Vous êtes sur la page 1sur 11

ANSI/ANS-8.

17-2004

criticality safety criteria for the handling, storage, and transportation of LWR fuel outside reactors

--`,,,```-`-`,,`,,`,`,,`---

Copyright American Nuclear Society Provided by IHS under license with ANS No reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS

ANSI/ANS-8.17-2004

Not for Resale

ANSI/ANS-8.17-2004

American National Standard Criticality Safety Criteria for the Handling, Storage, and Transportation of LWR Fuel Outside Reactors

Secretariat American Nuclear Society Prepared by the American Nuclear Society Standards Committee Working Group ANS-8.17 Published by the American Nuclear Society 555 North Kensington Avenue La Grange Park, Illinois 60526 USA Approved November 3, 2004 by the American National Standards Institute, Inc.

--`,,,```-`-`,,`,,`,`,,`---

Copyright American Nuclear Society Provided by IHS under license with ANS No reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS

Not for Resale

American National Standard

Designation of this document as an American National Standard attests that the principles of openness and due process have been followed in the approval procedure and that a consensus of those directly and materially affected by the standard has been achieved. This standard was developed under procedures of the Standards Committee of the American Nuclear Society; these procedures are accredited by the American National Standards Institute, Inc., as meeting the criteria for American National Standards. The consensus committee that approved the standard was balanced to ensure that competent, concerned, and varied interests have had an opportunity to participate. An American National Standard is intended to aid industry, consumers, governmental agencies, and general interest groups. Its use is entirely voluntary. The existence of an American National Standard, in and of itself, does not preclude anyone from manufacturing, marketing, purchasing, or using products, processes, or procedures not conforming to the standard. By publication of this standard, the American Nuclear Society does not insure anyone utilizing the standard against liability allegedly arising from or after its use. The content of this standard ref lects acceptable practice at the time of its approval and publication. Changes, if any, occurring through developments in the state of the art, may be considered at the time that the standard is subjected to periodic review. It may be reaffirmed, revised, or withdrawn at any time in accordance with established procedures. Users of this standard are cautioned to determine the validity of copies in their possession and to establish that they are of the latest issue. The American Nuclear Society accepts no responsibility for interpretations of this standard made by any individual or by any ad hoc group of individuals. Requests for interpretation should be sent to the Standards Department at Society Headquarters. Action will be taken to provide appropriate response in accordance with established procedures that ensure consensus on the interpretation. Comments on this standard are encouraged and should be sent to Society Headquarters.

Published by

American Nuclear Society 555 North Kensington Avenue La Grange Park, Illinois 60526 USA

Copyright 2004 by American Nuclear Society. All rights reserved.


Any part of this standard may be quoted. Credit lines should read Extracted from American National Standard ANSI0ANS-8.17-2004 with permission of the publisher, the American Nuclear Society. Reproduction prohibited under copyright convention unless written permission is granted by the American Nuclear Society.

Printed in the United States of America

--`,,,```-`-`,,`,,`,`,,`---

Copyright American Nuclear Society Provided by IHS under license with ANS No reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS

Not for Resale

Foreword

~This foreword is not a part of American National Standard Criticality Safety Criteria for the Handling, Storage, and Transportation of LWR Fuel Outside Reactors, ANSI0 ANS-8.17-2004!

Criticality safety is an important component in a comprehensive safety assessment of a facility or an operation involving fissile materials. Designers, operators, and standards writing groups having concern with nonreactor nuclear facilities justifiably have occasion to address criticality safety. The present work was undertaken in the interest of an orderly presentation that embodies criticality safety principles and practices consistent with existing American Nuclear Society standards in the field of criticality safety, Subcommittee 8, Fissionable Materials Outside Reactors, of the ANS Standards Committee. The principal intent of the ANS-8.17 working group has been to provide basic requirements that address the criticality safety aspects of a facility or operation and that can be referenced or used in conjunction with other safety standards or regulations to address the total safety and operational requirements. This standard presents safety criteria applicable to the handling, storage, and transportation of light water reactor fuel rods and elements outside a reactor core. This revision of the standard was drafted by Working Group ANS-8.17 of Subcommittee 8 of the American Nuclear Society. The following members participated in the preparation:
B. O. Kidd ~Chair!, BWX Technologies, Inc.
D. B. Lancaster, NuclearConsultants.com C. D. Manning, Framatome ANP C. V. Parks, Oak Ridge National Laboratory S. E. Turner, Holtec International
--`,,,```-`-`,,`,,`,`,,`---

The membership of Subcommittee 8, Fissionable Materials Outside Reactors, at the time of draft preparation and approval was the following:
T. P. McLaughlin ~Chair!, Los Alamos National Laboratory J. A. Schlesser ~Secretary!, Westinghouse Safety Management Solutions, LLC
F. M. Alcorn, Individual E. D. Clayton, Individual A. S. Garcia, U.S. Department of Energy C. M. Hopper, Oak Ridge National Laboratory N. Ketzlach, Individual R. Kiyose, Individual R. A. Libby, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory W. G. Morrison, Individual D. A. Reed, Oak Ridge National Laboratory T. A. Reilly, Westinghouse Safety Management Solutions, LLC P. R. Thorne, BNFL H. Toffer, Fluor Federal Services G. E. Whitesides, Individual

The American National Standards Committee N16, Nuclear Criticality Safety, which reviewed and approved this standard in 2004, had the following membership:
C. M. Hopper ~Chair!, Oak Ridge National Laboratory R. Knief ~Vice-Chair!, Sandia National Laboratories
G. H. Bidinger, Individual R. D. Busch, University of New Mexico M. S. Chatterton, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission R. S. Eby, American Institute of Chemical Engineers C. D. Manning, Framatome ANP B. McLeod, Institute of Nuclear Materials Management S. P. Murray, Health Physics Society

i
Copyright American Nuclear Society Provided by IHS under license with ANS No reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS Not for Resale

R. L. Reed, Washington Safety Management Solutions, LLC B. Rothleder, U.S. Department of Energy F. W. Sanders, Individual D. R. Smith, Individual R. G. Taylor, Individual J. T. Thomas, Individual R. M. Westfall, Oak Ridge National Laboratory

Copyright American Nuclear Society Provided by IHS under license with ANS No reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS

--`,,,```-`-`,,`,,`,`,,`---

ii
Not for Resale

Contents

Section

Page 1 1 1 1 2 3

1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 General Safety Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Criteria to Establish Subcriticality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Appendix Fuel Unit Handling, Storage, and Transportation: Criticality Safety Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Copyright American Nuclear Society Provided by IHS under license with ANS No reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS

--`,,,```-`-`,,`,,`,`,,`---

iii
Not for Resale

Criticality Safety Criteria for the Handling, Storage, and Transportation of LWR Fuel Outside Reactors
1 Introduction
The potential for criticality accidents during the handling, storage, and transportation of fuel for nuclear reactors represents a health and safety risk to personnel involved in these activities, as well as to the general public. Appropriate design of equipment and facilities, handling procedures, and personnel training can minimize this risk. While American National Standard Nuclear Criticality Safety in Operations with Fissionable Materials Outside Reactors, ANSI0 ANS-8.1-1998 @1# ,1! provides general criteria for assurance of criticality safety, this standard provides additional guidance applicable to handling, storage, and transportation of light water reactor ~LWR! nuclear fuel units in any phase of the fuel cycle outside the reactor core. nor a recommendation. In order to conform with this standard, all operations shall be performed in accordance with its requirements but not necessarily with its recommendations. When recommendations are not implemented, justification should be documented. 3.3 Glossary of Terms

controlled parameter: A parameter that is kept within specified limits. fuel rod: A long slender column of material containing fissile nuclides, normally encapsulated by metallic tubing. fuel unit: The fundamental item to be handled, stored, or transported. Examples include an assembly of fuel rods, canned spent fuel, or consolidated fuel rods. independent assessment: A review of a criticality safety evaluation by a competent individual ~ s ! , other than the originator, that confirms the adequacy of the evaluation. The reviewer ~s! may be from the same organization as the originator.

Scope

This standard provides nuclear criticality safety criteria for the handling, storage, and transportation of LWR fuel rods and units outside reactor cores.

4 3
3.1

General Safety Criteria

Definitions
Limitations

The definitions given below are of a restricted nature for the purpose of this standard. Other specialized terms are defined in Glossary of Terms in Nuclear Science and Technology @2# . 3.2 Shall, Should, and May

4.1 General administrative and technical practices are contained in American National Standards ANSI0ANS-8.1-1998 @1# and ANSI0ANS8.19-1996 @3# . 4.2 Methods used to calculate the effective multiplication factor shall be validated in accordance with ANSI0ANS-8.1-1998 @1# . 4.3 Guidance to determine the need for and use of criticality alarms for personnel protection is contained in American National Standard Criticality Accident Alarm System, ANSI0 ANS-8.3-1997 @4# .

The word shall is used to denote a requirement; the word should is used to denote a recommendation; and the word may is used to denote permission, neither a requirement
1! Numbers

in brackets refer to corresponding numbers in Section 6, References.


--`,,,```-`-`,,`,,`,`,,`---

1
Not for Resale

Copyright American Nuclear Society Provided by IHS under license with ANS No reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS

American National Standard ANSI0ANS-8.17-2004

4.4 Prior to first use of, or before implementing changes to, any operation or system involving handling, storage, or transportation of fuel units or rods, a criticality safety evaluation shall be performed for all normal and credible abnormal conditions 2! to determine that the entire operation or system will be subcritical based on the criteria contained in section 5. 4.5 The criticality safety evaluation shall determine and explicitly identify the controlled parameters and their associated design and operating limits upon which nuclear criticality safety depends. The effect of changes in these parameters, or in the conditions to which they apply, shall be documented. 4.6 The criticality safety evaluation shall be documented with sufficient detail, clarity, and lack of ambiguity to allow independent review and confirmation of results. 4.7 Prior to commencing an operation, there shall be an independent assessment that confirms the adequacy of the evaluation required by 4.4. 4.8 Prior to commencing operation, the operating organization shall verify that the configurations and conditions at the time of operation conform with the design and operating limits specified in 4.5. 4.9 Reliance may be placed on neutronabsorbing materials, such as gadolinium and boron, that are incorporated in the fuel material itself, incorporated in structures or equipment, or included within solutions integral to the structures or equipment. However, when reliance is placed on neutron-absorbing materials, control shall be exercised to ensure their continued presence with the intended configurations, distributions, and concentrations. Extraordinary care should be taken with solutions of absorbers because of the difficulty of exercising such control and with fuel units containing burnable poison to identify the maximum reactivity condition to be considered. Guidance for the use of fixed neutron absorbers is contained in American National Standard ANSI0 ANS-8.21-1995 @5# and for the use of soluble neutron absorbers is contained in American National Standard ANSI0ANS-8.14-2004 @6# .
2!

4.10 In performing the criticality safety evaluation, the fuel characteristics ~e.g., material compositions, geometry, temperature! that affect reactivity shall be chosen from the range of credible values such that the maximum neutron multiplication factor of the system is obtained. Credit may be taken for fuel burnup by establishing a maximum fuel unit reactivity and assuring that each fuel unit has a reactivity no greater than the maximum established reactivity. Assurance that the reactivity limit is not exceeded may be provided by ~1! a measurement that can be related to the reactivity or ~2! an analysis and verification of the exposure history of each fuel unit. Consideration shall be given to the axial distribution of burnup in the fuel unit. 4.11 The fuel unit and fuel rods should be handled, stored, and transported in a manner providing a sufficient factor of safety to require at least two unlikely, independent, and concurrent changes in conditions before a criticality accident is possible.

5 Criteria to Establish Subcriticality


5.1 Where methods of analysis are used to predict neutron multiplication factors, the calculated multiplication factor k p shall be equal to or less than an established allowable neutron multiplication factor; i.e., kp kc kp kc km , where: k p is the calculated multiplication factor k eff of the system being evaluated for all normal or credible abnormal conditions or events; k c is the mean k eff that results from the calculation of the benchmark criticality experiments using a particular calculational method. The criticality experiments used as benchmarks in computing k c should have physical compositions, configurations, and nuclear characteristics ~including ref lectors! similar to those of the system being evaluated. If the system being evaluated has param-

Examples of conditions that may be appropriate for consideration are given in the Appendix.
--`,,,```-`-`,,`,,`,`,,`---

Copyright American Nuclear Society Provided by IHS under license with ANS No reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS

Not for Resale

American National Standard ANSI0ANS-8.17-2004

eter ~s! beyond the area of applicability established by the benchmark criticality experiments, then the area of applicability may be extended by using trends in the calculated values of k c with the parameter ~s!. For large extensions, the use of trends should be supplemented by use of other calculational methods. See ANSI0ANS-8.1-1998 @1# for further guidance on the area of applicability and extension beyond the area of applicability.3! k p is an allowance for

5.3 Appropriate experimental data or data derived from experiments, with an allowance adequate to ensure subcriticality, may be used directly. 5.4 In situ measurements performed in accordance with American National Standard Safety in Conducting Subcritical Neutron-Multiplication Measurements In Situ, ANSI0ANS-8.6-1983 @7# may be used to confirm subcriticality.

Copyright American Nuclear Society Provided by IHS under license with ANS No reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS

--`,,,```-`-`,,`,,`,`,,`---

6
@1#

References
ANSI0ANS-8.1-1998: Nuclear Criticality Safety in Operations with Fissionable Materials Outside Reactors, American Nuclear Society, La Grange Park, Illinois. Glossary of Terms in Nuclear Science and Technology, American Nuclear Society, La Grange Park, Illinois ~1986!. ANSI 0 ANS-8.19-1996: Administrative Practices for Nuclear Criticality Safety, American Nuclear Society, La Grange Park, Illinois.

statistical or convergence uncertainties, or both, in the computation of kp ; material and fabrication tolerances; uncertainties due to limitations in the geometric or material representations used in the computational method; @2#

@3#

k c is a margin for uncertainty in k c that includes allowance for

uncertainties in the critical experiments; statistical or convergence uncertainties, or both, in the computation of k c ; uncertainties due to extrapolation of k c outside the range of experimental data; uncertainties due to limitations in the geometrical or material representations used in the computational method.

@4# ANSI0ANS-8.3-1997;R2003: Criticality Accident Alarm System, American Nuclear Society, La Grange Park, Illinois. @5# ANSI0ANS-8.21-1995;R2001: Use of Fixed Neutron Absorbers in Nuclear Facilities Outside Reactors, American Nuclear Society, La Grange Park, Illinois.

k m is an arbitrary margin to ensure the subcriticality of k p . The various uncertainties may be combined statistically if they are independent. In this situation the correlation would become
2 2 10 2 kc ! km . kp kc ~ kp

@6# ANSI0ANS-8.14-2004: Use of Soluble Neutron Absorbers in Nuclear Facilities Outside Reactors, American Nuclear Society, La Grange Park, Illinois. @7# ANSI0ANS-8.6-1983;R1988;R1995;R2001: Safety in Conducting Subcritical NeutronMultiplication Measurements In Situ, American Nuclear Society, La Grange Park, Illinois.

5.2 Methods that do not directly yield k eff but whose validity has been established in accordance with ANSI0ANS-8.1-1998 @l# may be used to ensure subcriticality.
3!

When the preceding American National Standards referred to in this document are superseded by a revision approved by the American National Standards Institute, Inc., the revision shall apply.

When the benchmark k eff value does not equal 1.0, then a normalized k eff should be used to establish trends and extensions to the area of applicability.

3
Not for Resale

American National Standard ANSI0ANS-8.17-2004


--`,,,```-`-`,,`,,`,`,,`---

Appendix
~This Appendix is not a part of American National Standard Criticality Safety Criteria for the Handling, Storage, and Transportation of LWR Fuel Outside Reactors, ANSI0ANS-8.17-2004, but is included for information purposes only.!

FUEL UNIT HANDLING, STORAGE, AND TRANSPORTATION: CRITICALITY SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS


Fuel design parameters, storage arrangement dimensions, fuel-handling procedures, and moderation and ref lection conditions are selected in performing criticality safety evaluations to assure consideration of the most reactive credible conditions. Section 4.4 requires that consideration be given to normal and credible abnormal conditions and to related uncertainties, including design tolerances, associated with controlled parameters. Representative parameters and conditions are listed as follows.

A.l

Fuel Rod Parameters


fissile material content, form, density, distribution, and nuclear properties; burnable poison content, density, and distribution ~CAUTION: The reactivity of irradiated fuel containing burnable poisons may exceed that of unirradiated fuel!; fuel rod geometry including cladding material and thickness; other materials, and their distributions, within the fuel rod that may significantly affect reactivity.

A.2

Fuel Unit Configuration


number of fuel rods and their location within a fuel unit; dimensions of each fuel unit; number and location of absorber rods, water channels, and other materials that may be present.

A.3

Arrangement of Fuel Units


number and spacing of fuel units; fixed neutron absorbers between fuel units; materials of construction that maintain the configuration of fuel units ~nuclear properties, quantities, location, and dimensions!; changes in the arrangement of fuel units during loading and unloading operations.


A.4

Moderator Conditions
credible conditions of moderation within and between fuel units, e.g., inclusion of plastic shims or other moderating material ~fog, snow, mist, or personnel! for dry storage of fuel units, and water density and temperature including consideration of void formation by boiling for storage of fuel units under water.

4
Copyright American Nuclear Society Provided by IHS under license with ANS No reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS Not for Resale

American National Standard ANSI0ANS-8.17-2004

A.5

Reflector and Interaction Conditions


ref lector composition, configuration, and location; interaction with other fissile material; consideration for changes caused by fuel handling during loading and unloading operations.


A.6

Abnormal and Accident Conditions Including


consequences of seismic events, hydrogen detonations, or fires; abnormal fuel unit location ~e.g., wrong enrichment in wrong location!; geometric deformations resulting from fuel or cask drop accidents, or from tipping during rack transfer; credible accident conditions that could result in loss of absorber material or changes in moderation, geometry, or ref lection; for off-site transportation, abnormal conditions that could credibly exist following the hypothetical accident test sequence defined in Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 71, Packaging of Radioactive Material for Transport and Transportation of Radioactive Material Under Certain Conditions, Appendix B, Hypothetical Accident Conditions ~available from the U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402!.

5
Copyright American Nuclear Society Provided by IHS under license with ANS No reproduction or networking permitted without license from IHS Not for Resale

--`,,,```-`-`,,`,,`,`,,`---