Milagros Manongsong vs. FelomenaJumaquio Estimo G. R. No. 136773. June 25, 2003 F !

"#$ Allegedly, AgatonaGuevarra (Guevarra) inherited a property from Justina Navarro, which is now under possession of the heirs of Guevarra. Guevarra had si children, one of them is !icente "ope#, the father of petitioner $ilagros "ope# $anongsong ($anongsong). %he respondents, the Juma&uio sisters and "eoncia "ope# claimed that the property was actually sold to them 'y Justina Navarro prior to her death. %he respondents presented deed of sale dated (cto'er )), )*+,. $ilagros and -arlito$anongsong (petitioners) filed a -omplaint on June )*, )**. praying for the partition and award to them of an area e&uivalent to one/fifth ()0+), 'y right of representation. %he 1%- ruled that the conveyance made 'y Justina Navarro is su'2ect to nullity 'ecause the property conveyed had a con2ugal character and that AgatonaGuevarra as her compulsory heir should have the legal right to participate with the distri'ution of the estate under &uestion to the e clusion of others. %he 3eed of 4ale did not at all provide for the reserved legitime or the heirs, and, therefore it has no force and effect against AgatonaGuevarra and should 'e declared a nullity a' initio. %##&E$ 5hether or not the rights of the compulsory heirs were impaired 'y the alleged sale of the property 'y Justina. R&'%NG$ No. %he 6asulatan, 'eing a document ac7nowledged 'efore a notary pu'lic, is a pu'lic document and prima facie evidence of its authenticity and due e ecution. %here is no 'asis for the trial court8s declaration that the sale em'odied in the 6asulatan deprived the compulsory heirs of Guevarra of their legitimes. As opposed to a disposition inter vivos 'y lucrative or gratuitous title, a valid sale for valua'le consideration does not diminish the estate of the seller. 5hen the disposition is for valua'le consideration, there is no diminution of the estate 'ut merely a su'stitution of values, that is, the property sold is replaced 'y the e&uivalent monetary consideration. %he 9roperty was sold in )*+, for 9.+:.::. %he trial court8s conclusion that the 9roperty was con2ugal, hence the sale is void a' initio was not 'ased on evidence, 'ut rather on a misapprehension of Article );: of the -ivil -ode, which provides< All property of the marriage is presumed to 'elong to the con2ugal partnership= unless it 'e proved that it pertains e clusively to the hus'and or to the wife. %he presumption under Article );: of the -ivil -ode applies only when there is proof that the property was ac&uired during the marriage. 9roof of ac&uisition during the marriage is an essential condition for the operation of the presumption in favor of the con2ugal partnership. %here was no evidence presented to esta'lish that Navarro ac&uired the 9roperty during her marriage. Ra(ael rsenio #. )i*on, v. !" an+ !%R G.R. No. 1,0-,,. /ril 30, 2000 F !"#$ Jose 9. >ernande# died in Novem'er ,, )*?,. %hereafter, a petition for the pro'ate of his will was filed. %he pro'ate court appointed Atty. 1afael Arsenio 9. 3i#on as administrator of the @state of Jose >ernande#.

An estate ta return was filed later on which showed A@1( estate ta lia'ility. BC1 thereafter issued a deficiency estate ta assessment, demanding payment of 9hp ;;.*, million as deficiency estate ta . %his was su'se&uently reduced 'y -%A to 9hp D,.E. million. %he -A affirmed the -%A8s ruling, hence, the instant petition. %he petitioner claims that in as much as the valid claims of creditors against the @state are in e cess of the gross estate, no estate ta was due. (n the other hand, respondents argue that since the claims of the @state8s creditors have 'een condoned, such claims may no longer 'e deducted from the gross estate of the decedent. %##&E$ 5hether the actual claims of creditors may 'e fully allowed as deductions from the gross estate of Jose despite the fact that the said claims were reduced or condoned through compromise agreements entered into 'y the @state with its creditors 1E')$ F@4. >ollowing the G4 4upreme -ourt8s ruling in Cthaca %rust -o. v. Gnited 4tates, the -ourt held that post/death developments are not material in determining the amount of deduction. %his is 'ecause estate ta is a ta imposed on the act of transferring property 'y will or intestacy and, 'ecause the act on which the ta is levied occurs at a discrete time, i.e., the instance of death, the net value of the property transferred should 'e ascertained, as nearly as possi'le, as of the that time. %his is the date/of/death valuation rule. %he -ourt, in adopting the date/of/death valuation principle, e plained that< >irst. %here is no law, nor do we discern any legislative intent in our ta laws, which disregards the date/of/death valuation principle and particularly provides that post/death developments must 'e considered in determining the net value of the estate. Ct 'ears emphasis that ta 'urdens are not to 'e imposed, nor presumed to 'e imposed, 'eyond what the statute e pressly and clearly imports, ta statutes 'eing construed strictissimi 2uris against the government. 4econd. 4uch construction finds relevance and consistency in our 1ules on 4pecial 9roceedings wherein the term HclaimsH re&uired to 'e presented against a decedentIs estate is generally construed to mean de'ts or demands of a pecuniary nature which could have 'een enforced against the deceased in his lifetime, or lia'ility contracted 'y the deceased 'efore his death. %herefore, the claims e isting at the time of death are significant to, and should 'e made the 'asis of, the determination of allowa'le deductions.