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Lorenzo vs Posadas Should the inheritance tax be computed on the basis of the value of the estate a t the time

of the testator's death, or on its value ten years later? What law governs the case at bar? Should the provisions of Act No. 3606 favorabl e to the tax-payer be given retroactive effect? Section 1536 as amended, of the Administrative Code, imposes the tax upon "every transmission by virtue of inheritance, devise, bequest, gift mortis causa, or a dvance in anticipation of inheritance excise or privilege tax imposed on the right to succeed to, receive, or take pro perty by or under a will or the intestacy law, or deed, grant, or gift to become operative at or after death Thomas Hanley died on May 27, 1922, it does not follow that the obligation to pa y the tax arose as of the date. SEC. 1544. When tax to be paid xxx within the six months subsequent to the death of the predecessor; but if judicia l testamentary or intestate proceedings shall be instituted prior to the expirat ion of said period, the payment shall be made by the executor or administrator b efore delivering to each beneficiary his share If the tax is not paid within the time hereinbefore prescribed, interest at the rate of twelve per centum per annum shall be added as part of the tax; and to th e tax and interest due and unpaid within ten days after the date of notice and d emand thereof by the collector, there shall be further added a surcharge of twen ty-five per centum. the tax should have been paid before the delivery of the properties in question to P. J. M. Moore as trustee on March 10, 1924. plaintiff contends that the real properties of Thomas Hanley did not and could n ot legally pass to Matthew Hanley, until after the expiration of ten years from the death and, that the inheritance tax should be based on the value of the esta te in 1932, or ten years after the testator's death right of the state to an inheritance tax accrues at the moment of death, and hen ce is transmission by inheritance is taxable at the time of the predecessor's de ath, notwithstanding the postponement of the actual possession or enjoyment of t he estate by the beneficiary, and the tax measured by the value of the property transmitted at that time regardless of its appreciation or depreciation. defendant levied and assessed the inheritance tax due from the estate of Thomas Hanley under the provisions of section 1544 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by section 3 of Act No. 3606. But Act No. 3606 went into effect on Ja nuary 1, 1930. It, therefore, was not the law in force when the testator died on May 27, 1922. The law at the time was section 1544 above-mentioned, as amended by Act No. 3031, which took effect on March 9, 1922. inheritance taxation is governed by the statute in force at the time of the deat h of the decedent A statute should be considered as prospective in its operation, whether it enact s, amends, or repeals an inheritance tax, unless the language of the statute cle arly demands or expresses that it shall have a retroactive effect The defendant Collector of Internal Revenue maintains, however, that certain pro visions of Act No. 3606 are more favorable to the taxpayer than those of Act No. 3031, that said provisions are penal in nature and, therefore, should operate r etroactively in conformity with the provisions of article 22 of the Revised Pena l Code. This is the reason why he applied Act No. 3606 instead of Act No. 3031. Indeed, under Act No. 3606, (1) the surcharge of 25 per cent is based on the tax only, instead of on both the tax and the interest, as provided for in Act No. 3 031, and (2) the taxpayer is allowed twenty days from notice and demand by rthe Collector of Internal Revenue within which to pay the tax, instead of ten days o nly as required by the old law. the term "penal statutes" all status which command or prohibit certain acts, and

establish penalties for their violation, and even those which, without expressl y prohibiting certain acts, impose a penalty upon their commission Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable to the case at bar, and i n the absence of clear legislative intent, we cannot give Act No. 3606 a retroac tive effect. Churchill vs Rafferty that relating to the power of the court to restrain by injunction the collection of the tax complained of, and (2) that relating to the validity of those provis ions of subsection it has been suggested that section 139 does not apply to the tax in question be cause the section, in speaking of a tax, means only legal taxes; and that an illeg al tax (the one complained of) is not a tax, and, therefore, does not fall withi n the inhibition of the section, and may be restrained by injunction. The inhibition applies to all internal revenue taxes imposes, or authorized to b e imposed, by Act No. 2339. this branch of the case must be controlled by sections 139 and 140, unless the same be held unconstitutional, and consequently, null and void. duty of the court to declare a statute or part of it as unconstitutional. due pr ocess clause, no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax sh all be maintained in any court. The remedy of a suit to recover back the tax after it is paid is provided by sta tute, and a suit to restrain its collection is forbidden. The result is that the courts have been expressly forbidden, in every act creati ng or imposing taxes or imposts enacted by the legislative body of the Philippin es since the American occupation, to entertain any suit assailing the validity o f any tax or impost thus imposed until the tax shall have been paid under protes t. URISDICTION OF COURTS. Nor is such a provision of law invalid as curtailing the ju risdiction of the courts of the Philippine Islands as fixed by section 9 of the Organic Act: (a) because jurisdiction was never conferred upon Philippine courts to enjoin the collection of taxes imposed by the Philippine Commission; and (b) because, in the present case, another adequate remedy has been provided by paym ent and protest. Philippine Guaranty Co vs. CIR Philippine Guaranty Co., Inc., protested the assessment on the ground that reins urance premiums ceded to foreign reinsurers not doing business in the Philippine s are not subject to withholding tax. Its protest was denied and it appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals. It maintains that the reinsurance premiums in question did not constitute income from sources within the Philippines because the foreign reinsurers did not enga ge in business in the Philippines, nor did they have office here. The reinsurance contracts, however, show that the transactions or activities tha t constituted the undertaking to reinsure Philippine Guaranty Co., Inc. against loses arising from the original insurances in the Philippines were performed in the Philippines. Philippine Guaranty Co., Inc. kept in Manila a register of the risks ced ed to the foreign reinsurers. Entries made in such register bound the foreign re sinsurers, localizing in the Philippines the actual cession of the risks and pre miums and assumption of the reinsurance undertaking by the foreign reinsurers Petitioner further contends that the reinsurance premiums are not income from so urces within the Philippines because they are not specifically mentioned in Sect ion 37 of the Tax Code. Section 37 is not an all-inclusive enumeration Petitioner would wish to stress that its reliance in good faith on the rulings o f the Commissioner of Internal Revenue requiring no withholding of the tax due o

n the reinsurance premiums in question relieved it of the duty to pay the corres ponding withholding tax thereon government is not estopped whether or not reinsurance premiums ceded to foreign reinsurers not doing busine ss in the Philippines are subject to withholding tax under Section 53 and 54 of the Tax Code, suffice it to state that this question has already been answered i n the affirmative petitioner contends that the withholding tax should be computed from the amount actually remitted to the foreign reinsurers instead of from the total amount ce ded. And since it did not remit any amount to its foreign insurers in 1953 and 1 954, no withholding tax was due. Sec. 54. Payment of corporation income tax at source. In the case of foreign cor porations subject to taxation under this Title not engaged in trade or business within the Philippines and not having any office or place of business therein, t here shall be deducted and withheld at the source a tax equal to twenty-four per centum thereof, and such tax shall be returned and paid in the same manner as i n section 53 (b) Nonresident aliens. All persons, corporations in what ever capacity acting a nd all officers and employees of the Government of the Philippines having the co ntrol, custody, disposal, or payment of interest, dividends, premiums, compensat ion or other fixed or determinable annual or periodical gains, profits, and inco me of any nonresident alien individual, not engaged in trade or business within the Philippines and not having any office or place of business therein, shall de duct and withhold from such annual or periodical gains, profits, and income a ta x equal to twelve per centum thereof xxx The petitioner's defense of reliance of good faith on rulings of the CIR requiri ng no withholding of tax due on reinsurance premiums may free the taxpayer from the payment of surcharges or penalties imposed for failure to pay the correspond ing withholding tax, but it certainly would not exculpate it from liability to p ay such withholding tax. The Government is not estopped from collecting taxes by the mistakes or errors of its agents. resolution: The Court of Tax Appeals and this Court did not find that it did not violate Sections 53 (c) and 54 of the Tax Code. On the contrary, movant was fou nd to have violated Section 53(c) by failing to file the necessary withholding t ax return and to pay tax due. Still, finding that movant's violation was due to a reasonable cause namely, reliance on the advice of its auditors and opinion of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue no surcharge to the tax was imposed. Republic vs Judge Caguioa he disregarded the fact that as a condition sine qua non to the issuance of a wr it of preliminary injunction, private respondents needed also to show a clear le gal right that ought to be protected. That requirement is not satisfied in this case. To stress, the possibility of irreparable damage without proof of an actua l existing right would not justify an injunctive relief. Angeles City vs Angeles Electric Corporation AEC was granted a legislative franchise under Republic Act No. (RA) 4079 to cons truct, maintain and operate an electric light, heat, and power system for the pu rpose of generating and distributing electric light, heat and power for sale in Angeles City, Pampanga. Pursuant to Section 3-A thereof, AEC s payment of franchi se tax for gross earnings from electric current sold was in lieu of all taxes, f ees and assessments LGC of 1991 was passed into law, conferring upon provinces and cities the power, among others, to impose tax on businesses enjoying franchise. In accordance wi

th the LGC, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Angeles City enacted on December 23, 1 993 Tax Ordinance No. 33, S-93, otherwise known as the Revised Revenue Code of A ngeles City (RRCAC). seeking the reduction of the tax rates and a eview of the provisions of the RR CAC files by Metro Angeles Chamber of Commerce and Industry Inc. (MACCI) of whic h AEC is a member; PNOC vs CA PNOC could not apply for a compromise under E.O. No. 44 because its tax liabilit y was not a delinquent account or a disputed assessment as of 31 December 1985. E.O. No. 44 granted the BIR Commissioner or his duly authorized representatives the power to compromise any disputed assessment or delinquent account pending as of 31 December 1985, upon the payment of an amount equal to 30% of the basic ta x assessed; in which case, the corresponding interests and penalties shall be co ndoned. Delinquent account Refers to the amount of tax due on or before December 31, 198 5 from a taxpayer who failed to pay the same within the time prescribed for its payment arising from (1) a self assessed tax, whether or not a tax return was fi led, or (2) a deficiency assessment issued by the BIR which has become final and executory. Disputed assessment refers to a tax assessment disputed or protested on or befor e December 31, 1985 under any of the following categories: 1) if the same is administratively protested within thirty (30) days from the date the taxpayer received the assessment, or 2.) if the decision of the BIR on the taxpayer's administrative protest is appealed by the taxpayer before an appropriate court. The tax liability of PNB as withholding agent also did not qualify for compromis e under E.O. No. 44. the compromise settlement executed between the BIR and PNOC was without legal basis because withholding taxes were not actually taxes that could be compromised, but a penalty for PNB's failure to withhold and for which it was made personally liable. E.O. No. 44 covers disputed or delinquency cases where the person assessed was h imself the taxpayer rather than a mere agent. The right to compromise under the se provisions should have been claimed by PNB, the withholding agent for PNOC. Philippine healthcare providers Section 185 should be strictly construed: Tax on premium charged on Fidelity Bon ds and other Insurance Policies Documentary Stamp Tax is a tax on documents, instruments, loan agreements and pa pers evidencing the acceptance, assignment, sale or transfer of an obligation, r ight or property incident thereto