods to whom the peasants give thanks, and the mortals, the peasants themselves who partake in the outpouring of the wine and who are aware of the m#ster# of the world and life itself. 5n this sense, the 'ug serves at the point where a rich web of practices can be sensed and made evident. Signi!icantly, it is the CugOor more precisely the @thingingA of the 'ug<that @assemblesA the elements of the four$fold. The @thingingA of ob'ects li1e the Cug or the oa1 tree /rings together the !ourB!old in such a .ay as to encourage one to @nurse and nurtureA one&s immediate environment 8oetic language brings about a sense of @nearnessA that facilitates a co$existence with the beings of one&s environment in which we @take careA of &p!legen( beings, and @spareA &schonen( them &%3'(.

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,oetr( 82029
8oetr# provides a uni1ue mechanism for interrogating the essence of technolog# and for exploring new wa#s of thinking. !eidegger
The

'/. [@artin 0erman philosopher, ':>:, The http<QQ.....right.eduQcolaQ-eptQP2LQClassQP.9nternetQP9Te?tsQRCT.html [E0E))


uestion concerning technology is the

=uestion

2oncerning

Technology,

uestion concerning the constellation in .hich revealing and concealing, in

.hich the essential un!olding o! truth propriates. Eut .hat help is it to us to loo1 into the constellation o! truthS

,e

look into the danger and see the growth of the saving power.

Through this .e are not yet saved. Eut .e are thereupon summoned to hope in the gro.ing light o! the saving po.er. 2o. can this happenS

!ere and now and in little things, that we ma# foster the saving power in its increase. This includes holding alwa#s before our e#es the extreme danger. The essential un!olding o! technology threatens revealing, threatens it .ith the possi/ility that all revealing
.ill /e consumed in ordering and that everything .ill present itsel! only in the unconcealment o! standingBreserve. 2uman activity can never directly counter this danger. 2uman achievement alone can never /anish it. Eut human re!lection can ponder the !act that all saving po.er must /e o! a higher essence than .hat is endangered, though at the same time 1indred to it. Eut might there not perhaps /e a more primally granted revealing that could /ring the saving po.er into its !irst shiningB!orth in the midst o! the danger that in the technological age rather conceals than sho.s itsel!S There .as a time .hen it .as not technology alone that /ore the name techne. Once the revealing that /rings !orth truth into the splendor o! radiant appearance .as also called techne. There .as a time .hen the /ringingB!orth o! the true into the /eauti!ul .as called techne. The poiesis o! the !ine arts .as also called techne. 8t the outset o! the destining o! the 6est, in 0reece, the arts soared to the supreme height o! the revealing granted them. They illuminated the presence [0egen.art) o! the gods and the dialogue o! divine and human destinings. 8nd art .as called simply techne. 9t .as a single, mani!old revealing. 9t .as pious, promos, i.e., yielding toB the holding s.ay and the sa!e1eeping o! truth. The arts .ere not derived !rom the artistic. 8rt.or1s .ere not enCoyed aesthetically. 8rt .as not a sector o! cultural activity. 6hat .as artOperhaps only !or that /rie! /ut magni!icent ageS 6hy did art /ear the modest name techneS Eecause it .as a revealing that /rought !orth and made present, and there!ore /elonged .ithin poiesis. 9t .as !inally that revealing .hich holds complete s.ay in all the !ine arts, in poetry, and in everything poetical that o/tained poiesis as its proper name. The same poet !rom .hom .e heard the .ords Eut .here danger is, gro.s there the saving po.er also . . . says to us< . poetically man d.ells on this earth. The poetical /rings the true into the splendor o! .hat Plato in the Phaedrus calls to

The poetical thoroughl# pervades every art, ever# revealing of essential unfolding into the beautiful . Could it /e that the !ine arts are called to poetic revealingS "ould it be that revealing la#s claim to the arts most primall#, so that the# !or their part may e?pressly foster the growth of the saving power, may a.a1en and !ound ane. our vision o!, and trust in, that .hich grantsS 6hether art may /e granted this
e1phanestaton, that .hich shines !orth most purely. highest possi/ility o! its essence in the midst o! the e?treme danger, no one can tell. Get .e can /e astounded. Ee!ore .hatS Ee!ore this other possi/ility< that

the fren(iedness of technolog# ma# entrench itself ever#where to such an extent that someda# , throughout ever#thing technological, the essence of technolog# ma# unfold essentiall# in the propriative event of truth. :ecause the essence of technolog# is nothing technological, essential reflection upon technolog# and decisive confrontation with it must happen in a realm that is , on the one hand, akin to the essence of technolog# and, on the other, fundamentall# different from it. Such a realm is art. Eut certainly only i! re!lection upon art, !or its part, does not shut its eyes to the constellation o! truth, concerning .hich .e are uestioning. Thus 1uestioning, we bear witness to the crisis that in our sheer preoccupation with technolog# we do not #et experience the essential unfolding of technolog#, that in our sheer

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aesthetic$mindedness we no longer guard and preserve the essential unfolding of art. Get the more 1uestioningl# we ponder the essence of technolog#, the more m#sterious the essence of art becomes . The closer .e come
to the danger, the more /rightly do the .ays into the saving po.er /egin to shine and the more

)or 1uestioning is the piet# of thought.

uestioning .e /ecome.

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,ro6o$nd )oredo.
!ere's the alternative text* 3e'ect the aff and their technological view of the world and being, but instead vote negative for an openness to engage the otherness of the world through profound boredom. To step outside of technoloigcal evaluations and become numb, disrupting our usual manner of being$in$the$world and opening up a space to re$formulate our ontological values. The clearing of this ontologcal space results in an authentic reali(ation of >asein and a call to responsibility when confronting nature&s alterit#. 3oss '0H
[8ndre. Peter, Pro!essor at Rueen,s University, Lethin1ing *nvironmental Lesponsi/ility< 2eidegger, Pro!ound Eoredom and the 8lterity o! Nature", Septem/er $AAD)

The emptiness that constitutes profound boredom is not the emptiness that stems from the lack of a particular fulfillment &as in the !irst stage(, nor is it the emptiness that arises from the self$ abandonment with particular beings in a particular situation &as in the second stage( &'%D(. 9nstead, the emptiness of profound boredom stems from the @telling refusalA of beings as a whole &'%D(. Eeings re!use themselves in such a .ay as to ma1e everything seem o! e ually great and e ually little .orth" &'%D(. :eings appear, in other .ords, so as to make the ver# activit# of valuing <the abilit# to draw distinctions on the basis of worth< impotent. This is not to say that one cannot dra.
Third, the emptiness o! pro!ound /oredom is !ar di!!erent !rom the !irst t.o stages. distinctions among /eings in the sense that one cannot di!!erentiate a stone !rom a tree. The telling re!usal does not collapse such distinctionsOstones

remain stones and trees remain trees<rather, the t#pe of distinction that is refused is the t#pe of meaningful distinction that facilitates one&s ordinar# engagement with the world. ,hat is missing, in other .ords, is not the categor# @stoneA or @treeA but the t#pe of valuing that facilitates the actual use of such categories . The emptiness of profound boredom can be thought of as experiencing the world as radicall# indifferent* as something that refuses value . Signi!icantly, the radical indi!!erence o! /eings precludes any attempts at evading /oredomM one cannot see1 out the engagement of a particular being nor attempt to immerse oneself in a particular situation.
6hile 2eidegger does not o!!er a particular scenario to illustrate the e?perience o! pro!ound /oredom, it may /e help!ul to

the experience of being under a sedative ma# bear a resemblance to the experience of profound boredom. Specificall#, through the ha(e of anesthesia one remains aware of the ordinar# categories that make up the worldhood while being simultaneousl# incapable of engaging with such categories in a meaningful fashion. O! course, the comparison !ails .hen it is noted that what is numbed in profound boredom is not one,s physical /ody /ut the t#pe of valuing that facilitates one&s usual wa# of being$in$the$world . 8dditionally, the source o! incapacitation di!!ers greatly<
consider an illustrative scenario. Though it is not a per!ect li1eness,

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the refusal of value within profound boredom makes it tempting to think of profound boredom as a form of depression* a state in which the beings of the world are stripped of their value. 2o.ever, as 9 .ill e?plain !urther /elo., the refusal of value within profound boredom should not be thought of as the complete absence of value<as beings might appear in a state of depression< but as the withholding of value. 9n particular, .hat the telling re!usal re!uses -asein is the very possi/ilities o! its doing and acting" &'>A(. The indifference of beings as a whole prevents >asein from engaging in its ordinar# wa#s of doing and acting in the world M >asein is stripped of its ever#da# attachments and pro'ects . The complete removal of >asein&s ordinar# wa#s of doing and acting brings >asein into an encounter with itself as a being that is responsible for its own being . 9n 2eidegger,s o.n .ords< profound boredom @brings the self in all its nakedness to itself as the self that is there and has taken over the being there of its >a$sein. Jor .hat purposeS To /e that -aBsein" &'>%(. The telling re!usal o! /eings impels -asein to.ards the original
one is a sedative, .hile the other results !rom the re!usal o! /eings. Nota/ly, ma1ingBpossi/le o! -asein as such< -asein is !orced to assume its o.n thereB/eing as an actual /urden. 9n other .ords,

profound boredom places >asein within a relationship of responsibilit#* the emptiness of profound boredom reveals >asein as answerable for what it makes of its there$being. Simultaneously, the telling refusal exposes >asein to a genuine experience of freedom in the sense that >asein recogni(es itself as free for its own existence.

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A$ant$. 7ec"anics 81029
!ere is the alternative text* 3e'ect the aff and their technological mindset and instead embrace a meditation of 1uantum mechanics and ph#sics. =editation on 1uantum mechanics and 1uantum ph#sics offers an invitation to encounter the deepest ab#sses of being, disrupting technological assemblages of meaning and radicall# rearranging our concept of ourselves. Seigfried '.0
[2ans, pro!essor in the -epartment o! Philosophy at. Loyola University Chicago, 8utonomy and Ruantum Physics< Niet+sche, 2eidegger and 2eisen/erg", Philosophy o! Science 3D, pp. =':B=%A)

!eisenberg states the lesson of 1uantum ph#sics about the relationship between us and the world in man# forms and on man# occasions, fre1uentl# illustrating it b# demonstrating its sobering effect on .hat Niet+sche descri/es as theoretical optimism, namel#, 2the unshakable faith that thought, using the thread of causalit#, can penetrate the deepest ab#sses of being2 &':=Da, p. :3(, !or 1uantum ph#sics shows that the use of the principle of causalit# remains restricted to the surface &':;>a, p. $'M ':;>/, pp. $=B$;(. The statement
.hich 2eidegger ta1es issue .ith is !ound in H-as Natur/ild der heutigen Physi1H< H. . . !or the !irst time in history man encounters only himsel! on this earth, he no longer !inds other partners or opponentsH &':;>c, p. >'$(. 6hen !irst made, this statement is actually understood in a very /road sense. 2eisen/erg !inds that

our relationship to nature is radicall# different from that of earlier ages. 5n earlier epochs man encountered nature as the other, as a realm with its ver# own structure and laws which had to be obe#ed somehow. Toda# we live in a different world+ the structures which we encounter in the world are our own constructs, and this is wh# we encounter onl# ourselves , as it .ere. 2eisen/erg then goes on to sho. that the new situation is most obvious in modem ph#sics. The uncertaint# relations show that what we originall# conceived as the ultimate ob'ective realit# , namely, the elements o! matter, cannot be observed 2in themselves2, that is, their ob'ective determination in space and time is impossible. 5t can no longer be the aim of science to get to know the atom in itself and its motion in itself, apart from our experimental setup and performance. ,e decide$for specific reasons of our own$what to ignore and what to look for. Our e?perimental setup is partBand only a small partBo! a much larger e?change and transaction /et.een man and nature. The new situation in ph#sics indicates that such received distinctions as sub'ectJob'ect, insideJoutside, mindJbod# are no longer applicable and useful. 2eisen/erg mostly develops the implications !or nature and .hat .e ordinarily call o/Cective reality. Eut, o! course, there are also similarl# radical implications which need to be drawn out for what we ordinaril# call the self.

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A$ant$. 7ec"anics 82029
Zuantum =echanics and advanced scientific theor# is better at accessing !eidegger&s reali(ation of the meaning of being than meditative thinking. Seigfried '.0
[2ans, pro!essor in the -epartment o! Philosophy at. Loyola University Chicago, 8utonomy and Ruantum Physics< Niet+sche, 2eidegger and 2eisen/erg", Philosophy o! Science 3D, pp. =':B=%A)

in recogni(ing this danger of the complete elimination of ourselves through the t#rannical demand of the setup we would be forced to relax our obedience to it and learn to see in the demand not a dictate from be#ond us &':==, pp. 3$B3D(, but an invitation &8nspruch( and call &auspruch( from within us to 2become those we are2 &':DD, p. $D(. The ver# t#rann# of the setup would bring about its downfall. Jor the demand could then be seen as something we have a sa# in &':DD, pp. $>, %$( and the encountering of the world and of ourselves in terms of the setup could be seen as a free response. The demand could be recogni(ed as a function of the care !or our o.n /eing and the attempt o! Hac uiring po.erH over it &':=$, p. %'A(, that is, o! H choosing GourselvesT and taking hold of GourselvesT2 &':=$, p. ';;(. Eut since 2eidegger !rom early
Eut 2eidegger thin1s that on argues that .e can never ac uire such po.er H!rom the ground upH, he must also claim, seemingly against 2eisen/erg, that .e can never encounter only ourselves &':DD, p. $D(, that the setup does not happen e?clusively in us or decisively through us &':DD, p. $>(, and that Hthe .orld cannot /e .hat it is or the .ay that it is through [us), /ut neither can it /e

inducing this profound reali(ation is all that one can expect of thinking and, conse uently, philosophy comes to an end &':D=a, p. $D;(. Eut it seems to me that this lesson is much more clearl# and forcefull# taught toda# b# 1uantum ph#sics than b# phenomenological anal#sis and contemplative thinking, the t.o 1inds o! philosophical thin1ing 2eidegger engages in.
.ithout [us)H &':D=a, p. $D;(. Perhaps 2eidegger is right .hen he maintains that 8nd so, once again< .e must /ecome physicists.

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<orks o6 #rt
!ere is the alternative text* 3e'ect the aff and their technological control of the world and people, which turns ever#thing into a standing$reserve and instead vote neg and embrace a new cultural paradigm shift through works of art6 "ultural Signposts K@works of artAD allow individuals to unite for a common goal and shift our ontological ideas in the process6 ,e solve in round technological mindsets. >re#fus '07
[2u/ert, Pro!. O! Philosophy at grauate university, University o! Cali!ornia Eer1eley, 2eidegger and Joucault on the Su/Cect, 8gency and Practices" Octo/er '' th, $AA$, 4COOK)

)or ever#da# practices to give meaning to people's lives and unite them in a communit# something must collect the scattered practices of the group, unif# them into coherent possibilities for action, and hold them up to the people. The people can then act and relate themselves to each other in terms of this exemplar. nd the ob'ect that performs this function best !eidegger calls a work of art. 8s his illustration o! an art .or1 .or1ing,
2eidegger ta1es the 0ree1 temple. The temple held up to the 0ree1s .hat .as important and so esta/lished the meaning!ul di!!erences such a victory and disgrace in respect to .hich they could orient their actions. The style o! the /ac1ground practices as a .hole change radically each time a culture gets a ne. art .or1. 8!ter such a change di!!erent sorts o! human /eings and things sho. up. Jor the 0ree1s, .hat sho.ed up .ere heroes and slaves and marvelous thingsM !or the Christians, saints and sinners, re.ards and temptations. There could not have /een saints in 8ncient 0reece. 8t /est there could have /een .ea1 people .ho let every/ody .al1 all over them. Li1e.ise, there could not have /een 0ree1B style heroes in the @iddle 8ges. Such people .ould have /een regarded as pride!ul sinners. 0enerali+ing the idea o! a .or1

!eidegger holds that 2there must alwa#s be some being in the open Gthe clearingT, something that is, in which the openness takes its stand and attains its constanc#2 &PLT =', 0 3 >;(. Cet us call such special things cultural paradigms. cultural paradigm is an# being in the clearing that disclose a new world or, b# refocusing the current cultural practices can disclose the world anew. 2eidegger mentions !ive types o! cultural paradigmsBB.or1s o! art, acts o!
o! art, statements, nearness o! a god, and sacri!ice o! a god, and the .ords o! a thin1erBB /ut, !or /revityFs sa1e, .e shall concern ourselves only .ith t.o, the !ounding political act and the thin1erFs .ords. The U.S. Constitution .ould count as a cultural paradigm !or 2eidegger. Jor it is Cust the sort o! political act that esta/lishes an understanding o! .hat it is to /e a state /y

9nce established, because it is so important to the people whose world it organi(es, it becomes the center of a struggle to make it clear, coherent and complete. 2eidegger calls this tendency in
articulating an understanding already in that culture. the practices to move to.ards clarity the .orld aspect. Eut any /eing resists /eing completely clari!ied. 2eidegger calls this resitance the .orld aspect.

The struggle between them sets up what he calls an outline which is the specific st#le of the culture. The struggle between various interpretations of the paradigm makes the culture historical since the present repeatedl# reinterprets the past and sets up a new future.

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Turn $

#nt"ro*ocentris.
nthropocentrism.

Technological 0iew of Earth 8ushes ?s 5nto

Turnbull '06
Thus,

[Neil, Cool -ude, The Ontological Conse uences o! Copernicus", Theory, Culture # Society 4ournal, $AA=, Pol. $%&'(< '$3B'%:, -O9< 'A.''DDQA$=%$D=>A=A=%$%$, Page '%' B '%$, 4COOK)

for the later !eidegger worlds are onl# conceivable as such 5 such that the s 7orld 5 only when the# framed b# the sk# above and the earth beneath &see @alpas, $AAA< $$D(. Clearly, !or the later 2eidegger, the idea of %the world& is conceptuall# inseparable from that of %the earth& &and in many .ays, !or the later
.orld is attained 2eidegger, the idea o! the .orld .ithin .hich 7 - sein is, is replaced /y the idea o! the !our!old .ithin .hich 7man d.ells,(.

The close relationship /et.een earth and .orld !or 2eidegger can again /e seen in the
2eidegger recogni+es that

<rigins o% the 3or. o% Art , .here

%GwTorld and earth are essentiall# different from one another and #et never separated. The world grounds itself in the earth and the earth 'uts through the world& &':D;/< 'D>(.$ ,hen seen in this wa#, the earth is viewed as forming the ontological basis for .hat 2eidegger terms 7the .or1, 5 o! /oth artist and artisan 5 and its corollar# the %thingl# character of the world& &':D;/< ';A(. @ore generally, !eidegger conceives the earth as the ground of all appearance and the physys out of which the world emerges &a ground that supports the nomos o! the .orld(. Jor, in 2eidegger,s vie., onl# a world supported b# the earth can give things their proper measure* and without this relation, things have no %true& measure Kand in such a case, the measurement of the world in terms of an abstract [end o! page '%$) mathematici(ed facticit# 4 re1uired for the efficient maintenance of purel# technological relationships 4 becomes the anthropocentric measure of all thingsD.

***1U;NS***

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)io*ower
Turn $ The technological mindset manifests itself in the form of biopower that renders all life to standing reserve6 >ean '7k
[Sociologist at @ac uarie University &@itchell, H8l.ays Loo1 on the -ar1 Side< Politics and the @eaning o! Li!eH, http<QQapsa$AAA.anu.edu.auQcon!papersQdean.rt!(.4LC) 8ristotle said that .hile the polis 7comes into e?istence !or the sa1e o! li!e, its e?ists !or the good li!e, &':=D, :, 9.i.;(. Today the good li!e has come to re uire a politics 7!or the sa1e o! li!e,. 8t the /eginning o! the t.entyB!irst century, .e appear to /e crossing everBne. thresholds to.ards learning the secrets o! the creation o! li!e itsel!.

3arel# a week goes b# when there is not a new biotechnological discover# or application which allows us to use and manipulate the processes of life itself for an# number of ends. PostBmenopausal .omen can no. /ear children. 9n!ertile .omen and
men can /ecome parents. The genes !rom an animal can /e implanted into a vegeta/le. Sheep and other animals can /e cloned. *vidence o! criminality or innocence can /e discovered through -N8 testing. 6ith the 2uman 0enome ProCect 5 in competition .ith private companies 5 engaged in completing the map o! the human genome, .e are issued .ith e?traordinary promises in disease detection, prevention and eradication. 6e are also issued .ith .arnings concerning 7designer /a/ies,, the ne. eugenics, and the uses o! genetic in!ormation /y governments, private companies and

the manipulation of the ver# biological processes life are not limited to what has been called the %genetic age& made possible b# molecular biolog# and human genetics. There are advances in organ transplantation and in our medical capacities to sustain life. ll of these processes of the manipulation of life contain what we like to think of as %ethical& 1uestions. Notions o! 7/rain death, and the ensuing 7!utility, o! !urther attempts to restore normal li!e
employers. The possi/ilities !or !unctioning rede!ine pro/lems o! euthanasia. Parious !orms o! prenatal testing and screening o! pregnant .omen rede!ine the conditions o! accepta/ility o! a/ortions.

9ther such ethical 1uestions concern the harvesting of organs for transplantation, or of the maintenance of the integrit# and diversit# of biological species in the face of geneticall# modified crops and seeds, etc. The capacit# to manipulate our mere biological life, rather than simpl# to govern aspects of forms of life, implies a bio$politics that contests how and when we use these technologies and for what purposes. 9t also implies a redra.ing o! the relations /et.een li!e and
death, and a ne. thanatoBpolitics, a ne. politics o! death. 8t some distance !rom these advances in /iomedicine and /iotechnology are the issues o! li!e and death that are played in various arenas o! international politics and human rights. These concern the e!!ects o! the /rea1Bups o! nationBstates !rom Gugoslavia and the Soviet Union to 9ndonesia, the su/se uent movement, detention and mass death o! re!ugees and illegal immigrants, and the conditions and !orms under .hich military action, 7peace1eeping, and 7humanitarian intervention, are accepta/le. -etention camps are /ecoming a !eature o! modern li/eralBdemocratic states. On the one hand, the t.entieth century gave us a name !or the death o! a .hole people or 7race,, genocide. On the other, it sought to promote the universal rights o! individuals /y virtue o! their mere e?istence as human /eings. Eiopolitics and thanato$politics are played out in .ar, in torture, and in /iological, chemical and atomic .eapons o! mass destruction as much as in declarations o! human rights and United Nations, peace1eeping operations. The potentialities !or the care and the

manipulation of the biological processes of life and of the powers of death have never appeared greater
than they do today. Eut ho. do .e consider this pro/lem as a political pro/lemS 2o. are issues o! li!e and death related to our conceptions o! politics and to the .ay in .hich .e thin1 a/out states and societies, and their !uturesS 8re the ideas o! po.ers o! li!e and death peculiarly modern, or do they lie at a deeper strataS

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Ca*ita%is.

Turn $ 3esisting "apitalism alone is not enough. ,e must combine anti$ capitalist movements with ontolog# to overcome the violence of global capitalism. Noronen 'QQ
[@i11o, -ept. o! 0eography, U. o! Tur1u, Jinland, -.elling in the Sites o! Jinitude< Lesisting the Piolence o! the @etaphysical 0lo/e," 8ntipode, A&A(.)

lack of awareness about the grounding dimension of machination eventuall# leads to the uncritical oblivion of the fundamental condition of possibilit# constitutive for globalisation* the metaph#sical scaffolding of the calculative ordering of space that has reached a climax under the contemporar# rubric of planetar# economics. 8ccordingly, even though the contemporar# powers of capital have become far more capable and flexible at ordering and utilising the earth than !eidegger imagined in the late Q.S0s, these forces present onl# one of the manifestations grounded upon the omnipotent power of machination and its calculative orderings.' One o! the core arguments o! the paper is that due to this fundamental condition of machination we also need to sharpen our wa#s of criticising and resisting the totalitarian and violent tendencies of contemporar# capitalism. 3esistance of things such as the capitalist means of production or the globalisation of neoliberal ideologies is not radical enough+ we also need to enter into the resistance of the violence alread# promoted at the ontological level of calculative machination, the manipulative ordering and production of beings.
The present paper concentrates on sho.ing ho.

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Cede t"e ,o%itica%0,o%itica% ,rocesses

Turn $ Technological enframing is the root cause of militarism, geopolitics, economic exploitation, and ecological destruction. 5t locks us into discursive constraints which do not allow us to think in other wa#s. ,e must stop the technological mindset to stop the root of the impacts. :urke '0H [8nthony, Senior Lecturer in Politics and 9nternational Lelations at UNS6, Sydney. Ontologies o!
6ar< Piolence, *?istence and Leason, 4ohn 2op1ins University Press, ProCect @use)

5 have sought to extend b# anal#(ing the militaristic power of modern ontologies of political existence and securit# BB is a vie. that the challenge is posed not merel# b# a few varieties of weapon, government, technolog# or polic#, but b# an overarching s#stem of thinking and understanding that la#s claim to our entire space of truth and existence. @any o! the most destructive features of contemporar# modernit# BB militarism, repression, coercive diplomac#, covert intervention, geopolitics, economic exploitation and ecological destruction $$ derive not merel# from particular choices b# polic#makers /ased on their particular interests, but from calculative, 'empirical' discourses of scientific and political truth rooted in powerful enlightenment images of being . Con!ined .ithin such an epistemological and cultural universe, polic#makers' choices become necessities, their actions become inevitabilities, and humans suffer and die. Pie.ed in this light, 'rationalit#' is the name we give the chain of reasoning which builds one structure of truth on another until a course of action, however violent or dangerous, becomes preordained through that reasoning's ver# operation and existence. 5t creates /oth discursive constraints BB availa/le choices may simply not /e seen as credi/le or legitimate BB and material constraints that derive from the mutuall# reinforcing cascade of discourses and events which then preordain militarism and violence as necessar# polic# responses, ho.ever ine!!ective, dys!unctional or chaotic.
6hat 9 ta1e !rom 2eideggerFs argument BB one that

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Co..$nit(0E.*at"(
Turn $ 9nl# b# first accepting that ontological examination exists for the self can feelings of altruism and communit# grow. 0oting negative allows, through our alternative, this ontological examination ot emerge. Thiele '.; [Ph.-. !rom Princeton, pro!essor o! political science at the University o! Jlorida, has pu/lished /oo1s !rom
Princeton and O?!ord &Leslie Paul, Timely @editations< @artin 2eidegger and Postmodern Politics", Princeton University Press, Chapter t.o, pg 3$B 3>()

This is not to sa# that empath# is s#non#mous with :eing$with. Empath# is an emotional and ethical disposition. !eidegger calls it ontic, signif#ing that which does not directl# address the ontological fundamentals of human being but rather pertains to its concrete possibilities. EeingB.ith, on the other hand, is an ontological category. Nevertheless, empath#, as an ontic capacit#, is made possible onl# on the basis of the ontological structure o! EeingB.ith. Nust as solitude is a mode of :eing$with that is asocial, so empath# is a mode of :eing$with that is, as it .ere, h#persocia. To /e empathetic is to e?tend a sel! already em/edded in a
social .orld in such a .ay that emotional and ethical connections to others come to the !ore and achieve prominence.

Empath# reflects the emotional and ethical extension of a self be#ond the ontological sharing of worldl# life that defines human being. The stimulus for empath# ma# often be the desire to offset the egoistic or immoral dispositions fre1uentl# encountered in social life. 8s 2eidegger notes, H-asein, as EeingB inBthe.orld, already is .ith Others. 'Empath#' does not first constitute :eing$with+ onl# on the basis of :eing$with does 'empath#' become possible < it gets its motivation !rom the unsocia/ility o! the dominant modes o! EeingB.ithH &ET '=$(. Empath# and egoism, in other words, are two possible wa#s that human being ma# experience its :eing$with$others. The prominence of one or the other, historically or phenomenologically, constitutes neither a confirmation nor a refutation of the more fundamental nature of :eing$with, 2eidegger de!ines human /eingFs shared EeingBinBtheB.orld as
care &Sorge(. 2uman /eing cares to the e?tent that it concerns itsel! .ith its .orldly nature, This entails a concern !or its EeingB.ithBothers as .ell as a concern !or the meaning o! this ontological structure.H Ey care 2eidegger means the al.aysB alreadyBinterpretive comportment o! human /eing. 2uman /eings care /ecause they are involved .ith the .orld and its meanings, including the meaning o! their o.n .orldly e?istence. 2eidegger o!!ers this concise de!inition< HCare is the term !or the Eeing o! -asein pure and simple. 9t has the !ormal structure, a /eing !or .hich, intimately involved in its EeingBinB theB.orld, this very Eeing is at issueH &2CT $:>(. To have oneFs Eeing as an issue is constantly to /e involved .ith the meaning o! oneFs Eeing. 8s such, human /eing can /e said to live H!or the sa1e o! its o.n sel! ... so !ar as it is, it is occupied .ith its o.n capacity to /eH &EP 'DA(. Eut /eing occupied .ith oneFs o.n capacity to /e, li1e /eing sel!B interpreting, is not the same as /eing sel!Ba/sor/ed. Lather, to care is to /e concerned .ith the meaning o! onesel! in the .orld. The !ocus o! human /eingFs sel!Binterpretation and sel!Barticulation is not a detached sel!, /ut a situated one. To /e !or the sa1e o! the sel! is to care a/out .orldly e?istence as a .hole. 2eidegger states that care is the Hprimary totality o! the constitution o! -asein, .hich as this totality al.ays adopts this or that particular .ay o! its canB/eH &2CT %A=(. The particular HcanB/eH o! an individual -asein re!ers to its ontic possi/ilities, .hich, though al.ays !ounded on the ontological structure o! care, remain distinct !rom it. Thus 2eidegger attempts to distinguish /et.een ontological descriptions and

2:eing towards oneself constitutes the :eing of >asein and is not something like an additional capacit# to observe oneself over and above 'ust existing. Existing is precisel# this being towards oneself,2 2eidegger .rites. 29nl# because >asein, constituted b# for$the sake$of, exists in
ethical dictates.

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selfhood, only !or this reason is an#thing like human communit# possible. These are primar# existential$ontological statements of essence, and not ethical claims a/out the relative hierarchy o! egoism and altruismH &@JL ':A(. :eing for the sake of the self, then, is the onl# possible foundation out of which an#thing like ethical obligation within human communit# might grow. 2uman /eing al.ays already
e?ists as an em/odied, social, .orldly relation, and this ontological description is neither more nor less valid simply /ecause particular human /eings deny or o/scure their social and .orldly nature or repudiate its practical e?tension to an

To be altruistic is to choose to channel one's thoughts, feelings, and actions into one's capacities for empath#. To be egoistic means to redirect this energ# elsewhere. Eeither activit# changes the fundamental structure of human being as care, a :eing$in$the$world$ with$others fundamentall# concerned with the meaning of its :eing.
e?plicitly moral realm.

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5e.ocrac(
Turn $ 9nl# b# challenging the tenants and practices of democrac# can one achieve true democrac#. The alternative allows people to see their relationship with the world and allow for the people to maintain being @peopleA. -i(ek %0I GLady 1illing suave machine &9n de!ense o! lost causes" p.'A$B'A> (QQCollinQQ4LC)
2o.ever, Ero.n ta1es here a crucial step !urther and pushes all the parado?es o! democracy to the end, more radically than Chantal @ou!!e did .ith her Hdemocratic parado?.H 8lready .ith Spino+a and Toc ueville, it /ecame clear that

democrac# is in itself inchoate empty, lac1ing a !irm principle Bit needs anti$ democratic content to fill in its form M as such, it really is constitutively H!ormal.H This anti$ democratic content is provided b# philosoph# , ideology, theory B no .onder that most o! the
great philosophers, !rom Plato to 2eidegger, .ere mistrust!ul o! democracy, i! not directly antiBdemocratic< 6hat i!

democratic politics, the most untheoretical o! all political !orms, parado?ically re1uires theor#, re1uires an antithesis to itself in both the form and substance of theor# , if it is to satisf# its ambition to produce a free and egalitarian orderB Ero.n deploys all the parado?es !rom this !act that H democrac# re1uires for its health a nondemocratic elementH< a democrac# needs a permanent influx of anti$ democratic self$1uestioning in order to remain a Civing democrac#$the cure for democrac#'s ills is homoeopathic in form < 9!, as the musings o! Spino+a and
Toc ueville suggest, democracies tend to.ards cathe?is onto principles antithetical to democracy, then critical scrutiny o! these principles and o! the political !ormations animated /y them is crucial to the proCect o! re!ounding or recovering -emocracy Ero.n de!ines the tension /et.een politics and theory as the tension /et.een the political necessity to !i? meaning, to HsutureH te?tual dri!t in a !ormal principle .hich can only guide us in action, and theoryFs permanent HdeconstructionH .hich cannot ever /e recuperated in a ne. positive program< 8mong human practices,

politics is peculiarl# untheoretical because the bids for power that constitute it are necessaril# at odds with the theoretical pro'ect of opening up meaning , o! Hma1ing meaning slide,H in Stuart 2allFs .ords. >iscursive power functions b# concealing the terms of its fabrication and hence its malleabilit# and contingenc#+ discourse fixes meaning b# naturali(ing it, or else ceases to have swa# in a discourse. This fixing or naturali(ing of meanings is the necessar# idiom in which politics takes place. Even the politics of deconstructive displacement implicates such normativit#. at least provisionall#. Theoretical anal#ses which unearth the contingent and inconsistent nature and lack of ultimate foundation of all normative constructs and political pro'ects, 2are anti$political endeavors insofar as each destabili(es meaning without proposing alternative codes or institutions.
Get each may also /e essential in sustaining an e?isting democratic regime /y reCuvenating it.,,'% 9t is thus as i! Ero.n is proposing a 1ind o! Kantian Hcriti ue o! deconstructive &antiBdemocratic( reason,H distinguishing /et.een its legitimate and illegitimate use< it is legitimate to use it as a negatively regulative corrective, a provocation, and so on, /ut it is illegitimate

:rown discerns the same ambiguous link in the relationship between state and people* in the same wa# that democrac# needs anti$democrac# to re'uvenate itself, the state needs the people's resistance to re'uvenate
to use it as a constitutive principle to /e directly applied to reality as a political program or proCect.

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itself* 9nl# through the state are the people constituted as a people+ onl# in resistance to the state do the people remain a people. Thus, 'ust as democrac# re1uires antidemocratic criti1ue in order to remain democratic, so too the democratic state ma# re1uire democratic resistance rather than fealt# if it is not to become the death of democrac#. Similarly, democracy may re uire theoryFs provision o! unliva/le criti ues and unreacha/le ideals.

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5istance 6ro. t"e 4t"er

Turn $ n authentic relationship with the other is not based onl# of nearness, but distance. The Qac dream of encountering new worlds is an act of ontological coloni(ation<an ethical relationship can onl# begin in that gap between m#self and the other. n# other relation will onl# produce a non$being. Puenther '07
[Lisa, 8ssistant Pro!essor o! Philosophy V Pandy, To.ards a Phenomenology o! -.elling" Canadian 4ournal o! *nvironmental *ducation, D&$(, Spring)

The dwelling of human beings<our essential character, our ever#da# habits, and the ver# root of our ethics< exists not onl# in the nearness of, but at a distance from, an other that both surpasses me and makes me what 5 am. 6e can thin1 o! this other as a spirit or intermediary, or as the human communityM /ut we can also think of the other as the entire human and more$than$human world < the plants, animals, elements, and people .ith .hom .e inha/it the earth. n ethics of dwelling emerges from the preservation of a tension between this nearness to others, and the distance which keeps us distinct from others. The gap between m#self and the other is the space which makes ethical dwelling possible+ in keeping us apart, it also preserves the difference which makes an ethical relation possible. Jor this is the parado? articulated /y !ragment '':< that 9 am only mysel! in
*thos anthropoi daimon. 9n light o! 2eidegger,s translation, 9 propose that .e interpret these .ords as !ollo.s< /eing divided, that 9 can only /ecome mysel! /y ris1ing my identity in pro?imity to others. 9n e!!ect, the /oundary that separates me !rom a /lade o! grass, or !rom the moose across the river, is precisely that .hich grants me the possi/ility o!

9ften we are tempted b# the romantic idea of @fusing consciousnessA with the natural world, den#ing that there is a difference which keeps us apart from others and, precisel# in keeping us apart, also directs us towards them . Eut the very possi/ility o! an
approaching, addressing, and giving to these others. environmental ethics o! d.elling rests upon the t.o!old nearness and distinction !rom others .hom .e need and !or .hom .e are responsi/le. 9n the pages that !ollo., 9 .ill re!lect more concretely on this relation /et.een nearness and distance, or relation and otherness, .hich emerges !rom my reBtranslation o! 2eidegger,s translation o! ethos anthropoi daimon. 9 shall argue that

an ethical relation with the natural world is onl# possible given the gap of difference or otherness which is maintained b# setting a boundar# or limit to our dwelling$space. This boundar#, far from alienating us from the natural environment, actuall# forms the basis for an environmental ethics of dwelling. Consider also an apartment in the city. Cities are more li1e
/eehives. 6hen 9 loo1 out a city .indo. &turning a.ay !rom the television, opening the curtains and /linds, and peering out over the /ac1 o! the couch(, 9 see houses Cust li1e my o.n, arranged into ro.s li1e cells in a honeycom/. They are inha/ited /y people more or less li1e me< people .ho .or1, come home, ma1e spaghetti !or dinner, !all asleep during the ne.s. 8nd yet 9 can .al1 through this city and see things that surprise me< a man .ith green hospital pants tied around his head, calmly .al1ing his dog. 8 cat stal1ing a /ird. Jire.eed pushing through a crac1 in the side.al1. Jor cities lea1 too, even in spite o! themselves. The air conditioning may /e on, the stereo may /e /laringM /ut a storm outside can 1noc1 this out in less than a minute. Thus cities tend to sho. themselves most clearly Cust there, .here they !ail< a ro/in,s nest in the mail/o?M a lea1ing tapM the sound o! an argument ne?t door. 9n these moments o! disruption .e reali+e .hat the city tries most to conceal< that .e d.ell in relation to others, and that .e can only /e there i! others are there, too. 6hile the ca/in and the apartment are undou/tedly very di!!erent sorts o! d.ellingBspace, /oth o!!er a glimpse into the ethical

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signi!icance o! d.elling. 6hile there is much to say here, 9 .ant to !ocus on one aspect in particular< the relation /et.een inside and outside in a home. The inside o! a place can e?ist only than1s to the /oundary &the .alls, !loor, and roo!( .hich separates it !rom the outside. 6ithout this sense o! a place hollo.ed out !rom the .orld at large, there could /e no d.elling, no intimacy, no home in .hich 9 .elcome !riends and strangers. The /oundary that separates inside !rom outside need not /e visi/le or materialM !or even among people .ho d.ell under the open s1y, there is the sense o! a socially interior space, a space .hich is descri/ed more /y trails and hunting grounds than /y .alls and !loor/oards. -.elling re uires a sense o! the inside< an intimate space .here 9 /elong .ith others .ho do not, properly spea1ing, /elong to me. 9! the /oundary .hich creates this interior space .ere a/solute and impermea/le, then li!e .ithin its /ounds .ould /e

dwelling occurs neither inside nor outside but in the tension between the two* in the interaction of spaces which have something to give one another precisel# because the# are not the same. The dwelling of human beings, the root of our ethics and the ver# character of our existence, occurs in the nearness of, but distinction from, an other, an outside, a complex of human and more$than$human beings who both transcend me, and let me become who 5 am. Though our contemporary cities have largely neglected this tension /et.een inside and outside, ancient Preek cities were founded upon the principle of a boundar# or cit# wall, which both sets limits on the cit#&s proper sphere, and establishes a connection between the human communit# and the cosmos in which it dwells. 9n his /oo1, 2$O and the 6aters o! Jorget!ulness, 9van 9llich &':;3( descri/es the .ay
impossi/le. 6e need .indo.s and doorsM .e need .ood !or the stove and air to /reathe. Thus 0ree1 cities .ere ritually traced out upon the earth in relation to heavenly /odies, the !light o! /irds, or the movement o! clouds. Jor the 0ree1s, a city could only /e !ounded in relation to that .hich e?ceeds it, that .hich is not the city /ut nevertheless is the condition !or its very e?istence. 8n ethos o! ritual and custom inaugurated the city once a site >$ Lisa 0uenther had /een divinedM a team o! one !emale and one male o? pulled a plough around the cosmic shape o! the city, the driver li!ting the plough at intervals to ma1e thresholds or city gates, places .here the interior .ould meet and interact .ith the e?ternal .orld. 9llich &':;3( calls this ritual o! inauguration a sacred marriage o! heaven and earth" &p. '3(, an opposition and .edding o! right and le!t," inside and outside, animal and human &p. '>(. 6ithout this colla/oration o! moreBthanBhuman othersOthe stars, the clouds, the o?en, the /irds, and the ground into .hich the template is etchedO the human city could not come into /eing. 8nd yet this relation /et.een the city and the moreBthancity only comes into vie. .hen the cityBspace is mar1ed o!! !rom that .hich e?ceeds it and !rom .hich it emerges .

The Preeks, we might sa#, had an ethos of cit#$dwelling* an understanding that human beings need to dwell with one another, but that we can onl# do so b# dwelling within the limits of a boundar# which both separates us from and aligns us with an exterior which is other$than$human and more$ thanhuman. One could argue, o! course, that the 0ree1s /uilt .alls around their cities not /ecause o! their deep
sensitivity to the nature o! ethical d.elling, /ut rather to protect themselves !rom armies and /ar/arians" and /easts !rom the .ild. Jor it is also trueOand especially true in the history o! the 6estOthat /oundaries have /een erected in the spirit o! e?clusion and sel!Bprotection rather than in pursuit o! harmonious d.elling. Thus .e must turn to the past not in order to repeat its mista1es, /ut rather to learn ho. not to repeat themM .e need the retrospective ga+e o! history not only to !ind inspiration !or the !uture !rom the past, /ut also to mar1 the line .hich separates past !rom !uture, and opens a di!!erent hori+on. The 0ree1s may not have conceived the city .all as a /oundary .hich separates and connects humanity .ith the moreBthanBhuman .orldM and 2eraclitus may not have understood his .ords as the startingBpoint !or environmental ethics. 8nd yet, .hen .e remem/er these ancient .ords and customs, .e are given the responsi/ility to hear /oth .hat has /een said in the past, and ho. this saying resonates !or the !uture. Jor 2eidegger, to remem/er is not to ma1e the past present" through reBpresentation, /ut rather to preserve !rom the past a meaning .hich e?ists ecstatically in relation to the !uture. Ey letting an ethical sense o! the /oundary address the traditional history o! the /oundary as an instrument o! e?ploitation and sel!Bassertion, .e open up the possi/ility o! ne. meanings !or old .ords. 6e need to remem/er the history o! 6estern culture in this .ay in order to understand .hy our o.n cities are the .ay

,e cannot change the wa# we dwell simpl# b# wiping the slate clean and starting over+ an# change in habits must arise first from an examination of our current habits and the conditions under which the# were formed. Jor 9van 9llich &':;3(, To d.ell means to inha/it the traces le!t /y one,s o.n
they are, and ho. they could /e other.ise.

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living, /y .hich one al.ays retraces the lives o! one,s ancestors" &p. ;(. 6hat does this sense o! d.elling mean !or the !uture o! our citiesS -rive into Pancouver or Toronto To.ards a Phenomenology o! -.elling >% O!or one cannot help /ut

This is no longer dwelling space, but rather .hat 9llich calls garages for living,A storage$ space for human enterprise. Eow, more than ever, we need to recuperate a sense of dwelling within limits* not in order to protect ourselves from the wilderness &as perhaps the ancient 0ree1s .ere concerned to do ( but rather to protect the wilderness from ourselves. ,e must do this not onl# because our ph#sical existence depends upon it, but also because without this relation to, and distinction from, others we cannot become who we are* namel#, human beings whose character is our ethos . 8nd yet .e cannot stop here. Jor ultimately, and more essentially, we must set a limit to human dwelling not for our own sake, but for the sake of the other, making room for an other not out of enlightened self$interest, but out of respect and hospitalit# . 9 propose, arising
drive thereOand .itness the hundreds o! 1ilometres o! occupied space spra.ling out o! our megaBcities. !rom this /rie! e?ploration o! d.elling as thought and as e?perience, an environmental ethics grounded in these gestures o! respect and hospitality. To respect someone is to hold her in regard .hile still letting her remain at a distance !rom me,

3espect thrives onl# where this distance and difference is maintained in the ver# midst of m# regard and concern for the other. Cikewise to offer hospitalit#Oa notion .hich 9 have inherited !rom the Jrench philosopher *mmanuel Levinas &':=:(Ois to open one&s dwelling space to an other, a stranger whom 5 cannot grasp or comprehend but for whom 5 am nevertheless responsible. To be hospitable is, like the gift of respect, to take a step back so that the other can step forth+ it is to set limits on m# own dwelling so that the other has room to come and go . The genius o! human /eing is not only that .e can /e ourselves" only in relation to an other .hich /oth surpasses and constitutes us. Lather, the genius of the human character, and the root of our ethics, is in our propensit# to give space, or make room for, an other who exceeds our grasp. 8n ethics o! respect and hospitality has political, social, and intellectual implications. 9n concrete terms, it
giving her room to move. means that .e ought to set aside .ilderness spaces that have no human !unction, not even the relatively /enign !unction o! providing recreation !or people li1e you and me. 9t means that .e ought to rethin1 our cities in terms o! density rather than spra.l, and to preserve .ithin them spaces o! otherness and ecological diversity< par1land spaces .ithout mo.ed la.ns and /ar/e ue pits. 8nd it means that in our everyday lives, as .ell as in our municipal and territorial planning, .e must cultivate ha/its o! respect !or those .ith .hom .e d.ell, and .ithout .hom .e could not e?ist .

n ethics of dwelling based on hospitalit# and respect demands that we resist the temptation to believe, even in a spirit of generosit#, that we are the same as the other, that there is no difference between a person and a tree and a l#nx across the river. Jor although .e are /y no means indi!!erent to these others, it is precisely our di!!erence !rom them, our not knowing who the# are from the inside out, that lets us be ethical towards them. The 9talian philosopher 0iorgio 8gam/en &'::'( ends his /oo1, Language
and -eath, .ith the !ollo.ing .ords, and this is .here 9, too, .ill conclude these re!lections upon the ethos o! d.elling< 6e .al1 through the .oods< suddenly .e hear the !lapping o! .ings or the .ind in the grass. 8 pheasant li!ts o!! and then disappears instantly among the trees, a porcupine /uries in the thic1 under/rush, the dry leaves crac1le as a sna1e slithers a.ay. Not the encounter, /ut this !light o! invisi/le animals is thought. No, it .as not our voice. 6e came as close as possi/le to language, .e almost /rushed against it, held it in suspense< /ut .e never reached our encounter and no. .e turn /ac1, untrou/led, to.ard home. So, language is our voice, our language. 8s you no. spea1, that is ethics. &p. 'A;(

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:reedo. 81029
Turn $ )reedom demands a openness to being and a letting$be. The alternative trul# creates freedom. Thiele '.;
[Pro!essor o! Political Science at University o! Jlorida &Leslie Paul, Timely @editations, p.D3()

!eidegger remarks that freedom demands pantheism &ST ;3(. That is, freedom demands openness to the impenetrable immanence of :eing in beings. 5t also demands what !eidegger calls 2releasement toward things2 &0elassenheit +u den -ingen(. 2eidegger /orro.s the term 0elassenheit !rom @eister *c1hardt. 5t literall# means a letting$be. The dispositions that best prepare human being for the visitations of freedom , then, are an ontological openness to no$thingness &Eeing( combined with a receptive releasement toward things
Summing up SchellingFs thesis, &/eings(. 2uman !reedom !or 2eidegger, particularly a!ter his HturningH o! the midB':%As, is !undamentally and !oremost an openness and lettingB/e.

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:reedo. 82029
The alternative's ke# to releasement and openness to being allowing for freedom6 Thiele '.; [Pro!essor o! Political Science at University o! Jlorida &Leslie Paul, Timely @editations, p.:>() >isclosive freedom is facilitated b# releasement toward things and openness to the m#ster# of :eing. Eut this is not to say that !reedom is achieved .ithout e!!ort and enCoyed in passivity. 2eidegger insists that 2releasement toward things and openness to the m#ster# never happen of themselves. The# do not befall us accidentall#. :oth flourish onl# through persistent, courageous thinking2 &-T 3=(. 8ersistent, courageous thinking provides the foundation on which disclosive freedom gains its foothold in the world. 9ndeed, there is a uni ue and original
!reedom to /e practiced in thought itsel!.

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2enera%07ars
Turn $ 5nvestigating 5nner Space allows us to cognitivel# meditate on the meaning of G5nsert hereTJ =ars and its position in our ontolog#. 5t not onl# allows us to know it, but also to bridge the distance cognitivel# and lets us know G5nsert hereTJ =ars better than ph#sical means. Nerkins '0.
[4ae, Pro!essor at Jlorida State University, 2eidegger,s Eridge< the Social and Phenomenological Construction o! @ars," Jlorida Philosophical Levie., :&$(.) Using the dou/leBentendre e?ample o! a /ridge, @artin 2eidegger e?amines the pro?imity o! phenomenological distance.

!eidegger implores his reader to think of @the old bridgeA in distant 2eidel/erg, though for our purposes the place to consider could ver# well be =ars.%: 2eidegger instructs, This thinking toward that location is not a mere experience inside the person&s present here+ rather, it belongs to the nature of our thinking of that bridge that in itself thinking gets through, persists through, the distance to that location .">A )rom where we are, we are also at that bridge in 2eidel/ergOor on =ars !or that matter. 2eidegger in!orms us, we are b# no means at some representational content in our consciousness. )rom right here we ma# even be much nearer to that [/ridge, city, or planetTMthan someone who uses it dail# as an indifferent river crossing.A >' ,hen we pause to consider criticall# a place of great ph#sical distance, we can become conscious of it in a far more powerful wa# than someone near it who casuall# takes for granted the existence of that place . This notion onl# further legitimi(es the relevance of our phenomenological knowledge of =ars. ,e not onl# construct =ars sociall# and phenomenologicall#, we ma# even bridge the ver# distance cognitivel# .

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Hege.on(
Turn $ The aff&s world$ordering engages in a t#pe of thinking that reduces all life on earth to a tool to be instrumentali(ed, further disconnecting ourselves from what it means to be. Swa(o '07
[Pro!essor o! Philosophy at the University o! 8las1a &Norman K., Crisis Theory and 6orld Order< 2eideggerian Le!lections, p. ''AB'') The inevita/ility o! such a !ight issues !rom the pathology o! nihilismO all political thought and practice in our time cannot

The attraction to 2rational design2 of the world order is toda# motivated b# a Sense of imminent catastrophe and, thus, b# the human impulse to self preservation. 2ere, ho.ever, it is li!e itsel! that compelsM and precisely in this attraction to rational design o! the world order is there /etrayed .hat Niet+sche recogni+es in 6estern moralism< 9t is pathologicall# conditioned. 8nd .hat is this pathologyS 5t is nothing other than the strife of sub'ective egoisms as #et unmastered. Such is the essence o! po.erBpolitics. Eut this, presuma/ly, is li!e &.ill to po.er(M and, as Niet+sche puts it, H life itself forces us to posit values+ life itself values through us when we posit values H &T.ilight o! the 9dols, H@orality as 8ntiBNature,H note 3(. 9n .orld order thin1ing, 9 su/mit, the ,est discharges the energ# of its moral essence, doing so as author of the prevailing moralit# and as the locus of the dominant sub'ective egoisms which have been inevitabl# diffused to determine all political cultures, the latter of which are now bound to the ,est's hegemon# over world political culture . The contemporar# world order in structure and value orientation is instituted on the basis of ,estern reaso n, and as such it is characteri+ed /y an Horder o! ran1H in .hich
/ut /e Hpathologically conditionedH &T.ilight o! the 9dols, HThe Pro/lem o! Socrates,H note 'A(. *uropean values have primacy, i.e., are hegemonous visBaBvis all HotherH &8sian, 8!rican, Latin 8merican, etc.( plausi/ly autochthonous valuations.

,orld order thinking, thus, compelled /y li!e itsel! in all its prevalent pathology, posits its values$peace, 'ustice, economic well$being, ecological balance$ over against all that shows itself as the contemporar# patholog# of 2pett# politics2 and all that is countervaluation in the strife motivated b# the re1uirements of global hegemon#. 5n this positing of primac# to the ,estern valuation, the 9ccident reveals its near exhaustion , i! not its desperation, in the face of competing modes of sub'ectivit# as manifest b# a fragmented and antagonistic 2s#stem2 of nation$states, each with its 2splinter$will.2 0iven that this .orld order movement is transnational, the 6est coBopting sympathetic !orces in the developing .orld, t.it her this e?haustion nor this desperation is restricted to the 6est< The 2crisis2 is effectivel# planetar#. Niet+sche .as not amiss in his articulation o! the great tas1 that .ould de!ine the
t.entieth century, i.e., the pro/lem o! glo/al governance. Neither .as he amiss in appreciating its hesitant approach, despite its ine?ora/ility. That is, Niet+sche recogni+es the persistent, though declining, in!luence o! the Christian ideal .ith respect to the pro/lem o! glo/al governance, anticipating that this ideal .ould yet issue in the call !or a moral .orld order< Not.ithstanding the death o! 0od, Christian value Cudgments .ould /e transmuted into the political domain. The t.entieth centuryFs emerging order .ould /e a Hhy/ridH o! sic1ness, the .ill to po.er heightening the demands o! modern manFs sel!Bdetermination, the Christian conscience yet restrainingBin short, a H!etteredH moment in humanityFs movement to.ard total sel!Ba!!irmation, total sovereignty in the a/sence o! 0od and transcendent norms. HThey are rid o! the Christian 0od,H .rites Niet+sche in his T.ilight o! the 9dols &HS1irmishes o! an Untimely @an,H note 3(, yet Hno. /elieve 8l the more !irmly

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that they must cling to Christian morality.H 9t is not yet reali+ed, o/serves Niet+sche, that H.hen one gives up the Christian !aith, one pulls the right to Christian morality out !rom under oneFs !eet.H 8ccordingly, the contemporary .orld order movement e?presses a commitment to trans!orming the philosophic orientation &values( as .ell as trans!orming institutional structures and patterns o! /ehavior. 6orld order thin1ing is, thus, normative.

That world order thinking is value thinking is evidence of its essential debt to the Eiet(schean metaph#sic, to thinking the world order from the vantage of sub'ectness, for it is onl# with Eiet(sche that value thinking comes to predominate in the twentieth centur#. HF 8s 2eidegger puts it, HPalues stem !rom valuationM valuation corresponds to the .ill to po.er.H That is, insofar as the creation of secureness is grounded in value$positing and world order thinkers on their own essential authorit# &understood metaphysically, not personally( seek to secure a world order, then world order thinking cannot but be so grounded. 5t is precisel# this ground, i.e., a self$grounded value$posit, that entails the technocratic conception of world order and, thus, eliminates a meaningful distinction between the normative and technocratic approaches. 2o. soS 2eidegger ans.ers in .ords that indict all value thin1ing< 2thinking in terms of values is a radical killing. 5t ... strikes down that which is as such, in its being$in itself. . . .2 Ever#thing which is 2is transformed into ob'ect2 and 2swallowed up into the immanence of sub'ectivit#. HHF Commensurate .ith this
su/Cectivity is that o/Cectivity .hich, in the essence o! the technological, is total, and .hich !inds its instrument in technocracy.

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Ni"i%is.

Turn $ The alternative commits to ontological reflection, which is critical for overcoming Eihilism. >re#fus '06 [2u/ert. Pro!essor o! Philosophy at the University o! Cali!ornia, Eer1ley, 2eidegger on the Connection
/et.een Nihlism, 8rt, Technology, and Politics", http<QQsocrates./er1eley.eduQWhdrey!usQpd!Q2dgerOn8rtTechPoli.pd!) 9n his lectures on Niet+sche in ':%= 2eidegger uotes .ith approval Niet+scheFs Kier1egaardian condemnation o! the present age< 8round the year ';;$ [Niet+sche) says regarding his times, HOur age is an agitate one, and precisely !or that reason, not an age o! passionM it heats itsel! up continuously, /ecause it !eels that it is not .arm BB /asically it is !ree+ing.... 9n our time it is merely /y means o! an echo that events ac uire their fgreatnessF BB the echo o! the

!eidegger agrees with Eiet(sche that 2There is no longer an# goal in and through which all the forces of the historical existence of peoples can cohere and in the direction of which the# can develop2. > Eihilism is Eiet(sche's name for this loss of meaning or direction. Eoth Kier1egaard and Niet+sche agree that i! nihilism .ere complete, there .ould /e no signi!icant private
ne.spapersH &[99, %>%B%>>(. % or pu/lic issues. Nothing .ould have authority !or us, .ould ma1e a claim on us, .ould demand a commitment !rom us. 9n a nonBnihilistic age there is something at sta1eM there are uestions that all can agree are important, even i! they violently disagree as to .hat the ans.ers to these uestions are. Eut

in our age, ever#thing is in the

process of becoming e1ual. There is less and less di!!erence /et.een political parties, /et.een religious communities, /et.een social causes, /et.een cultural practices BB everything is on a par, all meaningful differences are being levelled. Fierkegaard thought that the answer to nihilism was to make one's own individual absolute commitment . 5f #ou can commit #ourself unconditionally BB in love !or instance BB then that becomes a focus for #our whole sense of realit#. Things stand out or recede into insignificance on the basis of that ultimate concern . One doesnot discover a signi!icance
that is already there. There is no /asis !or this commitment in the cosmos. 9ndeed, such a commitment is e?actly the opposite o! /elie! in an o/Cective truth.

Oou are called b# some concrete concern $$ either a person or a cause $$ and when #ou define #ourself b# #our dedication to that concern, #our world ac1uires seriousness, and significance . The only .ay
to have a meaning!ul li!e in the present age, then, is to let your involvement /ecome de!initive o! reality !or you, and .hat is de!initive o! reality !or you is not something that is in any .ay provisional BB although it certainly is vulnera/le. That is .hy,

once a societ# like ours becomes rational and reflective, such total commitments begin to look like a kind of dangerous dependenc#. The committed individual is identified as a workaholic or a woman who loves too much. This suggests that to /e recogni+ed and appreciated individual commitment re uires a shared understanding o! .hat is .orth pursuing. :ut as our culture comes more and more to celebrate critical detachment, self$sufficienc#, and rational choice, there are fewer and fewer shared commitments. So, commitment itself beings to look like cra(iness. Thus !eidegger comes to see the recent undermining of commitment as due not so much to a failure on the part of the individual, as to a lack of an#thing in the modern world that could solicit commitment from us and sustain us in it. The things that once evo1ed commitment BBgods, heroes, the 0odBman, the acts o! greatstatesmen, the .ords o! great thin1ers BB have lost their authority. s a

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result, individuals feel isolated and alienated. The# feel that their lives have no meaning because the public world contains no guidelines. ,hen ever#thing that is material and social has become completel# flat and drab, people retreat into their private experiences as the onl# remaining place to find significance. 2eidegger sees this move to private e?perience as characteristic o! the modern
age. 8rt, religion, se?, education all /ecomes varieties o! e?periences. 6hen all our concerns have /een reduced to the common denominator o! He?perienceH .e .ill have reached the last stage o! nihilism. One then sees Hthe plunge into !ren+y and the disintegration into sheer !eeling as redemptive. The flived e?perienceF as such /ecomes decisive.H

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N$c%ear <ar
Turn $ The forgetting of being makes all acts of destruction not events in and of themselves but rather merel# signs of a new age defined b# technological comportment<an unworld that 'ustifies nuclear annihilation. =ilchman and 3osenberg '.6
[8lan, 8lan. Pro!essor o! Political Science at Rueens College and 8ssistant Pro!essor o! Philosophy at Rueens College. 2eidegger, Planetary Technics, 2olocaust." 5 rtin 0eidegger nd the 0oloc ust. *d. @ilchman and Losen/erg. '::=. pp. $$3B$$=)

The !olocaust can provide insight into the meaning of the danger that threatens the ,est. ,e are not suggesting that the !olocaust constitutes that danger, but rather that it is a sign of that danger. )or !eidegger the danger was that, as a result of the reduction of nature and humans to standing reserve, the oneness o! the !our!old .ould /e de!initively shattered and modern man would cease to be a mortal and would henceforth perish but not die . Jor 2eidegger, such a condition would be marked not simpl# b# the forgetting of :eing, but<far worse<b# a forgetting of the forgetting of :eing+ the essential distress of modernit# would be immeasurabl# heightened b# the inabilit# of humans to an# longer @feelA that distress. 5n place of a world, humankind would inhabit an un$world &Un.elt(. 6hile 2eidegger is elo uent
concerning the danger in his later .ritings, the !ashion in .hich man,s !actical e?istence .ould /e actually trans!ormed /y the gro.ing specter o! an unB.orld, the stages /y .hich such an Un.elt .ould emerge, as the danger loomed, .as never

the @realA danger, was less the atomic bomb than the technological understanding of :eing that tendentiall# reduced all beings to standing reserve, has concluded that the unB.orld that 2eidegger sa. emerging might /e a per!ectly ordered society
clearly spelled out. 2u/ert -rey!us, /asing himsel! on 2eidegger,s o.n insistence that .hat threatened man, dedicated to the .el!are o! all.">' This vie., that the Un.elt might /e a smoothly !unctioning, consumerist society, though one in .hich man no longer !elt distress and no longer mani!ested a concern !or Eeing, a society in .hich there .ould uestiona/le to us. 5f !eidegger was that what threatens man was not the atomic bomb Pe$Stell, it was not to den# the threat posed b# the make clear that the bomb was the culmination of a with the technological understanding of :eing . 8s 2eidegger asserts in The Thing"< =an stares at what the explosion of the atom bomb could bring with it. !e does not see that the atom bomb and its explosion are the mere final emission of what has long since taken place, has alread# happened.">$ 2eidegger does not deny the threat posed /y the /om/, or the train o! destruction that seem to /e no place !or 8usch.it+ and its deathB.orld, seems

determined to show but the reign of das bomb, but rather to process that began

.ould characteri+e such an unB.orld, so much as insist on its source, and identi!y .hat he sees as its 0rund. @oreover, .hat is implied in -rey!us,s position is that the smoothly !unctioning society and the deathB.orld are mutually e?clusive, that the manBmade mass death sym/oli+ed /y 8usch.it+ cannot /e !actored into the unB.orld. Eut .hy is the e?termination o! those designated as the Other, those .ho are the em/odiment o! alterity, incompati/le .ith this image o! a per!ectly ordered society"S 9t seems to us that the horror o! the deathB.orld can all too easily /e routini+ed and normalili+ed in an Un.elt, .here humans have /een turned into standing reserve. Jinally, the image o! the unB.orld as a site .here everyone might simply /ecome healthy and happy," even as they !orget their !orgetting o! Eeing,>% overloo1s 2eidegger,s insistence, in his Overcoming @etaphysics," that< The

%world wars& and their

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character of %totalit#& are alread# a conse1uence of the abandonment of :eing.">> 5t is precisel# this character of the ?nwelt as a site of miser# and devastation which seems to stamp !eidegger&s thinking. Thus , in his 2eraclitus lecture course o! ':>%, !eidegger raises the 1uestion of the @progressA to which humankind can look forward under the reign of planetar# technics* @)orwardB ,here to, pleaseB To the shattered cities on the 3hine and the 3uhrS">3 This imagery o! /ro1en cities and people seems to us to /etter accord .ith 2eidegger,s vision o! the unB.orld than that o! a consumer society. Thus, .e /elieve that uschwit( constitutes a grim sign of what it would mean for the oneness of das Peviert to be shattered, for the dwelling &6ohnung( of mortals to be destro#ed, and of 'ust how close that threat is. 8t 8usch.it+ the 2eideggerian imagery /ecame real< Eehind its /ar/ed .ire .e can see, in all its horror,
.hat in 2eideggerian terms might constitute the end o! the .orld. The 2olocaust there/y provides an indication o! .hat an Un.elt .ould loo1 li1e. The lin1age o! the 2olocaust to the image o! the unB.orld ma1es it possi/le to /ring out .hat is latent in the 2eideggerian te?t.

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4'erco.ing H$.an 2rowt"
Turn $ The idea of overcoming limits and growth is precisel# the problem that turns the case6 Thiele '.; [Pro!essor o! Political Science at University o! Jlorida &Leslie Paul, Timely @editations, p.':'() in postmodern times largel# as a result of the increasingl# apparent limits to human growth. The more these limits are ignored B or .orse, viewed as obstacles to be overcome $ the graver the crisis becomes. 2eidegger develops a philosophy o! limits. @ore to the point, !eidegger describes our freedom as dependent on rather than curtailed b# our worldl# boundaries. 9nce the boundaries of human being are experienced neither as a threat to human freedom nor as an affront to human dignit#, the tragic attempt to con1uer the earth might be abated and the opportunit# for its caretaking approached.
*cological concerns have erupted

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1erroris.
Turn $ Terrorism the result of technological domination of the world 4 it is an attempt to break free from the standing reserve. =itchell '0;
[8ndre. 4. @itchell, PostB-octoral Jello. in the 2umanities at Stan!ord University, H2eidegger and Terrorism,H Lesearch in Phenomenology, Polume %3, Num/er ', $AA3 , pp. ';'B$';)

Terror ta1es a situation that loo1s hopelessly doomed and !inds the essential .ithin it, /ut terror contains its o.n demise, too. ,e flee from it. ,e respond to it with a hardening of our own wa#s+ we reaffirm the identit# of being instead of opening ourselves to others. The merican response to terror has been one of mericanism, there can /e no dou/t a/out that. Terror ends in this, and there is no commemoration, Cust a
Nothing sta/le, this Cuncture in /eing itsel! must /e !ollo.ed and traced. 9t trem/les. !orgetting. The commemorative aspect o! terror allo.s us to remem/er the !allen and understand ho. they can still /e

Terrorism will take place in the withdrawal of being, in the unworld of machination. The modem configuration of war is surpassed b# the technological plan of homogeni(ed circulation, and the distinction between war and peace falls awa# in their mutual commitment to furthering the c#cle of production and consumption. The abandonment of being that forms this unworld b# draining the world of its being does not occur without a trace, however, and terror in its trembling corresponds to that trace. Terrorism necessarily results !rom such a devastationBor, H/ecomingBdesert,H PendiistungBo! the .orldM terrorism is al.ays /orn in the desert. Terrorism is metaph#sical because it touches ever#thing , every particular /eing, all o! .hich may /e attac1ed and annihilated. The circulation of the standing$ reserve sets an e1uivalence of value among things with a resulting worldlessness where existence is another name for exchangeabilit#. The
.ith us today in our 8merican .ay o! /eing. e?changed and replacea/le things are already replaced and e?changed, not serially, /ut essentially. They are not !ully present .hen here. Terrorism names this a/sence, or rather is the e!!ect o! this a/sence, .hich is to say it is that a/sence itsel!, since here .e are not dealing .ith an a/sence that could /e the e!!ect o! any loss o! presence. The a/sence in uestion is not an a/sence o! presence, /ut an a/sence in and through presence.

5t would be ridiculous to think that such a change in being would lack a corresponding change in beings. This change inF the nature o! /eing sho.s itsel! in the !act that all beings toda# are terrori(ed. They all stand under a very real threat o! destruction via Bterrorist acts. There would be no terrorist threat were it not for these terrorists , yet there .ould /e no possi/ility o! a threat .ere it not !or /eing. Certainly terrorism is not the onl# 2effect2 of this absence in presenceM 2eidegger !re uently re!ers to the atomic /om/ in precisely this regard. TerrorismFs claim, ho.ever, is distinct !rom that o! atomic .ar. Li1e the atomic /om/, terrorism operates at the level of threat. 5nsofar as it calls into 1uestion all beings, terrorism is itself a metaphysical determination of being. Terrorism ma1es everything a possi/le o/Cect o! terrorist attac1, and this is the very terror o! it. Ever#thing is a possible target, and this now means that all beings exist as possible targets, as possibl# destro#ed. Eut this should not /e ta1en to mean that there are discrete /eings, !ully present, no.

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The ineradicable threat of destruction transforms the nature ofthe being itself. The being can no longer exist as indifferent to its destruction+ this destruction does not reside outside of the being. 5nstead, destruction inhabits the being and does so, not as something superadded to the being, but as the essence of the being itself. :eings are henceforth as though destro#ed. Terror /rings a/out an alteration in the very mode o! /eing o!
threatened .ith destruction. reality, the real is no. the terrori+ed. Leality is already terrori+edM the change has already ta1en place, Band this regardless o! .hether an attac1 comes or not.

:eings exist as endangered, as terrori(ed, and this means as no longer purel# self$present. 5t means that, in terms of pure presence, /eings e?ist asalready destroyed. -estruction is not something that comes at a
later date, nor is it something that may or may not already have ta1en place. -estruction e?ists no. as threat. The e!!ectiveness o! terror lies in the threat, not the attac1.

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;ea%is.
Turn $ The alternative solves the imbalances of power that are experience in hegemon#6 The alternative also solves for 3ealism's inabilit# to view :eings, which entraps them in the 3ealist perspective. >allma#r '0/
[Ph-, Pro!essor, -epartment o! 0overnment and 9nternational Studies, Notre -ame, Constellations Polume '', No ', $AA> The Underside o! @odernity< 8dorno, 2eidegger, and -ussel Jred -allmayr(.QQ4LC)

the reflective recover# of the 1uestion of and care for being, a care completel# immune to managerial manipulation. 8s /e!ore, 2eidegger distinguishes
@oving /eyond the criti ue o! @achenscha!t, Eesinnung o!!ers glimpses o! a radically other" possi/ility< namely, /et.een po.er and violence, on the one hand, and genuine authority" &2errscha!t(, on the other. 8part !rom e?uding intrinsic dignity or .orth," he .rites, !errschaft

means the free potenc# or capacit# for an original respect for beingA Krather than merel# empirical thingsD. To characteri+e this dignity, Eesinnung introduces a ne. voca/ulary, b# presenting being &Seyn( as a /asically po.erB!ree domain &das @achtlose( be#ond power and non$power or impotence &Censeits
von @acht und Unmacht(." 8s 2eidegger emphasi+es, po.erB!ree" does not mean po.erless or impotent, /ecause the latter remains !i?ated on po.er, no. e?perienced as a lac1.

)rom an ever#da# @realistA angle, being&s realm ma# appear powerless or impotent+ but this is onl# a semblance or illusion resulting from its reticent inobstrusiveness. >ue to its reticence, being&s realm can never be dragged into human machinations, into the struggles between the powerful and the powerless Kas long as the latter merel# seek powerD+ but precisel# in this manner it reveals its !errschaft, a reign that @cannot be matched b# an# power or superpower because the# necessaril# ignore the nature of the basicall# power$free possibilit#.A To /e sure, access to this reign is di!!icult and radically o/structed /y the @achenscha!t o! our age. Get, an important pathwa# through and be#ond these obstructions is offered b# meditative thinking &Eesinnung( which opens a glimpse into the @time$space$pla#A &aeitBSpielB Laum( of being as *reignis, that is, into the interpla# and differential entwinement of being and beings, of humans, nature, and the divine.

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1ota%itarianis.
Turn $ 9nl# the alternative&s pluralistic :eing bring down authoritarianism. Status 1uo metaph#sics ensure that authoritarianism happens b# ignoring the pluralities of metaph#sics. 0attimo '0S [0ianni Pattimo, Philosophy Pro!essor, University o! Turin, and mem/er o! the *U Parliament, Nihilism
# *mancipation, *dited Satiago aa/ala, Translated 6illiam @cCuaig, pg. =3B=:) >2ompelle intr re>?the

slogan that 'ustified "hristian missionaries in using force to convert the pagans they encountered in the ne. lands that /ecame colonies o! Christian po.ers 2for their own good2$is one of the well$known conse1uences of the assurance that one possesses the truth. 8nd it accuratel# portra#s the linkage between metaph#sics, essentialism, Eurocentrism, and authoritarianism.
9t is the same authoritarianism that .e see today in the claim advanced /y churches and other HmoralH authorities that they may ignore even decisions ta1en /y legitimate parliamentary maCorities .hen values deriving !rom Hnatural la.H are at sta1e. &Let me state in passing that 9 do not mean /y this that the naturalBla. theorists .ho legitimi+ed the modern revolutions, starting .ith the Jrench Levolution, .ere .rong. 9 maintain only that the claim to incarnate a la. o! nature is al.ays a violent positionM sometimes, as in the case o! the revolutions against the ancien regime, it is Custi!ia/le as a reaction against prior violence. Eut no more than that.( The reasons !or pre!erring

the 2post metaph#sical2

reading of current ethical discourse are more or less the same as the ones advanced in !avor o! a
postmetaphysical reading o! modernity and the situation to .hich it has /rought us. They are HhistoricalH reasons in many senses o! the term< they have the !orce o! Had hominemH arguments and hence are situated .ithin the very situation they claim to interpret &.hich is the nature o! interpretation in any case(, and they are historical in the sense that they survey the history through .hich .e have lived and are living. Their practicalBtheoretical /ac1ground

is the end of colonialism and the discover# of the existence of other cultures that resist being assigned a backward and primitive place on an evolutionar# line leading to .estern civili+ation. The# are not 2absolute2 reasons, the# flow from no essence< it .ould a!ter all /e a contradiction to claim to demonstrate in a/solute terms the positive signi!icance
o! a process that has dissolved all a/solutes. Get despite all, the historical reasons to .hich 9 re!er are persuasive to this

it is hard to find an#one who denies that the recognition of the pluralit# of cultures and the re'ection of a Eurocentric historicist model are positive steps toward achieving a 2better2 form of rationalit#. *ven
e?tent< admitting that there is nothing a/solute a/out these last arguments, a shared criterion does appear to emerge. 8t the least it seems undenia/le that

the emancipator# significance of the dissolution of metaph#sical absoluteness understood in this wa# is widel# shared , is a
matter o! common senseBso that the /urden o! proo! !alls on .hoever de!ends the opposite vie., and it is hard to !ind anyone !itting that description.

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<ar and Sec$rit(

Turn $ 9ntological interrogation is the onl# wa# to solve the root cause of war. ,ithout the ontological interrogation we will be forced to not understand beings and be forced into the mindset we must act for securit#. Oet, these paths of action are due to an ontological dis$ attachment due to the technik mindset. :urke '0H
[8nthony, Senior Lecturer in Politics and 9nternational Lelations V UNS6 in Sydney, Ontologies o! 6ar< Piolence, *?istence, and Leason", The 4ohns 2op1ins University Press, ProCect @use)

dual ontologies of war link being, means, events and decisions into a single, unbroken chain whose very process o! construction cannot be examined. 8s is clear in the .or1 o! Carl Schmitt, being implies action, the action that is war. This chain is also obviousl# at work in the U.S. neoconservative doctrine that argues, as Eush did in his $AA$ 6est Point speech, that 'the onl# path to safet# is the path of action', which begs the 1uestion of whether strategic practice and theor# can be detached from strong ontologies of the insecure nation$state.$% This is the direction taken b# much realist anal#sis critical of 9srael and the Eush administrationFs 'war on terror'.$> Le!raming such concerns in
The danger o/viously raised here is that these Joucauldian terms, .e could argue that o/sessive ontological commitments have led to especially distur/ing Fpro/lemati+ationsF o! truth.$3 2o.ever such

rationalist criti1ues rel# on a one$sided interpretation of "lausewit( that seeks to disentangle strategic from existential reason, and to open up choice in that .ay. !owever without interrogating more deepl# how the# form a conceptual harmon# in "lausewit('s thought $$ and thus in our dominant understandings of politics and war $$ tragicall# violent 'choices' will continue to be made.

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2NC :ront%ine
Q. P?T "!E"F 4 This is the 0 3S5TO level of debate Gand we are in 9?T 39?E>ST. 5f #ou&re not prepared to debate the ontological reasoning behind the exploration of space then #ou should C9SE on 83ES?=8T59E 7. 9ur interpretation 4 the debate should answer the 1uestion @do we endorse or oppose the technological mindset of the status 1uo.A The Eeg still gets their impacts, but the# have to win the# solve despite our links S. 5f we win the kritik we win framework<the entire neg is a disadvantage to their framework. The# have to beat the thesis of our kritik before the# get to access offense on this flow. /. G5nsert Specific )ramework rgumentsT

***:;#7E<4;K***

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)a%%ot )eco.es t"e Criticis.
The ballot is a line of flight, a single cr# of dissent which echoes all over the world. The point is to recogni(e the infinit# of the lines and understand an overarching framework through which these lines become revolutionar#. 0ote affirmative not onl# because of our micropolitical, rhi(omatic tactic for resistance, but also for the method b# which our tactic allows voting negative to turn the ballot into the criticism. Turns into the line of flight to create real change. The ballot can adopt and become the criticism with a negative vote. !ollowa# 'Q0 [4ohn, Pro!essor in the 9nstituto de Ciencias Sociales y 2umanidades o! the Eenemerita Universidad
8utonoma de Pue/la in @e?ico, Crac1 Capitalism, 'DB$A)

5magine a sheet of ice covering a dark lake of possibilit#. ,e scream 'E9' so loud that the ice begins to crack. ,hat is it that is uncoveredB ,hat is that dark li1uid that Ksometimes, not alwa#sD slowl# or 1uickl# bubbles up through the crackB ,e shall call it dignit#. The crack in the ice moves, unpredictable, sometimes racing, sometimes slowing, sometimes .idening, sometimes narro.ing, sometimes free(ing over again and disappearing, sometimes reappearing. ll around the lake there are people doing the same thing as we are, screaming 'E9' as loud as the# can , creating cracks that move 'ust as cracks in ice do, unpredictabl#, spreading, racing to 'oin up with other cracks, some being fro(en over again. The stronger the flow of dignit# within them, the greater the force of the cracks . Serve no more, La Eoetie
The /rea1 /egins .ith re!usal, .ith No. No, .e shall not tend your sheep, plough your !ields, ma1e your car, do your e?aminations. The truth of the
tells us, and .e shall at once /e !ree.

relation of power is revealed* the powerful depend on the powerless.


more comes .hen .e do something else instead.

The lord depends on his ser!s, the capitalist depends on the .or1ers .ho create his capital. Eut the real !orce o! the serve no

Serve no more, and then whatB 5f we 'ust fold our arms and do nothing at all, we soon face the problem of starvation. The serve no more, if it does not lead to an other$doing, an alternative activit#, can easil# become converted into a negotiation of the terms of servitude. The workers who sa# 'no' and cross their arms, or go on
stri1e, are implicitly saying Fno, .e shall not carry out this command F,
.or1ing under these conditions.F or F.e shall not carry on

This does not exclude the continuation of servitude &o! the relationship o! employment( under other conditions. The Fserve no moreF /ecomes a step in the negotiation o! ne. conditions o! servitude. 5t is a different matter when the negation becomes a negation$and$ creation. This is a more serious challenge. The workers sa# 'no' and the# take over the factor# . They declare that they do not need a /oss and /egin to call !or a .orld .ithout /osses.$ Thin1 o! the sad story o! =r 8eel, .ho, @ar? tells us ... took with him to Swan 3iver, ,est ustralia, means of subsistence and of production to the amount of ;0,000 pounds . @r. Peel had the !oresight to /ring .ith him,

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besides, S,000 persons of the working$class, men, women and children.
Once arrived at his destination, F@r. Peel .as le!t .ithout a servant to ma1e his /ed or !etch him .ater !rom the river.F Unhappy @r. Peel .ho provided !or everything e?cept the e?port o! *nglish modes o! production to S.an Liver.

,hat happened was that land .as still !reely availa/le in S.an Liver, so that the S,000 persons of the working class went off and cultivated their own land. One can imagine the scene as the unhappy @r. PeelFs initial anger, .hen the workers refused to carr# out his orders, turned to despair .hen he sa. them going off to develop an alternative life free of masters. The availa/ility o! land made it possi/le !or them to convert their
&';=DQ':=3< D==M ';=DQ'::A< :%%( re!usal into a decisive rupture and to develop an activity uite di!!erent !rom that planned !or them /y @r. Peel. Thin1 o! the e?citing story o! the teachers in Pue/la.% 6hen the government announced in $AA; the creation o! a ne. scheme to improve the uality o! education /y imposing greater individualism, stronger competition /et.een students, stricter measurement o! the output o! teachers, and so on the teachers said FNo, .e .ill not accept it.F 6hen the government re!used to listen, the dissident teachers moved /eyond mere re!usal and in consultation .ith thousands o! students and parents, ela/orated their o.n proposal !or improving the uality o! education /y promoting greater. cooperation /et.een students, more emphasis on critical thin1ing, preparation !or cooperative .or1 not directly su/ordinate to capital, and /egan to e?plore .ays o! implementing their scheme in opposition to the state guidelines, /y ta1ing control o! the schools.> 2ere too the initial re!usal /egins to open to.ards something else, to.ards an educational activity that not only resists /ut /rea1s .ith the logic o! capital. 9n /oth o! these cases, the No is /ac1ed /y an otherBdoing. This is the dignity

The original Eo is then not a closure, but an opening to a different activit#, the threshold of a counter$world with a different logic and a different language. The Eo opens to a time$space in which we tr# to live as sub'ects rather than ob'ects. These are times or spaces in which we assert our capacit# to decide for ourselves what we should do B .hether it /e chatting .ith our !riends, playing .ith our children, cultivating the land in a different wa#, developing and implementing pro'ects for a critical education. These are times or spaces in .hich .e ta1e control o! our o.n lives, assume the responsi/ility o! our o.n humanity. >ignit# is the unfolding of the power of Eo. Our re!usal con!ronts us .ith the opportunity, necessity and responsi/ility o! developing our o.n capacities. The women and men who left =r. 8eel in the lurch were confronted with the opportunit# and necessit# of developing abilities suppressed b# their previous condition of servitude. The teachers .ho reCect the state te?t/oo1s are !orced to develop another education. The assumption o! responsi/ility !or our o.n lives is in itsel! a /rea1 .ith the logic o! domination. This does not mean that ever#thing will turn out to be perfect. The dignit# is a breaking, a negating, a moving, an exploring. ,e must be careful not to convert it into a positive concept that might give it a deadening fixit# . The women and men who deserted =r. 8eel ma# well have turned into small landholders who defended their propert# against all newcomers. The
that can !ill the crac1s created /y the re!usal. teachers .ho ta1e their schools to create a critical education may possi/ly reproduce authoritarian practices as /ad as those .hich they are reCecting.

5t is the moving that is important, the moving against$ and$be#ond* the negating and creating of those who abandoned =r. 8eel, more than the new spaces that the# created+ the ta1ing o! the schools /y the teachers, more than the schools that they have ta1en. 5t is the assuming of our own responsibilit# that is important, though the results ma# well be contradictor# .= >ignit#, the movement of negating$and$creating, of taking control of our own lives , is not a simple matter< it is, .e said, a dar1 li uid /u//ling up !rom a la1e o! possi/ility. To give a positive solidit# to what can onl# be a moving of refusing and creating and

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exploring can easil# lead to disillusion. pro$-apatista collective, or a social centre, or a group o! pi ueteros ends in conflict and disarra# and we conclude that it was all an illusion, instead of seeing that such dignities are inevitabl# contradictor# and experimental. The cracks are alwa#s 1uestions, not answers. 5t is important not to romanticise the cracks, or give them a positive force that the# do not possess. nd #et, this is where we start* from the cracks, the fissures , the rents, the spaces of rebellious negation$and$creation. ,e start from the particular, not from the totalit#. ,e start from the world of misfitting, from the multiplicit# of particular rebellions, dignities, cracks, not from the great unified Struggle that simpl# does not exist, nor from the s#stem of domination . 6e
start !rom /eing angry and lost and trying to create something else, /ecause that is .here .e live, that is .here .e are. Perhaps it is a strange place to start, /ut .e are loo1ing !or a strange thing. 6e are loo1ing !or hope in a dar1 night. D

,e are tr#ing to theorise hope$against$hope. This is surel# the onl# sub'ect matter of theor# that is left.

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Ca%c$%ati'e Uti%itarianis. :ai%s
"alculative attempts to assign weight to and compare between alternatives destro#s the essence of what these options were in the first place b# viewing their meaning solel# through their value and makings an authentic relationship impossible. !a#nes '0I
[4ohn -., Pro!essorial Pisiting Jello. School o! 9n!ormation Systems, Technology and @anagement University o! Ne. South 6ales, Calculative Thin1ing and *ssential Thin1ing in 2eidegger,s Phenomenology," http<QQ...docs.!ce.uns..edu.auQsistmQsta!!Q2eidegger\calculation\essential\@archA;.pd!) 9n 2eidegger,s .or1 6hat is @etaphysicsS" reprinted .ith an introduction /y 2eidegger himsel! in Kau!mann,s *?istentialism 5 Jrom -ostoeves1y to Sartre &Kau!mann ':D3(, .e !ind perhaps in all o! 2eidegger,s .or1s the clearest rendition o! 2eidegger,s distinction /et.een calculative thin1ing and essential thin1ing. 9ndeed 2eidegger himsel! returns again and again to this .or1. Jirstly, in relation to calculative thin1ing, 2eidegger says &Kau!mann ':D3, pp $='B$(< 8ll calculation ma1es the calcula/le come out" in the sum so as to use the sum !or the ne?t count.

Eothing counts for calculation save for what can be calculated. n# particular thing is onl# what it @adds up toA, and an# count ensures the further progress of counting. This process is continuall# using up numbers and is itself a continual self$consumption. The coming out" o! the calculation .ith the help o! .hatBis counts as the e?planation o! the latter,s Eeing. "alculation uses ever#$thing that @isA as units of computation, in advance, and, in the computation, uses up its stock of units. This consumption o! .hatBis reveals the consuming nature o! calculation. Only /ecause num/er can /e multiplied inde!initely ... is it possible for the consuming nature of calculation to hide behind its @productsA and give calculative thought the appearance of @productivit#A.... "alculative thought places itself under compulsion to master ever#thing in the logical terms of its procedure. 8nd o! essential thin1ing,
2eidegger says &Kau!mann ':D3, pp $=%B>(< The thought o! Eeing see1s no hold in .hatBis. *ssential thin1ing loo1s !or the slo. signs o! the incalcula/le and sees in this the un!oreseea/le coming o! the inelucta/le. Such thin1ing is mind!ul o! the truth o! Eeing and thus helps the Eeing o! truth to ma1e a place !or itsel! in man,s history. This help e!!ects no results /ecause it has no need o! e!!ect. *ssential thin1ing helps as the simple in.ardness o! e?istence, inso!ar as this in.ardness, although una/le to e?ercise such thin1ing or only having theoretical 1no.ledge o! it, 1indles its o.n 1ind. 9n relation to calculative thin1ing, 2eidegger ma1es it clear in a !urther passage &Kau!mann ':D3, p $=$( that this 1ind o! thin1ing cannot comprehend itsel!. One gets a sense o! this in vie. o! the notion o! calculative thought,s compulsion to master everything in the logical terms o! its procedure" at the tail end o! the a/ove uoted passage, /ut the !ollo.ing passage &Kau!mann ':D3, p $=$( ma1es it a/undantly clear< 9t

Gcalculative thinkingT has no notion that in calculation ever#thing calculable is alread# a whole before it starts working out its sums and products , a whole whose unit# naturall# belongs to the incalculable which, with its m#ster#, ever eludes the clutches of calculation. That which, ho.ever, is alwa#s and ever#where closed at the outset to the demands of calculation and , despite that, is alwa#s closer to man in its enigmatic unknowableness than an#thing that %is&, than an#thing he ma# arrange and plan, this can sometimes put the essential man in touch with a thinking whose truth no @logicA can grasp.

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4nto%ogica% 1"inking Ke(
,e cannot base our polic# choices off of statistical anal#sis alone, we must include the ontological 1uestions about being before we can come to a conclusion about realit#. 9livier '0H [Eert, Pro!essor o! Philosophy at the Nelson @andela @etropolitan University, Nature as 7a/Cect,, critical
psychology, and 7revolt,< The pertinence o! Kristeva," South 8!rican 4ournal o! Psychology, %D&%(, $AAD, pp. >>%5>=:)

an# responsible human being who has taken note of the current state of affairs cannot and should not avoid making use of ever# possible medium to create and expand an informed awareness of the situation, as well as a sense of urgenc# and the need to act, among as man# people as possible. 9n my e?perience, mere %factual knowledge& is not sufficient to have the desired effect of galvanising people into action < in the present %information age&, people .ith access to media &that is, the vast maCority o! people on the
9n the light o! this, planet( are 7/etter in!ormed, than in any previous era, /ut argua/ly Cust as apathetic as 7in!ormed,, Cudging /y the

b# placing %information& about the precarious state of the earth in the context of not onl# a philosophical$ theoretical but also, cruciall#, a critical$ps#chological interpretation, people are afforded the intellectual, ps#chological, and ethical means to appreciate what all this information means for them and for other creatures on the planet.
deteriorating condition o! natural resources.% Lather, there!ore,

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4nto%og( 3e6ore Et"ics

>welling is the onl# wa# ethics can be full# cultivated. 3ather than defining ethical values as static and universal rules, dwelling allows ethics to be more fluid and d#namic. !atab '.H
[La.rence 4., Pro!essor o! Philosophy at Old -ominion University, *T29CS 8N- J9N9TU-*< 2eideggerian Contri/utions to @oral Philosophy, http<QQ....!ocusing.orgQapm\papersQhata/.html) -.elling &6ohnen( is a .ord that occupied 2eideggerFs later thin1ing. Eut it is completely consistent .ith, and e?pressive o!, the nono/CectiveBnonsu/Cective con!iguration o! /eingBinBtheB.orld delineated in the early .ritings.

The word

2dwelling2 captures both 2sub'ective2 and 2ob'ective2 tones &human meaning and the environment .hich .e inha/it(, but in a single, indivisible, existential term. The word in all its resonances becomes !eidegger's replacement for traditional sub'ect$ob'ect ontologies. 9n Letter on 2umanism, 2eidegger ta1es up the 0ree1 .ord
ethos in its sense o! a/ode and d.elling place, and concludes that his ontological investigations might then /e called an Horiginal ethicsH &p. $%3(. 8lthough this ans.er is a typically unsatis!ying Hend runH around the speci!ic uestion regarding the possi/ility o! ethics in 2eideggerFs thin1ing, 9 /elieve that .e can go /eyond 2eideggerFs ontological !i?ation, that

a normative ethics can benefit from attention to ethos$as$dwelling, that we can ask 1uestions about how we dwell ethicall#, and how we should dwell in the world. !eidegger's notion of dwelling offers two main contributions to moral philosoph#M the !irst points /ac1 to and summari+es preceding sections o! my te?t, the second points !or.ard to the rest o! my essay< QD 0alues can not be understood as either ob'ective or sub'ective conditions+ the# are modes of being$in$the$ world. 7D :eing$ethical$in$the$world must be understood as radicall# finite. Jor 2eidegger, !rom /eginning to end, !rom /eingBinBtheB.orld to the !our!old, dwelling means being at home in the finitude of :eing , in its mixture of presence and absence, especiall# in terms of human mortalit# and the limit conditions of unconcealment. -.elling is contrasted .ith the H!lightH !rom Eeing indicated in the closure o! metaphysical systems and the uest !or certainty and control. >welling names something li1e .hat the poet 4ohn Keats called Hnegative capa/ility,2 the capacit# to live with conditions of uncertaint# , or as 9 .ould
put it, a reconciliation .ith !initude. 8lthough d.elling has a positive content suggesting a sense o! placement in the .orld to counter radical versions o! s1epticism, phenomenalism, or anarchism, it also presents a deep challenge in that .e must e?ist in a .orld .ithout !oundations, guarantees, or ultimateresolution o! e?istential di!!iculties.

The same radical finitude can be shown in our ethical dwelling. 5n fact, this finitude has alwa#s been acknowledged in moral philosoph#, but it was deemed a deficienc# that either needed correcting or that prevented ethics from achieving intellectual legitimation. The moral life is alwa#s faced with cognitive, ps#chological, empirical, and practical limits , .hich are e!!ectively
e?pressed in the mi?ture o! presence and a/sence that rings in 2eideggerFs !avorite .ord, aletheia, unconcealment<

0alues are not grounded in proof or demonstration+ the moral arena is marked b# disagreement and conflict+ moral situations are often complex and ambiguous, where outcomes are uncertain, where goods conflict with each other, .here a /alance o! di!!ering interests is hard to gaugeBB/ut we have to decide

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and sometimes all we are left with is an ab#ssal moment of choice+ we sometimes fail in our aim for the good, or in doing good we sometimes instigate harmful effectsM e?treme or degraded environments can ruin ethical potentialM ethical commitments often re1uire risk and sacrifice, which makes anxiet# and mixed dispositions inevitable. The value of !eidegger's notion of dwelling is that we are forced to give up the idea that such conditions of finitude are 2deficiencies.2 This is the ethical world, and the m#th of pure 2presence2 must be surrendered in moral philosoph# no less than in ontolog#. The pro/lem .ith ethical /elie!s that insulate the good !rom limit conditions is not simply a philosophical !la.. There is an irony that history has demonstrated all too o!ten< The 2purer2 the concept of the good, the greater the capacit# to do evil on its behalf. 6ith a de!initi+ed ideal, the
.orld no. appears H!allenH and in need o! re!ormM .hen elements in the .orld continue to resist or !all short, there arises a potential to commit terror in the name o! Hsalvation.H

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4nto%og( :irst

QD Oour )ramework is built upon fundamental ontological assumptions that our Fritik is designed to call into 1uestion. 9ntolog# makes its wa# into ever# mode of thought. Ever#thing the aff claims is based off their ontological pressumptions. ,ithout first begging the ontological 1uestions we are stuck in the mindset we originall# had and cannot even think of change. >illon '.. [@ichael, Pro!. o! Politics V University o! Lancaster, @oral Spaces, p. :DB:;)
2eirs to all this, .e !ind ourselves in the tur/ulent and no. glo/ali+ed .a1e o! its con!luence. 8s 2eideggerBhimsel! an especially revealing !igure o! the deep and mutual implication o! the philosophical and the political >Bnever tired o! pointing

the relevance of ontolog# to all other kinds of thinking is fundamental and inescapable. Jor one cannot sa# an#thing about an#thing that is, without alwa#s alread# having made assumptions about the is as such . n# mode of thought, in short, al.ays already carries an ontolog# se1uestered within it. ,hat this ontological turn does to other regional modes o! thought is to challenge the ontolog# within which the# operate. The implications of that review reverberate throughout the entire mode of thought, demanding a reappraisal as !undamental as the reappraisal ontology has demanded o! philosophy. ,ith ontolog# at issue, the entire foundations or underpinnings of an# mode of thought are rendered problematic. This applies as much to any modern discipline o!
out, thought as it does to the given up the ontological uestion o! modernity as such, .ith the e?ception, it seems, o! science, .hich, having long ago uestioning o! .hen it called itsel! natural philosophy, appears no., in its industriali+ed and

,ith its foundations at issue, the ver# authorit# of a mode of thought and the wa#s in which it characteri(es the critical issues of freedom and 'udgment Kof what kind of universe human beings inhabit, how the# inhabit it, and what counts as reliable knowledge for them in it( is also put in 1uestion. The very .ays in .hich Niet+sche, 2eidegger, and other continental philosophers challenged 6estern ontolog#, simultaneously, there!ore reposed the fundamental and inescapable difficult#, or aporia, for human being of decision and 'udgment. 9n other .ords, whatever ontolog# #ou subscribe to, knowingl# or unknowingl#, as a human being #ou still have to act. ,hether or not #ou know or acknowledge it, the ontolog# #ou subscribe to will construe the problem of action for #ou in one wa# rather than another. Gou may thin1 ontology is some arcane uestion o! philosophy, /ut Niet+sche and 2eidegger sho.ed that it intimatel# shapes not onl# a wa# of thinking , but a wa# of being, a form of life. >ecision, a !ortiori political decision, in short, is no mere techni1ue. 5t is instead a wa# of being that bears an understanding of :eing, and of the fundaments of the human wa# of being within it. This applies, indeed applies most, to those mock innocent political slaves who claim onl# to be technocrats of decision making.
corporati+ed !orm, to /e invulnera/le to ontological pertur/ation.

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7D 5gnoring ontological 1uestions leaves us in a nihilistic position where existence loses its meaning. "ropse# 'IH [4osepth, Pro!essor o! Philosophy at the University o! Chicago, 2istory o! Political Philosophy," ;:')
On the sur!ace there is little indication that this proCect has a practical or political motive. 9ndeed, the .or1 presents itsel! only as an attempt to recover the !oundations o! science. 9n this sense it stands .ithin the hori+on o! phenomenology. 8 some.hat closer e?amination, ho.ever, reveals a !undamental continuity o! the theoretical and practical.

The 1uestion of :eing, according to 2eidegger, is the source and ground of all ontologies or orderings of beings and thus of all human understanding. 5n forgetting this 1uestion, man thus forgets the source of his o.n knowledge and loses the capacit# to 1uestion in the most radical wa#, which is essential to both real thought and authentic freedom. ,ithout it, man is reduced to a calculating beast concerned onl# with preservation and pleasure, a Hlast man,H to use Niet+scheFs terminology, !or .hom /eauty, .isdom, and greatness are mere .ords. The nihilistic brutalit# o! this last man thus seems to lie behind !eidegger's concern with the foundations of science. SD >iscourse in ever# societ# is managed and controlled in order to contain its potential implications on the government&s abilit# to manage populations. The failure of the neg is its inabilit# to challenge the ontological assumptions behind their ver# problemati(ation. 9ur criti1ue proves voting aff is necessar# to an effective political thought in order to prevent error replication. >illon and 3eid '7F
[@ichael and 4ulian, 0lo/al 0overnance, Li/eral Peace, and Comple? *mergency," 8lternatives< Social Trans!ormation # 2umane 0overnance, 4anB@ar $AAA, Pol. $3, 9ssue ', */sco) 8s a precursor to glo/al governance, governmentality, according to JoucaultFs initial account, poses the uestion o! order not in terms o! the origin o! the la. and the location o! sovereignty, as do traditional accounts o! po.er, /ut in terms instead o! the management o! population. The management o! population is !urther re!ined in terms o! speci!ic pro/lematics to .hich population management may /e reduced. These typically include /ut are not necessarily e?hausted /y the !ollo.ing topoi o! governmental po.er< economy, health, .el!are, poverty, security, se?uality, demographics, resources, s1ills, culture, and so on. No.,

where there is an operation of power there is

knowledge, and .here there is 1no.ledge there is an operation o! po.er. 2ere discursive !ormations emerge and, as Joucault noted, in ever# societ# the production o! discourse is at once controlled, selected, organised and redistributed b# a certain num/er o! procedures .hose role is to ward off its powers and dangers, to gain master# over its chance events, to evade its ponderous, !ormida/le materialit#.[%>) @ore speci!ically, where there is a polic# problematic there is expertise, and where there is expertise there, too, a polic# problematic will emerge. Such problematics are detailed and elaborated in terms of discrete forms of knowledge as well as interlocking polic# domains. 8olic# domains reif# the problemati(ation of life in certain .ays b# turning these epistemicall# and politicall# contestable

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orderings of life into 2problems2 that re1uire the continuous attention of polic# science and the continuous resolutions of polic#makers. 8olic# 2actors2 develop and compete on the basis of the expertise that grows up around such problems or clusters o! pro/lems and their client populations . 2ere, too, .e
may also discover .hat might /e called Hepistemic entrepreneurs.H 8l/eit the mar1et !or discourse is prescri/ed and policed in .ays that Joucault indicated, /idding to !ormulate novel pro/lemati+ations they see1 to HsellH these, or other.ise

there is no limit to the wa#s in which the management of population ma# be problemati(ed. 8ll aspects o! human conduct, any encounter .ith li!e, is pro/lemati+a/le. n# problemati(ation is capable of becoming a polic# problem. Povernmentalit# there/y creates a market for polic#, !or science and !or policy science, in which problemati(ations go looking for polic# sponsors .hile policy sponsors !iercely compete on /ehal! o! their !avored pro/lemati+ations. 3eproblemati(ation of problems is constrained b# the institutional and ideological investments surrounding accepted 2problems,2 and b# the sheer difficult# of challenging the inescapable ontological and epistemological assumptions that go into their ver# formation. There is nothing so !iercely contested as an epistemological or ontological assumption. 8nd there is nothing so fiercel# ridiculed as the suggestion that the real problem with problemati(ations exists precisel# at the level of such assumptions. Such 2paral#sis of anal#sis2 is precisel# what polic#makers seek to avoid since the# are compelled constantl# to respond to circumstances over .hich they ordinarily have in !act /oth more and less control than they proclaim. 6hat the# do not have is precisely the control that the# want. Get serial polic# failureBB the fate and the fuel of all polic# BBcompels them into a continuous search for the new anal#sis that .ill extract them from the aporias in which the# constantl# find themselves enmeshed.[%3) Serial polic# failure is no simple shortcoming that science and policyOand polic# science<will ultimately overcome. Serial polic# failure is rooted in the ontological and epistemological assumptions that fashion the wa#s in which global governance encounters and problemati(es life as a process o! emergence through !itness landscapes that constantly adaptive and changing ensem/les have continuously to negotiate. 8s a particular 1ind o! intervention into li!e, global governance promotes the very changes and unintended outcomes that it then seriall# reproblemati(es in terms of polic# failure . Thus, global liberal governance is not a linear problem$solving process committed to the resolution of ob'ective polic# problems simpl# b# bringing better information and knowledge to bear upon them. nonlinear econom# of powerJknowledge, it deliberatel# installs sociall# specific and radicall# ine1uitable distributions of wealth, opportunit#, and mortal danger both locall# and globall# through the ver# detailed wa#s in which life is variousl# Kpolic#D problemati(ed b# it. 9n conse uence, thinking and acting politicall# is displaced b# the institutional and epistemic rivalries that infuse its powerJ knowledge networks, and b# the local conditions of application that govern the introduction of their policies . These no. threaten to e?haust .hat Hpolitics,H locally as .ell as glo/ally, is a/out.[ %=) 9t is here that the HemergenceH characteristic o!
have them o!!icially adopted. 9n principle,

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it is increasingl# recogni(ed that there are no definitive polic# solutions to ob'ective, neat, discrete polic# problems .
governance /egins to ma1e its appearance. Jor The Hsu/CectsH o! policy increasingly also /ecome a matter o! de!inition as .ell, since the concept population does not have a sta/le re!erent either and has itsel! also evolved in /iophilosophical and /iomolecular as .ell as Joucauldian H/iopo.erH .ays.

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;eso%'ed B 4nto%og(

9ur interpretation is best 4 3esolved does not indicate action 4 5t is becoming aware of our own :eing. 8e((e '06 [Ear/ara, Ph- Philosophy at 2on1 httpDEEwww.ul.ieEMphilosEvol1LE%eidegger.html)
Kong U, 2eidegger on 0elassenheit", @inerva, vol .'A,

Let us pause !or a moment to consider a possi/le misunderstanding. 9t could appear, !rom .hat .e have /een saying, that Gel ssenheit !loats in the realm o! unreality and so in nothingness, and, lac1ing all po.er o! action, is a .illBless letting in o! everything and, /asically, the denial o! the .ill to liveZ" &':==a, p. ;A(. Eut this is not the case, !or in the

we find something that recalls the @power of action,A but which is not a will. 5t is a @resolveA [)ntschlossenheit) &i/id., p. ;'D, but not as an act of will that makes a decision and finds a solution to a problem or a situation. This @resolve,A as !eidegger himsel! suggests, must be thought as the one that is spoken of in :eing and Time, that is, it is a @letting oneself be called forthA KQ..6, p. 7ISD to one&s own most possibilit# of being . @3esoluteness" O as )ntschlossenheit is translated in Being nd Time O is authentic being a selfA &'::=, p. $D>(. 5t is 1uite difficult to think a resolve that is not a matter of will that moves to an action+ we tend, in fact, to consider resoluteness as a strong determination to attain something . 8s .e read in 2eidegger,s 1ntroduction To 5et physics &$AAA(, the essence of the resolve, as he intends it, is not an intention to act+ it is not a %gathering of energ#& to be released into action. 3esolve is the beginning, the inceptual beginning of an# action moved. 2ere acting is not /e
Gel ssenheit
ta1en as an action underta1en /y -asein in /eing resolute. Lather, acting re!ers to the e?istential and !undamental mode o! /eing o! -asein, .hich is to /e care," and .hich is the primordial" /eing o! -asein. Lesoluteness, in its essence, is the remaining open o! -asein !or /eBing. 9n the conte?t o! the 2onvers tion, this resolve should thus /e understood as the

p rticul rly underta1en /y him %or opennessI" [ ls d s eigens @#ernommene &ichA%%nen des - seins %@r d s <%%ene I) &2eidegger ':==a, p. ;'(. 9t is a resolve to remain open to /eBing, and there!ore to
opening o! man .hat is o.nmost to man,s nature, .hich is disclosed in relation to /eBing. This resolve is .hat 2eidegger, in the 2onvers tion, indicates as releasement to thatB.hichBregions," the resolve to release onesel! to thatB.hichBregions, to remain open to.ards the openness itsel!. No., there is another element that pertains to 0 el not only a resolve, /ut also a stead!astness" [Ausd

uer)

ssenheit<

there is, in !act,

&2eidegger ':==a, p.;'( proper to

Gel ssenheit.

Thinking, becoming more and more aware of its nature, and experiencing more clarit# about it, remains firm and resolute. Thinking @stands withinA and @restsA in this @composed steadfastnessA &i/id., p. ;')(. The
stead!astness" proper to

Gel ssenheit,

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<estern En6ra.ing Ki%%s So%'enc(

ll attempts to think global politics presuppose an ontolog# which inform all following action 4 53 and world order studies inherentl# follow a calculatative and technolog# mindset6 ll the aff claims are based off ,estern Enframing of the world which must be confronted before we can enact change. Swa(o '07
[pro!essor o! philosophy at university o! 8las1a, Jair/an1s, $AA$ [Norman K, Crisis Theory and 6orld Order< 2eideggerian Le!lections p.D>BD=)

To the extent that world order studies are steeped in a strategic rationalit#, in calculative thinking, the# do not concern themselves with the task of having a reflective insight into the fundamental features of the age. The# do not concern themselves with the ground that enables an# thinking and doing such as is pursued b# a science, natural or social. Get, it is this enabling ground that is reall# determinative of that science, inasmuch as all positing of a domain of in1uir# presupposes an ontolog#. ,orld order studies, as a development o! contemporary social science, li1e.ise are dependent upon one or another ontological commitment. Speci!ically, 9 shall argue, the# are determined b# the ontological positions that prevail in the modern period of ,estern philosoph#+ for these are the positions fundamentall# decisive for the profound change taking place in humanit#'s self$understanding, in our conception of all that is content of our world, and our relation to this world. 8/out this 9 shall concern mysel! in section $. Ee!ore doing this it is important that this relation /et.een
a positive science and ontology /e stated in /road outline. Jor this 9 turn to 2eidegger. H8ll nonBphilosophical sciences,H remar1s 2eidegger, Hhave as their theme some /eing or /eings, and indeed in such a .ay that they are in every case antecedently given as /eings to those sciences.H; Continuing, 2eidegger .rites< They are posited /y them in advanceM they are a positum !or them. 8ll the propositions o! the nonBphilosophical sciences, including those o! mathematics, are positive propositions. 2ence, to distinguish them !rom philosophy, .e shall call all nonBphilosophical sciences positive sciences. Positive sciences deal .ith that .hich is, .ith /eingsM that is to say, they al.ays deal .ith speci!ic domains, !or instance, nature. 6ithin a given domain scienNti!ic research again cuts out particular spheres< nature as physically material li!eless nature and nature as living nature. 9t divides the sphere o! the living into individual !ields< the plant .orld, the animal .orld. 8nother domain o! /eings is historyM its spheres are art history, political history, history o! sciNence, and history o! religion. . . . The /eings o! these domains are !amiliar to us even i! at !irst and !or the most part .e are not in a position to delimit them sharply and clearly !rom one another. 6e can, o! course, al.ays name, as a provisional description .hich satis!ies practically rhe purpose o! posiB tive science, some /eing that !alls .ithin the domain 6e can al.ays /ring !or.ard and picture ourselves some /eing /elonging to any given domain. ... 8 /eingOthatFs something, a ta/le, a chair, a tree, the s1y, a /ody, some .ords, an action.: nonphilosophical. 6hile

,orld order studies are, properly spea1ing, concerned with a num/er o! domainsOpolitical, economic, historical, etc.Oit is the political domain that is central to these in1uiries, presupposing the classical architectonic claims of the science of politics fot thinking and doing.'A 9nso!ar as the political domain is primary, world order studies deal with beings that are said to be political, ho.ever e?plicitly or am/iguously this denomination is to /e understood.
Such /eings are things o! vatious 1inds< humans ua citi+ens, o!!ice holders, rulers, legislatotsM .ords such as pu/lic or o!!icial documents, codes o! la., tteaties o! reciprocal o/ligation, spo1en discoutseM actions in all modes o! pu/lic /eingB .ithBoneBanotherM things mote or less !amiliar /ut not so .ell delimitedOregimes, states, constitutions, organi+ations,

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ll beings of the political domain become the proper concern of this thinking 1ua world order studies, despite the division o! this domain into particular spheres &domestic politics and international relations( and
associaNtionsM in short, things that have theit /eing in thought, .otd, and deed. individual !ields &!oreign policy, legislation, pu/lic la., pu/lic administration, state and municipal or provincial and local government, party politics, etc.(.

)or world order studies, politics presents itself as global. 8olitics so conceived, as .ell as patterns o! /ehaviot and practice /et.een levels o! government, matter insofar as the# bear upon and contribute to the overall condition of our common planetat# existence. 9ndeed, properly spea1ing, where global identit# and global interdependence are determinative of outlook concerning political existence, the distinction of domestic and international spheres becomes rather anachronistic, remaining useful onl# for purposes of anal#ses and investigations proper to the science of politics in its present empiricall#$oriented methodolog#. 9t is important to undetstand that political science posits in advance the various political things that constitute its ob'ects of investigation. 5n this posit, an ontolog#O.hat these things are, ho. they are, their .ay o! /eingO is implicit, if not explicit. This ontolog#, insofar as it is the ontology o! the speci!ic domain or region o! /eings that politics is, grounds the science of politics. That is, political science can be said to be dependent on, or to derive !rom, a regional ontolog#, vi(., political ontolog#. 9ntolog# as such is a theoretical in1uir#, i.e., in uiry He?plicitly devoted to the meaning o! entities,H this meaning being articulated b# wa# of basic concepts. 8olitical ontolog#, too, is a theoretical in1uir# devoted to the meaning of those entities that provide the sub'ect matter of empirical political science 1ua positive science. Consider 2eideggerFs !ollo.ing comments concerning such a
relation< Scienti!ic research accomplishes, roughly and naively, the demarcation and initial !i?ing o! the areas o! su/CectB

The basic structures of an# such area have already /een worked out after a fashion in our pre$scientific wa#s of experiencing and interpreting that domain of :eing in which the area of sub'ect$matter is itself confined. The F/asic conceptsF .hich thus arise remain our pro?imal clues !or disclosing this area concretely !or the !irst time. ... :asic concepts determine the wa# in which we get an understanding beforehand of the sub'ect$matter underl#ing all the ob'ects a science takes as its theme, and all positive investigation is guided b# this understanding. 9nl# after the area itsel! has /een e?plored /e!orehand in a corresponding manner do these concepts become genuinely demonstrated and 'grounded'. Eut since every such area is itsel! o/tained !rom the domain o! entities themselves, this preliminar# research, !rom .hich the /asic concepts are dra.n, signifies nothing else than an interpretation of those entities with regard to their basic state of being. n 9t is in ta1ing the Hstep /ac1,H so to
matter. spea1, !rom the positing o! a domain and the research underta1en /y a positive science to the ontology implicit in this Hdemarcation and initial !i?ing o! the areas o! su/CectBmatterH that one /egins to ma1e the move !rom calculative thin1ing to meditative thin1ing. 9nasmuch as meditative thin1ing is concerned .ith the HmeaningH that reigns in things and thus .ith the ground that ena/les scienti!ic in uiry, the orientation o! such thin1ing is primarily ontological rather than positive &scienti!ic(. 2ere .e have the distinction /et.een philosophy and scienceO speci!ically, /et.een philosophy ua metaphysics and science. 6e can no. /egin to ma1e our .ay through the uestions initially set !orth at the /eginning o! this chapter, and to clari!ying the need !or and Custi!ication o! meditative thin1ing as it /ears upon contemporary .orld order thin1ing.

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2NC 4'er'iew
The aff views the world in a technological mindset. 5n doing so, we no longer ask the ontological 1uestions of who we are or wh# we do things and instead views ever#thing as an ob'ect to be ordered about. These ob'ects are seen as , 5T5EP on our usage of them, and therefore, aren't even ob'ects to us but a waiting reserve. ,e lose all relations to people and the value in our lives because we are these waiting, standing reserves. This loss of the value in our lives is worse than a nuclear catastrophe because even if we die it doesn't matter. ,e had no value, so our lives meant nothing an#wa#. )urther, once in this place we can't even get out of this mindset ourselves because we lost our ontological relationship with people, and therefore can't think in new ontological terms because we don't have that relationship to do so, and can't unless we can be broken from this thought. That's the alt.

***2NC )L4CKS***

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2NC
Q. There is Eo Status Zuo 5 the aff&s description of harms and solvenc# should be viewed with extreme suspicion 4 the wa# the# understand the world is based on a highl# technical, skewed picture which excludes the element of human conscious and uses nature as standing$reserve. Extend Swa(o '07 and Turnbull '06 Gand -immerman './T 7. 0alue to Cife 4 their technical breakdown of the world means we forget other modes of thinking the world 4 !eidegger indicates this destro#s humanit#&s essential nature as such, which reduces us to clever contented animals. Cife is not worth living when we as humans we are no longer living as such. This subsumes their impacts 4 even if the# save lives, those lives have alread# been rendered worthless. Extend :oth =itchell '0; and =c,horter '.76 Gand Thiele '.;T S. ,e Turn the ff 4 breaking out of the technological c#cle allows us to reveal the world in human dimensions. The continual drive to management and technolog# can onl# continue the aff's harms. ,e turn their impacts both on a discursive level and in a world of fiat. That's Swa(o '07.

/. ,e offer a role of the ballot separate from framework* #ou should decide between competing forms of thought 4 i.e., technological and meditative. Extend Thiele '.;. G nd !eidegger '66T ;. G dd framework hereT

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#2C #%ternati'e 5oesnDt End #%% 1ec"no%ogica% 1"o$g"t
Q. 5t&s irrelevant 4 #ou should decide between competing forms of thought 4 i.e., technological and meditative. The debate here is onl# over the paradigm to frame our discussion+ i.e., debate is a forum for comparing political imaginaries 4 fiat isn&t real either. 7. Ever# instance is ke# 4 again T!5S 5SE'T "9?ETE3 8C E >E: TE, this decision is between competing philosophies, not competing actions. 5t&s like sa#ing, @,e agree with nonviolence, except when we don&tA. S. nd, the ideas matter most 4 discursive framing affects polic# implementation )rameworks 5nstitute %0S [The Jrame6or1s http<QQ....!rame.or1sinstitute.orgQstrategicanalysisQperspective.shtml)
Perspective< Strategic Jrame 8nalysis",

This interdisciplinary .or1 is made possi/le /y the !act that the concept o! !raming is !ound in the literatures o! numerous academic disciplines across the social, /ehavioral and cognitive sciences. Put simply, !raming re!ers to the construct o! a communication O its language, visuals and messengers O and the .ay it signals to the listener or o/server ho. to interpret and classi!y ne. in!ormation.

:# framing, we mean how messages are encoded with meaning so that the# can be efficientl# interpreted in relationship to existing beliefs or ideas. Jrames trigger meaning. The uestions .e as1, in applying the
concept o! !rames to the arena o! social policy, are as !ollo.s< 2o. does the pu/lic thin1 a/out a particular social or political issueS 6hat is the pu/lic discourse on the issueS 8nd ho. is this discourse in!luenced /y the .ay media !rames that issueS 2o. do these pu/lic and private !rames a!!ect pu/lic choicesS

!ow can an issue be reframed to evoke a different wa# of thinking , one that illuminates a broader range of alternative polic# choicesB This approach is strategic in that it not onl# deconstructs the dominant frames of reference that drive reasoning on public issues, but it also identifies those alternative frames most likel# to stimulate public reconsideration and
enumerates their elements &re!raming(. 6e use the term re!rame to mean changing Hthe conte?t o! the message e?changeH so that di!!erent interpretations and pro/a/le outcomes /ecome visi/le to the pu/lic &-earing # Logers, '::>< :;(.

Strategic frame anal#sis offers polic# advocates a wa# to work s#stematicall# through the challenges that are likel# to confront the introduction of new legislation or social policies , to
anticipate attitudinal /arriers to support, and to develop researchB/ased strategies to overcome pu/lic misunderstanding. 6hat 9s Communications and 6hy -oes 9t @atterSThe domain o! communications has not changed mar1edly since ':>; .hen 2arold Lass.ell !ormulated his !amous e uation< 7ho s ys 7h t to 7hom through 7h t ch nnel 7ith 7h t e%%ectB Eut .hat many social policy practitioners have overloo1ed in their uests to !ormulate e!!ective strategies !or social change is that communications merits their attention /ecause it is an ine?trica/le part o! the agendaBsetting !unction in this country. Communications plays a vital role in determining .hich issues the pu/lic prioriti+es !or policy resolution, .hich issues .ill move !rom the private realm to the pu/lic, .hich issues .ill /ecome pressure points !or policyma1ers, and .hich issues .ill .in or lose in the competition !or scarce resources. No organi+ation can approach such tas1s as issue advocacy, constituencyB/uilding, or promoting /est practices .ithout ta1ing into account the critical role that mass media has to play in shaping the .ay 8mericans thin1 a/out social issues. 8s 6illiam 0amson and his colleagues at the @edia Lesearch and 8ction ProCect li1e to say, media is Han arena o! contest in its o.n right, and part o! a larger strategy o! social change.H One source o! our con!usion over communications comes in not recogni+ing that each ne. push !or pu/lic understanding and acceptance happens against a /ac1drop o! longBterm media coverage, o! perceptions !ormed over time, o! scripts .e have learned since childhood to help us ma1e sense o! our .orld, and !ol1 /elie!s .e use to interpret ne. in!ormation. 8s .e go a/out ma1ing sense o! our .orld, mass media serves an important !unction as the mediator o! meaning O telling us .hat to thin1 a/out & gend ?setting( and ho. to thin1 a/out it & medi e%%ects( /y organi+ing the in!ormation in such a .ay & %r ming( that it comes to us !ully con!lated .ith directives & cues( a/out .ho is responsi/le !or the social pro/lem in the !irst place and .ho gets to !i? it & responsi#ility(. 9t is o!ten the case that nonpro!it organi+ations

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.ant communications to /e easy. 9ronically, they .ant sound/ite ans.ers to the same social pro/lems .hose comple?ity they understand all too .ell. 6hile policy research and !ormulation are given their due as tough, demanding areas o! an organi+ationFs .or1plan, communications is seen as Hso!t.H 6hile program development and practice are seen as re uiring e?pertise and the thought!ul consideration o! /est practices, communications is an Hanyone can do it i! you have toH tas1. 9t is time to retire this thin1ing. -oing communications strategically re uires the same investment o! intellect and study that these other areas o! nonpro!it practice have /een accorded. 8 Simple *?planation o! Jrame 8nalysis 9n his seminal /oo1 Pu/lic Opinion &':$'<'=(, 6alter Lippmann .as perhaps the !irst to connect mass communications to pu/lic attitudes and policy pre!erences /y recogni+ing that the H the

wa# in which the world is imagined determines at an# particular moment what men will do .2 The modern extension of Cippmann's observation is based on the concept of 2frames.2 People use mental shortcuts to ma1e sense o! the .orld. Since most people are loo1ing to process
incoming in!ormation uic1ly and e!!iciently, they rely upon cues .ithin that ne. in!ormation to signal to them ho. to connect it .ith their stored images o! the .orld. The Hpictures in our heads,H as Lippmann called them, might /etter /e thought o! as vividly la/eled storage /o?es B !illed .ith pictures, images, and stories !rom our past encounters .ith the .orld and la/eled youth, marriage, poverty, !airness, etc. The incoming in!ormation provides cues a/out .hich is the right container !or that idea or e?perience. 8nd the e!!icient thin1er ma1es the connection, a process called Hinde?ing,H and

how an issue is framed is a trigger to these shared and dura/le cultural models that help us make sense of our world. 6hen a !rame ignites a cultural
moves on. Put another .ay, model, or calls it into play in the interpretation, the .hole model is operative. This allo.s people to reason a/out an issue, to ma1e in!erences, to !ill in the /lan1s !or missing in!ormation /y re!erring to the ro/ustness o! the model, not the s1etchy !rame.

/. 9ur argument deals with the in$round interactions in which we as debaters conceptuali(e action through certain modes of knowledge$ production. 6. This is not an argument 4 #ou wouldn&t accept racism in one instance because #ou can't solve ever# instance 4 if we prove the aff is undesirable then #ou should vote negative. H. ,e don&t need to win that ever#one does the alternative 4 the mere call to resist calculations forces critical reflection =c,horter '.7 [8ssistant Pro!essor o! Philosophy at Northeast @issouri State University &Ladelle, 2eidegger and
the *arth, ed. /y Ladelle @c6horter(4LC)

!eidegger )rustrates ?s. at a Time ,hen the Stakes are So Pery 2igh and -ecisive 8ction is So Loudly and Urgently Called !or, !eidegger 8pparently "alls ?s to >o $ Eothing. 9! 6e
0et Eeyond the Levulsion and 8nger That Such a Call 9nitially 9nspires and 8ctually *?amine the Jeasi/ility o! Lesponse,

,e :egin to ?ndergo the )rustration ttendant ?pon 8aradox+ !ow is 5t 8ossible, 6e 8s1, to "hoose, to 6ill, to >o EothingB the "all 5tself 8laces in Zuestion the :imodal Cogic of ctivit# and 8assivit# M 9t Points up the Parado?ical Nature o! Our Passion !or 8ction, o! Our Passion !or @aintaining Control. the "all 5tself Suggests That 9ur >rive for cting >ecisivel# and Jorce!ully is 8art of ,hat =ust :e Thought Through, That the Earrow 9ption of ,ill 0ersus Surrender is 9ne of the 8ower "onfigurations of "urrent Thinking That =ust :e llowed To >issipate.

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I. ,estern nation must be the ones to lead the revolution because the# are the current technological leaders. 8adrutt '.7
[2anspeter. 2eidegger # The *arth. '::$. 2eidegger and *cology". Pg. %%)

a turning can come about onl# from out of the same place in he world where the modern technical world has emerged 4 and that it cannot take place b# an acceptance of aenBEuddhism or other Easter experiences o! the .orld. This re$thinking needs the help of the European tradition and a new appropriation of it. Thinking is trandsformed onl# through a thinking that has the same origin and destin#.
9t 9 my conviction that

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#2C #%ternati'e not ;ea% <or%d
9nl# b# den#ing the right of technological thought to dominate can we reorient our relationship with technolog# and being<Napan is our historical proof >re#fus '.S [2u/ert, Pro! o! Philosophy V CalBEer1eley, The Cam/ridge Companion to 2eidegger, p. %AD)
2eidegger, ho.ever, sees that Hit .ould /e !oolish to attac1 technology /lindly. 9t .ould /e shortsighted to condemn it as the .or1 o! the devil. 6e depend on technical devicesM they even challenge us to ever greater advancesH &-T 3%, 0 $>W.

there is a wa# we can keep our technological devices and #et remain true to ourselves as receivers of clearings* 2,e can affirm the unavoidable use of technical devices, and also den# them the right to dominate us, and so to warp, confuse, and la# waste our nature H
9nstead, 2eidegger suggests that &-T 3>M 0 $>B$3(. To understand ho. this might /e possi/le, .e need an illustration o! 2eideggerFs important distinction /et.een technology and the technological understanding o! /eing. 8gain .e can turn to 4apan.

5n contemporar# Napan traditional, nontechnological practices still exist alongside the most advanced high$tech production and consumption. The television set and the household gods share the same shelf $ the St#rofoam cup coexists with the porcelain teacup. ,e thus see that the Napanese, at least, can en'o# technolog# without taking over the technological understanding of being.

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#2C Cede t"e ,o%itica%
Q. ,e don&t have to defend all of !eidegger 4 Gthe warrant is !eidegger&s re'ection of democrac#, which we don&t doT 4 we aren&t a total re'ection of an# political engagement ever, we 'ust think the specific technological action of the aff is bad. 7. 8olitical engagement in a technological manner is bad 4 the thesis of our criticism turns 4 participating in management 'ust furthers the c#cle of domination and replication. That's Swa(o '076 S. "J Thiele '.;. The root of politics is depended on the neg's alt. ,e turn the argument. 3e'ecting the neg's critism ends the political. /. Eon$?ni1ue 4 the right&s alread# in power 4 look around #ou 4 there&s onl# a risk the alternative can be a different wa# of looking at the world.. ;. =editative thinking allows us to consider a multiplicit# of perspectives 4 it means we can engage with modern technological societ# without being corrupted b# it, that&s !eidegger and Thiel. 6. 0iew this argument with extreme suspicion 4 Swa(o indicates actomania is propagated b# the expert linkage of thought to action in the modern era.

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#2C C%a$sewit/0Sc".itt
SchmittJ"lausewit( ontolog# causes endless warfare and precludes alternative solutions to conflicts :urke '0H
[Senior Lecturer in Politics and 9nternational Lelations at UNS6, Sydney, and author o! many /oo1s &8nthony, Ontologies o! 6ar< Piolence, *?istence and Leason", Truth # *?istence, 'A<$, aL)

Schmitt claims that his theor# is not biased towards war as a choice
!avours .ar nor militarism, neither imperialism nor paci!ismF(

&F9t is /y no means as though the political signi!ies nothing /ut devastating .ar and every political deed a military action...it neither

but it is hard to accept his caveat at face value.%= ,hen such a theor# takes the form of a social discourse &.hich it does in a general !orm( such an ontolog# can onl# support, as a kind of originar# ground, the basic "lausewit(ian assumption that war can be a rational wa# of resolving political conflicts BB because the import of Schmitt's argument is that such 'political' conflicts are ultimatel# expressed through the possibilit# of war. 8s he says< 'to the enem# concept belongs the ever$present possibilit# of combat'.,J ,here Schmitt meets "lausewit(, as 9 e?plain !urther /elo., the existential and rationalistic ontologies of war 'oin into a closed circle of mutual support and 'ustification. This closed circle o! e?istential and strategic reason generates a num/er o! dangers. Jirstly, the emergence of conflict can generate militar# action almost automaticall# simpl# because the world is conceived in terms of the distinction between friend and enem#+ because the ver# existence of the other constitutes an unacceptable threat, rather than a chain of actions, 'udgements and decisions. &8s the 9sraelis insisted o! 2e+/ollah, they Fdeny our right to e?istF.( This effaces agenc#, causalit# and responsibilit# from polic# and political discourse* our actions can be conceived as independent of the conflict or 1uarantined from critical en1uir# , as necessities that achieve an instrumental purpose /ut do not contri/ute to a ne. and unpredicta/le causal chain. Similarly the "lausewit(ian idea of force BB .hich, /y transporting a Ne.tonian category !rom the natural into the social sciences, assumes the very e!!ect it see1s BB further encourages the resort to militar# violence. ,e ignore the complex histor# of a conflict, and thus the alternative paths to its resolution that such historical anal#sis might provide, b# portra#ing conflict as fundamental and existential in nature+ as possibl# containable or exploitable, but alwa#s irresolvable. >ominant portra#als of the war on terror, and the 9sraeliB8ra/ con!lict, are arguabl# examples of such ontologies in action. Secondly, the militaristic !orce o! such an ontology is visi/le, in Schmitt, in
the a/solute sense o! vulnera/ility .here/y a people can Cudge .hether their Fadversary intends to negate his opponentFs .ay o! li!eF.%; *vo1ing the 1ind o! thin1ing that .ould /ecome controversial in the Eush doctrine, 2egel similarly argues that< ...a state may regard its in!inity and honour as at sta1e in each o! its concerns, ho.ever minute, and it is all the more inclined to suscepti/ility to inCury the more its strong individuality is impelled as a result o! long domestic peace to see1 and create a sphere o! activity a/road. ....the state is in essence mind and there!ore cannot /e prepared to stop at Cust ta1ing notice o! an inCury a!ter it has actually occurred. On the contrary, there arises in addition as a cause o! stri!e the idea o! such an inCury...%:

5dentit#, even more than physical security or autonomy, is put at stake in

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such thinking and can be defended and redeemed through warfare Kor, when taken to a further extreme of an absolute demonisation and dehumanisation of the other, b# mass killing, 'ethnic cleansing' or genocide(. 2o.ever anathema to a classical realist li1e @orgenthau, !or .hom prudence .as a core political virtue,
these have /een in!luential .ays o! de!ining national security and de!ence during the t.entieth century and persists into the t.entyB!irst. The# infused "old ,ar strateg# in the ?nited States &.ith the 1ey policy document NSC=; stating that Fthe SovietBled assault on !ree institutions is .orld.ide no., and ... a de!eat o! !ree institutions any.here is a de!eat every.hereF( >A

and frames dominant ,estern responses to the threat posed b# l Zaeda and like groups &as Tony Elair admitted in $AA=, F6e could have chosen security as the /attleground. Eut .e didnFt. 6e chose values.F( >' 5t has also become influential, in a particularl# tragic and destructive wa# , in 9srael, .here memories o!
the 2olocaust and &all too common( statements /y @uslim and 8ra/ leaders reCecting 9sraelFs e?istence are mo/ilised /y conservatives to Custi!y military adventurism and a reCectionist policy to.ards the Palestinians. On the reverse side o! such ontologies o! national insecurity .e !ind pride and hu/ris, the /elie! that martial preparedness and action are vital or healthy !or the e?istence o! a people. Clause.it+Fs thought is thoroughly im/ued .ith this conviction. Jor e?ample, his de!inition o! .ar as an act o! policy does not re!er merely to the policy o! ca/inets, /ut e?presses the o/Cectives and .ill o!peoples< 6hen .hole communities go to .ar BB .hole peoples, and especially civili+ed peoples BB the reason al.ays lies in some political situation and the occasion is al.ays due to some political o/Cect. 6ar, there!ore, is an act o! policy. >$

Such a perspective prefigures Schmitt's definition of the 'political' Kan earlier translation reads 'war, therefore, is a political act'D, and thus creates an inherent tension between its tendenc# to fuel the escalation of conflict and "lausewit('s declared aim, in defining war as polic# , to prevent war becoming 'a complete, untrammelled, absolute manifestation of violence'.>% Li1e.ise his argument that war is a 'trinit#' of people Kthe source of 'primordial violence, hatred and enmit#'D, the militar# Kwho manage the 'pla# of chance and probabilit#'D and government Kwhich achieve war's 'subordination as an instrument of polic#, which makes it sub'ect to reason alone'D merges the existential and rationalistic conceptions of war into a theoretical unit#. >>

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#2C Co"ran
Q. ,e straight turn action 4 the onl# real warrant is that action&s valuable, but our entire F answers this 4 action presupposes a world described through technological thought, causing our impacts. $ That's all in the overview6 7. ction cannot be made with new thought. ,e are stuck in the current mindset until we ST98 and think, which destro#s the basis for combination 4 that&s the Swa(o '07 evidence+ in the modern age, technolog# and action have become too intertwined. ,e have to be willing to step back from our visions of catastrophe and think meditativel#.

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#2C 5oing Not"ing )ad

Q. @Cetting beA is the opposite of a retreat from action. 5t lets action occur. Thiele '.; [Pro!essor o! Political Science at University o! Jlorida &Leslie Paul, Timely @editations, p.;%() 9penness and releasement do not preclude, but rather invite, activit# and thought. 5n turn, letting$be is not tantamount to a retreat from the world. Zuite the opposite* it entails the formation of worldl# relationships made all the more d#namic because the# are no longer constrained b# the habits of possessive master#. 2eidegger .rites< HThe freedom to reveal something overt lets whatever 'is' at the moment be what it is. )reedom reveals itself as the 'letting$be' of what$is.... The phrase we are now using, namel# the 'letting$be' of what$is, does not, however, refer to indifference and neglect, but to the ver# opposite of them. To let something be is in fact to have something to do with it.... To let what$is be what it is means participating in something overt and its overtness in which ever#thing that 'is' takes up its position.2
-isclosive !reedom is al.ays the !reedom resolutely to .ill openness to Eeing and releasement to /eings.

7. "J Thiele '.; Gand !eidegger '66T. 5t's not doing nothing. 5t's resistence and ontological examination. 3esistance is E9T no action. ,e directl# answer this in the QE".

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#2C Et"ics is 2reater t"an 4nto%og(
Q. This argument makes no sense<ontolog# comes first<the wa# we think about something frames how the problem is perceived. The moment of decision<the wa# we act towards the other<is determined b# how we know the world, which means it&s impossible to develop an ethics towards the other without having an ontolog# first. 7. "an&t reconstruct ethics without ontolog# 4 the# merel# replicate the Nudeo$"hristian model of suffering Carochelle %.. [0il/ert, Philosophy Today &Summer(, Pro uest)
6hile Cevinas only made sporadic re!erence to the 2olocaust in his .or1, his entire philosophy is admittedly impregnated .ith the lessons it teaches. 2o.ever, my argument consists in demonstrating that he is not able to reconstruct metaph#sics without ontolog# , Custice .ithout identity, responsibilit# without sub'ectivit#. 5nstead of actuall#

decentering all points of view, Cevinas seems rather to displace the final legitimac# of histor# from the persecutor to the persecuted, b# giving the victim the final right to ontolog#. Three propositions can serve here to esta/lish the
!rame.or1 !or this re!lection< a( re!le?ivity, as a !orm o! identity, resur!aces in Levinas through the status o! the victim in the 2olocaustM /( his notion of responsibilit# is defined b#

the will to adopt the point of view of the victim and opens onto, in accordance with Nudeo$"hristian tradition, an ontolog# of suffering as a wa# to salvation+ cD that conception of identit# and responsibilit# ends up 'ustif#ing the moral superiorit# of the New , victim par excellence, and of his universal model of 'ustice. The paradox we wish to expose is that the weakness of the victim curiousl# becomes the instrument of a will of power in which the New takes on the form of the 2last man2 in histor# . To
demonstrate these assertions, it seems pertinent !irst to try to understand, through a rereading o! -i!!icult Jreedom, LevinasF o!!ensive against 6estern philosophy and paganism, then to see ho. Na+ism /ecame its .orst mani!estation. Jinally, bringing light onto the victim will

serve to unveil Cevinasian ontolog# and the failure of his decentering effort. S.D Ethics reifies responsibilit# over an# other mode of revealing 4 it represents 'ust another wa# of managing being. =c,horter '.7 [La-elle, Pro!essor o! Philosophy, Northeast @issouri State, also o! the /um/les, '::$, 2eidegger
and the *arth, ed. @c6horter.) 8nd shattered .e may /e, !or our sel!Bunderstanding is at sta1eM in !act, our very selves 5 selves engineered /y the technologies o! po.er that shaped, that are, modernity 5 are at sta1e. 8ny thin1ing that threatens the state. 8s a result, guilt is !amiliar, and, though some.hat uncom!orta/le at times, it comes to !eel almost sa!e. 9t is no surprise, then, that .henever caring people thin1 hard a/out ho. to live .ithQinQon the earth, .e !ind ourselves gro.ing an?ious and, usually,

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Puilt is a standard defense against the call for change as it takes root within us . Eut, i! .e are to
!eeling guilty a/out the .ay .e conduct ourselves in relation to the natural .orld. thin1 .ith 2eidegger, i! .e are to heed his call to re!lect, .e must not respond to it simply /y deploring our decadent li!eB styles and indulging ourselves in a !it o! remorse.

!eidegger's call is not a moral condemnation, nor is it a call to take up some politicall# correct position or some privileged ethical stance. ,hen we respond to 2eideggerFs call as i! it .ere a moral condemnation, we reinstate a discourse in which active agenc# and its pro'ects and responsibilities take precedence over an# other wa# of being with the earth. 5n other words, we insist on remaining within the discourses, the power configurations, of the modern managerial self. 0uilt is a concept 5.hose heritage and meaning occur .ithin the ethical tradition o! the .estern .orld. Eut the histor# of ethical theor# in the west &and it could /e argued that ethical theory only occurs in the 6est( is one .ith the historyBof technological thought. The revelation of things as to$be$ managed and the imperative to be in control work themselves out in the histor# of ethics 'ust as surel# as the# work themselves out in the histor# of the natural and human sciences. /.D 8lacing ethics before ontolog# presupposes a neutral, generic, homogeni(ed 9ther towards which we have responsibilit# 4 this is an 5E>E8EE>EET internal to damnation 4 the aff is too bus# stuffing the 9ther&s mouth with rice to hear the 9ther speak. 0isker '0S
[Ludi, Katholie1e Universiteit Leuven, $AA% &9s ethics !undamentalS Ruestioning Levinas on irresponsi/ility", Continental Philosophy Levie., %=< $=%5%A$) These /road stro1es should su!!ice to give us the outline o! Levinas, ethics o! responsi/ility. 8dmittedly, it not only seems to /e coherentM /ut is also uite attractive. Jor it is no dou/t the central place this ethics reserves !or the Other that e?plains .hy people are so impressed /y it, as Levinas himsel! seems have reali+ed uite early. 9n ':=; . . . all values .ere /eing contested as /ourgeois 5 this .as uite impressive 5 all e?cept !or one< the other. . . . [*)ven .hen a language against the other resounds, language !or the other is heard /ehind it" &LTE, p. ::(. 9ndeed,

the otherness of the 9ther seems to have become our obsession. 5t is an otherness we should respect, learn !rom, and refrain from reducing to a cop# of ourselves 5 as .e have done !or too long 5 in a euroB or occidentalocentrism that, li1e 1ing @idas, fatall# turned whatever it encountered, into of cop# of what it had wished to be the ideal .orld.'D Eut this world turned out to be uninhabitable, the lonel# world of knowledge where ever#thing has finall# become familiar and thus uninteresting, and .here .e have /ecome, as a result, terri/ly alone, /ored /y everything including ourselves. 9n
short, .e,re !aced .ith the crisis o! the *uropean sciences that, as 2usserl remar1s in the opening o! his last great /oo1, no longer seem to have anything to say" a/out the uestions that are decisive !or genuine humanity."'; 9s it not time to dig a hole in .hich .e can /ury our shameS Jirst philosophy has don1ey,s ears" 5 is it not that con!ession !or .hich .e are truly grate!ul to Levinas, .hose ethics o! the Other !inally Custi!ies our desire to /rea1 .ith the pastS 8nd .hat a /rea1 it is< The discovery o! the value o! cultures and o! the su/cultures .ithin these cultures. 8 vulgar criti ue o! pure Cudgment &Eourdieu(. The triumph o! multiculturalism. 8nd .ithin that triumphant cele/ration o! alterity, a ne. so/riety< one should learn one,s lessons !rom the past, and avoid, !or e?ample, reducing the Other to a culture 5 not ours, /ut hisQhersQtheirsZ One should avoid homogeni+ation /y letting himQherQthem /e a/sor/ed /y a ne. totality 5 the other" culture&s( 5 !or that .ould /e /ut another .ay o! la/eling and controlling others /y ma1ing them recogni+a/le. Eesides, one should perhaps mistrust all this tal1 a/out multiculturalism. 9s it not, in truth, an ideology that simply serves to mas1 late capitalism,s true contradictions< e?ploitation, deprivation, repressionS': 8 !alse consciousness, to /e sureZ Eut then again, !or @ar?,

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ideology is not simply a !alse consciousness /ut the correct consciousness o! a !alse .orld. 9n covering up its inCustice, multiculturalism at least indirectly testi!ies to the need !or such a coverBup, and in the !alse harmony it preaches, there is

5n all this confusion, clearl# one value keeps us going* the 9therness of the 9ther. !isJ!er hunger , as Levinas says, is sacred. :ut can this hunger be approached , as Levinas /elieves, ob'ectivel#A &T9, p. $A', uoted a/ove(S -oes it provide us .ith a !irm standardS Couldn,t it /e con!using us, in its turnS )or human beings not onl# need to be kept alive . The !ood one o!!ers to humans should, lest one treats them as cattle, /e spiced. 8lain )inkielkraut, .ho considers himsel! a disciple o! Levinas,$' comes across this complication without noticing that it makes the whole edifice tumble. @The reverse side of the humanitarian concern with suffering," he says, @is a disdain for ever#thing in life which does not let itself be reduced to Cife in the biological sense of the term ."$$ 8nd in a chilling passage in .hich he protests again against this Olympian indi!!erence to.ard a peasant humanity" &CC, p. ;;( 5 a humanit# that is more than such a biological life, that has all sorts of customs and practices which divide it 5 he .rites, To save lives, such is the global task of the doctor without frontiers+ he is too bus# filling the hungr# mouth with rice, to still have time to listen to what it is tr#ing to sa#A &2P, p. '$;(. )inkielkraut protests against a uniformi(ation in suffering . 9n the end, pain would be the final e1uali(er+ we all moan and cr# the same wa#. The 9l#mpian indifference about which he is so shoc1ed .ould /e, in !act, a refusal to take into account @the meaning which people give to their existenceA &CC, p. ;;( 5 a meaning about which, needless to sa#, the# do not agree. Spices are important, /ut it is hard to prove .hy they are. Li1e everything important in li!e, the# are without reason. ,e do not bur# our dead simpl# because we are afraid of epidemics 4 there would then be more efficient wa#s of getting rid of them, some sort o! gar/ageBservice, perhaps. 5t is important how we bur# them M and on this, there is no agreement 5 not even among the monotheistic religions. ,e can, o! course, give some sort of @explanationA !or our practices &e.g., !or /eing /uried on your right side, .ith your head !acing @ecca rather than @adrid(, but the process will soon come to a fruitless end &.hy the head and not the !eetS
nonetheless the desire !or happiness, !or a /etter .orld.$A .hy lying on the right side, rather than on the le!t or the /ac1S( Such things are e?tremely important &hence the e?istence o! 7multicultural, graveyards(, /ut .e cannot prove" .hy they are. They are, so to spea1, /oth necessary and ar/itrary.

The# are like that because the# are like that . 8nd it ma# not alwa#s be pleasant to be confronted with our incapacit# to full# argue for what is trul# important to us, to full# account for those practices that constitute the inner core of our intimacies. 5t is as if this incapacit# is somehow improper. 2o. can .hat is most our o.n /e something .e so poorly possess that .e cannot even give conclusive argument !or itS )inkielkraut&s protest against a humanitarianism that does not allow @the words Gof the 9therT to reach the domain of its careA &2P, p. '$;( is no doubt 'ustified. Eut .hat e?actly is happening hereS ,h# do these words not reach meB "ould it be that precisel# because these words do not reach me, 5 prefer to stuff the 9ther&s mouth with rice B 6hat is the status o! this not reaching," this not hearing"S 5s there, then, some sort o! appeal, .hich 5 contrary to .hat Levinas had told us 5 5 can not hearB "an there be some sort of insensitivit# or impassibilit# between

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me and the 9ther that points to something other than the attempt to sedateJanaestheti(e a prior sensitivit#S Could it /e that, i! there is something in this li!e o! the
Other to .hich 9 do not respond, this lac1 o! response on my part is something uite di!!erent !rom any attempt to mu!!le .hat in me has already respondedS 9nsensitivity, impassi/ility, nonBresponse< could it /e that .hat announces itsel! here, should not /e understood in the privative modeS 9s any other .ay to understand these nonBresponses possi/le, ho.ever, once one has em/raced &li1e Jin1iel1raut, in the same /oo1( the principles o! a philosophy li1e that o! Levinas 5 a philosophy .hich has perhaps not /y accident e?pressed a similar disdain !or .hat is peasant in humanity and sung the praise o! Socrates .ho pre!erred the to.n to the countryside and the trees"S 2ere is the passage immediately preceding sentence, .here Cevinas seems to speak from his heart* 9ne&s implementation in a landscape, one&s attachment to 8lace, without which the universe would become insignificant and would scarcel# exist [Levinas is rendering here .hat he sees as 2eidegger,s vie.), is the ver# splitting of humanit# into natives and strangers. nd in this light Gsupreme provocation against !eideggerT technolog# is less dangerous than the spirits of the 8lace. Technolog# does awa# with the privileges of this enrootedness and the related sense of exile. 5t goes be#ond this alternative. 5t is not a 1uestion of returning to the nomadism that is as incapable as sedentar# existence of leaving behind a landscape and a climate. Technolog# wrenches us out of the !eideggerian world and the superstitions surrounding the 8lace. Jrom this point on, an opportunity appears to us< to perceive men outside the situations in .hich they are placed, and let the human !ace shine in all its nudity &-J, pp. $%$5$%%(. Cet us linger with this passage, for it is crucial if we are to understand wh# )inkielkraut ma# be raising an issue that can onl# be taken seriousl# once one leaves the alternatives that Cevinas allows here. s Cevinas sees it, the choice is either being @attachedA to or @complementedA in a landscape, a 8lace, a climate 4 in short, being en$rooted 4 or being without such attachment. This latter unrootedness," ho.ever, is no mere a/sence. 9t is not, for Cevinas, a handicap, /ut a positive capacity< the a/ility to leave /ehind all such roots. To trul# perceive the 9ther as a human being presupposes that one is wrenched out of one&s native world 4 that the ties b# which that world holds us are broken. 5t thus presupposes an emancipation< a doing a.ay .ith that mancipium that holds us in its spell.$% Technolog# can break that @ gripA b# situating us in a space in which the division between the autochthonous and the allochthonous no longer makes sense. !ence, it is surel# no coincidence that Cevinas never emplo#s the latter term in reference to the 9ther . 6hereas the 9 is said to /e this autochthonous 5 enrooted in .hat it is not [and yet) .ithin this enrootedness, independent and separated" &T9, p. '>%( 5

the 9ther is never referred to as the one belonging to a different &allo( soil &chthoon(. !e or she is, instead, consistentl# called a Stranger, someone without a homeland &apatride( who is @outside the situation in which he or she is placed.A nd again this @outsideA or this @withoutA are positive 1ualifications, not privative ones< it is than1s to them, it seems, that the human !ace can shine in all
its nudity. 6hoever is native" .ill !irst have to unlearn hisQher in/orn tendency to treat that nudity as a lac1 o! something

To overcome the division between natives KinsideD and strangers Koutside of that insideD, means to break with the meaning privative reasoning bestows on these
the Other should have in order to /elong to the community o! those .ho are inside."

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terms. Eetter still, it means to turn this reasoning against itsel!. Jor, to be a native 5 to /e inside" 5 is in fact itself a shortcoming. 5t refers to the incapacit# to have broken with what Totalit# and 5nfinit# calls participation . 9n this condition, one is still part o! a .hole to .hich one !inds onesel! su/Cected. 9ne is spell$bound, under the spell of some >ifference to which one finds oneself attached to the point of being pre$ 'udged, for it is precisel# this difference which will render one indifferent to those who seem to lack these ver# same ties. 5t is onl# b# breaking its spell 4 whether with the help of technolog# , as the a/ove uote suggests, or through the appeal of the 9ther , as other te?ts tell us$> 5 that one is able to accede to that @non$indifferenceA which Cevinas sees as our deepest essence* responsibilit#. The a/ove is as !air a comment as 9 could give on the passage that concerns us here and in
.hich, as 9 no. hope to have sho.n, Levinas indeed spea1s !rom his heart. Leaving the polemics .ith 2eidegger aside,$3

one can perhaps begin to see wh# )inkielkraut, in complaining about the @9l#mpian indifference toward a peasant humanit#,A ma# have raised an issue that does not fit at all well with the wa# Cevinas would want to approach this issue. 5ndeed, whereas for Cevinas @peasantismA breeds @indifferenceA 4 both categories characteri(ing the @nativeA 4 )inkielkraut seems to see in @peasantismA something that characteri(es both m# humanit# and that of the 9ther. There is, as it were, something @peasantA about the human condition as such. 6hether it /e that o! /eings .ho live in the
to.n or in the countryside, the human condition .ould appear to o.e its humanity to .hat Jin1iel1raut 5 .ith another &and to my mind< /etter( metaphor 5 calls an inscription in a .orld."

,ithout such inscription, a

human being would be reduced to anon#mit#, i.e., .ould /e nothing more than a collection o! /odily !unctions, nothing else than the anonymous organic li!e that pulsates in him" &2P, p. '$;(. 9ne would be what )inkielkraut elsewhere calls a @victimA 4 @ a human being severed from its surroundings and its roots, who no longer has a spot and a situation of his own, whose essence and possibilities are taken awa# from him" &2P, p. '%$(. Our uestion then is this. 5s the Cevinasian 9ther such a victimB 5f so, is this due to an implicit naturali(ation of hisJher othernessS Let us not discuss this uestion straighta.ay, /ut try to clear up the apparent con!usion o! tongues that
may ma1e it di!!icult to hear .hat e?actly is /eing addressed /y it.

;. >welling is the onl# wa# ethics can be full# cultivated. 3ather than defining ethical values as static and universal rules, dwelling allows ethics to be more fluid and d#namic. !atab '.H
[La.rence 4., Pro!essor o! Philosophy at Old -ominion University, *T29CS 8N- J9N9TU-*< 2eideggerian Contri/utions to @oral Philosophy, http<QQ....!ocusing.orgQapm\papersQhata/.html) -.elling &6ohnen( is a .ord that occupied 2eideggerFs later thin1ing. Eut it is completely consistent .ith, and e?pressive o!, the nono/CectiveBnonsu/Cective con!iguration o! /eingBinBtheB.orld delineated in the early .ritings.

The word

2dwelling2 captures both 2sub'ective2 and 2ob'ective2 tones &human meaning and the environment .hich .e inha/it(, but in a single, indivisible, existential term. The

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word in all its resonances becomes !eidegger's replacement for traditional sub'ect$ob'ect ontologies. 9n Letter on 2umanism, 2eidegger ta1es up the 0ree1 .ord
ethos in its sense o! a/ode and d.elling place, and concludes that his ontological investigations might then /e called an Horiginal ethicsH &p. $%3(. 8lthough this ans.er is a typically unsatis!ying Hend runH around the speci!ic uestion regarding

a normative ethics can benefit from attention to ethos$as$dwelling, that we can ask 1uestions about how we dwell ethicall#, and how we should dwell in the world. !eidegger's notion of dwelling offers two main contributions to moral philosoph#M the !irst points /ac1 to and summari+es preceding sections o! my te?t, the second points !or.ard to the rest o! my essay< QD 0alues can not be understood as either ob'ective or sub'ective conditions+ the# are modes of being$in$the$ world. 7D :eing$ethical$in$the$world must be understood as radicall# finite. Jor 2eidegger, !rom /eginning to end, !rom /eingBinBtheB.orld to the !our!old, dwelling means being at home in the finitude of :eing , in its mixture of presence and absence, especiall# in terms of human mortalit# and the limit conditions of unconcealment. -.elling is contrasted .ith the H!lightH !rom Eeing indicated in the closure o! metaphysical systems and the uest !or certainty and control. >welling names something li1e .hat the poet 4ohn Keats called Hnegative capa/ility,2 the capacit# to live with conditions of uncertaint# , or as 9 .ould
the possi/ility o! ethics in 2eideggerFs thin1ing, 9 /elieve that .e can go /eyond 2eideggerFs ontological !i?ation, that put it, a reconciliation .ith !initude. 8lthough d.elling has a positive content suggesting a sense o! placement in the .orld to counter radical versions o! s1epticism, phenomenalism, or anarchism, it also presents a deep challenge in that .e must

The same radical finitude can be shown in our ethical dwelling. 5n fact, this finitude has alwa#s been acknowledged in moral philosoph#, but it was deemed a deficienc# that either needed correcting or that prevented ethics from achieving intellectual legitimation. The moral life is alwa#s faced with cognitive, ps#chological, empirical, and practical limits , .hich are e!!ectively
e?ist in a .orld .ithout !oundations, guarantees, or ultimateresolution o! e?istential di!!iculties. e?pressed in the mi?ture o! presence and a/sence that rings in 2eideggerFs !avorite .ord, aletheia, unconcealment<

0alues are not grounded in proof or demonstration+ the moral arena is marked b# disagreement and conflict+ moral situations are often complex and ambiguous, where outcomes are uncertain, where goods conflict with each other, .here a /alance o! di!!ering interests is hard to gaugeBB/ut we have to decide and sometimes all we are left with is an ab#ssal moment of choice+ we sometimes fail in our aim for the good, or in doing good we sometimes instigate harmful effectsM e?treme or degraded environments can ruin ethical potentialM ethical commitments often re1uire risk and sacrifice, which makes anxiet# and mixed dispositions inevitable. The value of !eidegger's notion of dwelling is that we are forced to give up the idea that such conditions of finitude are 2deficiencies.2 This is the ethical world, and the m#th of pure 2presence2 must be surrendered in moral philosoph# no less than in ontolog#. The pro/lem .ith ethical /elie!s that insulate the good !rom limit conditions is not simply a philosophical !la.. There is an irony that history has demonstrated all too o!ten< The 2purer2 the concept of the good, the greater the capacit# to do evil on its behalf. 6ith a de!initi+ed ideal, the
.orld no. appears H!allenH and in need o! re!ormM .hen elements in the .orld continue to resist or !all short, there arises a potential to commit terror in the name o! Hsalvation.H

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#2C Ha3er.as Kritik o6 Heidegger0?i%%a E'idence
!abermas&s criti1ue of !eidegger is false 4 the alternative can aid the recover# of praxis 0illa '.6
8s [Pro!essor o! Political Theory at Notre -ame &-ana, 8rendt and 2eidegger, p $$:B%A, L/atra)

with the devaluation of intersub'ectivit# in :eing and Time , .hat starts out as a criti1ue b# !abermas and his !ollo.ers rapidly degenerates into a !airly crude campaign to place !eidegger&s thought outside the boundaries of the ,estern tradition. 6hether .ill!ul &early( or non.ill!ul &later(, !eidegger&s thought is presented as inelucta/ly leading to a worship of authorit# and a cele/ration o! o/edience. The problem with this interpretation is that it so full# hinges upon the binar# of voluntarism and fatalism , evils one supposedl# slides into the moment reason&s power to comprehensivel# ad'udicate competing ends, or the sub'ect&s power to act autonomousl#, is 1uestioned.'$D Thus, .hile the proponents o! communicative rationality employ 8rendt to e?pose a very real /lind spot in 2eidegger,s thought, their desire to exclude him from an# conversation about what postmetaph#sical conceptions of action, freedom, and agenc# might look like produces a caricature. This , 9 suggest, is a function of two factors* first, a reif#ing, metaph#sical interpretation of the ontological difference , which enables the view that :eing is @an all$powerful metasub'ectA+ second, a failure to penetrate the surface of !eidegger&s thought in order to see how his criti1ue of productionist metaph#sics and the @technical interpretation of actionA might be appropriated precisel# to aide in the recover# of praxis. These themes .ill /e e?plored !urther /elo., /ut !irst 9 .ish to turn to the matter o!
plausi/le and help!ul 8rendt,s o.n 2eidegger criti ue.

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#2C &ndi'id$a% C"oice So%'es ?a%$e to Li6e
Eo, it doesn&t. 9ne&s own perception of value to life does not e1ual ontolog#. The reason @lives become worthlessA is not that people become depressed to the point where the#&re suicidal or whatever. 3ather, it is that our relation to the world has become fundamentall# changed. 5t is an epistemological mindset. The affirmative has essentiall# locked us in ontological cages. Eo matter what we think or wish, those cages still exist. The onl# wa# out is to refuse that worldview altogether, to restore ontological creativit# b# allowing being to be fluid, to flow out of the cages the aff has established. G#ou can also think of it in terms of having a disease. The aff is like, diseases don&t suck at all6 ,e can still en'o# doing things we choose to en'o#. :ut, #ou&re still sick.T

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#2C &n6inite E$stice 85errida9
Q. The# do not access this evidence. "alculation is not monolithic. ,e don&t re'ect all calculation, we re'ect technological revealing specificall#. This evidence is E9T talking about calculation of energ# as technolog# being good. 5t is talking about the calculation of 'ustice. 5t sa#s that the notion of what @'usticeA is, although it is an infinite ideal be#ond determination, should be calculated to prevent reappropriation b# @the worstA purposes. The affirmative does not attempt to redefine 'ustice+ in fact, the# operate within their own preconceived notions of what would be best. This is the opposite of what >errida advocates. The#&ve simpl# underlined where >errida uses the term @calculationA but the#&ve left out his explanation. 7. >errida would vote negative. ,e&ve indicted their preconceived worldviews, which is what >errida means b# the phrase @we must take it as far as possible.A !e means that we should calculate be#ond the current ideological coordinates, which the aff has un1uestioningl# accepted.

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#2C Kete%s

Fetels votes negative 4 Fetels indicates a, 1uote, @gradual transformation of human consciousnessA would solve what he proposes 4 that&s exactl# meditative thought. The human dimension is exactl# what is missing from the affirmative. Technological thought functions as a net benefit.

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#2C Kritik is ,ri.iti'ist
Q. The criti1ue doesn't strive to recreate the past 4 =erel# to re'ect the demand that nature become ordered and calculable 4 The alternative breaks down the illusion.

!eidegger '/.

[@artin. The $Ath century,s SlavoC. The =uestion 2oncerning Technology. ':>:. 4COOK)

The modern ph#sical theor# of nature prepares the wa# not simpl# for technolog# but for the essence of modern technolog#. Jor such gatheringBtogether,
.hich challenges man to reveal /y .ay o! ordering, already holds s.ay in physics. Eut in it that gathering does not yet come e?pressly to the !ore. @odern physics is the herald o! en!raming, a herald .hose provenance is still un1no.n. The essence o! modern technology has !or a long time /een concealed, even .here po.er machinery has /een invented, .here electrical technology is in !ull s.ing, and .here atomic technology is .ell under .ay. 8ll coming to presence, not only modern technology, 1eeps itsel! every.here concealed to the last. Nevertheless, it remains, .ith respect to its holding s.ay, that .hich precedes all< the earliest. The 0ree1 thin1ers already 1ne. o! this .hen they said< That .hich is earlier .ith regard to its rise into dominance /ecomes mani!est to us men only later. That .hich is Zprimally early sho.s itsel! only ultimately to men. There!ore,

in the realm of thinking, a painstaking effort to think through still more primall# what was primall# thought is not the absurd wish to revive what is past, but rather the sober readiness to be astounded before the coming of the dawn. Chronologically spea1ing, modern physical science
/egins in the seventeenth century. 9n contrast, machineBpo.er technology develops only in the second hal! o! the eighteenth century. Eut modern technology, .hich !or chronological rec1oning is the later, is, !rom the point o! vie. o! the essence holding s.ay .ithin it, historically earlier.

5f modern ph#sics must resign itself ever increasingl# to the fact that its realm of representation remains inscrutable and incapable of being visuali(ed, this resignation is not dictated b# an# committee of researchers. 5t is challenged forth b# the rule of enframing, which demands that nature be orderable as standing$ reserve. 2ence ph#sics, in its retreat !rom the 1ind o! representation that turns only to o/Cects, .hich has /een the sole standard until recently, will never be able to renounce this one thing< that nature report itself in some wa# or other that is identifiable through calculation and that it remain orderable as a s#stem of information. This system is then
determined /y a causality that has changed once again. Causality no. displays neither the character o! the occasioning that /rings !orth nor the nature o! the causa et!iciens, let alone that o! the causa !ormalis. 9t seems as though causality is shrin1ing into a reportingOa reporting challenged !orthOo! standingBreserves that must /e guaranteed either simultaneously or in se uence. To this shrin1ing .ould correspond the process o! gro.ing resignation that 2eisen/ergFs lecture depicts in so impressive a manner. FEecause the essence o! modern technology lies in en!raming,

modern

technolog# must emplo# exact ph#sical science. Through its so doing the deceptive appearance arises that modern technology is applied physical science. This illusion can maintain itself precisel# insofar as neither the essential provenance of modern science nor indeed the essence of modern technolog# is ade1uatel# sought in our 1uestioning.

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#2C Lato$r
Q. )atalismJ"reativit# >istinction 4 ,e don&t sa# do nothing forever 4 we sa# should meditativel# think over things before acting. 7. ,e don&t sa# technolog# 8398E3 can&t have being 4 we sa# technological T!9?P!T is bad. This evidence is based off a sill# misreading of !eidegger. S. 5nternalJExternal >istinction 4 this card actuall# goes negative 4 it sa#s we shouldn&t determine the sub'ectivit# of others 4 that&s exactl# what the aff does through technological thought 4 the alternative solves this evidence b# allowing people to determine their own sub'ectivit# 4 even if the# win a link, the aff is far more hegemonic. /. There are no actual warrants in the card. The argument boils down to, @5 think !eidegger&s wrong because there is actuall# being in other things. ,h#B :ecause despite what !eidegger thinks, there is in fact being there.A 8refer our anal#sis. ;. The point of ontological damnation is that #ou cannot know that #ou are ontologicall# damned 4 when we weigh impacts in a certain manner all alternative viewpoints are viewed with suspicion 4 err negative on the 1uestion of risk in terms of problemati(ing the wa# the# relate to the world 4 we are winning a big enough risk that what the aff proposes is a terrible wa# to conceptuali(e life6

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#2C 7$st #ct

Q. Extend Swa(o '07. ,e can't create change without first stepping back and thinking. 7. The call to act is precisel# the link 4 calculative action presupposes a world described through technological thought, turning case and causing our impacts 4 that&s all in the overview. The entire F answers this. S. 9ntolog# prefigures fundamental meaning 4 their argument makes no sense without an accurate ontolog# 4 the F must come prior. 8olicies that can solve can appear after #ou vote negative. >illon '.. [@ichael, Pro!. o! Politics V University o! Lancaster, @oral Spaces, p. :DB:;)
2eirs to all this, .e !ind ourselves in the tur/ulent and no. glo/ali+ed .a1e o! its con!luence. 8s 2eideggerBhimsel! an especially revealing !igure o! the deep and mutual implication o! the philosophical and the political >Bnever tired o! pointing

the relevance of ontolog# to all other kinds of thinking is fundamental and inescapable. Jor one cannot sa# an#thing about an#thing that is, without alwa#s alread# having made assumptions about the is as such . n# mode of thought, in short, al.ays already carries an ontolog# se1uestered within it. ,hat this ontological turn does to other regional modes o! thought is to challenge the ontolog# within which the# operate. The implications of that review reverberate throughout the entire mode of thought, demanding a reappraisal as !undamental as the reappraisal ontology has demanded o! philosophy. ,ith ontolog# at issue, the entire foundations or underpinnings of an# mode of thought are rendered problematic. This applies as much to any modern discipline o!
out, thought as it does to the given up the ontological uestion o! modernity as such, .ith the e?ception, it seems, o! science, .hich, having long ago uestioning o! .hen it called itsel! natural philosophy, appears no., in its industriali+ed and

,ith its foundations at issue, the ver# authorit# of a mode of thought and the wa#s in which it characteri(es the critical issues of freedom and 'udgment Kof what kind of universe human beings inhabit, how the# inhabit it, and what counts as reliable knowledge for them in it( is also put in 1uestion. The very .ays in .hich Niet+sche, 2eidegger, and other continental philosophers challenged 6estern ontolog#, simultaneously, there!ore reposed the fundamental and inescapable difficult#, or aporia, for human being of decision and 'udgment. 9n other .ords, whatever ontolog# #ou subscribe to, knowingl# or unknowingl#, as a human being #ou still have to act. ,hether or not #ou know or acknowledge it, the ontolog# #ou subscribe to will construe the problem of action for #ou in one wa# rather than another. Gou may thin1 ontology is some arcane uestion o! philosophy, /ut Niet+sche and 2eidegger sho.ed that it intimatel# shapes not onl# a wa# of thinking , but a wa# of being, a form of life. >ecision, a !ortiori political decision, in short, is no mere
corporati+ed !orm, to /e invulnera/le to ontological pertur/ation.

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techni1ue. 5t is instead a wa# of being that bears an understanding of :eing, and of the fundaments of the human wa# of being within it. This applies, indeed applies most, to those mock innocent political slaves who claim onl# to be technocrats of decision making. /. @Cetting beA is the opposite of a retreat from action. 5t lets action occur. Thiele '.; [Pro!essor o! Political Science at University o! Jlorida &Leslie Paul, Timely @editations, p.;%() 9penness and releasement do not preclude, but rather invite, activit# and thought. 5n turn, letting$be is not tantamount to a retreat from the world. Zuite the opposite* it entails the formation of worldl# relationships made all the more d#namic because the# are no longer constrained b# the habits of possessive master#. 2eidegger .rites< HThe freedom to reveal something overt lets whatever 'is' at the moment be what it is. )reedom reveals itself as the 'letting$be' of what$is.... The phrase we are now using, namel# the 'letting$be' of what$is, does not, however, refer to indifference and neglect, but to the ver# opposite of them. To let something be is in fact to have something to do with it.... To let what$is be what it is means participating in something overt and its overtness in which ever#thing that 'is' takes up its position.2
-isclosive !reedom is al.ays the !reedom resolutely to .ill openness to Eeing and releasement to /eings.

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#2C Na/is.
Q. Ea(ism is the product of humanism, not its re'ection < !eidegger&s alignment with Ea(ism was a product of his inabilit# to follow his own advice. 8ease '.S [-onald, 2umanitiesO-artmouth, '::%. 9ntroduction, 2eidegger and Eum/le/ees /y Spanos, p. ?i?B?) it is difficult not to affiliate this factor with the Ea(i residue sedimented in !eidegger&s philosoph#. Philippe LacoueBLa/arthe gave this interanimation o! Na+ism and humanism the !ollo.Bing description< Ea(ism is a humanism in that it rests on a determination of humanitas, .hich is in its eyes more po.er!ul, i.e., more e!!ective, than any other. The su/Cect o! a/solute sel!Bcreation, even i! it transcends all the determinations of the modern sub'ect in an immediatel# natural position &the particularity o! race(, bring together and concreti(es these same determinations &as does Stalinism .ith the su/Cect o! a/solute sel!B production( and sets itself up as the sub'ect, absolutel# speaking. The !act that this
2aving disBcovered the li/eral humanism at .or1 in Spanos, o.n retrieval o! 2eidegger, su/Cect lac1s the universality that seems to de!ine the hum nit s o! humanism in the usual sense does not, ho.ever, ma1e Na+ism and antiBhumanism. Ruite simply it !its Na+ism into the logic, o! .hich there are many other e?amples, o! the reali+ation and concreti+ation o! a/stractions." '' Eut i! 2eidegger,s adherence to Na+ism cannot, in the last instance, /e understood as separa/le !rom the li/eral humanism o! his detractors, can Spanos,s destruction" o! li/eral humanism /e understood as a tacit reconstruction o! &2eidegger,s( residual adherence to Na+i humanismS Spanos e?plains .hy it de!initely c nnot in the !ollo.ing succinct account o! 2eidegger,s involvement .ith Na+ism< 9t .ill have to su!!ice !or this

!eidegger&s failure to perceive and fulfill the sociopoliticalD emancipator# imperatives of his destructive ontological pro'ect in the context of his own historicall# specific occasion
conte?t to suggest all too summarily that practical &i.e. Oto ma1e thin1ing overtly a critical theory," as it .ereO.as in some !undamental sense, perhaps, the result o! a com/ination o! his vestigial nostalgic loyalty to the separation o! theori and pr 6is inscri/ed /y the postBSocratics into the philosophical tradition and an une?amined nationalism that reinscri/ed, against his destructive discourse, the principle o! ethnic &not racial( identity. 6hatever the source o! this !ailure.. I 9t is possi/leI that

his apparent complicit# with Ea(ism was the result of the tension on the one hand between the political circumstances in which he was teaching and writing, circumstances, that is, .hich demanded an indirect rather than overt con!rontation o! the /rutal e?cesses o! the Na+i regime, and on the other, his overdetermined commitment to the criti1ue of ,estern technological imperialism. To focus his discourse after the brief period of the rectorship &8pril ':%% to Je/ruary ':%>( on the enormities o! the Na+i,s atrocities wouldI especially a!ter the .ar, be to read it as a tacit ac1no.ledgement and confirmation of the ,estern metaph#sical principle that, according to his essential thought, had come to its end in the globali(ation of technik. 5t would, in short, tacitl# reprieve the ,est&s essential complicit# in the making of the Ea(i machine and the horrors it perpretrated.

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7. 9ur reading of !eidegger avoids Ea(ism. 8ease '.S [-onald, 2umanitiesO-artmouth, '::%. 9ntroduction, 2eidegger and Eum/le/ees /y Spanos, p. ?viiBiii)
Spanos,s intervention disclosed the political conse uences o! the *uropeans, appropriation to /e t.o!old< they authori+ed their /elated 8merican !ollo.ers to understand 2eidegger,s te?ts as super!luous" and to institutionali+e a representation

Spanos rediscovers in these post$ !eideggereans the fault that originated with !eidegger+ that is, the failure to theori(e the political implication of a historicall# pol#valent logocenter, which restricts their critical discourse to the generali(ed site of ontolog# at the expense of sociopolitical criti1ue. !aving thereb# @retrievedA a second !eideggerianism as the European post$ !eideggereans& failure to theori(e the lateral continuum of :eing , Spanos
o! temporal di!!erence as -erridean te?tuality." 9n essence, e?ports this ne. postB2eideggerian tradition to the site o! the 8merican appropriation, .here it counters -avidson,s recurperative retrieval" o! li/eral humanism. That Spanos !inds the entire lateral continuum itsel! in danger o! disappearing at the site o! the 8merican appropriation o! the 2eidegger uestion discloses the sta1es o! Spanos,s proCect.

5n @retrievingA !eidegger&s destructive hermeneutics in a site missing from !eidegger&s own pro'ect, Spanos uite literally produces, as an %ter?the?% ct e6tenu ting circumst nce, the sociopolitical criti1ue that , had it /een availa/le at the time o! 2eidegger,s .artime .ritings, would have rendered him immune to Ea(ism. S. !itler wore pants. The# wear pants. This doesn't make them Ea(is. Nust because we read a card about a gu# who was at one point a na(i doesns't make us na(is nor his philosoph# inherentl# Ea(i philososph#. This argument is stupid. Oou have not proven causalit#. /. 5deolog# isn't enough to cause impacts. 5t takes people and idividuals who activate the cores of the ideologies. )reedman 'QQ [4esse. 4UN*, '%, $A''. 2istorical @usings. http<QQ/oo1sin
musings.html. 4COOK) 8s a history teacher, 9,ve al.ays !ound it interesting to discuss .ith high schoolers the complicated idea o! 7causation, &that ./logspot.comQ$A''QA=QhistoricalB

,hat&s striking a/out conversations involving this topic is the extent to which students are willing &o!ten through no !ault o! their o.n( to attribute events to ideologies 4 as if Ea(ism itself were responsible for the !olocaust. Legarding Na+ism &and Jascism, too(, 9 stress that, without Ea(is, Ea(ism &as an ideology( would have been unable to do, .ell, to do an#thing. This, 9 thin1, is 1ey< that students con!ront the idea that s#stems of belief are not , in and o! themselves, capable of destruction. 5deolog# becomes dangerous 5 in a historical sense 5 when individuals activate their core tenets. 8t the high school level, conversations involving causation
is, .hat caused, .hat contri/uted to, past events(. can lead in other directions as .ell. @ost re.arding, 9 thin1, are those .hich involve the idea o! 7attri/ution., Continuing !or a moment .ith the e?ample o! the Second 6orld 6ar< students must address in their thin1ing the notion that 0ermany &.ith a capital 70,( .as not in itsel! responsi/le !or the 2olocaust. True, that country initiated the events .hich conspired against *urope,s 4e.s, /ut again, a nation cannot act .ithout individuals.

To attribute to Perman#

&as

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blame for the !olocaust seems, there!ore, as irresponsible as attributing that same umbrella of blame to Ea(ism. 8!ter discussions involving ideology and attri/ution, students, 9 !ind, are more e!!ectively positioned to handle the cru? o! the issue involving causation 5 that is, that individuals, and individual action, trigger historical events. To get at the 2olocaust, students need to .restle .ith documents .hich re!lect the mindset, the priorities, o!
many te?t /oo1s do( the 0erman people

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#2C No Scenario
Q. Turns case 4 our F functions as a case turn, even in a post$fiat world in addition to discursivel# 4 continuing the logic of technolog# can onl# exacerbate the harms of the aff. That's Swa(o and Thiele. 7. Oou gotta defend #our discourse 4 if we win a link, that ideolog# is to be considered part of the aff advocac#, 'ust as if it were in the plan text. This means perm do both includes that ideolog#, for one example. a. fairness 4 it&s critical to stable links and negative ground. 9therwise, even in a non$F debate the# could randoml# discard advantages to get out of impact turns, because the plan in a vacuum doesn&t connect to the advantages. b. education and effect 4 The ideas matter most 4 >iscursive framing affects polic# implementation6 )rameworks 5nstitute %0S [The Jrame6or1s http<QQ....!rame.or1sinstitute.orgQstrategicanalysisQperspective.shtml)
Perspective< Strategic Jrame 8nalysis",

This interdisciplinary .or1 is made possi/le /y the !act that the concept o! !raming is !ound in the literatures o! numerous academic disciplines across the social, /ehavioral and cognitive sciences. Put simply, !raming re!ers to the construct o! a communication O its language, visuals and messengers O and the .ay it signals to the listener or o/server ho. to interpret and classi!y ne. in!ormation.

:# framing, we mean how messages are encoded with meaning so that the# can be efficientl# interpreted in relationship to existing beliefs or ideas. Jrames trigger meaning. The uestions .e as1, in applying the
concept o! !rames to the arena o! social policy, are as !ollo.s< 2o. does the pu/lic thin1 a/out a particular social or political issueS 6hat is the pu/lic discourse on the issueS 8nd ho. is this discourse in!luenced /y the .ay media !rames that issueS 2o. do these pu/lic and private !rames a!!ect pu/lic choicesS

!ow can an issue be reframed to evoke a different wa# of thinking , one that illuminates a broader range of alternative polic# choicesB This approach is strategic in that it not onl# deconstructs the dominant frames of reference that drive reasoning on public issues, but it also identifies those alternative frames most likel# to stimulate public reconsideration and
enumerates their elements &re!raming(. 6e use the term re!rame to mean changing Hthe conte?t o! the message e?changeH so that di!!erent interpretations and pro/a/le outcomes /ecome visi/le to the pu/lic &-earing # Logers, '::>< :;(.

Strategic frame anal#sis offers polic# advocates a wa# to work s#stematicall# through the challenges that are likel# to confront the introduction of new legislation or social policies , to
anticipate attitudinal /arriers to support, and to develop researchB/ased strategies to overcome pu/lic misunderstanding. 6hat 9s Communications and 6hy -oes 9t @atterSThe domain o! communications has not changed mar1edly since ':>; .hen 2arold Lass.ell !ormulated his !amous e uation< 7ho s ys 7h t to 7hom through 7h t ch nnel 7ith 7h t e%%ectB Eut .hat many social policy practitioners have overloo1ed in their uests to !ormulate e!!ective strategies !or social change is that communications merits their attention /ecause it is an ine?trica/le part o! the agendaBsetting !unction in this country. Communications plays a vital role in determining .hich issues the pu/lic prioriti+es !or policy resolution, .hich issues .ill move !rom the private realm to the pu/lic, .hich issues .ill /ecome pressure points !or policyma1ers, and .hich issues .ill .in or lose in the competition !or scarce resources. No organi+ation can approach such tas1s as issue advocacy, constituencyB/uilding, or promoting /est practices .ithout ta1ing into account the critical role that mass media has to play in shaping the .ay 8mericans thin1 a/out social issues. 8s 6illiam 0amson and his colleagues at the @edia Lesearch and 8ction ProCect li1e to say, media is Han arena o! contest in its o.n right, and part o! a larger strategy o! social change.H One source o! our con!usion over communications comes in not recogni+ing that each ne. push !or pu/lic

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understanding and acceptance happens against a /ac1drop o! longBterm media coverage, o! perceptions !ormed over time, o! scripts .e have learned since childhood to help us ma1e sense o! our .orld, and !ol1 /elie!s .e use to interpret ne. in!ormation. 8s .e go a/out ma1ing sense o! our .orld, mass media serves an important !unction as the mediator o! meaning O telling us .hat to thin1 a/out & gend ?setting( and ho. to thin1 a/out it & medi e%%ects( /y organi+ing the in!ormation in such a .ay & %r ming( that it comes to us !ully con!lated .ith directives & cues( a/out .ho is responsi/le !or the social pro/lem in the !irst place and .ho gets to !i? it & responsi#ility(. 9t is o!ten the case that nonpro!it organi+ations .ant communications to /e easy. 9ronically, they .ant sound/ite ans.ers to the same social pro/lems .hose comple?ity they understand all too .ell. 6hile policy research and !ormulation are given their due as tough, demanding areas o! an organi+ationFs .or1plan, communications is seen as Hso!t.H 6hile program development and practice are seen as re uiring e?pertise and the thought!ul consideration o! /est practices, communications is an Hanyone can do it i! you have toH tas1. 9t is time to retire this thin1ing. -oing communications strategically re uires the same investment o! intellect and study that these other areas o! nonpro!it practice have /een accorded. 8 Simple *?planation o! Jrame 8nalysis 9n his seminal /oo1 Pu/lic Opinion &':$'<'=(, 6alter Lippmann .as perhaps the !irst to connect mass communications to pu/lic attitudes and policy pre!erences /y recogni+ing that the H the

wa# in which the world is imagined determines at an# particular moment what men will do .2 The modern extension of Cippmann's observation is based on the concept of 2frames.2 People use mental shortcuts to ma1e sense o! the .orld. Since most people are loo1ing to process
incoming in!ormation uic1ly and e!!iciently, they rely upon cues .ithin that ne. in!ormation to signal to them ho. to connect it .ith their stored images o! the .orld. The Hpictures in our heads,H as Lippmann called them, might /etter /e thought o! as vividly la/eled storage /o?es B !illed .ith pictures, images, and stories !rom our past encounters .ith the .orld and la/eled youth, marriage, poverty, !airness, etc. The incoming in!ormation provides cues a/out .hich is the right container !or that idea or e?perience. 8nd the e!!icient thin1er ma1es the connection, a process called Hinde?ing,H and

how an issue is framed is a trigger to these shared and dura/le cultural models that help us make sense of our world. 6hen a !rame ignites a cultural
moves on. Put another .ay, model, or calls it into play in the interpretation, the .hole model is operative. This allo.s people to reason a/out an issue, to ma1e in!erences, to !ill in the /lan1s !or missing in!ormation /y re!erring to the ro/ustness o! the model, not the s1etchy !rame.

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#2C ,er. #%% 4t"er &nstances
Q. The other instances the# re'ect aren&t present in this round. Oou cannot re'ect something that doesn&t exist. 9ur argument deals with the in$round interactions in which we as debaters conceptuali(e action through certain modes of knowledge$production. This t#pe of permutation is a debate artifact which doesn&t appl# to our criticism. The# don&t even name, and no one knows, what these @other instancesA the# re'ect are. There is (ero solvenc# or discursive effect to this perm. The# ask #ou to imagine criticism in a world of fiat, we "T? CCO critici(e. 7. This is not an argument 4 #ou wouldn&t accept racism in one instances because #ou had the opportunit# to re'ect it in other instances 4 if we prove the aff is undesirable then #ou should vote negative. S. Ever# instance is ke# 4 this decision is between competing philosophies, not competing actions. 5t&s like sa#ing, @,e agree with nonviolence, except when we don&tA. Gread some at* p J both if desiredT

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#2C ,er. 5o )ot"
Q. 5t&s too late 4 The Q " has alread# engaged in enframing 4 Their representations of technolog# have alread# been introduced to the round 4 E9 EET :EEE)5T T9 T!E 8E3= 7. 5t&s Severence 4 The# sever out of their methodolog# 4 The alternative text re'ects action as such. Severance is a voting issue 4 it destro#s all negative ground b# making links to disads and Fs impossible and makes no counterplan competitive. S. The permutation still links to the criticism$ n embracement of the technological mindset is mutuall# exclusive from examination of ontolog#6 Thiele '.; [Pro!essor o! Political Science at University o! Jlorida &Leslie Paul, Timely @editations, p.':%B>, 4LC() Technolog# is one of !eidegger's enduring and foremost concerns.
.ould /ecome a preoccupation o! his pu/lished .or1. 2e .rites< H The Though 2eidegger only e?plicitly !ormali+ed this concern in his later .or1, he e?pressed his .orry a/out the systematic rationali+ation o! the .orld early on. 9n ':':, 2eidegger clearly descri/ed in a personal letter .hat over t.o decades later

unbridled, /asically *nlightenment directive to nail life and ever#thing living onto a board , li1e things, orderl# and flat, so that ever#thing becomes overseea/le, controllable, de!ina/le, connecta/le, and e?plica/le, .here only many pure and unrestrained &sit venia ver/o(Ofa/lesF e?istO this directive underlies all the man# 1uasi$memories of life, which are being attempted toda# in ever# sphere of experience.2' Jor 2eidegger, the 2Enlightenment directive2 to control and standardi(e life ensues from the metaph#sical drive to ob'ectif# the world. @odern technology and metaphysics, it !ollo.s, are largely e uivalent terms &*P :%(.
Eoth arise !rom and evidence a re!usal to thin1 Eeing in their systematic &conceptual and practical( e!!ort to possess and

=odern technolog# and metaph#sics stand entwined. s such, neither allows a proper perspective from which to evaluate or overcome the other &O0S 3:(. Technolog# entices us into a productive process that precludes 1uestioning thought, #et onl# such 1uestioning could ade1uatel# reveal the nature of metaph#sics. 9n turn, metaphysical human1ind, engaged as
master /eing. a su/Cect in the reductive o/Cecti!ication o! /eing, is le!t little alternative /ut a technological apprehension and manipulation o! the .orld.

/. Fills lt Solvenc# $ Technological thought shuts out all other modes of thinking6 =c,horter '.7 [8ssistant Pro!essor o! Philosophy at Northeast @issouri State University &Ladelle, 2eidegger and
the *arth, ed. /y Ladelle @c6horter(4LC)

This managerial, technological mode of revealing, 2eidegger says, is em/edded in and constitutive o! 6estern culture and has /een gathering strength !or centuries. No. it is well on its wa# to

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extinguishing all other modes of revealing , all other wa#s of being human and being earth. 5t will take tremendous effort to think through this danger, to think past it and be#ond, tremendous courage and resolve to allow thought of the m#ster# to come forthM thought o! the inevita/ility, along .ith revealing, o! concealment, o! loss, o! ignoranceM thought of the occurring of things and their passage as events not ultimatel# under human control. nd of course even the call to allow this thinking $ couched as it so often must be in a grammatical imperative appealing to an agent $ is itself a paradox, the first that must be faced and allowed to speak to us and to shatter us as it scatters thinking in new directions, directions of which we have not #et dreamed, directions of which we ma# never dream. 8nd shattered .e may /e, !or our self$understanding is at stakeM in !act, our ver# selves B selves engineered /y the technologies o! po.er that shaped, that are, modernity B are at stake. n# thinking that threatens the notion of human being as modernit# has posited it 4 as rationall# self$interested individual, as self$possessed bearer of rights and obligations, as active mental and moral agent $ is thinking that threatens our ver# being, the configurations of sub'ective existence in our age. ;. 8ermutations are incoherent 4 the perm asks #ou to 5= P5EE doing the plan and part of the alt+ we "T? CCO critici(e the Q " 4 for this argument to function the#&d have to re$read our shell. 6. This is not an argument 4 #ou wouldn&t accept racism in one instances because #ou had the opportunit# to re'ect it in other instances 4 if we prove the aff is undesirable then #ou should vote negative. H. Ever# instance is ke# 4 this decision is between competing philosophies, not competing actions. 5t&s like sa#ing, @Oo, we agree with nonviolence, except when we don&t with it, #o6A I. =editative thought cannot be accessed b# the perm, it&s a wa# of living that lets things be. Taking action is incompatible with meditative thinking because it directs meditative thinking to a desired end, technologi(ing the ver# process that is supposed to provide the escape. :rown and Toadvine '0S [Charles S. pro!essor in dept o! philosophy V University o! Oregon, and Ted
assoc pro!essor in dept o! philosophy V University o! Oregon , *coBphenomenology < Eac1 to the *arth 9tsel!," *?cerpted !rom a /oo1, @US*)

2"alculative thinking$ is actuall# thoughtless and oblivious of :eing < which withdraws, leaving humans 2rootless' and 2homeless.2 :# contrast, 2meditative thinking2 is profoundl# thoughtful and receptive to :eing. 5t dwells in the nearness of :eing, where humans are trul# root,

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and 2at home.B 8s the thinking of :eing' meditative thinking is nonmanipulative and noncoercive. 5t lets :eing and beings be+ and 2letting be2 involves profound care and concern. Such thinking is not a matter of having ideas or constructing theories< nor is it a particular act or series of acts. Lather, it is an entire disposition and wa# of living which , .'' a thought a heart, heeds :eings call. Such heart$full, thought$full thinking cannot, of course be coerced or willfull# begun because it is itself noncoercive. Ultimately, it comes to us as a gi!t !rom Eeing. 5t is up to us to 2step back2 from our thoughtless wa#s of thinking so as to 2prepare the ground for this gift 'ust as a farmer prepares the soil but cannot force the seed to grow. Such receptivit# opens us to nature's meaning and m#ster#. =editative thinking lets the unspoken Truth of :eing come to Canguage M and H[l)anguage is the house o! EeingH inso!ar as it shelters the Truth which :eing discloses . Such authentic language is the 2home2 in which we thoughtfull# dwell..
8lready decades /e!ore his HLetter on 2umanismB and H@emorial 8ddress,H 2eidegger emphasi+ed the crucial importance o! language, claiming that Hthe po.er o! languageH distinguishes us H!rom stones, plants, animal, /ut also !rom the gods.H 2e cautioned that H.ords and language are not .rappings in .hich things are pac1ed !or the commerce o! those .ho .rite and spea1.

5t is in worlds and language that things first come into being and are. )or this reason the misuse of language ... destro#s our authentic relation to things.H$% .. ,e cannot change the current state of the world without )53ST changing our ontological views of the world. That's our Swa(o '07 evidence straight from the QE". Q0. Ea(ism >isad 4 "ombining the F with state action recreates the exclusionar# blind spot that caused !eidegger to be unable to take his own advice 4 The end result is a genocide6 >illon '.6
$) [@ichael, Pro!essor o! Politics, Lancaster University, Small Eum/le, '::=. The Politics o! Security. P. '%'B

There is a pressing need to recover the 1uestion of the political as much from !eidegger$the$Ea(i, who seems to corrupt it, as from !eidegger the philosopher who appears to elide it. refurbished interrogation and understanding of the political is conse1uentl# one of the pri(es to be prised$out of an engagement with !eidegger. The pre!ace !or such an engagement, .hich is all 9 have /een attempting here, mut, 9 have /een arguing, proceed through security /y .ay o! the tragic. ,e cannot, therefore, go the route which !eidegger himsel first took and against which his subse1uent thinking was 1uite clearl# and criticall# devoted. That is precisel# the technological nemeis to which his own thoughts alert us and from which the recover# of the political will alwa#s be re1uired. The matter o! 2eideggerFs FsilenceF
2ere, .ith his very political !alli/ility, arises a particular reason .hy it does so. 5 that 9 to say, his re!usal to repudiate the Na+i period pu/licly, to FatoneF !or his mem/ership o! the Na+i Party, and his silence concerning the !ate o! *uropean 4e.ry 5 is particularly relevant here. 9 could say that 9 do not have the pace to

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give it all the thought and close attention it deserves, /ut in !act 9 do not 1no. precisely .hat amount o! space it .ould re uire. Jor this conventional gen!lection to seriousness implies that someho. 9 do 1no., or could 1no.. Eud 9 do not. 8nd uet it 9 not a matter o! me not 1no.ing. 9 simply thin1 it is not 1no.a/le. The uestion .ill never /e ans.ered and so it .ill never /e settled. This is in !act .hat allo.s me to go on a/out it, and .ith it. 0iven the importance attached to silence in all o! 2eideggerFs thought, this FsilenceF cannot /e mere omision. 9n his lectures on Parmenides, !or e?ample, he says, F9n 1eep silentF is not merely to say nothing. 6ithout something essential to ay, one cannot 1eep silent. Only .ithin essential speech, and /u means o! it alone, can there prevail essential silence, having nothing in common .ith secrecy, concealment, or Fmental reservationsF" @ani!estly, it is not a simple oversight either, /ecause silence al.ays resounded !or 2eidegger, and so perhaps it 9 also something even more than a Fradical !ailure o! thoughtF. Jor, in his thin1ing, 2eidegger systematically and conistently elevated reticence and comportment even a/ove thought. Or, rather, consonance .ith his radical hermeneutical phenomenological, and .ith his history o! Eeing and it preoccupation .ith the hidden and the inconsoicuous, 2eidegger made o! thought osmethign .hich .as !undamentally related to d.elling in a piou attentiveness to the mystery o! Eeing. 2ense, one might supect that hi o! hi o.n FdispositionF or comportment. 8nd it is preci!ely this, though .or1ed through his thought in detailed .aysm .hich 4ohn Caputo concludes is 2eideggerFs scandal.

Somehow !eidegger, here on this site and .ith respect to the siteBing o! the political, seemed unwilling to think through the fundamental belonging together of dwelling and displacement* that we are all strangers native born, and so alwa#s alread# dwelling en routeM that routes and roots are ineradica/ly intert.innedM hence, that to found and be a people &even, in his terms, .ith the assignment o! the .ord( is an exclusionar# practice+ that indigeneit#, ho.ever use!ul it may /e as a device to protect some !rom the violence o! @odernity and its modernisers, is a certain sort of violent claim+ and that to circumscribe and inhabit a 'place' simultaneousl# also poses the 1uestion of the one who is thereb# estranged from that place , or comes to that
place as a stranger.

QQ. Thought fails when done from within the existing frame of technological reference 4 we must step back and not act for contemplation to be successful. 5'selling 'II [Samuel, Pro!essor o! Philosophy and Eum/le/ees, Catholic University o! Louvain, ':;;, The *nd o!
Philosophy as the Commencement o! Thin1ing< Critical 2eidegger, p. ':=BD)

To metaph#sical thinking, !eidegger counterposes another kind of thinking which he calls recollective &anden1ende( thinking. Under 2olderlinFs in!luence, it is also associated with celebrating, greeting, remembering, thanking. 5t is an abiding$with, a wonderful tarr#ing, a holding out, an abilit# to wait B indeed !or a li!etime B a stepping back, an a/ode. 9t reminds us perhaps o! Jar *astern .isdom .hich .as not
alien to 2eidegger or o! a pro/ing o! reality o! the 1ind to /e !ound in Paul Klee, a man .ho astonished 2eidegger and .hose theoretical and pedagogical .ritings the latter perused thoroughly. 9n my opinion, it can also /e understood as the reali+ation and the radicali+ation o! the original idea o! phenomenology. Thin1ing as the enduring o! /eing, as an a/iding .ith /eings in their /eing, an a/iding .ith thin1ing and precisely in vie. o! the !act that .e really do thin1 in this .ay and !inally, as an a/iding .ith .hat determines our thin1ing, .hat calls us to thin1, .hat commands our thin1ing and so points the .ay. One uestion .hich 1eeps on arising is< is such a thinking &still( possibleB -oes it not once again and necessarily amount to a metaphysicoBtechnical thin1ingS 9! .e are dominated /y metaphysicoBtechnical thin1ing and, in the end, are solely directed /y the 1ey concepts o! computer science, is another 1ind o! thin1ing then still possi/leS

!eidegger is himsel! full# aware of the seriousness of this problem. !e will contend that this other thinking can onl# be prepared, that it is essentiall#, and indeed remains, untimel# and can alwa#s onl# be a task. 5t re1uires 1uite specific strategies to guard it and to protect it against the danger which threatens it to an ever$ increasing degree from the side of the sciences and their cy/ernetic
One should not underestimate this di!!iculty and

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organi(ation within a self$regulating world civili(ation. 2eidegger 1no.s that this other thinking can never be a purel# universit# or academic affair because these organi(ations, .ith their indigenous research operations, their con!erences and their literary directives are carried along b# the metaph#sico$technical thinking and themselves belong to world civili(ation. Still less can it su/sist outside o! a particular historical, technicoBeconomic, politicoBscienti!ic, institutional and linguistic !rame o! re!erence. Jor this reason, the greatest possible care has to be taken to prevent it from being the victim of the attempt to interpret it and to integrate it within the existing frame of reference. @uch o! 2eideggerFs rhetoric must /e vie.ed in this light.

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#2C ;ea%is.
Q. 3ealism isn't inevitable $ their authors are wrong $ the QE"s attempt to 1uestion securit# is ke# =antle '06
[Lecturer in the College o! 9nternational Lelations V Litsumei1an University, -e!ending the -ugong< Lede!ining 7Security, in O1ina.a and 4apanH, pg. :A, http<QQ....ritsumei.ac.CpQacdQcgQirQcollegeQ/ulletinQeB vol.3Q@8NTL*.pd!) 8lthough critical scholars, .ithin 9L generally and the study o! security speci!ically, dra. on a variety o! theoretical traditions !rom .ithin and /eyond the disciplinary /orders o! 9L, including the Jran1!urt School o! Critical Theory and PostB

a common understanding is that the wa# things are is onl# one of man# possibilities. 8s Eerger and Luc1mann state, %Social order exists onl# as a product of human activit#& &Eerger # Luc1mann, '::'< DA, emphasis in original(. !umans construct their own realities, and within those realities their own identities. ,hat is named as %male&, %female&, %art& or %nature& is given meaning and value particular to a time and culture. This specific meaning is constructed and then reconstructed dail# through language and social custom. 9nce the temporal and cultural contingenc# of such concepts is recognised, what has been assumed to be real, inevitable and immutable can be challenged. Such critical thin1ing is a pro!ound challenge !or 9L as a discipline and the study o! security
@odernismQPostBStructuralism, .ithin the discipline. 78narchy is .hat states ma1e o! it, says 8le?ander 6endt &'::$< %:3(. Eooth ta1es this one step !urther,

%securit# is what we make it& &Eooth, '::D< 'A=, emphasis added(. Sa#ing that thinking about politics and doing politics can be done differentl# opens up the space for change. Since power is integral to an# social relation, %securit#& can be seen as sociopolitical construct. 8s one concept o! security /ecomes dominant others are ridiculed, suppressed or not even considered. Since such perceptions are often entrenched to the point of %naturalness&, problemati(ing them is potentiall# disturbing and even threatening. The status 1uo is the status 1uo because it suits those who have the power to define and keep it that wa#. Eevertheless, without such %dangerous& critical 1uestions little substantive change can occur. 7. 5nevitabilit# is a self fulfilling prophec# Fim 'I/ [Samuel S, -ept o! Poli Sci @onmouth College, 0lo/al Piolence and a 4ust 6orld Order, 4ournal o! Peace
Lesearch, no $, ':;> p. ';D) This paci!ied and disarmed consciousness or alienation in @ar?ian terms B has allo.ed the managers o! the national security superstate to shi!t /oth their military doctrine and hard.are to.ard ma1ing nuclear .ar more thin1a/le, more !ighta/le, and more F.inna/leF. The resultant e?pectations o! nuclear .ar do not augur .ell, !or, as social psychologist

llport put it* 'The greatest menace to the world toda# are leaders in office who regard war as inevitable and thus prepare their people for armed conflict. )or b# regarding war as inevitable, it becomes inevitable. Expectations determine behavior' &8llport ':=;, p. ''(.
0ordon

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S. Their proclaimed inevitabilit# arguments are based off of sub'ective realist viewpoints. )usion with critical thinking includes more accurate conclusions6 -alewski and Enloe '.;
[Lecturer in 9nternational Politics at the University o! 6ales UUPro!essor o! 0overnment at Clar1 University &@arysia and Cynthia, '::3, 9nternational Lelations Theory Today," pg. $::)

The positivist conception of the world and realit# t#pifies much of mainstream international relations theor# in the Q..0s despite the emergence of the 'third debate' or the so$called post$positivist revolution. This understanding of the world allows the possibilit# of thinking that defining specific referents or identities as the central issues in international relations theor# is not a particularl# political or epistemologicall# significant act+ it is merel# one of choice. 5n other words, the choice of referent is seen as a neutral activit# b# positivists.
6alt+ can choose to study states, .ars and the activity o! leaders, others can loo1 at the situation o! .omen or .hatever group they .ish. *ach then collects data and !acts a/out the chosen group and ultimately develops theories a/out them. 4im 0eorge calls this the Fspectator theory o! 1no.ledge, in .hich 1no.ledge o! the real .orld is gleaned via a realm o! e?ternal !actsF &'::%, p. $A>(. @ar1 Neu!eld similarly tal1s a/out Ftruth as correspondenceF &'::%, p. 33(. This involves /elieving that there is a distinct separation /et.een FtheoryF and the FrealF .orld, Fthe !ormer, the realm o! HinternallyH generated HinventionH B the latter, the He?ternalH repository o! la.s .hich theories &retrospectively( e?plain, order and systematise . . . theory . . . al.ays remains distinct !rom that .orldF &0eorge, '::%, p. $A:(.

The ke# point to be taken from this is that theor# is represented as a 'cognitive reaction to realit# rather than integral to its construction. Theor#, in this context, takes place after the factF &p. $'%(.Eut theor# does not take place after the fact. Theories, instead, pla# a large part in constructing and defining what the facts are. This is a central claim made b# those scholars working on postpositivist perspectives in international relations theor# but it is not a new claim. 8l/ert *instein once pointed out that 'on principle it is 1uite wrong to tr# founding a theor# on observable magnitudes alone. 5n realit#, the ver# opposite happens' & uoted in @acKinnon, ':;:, p. 'A=(. 2o.ever, it is a claim resisted strongl# b# mainstream international relations theor#, which remains, despite recent claims to the contrar#, entrenched in a realist$positivist paradigm &Lunyan and Peterson, '::'M Peterson, '::$/M 0eorge, '::%(. ,hen vilified for serving the interests of the powerful and preserving the status 1uo, classical and neo$realists simpl# repl# that the# are 'telling things the wa# the# are' &Lunyan and Peterson, '::', p. DA(. 9t may /e /ecoming some.hat o! postBpositivist cliche
to claim that .e are living in a comple? .orld and thus simplistic theories .ill /e o! little e?planatory or descriptive use.

if we are tr#ing to understand more about the world and in particular those events which cause pain and destruction, wh# would an#one not want to include insights which might help us do thatB 5f realist scholars want genuinel# to investigate the causes of war in a sophisticated and s#stematic manner, wh# not investigate the construction and internali(ation of certain images of masculinit# in militar# ideolog#B 5f the# want to argue that students be better e1uipped, intellectuall# and
Eut

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conceptuall#, to understand international politics, wh# not extend their anal#ses to include concepts of identit#B There ma#, of course, be ideological resistance to thinking about these issues. The assumption is made that
se?ual identity or gender identity can have nothing to do .ith the causation and enactment o! .ar. Eut although these are Cust assumptions they do a great deal o! .or1 in de!ining .hat is and is not relevant to consider.

,hen this ideological commitment is linked with a limited epistemological understanding of the construction of realit#, it becomes eas# for scholars within international relations to think that such things as the politics of identit# can have no real importance to our understanding of the international s#stem. 8dditionally, it implies a lot more work in the sense that more books have to be read &ones that many realist scholars might thin1 irrelevant(, new methodological tools have to be learned and old positions have to be rethought. iCKal 2olsti &'::%( is one .ho laments the increasing theoretical e?pansion o! the discipline o! international relations. This e?pansion, he argues, is not necessarily evidence o! progress. ?nless we can agree on, at least, the purposes of the theoretical enterprise and on what some of the fundamental problems in the real worldare, the 'menu Gof international relations theor#T threatens to become tasteless for all but the few that inhabit the rarefied sanctuaries of the ?niversities' &p. >A;(. 6hy
should this /e the caseS 9!, as 2olsti suggests, our FconsumersF are students and policyBma1ers and .hat they .ant most o! all is to 1no. F.hat is going on in the real .orldF &p. >AD(, it seems to ma1e eminent sense to !ind out more a/out ho. that Freal .orldF .or1s /y as1ing more, deeper and searching uestions. 6hat apparently seems to /e Fstaring us in the !aceF &p. >AD( in the .orld may .ell /e an e?ample o! .hat psychologists call a perceptual illusion. 9n these illusions .hat stares one person in the !ace cannot /e seen at all /y another person. The same can /e true .hen .e move !rom a psychologistFs dra.ing to the FrealityF o! politics on a glo/al scale. The simple uestions F6ho am 9SF and F6ho de!ines .ho 9 amSF might /e as revolutionary !or the discipline o! international relations as that o! the little /oy .ho uestioned not the

one characteri(ed b# a global menu, global music and global time, the resurgence of claims to identit# might be seen as a response to a fear of disappearing into bland sameness. ,e can drink "oke, eat sushi and watch #eighbours and be in practicall# an# countr# in the world. The !ight !or identity may, at one level, /e an e?ample o! resistance to such an image o! glo/al uniBidentity. 8lternatively, the struggle for identit# ma# be a reaffirmation of belonging, in a postmodern, post$local age. This desire ma# be fuelled b# nostalgia, a nostalgia for 'tradition', which might be construed as a nostalgia for the nation$state, the icon of modernit#. 5dentities in this view ma# be increasingl# fluid and multipl# at ever more rapid rates as we approach the twent#first centur#. Eut those properties do not ma1e them analytically irrelevant to the international
magni!iB \ cence o! the *mperorFs clothes, /ut .hether he had any at a l l Z g % C UU 9n a glo/al age, relations analyst. 6ho .e are, ho. .e are, .ho de!ines us, ho. international processes and events are moulded and manipulated /y identities< these are all uestions relevant to international politics. n#one tr#ing to make sense of international political trends in the near future who treats these maddeningl# complex and infuriatingl# d#namic identities as a mere mos1uito to be swatted awa# risks being surprised.

/. "J Swa(o '07. 5nternational 3elations can't change unless we change our ontological views.

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;. Turn $ The alternative solves the imbalances of power that are experience in hegemon#6 The alternative also solves for 3ealism's inabilit# to view :eings, which entraps them in the 3ealist perspective. >allma#r '0/
[Ph-, Pro!essor, -epartment o! 0overnment and 9nternational Studies, Notre -ame, Constellations Polume '', No ', $AA> The Underside o! @odernity< 8dorno, 2eidegger, and -ussel Jred -allmayr(.QQ4LC)

the reflective recover# of the 1uestion of and care for being, a care completel# immune to managerial manipulation. 8s /e!ore, 2eidegger distinguishes
@oving /eyond the criti ue o! @achenscha!t, Eesinnung o!!ers glimpses o! a radically other" possi/ility< namely, /et.een po.er and violence, on the one hand, and genuine authority" &2errscha!t(, on the other. 8part !rom e?uding intrinsic dignity or .orth," he .rites, !errschaft

means the free potenc# or capacit# for an original respect for beingA Krather than merel# empirical thingsD. To characteri+e this dignity, Eesinnung introduces a ne. voca/ulary, b# presenting being &Seyn( as a /asically po.erB!ree domain &das @achtlose( be#ond power and non$power or impotence &Censeits
von @acht und Unmacht(." 8s 2eidegger emphasi+es, po.erB!ree" does not mean po.erless or impotent, /ecause the

)rom an ever#da# @realistA angle, being&s realm ma# appear powerless or impotent+ but this is onl# a semblance or illusion resulting from its reticent inobstrusiveness. >ue to its reticence, being&s realm can never be dragged into human machinations, into the struggles between the powerful and the powerless Kas long as the latter merel# seek powerD+ but precisel# in this manner it reveals its !errschaft, a reign that @cannot be matched b# an# power or superpower because the# necessaril# ignore the nature of the basicall# power$free possibilit#.A To /e sure, access to this reign is di!!icult and radically o/structed /y the @achenscha!t o! our age. Get, an important pathwa# through and be#ond these obstructions is offered b# meditative thinking &Eesinnung( which opens a glimpse into the @time$space$pla#A &aeitBSpielB Laum( of being as *reignis, that is, into the interpla# and differential entwinement of being and beings, of humans, nature, and the divine.
latter remains !i?ated on po.er, no. e?perienced as a lac1.

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#2C ;ose FCa%c$%ations B ;es*onsi3i%it( and Et"ics9
Q. Ethics reifies responsibilit# over an# other mode of revealing 4 it represents 'ust another wa# of managing being. =c,horter '.7 [La-elle, Pro!essor o! Philosophy, Northeast @issouri State, also o! the /um/les, '::$, 2eidegger
and the *arth, ed. @c6horter. 8ny thin1ing that threatens the state. 8s a result, guilt is !amiliar, and, though some.hat uncom!orta/le at times, it comes to !eel almost sa!e. 9t is no surprise, then, that .henever caring people thin1 hard a/out ho. to live .ithQinQon the earth, .e !ind ourselves gro.ing an?ious and, usually, !eeling guilty a/out the .ay .e conduct ourselves in relation to the natural .orld.

Puilt is a standard defense against the call for change as it takes root within us. Eut, i! .e are to thin1 .ith 2eidegger, i! .e are to heed his call to re!lect, .e must not respond to it simply /y deploring our decadent li!eBstyles and indulging ourselves in a !it o! remorse. !eidegger's call is not a moral condemnation, nor is it a call to take up some politicall# correct position or some privileged ethical stance. ,hen we respond to 2eideggerFs call as i! it .ere a moral condemnation, we reinstate a discourse in which active agenc# and its pro'ects and responsibilities take precedence over an# other wa# of being with the earth. 5n other words, we insist on remaining within the discourses, the power configurations, of the modern managerial self. 0uilt is a concept 5.hose heritage and meaning occur .ithin the ethical tradition o! the .estern .orld. Eut the histor# of ethical theor# in the west &and it could /e argued that ethical theory only occurs in the 6est( is one .ith the historyBof technological thought. The revelation of things as to$be$managed and the imperative to be in control work themselves out in the histor# of ethic s 'ust as surel# as the# work themselves out in the histor# of the natural and human sciences. 7. Technological thought sucks, dood 4 that&s in the overview, straight turns this argument. 5t eternall# maintains the status 1uo.

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#2C 1ec"no%og( 2ood
Q. ?hm. >erp$a$derp. ,e sa# the technological mindset is bad. ,e don't care about technolog#. Cook at our link. 7. Turn 4 technological thinking drives technolog# into darkness$ onl# the alternative creates the capacit# of reclaiming technolog# for non$ aggressive ends ,olcher '0/ [Louis *., Pro!essor o! La., University o! 6ashington School o! La., 6ashington La. Levie., Je/ruary
$AA>)

Cike all things human, the essence of modern technolog# makes a world $ an odious world, perhaps, but a world nonetheless. 5n a world in thrall to technological thinking, freedom's mode of abiding consists for the most part in its withdrawal and 1uiescence . 8 mani!estation o! human /eingBi nBthe.orld,
technological thin1ing stands in the sharpest possi/le contrast to .hat .e .ill no. call !reedom !or responsi/ility. The latter is also a mani!estation o! human /eingBinBtheB.orld, /ut unli1e technological thin1ing it maintains a certain critical

Technological thinking falls into its world wholeheartedl#, becoming its world to such a degree that it is incapable of imagining an# other possibilit# of existence. 9n a manner that .ill
distance /et.een itsel! and its .orld. 9n it, !reedom a.a1es. /ecome clear later, ho.ever, !reedom !or responsi/ility al.ays remains on the hither side o! its .orld in the !orm o! !reedomFs possi/ilities and !reedomFs responsi/ility.

=odern technolog#, in the sense of technics, has been 2captured2 b# technological thinking to such a degree that the latter has driven the ultimate end of technolog# as such into darkness and obscurit#. 9t is high time !or !reedom to rediscover that end B namely,itsel! B and in so doing
to trans!orm modern technologyFs essence, its mode o! /eing.

S. The alternative doesn&t link to #our tech good disads, it onl# changes our relationship towards technolog#6 Thiele '.;
$'3(QQmar1o!!) [Pro!essor o! Political Science at University o! Jlorida &Leslie Paul, Timely @editations, pgs. $'%B

3ecollecting our worldl# habitat not onl# fosters resistance to en$ framing, but also provides guidance in negotiating relations with the products of technolog#, namely machines and techni ues. !eidegger acknowledges that we should neither re'ect nor do without technological artifacts or skills as a whole. !e neither advocates nor accepts a retreat to a pretechnological state of being. Nor, despite much misinterpretation /y his commentators, does he suggest that .e !atalistically resign ourselves to the victor# of enframing. 9ts victory, he emphatically states, is not inevitable &O0S ='(. H,e cannot, o! course, re'ect toda#'s technological world as devil's .or1, nor may .e destroy itOassuming it does not destroy itsel!,H 2eidegger maintains. 2Still less ma# we cling to the view that the world of technolog# is such that it will absolutel# prevent a spring out of it2 &9- >AB>'(. To con!use our destined
relation to Eeing as i! it .ere a !ate, particularly one that leads to the inevita/le decline o! our civili+ation /ecause o!

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technological rule, is itsel! a historically determinist, and there!ore metaphysical and technological, understanding. 8ccording to 2eidegger, H8ll attempts to rec1on e?isting reality morphologically, psychologically, in terms o! decline and loss, in terms o! !ate, catastrophe, and destruction, are merely technological /ehaviorH &RT >;(.H Jatalism is no ans.er /ecause !atalism re!lects the same a/sence o! thought that is evidenced in a naive complacency .ith technological Hprogress.H 2eideggerFs admonition to thin1 the nature o! technology, though !ar !rom a resigned musing, is not the devising o! a countero!!ensive.

,e are asked to respond first to the 1uestion 2,hat shall we thinkB2 rather than the 1uestion 2,hat is to be doneB2 Eut the point is
not simply that .e must thin1 /e!ore .e act. The needed thin1ing o! .hat .e are doing and ho. .e are /eing is not solely a strategic $'> C28PT*L *902T L*C*9P9N0 T2* SKG $'3 preparation !or more in!ormed and e!!ective /ehavior. Thought must !irst save us !rom our typical modes o! /ehaving, namely those oriented to possessive mastery. 2eidegger .arns that

2so long as we represent technolog# as an instrument, we remain held fast in the will to master it2 &RT %$(. The more we fail to experience the essence of technolog# as enframing, persevering in the mistaken notion that complex machiner# is the danger, the more we will believe that salvation lies in our mastering technolog# /e!ore it masters us. 6ith this in mind, !eidegger explicitl# states that he is 2not against technolog#,2 nor does he suggest an# 2resistance against, or condemnation of, technolog#2 &@2C
>%B>>(. 9ndeed, the development o! comple? machines and techni uesOtechnology as it is commonly understoodO has enormous /ene!its that must not /e depreciated. 9t .ould /e shortsighted to condemn such technology out o! hand. 8part !rom our o/vious dependence on technical devices, their development also o!ten Hchallenges us to ever greater advancesH &-T 3%(. Jrom political, social, cultural, and environmental standpoints,

technolog# demonstrates

man# virtues.

9ndeed, given the unrelenting e?tension o! human po.er and population, technological developments that /u!!er the earth !rom our predaceousness seem /oth urgent and indispensa/le. 8 good /it o! the destruction humanity presently visits on the earth and itsel! ma1es sophisticated technological remedies necessary.

!aving machines efficientl# serve our needs is neither evil nor regrettable. :ut this service must be grounded on our discover# of what needs we trul# have. @ore importantly, it must /e grounded on our discovery o! .hat transcends human need.H These, decidedly, are not technological 1uestions, and our capacit# to answer them largel# rests on our recover# of the capacit# to think be#ond the criterion of instrumental service.

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#2C 1r$t" E>ists 8Soka% St(%e #rg$.ents9
Q. Technological thought creates bad notions of truth 4 the# can&t access it because their mode of revealing necessaril# creates flaws in their worldview, that&s the first piece of Swa(o ev. Their truth isn&t ob'ective, but is based on a drive towards ever$more revealing and management. 7. The offense assumes a postmodern alternative of affirming @local knowledges,A which we don&t do. ,e replace an# sort of assumption with thought. S. lternative accesses truth best 4 Thiele indicates that meditativel# thinking allows the world to disclose it to us, solving for a multiplicit# of perspectives which means we can actuall# think things through and anal#(e the world carefull# 4 this is exactl# what Sokal would demand of us. /. Truth doesn&t exist independent of our ontological relationship towards the world6 :urke '0H
[Senior Lecturer in Politics and 9nternational Lelations at UNS6, Sydney, and author o! many /oo1s &8nthony, Ontologies o! 6ar< Piolence, *?istence and Leason", Truth # *?istence, 'A<$, aL) This essay develops a theory a/out the causes o! .ar BB and thus aims to generate lines o! action and criti ue !or peace BB that cuts /eneath analyses /ased either on a given se uence o! events, threats, insecurities and political manipulation, or the play o! institutional, economic or political interests &the FmilitaryBindustrial comple?F(.. 9n this light, the t.o Fe?istentialF and FrationalistF discourses o! .arBma1ing and Custi!ication mo/ilised in the Le/anon .ar are more than merely arguments, rhetorics or even discourses. Certainly they mo/ilise !orms o! 1no.ledge and po.er togetherM providing political leaderships, media, citi+ens, /ureaucracies and military !orces .ith organising systems o! /elie!, action, analysis and rationale. Eut they run deeper than that.

The# are truth$s#stems of the most powerful and fundamental kind that we have in modernit#* ontologies, statements about truth and being which claim a rarefied privilege to state what is and how it must be maintained as it is. 9 am thin1ing o! ontology in /oth its senses< ontolog# as /oth a statement about the nature and idealit# of being Kin this case political being, that o! the nationBstate(, and as a statement of epistemological truth and certaint#, of methods and processes of arriving at certaint# Kin this case, the development and application of strategic 1no.ledge !or the use o! armed force, and the creation and maintenance of geopolitical order, securit# and national survivalD. These derive from the classical idea of ontolog# as a speculative or positivistic in1uir# into the fundamental nature of truth , o! /eing, or o! some phenomenonM the desire for a solid metaph#sical account of things inaugurated b# ristotle, an account of 'being 1ua being and its essential attributes'.'D 9n contrast, drawing on )oucauldian theorising about truth and power, 5 see ontolog# as a particularl# powerful claim to truth itself* a

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claim to the status of an underl#ing s#stemic foundation for truth, identit#, existence and action+ one that is not essential or timeless, but is thoroughl# historical and contingent, that is deplo#ed and mobilised in a fraught and conflictual socio$political context of some kind. 9n short, ontolog# is the 'politics of truth' in its most sweeping and powerful form.

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#2C <o%in
Q. ,olin has no warrants as to wh# !eideggers theor# of technolog# fails. 8refer our reasons wh# the technik mindset is bad 7. ,olin advocates an expansion of instrumental reason, essentiall# advocating an expansion of the technik mindset itself6 n# reason we win that the technik mindset is bad means that ,olin&s alternative magnifies that exponentiall#. S. ,olin sa#s !eidegger&s @will to willA onl# confuse the issue$ clearl# he doesn&t understand !eidegger&s writings. /. ,olin&s criticism of !eidegger is completel# illogical$ aD !e assumes that for something to be @authenticA it has to be reali(ed in the world, and thus >asein is not authentic because it isn&t reali(ed in the worldB That&s what we said bD >iscussing ontolog# does not prevent us from discussing realit#$ those exist on two different levels but are not opposed to each other$ rather the# supplement each other cD 8rivate language prevents private meaningB That doesn&t even appl# to our alt ;. The aff can&t explain ,olin&s argument$ don&t vote on something #ou don&t understand 6. ,olin is Eon$uni1ue$ the technik mindset is ruling over ever#one in order to perfectl# order the world right now, which means that this impact is happening in the status 1uo H. ,e control the direction of this link$ there is onl# a chance that the alt can break awa# from the status 1uo grip of the technik mindset I. TJ we can develop a space of authentic >asein or being$in$the$world b# re'ecting the technik mindset of the status 1uo and redefining our ontolog#$ this solves ,olin authenticit# concerns .. TJ 9ur alt allows us to lead authentic lives

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Q0. TJ the technik mindset prevents feeling b# turning us into standing reserves$ onl# the act of the Qac can allow us to actuall# feel QQ. lt is comparabl# advantageous$ an# risk that we allow even one more person to live authenticall# where the# didn&t before means #ou vote neg Q7. This doesn&t prove !eidegger endorsed Eational Socialism$ this is merel# a sad attempt to sling mud at a dead Perman philosopher QS. >oesn&t matter$ even if we are nihilistic, re'ecting the technik mindset is more important than action$ extend Gimpact evidenceT on this point Q/. The Qnc is literall# steeped in realit#$ if #ou didn&t reali(e that this is what goes on under the sombrero, then now #ou know Q;. 9ntolog# precedes realit#$ it shapes how we view realit#, which means it must logicall# comes first Q6. Empiricall# denied$ we can comprehend feeling without calculative reason$ we all did as little kids$ that ma# sound naive but actuall# recogni(es that calculative reason is not inevitable

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