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MURO [236 SCRA 505, September 19, 1994] the doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the courts. The power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by the courts with caution; care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and reasonable doubt on the subject should be resolved in the negative F !t"# The state prosecutors who are members of the DOJ Panel of Prosecution filed a complaint against respondent Judge Muro on the ground of ignorance of the law, grave misconduct and violation of the provisions in the Code of Judicial Conduct. The case at bar involves the prosecution of the charges against !melda Marcos in violation of the Central "an# $oreign %&change 'estriction in the Central "an# Circular ()*. The respondent +udge dismissed all cases solel, on the basis of the report published from the - newspapers, which the +udge believes to be reputable and of national circulation, that the Pres. of the Philippines lifted all foreign e&change restrictions. The respondent.s decision was founded on his belief that the reported announcement of the %&ecutive Department in the newspaper in effect repealed the C" ()* and thereb, divested the court of its +urisdiction to further hear the pending case thus motu propio dismissed the case. /e further contends that the announcement of the President as published in the newspaper has made such fact a public #nowledge that is sufficient for the +udge to ta#e +udicial notice which is discretionar, on his part. The complainants contend that the respondent +udge erred in ta#ing +udicial notice on matters he purported to be a public #nowledge based merel, on the account of the newspaper publication that the Pres. has lifted the foreign e&change restriction. !t was also an act of ine&cusable ignorant of the law not to accord due process to the prosecutors who were alread, at the stage of presenting evidence thereb, depriving the government the right to be heard. The +udge also e&ercised grave abuse of discretion b, ta#ing +udicial notice on the published statement of the Pres. !n the newspaper which is a matter that has not ,et been officiall, in force and effect of the law. $""%e# 0hether or not the respondent +udge committed grave abuse of discretion in ta#ing +udicial notice on the statement of the president lifting the foreign e&change restriction published in the newspaper as basis for dismissing the case1 R%&'()# The 2upreme Court held the respondent +udge guilt, for gross ignorance of the law. !t cannot comprehend his assertion that there is no need to wait for the publication of the circular no. 343 which is the basis of the President.s announcement in the newspaper, believing that the public announcement is absolute and without 5ualification and is immediatel, effective and such matter becomes a public #nowledge which he can ta#e a +udicial notice upon in his discretion. !t is a mandator, re5uirement that a new law should be published for 4 da,s in a newspaper of general circulation before its effectivit,. 0hen the President.s statement was published in the newspaper, the respondent admitted of not having seen the official te&t of C" circular 343 thus it was premature for him to ta#e +udicial notice on this matter which is merel, based on his personal #nowledge and is not based on the public #nowledge that the law re5uires for the court to ta#e +udicial notice of. $or the court to ta#e +udicial notice, three material re5uisites should be present6 7 8 the matter must be one of common and general #nowledge9

7-8 it must be well and authoritativel, settled and not doubtful or uncertain9 738 it must be #nown to be within the limits of the +urisdiction of the court. The fact that should be assumed as +udiciall, #nown must be on such notoriet, that such fact cannot be disputed. Judicial notice is not +udicial #nowledge where the personal #nowledge of the +udge does not amount to the +udicial notice of the court. The common #nowledge contemplated b, the law where the court can ta#e +udicial notice must come from the #nowledge of men generall, in the course of ordinar, e&periences that are accepted as true and one that involves un5uestioned demonstration. The court ruled that the information he obtained from the newspaper is one of hearsa, evidence. The +udge erred in ta#ing cogni:ant of a law that was not ,et in force and ordered the dismissal of the case without giving the prosecution the right to be heard and of due process. The court ordered for the dismissal of the +udge from service for gross ignorance of the law and grave abuse of discretion for dismissing the case motu proprio and for erring in e&ercising his discretion to ta#e +udicial notice on matters that are hearsa, and groundless with a reminder the power to ta#e +udicial notice is to be e&ercised b, the courts with caution at all times.