G.R. No. 180595 March 5, 2010 ARTHUR DEL ROSARIO and ALEXANDER DEL ROSARIO, Petitioners, vs.

HELLENOR D. DONATO, JR. and RAFAEL V. GONZAGA, Respondents. DECISION ABAD, J.: This case is about the need for plaintiff to state the facts constituting his cause of action and the correct forum for actions for damages arising from alleged wrongful procurement and enforcement of a search warrant issued in connection with an alleged criminal violation of the intellectual property law. The Facts and the Case On January 23, 2002 Philip Morris Products, Inc. (Philip Morris) wrote the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), requesting assistance in curtailing the proliferation of fake Marlboro cigarettes in Angeles City, Pampanga. After doing surveillance work in that city, respondent Hellenor Donato, Jr., the NBI agent assigned to the case, succeeded in confirming the storage and sale of such fake cigarettes at the house at 51 New York Street, Villasol Subdivision, Angeles City, that belonged to petitioner Alexander del Rosario. On March 5, 2002 respondent Donato applied for a search warrant with Branch 57 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles City to search the subject premises. But it took a week later or on March 12, 2002 for the RTC to hear the application and issue the search warrant. Although Donato felt that the delayed hearing compromised the operation, the NBI agents led by respondent Rafael V. Gonzaga proceeded to implement the warrant. Their search yielded no fake Marlboro cigarettes. Subsequently, petitioners Alexander and Arthur del Rosario (the Del Rosarios) filed a complaint for P50 million in damages against respondents NBI agents Donato and Gonzaga and two others before the RTC of Angeles City, Branch 62, in Civil Case 10584. On August 6, 2003 respondents NBI agents answered the complaint with a motion to dismiss on the grounds of: a) the failure of the complaint to state a cause of action; b) forum shopping; and c) the NBI agents immunity from suit, they being sued as such agents. The RTC denied the motion on March 25, 2003. The NBI agents filed a motion for reconsideration but the RTC denied the same on June 27, 2003. Dissatisfied, respondents NBI agents filed a special civil action of certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. SP 79496. On June 29, 2007 the latter court granted the petition and annulled the RTCs orders, first, in alleging merely that the NBI agents unlawfully procured the search warrant without stating the facts that made the procurement unlawful, the complaint failed to state a cause of action; and second, the Del Rosarios were guilty of forum shopping in that they should have filed their claim for damages against the NBI agents through a motion for compensation with the court that issued the search warrant. The Del Rosarios sought reconsideration of the decision but the CA denied it on November 19, 2007, prompting them to file this petition for review. The Issues Presented The petition presents two issues: 1. Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the complaint of the Del Rosarios did not state a cause of action; and 2. Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the Del Rosarios were guilty of forum shopping. The Courts Rulings One. The CA held that the Del Rosarios complaint before the RTC failed to state a cause of action against respondents NBI agents. Such complaint said that the NBI agents unlawfully procured and enforced the search warrant issued against the Del Rosarios but it failed to state the ultimate facts from which they drew such conclusion. The test of sufficiency of a complaint is whether or not, assuming the truth of the facts that plaintiff alleges in it, the court can render judgment granting him the judicial assistance he seeks.1 And judgment would be right only if the facts he alleges constitute a cause of action that consists of three elements: (1) the plaintiffs legal right in the matter; (2) the defendants corresponding obligation to honor or respect such right; and (3) the defendants subsequent violation of the right. Absent any of these, the complaint would have failed to state a cause of action.2 According to the Del Rosarios, the following allegations in their complaint state a cause or causes of action against respondents NBI agents: 2.4 On 12 March 2002, elements of the [NBI] x x x led by Defendant Rafael I. Gonzaga x x x entered by force the premises belonging to Plaintiff Alexander del Rosario situated at No. 51 New York Street, Villasol Subdivision, Angeles City, pursuant to a Search Warrant unlawfully obtained from the [RTC] of Angeles City, Branch 57 x x x. xxxx 2.6 Contrary to the sworn statements given before the court by defendants Hellenor D. Donato Jr. x x x and contrary to the allegation in Search Warrant No. 02-09A, no fake Marlboro cigarettes and their packaging were found at No. 51 New York Street, Villasol Subdivision, Angeles City x x x.

2.7 The inclusion of Plaintiff Arthur del Rosario in Search Warrant No. 02-09 had no factual basis considering that the premises searched is the property solely of Plaintiff Alexander del Rosario. 2.8 Worse the enforcement of Searched [sic] Warrant No. 02-09 was just part of the series of raids and searches that was conducted in Angeles City and Pampanga, which was done with much publicity in the community and had tended to include the Plaintiffs in the same category as other persons and entities who were in fact found to be dealing with fake Marlboro cigarettes. xxxx 3.2 The baseless sworn allegations that Plaintiffs had under their control and possession counterfeit Marlboro cigarettes and packaging to obtain a search warrant, and the malicious service of the such warrant at the residential premises of Plaintiff Alexander del Rosario in full and plain view of members of the community, as part of the series of raids and operations conducted within Angeles City and Pampanga during that period, has tainted irreversibly the good names which Plaintiffs have painstakingly built and maintained over the years. xxxx 3.4 Plaintiffs were subjected to so much humiliation and embarrassment by the raid conducted on the subject residential premises, and subjected them to much unwarranted speculation of engaging in the sale of fake merchandise. Essentially, however, all that the Del Rosarios allege is that respondents NBI agents used an unlawfully obtained search warrant against them, evidenced by the fact that, contrary to the sworn statements used to get such warrant, the NBI agents found no fake Marlboro cigarettes in petitioner Alexander del Rosarios premises. But a judicially ordered search that fails to yield the described illicit article does not of itself render the courts order "unlawful." The Del Rosarios did not allege that respondents NBI agents violated their right by fabricating testimonies to convince the RTC of Angeles City to issue the search warrant. Their allegation that the NBI agents used an unlawfully obtained search warrant is a mere conclusion of law. While a motion to dismiss assumes as true the facts alleged in the complaint, such admission does not extend to conclusions of law.3 Statements of mere conclusions of law expose the complaint to a motion to dismiss on ground of failure to state a cause of action.4 Further, the allegation that the search warrant in this case was served in a malicious manner is also not sufficient. Allegations of bad faith, malice, and other related words without ultimate facts to support the same are mere conclusions of law.5 The Del Rosarios broad assertion in their complaint that the search was conducted "in full and plain view of members of the community" does not likewise support their claim that such search was maliciously enforced. There is nothing inherently wrong with search warrants being enforced in full view of neighbors. In fact, when the respondent or his representative is not present during the search, the rules require that it be done in the presence of two residents of the same locality. These safeguards exist to protect persons from possible abuses that may occur if searches were done surreptitiously or clandestinely. Two. Invoking Section 21 of this Courts Administrative Matter (A.M.) 02-1-06-SC (not A.O. 01-1-06-SC as cited), the CA held that, rather than file a separate action for damages, the Del Rosarios should have filed their claim for compensation in the same proceeding and with the same court that issued the writ of search and seizure. The Del Rosarios were thus guilty of forum shopping. A.M. 02-1-06-SC, the Rule on Search and Seizure in Civil Actions for Infringement of Intellectual Property Rights, provides: SEC. 21. Claim for damages. Where the writ [of search and seizure] is discharged on any of the grounds provided in this Rule, or where it is found after trial that there has been no infringement or threat of infringement of an intellectual property right, the court, upon motion of the alleged infringing defendant or expected adverse party and after due hearing, shall order the applicant to compensate the defendant or expected adverse party upon the cash bond, surety bond or other equivalent security for any injury or damage the latter suffered by the issuance and enforcement of the writ. Should the damages exceed the amount of the bond, the applicant shall be liable for the payment of the excess. When a complaint is already filed in court, the motion shall be filed with the same court during the trial or before appeal is perfected or before judgment becomes executory, with due notice to the applicant, setting forth the facts showing the defendants right to damages and the amount thereof. The award of damages shall be include d in the judgment in the main case. Where no complaint is filed against the expected adverse party, the motion shall be filed with the court which issued the writ. In such a case, the court shall set the motion for summary hearing and immediately determine the expected adverse partys right to damages. A judgment in favor of the applicant in its principal claim should not necessarily bar the alleged infringing defendant from recovering damages where he suffered losses by reason of the wrongful issuance or enforcement of the writ.

The damages provided for in this section shall be independent from the damages claimed by the defendant in his counterclaim. But the subject search warrant was not issued under A.M. 02-1-06-SC, which governed the issuance of a writ of search and seizure in a civil action for infringement filed by an intellectual property right owner against the supposed infringer of his trademark or name. Philip Morris, the manufacturer of Marlboro cigarettes, did not go by this route. Philip Morris did not file a civil action for infringement of its trademark against the Del Rosarios before the RTC of Angeles City. Instead, Philip Morris sought assistance from the NBI for the apprehension and criminal prosecution of those reportedly appropriating its trademark and selling fake Marlboro cigarettes. In turn, the NBI instituted a police action that included applying for a search and seizure warrant under Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure (not under the provisions of A.M. 02-1-06-SC) against the Del Rosarios upon the belief that they were storing and selling fake Marlboro cigarettes in violation of the penal provisions of the intellectual property law. The proceeding under Rule 126, a limited criminal one, does not provide for the filing of counterclaims for damages against those who may have improperly sought the issuance of the search warrant. Consequently, the Del Rosarios had the right to seek damages, if the circumstances warranted, by separate civil action for the wrong inflicted on them by an improperly obtained or enforced search warrant. Unfortunately, their complaint, as worded, failed to state a proper cause of action.1avvphi1 Petitioner Arthur del Rosario claims that respondents NBI agents wrongfully included him as respondent in their application for a search warrant since he neither owned the house at 51 New York Street nor resided in it. But the rules do not require respondents in search warrant proceedings to be residents of the premises to be searched. If this were the case, criminals in possession of illegal articles could simply use other peoples residence for storing such articles to avoid being raided and searched. The Del Rosarios raise a number of procedural issues: a) the supposed failure of respondents NBI agents to file their motion for reconsideration of the RTC order denying their motion to dismiss within 15 days of receipt of the order; b) their resort to a special civil action of certiorari to challenge the RTCs denial of their motion to dismiss; c) the propriety of their inclusion of a motion to dismiss in their answer; d) the CAs grant to them in 2003 of a 15 -day extension to file a petition for certiorari after the lapse of 60 days when the Court did not yet come out with a ruling that barred such extension; and e) their being represented by private counsel rather than by the Office of the Solicitor General. With the Courts rulings in the principal issues raised in this case, it finds no sufficient reason to further dwell on the lesser issues that the Del Rosarios raise above. Besides, the Court finds no error in the CAs disposition of the same. WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 79496 dated June 29, 2007 and its Resolution dated November 19, 2007 for the reasons stated in this Decision, with the MODIFICATION that Civil Case 10584 is DISMISSED without prejudice. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 182779 August 23, 2010 VICTORINA (VICTORIA) ALICE LIM LAZARO, Petitioner, vs. BREWMASTER INTERNATIONAL, INC., Respondent. RESOLUTION NACHURA, J.: Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 dated September 4, 2007 and Resolution dated January 31, 2008, which awarded the amount sought by respondent in its Complaint. As held by the CA, to grant the relief prayed for by respondent is, in the words of Section 6 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, the judgment "warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint." Respondent, Brewmaster International, Inc., is a marketing company engaged in selling and distributing beer and other products of Asia Brewery, Inc. On November 9, 2005, it filed a Complaint for Sum of Money against Prescillo G. Lazaro (Prescillo) and petitioner, Victorina (also known as Victoria) Alice Lazaro, with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati City. The complaint alleged as follows: 6. During the period from February 2002 to May 2002, defendants obtained on credit from plaintiff beer and other products in the total amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED TWO PESOS AND NINETY TWO CENTAVOS (Php 138,502.92), evidenced by sales invoices photocopies of which are hereto attached as Annexes "A," "A-1" to "A-11," 7. Despite repeated demands, defendants have failed and refused, and up to now, still fail and refuse to pay their aforesaid obligation to plaintiff in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED TWO PESOS AND NINETY TWO CENTAVOS (Php 138,502.92) as evidenced by the demand letters dated 21 April 2003, 12 May 2003, 5 August 2003 and 17 August 2005, photocopies of which are hereto attached as Annexes "B," "C," "C-1," "D," "D-1," "D-2," and "E," "E-1,"

8. Under the terms of the sales invoices, defendants agreed that in case of litigation, the venue shall only be at the proper courts of Makati City and to pay 24% interest on all overdue accounts. WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that judgment be rendered in favor of plaintiff and against the defendants, ordering the latter to pay the sum of Php138,502.92 representing plaintiffs claim and the sum of Php33,240.00 as interest. Plaintiff prays for such other or further relief and remedies that are just and equitable in the premises.2 Annexes A, A-1 to A-11 are photocopies of sales invoices3 indicating the amount of the goods purchased and showing that they were sold to "TOTAL" and received by a certain Daniel Limuco. Prescillo filed an answer with counterclaim, denying any knowledge of the obligation sued upon. According to Prescillo, he and petitioner had lived separately since January 15, 2002 and he never authorized petitioner to purchase anything from respondent. He pointed out that the purchaser of the items, as borne out by the sales invoices attached to the complaint, was Total, which should have been the one sued by respondent.4 Petitioner, in her own answer with counterclaims, likewise denied having transacted with respondent, and averred that the documents attached to the complaint showed that it was Total which purchased goods from respondent.5 On June 14, 2006, during the scheduled preliminary conference, petitioner and her co-defendant did not appear. Hence, the MeTC declared the case submitted for decision.6 On August 22, 2006, the MeTC dismissed the complaint, ratiocinating that respondent, as plaintiff, failed to meet the burden of proof required to establish its claim by preponderance of evidence. The court a quo noted that the sales invoices attached to the complaint showed that the beer and the other products were sold to Total and were received by a certain Daniel Limuco; they did not indicate, in any way, that the goods were received by petitioner or her husband.7 Respondent elevated the case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) through a notice of appeal. Attached to its Memorandum was additional evidence, showing that it transacted with petitioner and her husband, who were then the operators and franchisees of the Total gasoline station and convenience store where the subject goods were delivered, and that Daniel Limuco was their employee.8 Unmoved, the RTC found no reversible error in the assailed decision. It agreed with the MeTC that respondent failed to submit any evidence proving that petitioner and her husband were liable for the obligation. The RTC disregarded the documents attached to the memorandum on the ground that admission of such additional evidence would be offensive to the basic rule of fair play and would violate the other partys right to due process. Thus, the RTC affirmed the assailed decision in toto.9 Respondent then went to the CA through a petition for review. There, it succeeded in obtaining a judgment in its favor. Applying Section 710 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, in conjunction with Section 611 thereof, the CA held that judgment should have been rendered "as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint" considering that both defendants failed to appear during the preliminary conference. The appellate court said that "by instead referring to the sales invoices and bypassing [the] ultimate facts [alleged in the complaint], the MeTC contravened the evident purposes of the [Revised] Rule on Summary Procedure directing that the judgment be based on the allegations of the complaint, which were, firstly, to avoid delay and, secondly, to consider the non-appearance at the preliminary conference as an admission of the ultimate facts." The CA judiciously pronounced that: In fact, evidentiary matters (like the sales invoices attached to the complaint) were not yet to be considered as of that early stage of the proceedings known under the Rule on Summary Procedure as the preliminary conference. The evidentiary matters and facts are to be required only upon the termination of the preliminary conference and only if further proceedings become necessary to establish factual issues defined in the order issued by the court. (citing Section 9, Rule on Summary Procedure) Thus, finding the amount claimed to be warranted by the allegations in the complaint, the CA, in its September 4, 2007 Decision, reversed the trial courts decision and ordered petitioner and her husband to pay the said amount plus interests, thus: WHEREFORE, the DECISION DATED MARCH 12, 2007 is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The respondents are ORDERED to pay, jointly and severally, to the petitioner the amount of P138,502.92, plus interest of 6% per annum from the filing of the complaint until this judgment becomes final and executory, and 12% per annum upon finality of this judgment until full payment. The respondents are also ORDERED to pay the costs of suit. SO ORDERED.12 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the said Decision but the same was denied by the CA in its January 31, 2008 Resolution.13 Petitioner submits the following issues to this Court for resolution: Petitioner respectfully submits that the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in the interpretation of Section 6 of the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure when it reversed the Decision of the RTC, Branch 162 of Makati in Civil Case [N]o. 06-944.

Petitioner further submits that the Court of Appeals erred in giving relief to the private respondent despite the lack of cause of action in its complaint against the petitioner herein.14 Petitioner contends that the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure does not warrant the automatic grant of relief in favor of the plaintiff when the complaint fails to state a cause of action. She avers that respondents complaint fails to state a cause of action; hence, no relief can be given to respondent. Petitioner points out that the sales invoices formed part of the complaint and should be considered in determining whether respondent has a cause of action against her. Consideration of the said sales invoices, she avers, would show that there is no contractual relationship between her and respondent; the invoices did not indicate in any way that petitioner was liable for the amount stated therein. Petitioner is correct in saying that no relief can be awarded to respondent if its complaint does not state a cause of action. Indeed, if the complaint does not state a cause of action, then no relief can be granted to the plaintiff and it would necessarily follow that the allegations in the complaint would not warrant a judgment favorable to the plaintiff. The basic requirement under the rules of procedure is that a complaint must make a plain, concise, and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the plaintiff relies for his claim.15 Ultimate facts mean the important and substantial facts which either directly form the basis of the plaintiffs primary right and duty or directly make up the wrongful acts or omissions of the defendant.16 They refer to the principal, determinative, constitutive facts upon the existence of which the cause of action rests. The term does not refer to details of probative matter or particulars of evidence which establish the material elements.17 The test of sufficiency of the facts alleged in a complaint to constitute a cause of action is whether, admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer of the petition or complaint.18 To determine whether the complaint states a cause of action, all documents attached thereto may, in fact, be considered, particularly when referred to in the complaint.19 We emphasize, however, that the inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the veracity of the material allegations in the complaint.20 Thus, consideration of the annexed documents should only be taken in the context of ascertaining the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint. Petitioner argues that the complaint fails to state a cause of action since reference to the sales invoices attached to and cited in paragraph six of the Complaint shows that it was not her who purchased and received the goods from respondent. Contrary to petitioners stance, we find that the Complaint sufficiently states a cause of action.1wphi1 The following allegations in the complaint adequately make up a cause of action for collection of sum of money against petitioner: (1) that petitioner and her husband obtained beer and other products worth a total of P138,502.92 on credit from respondent; and (2) that they refused to pay the said amount despite demand. As correctly held by the CA, the sales invoices are not actionable documents. They were not the bases of respondents action for sum of money but were attached to the Complaint only to provide details on the alleged transactions. They were evidentiary in nature and not even necessary to be stated or cited in the Complaint. At any rate, consideration of the attached sales invoices would not change our conclusion. The sales invoices, naming Total as the purchaser of the goods, do not absolutely foreclose the probability of petitioner being liable for the amounts reflected thereon. An invoice is nothing more than a detailed statement of the nature, quantity, and cost of the thing sold and has been considered not a bill of sale.21 Had the case proceeded further, respondent could have presented evidence linking these sales invoices to petitioner. In Pea v. Court of Appeals,22 petitioners therein likewise argued that the sales invoices did not show that they had any involvement in the transactions covered by the same. What the Court said in reply to this argument bolsters our view in this petition: Although it appears in the other sales invoices that the petitioners were the salespersons who brokered the sales of the products covered by the said sales invoices to the vendees therein named, the said entries are not conclusive of the extent and the nature of the involvement of the petitioners in the sales of the products under the said sales invoices which are not absolutely binding. They may be explained and put to silence by all the facts and circumstances characterizing the true import of the dealings to which they refer. The facts contained in the said sales invoices may be contradicted by oral testimony.23 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals Decision dated September 4, 2007 and Resolution dated January 31, 2008 are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 171842 July 22, 2009 GLORIA S. DY, Petitioner, vs. MANDY COMMODITIES CO., INC., Respondent. DECISION CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Gloria S. Dy seeks to reverse and set aside the 15 September 2005 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 86478 dismissing petitioners appeal on the ground of forum shopping and its Resolution2 dated 3 March 2006, denying the petitioners motion for reconsideration. This case has its origin in the contract entered into by the National Government with the Philippine National Bank (PNB) on 9 June 1978, wherein the former leased in favor of the latter the 21,727-square meter government-owned land located at Numancia Street, corner Urbiztondo, Binondo, Manila. The lease was good for 25 years which commenced on 1 August 1978 and was to expire on 31 July 2003, renewable for the same period upon agreement of both parties. On 17 October 1994, PNB sublet a portion of the subject land consisting of 8,530.l6 square meters to respondent Mandy Commodities Co., Inc. (Mandy Commodities), for a period corresponding to PNBs contract with the National Government. Respondent constructed on the subleased portion a two-storey warehouse which was leased out to its tenants. When the expiration of the subject lease contract was approaching, then Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Secretary Heherson Alvarez (Secretary Alvarez), on behalf of the government, issued a Memorandum Order dated 6 May 2002 initially approving the renewal of PNBs lease for another 25 years. In another Memorandum dated 6 August 2002, Secretary Alvarez, however, recalled the earlier 6 May 2002 Memorandum and revoked the renewal of the said lease contract for the purpose of clarifying the terms thereof and re-evaluating the role, qualifications and capability of the subject realtys sub-lessees. Later, in a Final Endorsement dated 29 November 2002, Secretary Alvarez had a change of heart and approved the renewal of the lease in favor of PNB and included respondent as one of the sub-lessees. This Final Endorsement, though, did not last long as the then new DENR Secretary, Elisea Gozun, issued a Memorandum dated 27 May 2003, withdrawing the lease contract with PNB and, consequently calling off the sub-lease contract with the respondent. Since the subject lease was about to expire, the Land Management Bureau (LMB), on behalf of the National Government, in a letter dated 25 July 2003, informed PNB that a take over team was created to effect repossession of the subject property and requested the PNB to turn it over to the DENR upon the termination of the lease contract. On 30 July 2003, in order to avert the eventual take over, PNB commenced a complaint for Injunction (PNB Injunction Case) with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) or Writ of Preliminary Injunction and damages docketed as Civil Case No. 03-0368-CFM before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay, Branch 118. The PNB alleged that the contract of lease between it and the National Government had already been renewed by virtue of the 29 November 2002 Final Endorsement of then Secretary Alvarez; hence, PNBs possession of the disputed property must be respected by the LMB. The PNB Injunction Case prompted Secretary Gozun to issue a Memorandum dated 31 July 2003 directing the LMB to observe the status quo until further advice from her office or from the Pasay RTC. In an Order dated 28 August 2003, the Pasay RTC in the PNB Injunction Case denied PNBs application for TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction. The Pasay RTC also ordered the LMB to secure and take over the subject land. PNB questioned this order before the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78980. Although the 28 August 2003 Order of the Pasay RTC had yet to be decided by the Court of Appeals, the LMB was able to implement said order and gain possession of the subject property on 29 August 2003. On 18 September 2003, the Court of Appeals, in the PNB Injunction Case, nullified the said RTC Order and granted PNBs application for TRO. Since the LMB had already taken possession of the questioned property, thereby rendering the 18 September 2003 TRO issued by the Court of Appeals moot, the LMB sought the legal advice of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). In its Opinion dated 23 September 2003, the OSG opined, among other things, that the TRO issued by the Court of Appeals against it was indeed moot, and that provisional permits for occupancy of the same property could be issued to qualified applicants, subject to the outcome of the main PNB Injunction Case involving the property before the RTC. In a letter dated 6 October 2003, PNB demanded the pull-out of the guards posted by the LMB in the premises of the property. This demand letter was ignored by the LMB on the strength of the Solicitor Generals opinion. In the meantime, banking on the same OSG opinion, LMB granted petitioner Gloria Dy a provisional permit to occupy the subject realty. Equipped with the provisional permit from the LMB, petitioner was able to enter and install her own guards in the premises of the property on 10 October 2003. Petitioner also posted notices announcing that all the tenants therein should secure from her an authorization to enter the same. On 15 October 2003, respondent Mandy Commodoties, being the sub-lessee, reacted to petitioners intrusion on the subject property by filing a complaint for Damages with prayer for injunction (Respondents Injunction Case) and TRO docketed as Civil Case No. 03108128 before the Manila RTC, Branch 25. On 21 October 2003, through the aid of its own security personnel, respondent regained possession of the same property. Meanwhile, in the PNB Injunction Case, the Court of Appeals in its 30 October 2003 Decision, affirmed the 28 August 2003 Order of the Pasay RTC denying PNBs application for TRO on the ground that PNB failed to establish its right

to the disputed property. Although the Court of Appeals affirmed the 28 August 2003 Order of the Pasay RTC, it nonetheless declared void the take over order, since the subject matter of the PNB Injunction Case was limited to whether the grant of the provisional remedy of TRO was warranted or not; hence, the RTC Pasay went beyond the matter submitted for adjudication when it ordered the take over of the property. The Court of Appeals went on by declaring that the take over by LMB of the property was void, and that any action affecting PNB and its lease was also condemned as lacking any legal basis, since such order to take over amounted to a disposition of the main case of injunction. PNB elevated this adverse decision to this Court, which case was docketed as G.R. No. 164786. On 7 November 2003, petitioner was able to wrest from respondent possession of the property in question. On 4 December 2003, respondent commenced the instant case with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila, Branch 20, for Forcible Entry (Respondents Forcible Entry Case), with prayer for mandatory injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. 176953-CV. On 6 April 2004, in Respondents Forcible Entry Case, the MeTC Manila ruled against respondent, opining that, by virtue of the expiration of PNBs lease contract, respondent lost its right to possess said property. Concomitantly, as respondents right thereto was intertwined with that of PNB, the same right also vanished. Respondent appealed to the RTC Manila, Branch 30, for the dismissal of its forcible entry complaint. On 12 July 2004, the RTC Manila, in Respondents Forcible Entry Case, reversed the MeTC decision and ordered petitioner to vacate the subject property. It ruled that despite the take over by the LMB, respondent was allowed to continue its business and possession of the disputed landholding. Hence, it was respondent who had prior, actual and physical possession of the property and had a better right over it. This favorable decision prompted respondent to file a motion for immediate execution which was granted by the RTC Manila and, accordingly, a Writ of Execution dated 7 September 2004 was issued in favor of the respondent. Conversely, petitioners motion for reconsideration of the RTC decision was denied. Undaunted, petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, where it was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 86478. Meanwhile, the OSG filed an Omnibus Motion seeking intervention in Respondents Forcible Entry Case, as well as the admission of its motion for reconsideration-in-intervention of the RTC decision and opposition-in-intervention to respondents motion for immediate execution. The RTC Manila denied the Omnibus Motion filed by the OSG. This adverse ruling was questioned by the OSG before the Court of Appeals, where it was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 86307 (OSG Certiorari). On 8 November 2004, petitioner moved for the consolidation of CA-G.R. SP No. 86307 and CA-G.R. SP No. 86478, a motion that was granted by the Court of Appeals, subject to the conformity of the ponente in the former case. On 21 April 2005, the OSG Certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 86307) was dismissed by the Court of Appeals upon a motion filed by respondent. The Court of Appeals said that the OSG should address its motion to intervene in CA-G.R. SP No. 86478. No further action was taken by the OSG in CA-G.R. SP No. 86307. In the meantime, on 15 May 2005, without waiting for the result of Respondents Forcible Entry Case (CA -G.R. SP No. 86478) pending before the Court of Appeals, petitioner filed an Unlawful Detainer case (Petitioners Unlawful Detainer Case) against respondent before the MeTC Manila, Branch 15, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 00000004-CV. In her complaint, petitioner made use of the same facts as in CA-G.R. SP No. 86478. On account of the foregoing fact, respondent moved for the dismissal of CA-G.R. SP No. 86478 on the ground of forum shopping. Calling the Court of Appeals attention to the 10 November 2004 and 2 February 2005 Resolutions of this Court in G.R. No. 164786 (PNBs Injunction Case) denying PNBs application for TRO, petitioner opposed the motion to dismiss on the ground that, among other things, her Unlawful Detainer Case was now premised on the settled termination of PNBs contract of lease with the National Government as implied by said Resolutions. In a Decision dated 15 September 2005, the Court of Appeals dismissed CA-G.R. SP No. 86478 on the ground of forum shopping and for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals stated that petitioners filing of the Unlawful Detainer Case during the pendency of the Respondents Forcible Entry Case (CA-G.R. SP No. 86478) in the Court of Appeals constituted forum shopping. The dispositive portion thereof reads: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED on account of forum shopping and for lack of merit3. On 6 October 2005, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration. For its part, respondent filed an Urgent Motion to Include in the Decision an Order Dismissing the Case Simultaneously Commenced by the Petitioner Together with the Instant Petition. The Court of Appeals was also apprised that petitioners Unlawful Detainer Case had already been decided by the MeTC Manila in petitioners favor and was now pending appeal before the Manila RTC, Branch 9. In its 3 March 2006 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals, on the other hand, granted respondents urgent motion to dismiss Petitioners Unlawful Detainer Case, which is now on appeal before the RTC Manila. Hence, the instant petition. Petitioner maintains that she did not commit forum shopping, since there is no identity of the cause of action or of the issue between Respondents Forcible Entry Case and Petitioners Unlawful Detainer Case.

The petition is not meritorious. Forum shopping is a deplorable practice of litigants consisting of resorting to two different fora for the purpose of obtaining the same relief, to increase the chances of obtaining a favorable judgment.4 What is pivotal to the determination of whether forum shopping exists or not is the vexation caused to the courts and the party-litigants by a person who asks appellate courts and/or administrative entities to rule on the same related causes and/or to grant the same or substantially the same relief, in the process creating the possibility of conflicting decisions by the different courts or fora upon the same issues.5 The grave evil sought to be avoided by the rule against forum shopping is the rendition by two competent tribunals of two separate and contradictory decisions. Unscrupulous party litigants, taking advantage of a variety of competent tribunals, may repeatedly try their luck in several different fora until a favorable result is reached. To avoid the resultant confusion, this Court adheres strictly to the rules against forum shopping, and any violation of these rules results in the dismissal of a case. To stamp out this abominable practice, which seriously impairs the efficient administration of justice, this Court promulgated Administrative Circulars No. 28-91 and No. 04-94, which are now embodied as Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, which reads: SEC. 5. Certification against forum shopping. The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed. Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading, but shall be a cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false certification of or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be a ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions. The test for determining the existence of forum shopping is whether the elements of litis pendentia are present, or whether a final judgment in one case amounts to res judicata in another. Thus, there is forum shopping when the following elements are present: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration. Said requisites are also constitutive of the requisites for auter action pendant or lis pendens. In the instant case, the first element of forum shopping is present. The parties to CA-G.R. SP No. 86478 and Petitioners Unlawful Detainer Case are the same. As to the second element, it must be stressed that in ejectment cases, either in unlawful detainer or in forcible entry cases, the only issue to be resolved is the question of who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the premises or possession de facto.6 Thus, these are summary proceedings intended to provide an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or right of possession of property. Title is not involved; that is why it is a special civil action with a special procedure.7 Here, the rights asserted in both cases are also identical, namely, the right of possession over the subject property. In fact, in the Unlawful Detainer case, petitioners cause of action was based on her alleged superior right over the property in question as a lessee thereof, pursuant to the provisional permit from the LMB, as against respondents allegedly expired sub-lease contract with the National Government.8 This is the very same assertion of petitioner and the contentious fact involved in CA-G.R. SP No. 86478 (Respondents Forcible Entry Case). As the issues in both cases refer singularly to the right of material possession over the disputed property, then an adjudication in Repondents Forcible Entry Case constitutes an adjudication of Petitioners Unlawful Detainer Case, such that the latter court would be bound thereby and could not render a contrary ruling on the very same issue. Petitioner insists that, assuming arguendo he is guilty of forum shopping, the Court of Appeals should have only dismissed CA-G.R. SP No. 86478 (Respondents Forcible Entry Case) and allowed Petitioners Unlawful Detainer Case be decided first by the MeTC. Petitioners argument is inaccurate. Once there is a finding of forum shopping, the penalty is summary dismissal not only of the petition pending before this Court, but also of the other case that is pending in a lower court. This is so because twin dismissal is a punitive measure to those who trifle with the orderly administration of justice. In Buan v. Lopez, Jr.,9 petitioners therein instituted before the Court a special civil action for prohibition and, almost a month earlier, another special civil action for "prohibition with preliminary injunction" before the RTC Manila. Finding

petitioners guilty of forum shopping, the Court dismissed not only the action before it, but also the special civil action still pending before the RTC, viz: Indeed, the petitioners in both actions x x x have incurred not only the sanction of dismissal of their case before this Court in accordance with Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, but also punitive measure of dismissal of both their actions, that in this Court and that in Regional Trial Court as well.10 Also, in First Philippine International Bank v. Court of Appeals,11 an action for specific performance became the subject of a petition for review before the Court. While said case was pending, a second one -- denominated as a derivative suit and involving the same parties, causes of action and reliefs -- was filed before the RTC Makati. The Court therein dismissed the petition before it and the derivative suit that was pending before the RTC Makati, thus: [F]inding the existence of forum-shopping x x x, the only sanction now is the dismissal of both cases x x x.12 Taking our cue from these cases, the Court of Appeals action of dismissing petitioners appeal relative to Respondents Forcible Entry Case and Petitioners Unlawful Detainer Case is, therefore, warranted. Moreover, even as we pass upon the merit of the instant case, we find that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the same. There is forcible entry or desahucio when one is deprived of physical possession of land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth.13 The basic inquiry centers on who has the prior possession de facto. In filing forcible entry cases, the law tells us that two allegations are mandatory for the municipal court to acquire jurisdiction: first, the plaintiff must allege prior physical possession of the property; and second, he must also allege that he was deprived of his possession by any of the means provided for in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, i.e., by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. It is also settled that in the resolution of such cases, what is important is determining who is entitled to the physical possession of the property. Thus, the plaintiff must prove that he was in prior physical possession of the premises until he was deprived thereof by the defendant. Indeed, any of the parties who can prove prior possession de facto may recover the possession even from the owner himself, since such cases proceed independently of any claim of ownership, and the plaintiff needs merely to prove prior possession de facto and undue deprivation thereof.1avvphi1 In the case under consideration, the Court of Appeals found that respondent as sub-lessee of the PNB was acting within its prerogatives as possessor when it filed the forcible entry suit against petitioner. From 1994 until the controversy arose, respondent was in peaceful possession of the property in question. The Court of Appeals even pointed out that even when the LMB gained possession of the property on 29 August 2003, respondent was allowed to continue business within the premises. In contrast, petitioners possession was predicated on the provisional permit issued to her by LMB and the 28 August 2003 Order of the Pasay City RTC in the PNB Injunction Case. It must be noted that the said order directing the take over of the disputed property was declared void by the Court of Appeals, even when it denied the propriety of the issuance of a TRO in the PNB Injunction Case. The said ruling of the Court of Appeals was in turn affirmed in the 10 November 2004 and 2 February 2005 Resolutions in G.R. No. 164786. Considering that the possession of petitioner was declared void, and bearing in mind that the validity of petitioners provisional permit to occupy the property is yet to be settled in the PNB Injunction Case, still pending in the Pasay City RTC, petitioners occupation thereof is without legal authority. Simply put, petitioner has no right to occupy the property. In contrast, respondents right to occupy it remains intact, since the records of the case are barren of any indication that the National Government or the PNB made a formal demand on the respondent to vacate said property. The way things stand, respondent, whose prior possession over the property remains intact, has the better right over it. Thus, when it filed the instant forcible entry case against petitioner who forcibly took possession thereof on 7 November 2003, respondent was just exercising its right. In sum, this Court defers to the findings of the Court of Appeals, there being no cogent reason to veer away from such findings. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 15 September 2005 and its Resolution dated 3 March 2006 dismissing petitioners appeal of the adverse resolution against her in Respondents Forcible Entry Case (CA-G.R. No. 86478) and Petitioners Unlawful Detainer Case ((Civil Case No. 00000004-CV) in the MeTC Manila, Branch 15, are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 154704 June 1, 2011 NELLIE VDA. DE FORMOSO and her children, namely, MA. THERESA FORMOSO-PESCADOR, ROGER FORMOSO, MARY JANE FORMOSO, BERNARD FORMOSO and PRIMITIVO MALCABA, Petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, FRANCISCO ARCE, ATTY. BENJAMIN BARBERO, and ROBERTO NAVARRO,Respondents. DECISION MENDOZA, J.:

Assailed in this petition are the January 25, 2002 Resolution1 and the August 8, 2002 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by the petitioners on the ground that the verification and certification of non-forum shopping was signed by only one of the petitioners in CA G.R. SP No. 67183, entitled "Nellie P. Vda. De Formoso, et al. v. Philippine National Bank, et al." The Factual and Procedural Antecedents Records show that on October 14, 1989, Nellie Panelo Vda. De Formoso (Nellie) and her children namely: Ma. Theresa Formoso-Pescador, Roger Formoso, Mary Jane Formoso, Bernard Formoso, and Benjamin Formoso, executed a special power of attorney in favor of Primitivo Malcaba (Malcaba) authorizing him, among others, to secure all papers and documents including the owners copies of the titles of real properties pertaining to the loan with real estate mortgage originally secured by Nellie and her late husband, Benjamin S. Formoso, from Philippine National Bank, Vigan Branch (PNB) on September 4, 1980. On April 20, 1990, the Formosos sold the subject mortgaged real properties to Malcaba through a Deed of Absolute Sale. Subsequently, on March 22, 1994, Malcaba and his lawyer went to PNB to fully pay the loan obligation including interests in the amount of 2,461,024.74. PNB, however, allegedly refused to accept Malcabas tender of payment and to release the mortgage or surrender the titles of the subject mortgaged real properties. On March 24, 1994, the petitioners filed a Complaint for Specific Performance against PNB before the Regional Trial Court of Vigan, Ilocos Sur (RTC) praying, among others, that PNB be ordered to accept the amount of 2,461,024.74 as full settlement of the loan obligation of the Formosos. After an exchange of several pleadings, the RTC finally rendered its decision3 on October 27, 1999 favoring the petitioners. The petitioners prayer for exemplary or corrective damages, attorneys fees, and annual interest and daily interest, however, were denied for lack of evidence. PNB filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied for failure to comply with Rule 15, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. PNB then filed a Notice of Appeal but it was dismissed for being filed out of time. The petitioners received their copy of the decision on November 26, 1999, and on January 25, 2001, they filed their Petition for Relief from Judgment4 questioning the RTC decision that there was no testimonial evidence presented to warrant the award for moral and exemplary damages. They reasoned out that they could not then file a motion for reconsideration because they could not get hold of a copy of the transcripts of stenographic notes. In its August 6, 2001 Order, the RTC denied the petition for lack of merit.5 On September 7, 2001, the petitioners moved for reconsideration but it was denied by the RTC in its Omnibus Order of September 26, 2001.6 Before the Court of Appeals On November 29, 2001, the petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the CA challenging the RTC Order of August 6, 2001 and its Omnibus Order dated September 26, 2001. In its January 25, 2002 Resolution, the CA dismissed the petition stating that: The verification and certification of non-forum shopping was signed by only one (Mr. Primitivo Macalba) of the many petitioners. In Loquias v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 139396, August 15, 2000, it was ruled that all petitioners must be signatories to the certification of non-forum shopping unless the one who signed it is authorized by the other petitioners. In the case at bar, there was no showing that the one who signed was empowered to act for the rest. Therefore, it cannot be presumed that the one who signed knew to the best of his knowledge whether his copetitioners had the same or similar claims or actions filed or pending. The ruling in Loquias further declared that substantial compliance will not suffice in the matter involving strict observance of the Rules. Likewise, the certification of non-forum shopping requires personal knowledge of the party who executed the same and that petitioners must show reasonable cause for failure to personally sign the certification. Utter disregard of the Rules cannot just be rationalized by harping on the policy of liberal construction. Aggrieved, after the denial of their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners filed this petition for review anchored on the following GROUNDS THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN RULING THAT ALL THE PETITIONERS MUST SIGN THE VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING IN A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI WHEREIN ONLY QUESTIONS OF LAW ARE INVOLVED. ALTERNATIVELY, THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN DISMISSING THE WHOLE PETITION WHEN AT THE VERY LEAST THE PETITION INSOFAR AS PETITIONER MALCABA IS CONCERNED BEING THE SIGNATORY THEREOF SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN DUE COURSE. THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN GIVING MORE WEIGHT ON TECHNICALITIES WHEN THE PETITION BEFORE IT WAS CLEARLY MERITORIOUS.7

The petitioners basically argue that they have substantially complied with the requirements provided under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping. The petitioners are of the view that the rule on Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping that all petitioners must sign should be liberally construed, since only questions of law are raised in a petition for certiorari and no factual issues that require personal knowledge of the petitioners. The petitioners further claim that they have a meritorious petition because contrary to the ruling of the RTC, their Petition for Relief clearly showed that, based on the transcript of stenographic notes, there was enough testimonial evidence for the RTC to grant them damages and attorneys fees as prayed for. On the other hand, PNB counters that the mandatory rule on the certification against forum shopping requires that all of the six (6) petitioners must sign, namely: Nellie Vda. De Formoso and her children Ma. Theresa FormosoPescador, Roger Formoso, Mary Jane Formoso, and Bernard Formoso, and Primitivo Malcaba. Therefore, the signature alone of Malcaba on the certification is insufficient. PNB further argues that Malcaba was not even a party or signatory to the contract of loan entered into by his copetitioners. Neither was there evidence that Malcaba is a relative or a co-owner of the subject properties. It likewise argues that, contrary to the stance of the petitioners, the issue raised before the CA, as to whether or not the petitioners were entitled to moral and exemplary damages as well as attorneys fees, is a factual one. Finally, PNB asserts that the body of the complaint filed by the petitioners failed to show any allegation that Macalba alone suffered damages for which he alone was entitled to reliefs as prayed for. PNB claims that the wordings of the complaint were clear that all the petitioners were asking for moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees. OUR RULING The petition lacks merit. Certiorari is an extraordinary, prerogative remedy and is never issued as a matter of right. Accordingly, the party who seeks to avail of it must strictly observe the rules laid down by law.8 Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides: SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari.- When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46. [Emphasis supplied] Under Rule 46, Section 3, paragraph 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, petitions for certiorari must be verified and accompanied by a sworn certification of non-forum shopping. SECTION 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of non-compliance with requirements. The petition shall contain the full names and actual addresses of all the petitioners and respondents, a concise statement of the matters involved, the factual background of the case, and the grounds relied upon for the relief prayed for. In actions filed under Rule 65, the petition shall further indicate the material dates showing when notice of the judgment or final order or resolution subject thereof was received, when a motion for new trial or reconsideration, if any, was filed and when notice of the denial thereof was received. It shall be filed in seven (7) clearly legible copies together with proof of service thereof on the respondent with the original copy intended for the court indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the judgment, order, resolution, or ruling subject thereof, such material portions of the record as are referred to therein, and other documents relevant or pertinent thereto. The certification shall be accomplished by the proper clerk of court or his duly authorized representative, or by the proper officer of the court, tribunal, agency or office involved or by his duly authorized representative. The other requisite number of copies of the petition shall be accompanied by clearly legible plain copies of all documents attached to the original. The petitioner shall also submit together with the petition a sworn certification that he has not theretofore commenced any other action involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if there is such other action or proceeding, he must state the status of the same; and if he should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to promptly inform the aforesaid courts and other tribunal or agency thereof within five (5) days therefrom. The petitioner shall pay the corresponding docket and other lawful fees to the clerk of court and deposit the amount of P500.00 for costs at the time of the filing of the petition. The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition. [Emphases supplied]

The acceptance of a petition for certiorari as well as the grant of due course thereto is, in general, addressed to the sound discretion of the court. Although the Court has absolute discretion to reject and dismiss a petition for certiorari, it does so only (1) when the petition fails to demonstrate grave abuse of discretion by any court, agency, or branch of the government; or (2) when there are procedural errors, like violations of the Rules of Court or Supreme Court Circulars.9 [Emphasis supplied] In the case at bench, the petitioners claim that the petition for certiorari that they filed before the CA substantially complied with the requirements provided for under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping. The Court disagrees. Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provide: SEC. 4. Verification. Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit. A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleadings and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records. A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on "information and belief" or upon "knowledge, information and belief" or lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading. SEC. 5. Certification against forum shopping. The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed. Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions. x x x. In this regard, the case of Oldarico S. Traveno v. Bobongon Banana Growers Multi-Purpose Cooperative,10 is enlightening: Respecting the appellate courts dismissal of petitioners appeal due to the failure of some of them to sign the therein accompanying verification and certification against forum-shopping, the Courts guidelines for the bench and bar in Altres v. Empleo, which were culled "from jurisprudential pronouncements," are instructive: For the guidance of the bench and bar, the Court restates in capsule form the jurisprudential pronouncements already reflected above respecting non-compliance with the requirements on, or submission of defective, verification and certification against forum shopping: 1) A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of defective verification, and non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of defective certification against forum shopping. 2) As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. The Court may order its submission or correction or act on the pleading if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rule may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served thereby. 3) Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct. 4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike in verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of "substantial compliance" or presence of "special circumstances or compelling reasons." 5) The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case; otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped as parties to the case. Under reasonable or justifiable circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, the signature of only one of them in the certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the Rule.

6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party-pleader, not by his counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a Special Power of Attorney designating his counsel of record to sign on his behalf. The petition for certiorari filed with the CA stated the following names as petitioners: Nellie Panelo Vda. De Formoso, Ma. Theresa Formoso-Pescador, Roger Formoso, Mary Jane Formoso, Bernard Formoso, Benjamin Formoso, and Primitivo Malcaba. Admittedly, among the seven (7) petitioners mentioned, only Malcaba signed the verification and certification of nonforum shopping in the subject petition. There was no proof that Malcaba was authorized by his co-petitioners to sign for them. There was no special power of attorney shown by the Formosos authorizing Malcaba as their attorney-infact in filing a petition for review on certiorari. Neither could the petitioners give at least a reasonable explanation as to why only he signed the verification and certification of non-forum shopping. In Athena Computers, Inc. and Joselito R. Jimenez v. Wesnu A. Reyes, the Court explained that: The verification of the petition and certification on non-forum shopping before the Court of Appeals were signed only by Jimenez. There is no showing that he was authorized to sign the same by Athena, his co-petitioner. Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules states that a pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his knowledge and belief. Consequently, the verification should have been signed not only by Jimenez but also by Athenas duly authorized representative. In Docena v. Lapesura, we ruled that the certificate of non-forum shopping should be signed by all the petitioners or plaintiffs in a case, and that the signing by only one of them is insufficient. The attestation on non-forum shopping requires personal knowledge by the party executing the same, and the lone signing petitioner cannot be presumed to have personal knowledge of the filing or non-filing by his co-petitioners of any action or claim the same as similar to the current petition. The certification against forum shopping in CA-G.R. SP No. 72284 is fatally defective, not having been duly signed by both petitioners and thus warrants the dismissal of the petition for certiorari. We have consistently held that the certification against forum shopping must be signed by the principal parties. With respect to a corporation, the certification against forum shopping may be signed for and on its behalf, by a specifically authorized lawyer who has personal knowledge of the facts required to be disclosed in such document. While the Rules of Court may be relaxed for persuasive and weighty reasons to relieve a litigant from an injustice commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedures, nevertheless they must be faithfully followed. In the instant case, petitioners have not shown any reason which justifies relaxation of the Rules. We have held that procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may have prejudiced a partys substantive rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed except for the most persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed. Not one of these persuasive reasons is present here. In fine, we hold that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for certiorari in view of the procedural lapses committed by petitioners.11 [Emphases supplied] Furthermore, the petitioners argue that the CA should not have dismissed the whole petition but should have given it due course insofar as Malcaba is concerned because he signed the certification. The petitioners also contend that the CA should have been liberal in the application of the Rules because they have a meritorious case against PNB. The Court, however, is not persuaded. The petitioners were given a chance by the CA to comply with the Rules when they filed their motion for reconsideration, but they refused to do so. Despite the opportunity given to them to make all of them sign the verification and certification of non-forum shopping, they still failed to comply. Thus, the CA was constrained to deny their motion and affirm the earlier resolution.12 Indeed, liberality and leniency were accorded in some cases.13 In these cases, however, those who did not sign were relatives of the lone signatory, so unlike in this case, where Malcaba is not a relative who is similarly situated with the other petitioners and who cannot speak for them. In the case of Heirs of Domingo Hernandez, Sr. v. Plaridel Mingoa, Sr.,14 it was written: In the instant case, petitioners share a common interest and defense inasmuch as they collectively claim a right not to be dispossessed of the subject lot by virtue of their and their deceased parents construction of a family home and occupation thereof for more than 10 years. The commonality of their stance to defend their alleged right over the controverted lot thus gave petitioners xxx authority to inform the Court of Appeals in behalf of the other petitioners that they have not commenced any action or claim involving the same issues in another court or tribunal, and that there is no other pending action or claim in another court or tribunal involving the same issues. Here, all the petitioners are immediate relatives who share a common interest in the land sought to be reconveyed and a common cause of action raising the same arguments in support thereof. There was sufficient basis, therefore, for Domingo Hernandez, Jr. to speak for and in behalf of his co-petitioners when he certified that they had not filed any action or claim in another court or tribunal involving the same issues. Thus, the Verification/Certification that Hernandez, Jr. executed constitutes substantial compliance under the Rules. [Emphasis supplied]

The same leniency was accorded to the petitioner in the case of Oldarico S. Traveno v. Bobongon Banana Growers Multi-Purpose Cooperative,15 where it was stated: The same leniency was applied by the Court in Cavile v. Heirs of Cavile, because the lone petitioner who executed the certification of non-forum shopping was a relative and co-owner of the other petitioners with whom he shares a common interest. x x x16 Considering the above circumstances, the Court does not see any similarity at all in the case at bench to compel itself to relax the requirement of strict compliance with the rule regarding the certification against forum shopping. At any rate, the Court cannot accommodate the petitioners request to re-examine the testimony of Malcaba in the transcript of stenographic notes of the April 25, 1999 hearing concerning his alleged testimonial proof of damages for obvious reasons. Primarily, Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court categorically states that the petition filed shall raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth. A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact.17 In this case, the petition clearly raises a factual issue.1avvphil As correctly argued by PNB, the substantive issue of whether or not the petitioners are entitled to moral and exemplary damages as well as attorneys fees is a factual issue which is beyond the province of a petition for review on certiorari. Secondly, even if the Court glosses over the technical defects, the petition for relief cannot be granted. A perusal of the Petition for Relief of Judgment discloses that there is no fact constituting fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which are the grounds therefor. From the petition itself, it appears that the petitioners counsel had a copy of the transcript of stenographic notes which was in his cabinet all along and only discovered it when he was disposing old and terminated cases.18 If he was only attentive to his records, he could have filed a motion for reconsideration or a notice of appeal in behalf of the petitioners. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 91391 January 24, 1991 FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, in his capacity as Solicitor General, petitioner vs. THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division) and JUAN PONCE ENRILE, respondents. Ponce Enrile, Cayetano Reyes & Manalastas for private respondent. GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:p The petitioner challenges the resolutions dated June 8, 1989 and November 2, 1989 of the Sandiganbayan issued in Civil Case No. 0033 which granted the motion of private respondent Juan Ponce Enrile, one of the defendants in the civil case, to implead the petitioner as additional party defendant in Enrile's counterclaim in the same civil case and denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration. On July 31, 1987, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) with the assistance of Solicitor General Francisco Chavez filed with the respondent Sandiganbayan a complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 0033 against Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. and Juan Ponce Enrile, among others, for reconveyance, reversion and accounting, restitution and damages. After the denial of his motion to dismiss, respondent Enrile filed his answer with compulsory counterclaim and crossclaim with damages. The Republic filed its reply to the answer and motion to dismiss the counterclaim. The motion was opposed by respondent Enrile. On January 30, 1989, respondent Sandiganbayan issued a resolution, to wit: The resolution of the Motion to Dismiss the Counterclaim against the Plaintiff government is deferred until after trial, the grounds relied upon not appearing to be indubitable. On the matter of the additional parties (Solicitor General Chavez, Ex-PCGG Chairman Diaz, former Commissioners Doromal, Rodrigo, Romero and Bautista), the propriety of impleading them either under Sec. 14, Rule 6 or even under Sec. 12 as third-party defendant requires leave of Court to determine the propriety thereof. No such leave has been sought. Consideration thereof cannot be entertained at this time nor may therefore, the Motion to Dismiss the same be considered. (Rollo, p. 329; Annex "H", Petition) Respondent Enrile then requested leave from the Sandiganbayan to implead the petitioner and the PCGG officials as party defendants for lodging this alleged "harassment suit" against him.

The motion was granted in a resolution dated June 8, 1989, to wit: In respect to defendant Juan Ponce Enrile's Manifestation and Motion dated February 23, 1989, praying for leave to implead additional parties to his counterclaim, the Court, finding reason in the aforesaid Manifestation and Motion, grants leave to implead the defendants named in the counterclaim and admits defendant Juan Ponce Enrile's answer with counterclaim. This is without prejudice to the defenses which said defendants may put forth individually or in common, in their personal capacities or otherwise. (Rollo, p. 27) In a later resolution dated November 2, 1989, respondent Sandiganbayan denied a motion to reconsider the June 8, 1989 resolution. The dispositive portion of the resolution states: WHEREFORE, the Motions for Reconsideration of the Solicitor General and former PCGG officials Ramon Diaz, Quintin Doromal, Orlando Romero, Ramon Rodrigo and Mary Concepcion Bautista are denied, but, considering these motions as in the nature of motions to dismiss counterclaim/answers, resolution of these motions is held in abeyance pending trial on the merits. (Rollo, p. 31) Thereafter, all the PCGG officials filed their answer to the counterclaims invoking their immunity from suits as provided in Section 4 of Executive Order No. 1. Instead of filing an answer, the petitioner comes to this Court assailing the resolutions as rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The lone issue in this petition is the propriety of impleading the petitioner as additional party defendant in the counterclaim filed by respondent Enrile in Civil Case No. 0033. It may be noted that the private respondent did not limit himself to general averments of malice, recklessness, and bad faith but filed specific charges that then PCGG Chairman Jovito Salonga had already cleared the respondent and yet, knowing the allegations to be false, the petitioner still filed the complaint. This can be gleaned from excerpts found in respondent Enrile's Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim and Cross-Claim: xxx xxx xxx Defendant-in-counterclaim Francisco Chavez was the Solicitor General who assisted the PCGG in filing and maintaining the instant Complaint against Defendant. As the incumbent Solicitor General, he continues to assist the PCGG in prosecuting this case. He is sued in his personal and official capacities. On or about October 1986, the PCGG, speaking through the then Chairman, now Senate President, Hon. Jovito R. Salonga, found and declared that "not one of the documents left by then President and Mrs. Ferdinand E. Marcos including the 2,300-page evidence turned over to the PCGG by the US State Department implicates Enrile." Chairman Salonga stressed that in view of the PCGG's findings, he refused to yield to the "pressure" exerted on him to prosecute Defendant. xxx xxx xxx Notwithstanding the findings of the PCGG that there was absolutely no evidence linking Defendant to the illegal activities of former President and Mrs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, the PCGG, this time composed of Chairman Ramon Diaz, the Commissioners Quintin Doromal, Ramon Rodrigo, Orlando Romero and Mary Concepcion Bautista, filed the Complaint against Defendant, among others, on or about 22 July 1987. Defendant has reasons to believe, and so alleges that Chairman Diaz, and Commissioners Doromal, Rodrigo, Romero and Bautista ordered, authorized, allowed or tolerated the filing of the utterly baseless complaint against Defendant. Solicitor General Francisco Chavez assisted or cooperated in, or induced or instigated, the filing of this harassment suit against Defendant. In so ordering, authorizing, allowing and tolerating the institution of the action against Defendant, all the aforenamed officers, with malice and in evident bad faith, and with grave abuse of power and in excess of their duty and authority, unjustly and unlawfully obstructed, defeated, violated, impeded or impaired the constitutional rights and liberties of Defendant . . . . (Rollo, pp. 260-262) On the other hand, the petitioner submits that no counter-claim can be filed against him in his capacity as Solicitor General since he is only acting as counsel for the Republic. He cites the case of Borja v. Borja, 101 Phil. 911 [1957] wherein we ruled: . . . The appearance of a lawyer as counsel for a party and his participation in a case as such counsel does not make him a party to the action. The fact that he represents the interests of his client or that he acts in their behalf will not hold him liable for or make him entitled to any award that the Court may adjudicate to the parties, other than his professional fees. The

principle that a counterclaim cannot be filed against persons who are acting in representation of another such as trustees in their individual capacities (Chambers v. Cameron, 2 Fed. Rules Service, p. 155; 29 F. Supp. 742) could be applied with more force and effect in the case of a counsel whose participation in the action is merely confined to the preparation of the defense of his client. Appellant, however, asserted that he filed the counterclaim against said lawyer not in his individual capacity but as counsel for the heirs of Quintin de Borja. But as we have already stated that the existence of a lawyer-client relationship does not make the former a party to the action, even this allegation of appellant will not alter the result We have arrived at (at pp. 924-925) Thus, the petitioner argues that since he is simply the lawyer in the case, exercising his duty under the law to assist the Government in the filing and prosecution of all cases pursuant to Section 1, Executive Order No. 14, he cannot be sued in a counterclaim in the same case. Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena correctly observed that there is no general immunity arising solely from occupying a public office. The general rule is that public officials can be held personally accountable for acts claimed to have been performed in connection with official duties where they have acted ultra vires or where there is a showing of bad faith. We ruled in one case: A number of cases decided by the Court where the municipal mayor alone was held liable for back salaries of, or damages to dismissed municipal employees, to the exclusion of the municipality, are not applicable in this instance. In Salcedo v. Court of Appeals (81 SCRA 408 [1978]) for instance, the municipal mayor was held liable for the back salaries of the Chief of Police he had dismissed, not only because the dismissal was arbitrary but also because the mayor refused to reinstate him in defiance of an order of the Commissioner of Civil Service to reinstate. In Nemenzo v. Sabillano (25 SCRA 1 [1968]), the municipal mayor was held personally liable for dismissing a police corporal who possessed the necessary civil service eligibility, the dismissal being done without justifiable cause and without any administrative investigation. In Rama v. Court of Appeals (G.R. Nos. L-44484, L-44842, L-44591, L-44894, March 16 1987), the governor, vice-governor, members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, provincial auditor, provincial treasurer and provincial engineer were ordered to pay jointly and severally in their individual and personal capacity damages to some 200 employees of the province of Cebu who were eased out from their positions because of their party affiliations. (Laganapan v. Asedillo, 154 SCRA 377 [1987]) Moreover, the petitioner's argument that the immunity proviso under Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 1 also extends to him is not well-taken. A mere invocation of the immunity clause does not ipso facto result in the charges being automatically dropped. In the case of Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Pea (159 SCRA 556 [1988]) then Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee, added a clarification of the immunity accorded PCGG officials under Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 1 as follows: With respect to the qualifications expressed by Mr. Justice Feliciano in his separate opinion, I just wish to point out two things: First, the main opinion does not claim absolute immunity for the members of the Commission. The cited section of Executive Order No. 1 provides the Commission's members immunity from suit thus: "No civil action shall lie against the Commission or any member thereof for anything done or omitted in the discharge of the task contemplated by this order." No absolute immunity like that sought by Mr. Marcos in his Constitution for himself and his subordinates is herein involved. It is understood that the immunity granted the members of the Commission by virtue of the unimaginable magnitude of its task to recover the plundered wealth and the State's exercise of police power was immunity from liability for damages in the official discharge of the task granted the members of the Commission much in the same manner that judges are immune from suit in the official discharge of the functions of their office . . . " (at pp. 581-582) Justice Florentino P. Feliciano stated in the same case: It may be further submitted, with equal respect, that Section 4 (a) of Executive Order No. 1 was intended merely to restate the general principle of the law of public officers that the PCGG or any member thereof may not be held civilly liable for acts done in the performance of official duty,provided that such member had acted in good faith and within the scene of his lawful authority. It may also be assumed that the Sandiganbayan would have jurisdiction to determine whether the PCGG or any particular official thereof may be held liable in damages

to a private person injured by acts of such manner. It would seem constitutionally offensive to suppose that a member or staff member of the PCGG could not be required to testify before the Sandiganbayan or that such members were exempted from complying with orders of this Court. (at pp. 586- 587) Immunity from suit cannot institutionalize irresponsibility and non-accountability nor grant a privileged status not claimed by any other official of the Republic. (id., at page 586) Where the petitioner exceeds his authority as Solicitor General acts in bad faith, or, as contended by the private respondent, "maliciously conspir(es) with the PCGG commissioners in persecuting respondent Enrile by filing against him an evidently baseless suit in derogation of the latter's constitutional rights and liberties" (Rollo, p. 417), there can be no question that a complaint for damages may be filed against him. High position in government does not confer a license to persecute or recklessly injure another. The actions governed by Articles 19, 20, 21, and 32 of the Civil Code on Human Relations may be taken against public officers or private citizens alike. The issue is not the right of respondent Enrile to file an action for damages. He has the right. The issue is whether or not that action must be filed as a compulsory counterclaim in the case filed against him. Under the circumstances of this case, we rule that the charges pressed by respondent Enrile for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code arising from the filing of an alleged harassment suit with malice and evident bad faith do not constitute a compulsory counterclaim. To vindicate his rights, Senator Enrile has to file a separate and distinct civil action for damages against the Solicitor General. In the case of Tiu Po v. Bautista, (103 SCRA 388 [1981]), we ruled that damages claimed to have been suffered as a consequence of an action filed against the petitioner must be pleaded in the same action as a compulsory counterclaim. We were referring, however, to a case filed by the private respondent against the petitioners or parties in the litigation. In the present case, the counterclaim was filed against the lawyer, not against the party plaintiff itself. To allow a counterclaim against a lawyer who files a complaint for his clients, who is merely their representative in court and not a plaintiff or complainant in the case would lead to mischievous consequences. A lawyer owes his client entire devotion to his genuine interest, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability. (See Agpalo, Legal Ethics [1980] p. 147 citing Javier v. Cornejo, 63 Phil. 293 [1936]; In re Tionko, 43 Phil. 191 [1922]; In re: Atty. C. T. Oliva, 103 Phil. 312 [1958]; Lualhati v. Albert, 57 Phil. 86 [1932]; Toguib v. Tomol, Jr., G.R. Adm. Case No. 554, Jan. 3, 1969; People v. Macellones, 49 SCRA 529 [1973]; Tan Kui v. Court of Appeals, 54 SCRA 199 [1973]). A lawyer cannot properly attend to his duties towards his client if, in the same case, he is kept busy defending himself. The problem is particularly perplexing for the Solicitor General. As counsel of the Republic, the Solicitor General has to appear in controversial and politically charged cases. It is not unusual for high officials of the Government to unwittingly use shortcuts in the zealous desire to expedite executive programs or reforms. The Solicitor General cannot look at these cases with indifferent neutrality. His perception of national interest and obedience to instructions from above may compel him to take a stance which to a respondent may appear too personal and biased. It is likewise unreasonable to require Government Prosecutors to defend themselves against counterclaims in the very same cases they are prosecuting. As earlier stated, we do not suggest that a lawyer enjoys a special immunity from damage suits. However, when he acts in the name of a client, he should not be sued on a counterclaim in the very same case he has filed only as counsel and not as a party. Any claim for alleged damages or other causes of action should be filed in an entirely separate and distinct civil action. WHEREFORE, the present petition is GRANTED. The questioned resolutions of the Sandiganbayan are SET ASIDE insofar as they allow the counterclaim filed against the petitioner. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 89132 February 26, 1990 LEONCIA, MANUEL, DIOSDADA, ANTONIA, ISIDRO, GERONIMO, CRESENCIO, ALEJANDRO, BONIFACIA, AURELIO, EPIFANIO, POLICARPO, IRENEO, ALL SURNAMED BACLAYON; HRS. of AGRIPINA BACLAYON, rep. by LUCIA BACLAYON; HRS. of MODESTA BACLAYON, rep. by FILING BACLAYON; HRS. OF HIPOLITO BACLAYON, rep. BY MARIO BACLAYON; HRS. OF TOMAS BACLAYON, rep. by CRISTITO BACLAYON; SILVESTRE ABANES; HRS. of LEONICA ABELLARE, rep. by FELIX BACLAYON; CECILIA, HERMINIA, FELIX, CONCORDIA, all surnamed DELA VICTORIA; and THE HON. JUDGE GERMAN LEE, JR., Presiding Judge of Branch XV, RTC, Cebu, petitioners, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF SPOUSES MARCIANO BACALSO AND GREGORIA SABANDEJA, namely, ARCADIA, FRANCISCA, JOSEFA, DIONESIA, VALENTINA, ANGELA, VENANCIO, DOMINGA and FELIMON, all surnamed BACALSO, respondents. Leonardo Garcillano for petitioners. Jesus N. Borromeo for private respondents.

MEDIALDEA, J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 28, 1989 ordering the trial court, in a hearing supplementary to execution, to receive private respondents' evidence to prove that they are builders in good faith of the improvements and the value of said improvements, and its resolution dated June 20, 1989 denying the motion for reconsideration. The antecedent facts are as follows: On May 7, 1969, petitioners Leoncia, Martin, Policarpio, Hilarion, Ireneo, Juliana and Tomas, all surnamed Baclayon; Rosendo, Felicidad and Silvestra, all surnamed Abanes; and Tomasa, Leoncia, Anacleto, Monica, Guillerma and Gertrudes all surnamed Abellare filed with the then CFI-Cebu Branch 2, in Civil Case No. R-11185, a complaint for recovery of ownership and possession, and damages, against spouses Marciano Bacalso and Gregoria Sabandeja of Lot No. 5528 of the Cebu Cadastre. The latter filed their answer thereto on July 15, 1969. On December 20, 1982, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the Bacalso spouses, declaring them owners of the subject lot, which decision was appealed by the petitioners to the respondent Court of Appeals. The case was docketed as AC-G.R. CV No. 04948. On July 29, 1986, the respondent court rendered a decision reversing the trial court, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows (p. 15, Rollo): WHEREFORE, the decision a quo is hereby reversed and set aside and another one is rendered declaring plaintiffs-appellants as heirs of the late Matias Baclayon the owners of Lot No. 5528 of the Cebu Cadastre covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 2726 (O-NA) of the Registry of Deeds of Cebu (Exh. I) and ordering defendants to vacate the lot and surrender the same to plaintiffs. No costs. SO ORDERED. The private respondents then elevated the case to this Court by filing a petition for review which was, however, denied in the Resolution dated May 27, 1987. The decision in favor of the petitioners having become final and executory, they filed a motion for execution of judgment and possession which was opposed by the private respondents. The opposition was based on the pronouncement of the respondent court in its decision dated July 29, 1986, to wit (p. 16, Rollo): No fraud or bad faith could be imputed on the part of the Bacalso spouses. They believed the lot they bought from Segundo Baclayon was the land they occupied. The private respondents argued that since they were found by the respondent court as builders and/or planters in good faith and Article 546 of the Civil Code ordains that the necessary and useful expenses for the improvements must be paid to the builders/planters in good faith with right of retention, a reception of evidence to determine the correct value of the necessary and useful improvements must be done first before ordering the execution. The RTC-Branch 15, Cebu City, presided by Judge German G. Lee, Jr., in its order, dated March 8, 1988, granted the motion for execution of judgment and possession, to wit (p. 16, Rollo): ORDER This is finally, acting on the Motion for Execution of Judgment and Possession filed by Atty. Garcillano in this case and the rejoinder of Atty. Nacua and the plaintiffs' rejoinder dated February 11 and the manifestation of Atty. Garcillano of February 26, 1988. It appearing that the dispositive portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals which is now being enforced categorically declares plaintiffs/appellants as heirs of the late Matias Baclayon, the owner of Lot No. 5526 (sic) of the Cebu Cadastre, covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 2728 (sic) (0-NA) of the Registry of Deeds of Cebu (Exh. 1) and ordering the defendants to vacate the lot and surrender the same to the plaintiffs, this Court is not in a position to entertain any further claims by any parties in connection with said case. However, if the clients of Atty. Nacua believe that they can prove their claims, then they should file a separate civil case to recover the same as this Court cannot pass judgment anew on certain claims that should have been interposed as counter-claims in this case. Wherefore, the Opposition to the issuance of the Writ of execution is hereby DENIED, as the Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to issue a writ of Execution in this case. SO ORDERED. The private respondents appealed the said order of March 8, 1988 by filing a notice of appeal dated March 30, 1988 which appeal was, however, dismissed by Judge Lee in the order dated April 15, 1988. On April 29, 1988, the petitioners filed a motion for writ of possession and demolition to which motion the private respondents filed their opposition reiterating the ground in the opposition to the motion for execution and possession. Judge Lee, thereafter, issued the order dated August 19, 1988, to wit (p. 17, Rollo): ORDER

An examination of the records of this case reveals that until now, there is yet no action by the Court of Appeals on the Clarificatory motion filed by the losing party. The Court has allowed this excuse to defer its issuance of an order of demolition after the prevailing party has prayed the Court to issue one. With the long passage of time, since the judgment in this case has become final, this Court cannot allow any further delay in the enforcement of its judgment. WHEREFORE, it is finally ordered that the losing party in this case be given fifteen (15) days from today within which to effect a voluntary removal of any improvements that they have introduced in the premises, considering that the prevailing party refused to reimburse the losing party therefor, and if they do not demolish it after the expiration of this 15 days, this Court will be constrained to order its demolition as prayed for. IT IS SO ORDERED. On September 19, 1988, the private respondents filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with the respondent court concerning the orders dated March 8, 1988 and August 19, 1988. On April 28, 1989, the respondent court granted the petition, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows (p. 21, Rollo): WHEREFORE, the orders of March 8,1988 and August 19, 1988 issued in Civil Case No. R11185 by the RTC-Cebu City, Branch 15, are hereby SET ASIDE and ANNULLED. In a hearing supplementary to execution, the said court is hereby ordered to receive petitioners' evidence to prove that they are builders in good faith of the improvements and the value of the said improvements introduced by them in the subject Lot 5528. IT IS SO ORDERED. The motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the present petition. The only issue is whether or not the private respondents should be allowed, in a hearing supplementary to execution, to present evidence to prove that they are builders in good faith of the improvements and the value of said improvements. Petitioners allege that the orders dated March 8, 1988 and August 19, 1988 are legitimate having been issued by a judge presiding a court of competent jurisdiction, pursuant to his duties which are ministerial in nature, to enforce a decision which is already final and executory. In ordering the trial court to receive private respondent's evidence to prove that they are builders in good faith of the improvements and the value of said improvements, reliance was placed by the respondent court in the cases of Naga Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-28173, September 30, 1971, 41 SCRA 105 and Vda. de Chi v. Tanada, etc., et al., G.R. No. L-27274, January 30, 1982, 111 SCRA 190. We shall narrate the facts in these two cases in a nutshell: 1) In the former case, Pacific Merchandising Corporation (Pacific) filed a complaint against Naga Development Corporation (Naga) for the balance of its indebtedness in the amount of P143,282.76. For failure to file an answer within the period, Naga was declared in default. In its affidavit of merit attached to the motion to set aside the order of default, Naga asserted that it had made certain payments to Pacific which should be deducted from the amount of the claim. The motion was denied. A judgment by default was rendered ordering Naga to pay said balance of indebtedness. The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and also by this Court, with the qualification that Naga was allowed to prove, during the process of execution of the judgment, whatever payments it had made to Pacific, either before or after the filing of the complaint, which constitute a proper deduction from the principal sum ordered to be paid. Thus, We rationalized (41 SCRA 115-116): Bearing in mind the nature of the instant suit and considering that the Court of Appeals' concurrence in the trial court's assessment of the amount of P143,282.76 is in the nature of a factual finding, this Court cannot now pass upon its correctness. The two courts below had before them the sales agreement between the parties, and to what extent the parties complied with their respective prestations thereunder was purely a matter of evidence. However, although we cannot pass upon the correctness of the said assessment, it is quite obvious that in the execution of its judgment as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, the trial court cannot compel the Naga to pay more than what it actually owes the Pacific under the terms of their covenant. Deeply imbedded in our legal system are the principles that no man may unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another, and that every person must, in the exercise of his rights, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. ... .

2) In the latter case, an action for recovery of damages as a result of a vehicular accident was filed by Rosita Yap Vda. de Chi against Alfonso Corominas, Jr., the owner of the bus, and Simplicio Lawas, the driver. Since the vehicle was insured, a third-party complaint was filed against the surety company. The trial court rendered judgment against Corominas, Jr. and Lawas by ordering them jointly and severally to pay P40,302.31 to Vda. de Chi. In turn, the surety company was ordered to indemnify Corominas, Jr. by the same amount. A writ of execution was issued against the defendants and the surety company. The decision was only partially satisfied because P6,700.00 has remained unpaid. Later, upon motion of the Southern Islands Hospital, the trial court ordered the surety company to pay directly to the hospital the amount of P686.35 out of the residue of the unpaid judgment; upon motion of the Chong Hua Hospital, the trial court issued another order requiring Corominas, Jr. and the surety company to pay the hospital the amount of P4,238.56. These two orders were questioned before this Court by Vda. de Chi. We set aside said orders and ordered the trial court to conduct a hearing, after proper notice to the parties, to determine whether or not the hospital bills incurred by Vda. de Chi have been paid, and thereafter, to render a decision accordingly. Thus, We explained (111 SCRA 196-197): Technically it was error for the respondent Court to order the defendants and the surety company to pay the respondents Southern Islands Hospital and Chong Hua Hospital the amounts of P686.35 and P4,238.56, respectively, from the balance of the judgment yet to be paid to the herein petitioner by the defendants and the surety company since the said respondents are not parties in the case. The judgment sought to be executed specifically ordered the defendants Alfonso Corominas, Jr. and Simplicio Lawas to pay, jointly and severally, the plaintiff Rosita Yap Vda. de Chi, the amount of P40,302.31, plus costs; and for the surety company to indemnify the defendant Alfonso Corominas, Jr. the amount of P40,302.31, which the said defendant is ordered to pay the plaintiff. Consequently, to order the payment of certain portions thereof to the herein respondent hospitals, Southern Islands Hospital and Chong Hua Hospital, would be to modify, alter, or vary the terms of the judgment. While the said respondents may have an interest over the said amounts claimed by them, their remedy was not to file a mere ex-parte motion before the court, but to file separate and independent actions before courts of competent jurisdiction, since the judgment rendered in the case had already become final and almost executed and the law allows no intervention after the trial has been terminated. On the other hand, it cannot also be denied that the sums of money in question have been awarded to the herein petitioner as expenses for her hospitalization in the respondent hospitals and are based upon petitioner's own evidence. To order the filing of a separate and independent action to recover a claim where the respondent hospitals concerned will have to prove exactly a claim which had already been tried, litigated and adjudged would unduly result in multiplicity of suits. Considering that the herein respondents claim that the herein petitioner has not yet paid the amounts she incurred for hospitalization, the interests of justice will be best served if a hearing be conducted to determine whether or not the hospital bills have been paid, instead of requiring the respondent hospitals to file separate actions to recover their respective claims. The aforementioned reliance on these two cases was misplaced. The common denominator between these two cases is the existence of a defense/claim which has been raised/tried before the trial court. In the Naga case, the defense of payments made to Pacific which are properly deductible from the principal sum ordered to be paid by Naga to Pacific was part of the issues which Naga was not allowed to prove, being already in default. In the Vda. de Chi case, her claim of hospitalization expenses incurred in the respondent hospital has been litigated and adjudged. The respondent court failed to appreciate that this shared denominator does not obtain in the present case. The defense of builders in good faith of the improvements and evidence of the value of said improvements were not raised/ presented before the trial court. More importantly, in the recent case of First Integrated Bonding and Insurance Co., Inc., et al. v. Isnani, etc., et al.,G.R. 70246, July 31, 1989, which involved a similar issue, We ruled: Significantly, the decision of September 30, 1971 in Naga Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, on which total reliance has been placed by the petitioners, does not appear to have been reaffirmed by this Court in subsequent cases. It is Justice Antonio Barredo's dissent (quoted below) that appears to have been firmed up in later decisions of this Court:

"... I believe that since Naga has been declared in default, and no grave abuse of discretion having been found by the Court in that respect, the judgment by default must stand and be executed, as is. Whether or not Naga has partially paid was part of the issue before the court before judgment was rendered, Naga through its own fault was not allowed to prove any such partial payment by the trial court; surely, that issue cannot be reopened during the execution because that would tend to vary the terms of the judgment. The matters of equity which can be raised in an execution proceeding, cannot to my mind, refer to those which the court could have passed upon before judgment. Otherwise, there will be no end to litigation, since conceivably the proof of partial payments could be so seriously controversial as to need another full blown trial, decision and appeal. It is my view that under the circumstances, Naga can do no more than address itself to the benignity or conscience of the private respondent. (Emphasis supplied; 41 SCRA 105, 119.)" The rule is well established that once a decision has become final and executory the only jurisdiction left with the trial court is to order its execution. To require now the trial court in a hearing supplementary to execution, to receive private respondents' evidence to prove that they are builders in good faith of the improvements and the value of said Improvements, is to disturb a final executory decision; which may even cause its substantial amendment. It appears that the private respondent's opposition to the motion for the execution of the judgment, possession and demolition is their last straw to prevent the satisfaction of the judgment. Sad to say, We have to cut this straw. We disagree with the respondent court that any counterclaim for reimbursement of the value of the improvements thereon by reason of private respondents' being builders in good faith, which presupposes that they are not the owners of the land, would run counter to the defense of ownership and therefore could not have been set up before the trial court. It should be emphasized that Rule 8, Section 2 of the Rules of Court allows a party to set forth two or more statements of a claim or defense alternatively or hypothetically, either in one cause of action or defense or in separate causes of action or defenses. This Court, in Castle Bros., Wolf and Sons v. Go-Juno, 7 Phil. 144, even held that inconsistent defenses may be pleaded alternatively or hypothetically provided that each defense is consistent with itself. Mention must also be made of the case of Camara, et al. v. Aguilar, et al., 94 Phil. 527, where We ruled: The contention that a counterclaim for expenses incurred in clearing and cultivating the parcel of land and planting coconut and other fruit-bearing trees therein could not have been set up in the former case because that would have been inconsistent with or would have weakened the claim that they were entitled to the parcel of land, is without merit, because 'A party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or defense alternatively or hypothetically, either in one cause of action or defense or in separate causes of action or defenses.' Hence, the plaintiffs herein and intervenors in the former case could have set up the claim that they were entitled to the parcel of land and alternatively that assuming (hypothetically) that they were not entitled to the parcel of land at least they were entitled as possessors in good faith to the coconut and other fruit-bearing trees planted by them in the parcel of land and their fruits or their value. (Emphasis supplied) A corollary question that We might as well resolve now (although not raised as an issue in the present petition, but conformably with Gayos, et al. v. Gayos, et al., G.R. No. L-27812, September 26, 1975, 67 SCRA 146, that it is a cherished rule of procedure that a court should always strive to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation) is whether or not the private respondents can still file a separate complaint against the petitioners on the ground that they are builders in good faith and consequently, recover the value of the impr vements introduced by them on the subject lot. The case of Heirs of Laureano Marquez v. Valencia, 99 Phil. 740, provides the answer: If, aside from relying solely on the deed of sale with a right to repurchase and failure on the part of the vendors to purchase it within the period stipulated therein, the defendant had set up an alternative though inconsistent defense that he had inherited the parcel of land from his late maternal grandfather and presented evidence in support of both defenses, the overruling of the first would not bar the determination by the court of the second. The defendant having failed to set up such alternative defenses and chosen or elected to rely on one only, the overruling thereof was a complete determination of the controversy between the parties which bats a subsequent action based upon an unpleaded defense, or any other cause of action, except that of failure of the complaint to state a cause of action and of lack

of jurisdiction of the Court. The determination of the issue joined by the parties constitutes res judicata. (Emphasis supplied) Although the alternative defense of being builders in good faith is only permissive, the counterclaim for reimbursement of the value of the improvements is in the nature of a compulsory counterclaim. Thus, the failure by the private respondents to set it up bars their right to raise it in a subsequent litigation (Rule 9, Section 4 of the Rules of Court). We realize the plight of the private respondents, the rule on comlpulsory counterclaim is designed to enable the disposition of the whole controversy at one time and in one action. The philosophy of the rule is to discourage multiplicity of suits. ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 28, 1989 and its resolution dated June 20, 1989 are SET ASIDE and the orders dated March 8, 1988 and August 19, 1988 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 15 are REINSTATED. SO ORDERED.