EMAP: Expedite Message Authentication Protocol for Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks

ABSTRACT Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs) adopt the Pu lic !e" #nfrastructure (P!#) and $erti%cate &e'ocation (ists ($&(s) for their securit") #n an" P!# s"ste*+ the authentication of a recei'ed *essage is perfor*ed " checking if the certi%cate of the sender is included in the current $&(+ and 'erif"ing the authenticit" of the certi%cate and signature of the sender) #n this paper+ we propose an Expedite Message Authentication Protocol (EMAP) for VANETs+ which replaces the ti*e,consu*ing $&( checking process " an ef%cient re'ocation checking process) The re'ocation check process in EMAP uses a ke"ed Hash Message Authentication $ode (HMA$)+ where the ke" used in calculating the HMA$ is shared onl" etween non,re'oked -n, .oard /nits (-./s)) #n addition+ EMAP uses a no'el pro a ilistic ke" distri ution+ which ena les non,re'oked -./s to securel" share and update a secret ke") EMAP can signi%cantl" decrease the *essage loss ratio due to the *essage 'eri%cation dela" co*pared with the con'entional authentication *ethods e*plo"ing $&() ." conducting securit" anal"sis and perfor*ance e'aluation+ EMAP is de*onstrated to e secure and efficient) Existing System #n Existing 0"ste*+ a securit" attack on VANETs can ha'e se'ere har*ful or fatal conse1uences to legiti*ate users) $onse1uentl"+ ensuring secure 'ehicular co**unications is a *ust efore an" VANET application can e put into practice the $&( si2e in VANETs is expected to e large for the following reasons: To preser'e the pri'ac" of the dri'ers+ i)e)+ to a stain the leakage of the real identities and location infor*ation of the dri'ers fro* an" external ea'esdropper should e preloaded with a set of anon"*ous digital certi%cate+ where the -./ has to periodicall" change its anon"*ous certi%cate to *islead attackers) $onse1uentl"+ a re'ocation of an -./ results in re'oking all the certi%cate carried " that -./ leading to a large increase in the $&( si2e) -./ , -n,.oard /nits

Disadvantage #n Existing s"ste*+ 'ehicles co**unicate through wireless channels+ a 'ariet" of attacks such as o #n3ecting false infor*ation+ o Modif"ing and o &epla"ing the disse*inated *essages can e easil" launched)

Proposed System #n Propose 0"ste* an efficient authentication and re'ocation sche*e called TA$!) TA$! adopts a hierarch" s"ste* architecture consisting of a central trusted authorit" and regional authorities (&As) distri uted all o'er the network) The proposed *ethod can reduce the &( checking to two pairing operations) Howe'er+ this solution is 'ehicle possi le) Advantages safet",related VANETs applications ased on %xing so*e para*eters in the group signature attached to e'er" certi%cate re1uest+ which reduces the pri'ac" preser'ation of TA$! and renders the tracking of a

Modules 4) Vehicle,to,Vehicle (V5V) and Vehicle,to,#nfrastructure 5) Expedite Message Authentication Protocol 6) 0ecurit" Anal"sis a. Hash Chain Values b. Resistance of forging attacks c. Forward secrecy d. Resistance to replay attacks e. Resistance to colluding attacks Modules Description 1. e!icle"to" e!icle # $ % and e!icle"to"&n'rastructure #n this Module+ the two asic co**unication *odes+ which respecti'el" allow -./s to co**unicate with each other and with the infrastructure &0/s) 0ince 'ehicles co**unicate through wireless channels+ a 'ariet" of attacks such as in3ecting false infor*ation+ *odif"ing and repla"ing the disse*inated *essages can e easil" launched) A securit" attack on VANETs can ha'e se'ere har*ful or fatal conse1uences to legiti*ate users) $onse1uentl"+ ensuring secure 'ehicular co**unications is a *ust efore an" VANET application can e put into practice) A well,recogni2ed solution to secure VANETs is to deplo" Pu lic !e" #nfrastructure (P!#)+ and to use $erti%cate &e'ocation (ists ($&(s) for *anaging the re'oked certi%cate) #n P!#+ each entit" in the network holds an authentic certi%cate+ and e'er" *essage should e digitall" signed efore its trans*ission) A $&(+ usuall" issued " a Trusted Authorit" (TA)+ is a list containing all the re'oked certi%cate) #n a P!# s"ste*+ the authentication of an" *essage is perfor*ed " %rst checking if the sender7s certi%cate is included in the current $&(+ i)e)+ checking its re'ocation status+ then+ 'erif"ing the sender7 certi%cate+ and %nall" 'erif"ing the sender7s signature on the recei'ed *essage)

$. Expedite Message Aut!entication Protocol #n this Module+ A Trusted Aut!ority #TA%( This is responsi le for pro'iding anon"*ous certi%cate and 8istri uting secret ke"s to all -./s in the network) Roadside units #RS)s%( which are %xed units distri uted all o'er the network) The &0/s $an co**unicate securel" with the TA) *n"Board )nits #*B)s%( which are e* edded in 'ehicles9 -./s can co**unicate either with other -./s through V5V co**unications or with &0/s through V5# co**unications) +. Security Analysis a. Hash Chain Values The 'alues of the hash chains are continuousl" used in the re'ocation processes+ and hence+ the TA can consu*e all the hash chain 'alues) As a result+ there should e a *echanis* to replace the current hash chain with a new one) b. Resistance of forging attacks To forge the re'ocation check of an" on oard unit an attacker has to find the current pro le*) And find the TA secret ke" and signature) To the re'ocation check and TA *essage and signature are unforgea le) c. Forward secrecy The 'alues of the hash chain included in the re'ocation *essages are released to non,re'oked -./s starting fro* the last 'alue of the hash chain+ and gi'en the fact that a hash function is irre'ersi le+ a re'oked -./ cannot use a hash chain 'alue recei'ed in a pre'ious re'ocation process to get the current hash chain 'alue+ a re'oked -./ cannot update its secret ke" set) d. Resistance to replay attacks Each *essage of an -./ includes the current ti*e sta*p in the re'ocation check 'alue check an attacker cannot record &EV check at ti*e T and repla" it at a later ti*e process as the recei'ing -./ co*pares the current ti*e)

e. Resistance to colluding attacks A legiti*ate -./ colludes with a re'oked -./ " releasing the current secret ke" such that the re'oked 'ehicle can use this ke" to pass the re'ocation check process " calculating the correct HMA$ 'alues for the trans*itted *essages) All the securit" *aterials of an -./ are stored in its ta*per,resistant) Algorit!m( Linear Search Algorithm #n the linear search algorith*+ the re'ocation status of a certi%cate is checked and 'ice 'ersa) !inary Search Algorithm The inar" search algorith* works onl" on sorted lists) $onse1uentl"+ upon recei'ing a new $&(+ each -./ has to *aintain a sorted (with respect to the certi%cate identit") data ase of the re'oked certi%cate included in pre'ious $&(s and the recentl" recei'ed $&() The *ain idea of the inar" search algorith* is to cancel out half of the entries under consideration after each co*parison in the search process) #n the inar" search+ the re'ocation status of a certi%cate is checked " co*paring the identit" of the certi%cate with *iddle 'alue (which in this case will e the *edian 'alue) of the sorted data ase) #f the identit" of the certi%cate is greater than the *edian 'alue+ the right half of the data ase will e considered in the next co*parison process and 'ice 'ersa) This process continues until a *atch is found+ i)e)+ the certi%cate is re'oked+ or the process is %nished without %nding a *atch which *eans that the certi%cate is unre'oked) " co*paring the certi%cate with each entr" in the $&() #f a *atch occurs+ the certi%cate is re'oked

System Re,uirements( -ard.are Re,uirements(

0"ste* Hard 8isk : Pentiu* #V 5): ;H2) : :< ;.)

=lopp" 8ri'e : 4):: M ) Monitor Mouse &a* : 4> V;A $olor) : (ogitech) : >45 M )

So't.are Re,uirements(
-perating s"ste* $oding (anguage =ront End : , ?indows @ /lti*ate (65, it) : A0P)Net with $A) : Visual 0tudio 5<4< Professional