Alliances and Asymmetry

Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances Author(s): James D.
Morrow Source: American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Nov., 1991), pp. 904-933 Published by: Midwest Political Science Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2111499 Accessed: 07/09/2009 13:04
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AlliancesandAsymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Modelof Alliances* Aggregation

James D. Morrow,Hoover Institution,StanfordUniversity
This paperproposes an alternativelogic of alliances to the capabilityaggregationmodel where both allies receive securityfrom an alliance. In this alternativelogic, one partnerreceives autonomy benefits, and the other, security benefits from the alliance. The former type of alliances are called symmetric and the latter asymmetric. The paper develops both logics from a model of alliance choices in the face of trade-offsbetween autonomyand security and provides a precise definitionof those two concepts. It then derives a series of critical tests that show the trade-offmodel is superior to the capabilityaggregationmodel. First, asymmetricalliances will be easier to form and last longer than symmetric alliances. Second, regardlessof the type of alliance, the greaterthe change in its members'individualcapabilities, the more likely it will be broken.Third, second-rankmajorpowers will be more likely to form asymmetricalliances as their capabilities increase. All the hypotheses are supportedby a statisticalexaminationof militaryalliances formed between 1815 and 1965. The relationstheory are drawnout. implicationsof the argumentfor several topics in international
Alliances are a critical tool in international politics, but we understand little about them. As Ward(1982, 26) describesour knowledge,"littleworkhas probed the black boxes of decision making within either nations or alliances. . . . Nor has there been very much work which has sought to examine, understand,or predict which alliance groupings were likely to form." Much of the literature emphasizes alliance formationand dissolutionat the systemic level (e.g., Li and Thompson 1978; McGowanand Rood 1975; Midlarsky1981, 1983). However, this body of work gives us few clues aboutwhy individualnations form specific alliances. Historical studies (e.g., Liska 1962; Rothstein 1968) discuss some cases in depth but provide little insight into what general tendencies hold. The surveys of work on alliances (Bueno de Mesquitaand Singer 1973; Holsti, Hopmann, and Sullivan 1973; Ward1982) leave the impressionthat much work has been done with few results. The dominant view sees alliances as tools for aggregating capabilities againsta threat;nationsform alliancesto increasetheirsecurityby massing their capabilities against a common enemy. The need for the alliance ends when the threatpasses. This view will be called the capabilityaggregationmodel of alliances. Although its origins lie in balance of power theory (Morgenthau1973;
* An earlier version of this paper was presentedat the 1987 annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association in Chicago. I would like to express my gratitudeto Michael Altfeld, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita,CharlesGlaser, PaulHuth, JackLevy, MichaelMcGinnis, RobertPowell, RandolphSiverson, and Barry Weingast;their comments improvedboth the presentationand substance of this paper.
American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 35, No. 4, November 1991, Pp. 904-33 (D 1991 by the Universityof Texas Press, P.O. Box 7819, Austin, TX 78713
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Waltz 1979), capability aggregationis the central theme of most work on alliances. This view emphasizes how alliances advance the common interests of their members. Because the common interest is generally assumed to be the deterrenceor defeat of a mutualthreat, alliances are seen as tools of capability aggregationin the face of an expansionistpower. This papercontends that the typical view of alliances as tools of capability aggregationand threatdeterrencealone is incomplete, but it can be subsumedin great powers, can use alliances to a more general model. Nations, particularly furthertheir pursuitof changes in the foreign policy status quo. Weakerparties can offer concessions, such as militarybases or the coordinationof foreign and domestic policies, that can increase a stronger ally's freedom of action while increasingtheir protectionfrom externalthreats.Alliances can advancediverse, but compatible, interests.' In this view a nation will judge the attractivenessof an alliance by comparingthe benefitsof the ally's ability to advance its interests to the costs of advancingthe ally's interests.When the formerexceeds the latter for both nations, they will want to form an alliance. The capabilityaggregation model is the special case of this broaderview where the allies possess a mutual interestin repelling a common threat. To understand the logic of alliances, we need a theorythatexplains national choices to form and to break them. Altfeld (1984) presents a rational choice theory of military alliances that emphasizes the trade-offbetween increasedsecurity and decreased autonomy. Morrow (1987) broadensAltfeld's concept of autonomyto create the possibility of autonomygains from alliances. This paper of issues and extends the Altfeld model by linking it to a spatial representation interests (Morrow 1986; also see Morgan 1984). This extension provides clear definitionsof autonomyand security from interestsand shows how alliances can trade-offmodel exadvanceeither autonomyor security.The autonomy-security plains both symmetric(where both allies receive security or autonomybenefits) and asymmetric(where one ally gains securityand the otherautonomy)alliances and the conditions underwhich each type occurs. This more general model subsumes the capability aggregationmodel and shows the differences between the two types of alliances. It leads to novel hypotheses about alliance patternsand durationsthat cannot be derived from the capabilityaggregationmodel. The criticaltest of the model is whetherasymmetric alliances are morecommon and last longerthansymmetricalliances. Because the two sides in asymmetricalliances derive their benefits from different interests, they strike a more stable bargainof intereststhan those in symmetric alliances. As each side's capabilities and interests change over time, asymmetric alliances are more likely than symmetric alliances to continue to provide net
'For example, the WarsawPact provides the Soviet Union with control over the internaland foreign policies of its allies and internaland externalsecurity for the EasternEuropeannations.
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benefits to their members. Further,the model shows why alliances are more likely to break when the allies' capabilitieschange (Berkowitz 1983) and why increases in capabilities by second-rankmajorpowers furtherthe formationof asymmetricalliances. Existing researchprovides some results supportingthese hypotheses. Midlarsky (1988, 158-68) finds that alliances with great differences in capabilities last longer than those with small differences. Altfeld (1984) found that symmetric alliances among major powers were formed to-gain security for all parties. Along a similar line, Lalmanand Newman (1991) found that 88% of all European nations forming alliances since 1815 increased their security as a consequence of the alliance. At the same time, a substantialnumberof nations, 31, (12% of all the national decisions to form alliances in the period 1816-1965) lost security when they formed an alliance. Their results suggest that both security and nonsecuritymotivationsexist for alliances. The paperbegins with the capabilityaggregationmodel and then discusses the concepts of autonomyand security. A model of alliance decisions focusing on the autonomy-security trade-off is presented. The differences between symmetric and asymmetricalliances are drawn, and the implicationsof those differences for the formationand durationof alliancesderived. Those implicationsare tested on the set of internationalmilitary alliances formed between 1815 and 1965. The paper concludes with a discussion of the wide-rangingimplications of the results for a numberof topics in international relations. The Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances Alliances and alignmentsoccur when two or more nations agree to coordinate theiractions. We distinguishformalalliancesfrom alignmentsby the greater length of commitmentpresentin an alliance; alignmentsreflect similarityin interest without the formal mutualcommitmentpresent in an alliance (Dingman 1979; Ward 1982). Alignmentsoccur when nationsconcert their actions to pursue common interests at the present without the implicationof coordinationof their actions in the future.2Alliances entail a pledge of futurecoordinationbetween the allies. Because those pledges are not binding, alliances do not merge the allies' capabilitiesby forging an everlastingcoordinationof action. Instead, alliances signal to other nations that the allies share certain interestsand so are likely to coordinatetheir actions in the future. Prospective allies must share both harmonious and divergent interests. Withoutthe latter, an alliance would be unnecessarybecause each party would come to the other'said simply in orderto pursueits own (identical)interests.For instance, the United States and Israel have never signed a military alliance because there has never been a questionthat the United States would provide mili2Alignmentscorrespondto the coalitions in Morrow(1986). Coalitions there requirecoordination on an agreed coalitionalposition and last only for the durationof the crisis.
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tary assistance to Israelin a crisis. Their militaryinterestshave been sufficiently similar that an alliance has been unnecessary. The capabilityaggregationmodel of alliancesassumesthatallies value each otherfor the militaryassistancethey can provideone another.Althoughthis view is not stated purely in any one source, it is quite common in the literature(e.g., Kaplan 1957; Morgenthau1973; Walt 1987; Waltz 1979). The presentationhere synthesizes the common elements of these differentanalyses. In this view alliances serve as a substitutefor internalsources of power by increasingthe likelihood that the allies will send their military forces to defend one another. The increasedcredibilityof militaryinterventionadvancesthe allies' mutualinterest in the deterrenceof a common threat, and the massing of their military forces increases their ability to defeat such a threatshould it materialize.The greatera nation'srelative capabilities, the more attractiveit will be as an ally (given a sharedperceptionof the threat). (Note: the term "capabilities"always refers to relative rather than absolute capabilities in this paper.) All else equal, major powers are the most attractivealliance partnersin this view. In the capabilityaggregationmodel, alliances last as long as they are useful against the threat they counter. Alliances will be terminatedwhen the threat passes. They could be short-livedor long-lived dependingupon the natureof the threat. But nations should also break alliances when their allies can no longer provide the necessary capabilities or when those additionalcapabilities are no longer needed. Increasesor decreasesin eitherally's relativecapabilitiesincrease the probabilitythatit no longer needs its ally's capabilitiesor thatit can no longer provide its ally with the necessarycapabilities,and so should increasethe probability of an alliance breakingup (all else equal). As a nation'srelativecapabilities increase, its ability to deteror defeat the threaton its own increases, lowering its valuationof an alliance. As a nation'srelative capabilitiesdecrease, its value as an ally declines, encouragingits ally to terminatethe alliance. In either case, one of the two allies will value the alliance less. Having detailed the capability aggregation model and its implications for alliance durations, we turn to the alternative,the autonomy-security trade-offmodel. Possible Benefits of Alliances: Autonomy and Security I startwith the assumptionthatnationspursuevalues-some realized, some unrealizedin the currentstate of affairs-in their foreign policies and that international issues are the manifestationof disagreementson those values across nations. These values run the gamut from the ideological throughthe pragmatic to the material. Specific international issues are policies of one or more nations
+hnt nar thm f %il f rnff 3
3Mansbachand Vasquez (1981) present a general theory of internationalrelations based on issues (althoughtheir concept of stake correspondsto my notion of issue). Morrow(1986) presents a formal model that analyzes international conflict for set of issues where the positions of the actors
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National preferences, strategies, and the outcome of issues are defined by three concepts: (1) ideal points that reflect nationalpreferencesover the issues; (2) positions that specify nationalstrategiesto achieve those preferences;and (3) the statusquo thatis the outcome determinedby all nations'positions. A nation's ideal point gives its preferredresolutionof the issues. A nation'sposition specifies the issue outcomes that it is trying to realize throughits actions. Because nationsmay choose not to pursuetheirpreferred outcomeon all issues, a nation's position can differ from its ideal point. The currentresolution of international issues defines the status quo. The status quo is determinedby combining all nations' positions and theirmilitary,political, andeconomic capabilitiesto affect outcomes. Nations evaluate the status quo by comparingit to their ideal point; the closer the status quo is to their ideal point (controlling for the salience of separateissues), the more favorablythey view the statusquo (Morrow 1986). The second assumptionis that winning coalitions-a coalition that can determine the status quo regardlessof the actions of other actors-do not exist. Because the outcomes of wars are unpredictable,increasinga coalition's capabilities increases the chance it will win and decreases the chance it will lose, increasingthe settlementit can extractshort of war (Morrow 1985). All nations influence the status quo, and so winning coalitions (except for a coalition possessing all the capabilitiesin the system) cannotexist.4 Nations can alter their position by taking actions that either supportor oppose the statusquo across a rangeof issues (perhaps just one issue or many issues at once). Most actions adjusta nation'sposition slightly. Alliances often lead to large shifts in the allies' positions because they adopt new actions and abandon previous actions to furtherthe goals of the alliance. Whatinterestscan nationspursuethroughalliances?Except for the rarecase where the status quo is some nation'sideal point, all nations will be dissatisfied with the status quo over some issues. If actions either support or oppose the status quo on some issue, every nation will partitionthe issues into those it acts to preserveand those it tries to change. A nation's security is its ability to maintain the current resolution of the issues that it wishes to preserve. A nation's security varies with the issues it defines as security concerns, its capabilities to defend those concerns, the supportit expects to garnerfrom other nations to defend its security interests, and the magnitudeof threatthat other nations pose to those interests. Nations wish to change the status quo for some issues. These issues give rise to a nation's autonomy, the degree to which it pursues desired changes in
for the issues are explicitly defined. For the present discussion, we shall assume that issues exist, that actorshave differences in theirpreferredresolutionof those issues, and that no actor is perfectly satisfied with the statusquo. 4Because I assume winning coalitions do not exist, the literature on alliances based on the size principle (Riker 1962) is irrelevantto this paper.
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the status quo. The concept of autonomyhere capturesone facet: thatof external self-assertion, of the general notion of autonomyas a state'sability to determine its own policies. A nation'sautonomy will vary with the actions it adopts; the more aggressively it challenges the statusquo, the greaterits autonomy.We can judge a nation'sautonomyby the differencebetween its ideal point and its position over the issues in the status quo that it would like to change. If a nation adopts its ideal point as its position, it has made no compromisesin its attempts to achieve desired changes. Each time it abandonsactions aimed to move the status quo closer to its ideal point in orderto gain supportfor its security interests, its position moves away from its ideal point. As the differencebetween the two grows, its autonomydecreases.5 Because winning coalitions do not exist, nations can never be absolutely secure. If winning coalitions did exist, then their members would possess absolute security (at least from all nations outside the alliance). Instead, the positions and capabilitiesof all nationsdeterminethe statusquo. Then a nation's security can always be increasedby addingcapabilitiesthroughan alliance provided that the shift in its position provoked by the alliance does not lead to additionalthreatsto the status quo that overmatchthe gain from the additional capabilities. The importantobservationhere is that althoughall nations possess some degree of security,there is no state of perfectsecurity.All nationsare both secure and insecure;a motivationto gain security is always present. Autonomy and security are judged at an instantin time and give a nation's ability to change and protect the status quo at that time. Over time, a nation's autonomy and security rises and falls with its capabilities and the support it receives from its allies. When autonomygoals are realized, those issues change into security concerns. Autonomy and security are plastic over time; I define them to be the instantaneousvalues ratherthan to measure the trade-off over
time.6
'Morrow (1987) providesa more thoroughdiscussionof the conceptsof autonomyand security employed here. One of the referees suggesteddividing the concept of autonomyin two-aggressive autonomybeing freedomto remakethe statusquo, anddefensive autonomyfreedomfrom entangling alliances. I reject this distinction because the concept of defensive autonomy is problematic. An alliance entangles one of its memberswhen the alliance leads it to adopt policies it would not have adoptedotherwise. If the alliance commits it to protectinterestsit would not defend otherwise, then the alliance has reduced its security by decreasing its ability to defend its other interests. If the alliance leads it to advanceinterestsof its allies thatit would not otherwise, then the alliance reduces its autonomyby decreasing its ability to advanceits own desiredchanges in the statusquo. In either case the pursuitof defensive autonomyis just the pursuitof either autonomyand security as I define those terms. 6Some actions to change the status quo appear to be taken in the name of future security-preventive war, for instance. If we consider autonomy and security as dynamic, ratherthan instantaneous,concepts, we must define the actors' discount factors. Autonomy and security would then become discounted streams over time. We would have to estimate discount factors in order to deficalculate (dynamic) security and autonomy.I reject this approachin favor of an instantaneous
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James D. Morrow The Autonomy-Security Trade-off Model of Alliance Behavior
Alliances can be consideredin termsof theireffects on the allies' autonomy and security. Because autonomy and security dichotomize a nation's interests, the political effects of an alliance are separableinto autonomyand security effects. Holding either autonomyor security constant, increases in the other are always preferred.Faced with an increase in one and a decrease in the other, I assume states have convex preferencesover autonomyand security. A moderate combinationof both is generally preferableto high levels of one and low levels of the other. Given convex preferencesacross issues, a nation preferssmall differences between the status quo and its ideal point on many issues to complete satisfaction on a few issues and vast differences on the remainingissues (once we account for the relative salience of differentissues). Autonomy and security are aggregationsof these issues, and so preferencesbetween autonomy and security must reflect the convex preferencesacross issues. Of course, the exact evaluationof the trade-offbetween autonomyand securityfor a particular nation depends on how it separatesthe issues into autonomyand security interests, the relative salience of differentissues, and its levels of security and autonomy. A trade that produces a less even mix may be preferredif it producesa very large increase in one for only a small loss in the other.7 Alliances lead nations to change their actions, producing a shift in their positions. By altering demands to change the status quo on some issues while supportingthe statusquo on others, these new positions producechanges in the allies' autonomyand security.The actualchanges in position are negotiable and dependupon the agreementbetweenthe allies. A nationcan reduceits autonomy by changing its position on the issues that it would like to change. Any alliance that reduces a nation'sautonomywill have to garneradditionalsecurity from the supportof the new ally (otherwise, why would a nationform an alliance if it lost both security and autonomy?). Many international agreements, including some militaryalliances, are struckon the groundsof both partiessacrificingautonomy for security. Otheragreementsincreasea nation'sautonomyby providingit with assistance from the ally that allows the first nation to adopt actions that pursue desired changes. At the same time, its security decreases both because its new position may provokenew challenges from other nationsand because the nation will take actions to defend its ally's security intereststhat it would not defend
nition of autonomy and security for reasons of simplicity. Although a dynamic model would be preferableto the static model, the treatment presentedhere is generallyin accordwith existing theory and empirical work. 7The assumption of convex preferences includes the idea of diminishing marginal returns. Pushing an already high level of security higher may be less preferredthan raising a low level of autonomy. Still, the evaluation of a particulartrade depends upon the exact trade-off; if a large amountof securitycould be obtainedfor a small loss in autonomy,this trademight be preferred even when security was alreadyhigh and autonomylow.
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withoutthe alliance.8Then a nation'sautonomyand securityin militaryalliances are generally constrainedto move in opposite directions.9This constraintoperates like a budget line in consumertheory in economics (except that there is no reason to assume the constraintis necessarilylinear). Because a roughtrade-offbetweenautonomyand securityexists in the logic of military alliances, a model of alliance decisions should focus on that tradeoff. Altfeld (1984) adoptsthe conventionsof consumerchoice theory to explain how governments(which he treats as unitary,rationalactors) employ arms and alliances as tools to gain the combinationof autonomy,security,and wealth they desire. Purchasingarms raises a nation'ssecurity at the cost of some wealth; forming alliances can raise a nation'ssecurity at the cost of some autonomy. Differentnations will acquiredifferentcombinationsof arms and alliances based on their utility for each of these three "goods." Formally,this approachleads to a constrainedoptimizationproblemwhich Altfeld (1984) solves to determine equilibriumconditions for a nation'sarmament and alliancedecisions. My approachis different;I examine the benefitsand costs of possible alliances to determine the attractivenessof different types of alliances. Because the set of available alliance partnersis small, nations are generallyunableto form theiroptimalallianceprofile. Instead,they use a weaker criterion, forming that alliance which most increasestheir utility. Individualalliances cannot be predictedbecause there are no existing indicatorsof national utilities for other nation'spolicies and the status quo other than Bueno de Mesquita's (1981) alliance similarityindicator.But there are patternsin the benefits of alliances that suggest certain regularitiesthat can be observed across a large numberof alliances. To explain those regularities,we now turn to the security and autonomybenefits (and costs) thatdifferentalliance partnerscan provide. Benefits and Costs of Alliances Security benefits arise primarilyfrom the military capabilities of an ally. The strongerthe ally, the greaterthe security providedby an alliance (all else
8The threatof entrapment,being draggedinto a waronly to supportan ally, is the main source threatensa nation'ssecuritybecause of a loss of securityfrom an alliance (Snyder 1984). Entrapment defeat in war may lead to issue concessions beyond the loss of the ally's interests. 9Some alliances might producegains in both autonomyand security for one of the allies if it valued the continued existence of its ally as one of its security interests. Because such alliances would be costless for thatnation, it would always be willing to ally. But then we should wonderwhy concessions to form the alliance; the first nation should be willing to would its ally grant a'utonomy defend the second even withoutthe alliance. Although autonomyand security can be tradedthroughalliances, there is not an inverse relationshipacross nationsbetweenthe two. Assume thatall nationsstartwith equal autonomy,but some nations startwith more security.Those states with high securitywould tradesome to states with less for additionalautonomy. (Strictly speaking, nations cannot trade autonomy and security, but they would form alliances that provide security to the weakerpartyand autonomyto the stronger.)Then
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equal). The precise amountof security an ally providesdepends on the location of the ally, the issues the agreementcovers, and the threatother nations pose to the status quo (which can be determinedfrom their capabilities and positions). In some cases an alliance will increasea nation'ssecurity by reducingthe threat its ally poses (cf. Walt 1987 on bandwagoningand Mares 1988 on regional hegemonies). An alliance can reduce a nation'ssecurity by revealing issue positions that other nations object to or by committingit to defend an ally it would not defend in the absenceof an alliance (Snyder 1984). The latterdanger-often called "entrapment"-is particularly problematicwhen the ally is weak and embroiled in a long-termpolicy dispute with anothernation. Generally,the security an ally providesrises with the ally's powerbut can be negative for weak, exposed allies or if the ally advancesa controversialposition. The autonomybenefits (or costs) of an alliance are negotiable. For an alliance to retain credibility over time, the allies must adjust their actions to demonstratetheir continuedcommitmentto the alliance. Consequently,Altfeld (1984) assumes that alliances must reduce both allies' autonomy. But the definition of autonomyhere (i.e., the freedom to pursuedesired changes in the status quo) allows for different patternsof alliance benefits. Offensive alliances (cf. Levy 1981 on offensive alliances in history) increaseboth allies' autonomy. The Axis brought together three nations (Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and ImperialJapan)that sharedcommon interests in changing the status quo. Alliances formed to change the status quo requireeither sharedor complementary goals. The Axis pursuedcomplementary territorial goals: Germany'sgoals being in Centraland EasternEurope, Italy's in the Mediterranean, and Japan'sin the Far East. In other alliances one partyreceives autonomybenefits from the other. For example, the Anglo-Portuguesealliance of 1899 (the Windsor treaty) stopped arms shipmentsto the Boers throughDelagoa Bay. Because the cession of arms shipmentsassisted the Britishin theirgoal of establishingcontrolover the Transvaal and Orange Free State (i.e., a change in the status quo), Britain gained autonomyfrom the treaty. The Portuguesein returnreceived territorialguarantees of their colonies. The exact natureof autonomybenefits is negotiable in an alliance. If one party is willing to offer concessions like changes in its internalpolicies or military bases that allow the projectionof military forces, the other side can gain autonomyfrom the alliance. Controlover one ally's internaland externalpolicies (Schroeder1976) can produceautonomybenefitsby realizingdesiredchanges in the status quo and by freeing resources to pursue other goats. Of course, the same concessions could be made to enhance both parties' security. What distinat any point in time, we should expect to find that nations with above-averagesecurity should also have above-averageautonomy. Even though alliances provide a trade-off between autonomy and security, we should observe a positive relationshipbetween the two across nations.
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guishes these concessions (which are common to alliances) as autonomyor security benefits is the motivationthat underliesthem. Now we turn to those motivations and examine them througha thoughtexperiment. Power and Alliance Motivations Imagine a pristine internationalsystem, one where there are no alliances and no previous history. Each nationdependsonly on its own capabilitiesfor its security, which increases with its capabilities. Major powers in such a system would be more secure than minorpowers because of their greatermilitarycapamajorpowers may be insecureif their interestsare bilities. Of course, particular greatly threatened,and particularminor powers may be secure if their interests are not threatened.But all nations would possess high levels of autonomy because none have formed alliances or taken actions that would move their positions away from their ideal points. Before the formation of any alliances, all nations would possess similarlevels of autonomybut varyinglevels of security. Given convex preferences in autonomy and security (i.e., possessing a moderatelevel of both is preferableto possessing a great deal of one and not much of the other), nations prefer alliances that equalize the mix of autonomy and security to an unaligned state with an unbalancedcombinationof the two. Minorpowers have low levels of securityand high levels of autonomyand so try to form alliances that increase their security at the cost of some autonomy.The exact alliances they form (if any at all) dependon the specific tradesof autonomy for security offered and the relative importanceof security versus autonomyfor each nation (i.e., its utility functionfor autonomyand security). The situationis differentfor majorpowers. They possess high levels of both autonomyand security.They have no overridinginterestto raise eitherautonomy or security;some desire to enhance their security, while others are content with theirs. As a group, major powers will not be driven to pursue exclusively autonomy or security in their alliances. Consider what types of alliances are attractivein this situation. A major power can offer a potential ally a large increase in its security, but it demandsa high price in autonomy to form an alliance. Minor powers cannot offer much security to a prospectiveally but may be able to offer concessions that increase its ally's autonomy. Figure 1 displays the attractivenessof different types of alliances to minor powers. An alliance with a major power provides a large increase in security at the cost of a large cost in autonomy; an alliance with another minor power provides a small gain in security at a small cost of autonomy. An alliance that increases autonomydoes so at a cost of security. The hypotheticalminor power wants to form any alliance that shifts its autonomysecurity mix above its indifferencecurve throughits original mix, in Figure 1 of a particular just the possible alliance with the majorpower. The attractiveness in and it alliance depends upon the changes autonomy security producesand how
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Figure 1. The Security and Autonomy Consequences of Alliances for Minor Powers
AutonomyIncreasing Allianlce PositionwithoutAlliance
Autonomy Alliance with Alliance with MinorPower MajorPower
Security
a nation evaluates those changes. The hypotheticalminor power in Figure 1 might want to ally with some minorpowersand not ally with some majorpowers dependingupon the exact consequencesof the potentialalliance. However,given convex preferencesand an initial mix unbalancedwith more autonomythan security, minorpowersdesire large gains in security,and only alliances with major powers can deliver the desired gains. Figure 2 gives a major power's situation. An alliance with anothermajor power could raise its security at the cost of some autonomy. Alternatively, it could form an alliance with a minorpower thatreduces its securitybut raises its autonomythroughconcessions made by the minor power to secure the alliance. These concessions could includemilitarybases thatprovidestrategiclocation for the projectionof power or agreementsthat allow the majorpower to intervenein the minorpower'sdomestic politics in the future.Deals betweenmajorand minor powers are naturalin this situation;the minor power will make autonomyconcessions to the majorpower in returnfor the security the majorpower can provide. This pattern of alliance will be called asymmetricbecause the parties receive differentbenefits from the alliance. Additionally,asymmetriesin capabilities are generally found in asymmetricalliances.
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Figure 2. The Security and Autonomy Consequences of Alliances for Major Powers
Alliance with MinorPower
Autonomy
PositionwithoutAlliance
Alliance with MajorPower
Security
Symmetric alliances, where each party gains the same type of benefit, are also possible. Two majorpowers' interestsmay be sufficientlyclose for them to form an alliance where they both gain security (if their interests in preserving the status quo match) or autonomy(if their interestsin changing the status quo complement one another), provided that the cost in the other is not too high. Minor powers may be able to provide one another with sufficient security to overcome the autonomy loss of an alliance, the Little Entente being a classic example of an alliance of minorpowers for security.However, such alliances are rareand limited. The Little Ententefaced only the Hungarian threatto the status quo because the German, Italian, and Soviet threatsto the status quo were not sharedby its members, and their militarycapabilitieswere insufficientto defeat any of those threats. Opportunities to form symmetricalliances will be rarebecause they require great harmonyof interest. Asymmetric alliances should be easier to form because each side receives differentbenefits, and both sides can deliver their end of the bargain. Assuming there are an equal numberof opportunitiesto form both types of alliances, we shouldexpect to see more asymmetric than symmetric alliances and more allies that are unequal in power than allies that are equal.
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As alliances startto form in our hypotheticalpristinesystem, minorpowers will convert some of their autonomyto security, and majorpowers will convert some of their securityto autonomy.These tradeslead to an international system where the powerful tend to possess higher levels of both autonomyand security than the weak. The attractionof any individualalliance depends on the autonomy and security that each party can provide and the value each party attaches to those goals. Some minor powers may be unable to form alliances because they are unable to deliver sufficientautonomybenefits to attracta majorpower. For example, if militarybases are the autonomyconcession, not all minorpowers possess the strategiclocation that make such bases attractiveto a majorpower. One type of asymmetricalliance (which Mares 1988 calls regional hegemonies) provides sufficientautonomybenefitsfor the majorpower to remove its incentive to threatenits ally, therebyincreasingthe minorpower'ssecurity.Otherminorpowers will value theirautonomyhighly, makingthose concessions unattractive even to gain large security benefits. The classic case here is Hoxha's Albania, which quit asymmetricrelationshipswith both the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of Chinain orderto preservethe autonomyof its foreign policy. The same considerationswill change the willingness of major powers to enter into alliances; the United States between the wars valued its security in the Western Hemisphere(and its autonomyin Latin America) highly and so remainedisolationist (with respect to Europeanpolitics). The argumentabove does not suggest thatall nationswill enterasymmetricalliancesnorthatonly asymmetricalliances will form, but ratherthatasymmetricalliances are unusuallyattractivecompared to symmetricalliances.
Hypotheses on Changesin Powerand Alliances

The thought experiment above asserts the attractionof asymmetric alliances, but how do the motivationsto form alliances change in a system where some alliances alreadyexist and capabilitieschange over time? To consider these changes, continue the thoughtexperimentto analyze the motivations to break alliances. A nation will want to break an alliance when it prefers (i.e., is on a higher indifferencecurve) the combinationof security and autonomyit obtains withoutthe alliance to that with it. Three motivationsmake this shift attractive: (1) a deterioration of its securityor autonomyin the alliance; (2) an improvementin its securityand autonomyout of the alliance;or (3) a shift in the nation'sutility function (Berkowitz 1983). Figure 3 shows each of these motivationsgraphically. What changes can produceeach of these three motivationsto breakan alliance? First, growth in capabilities in one alliance partner:as one ally grows in power, its ability to providefor its own securityincreases. At the same time, its
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Figure3. ThreeChangesThat CouldBreakan Alliance
I Original \ \ I
ce
Curve
ihu Position l: ..~~~2
Alliance
Autonomy 3. Chane
in s Pbsrt=n out of Alliance
UilfityFPunction
3.
m~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
1. Deterortiono of .B..enefits .. Alian,ce.
Security
security in the alliance also increases. As a consequenceof this second increase, it will demand additionalautonomyfrom its ally, either by obtaining new concessions or by removing old obligations. Much of that renegotiationoccurs tacitly as the parties adjust their actions over time; McGinnis (1986) provides an insightful analysis of such adjustmentbetween superpowersand their clients. These changes can make breakingthe alliance more attractiveto the ally than can continuing the alliance. Second, decline in a nation's capabilities has the same effect when its ally obtains security from the alliance. The alliance now provides less security, and the partnerwith constant capabilities will demand additionalautonomy to continue the alliance. For both of the first two reasons, the bigger the change in capabilities, the bigger the renegotiation required. Third, shifts in either ally's utility function (e.g., througha change in government) can make existing alliances no longer attractive(such shifts can also reinforce the attractivenessof existing alliances). of securityand autonomyare easier when For all threechanges, adjustments
9I8
James D. Morrow of Utility"Surplus" Figure4. A GraphicDepiction
PositionwithoutAlliance
Autonomy
Positionwith Alliance
ity "Surplus"
Security
both partieshave a large utility "surplus"for the alliancebecause each can grant largerconcessions of autonomyor security and still wish to remain in the alliance. We can think of a nation'sutility "surplus"for an alliance as the distance between its autonomyand securityposition with the alliance and its indifference curve throughits autonomyand securitywithoutthe alliance (see Figure4). Asymmetric alliances are less likely to break in a given period than symmetric alliances and so tend to last longer for two reasons. First, changes in the weakerpower'scapabilitieswill not greatlyalterthe natureof the trade. Because it provides autonomyto the majorpower, its contributionto the alliance is unaffected by changes in its capabilities. Its security is primarilyprovided by its major power ally, so its benefits from the alliance will not change greatly with changes in its capabilities. Consequently,these shifts in capabilitiesare unlikely to breakthe alliance. In a symmetricalliance, a change in either ally's capabilities forces a reallocationof the benefitsof the alliance, making the alliance less likely to persist. Second, asymmetricalliances tend to produce a greaterutility "surplus"thansymmetricalliancesbecauseboth allies move towarda more even mixture of autonomy and security. Once again, these argumentsdo not claim
919
that all asymmetric alliances persist longer than all symmetric alliances, only that across a large numberof alliances, asymmetryleads to greateraverageduration. Also the bigger the change in an individualally's capabilities, the more likely the alliance will break(all else equal).
HYPOTHESIS 1: Asymmetricalliancesare less likely to breakthansymmetric
alliances and so will tend to last longer than symmetricalliances.

HYPOTHESIS2: The probabilitythat an alliance will be brokenincreases the greaterthe changes in its individualmember'scapabilitiesover time.
Let us returnto the questionof the formationof alliances. We should expect that asymmetricalliances are easier to form than symmetricalliances. But does this observationnecessarily lead to the conclusion that asymmetricalliances are formed more often than symmetric alliances? No. Existing alliances provide some nations with additional security and others with additional autonomy, reducing their desire to form asymmetricalliances. Given that asymmetricalliances last longer than symmetric alliances, a smaller number of asymmetric alliances may satisfy the demandfor such alliances. Although asymmetricalliances are generally more attractivethan symmetricalliances, demands for such alliances may be satisfiedby fewer of thembecausethey persist. More symmetric alliances may be formed beca-use they do not last as long; nations will probably have to form a symmetric alliance whenever a situationcalling for one arises. Asymmetricalliances then should be more common than symmetricalliances in the sense thatmore nation-years of asymmetricalliancesshouldbe observedthan nation-yearsof symmetric alliances. However, more symmetric alliances are likely to be formed.
HYPOTHESIS 3: Asymmetricalliances exist more frequentlythan symmetric
alliances-more nation-yearsof asymmetricalliances should be observed than nation-yearsof symmetricalliances.

HYPOTHESIS 4:
More symmetric alliances are formed than asymmetric
alliances. Finally, we turn to which nations are likely to form alliances. Asymmetric alliances trade security for increasedautonomy.For majorpowers, increases in their capabilities raise their security. When the capabilities of a major power increase, it should want to trade some of that increased security for more autonomy by forming an asymmetricalliance. The major powers that form new drawn from those major powers asymmetricalliances should be predominantly whose capabilitieshave recently increased. However, this line of logic should not work for the most powerful nations. Because of their exceptionally high capabilities, those nations should always
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James D. Morrow
possess "extra" securitythatthey would like to tradefor autonomy.Increasesin their capabilities should be irrelevantto their interest in forming asymmetric alliances. A second reason supportsthe hypothesis that increases in capabilities increase the likelihood that a major power will form an asymmetricalliance but are irrelevantfor exceptionally powerful nations. Asymmetric alliances require an interested minor power. Minor powers requiresecurity to complete such a deal, but not all major powers can provide that security. One way for a minor power to ensure thata prospectiveprotectorwill possess sufficientcapabilitiesis to ally with a majorpower whose capabilitiesare increasing. Some major powers, such as Britain in the nineteenth century and the United States in the twentiethcentury, are so powerful that they can guarantee security to any minor power. Increases in capabilitiesin the latter case are not necessary to ensure their ability to protecttheirclients. Minor powers tend to have less choice in the formationof asymmetricalliances. If they do not hold a strategic geographicposition or a central political role, it may be very hardto find any majorpower that wishes to protectthem in returnfor autonomy concessions. Changes in minor power capabilities should then be less relevantto the formationof asymmetricalliances. HYPOTHESIS 5: Increases in capabilities for second-rankmajor powers increase the chance that they form an asymmetricalliance. HYPOTHESIS 6: Increasesin capabilitiesfor exceptionally powerful nations are irrelevantto their formationof asymmetricalliances. Compare the two models of alliances. The capability aggregation model provides a basis for understanding security-increasing symmetricalliances. But the autonomy-security trade-off model is logically superiorbecause it incorporatesthis understanding while also explainingasymmetricalliancesand offensive alliances (i.e., autonomy-increasing symmetric alliances). Further,Hypotheses 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6 provide critical tests for separatingthe two models. Although both models predict that alliances are more likely to break as their members' capabilitieschange, the capabilityaggregationmodel says little aboutwhy asymmetric alliances would form or when they would be broken. Given that minor powers can offer little security to their majorpower allies, the capabilityaggregation model suggests that asymmetricalliances would be rare and more likely to break than symmetric alliances. Now we turn to an examinationof alliance durationsand patternsto assess the evidence for the autonomy-security trade-off model. Testing the Hypotheses A set of 164 military alliances formed between 1815 and 1965 is used to test the six hypotheses. The primarysource is the Correlatesof Warcollection
921
of all mutual military alliances (Small and Singer 1969) with the addition of wartimealliances given by Holsti, Hopmann,and Sullivan (1973). Each alliance is treated as a whole and is not decomposed into dyads of allies. Separatealliances formed with the intent of building one multilateralalliance are treated as one alliance, startingwith the formationof the firstalliance in the set and ending with the dissolution of the whole alliance. For instance, the Little Entente is treatedas one alliance beginning in 1920, when Czechoslovakiaand Yugoslavia concluded the firstbilateralpact. To test the first hypothesis, the alliances were classified as symmetric or asymmetric. Nations are classified into three groups: minor, major, and superpowers. The definition of major powers is taken from the Correlatesof War (Small and Singer 1982, 47-50). All nonmajorpowers are classified as minor powers. After 1945 the definition of major power is problematicbecause the Soviet Union and the United States are more than equals of the other major powers (i.e., United Kingdom, France, and the People's Republicof China). To rectify this problem, the Soviet Union and the United States are classified as superpowersfrom 1945 on, creatingthree types of nations for that period. Alliances with only one type of power are considered symmetric;those including or one majorpowerand only lesser powers are consideredasymone superpower metric. Alliances with more thanone majorpower and at least one minor power were classified on a case-by-case basis dependingon the natureand purpose of the alliance.'0
'?The mixed alliances were classified as follows: The GermanicConfederationis asymmetric because Austria and Prussia used it to control the German states (Kraehe 1963). The Quadruple Alliance is asymmetricbecause Francerequestedthe additionof Spain and Portugalto the alliance to give Britainand Francecontrol over Spainand Portugal(Webster1951). The 1840 alliance against Mehemet Ali is symmetric because all parties were interested in restrainingindependent French action (Webster 1951; Schroeder1976). The CrimeanWaralliance of Britain, France, and Turkeyis symmetric because of their common interest in resisting the Russian threatto the status quo in the Eastern Mediterranean.The 1861 alliance of France, Great Britain, and Spain against Mexico is symmetric because of their common interestin interveningin Mexico (Albrecht-Carrie1958, 120). The alliance of Romaniawith the membersof the Triple Alliance is treatedas a separateasymmetric used the alliance to provide additional alliance from the Triple Alliance because Austria-Hungary supportagainst Russia in the Balkansand to protectagainstRomanianagitationin Transylvania,and Romania insisted that Germanybe included (Taylor 1954, 277). The Mediterranean agreementbetween Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Spain is asymmetricbecause the alliance acted to constrainSpain from dealing with Franceover Morocco. Bulgariajoining the CentralPowers and Romaniajoining the Allies during WorldWarI are symmetricbecause all partieswere pursuingchanges in the status quo. The Brussels Pact is symmetricbecause its original purposewas to encourage U.S. protection of Western Europe (Kaplan 1984); having succeeded in that goal with the formation of NATO, I consider the alliance terminatedin 1949, even though it continuesto exist to this day. All bilateral alliances between WarsawPact members are considered separatefrom the pact itself because they are considered to bind the Soviet Union to defend EasternEuropemore strongly than the pact itself (Meissner 1966). One of the referees wonderedif some alliances between majorand minor powers are actually
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James D. Morrow
Table 1. Mean Durations of Symmetric and Asymmetric Alliances Type Asymmetricalliances Symmetricalliances Years 15.69 ? 12.80 12.21 ? 12.84 Number 78 86
t = 1.74 Significance = .043

Note: The t-statisticis calculatedusing independent estimatesof the variances and 78 degrees of freedom. The significance probabilityis based on a onetailed test of the hypothesisthatasymmetricalliancesendurelongerthansymmetric alliances.
The averagelengths of asymmetricand symmetricalliances were compared using a one-tailed t-test on the hypothesis that asymmetricalliances should last longer. Table 1 gives the results;asymmetricalliances last three and a half years longer on the averagethan symmetricalliances. This differenceis significantat the .05 level. The data set contains78 asymmetricand 86 symmetricalliances. Compared to the probabilityof symmetric and asymmetric alliances if alliance partners where chosen randomly,the significanceprobabilityof this difference is .26 (n = 164, the numberof alliances)."I Althoughthis observationsupportsthe fourth
symmetric. Misclassifying symmetric alliances between minor and major powers as asymmetric might compromise the statistical tests. Such misclassificationscould produce either error or bias. Error(i.e., randommisclassificationsof cases) increasesthe varianceof the estimatorswhich would reduce the power of the tests. Bias (i.e., systematic errors)is a more serious problem. If this bias exists here, it can make the tests only more, not less, likely to falsify the theory. If my theoryis true, such alliances should be short-livedbecause they producea small utility surplusfor the majorpower. By misclassifying these symmetric alliances as asymmetric, I would reduce the mean durationof asymmetricalliances and increasethatof symmetricalliances in the test. These changes would make it more difficult to show that asymmetricalliances last longer than symmetricalliances. Thus, if my theory is true, any erroror bias introducedby misclassifyingsymmetricalliances between majorand minor powers as asymmetric makes the tests less powerful; it increases the probabilityof type II errors, but reduces the probabilityof type I errors. The readermay also wonderif the accumulation of differentnationalcommitmentsacross time into one alliance introducesa bias by includingex post information(what nations were in the complete alliance) when determiningthe nature(i.e., symmetricversus asymmetric)of an alliance for a predictionof its length. This problem does not occur because none of the alliances examined that added or lost membersafter initial formationchanges its natureas a consequence of those changes. "The randomprobabilitiesof asymmetricand symmetricalliances are calculatedby assuming that each ally is drawnrandomlyfrom the three types (super, major,and minorpowers) with probability equal to the proportionof alliance commitmentsmade by the three types and that all alliances are bilateral. This calculation controls for both the numberof opportunitiesto form the different
923
hypothesis, it understatesthe higher formationrate of symmetric alliances because more nationsare includedin the typical symmetricalliancethanthe typical asymmetric alliance. To test the third and fourth hypotheses, the number of nations that formed each type of alliance and the numberof nation-yearsthat each type of alliance existed were calculated. Nations form symmetricalliances more often than asymmetricalliances, with 259 nationalcommitmentsto symmetric alliancescomparedto 224 nationalcommitmentsto asymmetricalliances. Using the same randomprobabilityas above, this differenceis significantat the .052 level (n = 483, the numberof alliance commitments). However, more asymmetricalliances than symmetricalliances are in existence, with 4,415 naof symmetric tion-yearsof asymmetricalliancescomparedto 3,261 nation-years the thirdhypothesis. This alliances over the 165-yearperiodcovered, supporting difference is significant at the .028 level (n = 164, the number of alliances) comparedto the same randomprobabilitiesabove. Evidence for the second, fifth, and sixth hypotheses requiresmore work. The second hypothesis states that the greaterthe change in the individualallies' capabilities over time, the more likely an alliance will break. The durationof each alliance was separatedinto a string of five-year periods, starting with its formationand extendingthroughits dissolution(or 1980 if it is still in existence). For example, an alliance formed in 1888 and dissolved in 1901 would be broken into three five-year periods, 1888 to 1892, 1893 to 1897, 1898 to 1902. The slope coefficient of a regressionof each member'scomposite capabilitieson time (year 1 to year 5 of each period) gives an estimate of the change in its relative capabilitiesover that five-yearperiod.12 Because both increasesand decreases in
types of alliances and the greaterpropensityof majorpowers to form alliances. Of the 483 alliance commitments,superpowersmake 15, majorpowers 176, and minorpowers 292. Then the probabilities of each type making an alliance commitmentare .031, .364, and .605, respectively. If a pair of allies are chosen randomly,the probabilityof a symmetricalliance being formed by two nations is the sum of the squares of the probabilityof each type: (.031)2 + (.364)2 + (.605)2 = .499. The probabilityof an asymmetricalliance is just the complementof this probability,.501. The statistical tests comparethese randomprobabilitiesto the observedfrequenciesin the data. '2Compositecapabilitiesscores used in the analysis were obtainedfrom the Correlatesof War project directed by J. David Singer at the Universityof Michigan. They are based on six different indicatorsof militarycapabilities:militaryexpenditures,militarypersonnel, total population,urban population, iron and steel production,and energy consumption.For each indicatorand each year, a nation'sshareof that indicatoris calculatedby dividing its score on that indicatorby the sum total of all nations' scores on that indicatorfor a given year. A nation'scomposite capabilitiesis the average of its shareof these six indicators,providinga measureof a nation'srelativecapabilities. Composite capabilities are a crude indicatorof existing and potential military capabilities. They vary from year to year, often throughessentially randomvariationof the underlyingindicators. To reduce the importanceof this randomvariationwhen determiningthe change in a nation'scapabilities, the strategyof regressingfive years of capabilitiesagainst time was adopted. The slope of a variaregressionline gives an averagechange across the five-yearperiod, smoothingout year-to-year tions in composite capabilitiesto tap the long-termchanges in capabilities.
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James D. Morrow
capabilities are hypothesizedto increase the chance that an alliance will break, the absolute value of the slope coefficientswas takento find a nation'schange in capabilities across each five-yearperiod. Two measuresof the changes in capabilities of the membersof an alliance (the sum total change of all members of the alliance and the maximum change experienced by any one member) were calculated from these absolute values of estimatedchanges in relative capabilities. The second measureof capabilityis used as a check on multilateral alliances where the first measure could make many small changes appear large when addedtogether. Probitanalysis was runto differentiate those periodsin which alliances were dissolved from those where they were not. Because composite capabilities indices are very unstableduring periods of major wars, all five-year periods that overlappedwith at least one year of WorldWarI or H were eliminatedfrom the analysis.13 Two analyses were run, one for each of the two measuresof changes in capabilities in an alliance. Each analysis also included a dummy variablefor whetherthe alliance was symmetricor asymmetric(coded 1 if the alliance was asymmetricand 0 if it was symmetric). The autonomy-security trade-offmodel predicts that the coefficient for the type of alliance should be negative (all else equal, asymmetricalliances should be less likely to break than symmetric alliances) and the coefficient for the change in capabilities in the alliance positive (the greater the change in the capabilities of the members of an alliance, the more likely the alliance will be broken). The capabilityaggregationmodel predicts thatboth coefficients should be positive. Table 2 gives the results of the two analyses. In both analyses the coefficients are in the direction predictedby the autonomy-security trade-off model and significant, with the coefficient for changes in capabilities being highly significant. The fifth hypothesisstates that increasesin capabilitiesfor second-rankmajor powers increasesthe chance of theirformingan asymmetricalliance, and the sixth hypothesis states thatsuch increasesare irrelevant for first-rank majorpowers. Both of these hypothesescan be tested with one probitequationthat relates changes in majorpower capabilitiesto the likelihood of forming an asymmetric alliance. The period from 1816 to 1965 was divided into five-yearperiods (e.g., 1816 to 1820, 1821 to 1825, etc.). For each period the averagecapabilitiesand averagerate of change of capabilitieswere calculatedfor each majorpower during that period as in the previous analysis (the interceptof the regression of capabilities on time gives the average capabilities and the slope coefficient the rate of change). The rate of change of each majorpower's capabilities and the interactionof its average capabilities and rate of change were used to predict
'3Analysesthat include the periods that overlapWorldWarI and II produceessentially identical results to those reportedin the text.
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Table 2. Probit Estimates of the Relationship between Changes in Capabilities and the Break-up of Alliances Model 1 Constant error Standard Alliance asymmetric? Standard error Significance Change in capabilities Sum of all allies error Standard Significance Maximumof all allies error Standard Significance -2 x Log likelihood ratio Significance -1.07 .11 -.26 .15 .04 51.71 14.19 .0001 46.83 16.79 .003 8.69 .01 Model 2 - 1.02 .11 -.26 .15 .04
14.55 .0007
Note: N = 454 for both models. All significance tests for coefficients are onetailed tests based on their predictedsign.
whether that major power formed an asymmetricalliance during that five-year period. Once again, time periods that overlappedeither WorldWarI or II were omitted from the analysis. Hypotheses 5 and 6 predictthatthe signs of the coefficients should be positive and negative, respectively.Increasesin capabilitiesshould increasethe likelihood of a majorpower forming an asymmetricalliance with the effect of those increases decreasing with the majorpower's averagecapabilities. Furthermore, the joint effect of the two variablesshould be negligible for the most powerful nations (e.g., GreatBritainin the nineteenthcenturyand the United States in the twentiethcentury). Table 3 presents the results of this analysis. Both coefficients are in the predicted directions and statistically significant at the .01 level. Dividing the coefficient for changes in capabilities by the coefficient for the interactionof capabilities and their change producesa break-evenlevel of about .16. That is, alliances changes in capabilities are irrelevantfor the formationof asymnmetric for nations with average capabilities greaterthan .16. Only Great Britain from 1816 to 1900, Russia from 1816 to 1850, the United States from 1900 to 1965, and the Soviet Union from 1945 to 1965 reach this level consistently. As the theory predicts, changes in capabilities are irrelevant for the most powerful
926
James D. Morrow Table3. ProbitEstimates of the Relationship betweenChangesin MajorPowerCapabilities and the Formation of Asymmetric Alliances Constant Standard error in capabilities Change Standard error Significance x (Capabilities) (Change in capabilities) Standard error Significance -2 x Loglikelihood ratio Significance
testsbasedon theirpredicted one-tailed sign.
-0.77 .12 125.86 52.40 .009 -730.06 294.69 .007 8.34 .015
are Note: N = 148. All significance testsforcoefficients
nations;for second-rankmajorpowers, like France, Italy, and Austria-Hungary, changes in capabilitiesdrive their formationof asymmetricalliances. Summarizingthe empirical analysis, hypotheses 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6 are all supported. The evidence presentedhere supportsthe autonomy-security tradeoff model over the capabilityaggregationmodel. Of course, this evidence is not definitive, but it suggests that asymmetricalliances are more common and durablethanthe capabilityaggregationmodel would lead us to believe. Hypothesis 2 is also supported,but it follows from both models, so it cannot differentiate between the two. Further Implications of the Argument Having establishedsome empiricalsupportfor the autonomy-security tradeoff model of alliances, let us turnto its consequencesfor otherconclusions about alliances and the international system. Balance of Power versus Power TransitionViewsof Alliances Opposing systemic theories of international politics arguefor differentconceptions of the fundamentalrole of alliances. In the balance of power theory (Morgenthau1973), nations form alliances to offset growing powers and restore the balance. Alliances in a balance of power system should be nonideological and last as long as the immediatethreat.This view is the capabilityaggregation model. Prospectiveallies arejust capabilitiesthatcan be addedthroughalliance,
927
and once the threatto the balancehas been countered,the alliance is unnecessary and should be broken. The power transitiontheory (Organski 1968; Organski and Kugler 1980) postulatesan international system dominatedby one nation. This dominantstate forms a large alliance from the lesser powers that share its ideology. Nations not in this satisfied coalition may form alliances dedicated to the overthrowof the existing internationalsystem. Alliances in a power transitionsystem should be ideological and long-lasting. From the perspective of the argumentof this paper, the theories are both correctand incorrectbecause, as Bueno de Mesquita(1988, 641-42) points out, they make differentassumptionsaboutthe distributionof capabilitiesin the system. Balance of power theory assumes an internationalsystem composed of a number of major powers with relatively equal capabilities. The role of minor powers is ignored because they do not possess sufficientcapabilitiesto shift the balance of power. In the internationalsystem postulated by balance of power theory, only symmetric alliances can be formed because all possible allies have equal capabilities. Alliances are formed only to gain security (i.e., nonideological) and do not persist because they are symmetric. Power transition theory, of however, assumes a system with one dominantstate holding a preponderance power. Any alliance that the dominantstate forms is asymmetric. Alliances in a power transition system are formed to advance the autonomy interests of the dominant state or challenger (i.e., ideological) and persist because they are asymmetric.14 Both theories are right in the sense that given their assumptionsabout the internationalsystem and their focus on relations among equals or between the dominantstate and all others, their conclusions aboutalliances follow. However, widening our analysis of alliances shows that those conclusions are not general. Furthermore,the argument presented here also explains why both theories should be able to find supportingevidence in the historical record. Scholars generally see the nineteenth century as a balance of power period, while the power transitionmodel fits the twentieth century better (e.g., Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey's 1972 resultson the effects of systemic concentration of capabilities on war). The alliances examinedreflectthis observation;symmetricalliances are formed more frequentlyin the nineteenthcentury(26 symmetricalliances versus 16 asymmetricalliances) than in the twentieth century (62 to 60). But in both centuries, asymmetricalliances last longer on the average than symmetric alliances. In the nineteenthcentury, symmetricalliances last an averageof 7.85 +
'4For Waltz's (1979) version of balance of power theory, a similar argumentexplains why alliances in a multipolarworld should be flexible (they must be symmetric)and why alliances in a bipolarworld should be rigid (they must be asymmetric).
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James D. Morrow
10.40 years; asymmetric alliances, 12.81 + 14.76 years. The significance probabilityof this difference is .128. In the twentieth century, symmetric alliances last an averageof 14.10 ? 13.40 years; asymmetricalliances, 16.44 ? 12.27 years. The significance probabilityof this difference is .160. Although neither difference is statistically significant at the .05 level, the significance probabilitiesare close, indicatingthat the differencebetween the symmetricand asymmetricalliances is not confinedto one of the two time periods. Balancing versusBandwagoning Walt (1985, 1987) draws a contrast between balancing (allying against a threat)and bandwagoning(allying with the threat). He contends that balancing should be more common than bandwagoningand supportshis contention with a surveyof alliances in the Middle East. This conclusion is not surprisingfrom the perspectiveof the argumenthere. Threatsarise from differences in position on issues on which the threatening nationpursueschange. Because alliances require agreementbetween the allies over some set of issues, nations will generally not ally with nationsthatthreatenthem for the lack of areasof agreement.Balancing alliances have the common interest in resisting the threateningnation to bring the allies together. Bandwagoningalliances could form for two reasons: (1) because both parties face a common threat from a third nation or (2) because the threatening nation receives concessions to deactivatethe threat. The former leads to a symmetric alliance;the latter, to an asymmetricalliance. An example of the former from Walt's 1987 cases would be Jordan'salignment with Egypt on the eve of the Six Day War. Balancingalliances can also be either symmetricor asymmetric. NATO is an example of an asymmetricbalancingalliance. BurdenSharing and Free Riding The questionof burdensharingwithin an alliance is anotherfamiliartheme in the literature(e.g., Beer 1972; Murdochand Sandler 1982; Olson and Zeckhauser 1965). According to this argument, security is a public good within an alliance. Each member of an alliance will attemptto free ride on the military expendituresof its allies, and so alliances should underproduce military goods unless one dominantmemberprovides sufficientsecurity for all. From the perspective of the argument here, the security as public good argumentis partlycorrectbut misses the main point. The dominantpartnerin an asymmetric alliance is willing to provide security for its allies if they provide autonomybenefitsfor it. The essential natureof those alliances leads to a disproportionatesharingof militaryexpenditures.Whatshould be contentiousin asymmetric alliances is the composition of military forces, not the distributionof military expenditure.The dominant nation wants alliance forces configured to
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advance its autonomy interests ratherthan the security of the alliance. When autonomy and security interests demand different force structures, we should expect to see conflict in asymmetricalliances over the appropriateforce structure. In symmetric alliances burden sharing should not be a great problem because each nation wishes to increase its security and is capable of making a significant contributionto its own security. Consequently, neither ally will be interestedin free riding on the alliance. Theis (1987) provides evidence that supports the argumentthat unequal burden sharing should only be present in asymmetric alliances. He examined seven pre-World WarII alliances for patternsof burdensharing. Every alliance (i.e., Franco-Czechand Franco-Belgianbetween the wars) that showed any evidence of free riding was asymmetric. However, the Franco-Polishalliance between the wars did not show evidence of free riding by Poland despite its asymmetric nature. ConflictbetweenAllies Bueno de Mesquita (1981, 73-83, 159-64) contends that allies are more likely to fight each other thanenemies are to fight each other. Ignoringthe question of relative frequency, what types of allies are likely to fight? Symmetric alliances bind together nations with very similar interests, whether they be security or autonomy interests. It is unlikely that the kind of policy differences necessary to starta war could develop within a symmetric alliance. If such differences did emerge, the alliance would fail to provide the desired benefits, and one nation would breakthe alliance before going to war. In an asymmetricalliance, the parties gain different interests. The difference in interests could lead the partiesinto conflict while preservingtheiroverall interestin the alliance. War among allies should occur only in asymmetricalliances. Three patternsof war within an asymmetric alliance (with historical examples) suggest themselves: first, the dominantally disciplines a strayingminorpower (the Russian invasion of Hungary);second, two minorpowers fight over a minor issue within the alliance (the Soccer War);and third, a struggle over the dominantposition in the alliance (the Seven Weeks' War;see Bueno de Mesquita 1990). Alliances Cycles of Hegemonyand Asymmetric The argumentalso provides a clue to the underlyingdynamics of cycles of general wars (e.g., Levy 1985). According to argumentsadvanced to explain general wars (e.g., Gilpin 1981; Modelski 1983; Organski 1968), a hegemon emerges after such a war and extends its control over the internationalsystem. Over time its power declines, allowing a challengerto catch up to the hegemon in power. Eventually,anothergeneral war is triggered, and the cycle startsover. Asymmetric alliances are one of the tools hegemons use to extend their control
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James D. Morrow
over the international system. The hegemon providesits allies with securityfrom their neighborsand receives both some control over the allies' policies and strategic locations to advanceits interestsfurther.The United States best exemplifies this strategy for extending hegemony throughthe network of asymmetric alliances that it establishedafter WorldWarII. These alliances both protectedU.S. allies and providedthe United States with bases for the projectionof power and the position to intervene on behalf of "friendly" governments. Great Britain depended on its empire to extend its control during the Pax Britannica, but it also extended its control of India through asymmetric alliances with native princes. What are the long-run power consequences of developing a network of asymmetricalliances? They help to create the "territorialtrap" that Thompson and Zuk (1986) discuss. Like the financial costs of an empire, supporting a networkof asymmetricalliances raises the hegemon's military expenditures.In the long run, these increasedmilitaryexpendituresdrainthe hegemon'seconomy and hasten its decline in power (Gilpin 1981; Kennedy 1987). These alliances help drive the cycle of rise and decline of nations. Hegemons make a commitment to enjoy short-runpolitical benefits by reshapingthe internationalsystem to fit their view of the system and pay the price of long-term relative decline in power and security.
Conclusion
The autonomy-security trade-offmodel of alliances implies thatasymmetric alliances should be easier both to form and to maintainthansymmetricalliances. In an asymmetric alliance, the stronger partnergains autonomy and provides security to the lesser partner.Because this trade of commitments produces a more even mix of autonomyand securityfor both partners,asymmetricalliances should be attractiveto both. Symmetric alliances provide both partnerswith security (or occasionally autonomy), which requires greater agreementon the intereststhat the alliance advances. Because symmetricalliances between major powers increase their alreadyhigh security, they move their memberstoward a less even mix of autonomyand security. This model also suggests that alliances are more likely to break as their members'capabilitieschange and thatsecond-rankmajorpowers are more likely to form asymmetric alliances as their capabilities increase. Statistical analysis of alliances formed between 1815 and 1965 strongly supports all the above hypotheses. The support for all the hypotheses lends credit to the autonomysecuritytrade-offmodel of alliances. Alliances requirea critical choice between conflicting goals of security and autonomy. The pursuitof one exacts sacrifices on the other. Credible commitments requirea careful matchingof interestsbetween allies; however, those in-
ALLIANCES ANDASYMMETRY
93I
terests need not be identical,just complementary.Predictingindividualalliances calls for carefulanalysis of the intereststhatthe alliance advancesand the ability of each side to carryout its end of the bargain.In the end, alliances are choices of which interestsshould be pursuedat the cost of other interests. Manuscriptsubmitted24 July 1989 Final manuscriptreceived 20 November1990
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Alliances and Asymmetry - An Alternative To The Capability Aggregattion Model of Alliances - JAMES MORROw - 1991

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Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances Author(s): James D.

AlliancesandAsymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Modelof Alliances* Aggregation

James D. Morrow The Autonomy-Security Trade-off Model of Alliance Behavior

ALLIANCES AND ASYMMETRY

AutonomyIncreasing Allianlce PositionwithoutAlliance

Autonomy Alliance with Alliance with MinorPower MajorPower

Alliance with MinorPower

Alliance with MajorPower

Hypotheses on Changesin Powerand Alliances

Figure3. ThreeChangesThat CouldBreakan Alliance

ihu Position l: ..~~~2

in s Pbsrt=n out of Alliance

1. Deterortiono of .B..enefits .. Alian,ce.

James D. Morrow of Utility"Surplus" Figure4. A GraphicDepiction

alliances and so will tend to last longer than symmetricalliances.

alliances-more nation-yearsof asymmetricalliances should be observed than nation-yearsof symmetricalliances.

More symmetric alliances are formed than asymmetric

t = 1.74 Significance = .043

ALLIANCES AND ASYMMETRY

are Note: N = 148. All significance testsforcoefficients

ALLIANCES AND ASYMMETRY

ALLIANCES AND ASYMMETRY

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