& Rome, Vol. 48, No.

2, October Greece 2001

BRIBERY IN ATHENIAN POLITICS PART II: ANCIENT REACTION AND PERCEPTIONS*

By CLAIRE TAYLOR

Efforts to stop bribery Bribery (or more specifically, bribery accusations) seem to have been a major feature of Athenian political life, if the evidence of law court speeches and comic drama is to be believed. How the Athenian demos reacted to this unsavoury feature of their political system, both legally and intellectually, is the subject of this article. It is clear from the vicious nature of many bribery accusations and the amount of anti-bribery legislation that it was generally thought of as detrimental, and was something that the Athenians wanted to reduce. They did this principally in two ways: through direct legislation to deter and punish wrongdoers and through preventative measures designed to make it difficult to successfully give or receive bribes.

Legislation The strongly adversarial nature of Athenian law and the complete freedom of private prosecution ensured that ho boulomenos('anyone who wishes') could bring an action against an offender if his crime affected the whole community. There was considerable freedom to choose the type of procedure when bringing a lawsuit, and the choice of procedure dictated the penalty awarded to the defendant if he was found guilty. If a magistrate was accused of bribery he could be prosecuted by one of seven different procedures, the choice of which depended on the plaintiff.' Ath. Pol. 59.4 states that the offence was liable to prosecution by the graphed6ron,but there are no surviving cases where it was used.2 It is thought that this law was primarily aimed at serving officials, and was used to prosecute both those giving and receiving bribes, but it is a theory which is impossible to test. It was probably intended for cases

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which were considered less serious, but again, since there are no surviving cases of its use, it is simply unclear. Bribe-takers could also be prosecuted under laws which penalized other criminal behaviour in the political arena. The graphepara presbeis for the misconduct of ambassadors, the grapheprodosiasfor treason and the graphe klopes demosion chrematonfor the embezzlement of public money could all be used against bribe-takers since all three charges to some extent covered or were connected to bribery. Many accusations of bribery were pursued under these laws as 'add-ons,' instead of as separate charges under the graphe d6orn,3which emphasizes the ease with which an additional charge could be brought (17, 22, 23). The annual euthyne provided an important arena for bribery against low level officials (16). According to Ath. Pol. 54.2 the penalty was a fine, ten times that of the bribe the magistrate accepted: 'if they prove that a man has taken bribes and the jurors convict him, an assessment is made and this sum is ... repaid tenfold.'4 If this fine was not paid within the allowed time limit the debtor was probably subject to atimia (disfranchisement or loss of citizen rights), and was therefore unable to enter any sanctuary, hold a magistracy or defend himself in court. This, in turn, could lead to voluntary, self-imposed exile. It also seems as if there was an alternative penalty of death available under this procedure. Dinarchus quotes the law in his speech against Demosthenes (34):
concerning men who accept gifts they have set only two assessments - either death, so that meeting with this penalty the man who has taken gifts may be a warning to everyone else, or the assessment is to be ten times the original gain from the gifts, so that those who dare to commit this offence may not profit from it.5

Whether a penalty of death was common in a euthyne accusation is unknown: it was probably fairly unusual since the biggest offenders were removed from office before they had the chance of submitting to a euthyne. The euthyne was only available to outgoing magistrates (16). What happened if the offender was in the middle of his term of office, or was not a magistrate to start with? To remove a magistrate from office mid-term or to prosecute an orator, the eisangelia procedure was needed. Eisangelia (denunciation) could be to the Assembly, who in the fourth century often delegated the business of the trial to the law courts, or to the Boule. It appears to be the mandatory procedure in the fourth century for accusations of bribery since it brought those accused to trial quickly.6 It was often, therefore, reserved for serious cases which involved treason (20, 25, 27, 28).7 The

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regularity with which politicians pursued their political differences through the law courts is probably a major factor in the use of the eisangeliaprocedure. The political and judicial spheres of Athenian life often encroached on each other: there was indeed little distinction between the two. Using legislation against bribery to further personal and political conflict was easy, and therefore common, and eisangelia could ensure the quick removal of a rival. The penalties in the eisangelia procedure, as in the euthyne, were either a ten-fold fine or death. The death penalty was more common here than in the euthyneowing to the fact that most of those accused were leading politicians, often strategoi, and so the stakes were higher (5, 7, 8, 9, 11, 25, 28). However, strategoi were not the only victims of eisangeliai:orators (17, 27, 33) and envoys (18, 19, 20, 29, 31) were often impeached, and bribery accusations were frequent in the list of charges. Another procedure, related to eisangelia,was apophasis.This could also be employed to prosecute an official or an orator. It took the form of a report by the Areopagus, which was either proposed by the Assembly or initiated by the Areopagus itself (but usually for its own members only). The most well-known use of apophasis (possibly the only use in this context) was in the trial of Demosthenes which resulted in his exile (34).8 It is evident that office holders were not the only men accused of taking bribes, and orators who proposed policy in the Assembly were equally regularly suspected. A further problem for the Athenians was how to react to bribery in the law courts, a crime for which there was a This law prescribed the death penalty special law: the graphedekasmou.9 for both giving and receiving bribes: there was no alternativepenalty, as there was with crimes committed by officials or other persons in the public eye. This seems to indicate that the Athenians viewed jury corruption as a more serious crime than any other form of bribery. Why this was so can perhaps be explained by the common notion that poorer men were more likely to be involved in financial irregularities than their wealthy counterparts: if the poor were more likely to accept bribes than the rich, they would need a greater deterrent.10However, this would not explain why the same penalty was awarded to those distributing bribes amongst jurors and to those jurors who accepted payment. Bribing a jury would be an expensive undertaking, which surely could only have been completed by those who were very wealthy themselves (13, 23). Perhaps these strict measures represent a desire amongst politicians to put a halt to bribery, which they could not effectively do in the mainstream political circuit owing to the enormous

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prevalence of a gift/bribe culture there. It can even be suggested that corruption in general was so rife that it would have been against the interests of the majority of political figures to seriously attempt to stop it, if it was not indeed impossible for them to do so. The true motivation for trials against politicians does not seem to be outrage at the audacity of accepting bribes from (e.g.) a foreign power, but personal rivalry or disagreement on a policy, which suggests the presence, at least on some level, of a bribe culture. Even so, the intention of the Athenians was clearly to limit the opportunity for corruption, but in practice society could only crack down harshly on bribery in law courts, which was probably not nearly as frequent in any case. The law courts did not only rely on legislative deterrents to discourage bribery:there was a great deal of emphasis on measures to prevent corruption in the first place. Prevention Limiting the opportunities for underhand dealings was an important function of the legislative process, designed to deter and prevent corruption in political life. However, it was not the only mechanism the Athenians used to reduce politically related bribery. The importance placed on the accountability of officials attempted to ensure that no-one was committing crimes whilst serving the polis. This feature, where all magistrates had to submit to public scrutiny, promoted the smooth running of the democracy. The Athenians were, therefore, serious about preventing venality: archons, when appointed to office, had to swear an oath that they would not take bribes; if they did, they had to dedicate a gold statue. The incoming archons 'swear that they will exercise their office justly and in accordance with the laws, and will not take bribes on account of their office or, if they do so, will dedicate a golden statue'. (Ath. Pol. 55.5)." Furthermore, the actual mechanics of the political system in itself sought to prevent widespread corruption. Fairness and equality (isonomia)were important principles of the democracy since the earliest times and the measures used to create this system also limited the opportunities for bribery. Originally introduced to undermine the established aristocracy as early as Solon, the selection of magistrates by lot had the effect of randomizing the selection process and therefore making bribery difficult.12The unpredictability of the outcome made elections to minor magistracies harder to influence. However, all the major offices of state were not appointed by lot, but by direct election,

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and although there is little evidence of electoral bribery in Athens,13the vast majority of allegations arose from these offices: 'although we have prescribed the penalty of death for anyone who is convicted of bribery, we elect men who are most flagrantly guilty of this crime as our
generals.'14

The personnel of most magistracies rotated annually and many served on Boards of Ten. The principles of rotation and collegiality, whilst ensuring high numbers of participants in the democracy, also made bribery difficult since no-one was in power for very long, nor were they individually responsible for any decision - it is, indeed, harder to buy ten men than one. However, as mentioned above, the most important offices were not chosen by lot, nor were they affected by rotation or collegiality. Does this mean that there was more opportunity to accept bribes in these offices? It would be tempting to see Athenian strategoias more venal than their less important counterparts, but this would be unwise. It is clear that most cases of bribery involved either strategoi,ambassadors or other important orators (e.g. 28, 20, 27 respectively). Naturally the most important cases, involving the largest amounts of money, involve the most important politicians in the state, and these are the cases that are recorded and survive. The temptations may indeed have been higher at this level, but the only conclusion that can safely be drawn is that bribery accusations played an important part in high politics. Whether this was due to increased levels of dishonesty of the top politicians compared with lesser magistrates, or due to the convenience of a bribery accusation in the context of a politico-personal feud, is open to debate. The mechanics of the democracy sought to prevent corruption as well as provide a fair and equal system of participation, and this extended to the increasingly complicated methods the Athenians used to organize their juries.15 Evidently, after some problems in the fifth century with the corruption of juries, the Athenians twice revised their selection process, which was specifically designed to prevent bribery of the dikasts. In the fifth century a dikast was allocated to a court for the whole year, so it was easy to know beforehand who would be listening to your case. Bribes could be offered directly to particulardikasts and the system was easy to manipulate. This changed early in the fourth century (at least by 409) to a system of allocation, not to a court, but to a letter, which was drawn by lot on the day of the trial. This system was manipulated by Anytos (13) and by the mid fourth century the method of choosing juries had evolved into a yet more complicated procedure, described by Ath. Pol 63-9.16 The Athenians were therefore concerned with the opportunities

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availableto bribe a jury and did their utmost to reduce these. Corruption of juries was a fundamental abuse of the democracy since it undermined the decision-making process of the demos and was viewed within this serious context.

Perceptions of bribery in Athenian society - a question of ethics? Did the Athenians see bribery as morally wrong? Was it an action that was considered reprehensible, or was it an accepted part of political life; a hazard of office? The language of bribery is noticeably neutral and non-judgmental, but it would be wrong to judge from this that the Athenians turned a blind eye to corruption.17It was obviously a very large problem: dishonesty was neither dismissed nor ignored. The frequency of allegations of corruption in the ancient sources must be stressed: it is undeniable that Athenian politicians were quick to accuse opponents of resorting to bribery. Even in tragedy and myth the immediate reaction to receiving unwelcome political intelligence is the accusation of bribery by opponents. Thus Creon accuses a sentry of being on the payroll of his enemies:
... There's a party of malcontents

In the city, rebels against my word and law, Shakers of heads in secret, impatient of rule; They are the people, I see it well enough, Who have bribed their instruments to do this thing. (Soph. Ant. 288-92)

Historical figures were also quick to accuse others of bribery: a charge which was hard to prove. Severe personal vilification either direct or implied, comic criticism and insinuations of politicians conspiring to increase the power they wielded through oratory are all common elements in the surviving source material.18It is through these techniques that rival politicians found fertile ground for accusations, serious or otherwise. A politician had to destroy his rival before his rival destroyed him and this inevitably led to a plethora of false (or impossible to substantiate) accusations. This is not to say that all allegations were unfounded. Some Athenian politicians undoubtedly took bribes some of the time. However, the openness of the Athenian political system produced a mechanism in which allegations could easily be made.

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It is profitable to analyse dorodokia in the context of reciprocity. Financial gain bestowed certain obligations, but if these obligations were created by underhand methods the politician was laying himself open to accusations of acting against the demos.Having obligations meant that it was your duty to help your friends, but by extension this provided an opportunity to help yourself and to a certain degree this was condoned.'9 The failure of reciprocity, as an important element in Athenian society, was that it did not set firm boundaries to what was acceptable. Bribery was not seen as 'ethical' or 'acceptable' per se, but in certain situations the lines were blurred between what was acceptable behaviour and what was not. Three areas have been distinguished which merit further discussion: the role of patronage and gift-giving in Athenian society (d6rodokia), the role of ambassadors and guest-friendships (xenia) and the role of the demos and its need for accountability. This will help to explain how the Athenians perceived their own social interactions and clarify the climate into which the large number of bribery accusations fit.

Bribery in the context of gift-giving A bribe could include payments of goods as well as payments of money, and a cynic can argue that any type of favour given or received by a politician could be described as a bribe. The problem for a modern historian, and perhaps the ancient Greeks also, is to determine where the common, customary practice of gift-giving ended and bribery began. The lack of a separate vocabulary for the two practices of 'gift-giving' and 'bribery' demonstrates the fine line that existed between legitimate and more sinister transactions: when was a 'gift' a genuine voluntary transaction between two people, and when did other motivations come into effect?20This is especially difficult to distinguish when payments to a politician take the form of goods, and it is no easier to differentiate in our own society. Aristophanes gives a list of such goods in The Wasps:
these men [the demagogues] they [other cities] ply with gifts - jars of salt fish, wine, rugs, cheese, honey, sesame, pillows, libation bowls, dress clothes, drinking cups, health and wealth! (Arist. Wasps 675-7)

Distinguishing 'gifts' and 'bribes' was also a problem for the Athenians. The distribution of both gifts and bribes served the same end, in that they conferred mutual obligations on both parties and were, therefore,

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functionally very similar.21 Added to this is the notion that making money from office was, up to a point, acceptable. Hypereides even admits, in his speech against Demosthenes in 323 (34), that bribery was tolerated unless it was detrimental to the city:
As I said in the Assembly, members of the jury, you willingly allow generals and orators to make large profits - it is not the law that allows them to do so, but your kindness and humanity - only maintaining one condition, that the money is taken for and not against
your interests. (Hyp. 1.24-5)22

Dorodokiain itself, therefore, was not seen as morally wrong. It was its effects in relation to the polls that was the important factor. In one sense it is not surprising that there was some toleration of d6rodokiasince the Athenians often openly admitted performing certain actions purely for the benefits they would receive at a later date, rather than simply for the sake of doing a good, or civic-minded, deed. It was the deed itself that mattered, not the motivation behind it.23 Thus, unless the actions of a magistrate were seen to be detrimental to the polis they were not questioned. Society not only condoned but actively encouraged giftexchange and it was easy for the bribe-taker and giver to blur the two activities. Even religion was seen as the mutual exchange of favours between human and god.24 Political gift-giving was an acceptable practice in some contexts, most notably those which involved foreign autocracies: diplomatic missions. Gifts were always associated with kings. If a monarch offered gifts it was inconceivable to refuse them. However, by accepting these gifts an ambassador would be opening himself up to allegations of bribery (18, 26, 29, 31). As the polis developed from its pre-archaic community, the role of a powerful king - necessarily an outsider - exercising an undue influence on political leaders became more abhorrent.25 Ideology dictated that the actions of a polis member should be for the common advantage of the city, but by receiving gifts, and therefore creating obligations with an outsider, an ambassador was putting himself in a state of ethical limbo: where did his true obligations lie? On a fairly narrow level with his immediate benefactor, or on a wider level with the polis? The answer necessarily depended on the point of view of the inquirer, and no doubt many accusations were trumped up by the immediate political rivals of the accused (5, 31, 34).26 The line between 'gifts' and 'bribes' was, therefore, a very fine one, but a distinction can perhaps be drawn if 'gifts' are seen as the traditional custom of giving presents to incur a non-specific obligation, and 'bribes' as gifts given for

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a purpose, with a specific intent in mind.27It was perhaps this confusion that led many leading political figures to justify 'bribes' as 'gifts'. The role of gift-giving in Athenian society, therefore, provided an excuse for already corrupt politicians and justification for a magistrate thinking of accepting a 'gift', and it was the imprecise nature of the Athenian attitude which caused the peculiarity in the system.28

Bribery and ambassadors Being an envoy in ancient Greece was a distinction, but one which needed a great deal of personal wealth to perform. Ambassadors were paid only a subsistence wage, but they could entail considerable expense to themselves, particularlyif an embassy was a long one. They did not receive any financial compensation, as with other high offices of state, but it is assumed that their wage was designed to limit the opportunities for profiteering from an embassy.29 So, why are there so many accusations involving ambassadors in the sources? It was customary for ambassadors to be highly honoured in the Greekworld:holding banquets was common, as was the offering of gifts. The notion of guest-friendship (xenia) had a strong reciprocal element, but any gift exchange with a foreigner left an ambassador vulnerable to charges of bribery.30Ambassadors were particularly vulnerable in their dealings with autocratic Persia and Macedon (6, 18, 19, 26, 29, 31). Gift-exchange with these states could easily be seen as treasonable or at least questionable actions because they involved obligational ties with non-Greeks, whose method of government was abhorrentto the Athenians. To admit the domination of the Greek world by a non-Greek power was terrible, and to think of Greek co-operation in this process was deemed as an evil. Accepting bribes from an enemy of the state was not a legitimate way of making money from politics, and this led to the close association of bribery and treason.31Time and again in trials which involved bribery accusations the official charge was one of treason (prodosia) and the procedure used was often that of eisangelia (denunciation/impeachment), a procedure used mainly for serious cases of treason (22, 25, 28).32 The law stated that eisangeliacould be used:
if any person . . .seeks to overthrow the democracy of the Athenians . . . or if he attends a meeting in any place with intent to undermine the democracy, or forms a political society, or if anyone betrays a city, or ships, or any land, or naval force, or, being an orator, makes speeches contrary to the interests of the Athenian people, receiving bribes. (Hyp. 4.7-8)

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Treason and bribery were, therefore, closely related. This is supported by Dem. 19.268: 'whenever, men of Athens, you see any man taking bribes, you may be sure that he is also a traitor.' The bribe-taker was betraying the demos by deliberately not pursuing the interests of the people. It was a short step, therefore, to view bribe-takers as 'demoshaters,'33and it was probably the seriousness of the charges that enabled accusations of bribery, and therefore treason, to be used as political weapons. Athenian ambassadors were often leading politicians of the day and embassies were not removed from the 'daily conflicts of partisan
politics.'34

The perceived failure of an embassy allowed opponents to

take the political advantage through bribery accusations, and it has been noted that the majority of trials resulting from such an accusation followed a defeat in war or other crisis at Athens, and this is surely significant. General approval of an embassy was forthcoming if the mission was successful, but if there was any doubt, a trial could occur (29). A perception of failure could be seized upon by political opponents for their own ends, rather than any well-grounded fear of corruption (31), and the importance of gift-giving in society was a major factor which allowed this to happen. Aeschines styled himself as the guest-friend (xenos) of Philip of Macedon, but the anti-Macedonian elements in Athenian politics viewed him as being on the Macedonian payroll, and therefore a traitor. The accusations of Aeschines' venality should be seen in the context of his long-running dispute with Demosthenes and the 'anti-Macedonian party' in Athens, rather than based on any secure evidence of corruption, which Demosthenes does not give in his prosecution speech (31).35 There were a large number of trials involving accusations of bribery against envoys (6, 10, 18, 19, 20, 21, 26, 29).36 Whether this indicates that bribery of Athenian ambassadors was common is impossible to say owing to the unverifiable nature of many of the charges, but it is clear that there are more extant accusations in the fourth century than in the fifth. Some scholars believe that many trials were almost definitely unjustified and there were a large number of fabricated charges for reasons of politics or personal conflict.37 Bribery in terms of the demos The sovereignty of the demoswas the underlying principle of Athenian democracy and the demos was master in both political and judicial spheres. The accountability of politicians was a vitally important

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factor in the smooth running of the democracy, and it was in this utilitarian context that many politicians were accused and convicted of political crimes. Bribery was just one of many possibilities: politics could be dangerous game. The more successful a politician was, the more likely he was to be prosecuted if he failed at any time.38 Political prosecutions were very frequent owing to the use of the law courts by individuals to further their own career, and the political casualty rate can be described as high. However, the effect of an allegation on the accused's career seems to have been minimal in some cases (7, 18, 30). The demoshas been accused of being fickle and ruthless, destroying the careers of many leading figures in the democracy.39 However, the demoswas not wholly to blame for this state of affairs. Politicians often exploited the Assembly and the law courts for their own political ends, using them as places in which they destroyed their opponents. The Athenians recognized that the accountability of officials was crucial to the maintenance of their own sovereignty, and although this process sometimes went awry, in general they effectively kept control of their politicians as much as was possible. The suspicion - or realization - that every official would have his hand in the till, so to speak, and that he would be persuaded by bribes, was reflected in the attitude towards those who were found guilty of the offence.40 The demos was, by definition, always right and if it made a bad decision the blame was laid with the proposer of a decree or the general in charge of an operation, who was duly charged and brought to trial:
if the common people decide on a course of policy which turns out badly, they pick on a few individuals and fasten the responsibility on them, claiming that they have acted against the interests of the common people and thus ruined their plans, if the policy (Ps-Xen. 2.17) succeeds, of course, they claim the credit for themselves.

These charges often incorporated accusations of bribery. Many cases which involve bribery allegations include another, more serious charge, usually of treason (22, 25, 28), which would fit into Hypereides' notion of dorodokiaas acceptable unless it is detrimental to the city. There was a direct relationship between the failure of politicians to fulfil what the demos asked of them and political prosecutions (9, 11, 14, 28), and this led to a situation where, especially in times of crisis, failure was not tolerated.41It was, in part, the inability of the demosto hold itself to account for its own bad decisions which enabled politicians to pursue their political rivalries in the courts in the form of bribery allegations.

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It was a widely held notion in the fifth century that political power was won by expenditure of money in return for receiving charis from the and this reciprocal relationship was inevitably open to accusademos,42 tions of manipulation.43 The traditionally heavily stratified society of Athens collided with the democratic ideal of isonomia, and politicians were at pains to reconcile the two ideologies. Aristocratic rivalriesplayed an important part in democratic politics and the evolution of the whole democracy as a political system can be interpreted in this context. This has led to the interpretation of policies which involve payments to the demos (misthos) as 'subtle and indirect bribery,'44such as the introduction of jury pay, grandiose liturgies and even comprehensive building projects. However, this is an argument which depends entirely on the political view of the analyst. Caution is necessary since the sources we have are, by nature, aristocratic, and are therefore more likely to be critical of any measure which gives the demosmore political power. This can be demonstrated by the way the sources handle the respective motivations of both Pericles and Cimon. Pericles has been accused of paying the demosin return for their support by introducing jury pay 'as a political measure to counter the generosity of Cimon'.45 This may indeed be true but, put cynically, what politician has ever introduced a measure which did not seek, at least in part, to act as a counter to his opponents? The effects of Pericles' policies in Athens ensured a redistribution of wealth which enabled larger numbers of citizens to participate in the democracy and kept him in power for many years. Democrats like Pericles were opposed to the aristocraticlargesse of men such as Cimon, primarily because they could not match it, but also because it went against the democratic ideology of preserving the demos' independence from the wealthy which enabled them to participate. They therefore sought to create the same charis relationship through policy, rather than patronage.46 I do not doubt that many of the measures introduced in Athens, which had the effect of strengthening the developing democracy, were in fact conceived through self-interest, class rivalry and personal vendettas, but I would hesitate to describe such measures as 'bribery.' Cynically, one could argue that all political advantages obtained by the demos arose only out of their manipulation by a powerful individual, purely for his own political benefit. However, it is unwise to accuse one side of such politically motivated bribery without accusing the other side of exactly the same thing. The mechanisms may have been different, but the aim was always the same: to gain a good personal reputation and charis amongst the demos, which could be

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capitalized on the political arena. It is difficult therefore to distinguish Pericles' action in this case from the actions of every other politician in every other political decision. To what extent was bribery tolerated? 'No man is free from audit who has held any public trust', proclaims Aeschines (3.18). The Athenians were, it is fair to say, naturally suspicious of their politicians, with seemingly good reason: there was plenty of opportunity for men in power to line their pockets with gifts from foreign kings and many politicians were proved by the courts to be untrustworthy. However, evidence from Hypereides and Isocrates suggests a certain degree of acceptance, or toleration at least, of politicians receiving gifts for supporting a course of action.47 This was explained by the proviso that accepting gifts was an acceptable part of politics so long as there was no detrimental effect on the city. This was the crucial factor in deciding whether a politician had taken bribes. A politician could accept gifts to promote a policy in the Assembly, but if the policy was viewed as a failure the politician was usually left with a lawsuit on his hands. Failure, or the perception of failure, was indeed a major factor in many of the cases involving allegations of bribery coming to court. The demoswas too willing to attribute military defeat and illjudged decision-making to the acceptance of dbraby their strategoiand rhetores, and not to other factors such as incompetence or lack of resources (11). However, the fact that they were able to do this suggests in politics. On the a widespread acceptance of the presence of d6rodokia a desire to indicates accusations of number one hand, the large bribery clean up politics and shows a refusal to give licence to dora in the political system but, on the other hand, its use as a 'cover-all' charge shows that dorodokiawas accepted as being a common feature of the political culture and was a believable charge to level at nearly every politician: few in number are the leaders known for their incorruptibility.48This must have indicated a certain degree of toleration of dora, or at least a recognition of their place in the political system. There are large numbers of accusations, but this does not necessarily suggest that all Athenian politicians were incredibly venal, and caution must be exercised about attributing shady motivation to every action, especially in a society where gift-giving played such a large role. The lack of distinction between gifts and bribes means that dorodokiashould not

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always be assessed as corrupt. In some contexts it was a legitimate institution which sought to reimburse leaders for their support of a particular course of action, a reimbursement that they would just not receive otherwise - or this was the excuse used by corrupt politicians. Many officials probably had an established view on a particular matter and accepted gifts as sweeteners to pursue their politics further. In other words, it is useful to see politicians as being paid, and not bought. To describe the motivation behind all incidences of d6rodokiaas venality is perhaps too strong. Dorodokia in itself does not necessarily involve corrupt motivation and this explains why a bribe is only a bribe if it had a detrimental effect on the city, and by extension why a certain level of political 'gift-giving' was tolerated in public life. Was there a bribe culture? The frequency of accusations of bribery against politicians suggests that Athens was a society in which such transactions were readily tolerated, or at least had an ambiguous status. However, the question still remains to be asked: how many of these accusations were true? It is regrettably impossible to tell which accusations are true and which are not, and each case needs to be assessed on its own merits. Some accusations may have been designed to provoke a general public feeling of hostility against an opponent, others must have been cynical attempts at character assassination, more still made simply for rhetorical effect. In one speech alone there are over forty allegations of the defendant's corruption, presumably designed to keep the alleged actions of the defendant uppermost in the minds of the jury and make him appear as unfavourable as possible.49There was indeed plenty of opportunity for officials to accept d6ra in many different aspects of political life, but there were also massive opportunities to accuse others of bribery: accusations which were impossible to prove. Within the framework of a working democracy it was easy to accuse a fellow politician of bribery and direct suspicion onto him. The competitiveness that existed between Athenian leaders gave rise to this situation: aristocratic rivalries were still played out in the fourth and fifth centuries as they were in the sixth. In the context of a society that attached great importance to reciprocity, giftgiving and bribery could be easily merged together and accusations could fly.50 In such a situation it did not matter, to a certain extent, whether the accusations were perceived to be true or not: it simply

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diverted attention from the accuser. Many politicians seem not to have been affected politically by accusations made against them, because many allegations were simply a form of character denigration rather than serious accusations complaining about an individual's behaviour on a particularoccasion. Cimon was still very powerful after his trial in 463 (5) and Pericles only gained from the accusations against him (7). Many of the accusations and allegations, therefore, should be seen as political fabrications designed to slander an opponent, and hopefully knock him out of politics permanently. The benefits of destroying a political opponent were numerous and many figures took the opportunities whenever they arose to do precisely this, often blurring the distinctions between gifts and bribes in the process. In the politics of Classical Athens, therefore, there was not so much a briberyculture, more an
accusation of bribery culture.

Endpiece Gifts were always commonplace in Greek society (1, 2, 4), but the political atmosphere of democratic Athens gave rise to a culture where the prosecution of leaders for accepting these gifts was common. Laws tried to address the problem, and they were successful to some extent: there were numerous prosecutions and convictions. However, the Athenians could not regulate the influence of outside forces and different political cultures where dorodokia was a customary way of
gaining power. 'Philip . . . spent money freely in bribing traitorous

persons in all the cities, and tried to promote embroilment and disorder', complains Dem. 18.19. The Athenian demos feared Greeks bearing gifts, but especially feared foreigners bearing gifts, since it skewed their notions of acceptable reciprocity. The prominence of gift-giving in Greek society joined with the need of the demos to hold its leaders to account and combined itself with point-scoring politicians exploiting their differences in the law courts. This created a situation where leaders could easily accuse one another of taking bribes. It is regrettably impossible to discover the extent of bribery in Athenian politics. Many politicians probably did accept gifts for pursuing a certain policy, but it is difficult to judge the norms of one society as being immoral from the perspectives of another. All that can be said is that the Athenian demosperceived that the receipt of d6ra by politicians created an irregular relationship which was undesired. Unfortunately

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dora seemed to have played a large part in politics, but whether large numbers of politicians intentionally changed their minds because of them is impossible to know. Both d6ra and accusations of bribery were free-flowing in the politics of ancient Athens.
NOTES * This article should be read in conjunction with Claire Taylor, 'Bribery in Athenian Politics Part I: Accusations, Allegations and Slander', G&R 48 (2001), 53-66. All references in (bold) in this article refer to an entry in the 'Table of Accusations of Bribery on pp. 58-61 of that article. 1. According to M. H. Hansen, The Athenian Democracyin the Age of Demosthenes(Oxford, 1991), 193, the seven procedures available for prosecuting a magistrate accused of taking bribes are: 1. Eisangelia to the Assembly, (22); 2. Eisangelia to the Boule; 3. Apophasis (Areopagus under graph doron;6. Ho report), (34); 4. The Boule acting on its own initiative; 5. Ho boulomenos boulomenos by apographe;7. Euthyne, (16). 2. See P. J. Rhodes, A Commentaryon the AristotelianAthenaion Politeia (Oxford, 1981), 662, (hereafter CAAP), S. Todd, The Shape of Athenian Law (Oxford, 1993), 106, 110, J. H. Lipsius, Das attischeRecht und Rechtsverfahren (Leipzig, 1912), 401-4. 3. Treason and embezzlement are often seen as related to bribery. Treason because of the detrimental effect bribery could have on the city and embezzlement because it was an abuse of power in the financial sphere which demonstrated the politician's dishonesty and therefore his willingness to be led astray by bribes. 4. Ath. Pol. 54.2. See CAAP, 598-9. 5. Din. 1.60. Hyp. 5.24 supports this: 'those guilty of accepting gifts (are) to pay tenfold; and it is possible according to the laws to assess the penalty as death.' See also D. M. MacDowell, RIDA 30 (1983), 58-61. 6. See M. H. Hansen, Eisangelia: The Sovereigntyof the People's Court in Athens in the Fourth of Generals(Odense, 1975), J. T. Roberts, Accountabilityin Athenian Centuryand the Impeachment Government(Wisconsin, 1982), 15ff. 7. Hansen, op. cit. (n. 6) cat. nos. 82, 100-2, 109 respectively. 8. For apophasissee D. H. MacDowell, The Law in ClassicalAthens (London, 1978), 190-1. For the Harpalus case see the speeches by Dinarchus and Hypereides against Demosthenes. I. Worthington, A Historical Commentaryon Dinarchus: Rhetoricand Conspiracy in Later Fourth CenturyAthens (Michigan, 1992), passim, E. Badian, JHS 81 (1961), 16-43. 9. Aes. 1.86, Isoc. 8.50, Ath. Pol. 27.5. See also MacDowell, RIDA 30 (1983), 64-9. 10. It is probably not remiss to assume that there were larger numbers of less wealthy members of society serving on juries than serving as strategoior rhetores.See Ps-Xen. 1.6, Plato. Prt. 319d. Xen. Mem. 3.7.6. Also M. M. Markle, in P. Cartledge & F. D. Harvey (edd.), Crux:Essays Presented to G. E. M. de Ste Croix (Exeter, 1985), 265-97; R. K. Sinclair, Democracyand Participation in Athens (Cambridge, 1988), 119ff., 127ff., Hansen, op. cit. (n. 1), 125-7, 248-9. 11. See CAAP, 621. 12. See E. S. Staveley, Greek and Roman Voting and Elections (London, 1972), 61-72, J. W. Headlam, Election by Lot at Athens, 2nd ed. revised by D. C. MacGregor (Cambridge, 1933). 13. Compared to Republican Rome electoral bribery seems insignificant in Athens. Arguably this was because there was less intense rivalry in the Athenian upper classes compared with the Roman upper classes. The political stakes were not as high in Athens as in Republican Rome (Athenian magistrates did not wield nearly the same level of power). For electoral bribery in the Roman Republic see M. Jehne, in M. Jehne (ed.), Demokratiein Rom? Die Rolle des Volkesin der Politik der romischenRepublik, (Stuttgart, 1995), 51 ff., P. Nadig, Ardet Ambitus (Frankfurt am Main, 1997), E. A. Bauerle, Procuringan Election:ambitusin the Roman Republic(Univ. of Michigan Diss. 1990), A. Lintott, JHS 80 (1990), 1 ff., L. R. Taylor, Party Politics in the Age of Caesar (Berkeley, 1959), 67ff. See also Staveley, op. cit. (n. 12), 105, Sinclair, op. cit. (n. 10), 80ff. Common consensus says that the Athenians would not let themselves be bribed in elections owing to the importance of the functions of the offices they were voting for, i.e. the offices needed skilled

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experts, and the Assembly, when presented with a list of candidates, would not choose a poor one if a better candidate was there. See Staveley, op. cit. (n. 12), 103, Hansen, op. cit. (n. 1), 159-60. However, can the lack of (evidence for ?) electoral bribery be seen as a symptom of the use of the law courts, rather than elections, as an arena for political feuding? The Athenians simply used a different arena to assault their upper class enemies. See Sinclair, op. cit. (n. 10), 210. 14. Isoc. 8.50. 15. See Ath. Pol. 63-9 with CAAP, 697-735; Aristophanes, Wasps 242-4, 303-5, 1107-9; Ekkl. 681-8; Wealth 277, 1166-7. See also MacDowell, RIDA 30 (1983), 64ff., The Law in Classical Athens (London, 1978), 36-8; Hansen, op. cit. (n. 1), 197-9; Sinclair, op. cit. (n. 10), 70ff. 16. See CAAP, 697-735. 17. For discussion of the vocabulary of bribery see F. D. Harvey, 'Dona Ferentes:Some Aspects of Bribery in Greek Politics' in Cartledge & Harvey (edd.), Crux (Exeter, 1985), 72-9. Also see G. Herman, RitualisedFriendshipand the GreekCity (Cambridge, 1987), 75 ff. 18. See K. J. Dover, GreekPopularMorality in the timeof Plato and Aristotle(Oxford, 1974), 23 ff. 19. L. Pearson, PopularEthics in Ancient Greece(California, 1962), 162: 'if a man's excellence or justice was determined by his willingness or ability to help his friends, it was also recognised that he must, within limits, help himself.' See also A. Missiou in C. Gill, N. Postlethwaite & R. Seaford (edd.), Reciprocity in Ancient Greece (Oxford, 1988), 188-91; M. Schofield in P. Cartledge, P. Millett & S. von Reden (edd.), Kosmos:Essays in Order, Conflict and Community in Classical Athens (Cambridge, 1998), 37-51; S. von Reden, Exchangein Ancient Greece(London, 1995), 935; T. W. Gallant, Risk and Survival in Ancient Greece. Reconstructingthe Domestic Economy (Cambridge, 1991), 143-69. 20. For discussions on the role of gift-giving and patronage in Greek society see M. I. Finley, The Worldof Odysseus(New York, 1979), 66 and P. Millett, 'Patronage and its Avoidance in Classical Athens', in A. Wallace-Hadrill (ed.), Patronage in Ancient Society (London & New York, 1989), 15 ff: Millett denies the existence of a patron/client relationship like that of the Romans, especially in a democratic polis such as Athens, since democracy depended on political equality (isonomia) and patronage depended on the exploitation of inequalities: the two ideologies were incompatible. However, the independence of the demoswas not always maintained, e.g. the poorer citizens were not economically independent from the wealthy and relied on public state pay for services such as jury or military service. This was their protection or 'insurance policy', rather than a traditional patron/client relationship as personified by Cimon's generosity. See Ath. Pol. 27.3, Plut. Cim. 10. Also CAAP, 338-9. For Pericles' introduction of pay for jury service in direct political competition to Cimon see Plut. Per. 9. 21. See J. Ober, Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens (Princeton, 1990), 236, who establishes the great importance of charis (gratitude). 22. B. Strauss, 'The Cultural Significance of Bribery and Embezzlement in Athenian Politics', Ancient World 11 (1985), 71. 23. See Lys. 16.17: Mantitheus at his dokimasiaopenly admits that his extensive military service was undertaken 'in order that if at any time I should be exposed to an unjust prosecution, my actions would give you a better opinion of me and I should receive all my rights'. This is obviously an acceptable motivation otherwise it would not have been used as an argument for the defence. 24. Plato Rep. 390e demonstrates the fine line between gift-giving and bribery by implying the similarity between religious offerings and venality: 'gifts persuade gods, gifts persuade reverend kings'. See also Strauss, op. cit. (n. 22), 72-3, R. Parker, 'Pleasing Thighs: Reciprocity in Greek Religion', in C. Gill, N. Postlethwaite & R. Seaford (edd.), op. cit. (n. 19), 120-1. 25. Herman, op. cit. (n. 17) sees dorodokiain the context of a clash of ideologies between the heroic age of kings on one hand and the continuing development of the polis into a collection of politically active persons on the other: a 'battle of ideologies between heroic and civic values', p. 78. He states that it is impossible to bribe an autocrat because a bribe is only so if it is against the interests of the community. Since tyranny is necessarily (in the Greek view) against the interests of the community, a bribe would have no extra undesired effects. 'Gifts' to Philip of Macedon, or the Persian kings, are gifts and not bribes by definition. However, gifts given to Philip or the Persian kings will be bribes if they are designed to achieve ends which would not have been achieved otherwise or if they are contraryto Athenian interests. See Harvey, op. cit. (n. 17), 106-7, especially n. 109. 26. Aeschines sees the problems caused by creating obligations with foreigners in Aes. 3.46: 'lest

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anyone set a higher value upon the gratitude of a foreign state than upon that of his own country, and so become corrupted'. Herman, op. cit. (n. 17), 79, interprets this as 'a mark of misguided solidarity'. See also Strauss, op. cit. (n. 22), 73: 'bribes threatened to turn an individual against the commonwealth, hence they were outlawed. Nevertheless individuals did not give up their belief in individual gifts, at least not entirely.' 27. See R. Kulesza, Die Bestechungim politischenLebenim 5. und 4. Jh v. Chr. (Konstanz, 1995), 11-12: he describes gifts as 'sittengemif3e Gabe, Prasent,' and bribes as 'ein Geschenk, das dem Gebenden einen Nutzen gewahren soll.' 28. See Hansen, op. cit. (n. 1), 276. 29. See D. J. Mosley, Ancient Society 3 (1973), 13, F. Adcock & D. J. Mosley, Diplomacy in Ancient Greece(London, 1975), 155. 30. See Sinclair, op. cit. (n. 10), 180, S. Perlman, GRBS 17 (1976), 226ff., M. Miller, Athens and Persia in the Fifth CenturyBC (Cambridge, 1997), 112-14. 31. For politicians profiteering from office see Arist. Pol. 1309a3-7. For examples of ways in which they benefited from office see Dem. 19.238 (gratitude), 249 (paid clerkships with free meals in the Theseum); Lys. 19.57 (doubled the money spent), 27.11 (theft). See also Ober, op. cit. (n. 21), 245ff. and M. H. Hansen, Class. et Med. 32 (1971-80), 124-5. 32. For discussion of eisangeliasee especially Hansen, op. cit. (n. 6), passim. These cases appear in his catalogue as numbers 73, 75, 100-102 respectively. 33. See Ober, op. cit. (n. 21), 332. This could be applied to orators accused of taking bribes as well as ambassadors. 34. D. J. Mosley, Ancient Society 3 (1973), 12; Miller, op. cit. (n. 30), 114. 35. Demosthenes had previously tried to prosecute Aeschines for bribe-taking in 346 through Timarchus (30), but Aeschines parried the prosecution by accusing Timarchus of sexual impropriety, forcing him to drop the charges. See also Kulesza, op. cit. (n. 27), 23, 28f., E. M. Harris, Aeschinesand Athenian Politics (Oxford, 1995), 116 ff. 36. Although this is disputed by S. Perlman, GRBS 17 (1976), who claims that they were not as frequent as is generally assumed and the number of actual cases is small. 37. Adcock & Mosley, op. cit. (n. 29), 233: charges of bribery and corruption were regularly made 'almost as if by reflex action but in Athens they were rarely justified and carried little weight,' p. 162; Perlman, op. cit. (n. 36), 233: 'accusations of bribe-taking against ambassadors were fabricated in order to strengthen arguments in a controversy on foreign policy.' For issues related to the distribution in time of accusations see n. 39. 38. R. A. Knox, G&R 32 (1985), 146: 'if he was normally successful, failure appeared to prove not incapacity but criminal conduct'. 39. W. K. Pritchett, The GreekState at War, vol. II (Berkeley & Los Angeles, 1974). He states that the increasing poverty of the fourth century led to an increase in accusations as the 'demos thrived on hearing words about corruption in political life', p. 132. See also Miller, op. cit. (n. 30), 114. However, it is difficult to see a direct link. There are more accusations in the fourth century, but there are also more surviving law court speeches and, as this is the medium of preservation of the majority of accusations, it is hard to draw any firm conclusions from the distribution of accusations in time. The implication that the demosthrived on destroying their politicians should be disputed. Bribery occurs in every political culture, not just in democracies. (For bribery in Sparta see K. L. Noethlichs, 'Bestechung, Bestechlichkeit und die Rolle des Geldes in der spartanischen Aussen und Innenpolitik, 7-2 Jh v. Chr.', Historia 36 (1987), 129-170.) 40. Hyp. 1.24-25, quoted above p. 8. 41. The role of dora was thus: 'd6ra become bribes when they lead to political failure; and ... such failure will be encoded in terms of bribe-taking, whether or not there is any evidence that money has changed hands.' Todd, op. cit. (n. 2), 306. 42. See Ober, op. cit. (n. 21), 236 and J. K. Davies, Wealth and the Power in ClassicalAthens (New York, 1981), 92 ff. 43. For discussion of the phenomenon of political groupings and policy of the period after the Peloponnesian War as a development from the money - charisrelationship see especially B. Strauss, AthensAfterthe PeloponnesianWar- Class, Faction and Policy, 403-386BC (New York, 1986), 13 ff. 44. Davies, op. cit. (n. 42), 66. For misthosas a term for bribery see Harvey, op. cit. (n. 17), 84-5. 45. Ath. Pol. 27.3. CAAP, 339, comments: 'what Cimon achieved by personal liberality, his successors had to achieve by misthos.'A fragment of Theopompus (115 F89) describes Cimon's

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generosity and through this 'he won his reputation and was the first of citizens'. Cimon's patronage was therefore legendary and was obviously successful in promoting his popularity. W. R. Connor, Theopompusand Fifth Century Athens (Cambridge, 1968), 35, describes Pericles' answer as 'politically inspired payments that are little better than bribery'. 46. See Millett, op. cit. (n. 20), 37ffwho describes public pay 'as a practical antidote to personal patronage'. 47. Hyp. 1.24-5, Isoc. 8.50. 48. Pericles: Thuc. 2.60.5, 2.65.8; Plut. 15.3. Aristides: Plut. Arist. 4.3, 7.2, 7.7. L. Pearson, Popular Ethics in Ancient Greece(California, 1962), 161. 49. Aes. 3.19; 48; 62; 66; 73; 81; 85; 91; 92; 93; 94; 103; 105; 114; 125; 129; 143; 146; 149; 156; 167; 173; 209; 212; 214; 218; 220; 221; 226; 233; 237; 239; 244; 257; 259, and also in Demosthenes' reply. See Kulesza, op. cit. (n. 27), 75. 50. See Sinclair, op. cit. (n. 10), 175: 'Athenian leaders displayed a spirit of rivalry which was reminiscent of the fierce bitterness with which the aristocratic leaders of the sixth century and the early fifth century had vied for power.'