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Romualdez-Marcos v.

COMELEC and Montejo

Facts:

Roy Montejo questioned Marcos’ candidacy as representative of the 1st


district of Leyte on the ground that she is not a resident thereof as required
by the Constitution. Montejo contended that Tacloban was Marcos’ domicile
of origin because she did not live there until she was eight (8) years old.
Moreover, Marcos resided and used to be a registered voter in San Juan and
in Manila.

Issue:

Whether or not Mrs. Marcos meets the residency requirement to run as


representative in Leyte

Held:

Yes. Marcos is domiciled in Tacloban, hence she meets the


Constitutional requirement on residency. Residence and domicile are
synonymous in election law. Mere absence of an individual from his/her
permanent residence without the intention to abandon it does not result in a
loss or change of domicile. Also, when she married the former President
Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new
home, not a domicilium necessarium. The Supreme Court held that even the
matter of a common residence between the husband and the wife during the
marriage is not an iron-clad principle. In cases applying the Civil Code on the
question of common matrimonial residence, our jurisprudence has recognize
certain situations where the spouses could not be compelled to live with
each other such that the wife is either allowed to maintain a residence
different from that of her husband or, for obviously practical reasons, revert
to her original domicile (apart from being allowed to opt for a new one).

In De La Vina v. Villareal, a married woman may acquire a residence or


domicile separate from that of her husband during the existence of the
marriage when the husband has given cause for divorce. The Supreme Court
also allowed the wife to either obtain a new residence or to choose a new
domicile in such an event. In the instances where the wife actually opts,
under the Civil Code, to live separately from her husband either by taking
new residence or reverting to her domicile of origin, the wife could not be
compelled to live with her husband on pain of contempt. In Arroyo v.
Vazquez-Arroyo, the Court held that it is not within the province of the courts
at this country to attempt to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and
render conjugal rights to the other.