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Mexico Oil Cooperation Aff/Neg

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AFF ..................................................................................................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined. 1ac ....................................................................................................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined. inherency ....................................................................................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined. stability ........................................................................................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined. Oil spills ......................................................................................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined. US-mexico relations .................................................................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined. solvency ......................................................................................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined. 2ac extensions ................................................................................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined. 2ac add-on: Latin American Instability .................................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined. 2ac add-on: relatons k2 cybersecurity ...................................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined. 2ac add-on: relations k2 terrorism ............................................................................................ Error! Bookmark not defined. 2ac add on: energy security ........................................................................................................ Error! Bookmark not defined. Ext: relations k2 econ ................................................................................................................. Error! Bookmark not defined. Ext: Tba k2 energy security and rels ........................................................................................ Error! Bookmark not defined. Ext: oil k2 mexican economy .................................................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined. Ext: Mexican stability on the brink........................................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined. Ext: Mexican oil k2 us econ ....................................................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined. Ext: Oil k2 mexican stability ...................................................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined. ext: TBA k2 relations .................................................................................................................. Error! Bookmark not defined. Ext: relations k2 econ ................................................................................................................. Error! Bookmark not defined. NEG ........................................................................................................................................................................................................... 4 China DA ................................................................................................................................................................................................... 5 1nc .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... 6 Uniqueness - mexico ......................................................................................................................................................................... 10 Uniqueness - mexico ......................................................................................................................................................................... 11 Uniqueness - mexico ......................................................................................................................................................................... 12 uniqueness ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 13 Uniqueness/link ................................................................................................................................................................................. 14 link unconditional engagement .................................................................................................................................................... 15 Link unconditional engagement .................................................................................................................................................. 17 Link latin america ........................................................................................................................................................................... 18 Link Latin America ........................................................................................................................................................................ 19 Link latin america ........................................................................................................................................................................... 20 Link latin america ........................................................................................................................................................................... 21 Link latin American oil .................................................................................................................................................................. 22 Link latin American oil .................................................................................................................................................................. 23 link latin American oil ................................................................................................................................................................... 24 link mexico oil ................................................................................................................................................................................. 25 link - mexico oil.................................................................................................................................................................................. 26 link mexico ...................................................................................................................................................................................... 27 Link - oil .............................................................................................................................................................................................. 28 link magnifier perception .............................................................................................................................................................. 29 Link/internal link - mexico .............................................................................................................................................................. 30 Link/internal link energy zero sum* ........................................................................................................................................... 31 internal link oil key ......................................................................................................................................................................... 32 Internal link oil war ........................................................................................................................................................................ 33 Internal link oil war ........................................................................................................................................................................ 34 internal link oil conflict ................................................................................................................................................................. 35 internal link energy conflict .......................................................................................................................................................... 36 Impact China economy ................................................................................................................................................................. 37 impact china economy - key to global ........................................................................................................................................ 39 Impact china economy nuclear war ......................................................................................................................................... 41 impact narcoterrorism ................................................................................................................................................................... 42 impact energy conflict ................................................................................................................................................................... 43 impact us econ ................................................................................................................................................................................ 44 impact latin American econ .......................................................................................................................................................... 45 impact us-china relations .............................................................................................................................................................. 46

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impact sphere of influence ........................................................................................................................................................... 48 impact ccp instability ..................................................................................................................................................................... 50 impact chinese expansion ............................................................................................................................................................. 51 AT heg impact turn ........................................................................................................................................................................... 52 AT heg impact turn ........................................................................................................................................................................... 53 AT heg impact turn ........................................................................................................................................................................... 54 AT heg impact turn ........................................................................................................................................................................... 55 2ac defense ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 56 2ac impact turn - heg ........................................................................................................................................................................ 59 2ac impact turn - terrorism .............................................................................................................................................................. 60 2ac impact turn china-taiwan war ................................................................................................................................................ 62 2ac impact turn latin American econ .......................................................................................................................................... 64 2ac impact turn energy security ................................................................................................................................................... 65 2ac impact turn latin America instability .................................................................................................................................... 67 Ext china Taiwan war ....................................................................................................................................................................... 69 Ext heg/trade ..................................................................................................................................................................................... 71 Ext heg/china war ............................................................................................................................................................................. 72 Ext impact turn magnifier/spills over ............................................................................................................................................ 73 Ext impact turn prefer our ev ...................................................................................................................................................... 74 Ext link defense ................................................................................................................................................................................. 75 At ccp instability ................................................................................................................................................................................ 76 At china-taiwan war ........................................................................................................................................................................... 77 At chinese economy .......................................................................................................................................................................... 78 At us-china relations.......................................................................................................................................................................... 79 no link cuba ..................................................................................................................................................................................... 80 K of the DA ....................................................................................................................................................................................... 81 Counterplan ............................................................................................................................................................................................. 82 1nc - cp ................................................................................................................................................................................................ 83 Ext: Pemex privat k2 mexican oil ................................................................................................................................................... 84 Ext: Privat solves ............................................................................................................................................................................... 86 Ext: Privat k2 mexican econ ............................................................................................................................................................ 88 2ac cp card: causes instability .......................................................................................................................................................... 90 2ac cp card: affs a prerequisite ....................................................................................................................................................... 92 2ac cp card: regulations take it out ................................................................................................................................................. 93 case defense ............................................................................................................................................................................................. 94 1nc relations adv ................................................................................................................................................................................ 95 1nc instability adv .............................................................................................................................................................................. 98 1nc oil spills adv ............................................................................................................................................................................... 102 At terrorism add-on......................................................................................................................................................................... 105 At latin American instability add-on ............................................................................................................................................ 106 At cybersecurity add-on .................................................................................................................................................................. 107 At energy security add-on .............................................................................................................................................................. 108

Mexico Oil Cooperation Aff/Neg

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Mexico Oil Cooperation Aff/Neg

UTNIF 2013

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NEG

Mexico Oil Cooperation Aff/Neg

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China DA

Mexico Oil Cooperation Aff/Neg

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1nc
China is increasing investment in Mexican oil to sustain its economy China wants to crowd the US out of the market Knowland 6/10/13 [Don, writer for The World Socialist Web Site, published by the International Committee of the
Fourth International, the leadership of the world socialist movement, Chinas president visits Mexico and Central America seeking economic ties]

Chinas new president, Xi Jinping, traveled to Trinidad and Tobago, Costa Rica and then Mexico last week, on
the eve of his weekend meeting in California with US President Barack Obama. Xis trip comes just a month after Obamas own visit in early May to Mexico and to Central America. Xi arrived in Trinidad just as US Vice President Joe Biden finished a six-day trip to Colombia, Trinidad and Brazil aimed at shoring up US economic interests in the region. Xis trip is part of a stiffening response by China to US

attempts to undercut Chinese efforts to assure itself worldwide access to critical mineral resources, and to encircle China under the guise of its pivot to Asia policy. There the US has stoked Japan, the Philippines and

Vietnam into increasingly abrasive relations with China over competing claims to various islands in the oil and gas-rich East China and South China Seas. China wants to remind the US that just as the US has influence in regions close to China, China too has

rising influence in the Americas, according to Matt Ferchen, a scholar at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy in Beijing. Past Chinese presidents were deferential to the US, making reference to Latin America as Washingtons backyard, as US Secretary of State John Kerry himself recently called it in testimony in April before the US Congress. But Xis Latin America trip, coming early in his presidency, shows little concern for American reaction, Evan Ellis, a professor at the National Defense University in Washington, told Bloomberg News. China had already invested heavily in South America in recent years, striking major trade deals with the regions governments. Beginning in 2009, it supplanted the US as the number one trading partner of Brazil, Latin Americas foremost economy, as well as its number one source of foreign direct investment. In the decade spanning 2000 to
2010, trade between China and Latin America as a whole increased 1,500 percent. By 2010, it had risen to $261.2 billion, gaining steadily on US-Latin American trade, which amounted to $351 billion last year. Between 2002 and 2011, Chinese foreign direct investment in the region rose 100-fold from $22.6 million to $22.7 billion. The areas where US capitalism has retained clear dominance, Mexico and Central

America, were the focus of Xis trip. Relations between China and Mexico have been tepid in the past, and they worsened after former

President Felipe Calderon hosted the Dalai Lama in 2011. More fundamentally, their economic relations have been unbalanced. In 2012 the value of Chinas exports to Mexico were ten times those of Mexico to China, $57 billion to $5.7 billion. Mexico exported to China copper and other

minerals, oil, cotton and car parts, and imported electronics, toys, plastics and furniture. Mexico and China also have been direct competitors in supplying the US market with manufactured goods. Mexican businessmen have long felt threatened by China undercutting them as a cheap labor platform, particularly in electronic and consumer products industries. A decade ago Mexicos average labor costs were nearly three times higher than Chinas. Recently that labor-cost differential has narrowed sharply, eating into Chinese cost advantage, so Mexico has regained some US market share. According to at least one report this year, hourly wages in Mexico are now lower than in China. Mexican companies still complain that Chinese workplace rules on flexibility, lower quality control and lack of respect for intellectual property rights continue to permit unfair competition. Mexicos new president, Enrique Pea Nieto, visited China two months ago, seeking to change this state of affairs. The

reciprocal visit by Xi this week was an unusually quick diplomatic follow-up. Upon his arrival, Xi said that he wanted to help with Mexicos huge trade deficit. This means oil, which China needs to fuel its economy and the cars of its middle class. Access to strategic raw materials is key to understanding the dynamic of relations with China, said Hugo Beteta, director for Mexico and Central America of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. Clearly there is an interest by China in Mexican oil. China is the principal consumer of coal, gas, oil, of secondary industries like cement, steel, concrete, said Juan Carlos Rivera, director of Mexicos Center for Business with Asia at the private Monterrey Technological Institute. Evidently (China) is looking to satisfy their market needs. Not coincidentally, Xis visit to Mexico comes just as the Mexican government is bent on opening up the state oil company Petroleos Mexicanos, or Pemex, to private and foreign investment in order to stem decreasing production by funding deepwater drilling. Pea Nieto will soon present an energy reform bill to the Mexican Congress allowing that. Of the roughly 2.5 million barrels of crude a day that Pemex presently produces, about 1.2 million are exported. Some 75 percent of those exports go to the US, but only 7 percent to the Far East, including China. China is looking for much more. During Pea Nietos April visit to China, Pemex signed its first long-term contract with a Chinese company, agreeing to ship 30,000 barrels a day to the state oil company Sinopec. This week Pemex said the ExportImport Bank of China would provide it with a $1 billion credit line to buy ships and offshore equipment. It also
signed a memorandum of understanding with state-owned Xinxing Cathay International Group to explore ways to work together on pipelines. For its part, Mexico is looking to diversify its trade and investment, which have long been dominated by the US. It also

recognizes Chinas rise as a geopolitical player far beyond Asia. In the new global geopolitical and economic map, China is, and I think it has arrived to stay, the worlds second economic power," Mexican vice minister of foreign affairs Carlos De Icaza sa id. Mexico has to

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understand and strengthen relations with a nation that has such great strategic value. In a speech before the Mexican Senate, Xi said the Sino-Mexican relationship stands before unprecedented opportunities. China is willing to work alongside Mexico to improve the strategic association between the two countries, Xi added. Xi also called on

the two countries to oppose protectionism and try to resolve trade disagreements through consultation. He and Pea Nieto agreed to end a dispute over Chinese textiles that had led to litigation. The Chinese sought to sign at least a dozen agreements in the fields of trade, energy, tourism (a huge Mexican industry), science and technology during Xis visit. All that was accomplished, however, were agreements to cooperate on commercial defense, and on access for Mexican tequila and Mexican pork to the Chinese market. Mexican Foreign Minister Jose Antonio Meade said it was too soon for a free-trade agreement between the two countries, perhaps reflecting caution as to the effect of courting China on Mexicos neighbor to the north. Mexico, along with the US and other Pacific Rim countries, but not China, is party to the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations, an effort to increase trade among the Americas, Asia and Australasia. Mexico is keen not to jeopardize those talks. Xi also visited Trinidad and Tobago, with which China has had diplomatic ties for almost 40 years. Trinidad is also a major trading partner in the Caribbean for China. Xis meetings in Trinidad were aimed at buying up liquified natural gas (LNG). Chinas LNG purchases rose 20 percent last year; it is eying Trinidads surplus now that the United States is shifting from Caribbean LNG imports to greater reliance on domestic shale gas extracts. During this phase of Xis trip, China utilized the checkbook diplomacy it has pursued in Africa. It promised $3 billion in concessionary loans for 10 Caribbean countries, whose leaders flew in to meet with Xi. Costa Rica is the only Central American country with diplomatic relations with China; the other Central American countries recognize Taiwan, a legacy of US dominance of the region. Xi ended his trip with a visit there with Costa Rican President Laura Chinchilla. The Chinese announced $2 billion in deals with Costa Rica, including $1.3 billion for joint construction of a refinery on the Caribbean coast, and hundreds of millions for a new highway. Chinchilla said her country was pursuing additional agreements on investment in clean energy and student exchanges. In

contrast to Chinas Xi, Obama, accomplished nothing concrete on the economic front during his May trip to the same region, and brought no investment dollars. Similarly, Bidens trip garnered only a vague accord to boost investment and
economic cooperation with 15 Caribbean nations, and a one-year free trade agreement with Colombia. The US offered no concrete plans for investment or economic aid. In contrast, according to a report published last year by Inter-American Dialogue, a Washington-based think tank,

China has made $75 billion in loan commitments in Latin America over the last six years, topping total lending by the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank combined. China is increasing its funding in the region just as the US has been pressured by its dwindling economic position to cut aid and investment. Confronted with a rising challenge to its longstanding economic hegemony, the US inevitably leans more heavily on military and intelligence pacts and training to assert its influence in the region.

US threats to Chinese oil acquisition in Latin America causes a new cold war Fergusson 12 [Robbie Murray, MS in China In The International Arena, The Chinese Challenge to the Monroe
Doctrine, http://www.e-ir.info/2012/07/23/does-chinese-growth-in-latin-america-threaten-american-interests/, 7/23]

The U.S has some reason to be concerned by the economic implications of Chinas resource drive in Latin America because while the United States has traditionally looked to Latin America as its source of numerous raw materials and a market for its finished products, China is fast replacing the United States in these roles. [37] The United States has no intention of being usurped in its role as chief beneficiary of the regions energy resources, but for every barrel of oil that China purchases from Latin America, there is potentially one less barrel available for the U.S [38] It is of course extremely premature to be using words such as usurped as Chinas involvement in the region is at a very early stage and its energy interests are not overly well defined, but already, Chinas total consumption of the five basic commodities grain, meat, oil, coal and steel has already surpassed that of the USA in all but oil, [39] leading many analysts such as Hutton to wonder how the global supply of energy can cope with the emergence of such a hungry economy without conflict over increasingly scarce resources. [40] The development of China and its interests in the region is therefore key. Roett & Paz argue that what matters most for Sino-Latin American energy relations is not where China is today but how it compares with its position in the world at the start of the twenty-first century and where it is likely to be in 2030. [41] Due to the triangular relationship between China, the U.S, and Latin America, any shift of the equilibrium towards China cannot fail to impact upon the United States. Bajpaee

moots the idea: While not a zero-sum game, growing inter-linkages and interdependence between China and Latin America is likely to come at the cost of the United States relations with its neighbours, which will only undermine U.S ability to access the regions energy resources. This will force the U.S to rely on energy resources from more remote and less stable regions, such as West Africa, the Caspian and the Middle East. [42] However, the

future of Sino-American relations with regard to energy relations is not purely Chinas responsibility America has a part to play too. Zweig suggests that if the U.S responds negatively to Chinese efforts to secure resources or improve Chinas energy security, the U.S will not be creating incentives that encourage China to behave responsibly. Energy disagreements, then, may indeed become a source of a new cold war. [43] It must surely be in both sides best interests to avoid such a scenario.

China has established an energy sphere of influence in Latin America US infringement makes military conflict likely

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Malik 6 (Dr. Mohan, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies professor, "CHINA'S GROWING INVOLVEMENT
IN LATIN AMERICA," PINR is an independent organization that utilizes open source intelligence to provide conflict analysis services in the context of international relations, 6-12-06, http://www.uyghuramerican.org/articles/300/1/Chinas-Growing-Involvement-in-Latin-America/Chinas-GrowingInvolvement-in-Latin-America.html)

With the United States preoccupied with Iraq and Afghanistan, Beijing has obviously been busy carving out a large sphere of influence for itself in Asia, Africa and Latin America. With the presence of China being felt everywhere, from the backwaters of the Amazon to mines in the Andes, U.S. dominance in its own backyard is no longer unquestioned or
unrivaled. Opinion is divided on whether China's economic engagement is guided only by commercial interests or is a ruse to divert attention from Beijing's geostrategic goals in the region. Some contend that the Chinese presence in Latin America marks the end of the Monroe Doctrine, while others are more skeptical. Over the long term, Chinese intentions in Latin America may not be as benign as some China-watchers suggest. Nor can China's expansion be equated with Japan's or Spain's interest in Latin America because of the highly competitive nature of the U.S.-China relationship. Beijing calculates that one of the consequences of the burgeoning Sino-Latin American trade and resource dependency will be a widening of the gap between U.S. and Latin American interests. As U.S. Deputy Assistant Defense Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs Roger Pardo-Maurer points out: "China has its own set of political, economic and military interests, requiring us to carefully distinguish between legitimate commercial initiatives and the possibility of political or diplomatic efforts to weaken the democratic alliances we have forged." While Beijing's forays do not indicate a seismic change in the balance of power within Latin America, the very presence of China does make U.S. diplomacy difficult. Increasingly, "the China

option" affords Latin American countries greater room for maneuver and an additional source of leverage vis--vis Washington. While the Chinese may not want to be drawn into Venezuela, Brazil or Cuba's problems with the United States, that does not mean that these countries will not play "the China card" in their relations with the United States.
Likewise, the revival of the old ideological debate over which political system -- Chinese authoritarianism or Western democracy -- delivers more people from poverty, and whether wealth or elections are a greater measure of freedom does not bode well for Washington's efforts to promote transparency and democracy. Beijing's strategic interests and unconditional investments prop up many authoritarian regimes, thereby undercutting Washington's ability to persuade them to change their behavior. Just as the United States can no longer take the Latin American countries' allegiances for granted, its access to the region's resources is also far from assured. Washington is increasingly concerned over Beijing's

efforts to "lock up" oil and mineral supplies with new ventures in Latin America, Africa, Central Asia and Russia, and the Middle East. Hong Kong-based Takungpao News recently quoted General Xiong Guangkai, the former PLA deputy chief of staff, as saying that "in the long term, the strategic race for the world's energy may result in regional tension and even trigger a military clash." In particular, Beijing's newly cultivated energy alliances with populist left-wing leaders in Latin America have caused alarm in Washington and prompted the dispatch in May 2006 of Thomas A. Shannon, Jr., assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere affairs, to hold first-ever talks with his Chinese counterpart on China's role in a region that some analysts fear could become a site for great power rivalry.

Oil war goes nuclear RT News 11 [US-China conflict: worldwide competition for oil?, http://rt.com/news/us-china-conflict-oil/]
Chinese jets have headed off an American spy plane over Taiwan, raising tensions between Beijing and Washington. But Conn Hallinan says the conflict is a worldwide competition, and both the US and China are out to secure oil resources. China has warned that relations with the US might become tense after two Chinese fighter jets intercepted a U2

reconnaissance plane over Taiwan, which China claims as its territory. In response, Beijing's Defense Ministry said the US must end such flights, as they have severely undermined mutual trust and remain a major obstacle to the development of military ties. However, US Admiral Michael Mullen, chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, has announced that America will continue to run reconnaissance missions near China s coastline despite the objections. But Conn Hallinan, of Foreign Policy in Focus says that this conflict is part of the worldwide

competition for energy resources between the number one and the number two energy users in the world. I think their [Chinese] anger is justified," Conn Hallinan told RT. The danger here is that people make mistakes and when mistakes get made between nuclear powers, that is something we all need to worry about. Mainly China is worried that the US could put its thumb on their energy resources. The South China Sea contains rich oil and gas reserves and some of the worlds most geo-strategically vital naval routes. "This is part of a worldwide competition. Right now the US is the number one user of energy in the world and China is number two. 80 per cent of Chinese energy supplies move by sea. They either move through the Straits of Hormuz, which is controlled by the American Fifth Fleet, or they move through the Straits of Malacca, which is controlled by the American Seventh Fleet, Hallinan said. They are concerned with keeping their sea lanes open. That is why they are so pushy about the South China Sea, he concluded.

Extinction The Straits Times, June 25, 2k (Regional Fallout: No One Gains in War Over Taiwan. Straits Times. Lexis)

THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If
Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such

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a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -- horror of horrors -- raise the possibility of a nuclear war . Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase . Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -- truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilization.

Mexico Oil Cooperation Aff/Neg

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Uniqueness - mexico
China is prioritizing engagement with Latin America - especially with Mexico AP 6/5/13 [Associated Press, Xi visits US, Latin America as leader of more confident China after decade of explosive
growth, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-06-05/world/39748386_1_trade-growth-beijing-china-s]
BEIJING President Xi Jinping meets his American counterpart, Barack Obama, this week after stops in the Caribbean and Latin America as the leader of a more confident China following a decade of explosive economic and trade growth. From Trinidad to Mexico City, Xi

presented Beijing as an important partner for developing countries and a source of markets and finance, handing out nearly $4 billion in loans and promising to boost imports. Chinas newfound self-assurance stems from an than the United States for 128 countries, while the U.S. was ahead in just 72, according to an Associated Press tally of export and

economic expansion that saw annual growth top 10 percent in six of the past 10 years. It passed Japan as the worlds second -biggest economy and rebounded quickly from the 2008 global crisis, which still has Western countries limping. By 2012, China was a bigger trading partner import data gathered by the International Monetary Fund. That is a reversal from six years ago, when the U.S. led in 127 countries, versus just 70 for China. Chinas quick rebound from the 2008 crisis on the strength of a multibillion-dollar stimulus helped to

reassure its own leaders about the strength of its system. There really were questions about whether the Chinese system worked
well, said Steve Tsang, director of the China Policy Institute at the University of Nottingham. But the financial crisis an d the sense that the Chinese were able to deal with it more effectively, at least until now, suggests to the Chinese leadership that Chinas system worked. One sign of

Chinas confidence may be Xis itinerary: He meets Obama on Friday and Saturday only after stops in Trinidad, Costa Rica and Mexico and does it in California, rather than pushing for a ceremony-laden White House encounter as previous Chinese leaders did. That suggests Beijing feels it no longer needs American help to burnish its image and wants to focus on practical matters, Tsang said. Xi Jinping is sending a clear signal that, Ive got other priorities that I want to attend to first, he said. Xis predecessors faced a more uncertain diplomatic

outlook. Jiang Zemin spent the 1990s guiding Beijing out of its diplomatic isolation following the 1989 crackdown on pro-democracy protesters in Tiananmen Square. Hu Jintao, who succeeded Jiang in 2002, oversaw efforts to win China a bigger role in the World Bank and other global bodies. Beijing also stepped up its presence in U.N. peacekeeping work after spending the 1980s and 90s following the late supreme leader Deng Xiaopings doctrine of keeping a low profile abroad. Xis visit to the Caribbean and Latin America highlights Chinas growing presence in

a region on the U.S. doorstep. Trade with China is smaller than that with the United States for much of the region, but is expanding faster an important element for governments that want to find future sources of growth. Over time, that might prompt emerging economies to see their interests more aligned with Beijing on trade, climate change importance to developing relations with the region. In Trinidad, Xi met leaders of nine Caribbean countries and showed off

and other global issues. The voices of emerging powers are getting louder, said Chen Yuanting, a Latin America specialist a t the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, an official think tank. Since the region is an important part of the emerging powers, China is attaching Chinas growing financial muscle, promising them loans totaling some $3 billion. We really welcomed that generosity, said Trinidadian Prime Minister Kamla Persad-Bissessar. The money kept flowing at Xis next stop in Costa Rica, where he promised a $900 million line of credit to finance the possible modernization of an oil refinery. Moving on to Mexico, Xi and President Enrique Pena Nieto said they would

take steps to move toward more balance in their trade. Mexico imported $57 billion in goods from China last year, while exporting only $5.7 billion back. With new leadership in China and in Mexico, I think this trip represents an effort on both sides to put the relationship on a new and more positive path, said Matt Ferchen, a Latin America specialist at Tsinghua
University in Beijing, in an email. Other Latin American countries such as Chile and Brazil have profited from selling iron ore, soybeans and copper to China, but Mexico competes with China as a manufacturer and, like the United States, runs a large trade deficit with Beijing. In a joint statement, Xi and Pena Nieto said Beijing had committed to open its markets to Mexican pork and tequila. Mexico, an oil

producer, also could benefit from booming Chinese energy demand.

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Uniqueness - mexico
China is increasing its influence in Mexico in an attempt to get oil and as a signal of strength to the US NYT 6/4/13 [Chinese President Makes Bridge-Building Trip to Mexico]
SAN CRISTOBAL DE LAS CASAS, Mexico President

Xi Jinping of China arrived in Mexico City on Tuesday for a three-day visit intended to smooth over relations that have long been prickly. China has moved forcefully to secure oil and other commodities in South America over the past decade. Mexico Latin Americas second-largest economy has played a different role

though, not supplying China but competing with it to export manufactured goods like electronics and clothing to the United States. President Xis visit to Mexico, coming only two months after President Enrique Pea Nieto of Mexico traveled to China, is an effort to recast the relationship under two new leaders. The trip underscores Chinas growing ties in the hemisphere. Before arriving in Mexico, President Xi visited Central America and the Caribbean, further securing his nations foothold there. In Trinidad and Tobago, he met with 10 Carib bean leaders and promised $3 billion in loans for projects in the region, according to Bloomberg News. Among the loans was one for $250 millio n to build a childrens hospital in Trinidad, the Caribbeans largest energy supplier. China has given billions in loans and aid to Caribbean nations to build stadiums, roads, ports and tourist resorts, and Mr. Xis visit came days after Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr. met with 15 regional leaders in Trinidad, drawing a sharp contrast about what the two countries had to offer the areas tiny economies. Mr. Biden announced no new initiatives, though he spoke about providing help for clean energy research and education and promised to dismantle remaining trade and investment barriers. On Sunday, Mr. Xi traveled to Costa Rica which has no diplomatic ties with Taiwan and promised almost $300 million in loans to finish building a highway. The trip sent a clear message to other Central American countries that by withdrawing their recognition of Taiwan they could get goodies too, Kevin P. Gallagher, a professor at Boston University, wrote in an e-mail. Latin American leaders have long complained that Washington

pays too little attention to the rest of the hemispheres concerns, and China has begun to take advantage of that perception. As Latin America and the Caribbean become less dependent on the United States, they have another economic ally, and that economic ally is a superpower, said S. Lynne Walker, the director of the China-Americas
program at the Institute of the Americas in California. Matt Ferchen, a scholar at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy in Beijing, suggested that President Xis itinerary may also be intended as a message to the United States. China wants to

remind the U.S. that just as the U.S. has influence in regions close to China, China too has rising influence in the Americas, he wrote in an e-mail. Analysts will be watching the trip closely for signs that Mexico and China are taking steps toward changing their frosty relationship. Mexicos government would like to narrow its large trade gap with China. Last year, Mexico imported $57 billion in goods from China and sent back only $5.7 billion in products, according to Mexicos Ministry of Economy. The two countries announced a series of agreements late Tuesday covering energy, trade and education. We agree on the
importance of balancing our trade and investment relationship, Mr. Pea Nieto said, noting promises from China to start by accepting more tequila and pork imports. China could also send a strong message by announcing investments in Mexican manufacturing, experts said, perhaps in the automobile industry. At least having the possibility of greater Chinese investment on the table might allow China and Mexico to move beyond their up-till-now quite dysfunctional and competitive relationship, Mr. Ferchen wrote. Still, Chinas interest in

natural resources leaves little doubt that it is looking at future oil deals in Mexico. In a symbolic move, Mexicos state-owned oil monopoly, Pemex, signed an agreement during Mr. Pea Nietos visit to China in April to ship 30,000 barrels a day to Sinopec, a state-owned company there.

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China and US are competing for influence in Mexico and China is ahead Ellis 6/6/13 [R. Evan Ellis is associate professor with the William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies,
China's New Backyard, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/06/06/china_s_new_backyard_latin_america]
For the past decade, Washington has looked with discomfort at China's growing interest in Latin America. But while Beijing's diplomats bulked up on their Spanish and Portuguese, most U.S. policymakers slept soundly, confident that the United States still held a dominant position in the minds of its southern neighbors. In April 2005, the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on

the Western Hemisphere held a hearing on China's influence in the hemisphere and concluded that the U.S. position in the Western Hemisphere was much stronger than China's and, moreover, that Beijing's economic engagement in the region did not present a security threat. But that was 2005. In late May of this year, when U.S. Vice President Joe Biden went to Latin America for a three-day, three-country tour, Beijing was hot on his heels.

Chinese President Xi Jinping arrived in Trinidad and Tobago just days after Biden left: Whereas Trinidad and Tobago's prime minister, Kamla PersadBissessar, characterized her discussions with Biden as "at times brutal," Xi's stop in Trinidad and Tobago included the unveiling of a children's hospital funded with $150 million from the Chinese government, discussion of energy projects, and meetings with seven Caribbean heads of state. Xi's

itinerary took him to Costa Rica and Mexico on June 4 to 6, but his shadow followed Biden all the way to Brazil. In Rio de Janeiro, Biden referred to a new "strategic partnership" between the United States and Brazil, yet his words' impact was undercut by the strategic partnership that Brazil has had with China since 1993 and the much-

publicized fact that China overtook the United States as Brazil's largest trading partner in 2009 (trade between China and Brazil exceeded $75 billion in 2012). It's not an accident that Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff made a state visit to China in April 2011, prior to paying one to the United States. Make no mistake: China is now a presence in the region. Xi's trip to Trinidad and Tobago is only the second visit by a Chinese president to the Caribbean -- his predecessor, Hu Jintao, visited communist Cuba in November 2008 -- but China and the Caribbean's economic and political ties have been growing rapidly. On this trip, Xi promised more than $3 billion in loans to 10 Caribbean countries and Costa Rica. Xi's choice of

three destinations near the United States, followed by a "shirt-sleeves" summit with U.S. President Barack Obama on June 7 and 8 at the Sunnylands resort in California, sends a subtle message that the new Chinese leadership seeks to engage the United States globally as an equal -- without the deference shown in the past to the United States in countries close to its borders. Ironically, it's the Latin American country closest to the United States where Xi might be able to make up the most ground. Mexican President Enrique Pea Nieto's engagement with the Chinese president, both at the April summit in Boao, China, and this week in Mexico City, allow him to differentiate himself from his pro-U.S. predecessor, Felipe Caldern. Similarly, Mexico's role in forming the Pacific Alliance, a new

subregional organization built around a group of four pro-market, pro-trade countries (Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru) allows Mexico to reassert a leadership role in the Americas, relatively independent of the United States.

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uniqueness
US is decreasing investment China filling in Munoz 6/9/13 [Heraldo, UN Assistant Secretary-General and UN Development Program Director for Latin
America and the Caribbean, The United States turns to an emerged Latin America, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/06/20136984021498867.html]

The United States is still the region's top foreign investor. In 2012, US exports to South and Central America plus the Caribbean totaled $205bn, compared with $110bn in exports to China. US exports to Mexico alone reached $216bn last year. But US exports to Latin America and the Caribbean have receded during the last decade. This vacuum is being filled by China, while India's
trade with the region is also growing substantially. The United States has become Brazil's second commercial partner after China. Bilateral trade between the countries stood at about $100bn but Vice President Biden said there is "no reason" why that number could not be $400-500bn.

China is edging out the US for economic influence in Latin America Global Post 6/4/13 [Xi flies to Mexico as China battles US for influence in Latin America]

When it comes to economic influence, China may be gaining the upper hand in Latin America. China is increasing its funding to the region just as the US has been coming under pressure to cut aid and investment. "If Im a Latin American leader, Im very happy because I now have more chips to play with," Kevin Gallagher, author of the 2010 book "The Dragon in the Room," about Chinas inroads in Latin America, told Bloomberg. "The onus is on the US to come up with a more flexible, attractive offer but thats not so easy because it doesnt have the deep pockets like it used to."

Latin America's growing economy makes for an attractive investment. The International Monetary Fund forecasts the regions ec onomies will expand 3.4 percent this year, almost three times the pace of growth in the developed world. Xi's tour of Trinidad, Costa Rica and Mexico are

setting the stage for his visit to California later this week, which will be his first face-to-face talks with Obama since taking office. That Xi's Latin America trip came so early into his presidency is a confident approach that shows little concern for American reaction, Evan Ellis, a professor at the National Defense University in Washington told Bloomberg. "In the past Chinese presidents were very deferential to the US., always making reference to Washingtons backyard," Ellis said. "You dont hear any of that from Xis team, though you dont find any threatening rhetoric either."

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Chinas influence is growing in Latin America and competes with US interests Cerna 11 [Michael, graduate student in International Policy Management at Kennesaw State University, China's
Growing Presence in Latin America: Implications for U.S. and Chinese Presence in the Region, China Research Center, a think-tank providing peer reviewed research on US-China relations]
Is China the preferred partner for Latin America? At this point, the definitive answer is no. However, the United States should not take its place in the region for granted. There is clear evidence of an increasingly symbiotic relationship with China throughout Latin

America. While the U.S. is the most dominant trade partner to the region as a whole, it is losing ground in key countries, namely Brazil, which is blossoming on the world stage and is emerging as the clear leader in the region. Increasing trade and investment can be beneficial for all, but the power that China can derive from its growing economic influence could bring increased political and ideological influence that the U.S. might find unnerving. China already has replaced the U.S. as the largest trading partner for Brazil and Chile, and is on pace to do the same in Peru and Venezuela. At the very least, this should cause the U.S. to pay more attention to its southern neighbors and take steps to make sure that China only benefits economically and not politically at the expense of the U.S. The world will be watching.

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China can only get an edge in Latin American markets because US investment is conditional Gallagher 6/11/13 [Kevin Gallagher is a professor of international relations at Boston University and a research
fellow at the Global Development and Environment Institute , US cannot take Latin America for granted, http://www.iol.co.za/business/opinion/columnists/us-cannot-take-latin-america-for-granted1.1530220#.UbdmJ2TwJOg]
serious competition ought to awaken ones creative juices in business, it

The administration of President Barack Obama and US media have made much ado about the US pivot to Asia. What has largely e scaped their attention, however, is that China has been lining up economic allies in the erstwhile backyard of the US. Well, just as

is time for the US to step up a suitable economic policy for Latin America before it is too late. The difference in approaches by the US and China were brought into focus last week when US Vice-President Joseph Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping made tours of Latin America. The USs principal offer to its Latin American neighbours is the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which offers Latin American and Asian nations access to the US market on the basis of three conditions: they must
deregulate their financial markets, adopt intellectual property provisions that give preference to US firms, and allow private US firms to directly sue governments of countries that sign up to the TPP for violating any of its conditions. Talk about a heavily conditioned offering.

So what is the Chinese approach? On his visit to the region, Chinas president offered more than $5.3 billion (R53bn) in financing, with few conditions attached, to its new-found Latin American friends. These offers will need to be confirmed, but according to press reports the Chinese have signed deals on this trip for: n $3bn in commitments to eight Caribbean countries for infrastructure and energy; n $1.3bn to Costa Rica in loans and lines of credit; and n A $1bn credit line from the Export-Import Bank of China to Mexico for its state-owned oil company. This financing comes on top of $86bn in financing already provided by China to Latin American governments since 2003. To put it into proper perspective, consider this. Since 2003, Chinas policy banks have provided more finance to Latin America than their counterparts at the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank and the US Export-Import Bank. If anything ought to awaken the US from its past slumber, that comparison ought to do it. Simply put, the US and the array of largely Western-dominated international financial institutions have been outgunned by Chinas financial muscle. Welcome to the brave new world! But its not just a matter of sheer numbers. Unlike US trade treaties or the finance from the international institutions largely under US control, China offers its loans with few strings attached. In a region that is understandably very sensitive to any notions of conditionality due to painful past experiences with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, China makes sure that its policy is not based on conditionalities. That said, the Chinese do not lack a strong
commercial focus. Often, the offer requires that Chinese firms are hired to conduct the bulk of the envisioned project work. In just a few years, China has become the number one (in the case of Brazil and Chile) or number two (for Peru and Mexico) trading partner. These are not just any countries. They are the most important economies in Latin America. Of course, the US is still the most important economic partner for the region overall. However, it cannot continue to take the region for granted. For too long, the US has relied on a rather imperial mechanism just

telling Latin America what it needs. Compare that with Chinas approach: it offers Latin America what it wants (in the form of financing and trade from China). When Obama took office, he and his team pledged to hit the reset button with the region and rethink its trade regime with Latin America. It has not worked out that way. So far, reset has essentially meant making the same old offer, but via new faces.

China is more appealing to Latin America because they dont condition trade deals Johnson 5 [Stephen, Senior Policy Analyst for Latin America in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign

Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Stud-ies, at The Heritage Foundation, Balancing China's Growing Influence in Latin America, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2005/10/balancing-chinas-growing-influence-in-latin-america]

Deals with few requirements. China can bar-gain on the spot without a lot of caveats. Its transactions are based on simple exchanges. Their leaders have broad authority to negotiate foreign deals without worrying about legislative oversight, the rule of law, or altruistic objec-tives. Unlike Western leaders, Chinese leaders represent state monopolies-which mesh well with Latin American government ownership or management of telecommunications, mining, and energy industries. They do not need to build up Latin American trade capacity to deal with diverse businesses.

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US unconditional engagement is key to out compete China in the region Johnson 5 [Stephen, Senior Policy Analyst for Latin America in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign

Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Stud-ies, at The Heritage Foundation, Balancing China's Growing Influence in Latin America, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2005/10/balancing-chinas-growing-influence-in-latin-america]

The United States and China have competing inter-ests in Latin America. Washington would like to see its hemispheric neighbors develop into stable, demo-cratic, prosperous trade partners that embrace the rule of law. Beijing sees the region as a source of raw materials, a market for manufactured goods, and a platform for power projection. U.S. interests probably coincide more with Latin American needs. In con-trast, China represents an opportunity to temper American
dominance with broader alliances. Regrettably, Chinese aid and commodity imports may buy time for state industries, powerful presi-dents, and influential oligarchs. Most of all, such commerce could delay needed reforms and indus-trialization that might lift Latin America's near majority underclass out of poverty. America's strength is competition, and it should influence the rules of the game in that

direction. As a good neighbor and in its own and Latin America's interests, the United States should: Accelerate free trade

agreements. Free trade agreements have been the hallmark of U.S. pol-icies toward the region since the 1990s. As an inducement, America should drop its agricul-tural and steel subsidies that dissuade potential partners and cost taxpayers money. Improved U.S. trade relations with Andean neighbors (and eventually Southern Cone countries) will open market access for both U.S. and Latin American enterprises and provide an outlet for industrial growth. Adopt more comprehensive relationships. Single-issue diplomacy that emphasizes U.S. interests, such as counternarcotics, leaves vacu-ums in other areas such as security assistance and trade capacity development that other powers can fill. Plan Colombia is working because the United States is helping Colombia to combat terrorism, expand public safety zones, strengthen institutions, reactivate the economy, and promote rural peace.[11] Cut

red tape on assistance. This policy should be followed to the greatest extent possible. Per-formance requirements are blunt instruments that do not cover every situation. Constraints such as annual certifications on counternarcot-ics cooperation and Article 98 letters that with-hold security assistance occasionally backfire by withdrawing support for allies in areas of mutual interest. If Congress considers such restrictions absolutely necessary, it should tai-lor them to suspend only economic aid that is not crucial to immediate U.S. interests.

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Latin American countries prefer Chinese investment because its unconditional Fergusson 12 [Robbie Murray, MS in China In The International Arena, The Chinese Challenge to the Monroe
Doctrine, http://www.e-ir.info/2012/07/23/does-chinese-growth-in-latin-america-threaten-american-interests/, 7/23]

China has many carrots to dangle in its pursuit of international influence, such as access to the worlds largest emerging market. A Congress report portrayed China as trying to project soft power by portraying its own system as an alternative model for economic development, one based on authoritarian governance and elite rule without the restrictions and demands that come with political liberalization, [80] but the inference that
China has any interest in the internal economic workings of its trading partners is ignorant of the depth of the peaceful rise, Chinas non interference policy and its new found ambivalence towards ideology as a source of kinship. A truer characterisation is that China has

attempted to exploit its no strings attached foreign aid stance and its ability to deploy state-owned assets to reap soft power advantages, [81] but even this ignores the fact that every nation-state attempts to reap soft power advantages, it is intrinsic to the nature of international politics. Political and cultural elements in Chinas burgeoning relationship w ith Latin America China has also emerged as a favoured political partner for Latin American countries, mostly because (as mentioned above) it has a no-strings approach to doing business. Its holistic approach has become an attractive alternative to traditional Western companies, which do not have a similar integrated package of carrots to offer a Chinese deal literally can mean an alternative economic lifeline, [82] because it offers a less bureaucratic alternative to American aid and political assistance.

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US engagement with Latin America trades-off with Chinese influence nations fear backlash from the US Ellis 12 [R. Evan, a professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the Center for
Hemispheric Defense Studies, with a research focus on Latin Americas relationships with external acto rs, including China, Russia, and Iran, The United States, Latin America and China: A Triangular Relationship?, Inter -American Dialogue, May]

The ability of the United States to serve as a market and a source of investment for Latin America has influenced the regions receptivity toward the PRC. The initial openness of the region to promises of investment and trade by Chinese President Hu Jintao came just after Latin America reached a historic low with regard to flows of investment from the United States and other sources.25 The 2007-2009 global financial crisis, which significantly impaired US purchases of Latin American exports and US credit to the region, strengthened the perceived importance of the PRC for Latin American governments, and Chinese commodity purchases and investments

emerged as one of the key factors helping these governments weather the crisis. Nonetheless, as noted earlier, while the PRC has occupied an important symbolic role as the largest and most visible source of new capital and markets, it has not been the only player to which Latin America has looked as the region seeks to engage globally. Attention also has been given to India and other emerging markets of Asia, as well as traditional players, such as the European Union, and actors such as Russia and Iran. At the political level, US engagement with Latin American

countries has impacted the ability of the PRC to develop military and other ties in the region. Although journalistic and academic accounts often suggest that the 19th century Monroe Doctrine continues to be pursued by contemporary US policymakers, with a presumed desire to keep China out of the region,26 official US policy has repeatedly met Chinese initiatives in the hemisphere with a cautiously welcoming tone.27 Nonetheless, Latin Americas own leadership has responded to Chinese initiatives with a view of how engagement with China could damage its relationship with the United States. Colombias close relationship with the United States, for example, made the military leadership of the country reluctant to procure major military items from the PRC.28 The same logic has also applied to countries such as Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia, for whom embracing the PRC politically and economically signaled displeasure with the United States. The degree to which a bad relationship with the United States has propelled a positive relationship with China has increasingly gone beyond symbolism. The desire of Venezuelan President Hugo Chvez to diversify away from sell F-16 fighter aircraft and components to Venezuela in 2006 prompted Venezuela to engage with China, and other countries, to procure military hardware. Similarly, Bolivia purchased Chinese K-8s after the United States blocked it from acquiring a comparable aircraft from the Czech Republic.30

Venezuelan dependence on the United States as the nations primary oil export market, for example, opened the door for massive loan -backed Chinese construction projects, the purchase of Chinese commercial goods and greatly expanded participation by Chinese oil companies.29 US refusal to

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US trade engagement with Latin America trades-off with Chinese influence Farnsworth 12 [Eric, vice-president of the Council of the Americas in WashingtonDC and from 1995 to 1998 was
senior adviser to the White House special envoy for the Americas, Memo to Washington: China's Growing Presence in Latin America, American Quarterly]
All of this lends itself to several policy options that require active consideration. For the first time in years, the U.S. faces a multifaceted rival in the region that requires a rethink of priorities, and the implementation of a true foreign policy (rather than development policy) agenda. The U.S.

must now contend for Latin America, recapturing the initiative in a region that, with Chinas engagement if not instigation, has begun to dismantle the previous U.S.-led consensus. In the near term the U.S. should ramp up education
and people-to-people exchanges, with private sector support. The administration should develop a common agenda with Brazil on issues like Chinese currency and global trade in agriculture that triangulates the developing BeijingBrasilia relationship. The U.S. should also intensify

public efforts to support democratic ideals, working with hemispheric allies including Mexico, Canada, Colombia,

and others to reinforce democracy consistent with the 10-year-old Inter-American Democratic Charter. Freedom of speech, freedom of the press and freedom of assembly are all increasingly at risk; open, universal access to the Internet could help support each of these, though more must be done to promote collective action in their defense. The U.S. should also promote the Organization of American States and work toward fundamental reforms to make it a more effective instrument to promote the broader agenda, including human rights. Current efforts by Brasilia, Caracas and others to build a new hemispheric architecture, insofar as they seek to undermine democratic and human rights norms and protections and seek to exclude the U.S. and Canada, should be resisted and denounced, by civil society, member governments and the United States. In this regard, the trade agenda partners into a more coherent group, and then working to build their economies through greater integration, for example, in the Asia-Pacific region, the U.S. would simultaneously be able to promote a trade and investment regime consistent with economic

remains one of the best tools that the U.S. has to promote a broader strategic agenda. By organizing existing free-trade competitiveness while also building a broader hemispheric consensus around democratic ideals that would implicitly highlight differences between the U.S. and China. Despite conventional wisdom, trade is not a dirty word in the hemisphere. In fact, recent scholarship has found that positive attitudes toward the U.S. are correlated with increased trade with the United States. One way for the U.S. to improve its regional standing would be to again promote the idea of a hemispheric trade area among willing partners. Given Chinas growing regional footprint, now is the time to promote such an initiative.6 The contrast is real. The hemisphere has a choice. Its time to acknowledge the stakes and get on with the important work of fighting for the soul of the hemisphere.

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Chinese and US influence in Latin America is zero-sum Ellis 6/7/13 [Dr. Evan Ellis is a professor at the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies in Washington, D.C. U.S. China Competition Heats Up as Chinese President Xi Tours Latin America]

The coincidence between this weeks Latin American trips by U.S. Vice President Joseph Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping highlight the undeclared competition between the U.S. and China in Latin America, and across the globe. The new competition is a struggle over the economic, legal, and political norms that will prevail as the global center of gravity shifts from the Atlantic to the Pacific in the course of the twenty-first century.

The U.S.-China competition is not a resurrection of the cold war, where the U.S. and Soviet Union actively promoted their respective concepts for a global order. Rather, it is an unintentional, yet inevitable struggle. Consistent with Chinas millennial history, the principal goal of PRC is to advance Chinese national power, wealth and security. Although the PRC does not seek to impose a new ideology on the world, the mercantilist way that it is promoting its economic development, combined with its lack of commitment to international norms that it did not create means that Chinas rise is wreaking havoc on the international system. Chinas rise is wreaking havoc on the international system. In Latin America, while many

governments and private interests have benefitted from the PRCs entry into the region, that same engagement has indirectly undermined a range of U.S. policy objectives there, including the promotion of democracy,
human rights, free trade, and the respect for contracts and rule of law.

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China perceives US aid to Latin America as a threat Ellis 10 [R. Evan Ellis is an Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the Center for Hemispheric Defense
Studies at the National Defense University, Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study, National Defense University, http://www.ndu.edu/press/chinese-soft-power-latin-america.html]
Blocking the Consolidation of U.S. Influence in the Region and Its Institutions. The

rise of China is intimately tied to the global economy through trade, financial, and information flows, each of which is highly dependent on global institutions and cooperation. Because of this, some within the PRC leadership see the country's sustained growth and development, and thus the stability of the regime, threatened if an actor such as the United States is able to limit that cooperation or block global institutions from supporting Chinese interests. In Latin America, China's attainment of observer status in the OAS
in 2004 and its acceptance into the IADB in 2009 were efforts to obtain a seat at the table in key regional institutions, and to keep them from being used "against" Chinese interests. In addition, the PRC has leveraged hopes of access to Chinese markets by Chile, Peru, and Costa Rica to

secure bilateral free trade agreements, whose practical effect is to move Latin America away from a U.S.-dominated trading block (the Free Trade Area of the Americas) in which the PRC would have been disadvantaged.

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China is suspicious of US attempts at challenging its economic engagement with Latin America they are in direct competition Fergusson 12 [Robbie Murray, MS in China In The International Arena, The Chinese Challenge to the Monroe
Doctrine, http://www.e-ir.info/2012/07/23/does-chinese-growth-in-latin-america-threaten-american-interests/, 7/23]

The U.S is still the most important economic partner for Latin America, but recently many in the region have felt neglected by Washington, whose focus on terrorism and the middle east and rigid U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America has left regional leaders with no option but to look for other patrons. Net foreign direct investment in Latin America has fallen from $78 billion in 2000 to $36 billion in 2003. [71] This economic neglect is exacerbating the political
grievances of the likes of Hugo Chavez, but the more moderate social democratic governments of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, recently extended the designation of Market Economy Status (MES) to China, something the U.S and the E.U have still denied. MES substantially diminishes the effect of anti-dumping legislation under World Trade Organization rules. Given the preponderance of non-market factors in the

P.R.C.s economy there can be little doubt that the three countries made their decision almost exclusively on the basis of Chinas growing political and economic influence. [72] This highlights the politico-economic independence of the U.S that Latin America is exerting. This is also symptomatic of a deep paradox in the American thinking about how to deal with China. On one hand, tying the nominally communist state to the world economy is expected to bring about economic maturity and gradual political change, but on the other, China is still a U.S rival whose influence China is competing against. The situation is reciprocal, as China views the U.S as [using] its economic leverage to exert political pressure on China, which is one reason that China seeks to diversify its economic relationships. [73] In this respect, the U.S has what it wants China is intrinsically tied to the ideals of the open market as a lower cost, less
politicized alternative to the United States.

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Close oil linkages to Latin America are necessary for Chinese energy security Economic Observer 13 [IN AMERICA'S BACKYARD: CHINA'S RISING INFLUENCE IN LATIN
AMERICA, http://worldcrunch.com/china-2.0/in-america-039-s-backyard-china-039-s-rising-influence-in-latinamerica/foreign-policy-trade-economy-investments-energy/c9s11647/, May 6]

Among the numerous needs of China, the demand for oil has always been the most powerful driving force. In the past 30 years, China has consumed one-third of the world's new oil production and become the world's second-largest oil importer. More than half of China's oil demand depends on imports, which increases the instability of its energy security. Diversification is inevitable. In this context, Latin America and its huge reserves and production capacity naturally became a destination for China. China must better protect its energy supply, and can't just play the simple role of consumer. It must also help solidify the important links of the petroleum industry supply chain. Indeed, the China National Petroleum Corporation frequently appears in Latin American countries, and Chinas investment and trade in the Latin American countries are also focused on its energy sector.

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Oil partnerships in Latin America counter Chinese involvement Vega 5 [Juan, 2006 J.D. candidate at the University of Minnesota Law School; M.B.A 2002, University of Florida; B.A.,
1994, Virginia Tech, China's Economic and Political Clout Grows in Latin America at the Expense of U.S. Interests, 14 Minn. J. Global Trade 377]

Trade relations between China and Latin America are growing. China is forming solid economic alliances and providing an attractive alternative to dealing with the United States. The United States cannot afford to lose economic or

political clout to China or it may lose Latin American support for important [*413] interests such as human rights, democracy, and a reliable oil supply. The United States must act to counter China's involvement by opting for bilateral trade agreements with sound social policies rather than by aggressively pursuing the FTAA. The United States should not hide behind the legal framework of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture because this increases Latin American resentment and encourages these countries to seek other trading partners like China. Instead,

the United States should understand and address the needs of each Latin American country and form partnerships in key sectors such as the oil industry. It must also work with Latin American governments to build the infrastructure necessary to support future, mutuallybeneficial free-trade agreements. Due to the factors outlined in this Note, such as increasing anti-U.S. sentiment, the growing popularity of leftist leaders, the emergence of China as an economic alternative to dealing with the United States, and a trend towards the nationalization of oil industries, the more aggressively the United States pushes for the FTAA without taking into account social policies in Latin America, the more precarious its future supply of regional oil becomes. More than
economic trade is at stake for the United States.

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China is investing heavily in Mexican oil Vega 5 [Juan, 2006 J.D. candidate at the University of Minnesota Law School; M.B.A 2002, University of Florida; B.A.,
1994, Virginia Tech, China's Economic and Political Clout Grows in Latin America at the Expense of U.S. Interests, 14 Minn. J. Global Trade 377]
2. China's Investments in Key Sectors in Latin America: Oil, Commodities, and Infrastructures China's

high demand for commodities has driven up the price of metals, agricultural products, and oil. n74 China is a major importer of raw materials, a plentiful commodity in Latin America. n75 This makes doing business with China very attractive to Latin American countries, especially Brazil. n76 For example, China's top steel maker, Baosteel, is considering a joint venture with Brazil's
Companhia Vale de Rio Doce, the world's top iron ore miner. n77 Latin America and the Caribbean provide over thirty percent of U.S. imported oil, which is more than all of the Middle Eastern countries combined. n78 But China is not just securing oil and commodities from Latin

American countries, it is becoming intimately involved in its extraction, transportation and infrastructure construction. n79 China's approach has been to show Latin American countries that, unlike the United States, it will treat them as sovereigns and as partners. In 2003, trade between China and Brazil totaled eight billion dollars, making China

Brazil's second-largest trading partner [*388] after the United States. n80 Brazil is China's largest trading partner in Latin America and annual bilateral trade has tripled since 2000. n81 Both countries recently took part in a workshop entitled "Brazil and China in the 21st Century," at which Chinese entrepreneurs sought Brazilian partners in economic sectors such as oil and agriculture. n82 China seeks to invest directly in Brazil's infrastructure, n83 where it has agreed to invest between $ 3 billion and $ 4 billion in railways and refineries. n84 With Argentina, China seeks not only bilateral trade agreements but also to become an investment partner, particularly in the infrastructure and transportation sectors. n85 To this end, Argentine President, Nestor Kirchner, and Chinese President, Hu Jintao, signed an agreement on June 28, 2004, which enables both countries to jointly begin construction of a railway and allows Argentina to export its citrus fruit to China. n86 Realizing that it must work with China because

it cannot compete against it, Mexico has decided to increase its exploration and production of oil to satisfy China's demand. n87 In February 2004, Mexico held a conference entitled "China's Influence on Mexico's Future," at which Mexico's ambassador to China [*389] announced that Mexico will increase its oil output to meet China's demands. n88

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link - mexico oil


The US consumes all of Mexican oil and China is moving in Vega 5 [Juan, 2006 J.D. candidate at the University of Minnesota Law School; M.B.A 2002, University of Florida; B.A.,
1994, Virginia Tech, China's Economic and Political Clout Grows in Latin America at the Expense of U.S. Interests , 14 Minn. J. Global Trade 377]

The United States should build on its existing relationships with oil-producing countries in Latin America. Like China, it should establish partnerships in order to secure oil for its future consumption beyond maximum current output. For example, the United States currently consumes all of the oil that Mexico exports. Given the energy shortages in the United States since [*399] 2000, U.S. companies should have partnered with Mexican firms to increase Mexico's oil production. Instead, China and Mexico are taking steps to jointly develop Mexico's oil industry so that Mexico can expand its production and export capacity. n148 Like China, the United States must invest in the infrastructure that will allow for successful joint exploration for oil and other commodities. Infrastructure projects provide a large incentive for Latin American countries to trade with China since these projects will improve their infrastructure, employ thousands of workers throughout their countries, and bring economic opportunities to small towns. By partnering with Latin American private and public oil firms, the United States could increase regional oil production and secure added capacity for itself. Moreover, by addressing Latin American infrastructure needs, the United States will bring jobs and other
economic opportunities to the region and in the process dissipate anti-U.S. sentiment in Latin America.

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link mexico
Mexico is super important to China Dominguez 6 [Jorge, Professor at Harvard University, Chinas Relations With Latin America: Shared Gains,
Asymmetric Hopes, Inter-American Dialogue, http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/china.pdf]

Mexico is one of Chinas strategic partners in Latin America. Its overall trade importance for China is second only to Brazils in this region. It is Chinas principal export market in Latin America. Compared to the four South American countries under discussion, China runs a substantial bilateral trade surplus with Mexico (see Tables 3 and 4). From 2000 to 2004, Chinas

exports to Mexico nearly quadrupled while its imports from Mexico quintupled. The dynamic of Sino-Mexican trade since 2000 is thus closest to that of Sino-Brazilian trade, except that Chinas bilateral trade surplus with Mexico also tripled in those years. China is also a significant foreign

direct investor in Mexico; in 2004, the stock of accumulated Chinese direct investment in Mexico exceeded $28 billion, with clothing manufacturing accounting for a third and plastic products nearly a fourth of the total.52 Mexico is the most important Latin American economy for Chinese investment, much of which is geared for sales throughout the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) area. China has good reasons to call Mexico a strategic partner.

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Link - oil
Competition over access to oil markets is zero sumif the U.S. increases its influence in Latin America, this directly limits Chinese market access Markman, 06 (Jon, editor of the independent investment newsletters Strategic Advantage and Trader's Advantage , How China is winning the oil race, 4/26, http://moneycentral.msn.com/content/P149330.asp) The United States is the world's greatest consumer of energy at present, but China is the world's fastest-growing consumer. That puts us in direct competition for any new sources of crude oil , natural gas, coal and uranium that materialize through exploration and discovery, not to mention any current sources that profit-seeking producers decide to put up for grabs. Increasingly, new energy sources that China is acquiring are in countries that Americans find distasteful. Many of them are in Africa, in
countries with horrific human-rights records such as Sudan, Chad and the Republic of the Congo. And much of the energy is controlled by rapacious despots in the Central Asian republic of Kazakhstan and in Southeast Asia's Myanmar. Energy acquisition is a zero-sum game in which there are winners and losers. Any new energy that China obtains for its fast-growing economy is unavailable to us forever. So you just have to wonder whether the United States' antipathy for dealing with the worst of the world's rogue states has led inexorably to $4-a-gallon gasoline this spring.

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link magnifier perception


Chinese perception of access to Latin America determines its actions Ellis 10 [R. Evan Ellis is an Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the Center for Hemispheric Defense
Studies at the National Defense University, Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study , National Defense University, http://www.ndu.edu/press/chinese-soft-power-latin-america.html]
In general, the bases of Chinese soft power differ from those of the United States, leading analysts to underestimate that power when they compare the PRC to the United States on those factors that are the sources of U.S. influence, such as the affinity of the world's youth for American music, media, and lifestyle, the widespread use of the English language in business and technology, or the number of elites who have learned their professions in U.S. institutions. It is also important to clarify that soft power is based on perceptions and emotion (that is, inferences), and not

necessarily on objective reality. Although China's current trade with and investment position in Latin America are still limited compared to those of the United States,3 its influence in the region is based not so much on the current size of those activities, but rather on hopes or fears in the region of what it could be in the future. Because perception drives soft power, the nature of the PRC impact on each country in Latin America is shaped by its particular situation, hopes, fears, and prevailing ideology. The "Bolivarian socialist" regime of Hugo Chvez in Venezuela sees China as a powerful ally in its crusade against Western "imperialism," while countries such as Peru, Chile, and Colombia view the PRC in more traditional terms as an important investor and trading partner within the context of global free market capitalism. The core of Chinese soft power in Latin America, as in the rest of the world, is the widespread perception that the PRC, because of its sustained high rates of economic growth and technology development, will present tremendous business opportunities in the future, and will be a power to be reckoned with globally. In general, this perception can be divided into seven areas:

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Link/internal link - mexico


The balance of power in Latin America is shifting towards China especially in Mexico and conflict could cause war Ellis 6/7/13 [Dr. Evan Ellis is a professor at the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies in Washington, D.C. U.S. China Competition Heats Up as Chinese President Xi Tours Latin America]
Chinas presence in the region also has a strategic significance beyond economics and policy objectives. The

critical posture by the U.S. Department of Defense regarding Chinese cyberattacks is a reminder that hostilities between the U.S. and China, while highly improbable and undesirable, are not unthinkable. In such a conflict, PRC-operated ports, airports, telecommunications infrastructure, and other parts of the Chinese commercial presence in Latin America represent potential assets in a global asymmetric warfare campaign against the United States. The comparison between the current trip to Latin America by Chinese president Xi, and that of U.S. Vice-president Biden highlights how much has changed in the 8 years since the April 2004 U.S. Congressional hearings on China and Latin America, when U.S. administration officials took comfort in the degree to which the U.S. dominated China in terms of influence in the region. In Rio de Janeiro, Biden talked about a U.S. strategic partnership with a Brazil that had already had one with the

PRC since 1993, with China-Brazil trade exceeding U.S.-Brazil trade by an expanding margin. Nor could it be overlooked that Brazilian President Rousseff had traveled to China before her first visit to the U.S. The Latin America agenda of Chinese President Xi Jinping also

illustrates the confidence of Chinas new 5th generation of leadership, with the choice of three destinations in close proximity to the United States illustrating how quickly the PRC has moved beyond the discourse of the previous administration respect for the U.S. backyard. The trip to Trinidad and Tobago is the first visit by a Chinese President

to the Caribbean, excepting his predecessors November 2008 trip to Cuba. The soft power of China in the Caribbean also was o n display, as seven full heads of state from across the region made the pilgrimage to Trinidad for an audience with President Xi, as he held court in the Marriott Hotel in Port of Spain. Of Xis three destinations, Mexico highlights how the Chinese and U.S. positions in the region are

interdependent. For Mexican President Pea Nieto, engagement with the PRC is a way to differentiate his regime from the policies of his predecessor Felipe Calderon, including not only the war against criminal organizations, but also Calderons closeness to the United States. Similarly, engagement with China through the Pacific alliance, Latin Americas hottest new sub-regional organization, shows Mexico progressively engaging with the new economy of the Pacific, while re-asserting a regional leadership role for Mexico, long a cornerstone of his Institutional
Revolutionary Party (PRI).

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Link/internal link energy zero sum*


US-China energy acquisition is zero-sum and causes competition and conflict Herberg 11 [Mikkal, Research Director, Energy Security Program The National Bureau of Asian Research, Chinas
Energy Rise and the Future of U.S.-China Energy Relations, New America Foundation, June 21]
Therefore, much despite its desirability, establishing something resembling an E-2 seems likely to be elusive.

will depend on the character of the energy relationship between China and the U.S. Nevertheless, China and the U.S. continue to have fundamentally different world views about energy security and how to achieve it. Beijings political leaders see energy security in distinctly national terms of establishing national control over energy resources and transportation routes. It is a decidedly 19th Century, mercantilist agenda. Maintaining adequate, reliable, and growing supplies of energy is viewed as indispensible for ensuring rapid economic growth, job creation, and social and political stability; i.e. the continued claim to legitimacy to rule by the Communist Party. Beijings political leaders have little faith in global energy markets to ensure adequate, reliable, and affordable energy to China: energy is simply too important to be left to the markets. Despite gradual market reforms, state control and intervention remain central to Chinas approach to energy security. Alternatively, the U.S. has built its conception of energy security over the past 40 years on an international energy structure based on integrated and transparent global markets, competitive pricing, private investment, private technological innovation, and multilateral cooperation. To paraphrase former President Bill Clinton, its the market, stupid. So each country views energy security through very different prisms. Moreover, the potential to view our energy security problems as shared challenges continues to be undermined by the chronic overlay of distrust at a strategic level. Beijings leaders suspect that the U.S. seeks to use its energy vulnerabilities as part of a broader effort to contain China. Criticism of the impact of Chinas overseas oil investments in pariah states and elsewhere is seen as a cynical ploy to weaken Chinas access to vital oil supplies. Pressure from Washington to This strategic suspicion casts a pall of a zero-sum atmosphere of national competition over energy access and security that is repeatedly reinforced by rhetoric on both sides. The 2005 episode when Chinas CNOOC
sought to acquire Unocal and was forced to withdraw its bid due to a firestorm of criticism of Chinas strategic energy intentions epitomiz ed the toxic mix of bilateral energy suspicions and mirror-imaging. Further, to the extent that the U.S. might encourage China to take a

reduce carbon emissions is seen as a thinly veiled attempt to slow Chinas economic growth and frustrate it from achieving it s rightful economic role in the world. Washington, on the other hand, sees Chinas energy expansion globally as built on predatory collaboration between Beijing and it s national oil champions to carve out privileged access to petroleum supplies, an approach that many believe undermines future U.S. access to needed supplies.

stronger leadership role on global energy security cooperation, it is still very unclear what role Beijing would want to take on the world energy stage. This is a corollary to the broader lack of clarity over what role Beijing wants to play in other

global issues, from currencies to nuclear proliferation. Beijing remains largely inwardly focused and driven by its domestic search for stability, economic development, and territorial integrity. Consistent with its traditional broader foreign policy of keeping a low profile, Beijing has shown relatively little serious interest in multilateral energy cooperation.5 Conversely, assuming China were to show interest in a strategic energy partnership, it is not clear to what extent Washington is truly ready for a shared global energy partnership. This would require accommodating very different Chinese views on the role of energy markets and pricing, policies toward key petroleum producers and regions, the role of the IEA and multilateral cooperation, and responsibility for reducing carbon emissions. Washington tends to view a partnership as China simply joining

in and becoming enmeshed and integrated into a set of U.S.-sponsored and led energy institutions and policy agendas established by the west. This is highly unlikely to be acceptable to Beijings leadership.6

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internal link oil key


China is competing for access to Latin American oil Arnson and Davidow 11[Cynthia J. arnson is director of the Latin American Program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for
Scholars, Jeffrey Davidow is the president of the Institute of the Americas, China, Latin America, and the United States: The New Triangle, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Institute of the Americas, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, January] Conference participants also addressed the implications of Chinas growing energy demands for LAC countries, for Chinas own economic development, and for the world energy market. Are we looking at China and Latin American oil as [a] panda or a dragon? asked Jeremy Martin, director of the Energy Program at the Institute of the Americas. Estimates

project that Chinas demand for oil will grow from 8 million barrels per day (mbd) to 16 mbd by 2030; current imports as a percentage of consumption are over 50 percent. Beijings general strategy for satisfying Chinese demand consists of securing access to a diverse array of material reserves and inserting itself into production positions in oil projects. Beijing is pursuing a strategy to assure that all of its oil reserve and production eggs are not in the same basket. Despite its ready economic capital, the Chinese must face increased competition for oil resources as they undertake their strategy against the backdrop of a global shift to peak access; in todays world there are few easy targets and access to resources has been seriously diminished.

China is looking to diversify its oil imports with Mexican oil Arnson and Davidow 11[Cynthia J. arnson is director of the Latin American Program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for
Scholars, Jeffrey Davidow is the president of the Institute of the Americas, China, Latin America, and the United States: The New Triangle, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Institute of the Americas, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, January] Dr. Sun hongbo of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences pointed to strong Chinese economic growth,

national oil companies, government, and financial organizationsespecially the Chinese Development bankas the four elements driving Chinese energy cooperation with Latin America. A new trend emerging from this mix is the increased cooperation between financial organizations and national oil companies. Sun listed five models that China

employs for cooperation: 1) a technical service model, 2) a joint development model, 3) an infrastructure-building participation model, 4) a loans for oil model, and 5) a bio-fuels technology joint research model. These models can be seen across various countries with which China is cooperating (See Figure 6) For example, in Mexico, Chinese companies had provided nearly $1 billion in engineering services for

oil projects by the end of 2007. Sun also cited successful joint ventures in Colombia and Ecuador including the Andes Petroleum purchase of all
of Encanas assets in Ecuadoras areas of successful cooperation. In addition to the China Brazil loan-for-oil agreement, China will also cooperate with Brazil in the development of renewable energy sources such as biofuels. However, given that Latin America only accounted for 7.58 percent of Chinas oil imports in 2008, Sun doubted that Latin America would play a strategic role in guaranteeing Chinas future energy security. While opportunities for growth and investment are present for both China and Latin America, Chinas national oil companies are conf ronting risks of social conflict at the local level, political instability, intense competition, environmental clauses, transportation costs, and the uncertain U.S. response to Chinas presence in the region. Sun also indicated that Latin America can still be viewed as a strategic alternative for China

to diversify its oil imports.

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Internal link oil war


The US and China are competing for Latin American oil resources Zhao 8 [Suisheng Zhao is Professor at the Graduate School of International Studies, Executive Director of the Center
for China-US Cooperation, University of Denver, China's Global Se arch for Energy Security: cooperation and competition in the Asia-Pacific, Journal of Contemporary China]

China's strategy has alarmed the United States, the world's largest energy consumer, and raised concerns among some in the US that China is not only challenging the United States' historic dominance in Africa, Latin America, and Asia but also undermining Western efforts to promote transparency and human rights in these developing countries, damaging US interests and values as China has vied for energy resources in some of the most unstable parts of the world and often ignored the promotion of transparency, good governance and responsible behavior with its partner nations. It is particularly a concern of the US as China has pursued deals with countries that are off-limits to Western companies because of sanctions, security concerns or the threat of bad publicity. Some observers have worried that China's active quest to secure energy supplies in Africa and Latin America may have fueled an energy cold war. In this case, it is not totally a surprise to see that when CNOOC put together an $18.5

billion takeover bid for California-based firm Unocal Corp in early 2005, the fierce opposition in US Congress prompted CNOOC to abandon the bid.

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Internal link oil war


China will go to war to protect foreign oil supplies from US competition Evans 6 [Justin, Adjunct Professor of Political Science, IUPUI; J.D./M.B.A. Candidate, 2007, Indiana University
School of Law, A New Energy Paradigm for the Twenty-First Century: China, Russia, and America's Triangular Security Strategy, 39 Ind. L. Rev. 627]

China is now the world's second largest demander of oil and is projected to consume 14.2 million barrels daily by 2025 with a net import of 10.9 million barrels per day. n75 In 1998, Beijing reorganized its state-owned petroleum

assets into two vertically-integrated firms: the China National Petroleum Corporation ("CNPC") and the China Petrochemical Corporation ("Sinopec"). n76 Other major firms include the China National Offshore Oil Corporation ("CNOOC") and China National Star Petroleum. n77 To date, the Chinese government still holds majority shares in CNPC, Sinopec, and CNOOC; the Chinese government "[has] not give[n] . . . foreign investors a major voice in corporate governance." n78 The unwillingness of the Chinese government to give foreign

investors significant influence over the state's petroleum companies suggests an acute paranoia afflicting the government as it pursues a reliable energy supply. China's increasing dependence upon foreign crude oil is, "[f]or the security-obsessed Chinese . . . scary." n79 As a result, the government is explicitly adopting offensive military scenarios to reinforce its petroleum supply n80 and is working to ensure that energy is not cut off from the mainland: "the Chinese are grabbing what they can-and fending off anyone with a rival claim in a show of muscular petrodiplomacy." n81 Some in the Chinese media see immediate conflicts over oil as inevitable, particularly with Japan. n82 At least one scholar has suggested that [*642] this posturing is unsurprising, given that "a liberal internationalist foreign policy is incompatible with China's illiberal domestic order." n83 These trends reinforce the theory of offensive realism as China escalates its competition with other nations for economic and security interests. American policymakers should note the immutable mindset of Chinese officials as they create U.S. energy security policy for the twenty-first century.

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internal link oil conflict


China will backlash to any perceived attempt at infringing on oil markets even if theres no real trade-off Zweig 10 [David Zweig is the Director of the Center on Chinas Transnational Relations and a Chair Professor in the
Division of Social Science, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, CHINAS ENERGY RISE, THE U.S., AND THE NEW GEOPOLITICS OF ENERGY, April, PCIP]

As a hegemon, the U.S. can affect the supply, prices, and delivery of the resources that China needs, thereby slowing Chinas emergence as a great power. American companies can bid up the price of oil, influencing resource prices and Chinas ability to buy those resources. The U.S. military can threaten Chinas oil supplies should conflict with Taiwan or Japan erupt. American oil companies have worldwide resource partnerships and deep pockets against which Chinas neophyte national oil and resources companies must compete. (Still, today Chinas pockets are also deep). As the moral hegemon, America determines which countries are violating international norms, such as nuclear non-proliferation or geno cide, complicating Chinas energy relations with pariah states, such as Sudan, Venezuela, and Iran. Chinese efforts to expand into Latin America or Africa trigger congressional hearings, while the U.S. media challenges China to improve its moral behavior. And even if the U.S. cannot really disrupt Chinas energy supplies, China believes it can, and will, follow such a path to limit Chinas rise. The result: as China evaluates its resources security, it sees Americans everywhere.

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internal link energy conflict


Chinese resource shortages increase the risk of a U.S.-China war Zweig and Jianhai, 05 (David, director of the Center on China's Transnational Relations at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, and Bi, post-doctoral fellow at the Center, Foreign Affairs, Chinas Global Hunt for Energy, September/October, proquest) Although China's new energy demands need not be a source of serious conflict with the West in the long term, at the moment, Beijing and Washington feel especially uneasy about the situation. While China struggles to manage its growing pains, the United States, as the world's hegemon, must somehow make room for the rising giant; otherwise, war will become a serious possibility. According to the power transition theory, to maintain its dominance, a hegemon will be tempted to declare war on its challengers while it still has a power advantage. Thus, easing the way for the United States and China -- and other states -- to find a new equilibrium will require careful management, especially of their mutual perceptions. Because China's extraordinary growth also increases its dependence on foreign resources, the Chinese government has developed a new sense of insecurity vis--vis the United States. An article published last June in the Beijing-backed Hong Kong newspaper Ta Kung Pao
suggested that Washington might resort to economic tactics to contain China. Given the White House's current penchant for unilateral intervention and the loud voices in Congress calling China a military threat, Beijing might reasonably begin to fear that the United States will try to

block its purchases of natural resources to destabilize it. Washington must be mindful of these worries and not exacerbate them needlessly.

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Impact China economy


China is focused on improving relations with Mexico in order to access oil its key to their economy AP 6/2/13 [China's president visits Latin America, eyes Mexico's plans to open energy sector,
www.foxnews.com/world/2013/06/02/china-president-visits-latin-america-eyes-mexico-plans-to-open-energysector/#ixzz2VwkkzArw]
MEXICO CITY

China has invested heavily in resource-rich Latin America in recent years, striking major trade deals with governments from Venezuela to Argentina. Now its president is reaching out to one of the few countries in the region where ties have been slow to develop: Mexico. President Xi Jinping's three-day visit starting Tuesday comes as Mexico debates opening its highly regulated energy sector to more foreign investment. China's president has said he plans to address Mexico's large trade deficit with the Asian power and discuss ways to increase Mexican exports. Analysts say that could mean oil, which Mexico has and China needs to fuel its expanding economy and the cars of its growing middle class. "Access to strategic raw materials is key to understanding the dynamic of relations

with China," said Hugo Beteta, director for Mexico and Central America of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. "Clearly there is an interest by China in Mexican oil." The trip is part of a four-country regional tour that ends in the United States. Xi started in Trinidad and Tobago, where he also met with leaders of other Caribbean countries, and he arrives Sunday night in Costa Rica. China and Trinidad have had diplomatic ties for almost 40 years, and Trinidad is a major trading partner in the Caribbean for China. Costa Rica is the only country in Central America to have diplomatic relations with China. U.S. trade still dwarfs China's for the three countries Xi is visiting. But China's trade with Costa Rica and with Mexico has tripled since 2006, according to the International Monetary Fund. Relations

with Mexico had been chilly in the past, especially when former President Felipe Calderon hosted the Dalai Lama in 2011, something China's Foreign Ministry said "hurt the feelings of the Chinese people and harmed Chinese-Mexican relations." President Enrique Pena Nieto, who took office in December, has been aggressive so far about changing that, and the two new presidents reportedly hit if off on a personal level when Pena Nieto visited China and met with Xi in April. That resulted in an unusually quick diplomatic follow-up, just two months into Xi's presidency. During the April talks, Xi said "he is committed to working with Mexican authorities to help Mexico export more," Mexico's vice minister of foreign relations, Carlos de Icaza, told The Associated Press. That's key for Mexico, because its trade deficit with China is exploding, far surpassing that of any other Latin American nation. While China is looking to assure supplies of raw materials, Mexico is looking to diversify its trade and investment, which have long been dominated by its superpower neighbor to the north. "In the new global geopolitical and economic map, China is, and I think it has arrived to stay, the world's second economic power," De Icaza said. Mexico "has to understand and strengthen relations with a nation that has such great strategic value." De Icaza said the countries hope to sign at least a

dozen agreements in the fields of trade, energy, tourism, science and technology during Xi's visit. Mexican exports to China came to a bit over $5.7 billion in 2012, while its imports from that country stood at almost $57 billion, according to statistics from Mexico's Economy Department. Cell phones, video games and parts for electronics factories have been pouring into Mexico, which sends China minerals such as copper and lead. Overall trade between China and Latin America has expanded quickly over the past decade and the continent now imports more from China than it does from the European Union, according to the U.N. economic agency for the region. Many countries balance those imports by sending China raw materials: oil from Venezuela, copper from Chile, soybeans from Argentina. But Mexico's exports go overwhelmingly to the huge U.S. market right on its border. Beteta noted that China imports three-quarters of the oil it consumes. "China needs to guarantee oil for its

citizens' cars, but also obviously for its economy as a whole, which has a high energy intensity, and Mexico is an oil power," he said. At the same time, Pena Nieto's government has said that it will soon present an energy reform bill to allow greater national and international investment in its oil sector. It hasn't revealed the details of the initiative, but Beteta said it "has awakened the appetite of many people." State oil company Petroleos Mexicanos, or Pemex, already has taken small steps to increase its relationship with China, which until recently had been minimal. Of the roughly 2.5

million barrels of crude that Pemex produces a day, about 1.2 million are exported. Energy ministry figures show that 75 percent of these exports go to the United States and about 7 percent to the "Far East." It does not specify how much each specific country in that region receives. In April, during Pena Nieto's visit to China, Pemex signed its first long-term contract with a Chinese company, agreeing to ship

30,000 barrels a day to the state oil company Sinopec. Mexico may have other goods and investment opportunities to offer as well. "China is the principal consumer of coal, gas, oil, of secondary industries like cement, steel, concrete," said Juan Carlos Rivera, director of the Center for Business with Asia at the private Monterrey Technological Institute. "Evidently (China) is looking to satisfy their market needs."

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Chinese economic downturn causes World War III Plate, 03 (Tom, professor of Policy and Communication Studies at UCLA where he founded the Asia Pacific Media Network, WHY NOT

INVADE CHINA? With allies like the neo-cons, Bush scarcely needs enemies,, June 30, 2003, http://asiamedia.ucla.edu/TomPlate2003/06302003.htm) But imagine a China disintegrating- on its own, without neo-conservative or Central Intelligence Agency prompting, much less outright military invasion because the economy (against all predictions) suddenly collapses. That would knock Asia into chaos. A massive flood of refugees would head for Indonesia and other places with poor border controls, which dont want them and cant handle them; some in Japan might lick their lips at the prospect of of World War II revisited and look to annex a slice of China. That would send Singapore and Malaysia- once occupied by Japan- into nervous breakdowns. Meanwhile, India might make a grab for Tibet, and Pakistan for Kashmir. Then you can say hello to World War III, Asia style. Thats why wise policy encourages Chinese stability, security and economic growth the very direction the White House now seems to prefer.

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impact china economy - key to global


Chinese economic growths key to fuel global growth Hoge, 04 (James, Editor of Foreign Affairs, from a speech given to Johns Hopkins University. A Global Power Shift in the Making. Foreign Affairs. July/August)
Nevertheless, China's own extraordinary economic rise is likely to continue for several decades -- if, that is, it can manage the tremendous disruptions caused by rapid growth, such as internal migration from rural to urban areas, high levels of unemployment, massive bank debt, and pervasive corruption. At the moment, China is facing a crucial test in its transition to a market economy. It is experiencing increased inflation, real-estate bubbles, and growing shortages of key resources such as oil, water, electricity, and steel. Beijing is tightening the money supply and big-bank lending, while continuing efforts to clean up the fragile banking sector. It is also considering raising the value of its dollar-pegged currency, to lower the cost of imports. If such attempts to cool China's economy -- which is much larger and more decentralized than it was ten years ago, when it last

crash. Even if temporary, such a massive bust would have dire consequences. China is now such a large player in the global economy that its health is inextricably linked to that of the system at large . China has become the engine driving the recovery of other Asian economies from the setbacks of the 1990s. Japan, for example, has
overheated -- do not work, it could become the largest beneficiary of China's economic growth, and its leading economic indicators, including consumer spending, have improved as a result. The latest official figures indicate that Japan's real GDP rose at the annual rate of 6.4 percent in the last quarter of 2003, the highest growth of any quarter since 1990. Thanks to China, Japan may finally be emerging from a decade of economic malaise. But that trend might not continue if China crashes.

Chinas the biggest driver in global economic growth and dwarfs the US in economic growth Washington Times, Patrice Hill, Editor, July 26, 2007, http://washingtontimes.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070726/BUSINESS/107260073/1001 China, this year for the first time, has dislodged the United States from its long reign as the main engine of global economic growth, with its more than 11 percent growth eclipsing sputtering U.S. growth of about 2 percent, according to the International Monetary Fund's 2007 projections released yesterday. China's growth, which has been fueled by booming domestic building and commercial development, as well as soaring exports, has accelerated even as U.S. growth dropped to 0.7
percent in the first quarter under the weight of a profound housing recession. China is expected to drive a hearty 5.2 percent expansion of the global economy this year, the IMF said. The United States, with one-quarter of the world's economy and the richest consumer markets in the world, has dominated global growth for decades. But China's emergence has been foreshadowed for years by its pull on world commodity markets, where it has driven up the price of raw materials to record levels, from oil to copper, in its race to build and export goods around the world. "This year for the very first time with its very strong growth expected, and with the growth slowdown in the United States China will be contributing the largest part to the increase in the global growth measured at market exchange rates, " said Charles Collyns, the IMF's deputy director of research. China will provide one-quarter of the annual growth rate of the world economy, and , Mr. Collyns said, "if you add together Russia and India as well, you get over half of global growth coming from the emerging-market countries."

Sustained economic growth in Chinas key to global growth Bloomberg News, July 6, 2004, http://quote.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=nifea&&sid=a8fksVM80TgA China is finally having the economic impact its backers have long predicted. The country's boom accounted for almost one-sixth of worldwide economic growth last year. Now that its economy is slowing, the world's most populous country may curb global expansion. Premier Wen Jiabao's effort to cool China's growth rate to about 7 percent from last year's 9.1 percent may trim global growth by half a percentage point in 2005 and Asia's expansion by a full percentage point, said Stephen S. Roach, chief economist at Morgan Stanley & Co. in New York. ``As the Chinese leadership now moves to bring its overheated economy under control, it's important to understand the global implications.'' Roach said in an interview. ``When today's Chinese economy sneezes, Asia -and possibly even the rest of the world -- could catch a cold.'' China's slowdown already is evident in commodity markets, said John
Mothersole, an economist for Global Insight Inc. in Lexington, Massachusetts. Commodity prices soared by 40 percent during 2003 and the first four months of 2004, the biggest jump in nine years, largely because of China's buying of products such as steel, copper, nickel and oil, Mothersole said in an interview. Commodity prices this year, as measured by Global Insight's Industrial Materials Index, already have declined 12 percent from their April peaks ``and the slowing in China was a major part of that,'' Mothersole said. Shipping rates that more than tripled from the end of 2002 through the first six weeks of 2004 partly because of China's purchases have fallen about 45 percent since April, based on the Baltic Dry Index, which measures dry bulk freight rates.

A Chinese economic slowdown triggers a global economic recession and prevents global growth James Pethokoukis, assistant managing editor for the Money & Business section at U.S. News & World Report, May 30, 2007, http://www.usnews.com/blogs/capital-commerce/2007/5/30/is-america-at-chinasmercy.html?s_cid=rss:capital-commerce:is-america-at-chinas-mercy Just how vulnerable is the U.S. economy to troubles in China? It's a question I really started pondering after watching the 6.5 percent

drop overnight in Chinese stocks in response to a government tripling of a tax on stock trading. Now Wall Street is sure reacting much better to the decline than it did back in February when the Shanghai Composite index fell 9 percent, sparking a 400-point drop in the Dow Jones industrial average. This time, the Dow industrials were flattish in midday trading. Paul Hoffmeister, chief economist at Bretton Woods Research, doesn't see much risk to the Chinese economy at this point: "As long as the Chinese apply this sort of 'acupuncture' to the market and avoid imposing growth-killing measures such as introducing a capital gains tax, these negative surprises could turn out to be buying opportunities." But what if the Chinese do

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make a policy mistake or some other internal issue slows down the amazing Chinese economic growth machine? What if there is a U.S.-China trade war, not an impossibility given the bipartisan protectionist zeal of the new Congress? China is a country, after all, that holds a trillion bucks in dollar-backed assets and imports some $800 billion worth of goods and services overall every year. Plus, there is the $60 billion in foreign direct investment pouring into the country on an annual basis. To get some handle on all this, I asked several experts to E-mail me their quick takes on what would happen to America if there were a hard landing in China. Bruce Kasman, chef economist at JP Morgan: At present, the global economy has a number of engines running, and a specific China event that slows demand theresay to 5 percent or sowould have a very modest impact on global growth. However, to the extent that the source of the Chinese slowing represents broader global themes at work, its effects could be much larger. I would note in this context that we do not think Chinese authorities are setting policies to slow growth at present. While they are working to restrain bank lending and limit the frothiness of their equity market, they maintain stimulative fiscal policies and continue to maintain a broadly accommodative monetary policy stance through their efforts to manage currency appreciation. Will Hutton, author of The Writing on the Wall: Why We Must Embrace China as a Partner or Face It as an Enemy: Because the country has been so open to imports, has been the single most important stimulus to the Asian and, thus, world economy over the past five years, China's stagnation would trigger a global slowdown, maybe even recession. On the plus side, oil and commodity prices would fall. On the negative side, there would be all the ills of a slowdown, but on top there would be major financial implications. The World Bank estimates that if China's growth rate fell by just 2 percent, up to 60 percent of China's bank loans would become nonperformingso threatening both China's and, via Hong Kong, Asia's financial system. The flow of saving to finance the U.S.'s deficit would dry up,

probably forcing U.S. interest rates upso worsening the economic slowdown. Kenneth Rogoff, economics professor at Harvard University: A sharp slowdown in Chinese growth represents the single biggest risk to U.S. and global growth today. China's massive excess savings have been helping to hold down mortgage interest rates everywhere. Trade with China
has been a major driver in the revival of U.S. productivity that has helped boost growth and lower inflation. Above all, China's generally peaceful integration into the world economy has been helping lower market volatility, thereby driving up the price for risky assets such as housing and equities. Most investors are far too sanguine about the risk of a China meltdown , forgetting that China is still very much a poor developing country with huge political, social, and financial vulnerabilities.. The immediate impact on the United States would be through a sharp rise in interest rates and market volatility, and a concomitant drop in equity and housing prices. The U.S. may not export a lot of goods to China, but it sure exports a lot of treasury bills and other bonds. Over time, if the meltdown persisted, the U.S. would suffer because globalization, and China in particular, has been a major factor in helping spur innovation and productivity growth.

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Impact china economy nuclear war


Economic collapse risks a Sino-Russian nuclear war Sharavin, 01 (Alexander, Director of the Institute of Military and Political Analysis, WHAT THE PAPERS SAY, October 3, 2001)
China's economy is among the fastest-growing economies in the world. It remains socialistic in many aspects, i.e. extensive and highly expensive, demanding more and more natural resources. China's natural resources are rather limited, whereas the depths of Siberia and the Russian Far East are almost inexhaustible. Chinese propaganda has constantly been showing us skyscrapers in free trade zones in southeastern China. It should not be forgotten, however, that some 250 to 300 million people live there, i.e. at most a quarter of China's population. A billion Chinese people are still living in misery. For them, even the living standards of a backwater Russian town remain inaccessibly high. They have absolutely nothing to lose. There is every prerequisite for "the final throw to the north." The strength of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (CPLA) has been growing quicker than the Chinese economy. A decade ago the CPLA was equipped with inferior copies of Russian arms from late 1950s to the early 1960s. However, through its own efforts Russia has nearly managed to liquidate its most significant technological advantage. Thanks to our zeal, from antique MiG-21 fighters of the earliest modifications and S-75 air defense missile systems the Chinese antiaircraft defense forces have adopted Su-27 fighters and S-300 air defense missile systems. China's air defense forces have received Tor systems instead of anti-aircraft guns which could have been used during World War II. The shock air force of our "eastern brethren" will in the near future replace antique Tu-16 and Il-28 airplanes with Su-30 fighters, which are not yet available to the Russian Armed Forces! Russia may face the "wonderful" prospect of combating the Chinese army, which, if full mobilization is called, is comparable in size with Russia's entire population, which also has nuclear weapons (even tactical weapons become strategic if states have common borders) and would be absolutely insensitive to losses (even a loss of a few million of the servicemen would be acceptable for China). Such a war would be more horrible than the World War II. It would require from our state maximal tension, universal mobilization and complete accumulation of the army military hardware, up to the last tank or a plane, in a single direction (we would have to forget such "trifles" like Talebs and Basaev, but this does not guarantee success either). Massive nuclear strikes on basic military forces and cities of China would finally be the only way out, what would exhaust Russia's armament completely. We have not got another set of intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-based missiles, whereas the general forces would be extremely exhausted in the border combats. In the long run, even if the aggression would be stopped after the majority of the Chinese are killed, our country would be absolutely unprotected against the "Chechen" and the "Balkan" variants both, and even against the first frost of a possible nuclear winter.

An economic slowdown would force the CCP to tap into nationalist sentiment and attack Taiwan Elizabeth Economy, Senior Fellow and Director of Asia Studies, Center on Foreign Relations, 200 4 (The River Runs Black: The Environmental Challenge to Chinas Future, p.269-271) In the political realm, this kind of economic downturn could produce at least three different scenarios. The first and most predictable would be a reversal in the present trend of modest political reform, exacerbating the tension within the Chinese leadership between its relatively newfound belief that there is much to gain from embracing forces of local political action and integration
with the international community and its traditional fear that such processes will undermine the security of the state and their capacity to govern. In such a time of domestic stress and leadership vulnerability, the environment is not likely to receive much positive attention. More likely, the public security apparatus would increasingly scrutinize the work of NGOs and independent lawyers for the political content of their work. Peasant and

worker unrest would be managed through repression and, perhaps, through the projection of an external threat or a manufactured crisis in the Taiwan Straits to rally nationalist sentiment and deflect attention from the country's economic woes. Although the CCP has proved remarkably adept at harnessing nationalistic sentiment for its own legitimizing purposes, the wave of anti-Party sentiment expressed during the confrontation with the United States over the EP3 spy plane during spring 2001 (when a Chinese fighter jet crashed and a U.S. spy plane was forced to land on Hainan Island) suggests that such views could spiral out of the government's control, producing a new challenge to the stability of the regime.

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impact narcoterrorism
Chinese investment in Latin America is crucial to fighting nacrotrafficking Ellis 12 [R. Evan, a professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the Center for
Hemispheric Defense Studies, with a research focus on Latin Americas relationships with external actors, including China, Russia, and Iran, The United States, Latin America and China: A Triangular Relationship?, Inter -American Dialogue, May]
On the positive side, Chinas

donation of goods to countries and its sale of goods at relatively low prices have contributed to the ability of governments in the region to assert control over national territory and meet such challenges as narcotrafficking. The use of Chinese K-8 aircraft, purchased by Bolivia from the PRC, is one example. The donation of trucks and buses to the Bolivian armed forces and non-lethal gear to the Jamaica Defense Force are other such examples.15

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impact energy conflict


Energy conflict between the US and China in Latin America escalates and draws in other countries Bajpaee 5 [Chietigj Bajpaee is a Ph.D. Candidate at Kings College London and he previously was a senior Asia
analyst at Control Risks, a London-based risk consultancy. Prior to working at Control Risks, Mr. Bajpaee worked at IHS Global Insight, the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC and the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), CHINESE ENERGY STRATEGY IN LATIN AMERICA, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=30557#.Ubedt2TwJOg]

The U.S. is looking on with caution as China encroaches upon a region that has traditionally been a major supplier of energy resources. Venezuela and Canada together provide the U.S. with a third of its energy imports. For every barrel of oil that China purchases from Latin America there is potentially one less barrel available for the U.S. Furthermore, as the American states reduce their reliance on the U.S. oil market, they will have greater political leverage over the U.S. on contentious issues such as Canadian trade disputes with the U.S. over lumber and beef, and tensions over human rights abuses in Venezuela. Finally, the competition for energy resources in Latin America is not limited to the U.S. and China. In October 2004, several oil companies including Chinas PetroChina and Indias ONGC (Oil and Natural Gas Corporation) were looking
into acquiring oil assets valued at $1.5 billion in Ecuador. Japan and South Korea are also stepping up efforts to secure raw materials in Latin America. Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi visited Brazil in September 2004 and South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun also made trips to Argentina, Brazil and Chile in 2004. Setting the Stage for an Energy Cold War Friction between China and the U.S. has so far

focused on the question of China's undervalued exchange rate, its human rights record, relations with rogue states and the issue of Taiwan. However, the competition over energy resources is now becoming an additional area of contention. While China and the U.S. have launched the U.S.-China Energy Policy Dialogue, both states are also engaged in a competition for energy resources in Russia, the Caspian, the Middle East, Africa and the Americas. This competition could foreseeably combine with other areas of friction. For example, if the U.S. were to side with Japan
on its territorial dispute in the potentially oil and gas rich East China Sea or support India over China in meeting its growing energy needs,

strategic blocs or alliances could form in the international energy arena. Latin America is likely to emerge as a major stage of this energy competition or confrontation.

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impact us econ
Chinese investment in Latin America causes investment in US markets Ellis 12 [R. Evan, a professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the Center for
Hemispheric Defense Studies, with a research focus on Latin Americas relationships with external actors, including China, Russia, and Iran, The United States, Latin America and China: A Triangular Relationship?, Inter -American Dialogue, May]
At the same time, Chinese

purchases of US assets in Latin America provide liquidity to US companies to invest elsewhere. Although it eventually fell through, the $7.1 billion deal in which China National Overseas Oil Corporation was to purchase 30 percent of the assets of British Petroleum, to help BP cover obligations stemming from the DeepwaterHorizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, is a primary example.10 Beyond such direct impacts of Chinese investment in Latin America, in sectors such as cars, heavy machinery and telecommunications equipment, investment by Chinese companies in the region also situates them to enter US markets. Such was the case with Chinese auto manufacturer First Auto Works (FAW), which positioned itself to invest in the Mexican maquiladora sector with the hope of assembling Chinese cars using Chinese components for export to the United States, leveraging advantageous tax treatment under the North American Free Trade Agreement. Similarly, investment promoters have cited other Latin American opportunities as indirect channels to the US market. They include Chinese companies production in

Central America in order to export goods to the United States under the advantageous tax terms of the Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), or production in Colombia, Panama and Peru in order to enter the United States under the bilateral free trade agreements those nations share with the United Statesalthough the ability to meet the provisions of the relevant agreements (particularly domestic content requirements) in order to realize such tax savings is questionable. To date, Chinese investments in final assembly operations in Latin American countries, with an eye on entering the US market, have been limited. To a lesser extent, Chinese companies may see sales to Latin American markets as

a way of incrementally increasing quality, giving them the experience and reputation required to successfully penetrate more discriminating US markets.

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impact latin American econ


Chinese investment in Latin America prevents economic decline Arnson and Davidow 11[Cynthia J. arnson is director of the Latin American Program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for
Scholars, Jeffrey Davidow is the president of the Institute of the Americas, China, Latin America, and the United States: The New Triangle, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Institute of the Americas, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, January] in a keynote address, enrique garca, president and CEO of the Corporacin Andina de Fomento (CAF), a Latin

American development bank, indicated that despite the economic downturn in 2009, the global economic crisis has not obstructed Latin Americas path to sustained economic growth, macroeconomic stability, and positive external balances. On average, the region was projected to grow by 4.5 percent in 2010, and in certain countries, by as much as 78
percent. This success is partially due to the implementation of conservative fiscal and monetary policies, continued central bank independence, and strict financial regulations. Strong regional growth rates and resilience in the face of the crisis can also be attributed

to the favorable terms of trade between Latin Americas resource rich countries and China.

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impact us-china relations


Regional competition for energy threatens the entirety of relations Zweig 10 [David Zweig is the Director of the Center on Chinas Transnational Relations and a Ch air Professor in the
Division of Social Science, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, CHINAS ENERGY RISE, THE U.S., AND THE NEW GEOPOLITICS OF ENERGY, April, PCIP]
Americas bilateral policy may be better coordinated. The Strategic Dialogues will give America a clearer voice when it speaks to the Chinese. But the target of this dialogue must not be only to promote U.S. interests, but to find ways to help China adapt to the world and hel p Chinas energy and environmental sector. But there are numerous voices in the U.S. that wish to inflate the China threat. For them, Chinas global energy dependence is a godsend, an excellent mechanism for limiting Chinas rise and challenge to the U.S. But there

are also ears in China that thrive on expressions of American concerns about Chinas rise. Mistrust of America runs surprisingly deep within the Chinese bureaucracy; since most Chinese are Realists and believers of conspiracy theories, they expect the U.S. to try to stop their rise and see it doing so, even when it is not. And while American

concerns about China cannot, nor should not be silenced, they must not drive Americas China policy. The message must be clea r: the U.S. welcomes a rising China that brings solutions to the bilateral, triangular and global problems. Finally, if the hypothesis is correct, that America is a silent and often invisible player triangularizing Chinas bilateral ties, then many issues could be best discussed within a triangular format, such

as a Sino-American-African dialogue or a Sino-American-Latin America one. While the U.S. may hesitate to join such discussions, as they give credence and legitimacy to Chinas engagement in regions from which the U.S. would have preferred to exclude them, such dialogue with a rising China is necessary. Many of the meetings could be

track-two, bringing influential academics and middle level policy makers together to discuss how Chinas rise in a particular regi on can be best managed to insure a win-win scenario. Conferences in the West on these issues tend to be run by the U.S. congressional committees and reflect the concerns of a declining hegemon. No doubt, both sides will hesitate to put their cards on the table. But the first step is to get people to recognize that U.S.-China interdependence occurs at the global level, and that regional competition poses a serious threat to the bilateral

relationship. Only then can the potentially negative implications of Sino-American triangularization be better managed.

Prevents extinction Wittner 11 professor of history emeritus at SUNY Albany

(Lawrence Wittner, Huffington Post World, 11-30-2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lawrence-wittner/nuclearwar-china_b_1116556.html) While nuclear weapons exist, there remains a danger that they will be used . After all, for centuries international conflicts have led to wars, with nations employing their deadliest weapons. The current deterioration of U.S. relations with China might end up providing us with yet another example of this phenomenon. The gathering tension between the United States and China is clear enough. Disturbed by China's growing economic and military strength, the U.S. government recently challenged China's claims in the South China Sea, increased the U.S. military presence in Australia, and deepened U.S. military
ties with other nations in the Pacific region. According to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the United States was "asserting our own position as a

need this lead to nuclear war? Not necessarily. And yet, there are signs that it could. After all, both the United States and China possess large numbers of nuclear weapons . The U.S. government threatened to attack China with nuclear
Pacific power." But weapons during the Korean War and, later, during their conflict over the future of China's offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu. In the midst of the latter confrontation, President Dwight Eisenhower declared publicly, and chillingly, that U.S. nuclear weapons would "be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else." Of course, China didn't have nuclear weapons then. Now that it does, perhaps the behavior

of national leaders will be more temperate. But the loose nuclear threats of U.S. and Soviet government officials during the Cold War, when both nations had vast nuclear arsenals, should convince us that, even as the military ante is raised, nuclear saber-rattling persists. Some pundits argue that nuclear weapons prevent wars between nuclear-armed nations; and, admittedly, there haven't been very many -- at least not yet. But the Kargil War of 1999, between nuclear-armed India and nuclear-armed Pakistan, should convince us that such wars can occur . Indeed, in that case, the conflict almost slipped into a nuclear war. Pakistan's foreign secretary threatened that, if the war escalated, his country felt free to use "any weapon" in its arsenal. During the conflict, Pakistan did move nuclear weapons toward its border, while India, it is claimed, readied its own nuclear missiles for an attack on Pakistan. At the least, though, don't nuclear weapons deter a nuclear attack? Do they? Obviously, NATO leaders didn't feel deterred, for, throughout the Cold War, NATO's strategy was to respond to a Soviet conventional military attack on Western Europe by launching a Western nuclear attack on the nuclear-armed Soviet Union. Furthermore, if U.S. government

officials really believed that nuclear deterrence worked, they would not have resorted to championing "Star Wars" and its modern variant, national missile defense. Why are these vastly expensive -- and probably unworkable -- military defense systems needed if other nuclear powers are deterred from attacking by U.S. nuclear might? Of course, the bottom line for those Americans convinced that nuclear weapons safeguard them from a Chinese nuclear attack might be that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is far greater than its Chinese counterpart. Today, it is estimated that the U.S.

government possesses over 5,000 nuclear warheads, while the Chinese government has a total inventory of roughly 300 . Moreover, only about 40 of these Chinese nuclear weapons can reach the United States. Surely the United States would "win" any nuclear

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war with China. But what would that "victory" entail? An attack with these Chinese nuclear weapons would immediately slaughter at least 10 million Americans in a great storm of blast and fire, while leaving many more dying horribly of sickness and radiation poisoning. The Chinese death toll in a nuclear war would be far higher. Both nations would be reduced to smoldering, radioactive wastelands. Also, radioactive debris sent aloft by the nuclear explosions would blot out the sun and bring on a "nuclear winter" around the globe -- destroying agriculture, creating worldwide famine, and generating chaos and destruction. Moreover, in another decade the extent of this catastrophe would be far worse. The Chinese government is currently expanding its nuclear arsenal, and by the year 2020 it is expected to more than double its number of nuclear weapons that can hit the United States. The U.S. government, in turn, has plans to spend hundreds of billions of dollars "modernizing" its nuclear weapons and nuclear production facilities over the next decade. To avert the enormous disaster of a U.S.-China nuclear war, there are two obvious actions that can be taken. The first is to
get rid of nuclear weapons, as the nuclear powers have agreed to do but thus far have resisted doing. The second, conducted while the nuclear disarmament process is occurring, is to improve U.S.-China relations. If the American and Chinese people are interested in

ensuring their survival and that of the world, they should be working to encourage these policies.

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impact sphere of influence


Encroaching on Chinas sphere of influence leads nuclear conflagration Ivan Eland - Director of the Center on Peace & Liberty at The Independent Institute, Former Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute - 4/11/05 (Coexisting with a Rising China, http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=1494) Although China is an autocratic state, it still has legitimate security interests. The United States would be smart to show some empathy with those concerns. In recent years, as the United States has become alarmed at Chinas expanded military spending, the Chinese have also become alarmed at large increases in the U.S. defense budget and U.S. attacks on the sovereign nations of Serbia and Iraq. Many Chinese see the threat of an expanding U.S. empire that aims at encircling China and preventing its legitimate rise to great power status. To lessen such perceptions and reduce the chance of conflict between the two nuclear-armed nations, the United States should
retract its forward military and alliance posture in Asia, including repudiating any implied commitment to defend Taiwan. With large bodies of water as moats and the most formidable nuclear arsenal in the world, the United States hardly needs a security perimeter that stretches across the entire Pacific Ocean to protect it from China. If the United States continues to maintain an outdated Cold War-style empire, it is bound to

come into needless conflict with other powers, especially China. Instead of emulating the policies of pre-World War I Britain toward Germany, the United States should take a page from another chapter in British history. In the late 1800s, although not without tension, the British peacefully allowed the fledging United States to rise as a great power, knowing both countries were protected by the expanse of the Atlantic Ocean that separated them. Taking advantage of that same kind separation by a major ocean, the United States could also safely allow China to obtain respect as a great power, with a sphere of influence to match. If China went beyond obtaining a reasonable sphere of influence into an Imperial Japanese-style expansion, the United States could very well need to mount a challenge. However, at present, little evidence exists of Chinese intent for such expansion, which would run counter to recent Chinese history. Therefore, a U.S. policy of coexistence, rather than neocontainment, might avoid a future catastrophic war or even a nuclear conflagration. US interfering in Chinas vital interests spurs US-Sino Nuclear War Ivan Eland - Director of the Center on Peace & Liberty at The Independent Institute, Former Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute - 4/11/05 (Coexisting with a Rising China, http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=1494) As during the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States and the recent tensions between India and Pakistan, nuclear weapons will likely restrain the conduct of both China and the United States in any crisis. And crises will likely arise. During the Cold War, neither superpower conducted direct military action in the other superpowers primary sphere of influence (eastern Europe for the Soviet Union and the Western Hemisphere for the United States). If one superpower stirred the pot in the others backyard, it usually did so covertly or by proxynot directly. In other words, the competition between the superpowers was usually constrained to peripheral regions of the world over marginal interests and did not occur in core areas over primary interests. Nuclear weapons can restrain competition and inhibit conventional war between powers possessing them. They induce caution because their effects are so horrific. Thus, they can dampen conflict, but at great risk of annihilation. Catastrophe can occur if there is a miscalculation or misstep . But nuclear weapons
are not going away anytime soon, and both China and the United States already possess them. Although anti-China hawks see as ominous the modernization of Chinas strategic nuclear force, there may be some positive aspects to it. Right now the Chinese have only about twenty long-range nuclear weapons with the range to strike the United States. They are very vulnerable to a U.S. preemptive or preventive nuclear attack. The U.S.

threat to those missilesexacerbated, at least in Chinese minds, by President Bushs new preventive war doctrine might force China into a use or lose situation. In that scenario, China might find the need to launch its missiles before they are preventively attacked by the United States. In the Cold War, nuclear stability was thought to be enhanced if both sides possessed

a survivable second strike capabilitythat is, powerful nuclear weapons that would survive a fi rst strike by the other side in order to retaliate, thus diminthe independent institute ishing the incentive to launch a bolt-out-ofthe- blue attack in the fi rst place. Th e current vulnerability of Chinese obsolescent nuclear forces comes from their need to be launched from vulnerable fi xed land-based silos and their inability to be fi red quickly. Th ey need to be assembled before launch because the warhead and liquid fuel are stored separately from the missile. Modernization of Chinese nuclear capabilities entails building solid fuel missiles that are mobile (the DF-31 and DF-31A extended range intercontinental ballistic missiles) thus improving rapidity of fi re and limiting the enemys ability to detect the missiles by increasing the area in which they can be deployed. Both attributes should enhance their survivability. Also, further increasing the survivability of the Chinese nuclear deterrent is the planned deployment of the new JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile on a new class of ballistic missile submarines.45 Th erefore, a modest Chinese nuclear modernization, although not to be celebrated, should be expected and should not be alarming to the United States. Yet it would be dangerous for China and the

United States to count solely on nuclear weapons to reduce or eliminate conflict between them. That strategy might lead to a tense situation similar to the forty-year Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States. In an attempt to avoid conflict with the other power, China and especially the United States must do some soul searching to reassess and more modestly construe their vital interests. Expanding the US empire into Chinas spheres of influence alarms China leading to nuclear conflict

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Ivan Eland - Director of the Center on Peace & Liberty at The Independent Institute, Former Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute - 4/11/05 (Coexisting with a Rising China, http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=1494) Reducing the chances of future SinoU.S. conflict requires more drastic changes in U.S. policy than in Chinese policy, mainly because the United States is in Chinas face, not vice versa. The United States has alliances, forward force deployments, and overseas military bases in East Asia and the Pacific that ring China. It is also improving bilateral relations with other Asian powers (for example, India and Russia) that can help to counter China. In other words, the United States has developed a stealthy neocontainment policy toward China in the postCold War years. In contrast, the Chinese have no alliances, military deployments, overseas bases, signifi - cant antiU.S. bilateral diplomacy, or containment policy in the Western Hemisphere directed against the United States. If they did, the United States would be very alarmed and hostile. Th e
United States has a much better human rights record and political and the independent institute economic system than does China, but its foreign policy is far more aggressive. Th e conventional wisdom is that democracies have benevolent foreign policies and authoritarian governments have aggressive ones. Th e historical record and the aforementioned U.S. and Chinese examples show this claim to be erroneous. Th e U.S. invasion of Iraq, a country halfway around the world that posed little direct threat to the United States, is an example of U.S. hegemonic behavior. In recent years, China has not invaded even a neighboring country. From a U.S. perspective, China is a rising power and should be watched, but current costly distractions have diverted attention, eff ort, and resources from that purpose. China must be careful about expanding its sphere of infl

uence to avoid alarming other Asian nations, but the United States must conduct a wholesale reassessment of its informal, but expansive, Asian empire. Th e mainstream view in U.S. policy circles, among Democrats and Republicans alike, is that an expansive U.S. Empireboth in Asia and around the globeenhances security. In fact, the opposite is true. Th e U.S. homeland would be much more secure if the United States worked on reducing the chance of a needless confl ict with a nuclear-armed China.

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impact ccp instability


Chinese control of resources is vital to the stability of the ruling party Zweig and Jianhai, 05 (David, director of the Center on China's Transnational Relations at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, and Bi, post-doctoral fellow at the Center, Foreign Affairs, Chinas Global Hunt for Energy, September/October, proquest) An unprecedented need for resources is now driving China's foreign policy. A booming domestic economy, rapid urbanization,
increased export processing, and the Chinese people's voracious appetite for cars are increasing the country's demand for oil and natural gas, industrial and construction materials, foreign capital and technology. Twenty years ago, China was East Asia's largest oil exporter. Now it is the world's secondlargest importer; last year, it alone accounted for 31 percent of global growth in oil demand. Now that China is the workshop of the world, its hunger for electricity and industrial resources has soared. China's combined share of the world's consumption of aluminum, copper, nickel, and iron ore more than doubled within only ten years, from 7 percent in 1990 to 15 percent in 2000; it has now reached about 20 percent and is likely to double again by the end of the decade. Despite calls by Prime Minister Wen Jiabao and other politicians to cut consumption of energy and other resources, there is little sign of this appetite abating. Justin Yifu Lin, director of the China Center for Economic Research at Peking University, in Beijing, says the country's economy could grow at 9 percent per year for the next 20 years. These new needs already have serious implications for China's foreign policy. Beijing's access to foreign resources is necessary both for continued economic growth and, because growth is the cornerstone of China's social stability, for the survival of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Since China remains a relatively centralized, government-driven economy, Beijing has been able to adapt its foreign policy to its domestic development strategy. Traditional institutions, such as the Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group of the CCP, are still making the key decisions, but a more pluralistic environment is emerging and allowing business leaders to help shape foreign policy. The China Institute for International Studies, a government think tank, holds numerous conferences bringing together academics and leaders in business, the military, and the government to devise strategies for the top rung of the Communist Party.

CCP legitimacy depends on economic growth Council on Foreign Relations, 07 (Report of an Independent Task Force, U.S. -China Relations: An Affirmative Agenda, A Responsible Course, April, http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/ChinaTaskForce.pdf) Apart from addressing the needs of the poor, Chinas leaders know they must also confront a host of new challenges, many of them the products of economic growth. Environmental, demographic, and public health trends, widening income disparities, a growing middle class clamoring for more responsive and accountable government, lingering ethnic and religious grievances, and endemic corruption all threaten Chinas economic health and political stability. Chinas leaders are also aware that they face these challenges at a time when their own legitimacy and that of the CCP depend increasingly on sustaining economic growth. And, Regime instability causes lashout and nuclear war Renxing, 05 (Sen, staff writer, The Epoch Times, August 3, 2005, CCP Gambles Insanely to Avoid Death http://www.theepochtimes.com/news/5-8-3/30931.html) Since the Partys life is above all else, it would not be surprising if the CCP resorts to the use of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons in its attempt to postpone its life. The CCP , that disregards human life, would not hesitate to kill two hundred million Americans, coupled with seven or eight hundred million Chinese, to achieve its ends . The speech, free of
all disguises, lets the public see the CCP for what it really is: with evil filling its every cell, the CCP intends to fight all of mankind in its desperate attempt to cling to life. And that is the theme of the speech. The theme is murderous and utterly evil. We did witness in China beggars who demanded money from people by threatening to stab themselves with knives or prick their throats on long nails. But we have never, until now, seen a rogue who blackmails the world to die with it by wielding biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. Anyhow, the bloody confession affirmed the CCPs bloodiness: a monstrous murderer, who has killed 80 million Chinese people, now plans to hold one billion people hostage and gamble with their lives.

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impact chinese expansion


Perception of oil supply insecurity will cause China to expand into the South China Sea causing regional instability Ronald Soligio, and Amy Jaffe, February 11, 2004, Prof. of Economics at Rice and Senior Energy Analyst at James Baker III Inst. For Public Policy, China and Long-range Asia Energy Security: An Analysis of the Political, Economic and Technological Factors Shaping Asian Energy Markets, http://www.rice.edu/energy/publications/docs/AsianEnergySecurity_ChinaGrowingEnergyDependence.pdf
Chinas rising oil import requirements and the physical constraints of its refining sector suggests that China will become in creasingly dependent on the same energy sources as the U.S., Japan, and other industrialized economies. This could tie its strategic interests more closely with Western interests in the Middle East. A rising reliance on Persian Gulf oil and gas imports imply that China will suffer the same negative consequences as the

U.S., Japan and Europe if military equipment it or others pass to regimes such as those in Iraq or Iran is used to impede the free flow of oil from the Middle East or elsewhere . Continued political instability in Afghanistan or Central Asia will have similarly

dire consequences for Chinas chances of tapping Caspian energy supplies. However, it remains to be seen if Chinas energy interests will be enough to alter Chinas militarys perceptions of its own more general strategic interests, particularly on the issue of weapons non-proliferation. China may continue to perceive a benefit in diverting U.S. strategic engagement away from Asia. Chinas leaders may view larger strateg ic interests in Asia beyond the energy sector as better served by diverting US diplomatic attention and military assets away from the Asian theatre to places like the Middle East. This latter interpretation of Chinese interests will depend greatly on Beijings perceptions of US intentions and their potential risk to China. Some analysts worry that Chinas dependence on the same energy supplies as its neighbors

and Western industrial nations will prompt heightened competition in the energy arena and drive Asian regional arms races. Kent Calder notes that "Expansionist, confrontationist strategies, not to mention the acquisition of nuclear weapons, offer some attractive prospects of gain to regional powers, such as preferential access to energy resources and sea lanes in the South China Sea. The costs of armament and preparation for war, conversely, become less onerous as East Asia grows increasingly affluent. This combination of wealth and bellicosity is a recipe for disaster." But such
predictions have already missed the mark on several counts and are likely to continue to do so. While it is true that China will increasingly compete for similar energy supplies with Japan, South Korea and India, the possibility that this will lead to increased tensions and conflict is not a foregone conclusion. For one thing, as the above forecasts show, the possibility that the world will have a slight to moderate surplus of oil for the foreseeable future reduces the need for a confrontational posture towards supplies. And, Asias recent financial woes have reduced not on ly the rate of rising energy use but also the budgets for increased military spending . However, the possibility of a major supply disruption will continue to

exist and with it, the risk that rivalry could emerge during a time of crisis.

Chinese adventurism in the South China sea crushes relations with the US and makes cross-straight war inevitable Cossa, Executive Director of the Pacific Forum of the CSIS, 19 98 (Ralph, "Security Implications of Conflict in the South China Sea: Exploring Potential Triggers of Conflict," http://www.southchinasea.org/docs/Cossa,%20Security%20Implications%20of%20%20Conflict%20in%20the%20S.C hinaSea.pdf) Implications for Sino-U.S. Relations. A use of force by the PRC in the South China Sea would have a particularly devastating affect on U.S.-PRC relations. Despite recent improvements brought about by Chinese President Jiang Zemin's successful visit to the U.S. last fall, these relations remain fragile, with debates continuing in both capitals as to how much one side can or should trust and cooperate with the other. A Chinese act of aggression in the Spratlys would likely tilt the debate in the U.S., perhaps irreparably. Were a major showdown to occur between the U.S. and China in the South China Sea, it would be difficult for Japan and for many of China's other neighbors (and primary investors) to remain neutral. Open conflict between the U.S. and PRC would also likely signal an end to U.S. adherence to a "one China" policy.

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China is economically motivated and wont use Latin America to challenge US heg Fergusson 12 [Robbie Murray, MS in China In The International Arena, The Chinese Challenge to the Monroe
Doctrine, http://www.e-ir.info/2012/07/23/does-chinese-growth-in-latin-america-threaten-american-interests/, 7/23]

The United States must realise that it is partly responsible for any military tension with China by backing it into a corner through its relations with Taiwan, India, and Japan. Mahbubani suggests that given how vulnerable Chinese leaders feel in the face of U.S pressure, it is only natural for them to look for ways to counterbalance U.S power. [138]
Subsequently a redressing of the security imbalance should be looked at if the United States desires to see an improvement in bilateral relations with China on this front. The likelihood however of an anti-American military alliance forming in Latin America is

exceedingly slim, because ideology does not play a role in Chinas thinking. Furthermore as previously mentioned, China does not desire conflict with the U.S, directly or indirectly, and certainly will not allow Chavez to make China his ally in battles with Washington. [139] Therefore, the United States must realise that China has no intention of drawing Americas ire in the same way Caracas and Havana have.

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China cant threaten US heg Ben-Ami 6/8/13 [Shlomo Ben Ami, a former Israeli foreign minister who now serves as the vice president of the
Toledo International Center for Peace, China muscles in on Latin America, but US influence remains strong, The Australian]
Yet it

would be a mistake to regard Latin America's broadening international relations as marking the end of US preeminence. Unlike in the bygone era of superpowers and captive nations, American influence can no longer be defined by the ability to

install and depose leaders from the US embassy. To believe otherwise is to ignore how international politics has changed over the last quarter-century. A continent once afflicted by military takeovers has slowly but surely implanted stable democracies. Responsible economic management, povertyreduction programs, structural reforms, and greater openness to foreign investment have all helped to generate years of low-inflation growth. As a result, the region was able to withstand the ravages of the global financial crisis. The US not only encouraged these changes, but has benefited hugely from them. More than 40 per cent of US exports now go to Mexico and Central and South America, the US's fastest-growing export destination. Mexico is America's second-largest foreign market (valued at $US215 billion in 2012). US exports to Central America have risen by 94 per cent over the past six years; imports from the region have risen by 87 per cent. And the US continues to be the largest foreign investor on the continent. American interests are evidently well served by having democratic, stable, and increasingly prosperous neighbors. This new reality also demands a different type of diplomacy - one that recognises the diverse interests of the continent. For example, an emerging power such as Brazil wants more respect on the world stage. Obama blundered when he dismissed a 2010 deal on Iran's nuclear program mediated by Brazil and Turkey (despite having earlier endorsed the talks). Other countries might benefit from US efforts to promote democracy and socioeconomic ties, as Obama's recent trips to Mexico and Costa Rica show. Trade relations provide another all-important lever. President Sebastian Pinera of Chile visited the White House earlier this week to discuss, among other things, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), an ambitious trade agreement that might encompass New Zealand, Singapore, Australia, Mexico, Canada, and Japan. President Ollanta Humala of Peru is expected in the White House next week, while Vice President Joe Biden is scheduled to visit Latin America soon after. Language and culture matter, too. Given the extraordinary growth

of Latinos' influence in the US, it is almost inconceivable that America could lose its unique status in the region to China or Russia, let alone Iran. Gone are the days when military muscle and the politics of subversion could secure US influence - in Latin America or anywhere else. A world power today is one that can combine economic vigor and a popular culture with global outreach on the basis of shared interests. The US is better positioned than any other power in this respect, particularly when it comes to applying these advantages in its immediate vicinity.

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China wont threaten US heg Tokatlian 7 [Juan Gabriel Tokatlian is a professor of international relations at the Universidad Torcuato Di Tella,
Argentina, Latin America, China, and the United States: a hopeful triangle, http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-protest/hopeful_triangle_4336.jsp]
Today, Beijing's

approach to the region involves an active economic diplomacy characterised by pragmatism, based on conciliation, seeking stability, concerned not to irritate Washington, and aimed at strengthening interstate ties. Therefore, China's expanding interest in the region appears to be moderate, not challenging, and in favor of the status quo. In recent years, China has acted in a responsible fashion in the region. This helps understand why, for the most part, no large or
middle-sized country of the region has attempted to exercise a "veto power" to halt or reverse what has become a policy of prudent and reliable engagement towards China. The United States has no motive to fear new Chinese-Latin American contacts, for four reasons. First, it should be emphasised that relations

between Latin America, China, and the United States are characterised by an asymmetrical dynamic in which the United States operates as a global power, China as a regional power, and Latin America as a non-threatening periphery. The three parties may manage this asymmetry confidently by avoiding ambiguity, conflict or miscalculation. Second, Latin America, China, and the United

States do not constitute a strategic triangle: the bilateral ties of each pair are not closely intertwined, nor are they equally vital for all parties. The reciprocal significance of Washington-Beijing relations is, for each side, greater than their respective relationships with Latin America. At the same time, the weight of the United States in the external and internal politics of Latin America is much more important than that of China, and Latin America is not among China's highest priorities when compared to other countries (particularly, the more developed ones) and regions (especially its closest periphery). Furthermore, the history and recent evolution of this triangle has not had notable implications for the international balance of power, nor does it appear that it will in the near future. Third, it should be recalled that geography matters. Latin America is located in the

same hemisphere as the leading contemporary superpower. Latin America has traditionally been secure for the United States. In addition, US hegemony in the hemisphere - despite the political "left turn" to its south in the 2000s - is still evident. By analogy, if we consider that Asia today contains several great contenders (India, Japan, China, and Russia) and many medium-size powers, then it is very unlikely that China will have the capacity and the will to seriously rival the United States in the Americas. Fourth, values matter. Latin America shares (and contributes to) the democratic values of the west. In addition, the last authoritarian wave of the 1970s gave impetus to an affirmative reassessment of the democratic regime. In that regard, China's internal political model is, in general, not very attractive for Latin America.

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Latin America China relations dont threaten the US Shixue 9 [Jiang, Vice President, Chinese Association of Latin American Studies Professor, Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences Understanding Chinas Relations with Latin America, http://www.sinolatincapital.com/Upload/2009929184158.pdf, April]
But there are other voices. For instance, Manuel Rocha, former U.S. ambassador to Bolivia also said, Were it not for China, Latin America would probably be showing a much more lackluster [economic] performance.1 Daniel P. Erikson, senior associate from the Inter-American Dialogue, a think-tank in Washington, commented that Chinas engagement in Latin America is not yet a major concern for the

United States, and there are few signs of any real frictions between the two countries on that score.2 At the

testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere in June 2008, Erikson once again pointed out that While Chinas expansion into Latin America may imply a potential loss for some U.S. business sectors, it is important to note that trade is not a zero sum game. To the extent that Chinas involvement is sparking economic growth in Latin America, it may contribute to economic stability and well-being in a manner that suits the U.S. desire to see a prosperous and healthy neighborhood. Indeed, the United States concern over

the closer relationship between China and Latin America is incorrect and unnecessary. It is well-known that Latin

America has been on the way of reforms and opening to the outside world for almost two decades. It endeavors to attract more foreign investment and liberalize the market so as to stimulate growth. As a result, China is only one of the economic partners Latin America has been trying to cooperate with. Chinas relations with Latin America are for economic purpose, not for political intention against the U.S. China understands well that Latin America is the backyard of the United States, so there

is no need for China to challenge the American influence in Latin America. Both China and Latin America have been opening to the outside world. In the age of globalization both of them should cooperate to push forward South-South cooperation. As a matter of fact, further cooperation between China and Latin America will benefit regional peace and development in Asia-Pacific and Latin America. This outcome would certainly be in the favor of the United States.

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2ac defense
The US is already attempting to increase its engagement with Latin America to compete with China Bloomberg News 5/29/13 [Biden Circles Xi as U.S. Duels China for Latin America Ties]
The competition between the worlds two biggest economies for influence in Latin America is on display this week as U.S. Vice President Joe Biden visits Rio de Janeiro today near the end of a three-nation tour of the region with Chinese President Xi Jinping close behind. The dueling visits -- Biden departs Brazil May 31, the same day Xi arrives in Trinidad & Tobago to begin his first tour of the region since Chinas political transition ended in March -- underscore how Latin Americas natural resources and rising middle class are making it an increasingly attractive trade partner for the worlds top two economies. Competing with Chinas checkbook isnt easy for the U.S. Seeking South American soy, copper and iron ore, China

boosted imports from Latin America 20-fold, to $86 billion in 2011 from $3.9 billion in 2000, according to calculations by the Inter-American Development Bank. By contrast, the U.S. policy of pursuing free-trade accords has been controversial, said Kevin Gallagher, a Boston University economist. If Im a Latin American leader, Im very happy because I now have more chips to play with, said Gallagher, author of the 2010 book The Dragon in the Room, about Chinas inroads in the region. The onus is on the U.S. to come up with a more flexible, attractive offer but thats not so easy because it doesnt have the deep pockets like it used to. The Latin America visits come as the International Monetary Fund forecasts the regions economies will expand 3.4 percent this year, almost three times the pace of growth in the developed world. U.S. Outreach Bidens tour, which began May 26 in Colombia, included a frank and at times brutal discussion about trade, economic growth and security with 15 Caribbean leaders in Trinidad yesterday, Prime Minister Kamla Persad-Bissessar said, without giving more details. The leaders signed an accord to boost investment and economic cooperation. Our country is deeply invested and wants to be more deeply invested in the region, Biden

said in Port of Spain. Yesterdays accord will give us all a vehicle to overcome special, specific, practical barriers to trade and investment. Our goal is not simply growth, but growth that reaches everyone. In Colombia, Biden said a one-year-old free-trade
agreement between the two countries is just the beginning, citing a doubling of the period for which entry visas are valid and efforts to expand trade ties further. State Visit The outreach follows President Barack Obamas visits in May to Mexico and Costa Rica and

precedes talks at the White House in June with the leaders of Chile and Peru. In October, Obama will host Brazilian

President Dilma Rousseff to a state dinner at the White House. U.S. business with the region is brisk even in the absence of a region-wide free-trade agreement that the U.S. pursued for more than a decade and that anti-U.S. allies of the late Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez helped bury in 2005.

Buoyed by bilateral agreements signed since then with Peru, Panama and Colombia, U.S. exports to Latin America have more than doubled since 2000 to a record $400 billion last year. The region last year bought 26 percent of U.S. exports,

an increase from 22 percent in 2000. Brazil Surplus In Rio, Biden will tour a research facility operated by state-run oil company Petroleo Brasileiro SA. U.S. exports of capital goods are helping Brazil develop the biggest oil discoveries in the Americas since 1976 and are one reason why the U.S. in 2009 began posting a trade surplus with Brazil, the regions biggest economy, for the first time in a decade. Trade with Brazil could rise to $500

billion from about $100 billion currently, Biden said today, citing biofuels, aviation and energy. We see greater

Brazilian investment in the United States, Biden said. We welcome it, we need it. We want you investing. For Xi, his week -long tour of Trinidad, Costa Rica and Mexico precedes a visit to California for his first face-to-face talks with Obama since taking office. The trip to Latin America and the Caribbean, coming so early in Xis presidency, reflects the rising confidence of the Chinese leadership as it pursues its strategic interests with little concern for U.S. reaction, said Evan Ellis, a professor at the National Defense University in Washington. China in recent years has ousted the U.S. to become the top trade partner for Brazil and Chile. Washingtons Backyard In the past Chinese presidents were very deferential to the U.S., always making reference to Washingtons backyard, said Ellis, the author of dozens of papers and a book about Chinas penetration of Latin America. You dont hear any of that from Xis team, though you dont find any threatening rhetoric either. Trinidad, the largest supplier of energy in the Caribbean and the one stop on both delegations itineraries, may be the best example of Chinas newfound boldness, said Ellis. While in Trinidad and Tobago, Xi will also meet with leaders from other countries in the region, including the Bahamas, Jamaica, Suriname and Antigua and Barbuda, Assistant Foreign Minister Zhang Kunsheng told reporters today in Beijing. Any loan or investment announced by Xi has the potential to surpass the $200 million the U.S. spends annually on the entire region through the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative. Highway Loan Biden yesterday said the U.S. will seek

to increase assistance through the security initiative, without giving more details. If the Chinese decide to unroll one of

their little packages in Trinidad, theyll win the entire Caribbean over, said Gallagher. Xi will bring a $400 million loan to help expand and modernize a highway in Costa Rica, newspaper La Nacion reported today, citing an interview with the countrys ambassador to China. As China asserts itself more, the regions leaders have also grown more wary. The decade-long export surge has concentrated on a few raw materials, making South America more vulnerable to a slowdown in China. Driven by Chinese demand, stronger dollar inflows used to buy exports have also fueled the regions currencies, making imports cheaper and hurting local manufacturers. Currency Gains Rousseff in 2011 increased by 30 percentage points a tax on foreign cars after automakers complained about threats from competitors including Wuhu-based Chery Automobile Co. Colombias peso, Brazils real and Chiles peso were three of the top four best performers over the past decade among 31 major currencies tracked by Bloomberg, each surging more than 40 percent. In Mexico, Xi visits a nation that competes directly with China for sales to the U.S. market. China more than doubled its market share in the U.S. since joining the World Trade Organization in 2001, accounting for 19 percent of goods sold last year, up from 8 percent in 2000, according to the U.S. Commerce Department. That compares with Mexicos 12 percent share, barely changed from 2000. April Visi t Still, Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto, who visited Beijing in April, is looking to expand trade and investment with China, if only to diversify away from the U.S., buyer of 80 percent of the countrys exports. Both the U.S. and China deny theyre competing with one another. The

two countries can play to their respective advantages and contribute to the regions development, Foreign

Ministry spokesman Hong Lei said May 21 in Beijing. In the case of the U.S., those advantages include its role as a purchaser of the regions high-value manufacturing goods, an administration official said in a May 22 conference call with reporters. Case in point: Brazils Embraer SA this month announced a $4 billion deal to sell regional jets to United Continental Holdings Inc. partner SkyWest Inc. after winning a U.S. contract in February to

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provide 20 Super Tucano turboprops to the Afghan military. At the same time, almost 90 percent of the $41 billion Brazil sold to China last year was derived from commodities. Earlier this month, Brazil was the focus of a U.S. trade mission for 20 companies including Morgan Stanley, Textron Inc.s Cessna Aircraft Co. and OSI Systems Inc.s Rapiscan, which makes airport screening devices. The delegation also visited Colom bia and Panama. The Chinese still come with a lot of money and thats tough to say no to, said Eric Farnsworth, head of the Washington office of the Council of the Americas, a group representing U.S. businesses. But

increasingly these countries have a better understanding of who has what to offer and on what conditions. For the first time questions are being raised about whether the region pushed the U.S. too far away

No link the US and China arent competing for influence in Latin America Global Times 5/31/13 [China, US not competing over Latin America: expert]

Chinese President Xi Jinping heads to Latin America and the Caribbean on Friday, in a state visit aiming at promoting China's cooperation with the region. Xi's visit to Trinidad and Tobago, Costa Rica and Mexico follows his first foreign trip to Russia and three countries in Africa, Tanzania, South Africa and Republic of Congo, shortly after taking office in March. While Xi kicks off his visit, US Vice President Joe Biden is concluding his Latin America visit on the same day, as he leaves Brazil Friday. Some media reports described "dueling visits" by Chinese and US

leaders, and said that the "competition between the world's two biggest economies for influence in Latin America is on display." Both the US and China deny they are competing with each other. Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Hong Lei said last week that the two countries can "carry out cooperation in Latin America by giving play to their respective advantages." Tao Wenzhao, a fellow of the Institute of American Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, told the Global Times that it is a coincidence that the two leaders chose to visit Latin America at a similar time, and that China has no intention to challenge US influence in the area. "It's not like in the 19th century when countries divided their sphere of influence in a certain area. China and the US' involvement in Latin America is not a zero-sum game," Tao said, explaining that it is a good thing for Latin America. Chinese and US leaders visit Latin America out of their respective strategic needs, Tao said. All countries need to interact and cooperate with other countries, and visits of such high-level are usually arranged long time before they starts, Tao said.

No Chinese energy wars reducing foreign dependence and seeking cooperation Cole 2006 [Bernard, Professor at the National War College, "Chinese Naval Modernization and Energy Security",
prepared for the Institute for National Strategic Studies, June 20, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/symposia/pacific2006/colepaper.pdf]
Chinas leaders are well aware of energy issues and maritime interests as vital elements in their nations economic health an d their own political legitimacy, and the PLAN is tasked with energy security as a mission. But Chinas concern for the security of its overseas energy supplies does not dominate its national security policy process, and the most important aspects of energy security for Beijing are economic and political, not military. While China currently imports approximately 45 percent of its oil, this is only slightly more than 6 percent of its national energy needs.38 The chairman of the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) has stated flatly that Chinas oil demand will remain fairly stable and will not expand as some analysts have predicted.39 Furthermore, China has codified the worlds most stringent automobile efficiency standards and announced a sharp tax increase on big cars and a matching reduction for smaller models; additionally, Beijings State Council Energy Leading group has delineated an oil alternative strategy, which prioritizes gas over oil, coal over either, and renewable energy (hydro, wind, solar, biomass, nuclear) over fossil fuels.40 Perhaps most significantly, coal will almost certainly remain the source of at least 70 percent of Chinas total energy requirements for the foreseeable future. That dependence poses problems of inefficiencies and environmental deficiencies, but these are amenable to technical solutions ****and do not detract from the very considerable comfort blanket provided to China by its huge coal reserves, third largest in the world. Beijing is also co ncerned about growing reliance on foreign ships for petroleum carriage. Speaking at a January 2004 energy industry conference, Zhang Guofa, Deputy Director of Chinas Water Transport Department of the Ministry of Communications, noted that while 90 percent of Chinas crude oil imports came by sea, only 10 percent is transported by Chinese flagged carriers. The present 50 million tons of oil imported by sea in 2003 was estimated to grow to 75 million tons by 2010 and to 130 million tons by 2020. Current Chinese tanker capacity of 5.2 million tons was targeted to grow to 10 million tons in the near term, but that would still be far too inadequate to reduce the risk of China getting in trouble once emergencies such as wars occur.41 The maritime dispute with Japan may pose the most serious risk of possible armed conflict between the two nations navies, despite the relatively modest amounts of energy resources contained in the disputed Chunxiao natural gas field. But almost certainly, any clash would be brief and quickly resolved by Tokyo and Beijing. The South China Sea is potentially contentious, because of the number of claimants to the bits and pieces of land that dot that body of water. Little chance of armed conflict presently exists, however, primarily because no

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significant energy reserves have been found in the disputed central areas of the Sea. In fact, China, the Philippines, and Vietnam have signed an agreement to jointly explore the area.42

No war China is rule abiding status quo power Lee 08 Professor of Political Science @ Wake Forest University [Wei-chin Lee, Long Shot and Short Hit: China as a Military Power and Its
Implications for the USA and Taiwan, Journal of Asian and African Studies, Vol 43(5): 523542 One recent debate between Brzezinski and Mearsheimer is a typical example of varying perspectives in dealing with Chinas rise in military power. Brzezinski has argued that the US decision to stay in East Asia has an added advantage for China in restraining a militarily powerful, increasingly nationalistic, and potentially nuclear-capable Japan. Moreover, Chinas credible nuclear credentials and strong economic

performance in an interdependent global market have made Chinese leaders become more rational, calculating, and conscious than before in order to avoid any mutually disastrous policies, including its oil diplomacy, with the USA (Brzezinski and Mearsheimer, 2005). Such a kinder and gentler view of China has been explored and elaborated by various studies indicating that China has virtually transformed into a responsible and cooperative player, in words and in deeds, in the international community, not only by vigorously embracing multilateralism, but also actively and bilaterally cultivating cooperative security partnerships with various countries (Goldstein, 2005). Given Chinas insufficient military capability and the vulnerability derived from the RMA, it serves no significant security benefit for China to challenge US hegemony. In fact, China has adapted itself to be a rule-abiding status quo supporter, rather than a radical rule challenger, in the international society. Even under provocative situations, Chinas tame and cool-handed responses have been demonstrated in several presumably serious USChina tests, including Lee Teng-huis abrupt announcement of the two-state theory in 1999, the EP-3 spy plane incident in 2001, and the US war on terror and unpopular war in Iraq in recent years. China has appeared to learn, internalize, and integrate the laws, norms and rules of the international community, just as neoliberal
institutionalists and constructivists had long articulated and prescribed.

No escalation purely defensive nuclear posture Xiangli 2005 [Sun, Deputy Director of the Arms Control Research Division, Beijing Institute of Applied Physics and Computational

Mathematics, China's Nuclear Strategy in 2005 Reports of International Arms Control and Disarmament, ed. by China Arms Control And Disarmament Association, http://chinasecurity.us/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=256] This author holds that it is unlikely for the Chinese government to give up its current defensive nuclear deterrent policy in the foreseeable future for the following reasons. First of all, there will be no material changes in the nuclear strategic principles, which are based on a consistent understanding of the nature and role of nuclear weapons. Despite todays continuing evolution of new and advanced military technologies, the fundamentals of nuclear weapons have not changed. And so, Chinas guidelines for its nuclear strategy have not changed. In fact, the

nuclear arms race during the Cold War proved that the nuclear war-fighting strategy does not substantially increase the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence. Rather, it leads to strategic instability and to the danger of nuclear wars among nuclear weapon states. In addition, such a strategy will theoretically require a large quantity and variety of nuclear weapons, which will consume substantial economic and technological resources. Obviously, this is not in conformity with Chinas long-term general strategy of economic development. Also, Chinas current security environment is much better than that of the 1950s and 1960s. Relations between China and major nuclear weapon states have markedly improved and, accordingly, it is unnecessary for China to modify its nuclear strategy. In addition, the international mechanism of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons requires nuclear weapon states to constantly minimize the significance of nuclear weapons. As the Chinese government is actively supporting such non-proliferation mechanisms it should not alter its defensive nuclear posture.

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Growing Chinese influence in Latin America signals the end of US heg globally Cerna 11 [Michael, graduate student in International Policy Management at Kennesaw State University, China's
Growing Presence in Latin America: Implications for U.S. and Chinese Presence in the Region, China Research Center, a think-tank providing peer reviewed research on US-China relations]
With both the U.S. and China making gains in the region in different sectors, there is seemingly room for each side to grow; which implies that, in fact, trade with Latin America is not a zero-sum game. China presents an alternative to the United States, but that is not necessarily a bad thing. The

U.S. is much more diversified than China at the moment and therefore does not need to enter into direct competition. However, as China responds to calls from Brazil and diversifies its investments, there is increasing worry that China is going to outmatch U.S. trade in the region. These fears may be economically based, but there are potentially harmful political consequences primarily, providing Latin America with a quasi-world power as an alternative to the U.S. Since the Monroe Doctrine, Latin America has been considered a secure sphere of influence for the U.S. The fact that China presents a less democratic alternative to U.S. influence presents a major problem. The third BRICS summit in April provided more insight into the potential consequences of Chinas growing place in Latin
America via its relations with Brazil. One proposal to emerge from the summit of the five nations (Brazil, India, China, Russia and South Africa) was a broad-based international reserve currency system providing stability and certainty. The idea was to set up a new exchange rate

mechanism that would bypass the U.S. dollar as the reserve currency of the world. In addition, banks of the five BRICS nations agreed to establish mutual credit lines in their local currencies, not in U.S. currency. While the chances of such a proposal gaining support are debatable, it sets a clear example of a possible shift in power away from the U.S. and toward a more global organization, one that is arguably anchored by China. If China becomes a preferred partner in Latin America, it will show that U.S. dominance around the globe also is at risk. So what does
Chinas growing place in the region mean for the future? Depending on whom this question is posed to, there are two probable answers. The first is that Chinas intensifying relations with Latin America offer a clear sign of the end of U.S. dominance in the

region, and in a greater sense, the entire world. There is enough evidence to show that the tides have changed in favor of China. The other answer is that it means nothing. The U.S. is obviously still the more dominant power in the region, and Chinese
presence will eventually subside, again leaving the United States as the regions premier partner. The real answer probably falls somewhere in the middle. Is China the preferred partner for Latin America? At this point, the definitive answer is no. However, the United States should not

take its place in the region for granted. There is clear evidence of an increasingly symbiotic relationship with China throughout Latin America. While the U.S. is the most dominant trade partner to the region as a whole, it is losing ground in key countries, namely Brazil, which is blossoming on the world stage and is emerging as the clear leader in the region. Increasing trade and investment can be beneficial for all, but the power that China can derive from its growing economic influence could bring increased political and ideological influence that the U.S. might find unnerving. China this should cause the U.S. to pay more attention to its southern neighbors and take steps to make sure that China only benefits economically and not politically at the expense of the U.S. The world will be watching.
<<cross apply 1ac heg frat impact>>

already has replaced the U.S. as the largest trading partner for Brazil and Chile, and is on pace to do the same in Peru and Venezuela. At the very least,

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2ac impact turn - terrorism


Chinese influence in Latin America destabilizes nations harboring terrorism Banks 8 [Danny Banks, MAJ, U.S. Army, STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF CHINESE INFLUENCE IN THE
LATIN AMERICA REGION, April,

The U.S. assisted many states in the LAC in the struggle against terrorist or insurgent groups indigenous to the regions and in recent years employed sanctions, anti-terrorism assistance and training, law enforcement cooperation, and multilateral cooperation through [the Organization of American States].85 Moreover, given the nexus between terrorism and drug trafficking, one can argue that assistance aimed at combating drug trafficking organizations in the region has also been a means of combating terrorism by cutting off a source of revenue for terrorist organizations. The

same argument can be made regarding efforts to combat money laundering in the region. 86 Terrorist organizations may launder money in the LAC region through connections with drug trafficking. As Mark Sullivan points out in his Congressional Research Survey Report, 16 nations in the region are jurisdictions of primary concern to the United States because of their vulnerability to money laundering. These are Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Belize, Brazil, Cayman Islands, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Haiti, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, St. Kitts and Nevis, Uruguay, and Venezuela.87 Chinese growing influence may destabilize these countries allowing for greater

proliferation of drug and terrorist activities through trade and money laundering. U.S. representatives reflected this feeling in House Congressional Resolution 338 on June 12, 2006, which recognizes the potential threat that sympathizers and financiers of Islamist terrorist organizations that operate in the Western Hemisphere pose to the United States, our allies, and interests.88

Terrorism causes nuclear war Ayson 10 [Robert, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the
Victoria University of Wellington, After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects, July, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 33, Issue 7, InformaWorld]
But these two nuclear worldsa non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchangeare not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of context, todays and tomorrows terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising

events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It

may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important some indication of where the nuclear material came from.41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular,

if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washingtons relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst ? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States
was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washingtons early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise

the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with U.S. president might be expected to place the countrys armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the
Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the

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temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a

devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier) Washington might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the Chechen insurgents long-standing interest in all things nuclear.42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide. There is also the question of how other nuclear-armed states respond to the act of nuclear terrorism on another member of that special club. It could reasonably be expected that following a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States, bothRussia and China would extend immediate sympathy and support to Washington and would work alongside the United States in the Security Council. But there is just a chance, albeit a slim one, where the support of Russia and/or China is less automatic in some cases than in others. For example, what would happen if the United States wished to discuss its right to retaliate against groups based in their territory? If, for some reason, Washington found the responses of Russia and China deeply underwhelming, (neither for us or against us) might it also suspect that they secretly were in cahoots with the group, increasing (again perhaps ever so slightly) the chances of a major exchange. If the terrorist group had some connections to groups in Russia and China, or existed in areas of the world over which Russia and China held sway, and if Washington felt that Moscow or Beijing were placing a curiously modest level of pressure on them, what conclusions might it then draw about their culpability

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2ac impact turn china-taiwan war


Chinese influence in Latin America results in war between china and taiwan Vega 5 [Juan, 2006 J.D. candidate at the University of Minnesota Law School; M.B.A 2002, University of Florida; B.A.,
1994, Virginia Tech, China's Economic and Political Clout Grows in Latin America at the Expense of U.S. Interests, 14 Minn. J. Global Trade 377]

China has made military moves and arms deals that should raise warning signs in the United States. China has sold missile technology to Iran and delivered military equipment to Cuba. n170 It also appears that China has set up a permanent electronic surveillance post in Cuba, just ninety miles from the United States. n171 These actions may be considered political jockeying. For example, China's sale of military equipment to Cuba may be in retaliation to the United States selling arms to Taiwan. n172 Its electronic surveillance outpost may be a political response to the United States's monitoring of Chinese communications from its spy planes. A more realistic confrontation may occur in the event of a forceful reunification with Taiwan. China will continue using its economic power to accomplish [*403] its own political goals. For several decades, the United States has had treaty obligations to protect Taiwan from mainland aggression. n173 China prefers a peaceful resolution but says it will use force if necessary to bring back this "renegade province." n174 If the United States decides to stand firm, it may need the backing of Latin American countries in order to obtain international legitimacy at the United Nations, where China is the only communist country on the Security Council. It is also likely that China will not be seen as an aggressor and regarded instead as merely reeling in its own Taiwanese citizens who could be considered outlaws for pushing for secession. The United States, on the other hand, may be seen as an aggressor meddling in the internal affairs of a sovereign nation, a sovereign nation whose economic trade is imperative to continued economic growth in Latin America. While a lack of Latin American political support may hurt the United States, the region's logistical cooperation with China may prove fatal in the event of a military confrontation with the United States. China may sabotage U.S. trade in Latin America during a military confrontation and may even pressure Latin American countries to stop trading in goods that "further" the military efforts of the United States. China has controlled the flow of goods between the Atlantic and the Pacific Panamanian legislators may create laws eliminating such rights. It is conceivable that Panamanian legislators may request that

Ocean since Hutchinson Whampoa Ltd., a Chinese company, was given control of both the Atlantic and Pacific ports of the Panama Canal in 1997. n175 Although the United States has the right to protect the canal pursuant to the treaty it signed with Panama, the Chinese military move into U.S. built bases in order to "protect" the canal; after all, the Chinese have filled the void left in Cuba when the former Soviet Union pulled out. [*404] As China's need for oil and as its obsession with reining in Taiwan grows, China's

control over the Panama Canal becomes more important. The Chinese military recently published a book entitled "Liberating Taiwan," detailing a plan to use Chinese warships to impose oil embargoes on Taiwan, Japan, and on the United States. n176 In the event of such a confrontation the loss of oil from Latin American countries may prove lethal to the United States. It is with this sense of urgency that the United States should counter China's growing influence by offering favorable bilateral trade agreements and reconsidering the wisdom of its
agricultural subsidies.

Extinction Hsiung 01 Professor of Politics and International Law at NYU [James, 21st Century World Order and the Asia Pacific, p. 359-360]

Admittedly, it is harmless for an analyst like Lind to be so oblivious of lessons from the past and of the reasons behind both the dogs barking and not barking. But decision-makers cannot afford such luxury. Lee Kuan Yew, Singapores Senior Minister, issued a grave warning presumably directed at al l government leaders, including the United States, that the Taiwan powder keg could ignite a conflagration that will engulf the entire region. It might even embroil the United States in a nuclear holocaust that nobody wants. Oftentimes, well-meaning analysts raise the question whether China, with its present military capability and modest defense expenditures (about U.S. $15 billion annually), can or cannot take Taiwan by force. But this is the wrong question to pose. As the late patriarch Deng Xiapoing put it, Wed rather have it proven that we tried but failed [to stop it] even by force, than be accused [by our disgruntled compatriots and posterity] of not trying to stop Taiwan from going independent. Earlier, I raised the issue of stability within the U.S.-China-Japan triad, precisely with the U.S.-Japan alliance in view. Apparently, many in Japan have apprehensions about the stability. Japanese Nobel laureate (for literature) Ohe Kenzaburo, for instance, once told a pen pal that he was fearful of the outcome of a conflict between the United States and China over the question of Taiwan. Because of its alliance relationship, Japan would be embroiled in a conflict that it did not choose and that might escalate into a nuclear holocaust. From the ashes of such a nuclear conflict, he figured, some form of life may still be found in the combatant nuclear giants, China and the United States. But, Kenaburo rued, there would be absolutely nothing left in Japan or Taiwan in the conflicts wake. By now, I hope it is clear why stability in the U.S.-China-Japan triadic relationship is a sine qua non for geopolitical peace in the Asia Pacific region.

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Conflict over Taiwan will escalate uncontrollably to US-China nuclear war Betts and Christensen 01 Adjunct Senior Fellow in National Security Studies at Council on Foreign Relations; and Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University [Richard K. and Thomas J., China: getting the questions right, National Interest, Winter 2000/2001, LN] The possibility of war with China over Taiwan is arguably the most dangerous threat that U.S. security policy faces in the coming decade. No other flashpoint is more likely to bring the U nited States into combat with a major power, and no other

contingency compels Washington to respond with such ambiguous commitment. U.S. policy regarding the defense of Taiwan is uncertain, and thus so is the understanding in Beijing and Taipei -- and in Washington -- over how strongly the United States might react in different circumstances.

Because Taiwan is more independent than either Washington or Beijing might prefer, neither great power can fully control developments that might ignite a crisis. This is a classic recipe for surprise, miscalculation and uncontrolled escalation. Traditional questions about Chinese intentions and capabilities miss the mark in analyzing the likelihood of war and the probable course

war would take. A PRC attack on a Taiwan following the pursuit of formal independence from the Chinese nation would be viewed (quite sincerely) in Beijing as purely defensive, to preserve generally recognized territorial sovereignty. Many outside China would view the attack as a sign of belligerence. But military activity against an independence-minded Taiwan might have little relevance to Beijing's behavior on other issues, even for other sovereignty disputes such as those over the Senkaku or Spratly Islands. The niceties of balance of power calculations could prove relatively unimportant in determining whether China would use force over Taiwan and whether it would do so effectively. U.S. efforts to create a stable balance across the Taiwan Strait might deter the use of force under certain circumstances, but certainly not all. Moreover, such efforts would miss the major point of cross-strait strategic interaction. China's military strategy in a conflict over Taiwan would likely be to punish and coerce rather than to control, tasks for which its military may be able to use force to great effect. The PLA's ability to mount a Normandy-style assault on the island is not the toughest question. Geography (the water barrier), together with U.S. supplies, would provide powerful means to Taiwan for blocking such an invasion, even without direct U.S. combat involvement. A greater challenge would be a blockade by the PRC, which has a large number of submarines and mines. Taiwan's proximity to the mainland and its dependence on international trade and investment enhance the potential effect of blockades -- or coercive campaigns involving ballistic and cruise missiles -- even if the military impact would be modest. The PRC might thus be able to damage severely the island's economy regardless of the number of F-16s, AWACS aircraft and theater missile defense batteries the island can bring to bear. Moreover, to break a blockade by sweeping the seas would likely require a direct attack on Chinese vessels. If Chinese forces had not already targeted U.S. ships by that point, it would be up to Washington to decide to fire the first shots against a nuclear-armed country that was attempting to regain limited control of what it believes is its own territory. Some think that the United States should give Taiwan military assistance or defend it directly even in the extreme case that it openly declares legal independence. Many assume that the United States could deter an attack from the mainland and that, if worse came to worst, the United States would prevail in a war should deterrence fail. These assumptions, unfortunately, are suspect. Before being deterred, Beijing would have to weigh the costs of inaction against action. The perceived cost of inaction against Taiwanese independence is very high. No leader can count on survival if labeled the next Li Hongzhang, the diplomat who ceded Taiwan to Japan in the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki. Many in Beijing believe that the United States lacks the national will to pursue a war against China to save Taiwan. If the prospect of casualties did not deter the United States from intervening, the reasoning goes, even low levels of casualties would frighten it into early withdrawal. Following this logic, China need not defeat the U.S. military in wartime or close the gap in military power in peacetime. Rather, the strategic requirement is much lower: to put a number of American soldiers, sailors and airmen at risk. It is dangerous that so many Chinese seem to subscribe to this "Somalia analogy." Washington would probably not be deterred by fears of casualties if it decided that Taiwan was being bullied without serious provocation, any more than it was deterred from attacking Iraq in 1991 by high pre-war casualty estimates. Nor is it likely that, once the United States had made the momentous decision to gear up for combat against a power like China, it would quit easily after suffering a small number of casualties. Thinking over the long term, however, it is hard to imagine how the United States could "win" a war to preserve Taiwan's independence against a resolute China. Too many analyses inside the Beltway stop at the operational level of analysis, assuming that tactical victories answer the strategic question. Sinking the Chinese navy and defeating an invasion attempt against the island would not be the end of the story. Unless the U.S. Air Force were to mount a massive and sustained assault against mainland targets, the PRC would maintain the capability to disrupt commerce, squeeze Taiwan, and keep U.S. personnel at risk. As one American naval officer put it, as a nation much larger than Iraq or Yugoslavia, "China is a cruise missile sponge." This will be doubly true once China builds more road-mobile, solid-fuel missiles and learns better ways to hide its military assets. Moreover, strikes against the mainland would involve huge risks. Recall that for three years, while Chinese forces were killing U.S. soldiers in Korea, the Truman administration refrained from carrying combat to the mainland for fear of a wider war -- and this at a time when China had no nuclear weapons and its Soviet allies had fewer than China now has. China maintains the capacity to strike the U.S. homeland with nuclear missiles, and to strike U.S. bases in the region with both conventional and nuclear missiles. China has or is feverishly obtaining increasingly sophisticated systems, including Russian sa-10 air defense batteries, stealth detection technologies, anti-ship missiles, land attack cruise missiles, accurate ballistic missiles, and new submarines. Any of these could give the United States and its regional allies pause before widening a campaign against the Chinese mainland. And if the issue is a PRC blockade of Taiwan, who will bear the onus of starting a war between China and the United States? If a conventional engagement leaves U.S. naval forces in control of the

Taiwan Strait, can anyone be confident that Beijing would not dream of using a nuclear weapon against the Seventh Fleet? And then what? Such a scenario of nuclear escalation seems fancifully alarmist to many in the post-Cold War era. But is it any more so than
such concerns ever were when defense planning focused on crises with the Soviet Union? Is this an experiment a U.S. commander-in-chief should run?

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2ac impact turn latin American econ


Chinese investment makes Latin America vulnerable to economic downturn Arnson and Davidow 11[Cynthia J. arnson is director of the Latin American Program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for
Scholars, Jeffrey Davidow is the president of the Institute of the Americas, China, Latin America, and the United States: The New Triangle, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Institute of the Americas, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, January] Garca warned that despite the benefits of high export prices, the concentration of exports to China in specific

areassuch as soya, raw materials, and mineralsmakes Latin America vulnerable to an economic downturn and reinforces its traditional production structures. In order to create more equitably distributed and sustainable growth, the China-Latin America trade model must move beyond free trade agreements. However, at present Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in Latin America and the Caribbean is low, and 80 percent of FDI is directed toward tax havens

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2ac impact turn energy security


Chinese influence in Latin American oil hurts US energy security Vega 5 [Juan, 2006 J.D. candidate at the University of Minnesota Law School; M.B.A 2002, University of Florida; B.A.,
1994, Virginia Tech, China's Economic and Political Clout Grows in Latin America at the Expense of U.S. Interests, 14 Minn. J. Global Trade 377]
C. Latin America and U.S. Interests 1. U.S. Oil Interests Roger Noriega, Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, has stated that President Bush's policy on Latin America "is based on promoting democracy through programs aimed at curbing corruption and improving education, promoting trade, and fighting drug trafficking." n103 Latin America is also an essential source of oil for the United States. n104

As China gains more clout in Latin America, the United States may obtain less cooperation from Latin American countries with regard to securing oil, promoting human rights, expanding antinarcotics programs, fighting terrorism, assuring U.S. national security, promoting democracy and higher environmental standards, and reaching long-term trade agreements. n105 It is imperative for the United States to secure future sources of oil from Latin America. Twenty
percent of U.S. energy originates in the Andean countries, which comprise Colombia, Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, and Venezuela. n106 Fourteen of that twenty percent originates in Venezuela. n107 Unrest in Venezuela and other oil-producing countries in Latin America as

well as rising anti-U.S. sentiment throughout the region may jeopardize the United States's access to Latin American oil. n108 The election [*392] of leftist leaders to positions of power and a movement throughout Latin America to nationalize the oil
industry further add to this potential decrease in U.S. access to Latin American oil. n109

Article continues

China is securing bilateral agreements, forming partnerships with Latin American companies and governments, building and repairing infrastructure, and treating Latin American leaders as equals and always with cortesia. As a result, China is becoming an attractive economic

alternative for Latin American countries that have historically been forced to deal predominately with the United States. n142 The United States cannot afford to distance itself from oil-producing countries in this hemisphere nor can it afford to ignore countries that may help it [*398] promote democracy, human rights, and its other interests. The United States should be aware of a future threat posed by a potentially aggressive China that is economically tied to Latin America. The United States should counter China's actions with favorable bilateral trade agreements. A. The China Threat 1. Oil impact turn Securing oil for future demand is imperative. While the United States works to secure oil in a volatile Middle East, China is quietly forming partnerships with the key oil-producing countries of Mexico, Venezuela, and Ecuador. n143 In forming these partnerships, China is creating jobs throughout Latin America and offering economic cooperation, joint partnerships, infrastructure construction, and over one billion new consumers. n144 In addition to agreeing to future purchases of oil, China is involved in the actual extraction and transportation of oil and also in the building of infrastructure to support the oil industry. n145 The threat of China's growing interest in Latin American oil is evident in light of two alarming and related trends: anti-U.S. sentiment is on the rise and socialist leaders are coming to power. These leaders are moving towards state control of the oil industry. n146 If anti-U.S. leftist leaders control twenty percent of the oil that the U.S. imports, an oil embargo against the United States would become a frightening prospect, especially in the event of a U.S. military confrontation with China. n147

Nuclear war Rosen 10

[Mark E. Rosen. Deputy General Counsel, CNA Corporation. LL.M., 1991, University of Virginia School of Law; J.D., 1978, University of Georgia School of Law; A.B., 1974, University of Georgia. Mr. Rosen has over thirty years of experience in the legal and national security fields, including positions with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and a twentyone year career as an international and maritime lawyer with United States Navy. Mr. Rosen holds adjunct teaching appointments at George Washington University School of Law and Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. He teaches courses in Homeland Security Law and Policy. ENERGY INDEPENDENCE AND CLIMATE CHANGE: THE ECONOMIC AND NATIONAL SECURITY CONSEQUENCES OF FAILING TO ACT UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW. Vol. 44. 3/16/2010] There is a growing consensus in U.S. national security circles that American dependence on imported oil constitutes a threat to the United States because a substantial portion of those oil reserves arecontrolled by governments that have historically pursued policies

inimical to U.S. interests. For example, Venezuela, which represents eleven percent of U.S. oil imports, regularly espouses anti-American and
anti-Western rhetoric both at home and abroad . . . [and] . . . promotes . . . [an] anti-U.S. influence in parts of Latin and South America . . .72 that retards the growth of friendly political and economic ties among the United States, Venezuela, and a few other states in Latin and South America. This scenario plays out in many different regions. Russia, for example, has used its oil leverage to exert extreme political pressure upon Ukraine and Belarus.73 Longstanding Western commercial relations with repressive regimes in the Middle Easti.e., Iran, Sudan, and Saudi Arabiaraise similar issues because of the mixed strategic messages that are being sent. Of course, large wealth transfers have allowed the Taliban in Saudi Arabia to bankroll terrorism.74 A. Chokepoints and Flashpoints For the foreseeable future, the U.S. military will most likely be involved in

protecting access to oil suppliesincluding the political independence of oil producersand the global movements of using oil to help

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sustain the smooth functioning of the world economy. The security challenges associated with preserving access to oil are complicated by geographical chokepoints, through which oil flows or is transported, but which are vulnerable to piracy or closure.75 Flashpoints also

exist as a result of political and sometimes militarycompetition to secure commercial or sovereign access to oil in the face

of disputed maritime and land claims that are associated with oil and gas deposits. Together, these challenges have necessitated that the United States and its allies maintain costly navies and air forces to protect sea lanes, ocean access, and maintain a presence to deter military competition in disputed regions. A selection of todays chokepoints and flashpoints follow. The Strait of Hormuz. This strait is the narrow waterway that allows access from the Indian Ocean into the Persian Gulf. Twothirds of the worlds oil is transported by ocean, and a very large percentage of that trade moves through Hormuz. The northern tip of Oman forms the southern shoreline of the strait.76 Hormuz is protected by the constant transits of the U.S. Navy and its allies. Even though the strait has not been closed, the Persian Gulf has been the scene of extensive military conflict.77 On September 22, 1980, Iraq invaded Iran, initiating an eight-year war between the two countries that featured the War of the Tankers, in which 543 ships, including the USS Stark, were attacked, while the U.S. Navy provided escort services to protect tankers that were transiting the Persian Gulf.78 There have been

past threats by Iran to militarily close the strait.79 Additionally, there are ongoing territorial disputes between the United Arab Emirates and Iran over ownership of three islands that are located in approaches to the strait.80 Closure of

the strait would cause severe disruption in the movements of the worlds oil supplies and, at a minimum, cause significant price increases and perhaps supply shortages in many regions for the duration of the closure.81 During the War of the Tankers, oil prices increased from $13 per barrel to $31 a barrel due to supply disruptions and other fear factors. 82 Bab el-Mandeb. The strait separates Africa (Djibouti and Eritrea) and Asia (Yemen), and it connects the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean via the Gulf of Aden. The strait is

an oil transit chokepoint since most of Europes crude oil from the Middle East passes north through Bab el-Mandeb into the Mediterranean via the Suez Canal.83 Closure of the

strait due to terrorist activities or for political/military reasons, could keep tankers from the Persian Gulf from reaching the Suez Canal and Sumed Pipeline complex, diverting them around the southern tip of Africa (the Cape of Good Hope).84 This would add greatly to transit time and cost, and would effectively tie-up spare tanker capacity. Closure of the Bab el-Mandeb would effectively block non-oil shipping from using the Suez Canal.85 In October 2002 the French-flagged tanker Limburg was attacked off the coast of Yemen by terrorists.86 During the Yom Kippur War in 1973, Egypt closed the strait as a means of blockading the southern Israeli port of Eilat.87 The Turkish Straits and Caspian Oil. The term Turkish Straits refers to the two narrow straits in northwestern Turkey, the Bosporus and the Dardanelles, which connect the Sea of Marmara with the Black Sea on one side and the Aegean arm of the Mediterranean Sea on the other. Turkey and Russia have been locked in a longstanding dispute over passage issues involving the Turkish Straits.88 The 1936 Montreux Convention puts Turkey in charge of regulating traffic through the straits;89 yet Turkey has been hard pressed to stop an onslaught of Russian, Ukrainian, and Cypriot tankers, which transport Caspian Sea oil to markets in Western Europe.90 Because of the very heavy shipping traffic and very challenging geography, there have been many collisions and groundings in the past, creating terrible pollution incidents and death.91 Thus far, none of these incidents have been attributed to state-on-state-conflict or terrorism;92 however, the confined waterway is an especially attractive target because of the grave economic and environmental damage that would result from a well-timed and wellplaced attack on a loaded tanker. The issues surrounding the straits are also a subset of larger problems associated with the exploitation of Caspian oil, including severe pollution of the Caspian Sea as a result of imprudent extraction techniques, as well as the ever-present potential for conflict among the various claimants to the Caspians hydrocarbon resources due to an inability of the various Caspian littoral states to agree on their maritime boundariesand their legal areas in which to drill.93 Any one of these problems could become a major flashpoint in the future. China vs. Japan. The

Daiyu/Senkaku islands located in the East China Sea have become an increasingly contentious dispute because both claimants

have, in the past, used modern military platforms to patrol the areas of their claims in which there are suspected oil and gas deposits in the seabed.94 In September 2005, for example, China dispatched five warships to disputed waters surrounding its oil and gas platforms, which were spotted by a Japanese maritime patrol aircraft.95 There have been other similar military-to-military encounters.96 Given the fact that both countries have modern armed forces and are comparatively energy starved, it

is not difficult to envision serious conflict erupting over these disputed areas. The Arctic Super Highway. Traditionalists would probably not include the Arctic as a security chokepoint. The oil

connection is reasonably well known: 22 percent of the worlds undiscovered energy reserves are projected to be in the region (including 13 percent of the worlds petroleum and 30 percent of natural gas).97 However, given the very small margins that transporters earn tran sporting oil from point A to B,98 shipping companies are always in search of shorter routes to transport oil to market. As the thawing of the Arctic Ocean continues as a result of climate change,99 this may create new shipping routes that transporters of oil and other goods will use to maximize their profits and minimize their transit times. As supplies of readily exploitable crude oil are reduced, the probability increases that some of this trade will result from exploitation activities in the land and littoral areas adjacent to the Arctic Sea. This development is concerning for a number of reasons: (1) the area is very remote and could provide a safe haven to pirates seeking to hijack cargoes; (2) the environmental sensitivity of the area, and the concomitant difficulty of mounting a cleanup effort, means that an oil spill in that marine environment will be much more persistent than an oil spill in temperate waters;100 (3) the Arctic presents unique navigational difficulties due to the lack of good charts, navigational aids, and communications towers, as well as the impacts of extreme cold on the operational effectiveness of systems;101 (4) the unsettled nature of claims by various countries, including the United States, to the seabed continental shelf resources in the littoral areas off their coastlines creates the potential for military competition and conflict over these claims.102 The International Maritime Organization (IMO) is now circulating draft guide lines for ships operating in Arctic areas to promotebut not requireship hardening against an iceberg strike, better crew training, and environmental protection measures.103 These guidelines are merely advisory and can only be implemented via the flag states.104 Also, neither IMO nor any of the UN Law of the Sea Institutions have mandatory jurisdiction over any of the flashpoint issues re- lating to competing continental shelf claims in the Arctic,105 meaning that any disputes will remain unresolved for a long time. The above is only a selected list of potential flashpoints in which oil is the main culprit. Disputes between China and six other nations of the Spratly Islands, and other territories in the South China Sea, remain unresolved.106 The Spratly Islands could become a flashpoint in the future, involving the United States or its

allies, because of the proximity of those areas to the major sea routes to Japan and Korea.107 The strategic straits of Malacca, Lombok, and Sunda in Southeast Asia are absolutely essential to the movement of raw materials to Japan, Korea, and China.108 Because of Lomboks depth and strategic location, it is a major transit route for very large crude carriers that move between the Middle
East and Asia.109 Lombok is an undefended waterway that is only eighteen kilometers in width at its southern opening, making it an attractive chokepoint for hijacking or eco-terrorism in which the waters of the environmentally sensitive Indonesian archipelago would be held hostage.110

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2ac impact turn latin America instability


Chinese influence in Latin America destabilizes the region Vega 5 [Juan, 2006 J.D. candidate at the University of Minnesota Law School; M.B.A 2002, University of Florida; B.A.,
1994, Virginia Tech, China's Economic and Political Clout Grows in Latin America at the Expense of U.S. Interests, 14 Minn. J. Global Trade 377]
in a democratic country, elected leaders are held accountable by their constituents. In an authoritarian or communist country, there are no such checks and balances. While some dictators or communist leaders are benign, there is no political safeguard that will

prevent future, malevolent leaders from taking aggressive action against their own people or other countries.
In the event that citizens protest, non-democratic leaders will quickly silence dissidents and continue to act with impunity. n149 The safest way to ensure peace and cooperation is to promote democracy and respect for human rights. China's growing influence in Latin America

represents a risk to unstable democracies in the region. If unchecked, China's economic prominence will cause fragile democracies in Latin America to think twice about the supposed benefits of democracy, capitalism, and globalization. n150 There is a common misconception that, since Latin American countries are democracies [*400] (with the exception of Cuba), democracy is permanent. n151 Based on the reversing trends of the past four years, it is evident that regional democracy is unstable. n152 As more socialist presidents are elected throughout Latin America and faith in the benefits of democracy and capitalism diminish, Latin Americans may begin to favor authoritarian regimes. n153 As China invests heavily in the region, bringing jobs and providing access to Latin American producers for over one-and-a-half billion Chinese consumers, Latin American voters may begin to believe that communism can really work. Communist
China offers Latin American countries an opportunity to see the economic benefits of such a system. The vices of communism have been evident throughout the twentieth century. Unlike Karl Marx's stateless, classless, communist nation, "communist" countries have actually been

ruthless in their pursuit of party loyalty and obedience. n154 Unlike the moderate, evolutionary, and law-abiding outlook that intellectuals had for communism in the beginning of the twentieth century, history has proven that the dictatorship of the proletariat has in fact suppressed expression, human rights, and other freedoms that people hold dear. n155
While the United States often offers trade incentives as a reward for adherence to principles of human rights, China is likely to disregard such requirements. n156

That causes nuclear war and extinction Manwaring 05 adjunct professor of international politics at Dickinson

(Max G., Retired U.S. Army colonel, Venezuelas Hugo Chvez, Bolivarian Socialism, and Asymmetric Warfare, October 2005, pg. PUB628.pdf) President Chvez also understands that the process leading to state failure is the most dangerous long-term security challenge facing the global community today. The argument in general is that failing and failed state status is the breeding ground for instability, criminality, insurgency, regional conflict, and terrorism. These conditions breed massive humanitarian disasters and major refugee flows.

They can host evil networks of all kinds, whether they involve criminal business enterprise, narco -trafficking, or some form of ideological crusade such as Bolivarianismo. More specifically, these conditions spawn all kinds of things people in general do not like such as murder, kidnapping, corruption, intimidation, and destruction of infrastructure. These means of coercion and persuasion can spawn further human rights violations, torture, poverty, starvation, disease , the recruitment and use of child soldiers, trafficking in women and body parts, trafficking and proliferation of conventional weapons systems and WMD, genocide, ethnic cleansing, warlordism, and criminal anarchy. At the same time, these actions are usually unconfined and spill over into regional syndromes of poverty, destabilization, and conflict.62 Perus Sendero Luminoso calls violent and destructive activities that facilitate the
processes of state failure armed propaganda. Drug

cartels operating throughout the Andean Ridge of South America and elsewhere call these activities business incentives. Chvez considers these actions to be steps that must be taken to bring about the political conditions necessary to establish Latin American socialism for the 21st century.63 Thus, in addition to helping to provide

wider latitude to further their tactical and operational objectives, state and nonstate actors strategic efforts are aimed a t progressively lessening a targeted regimes credibility and capability in terms of its ability and willingness to govern and develop its national territory and society. Chvezs intent is to focus his primary attack politically and psychologically on selected Latin American governments ability and right to g overn. In that context, he understands that popular perceptions of corruption, disenfranchisement, poverty, and lack of upward mobility limit the right and the ability of a given regime to conduct the business of the state. Until a given populace generally perceives that its government is dealing with these and other basic issues of political, economic, and social injustice fairly and effectively, instability and the threat of subverting or destroying such a government are real.64 But failing and failed states simply do not go away. Virtually anyone can take advantage of such an unstable situation. The tendency is that the best motivated and best armed organization on the scene will control that instability. As a consequence, failing and failed states become dysfunctional states, rogue states, criminal states, narco-states, or new peoples democracies. In connection with the creation of new peoples democracies, one can rest assured that Chvez and his Bolivarian populist allies will be available t o provide money, arms, and leadership at any given opportunity. And, of course, the longer dysfunctional, rogue, criminal, and narco-states and peoples democracies persist, the more they and their associated problems endanger global security, peace, and prosperity .65

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Ext china Taiwan war


China uses influence in Latin America to turn countries against Taiwan this results in war Fergusson 12 [Robbie Murray, MS in China In The International Arena, The Chinese Challenge to the Monroe
Doctrine, http://www.e-ir.info/2012/07/23/does-chinese-growth-in-latin-america-threaten-american-interests/, 7/23]
On the other hand, for

the PRC, every state which withdraws its support for the ROC takes it one step closer to being in a position where it can resolve the Taiwan issue unilaterally. Subsequently, undermining Taiwan is of the utmost importance to China, and it has taken to outbidding Taiwan in offers of foreign aid, a strategy made possible by the decline in aid from the defunct Soviet Union, and the West, which is pre occupied with terrorism and the Middle East.

Li notes that the regions leaders have turned to Asia for help to promote trade and financial assistance, and consequently played the PRC and Taiwan against each other. [53] Despite its smaller size, Taiwan has fared remarkably well in this bidding war; focusing its aid investments on infrastructure such as stadiums in St Kitts & Nevis for the Cricket World Cup in 2007. However, even Taiwans economy can be put under strai n by the seemingly relentless stream of foreign aid which has brought only debateable and mild gains to the Taiwanese cause. This has contributed to the PRC

picking off the few remaining supporters of the ROC take for example, the Dominican case. In early 2004, Commonwealth of
Dominica asked Taipei for a $58 million aid, which is unrelated to public welfare. The Caribbean nation had relied on Taiwan to develop its agriculture-based economy since 1983. Diplomatic relationship was soon broken after Taipei turned down the request. [54] This incident showcased the fact that in economic terms, the PRC is winning the battle for Latin America. Political strategies of the PRC In political terms too; the PRC is in an advantageous position, thanks in part again to its position within the UN. While

it can be argued that China provides incentives but does not threaten harm to induce countries to defect from recognizing Taiwan, [55] the reality is that the It refuses to maintain official relations with any state that recognises the ROC; an action which can be quite prohibitive to the country being able to take advantage of the growing Chinese market. use of force and direct harm are not the only means available to an economic entity as powerful as China. Although
Domnguez suggests that the PRC has not been punitive toward those states that still recognize the Republic of China (Taiwan), [56] the legitimacy of this claim has to be brought into question for example in June 1996, China fought the extension of the UN mission in Haiti, to punish the Caribbean nation for its appeal for UN acceptance of Taiwan. [57] This incident showed that China is prepared to use its global clout

to play spoiler and apply indirect pressure on countries to adopt its position. Similarly, Chinas experience with one-party
rule has taught it the importance of party-to-party relations in addition to state-to-state relations, further cementing the PRC by establishing a relationship based on goodwill and common understanding. Indeed by the start of 1998 the CCP had established relations with

almost all major political parties in the countries that were Taiwans diplomatic allies in Latin America, [58] further isolating the ROC. The effect on American interests Were the ROC to be deserted by its remaining allies in Latin America, the USA would be disadvantaged in attempting to maintain the status quo across the Taiwan Strait. A Taiwan that was not recognised by any state from the Americas, or Europe (with the exception of the Vatican) would not be seen as a genuine sovereign entity whose defence would be more important than the upkeep of good relations between China and the West. As Chinas economic and political position in the world improves vis--vis both America and Taiwan, so might its ambitions. The U.S.A might find itself in a position where it could no longer withstand the diplomatic pressure to allow the PRC to conclude a settlement on Taiwan, perhaps by force.

China uses economic leverage in Latin America to gain support against Taiwan Ellis 10 [R. Evan Ellis is an Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the Center for Hemispheric Defense
Studies at the National Defense University, Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study, National Defense University, http://www.ndu.edu/press/chinese-soft-power-latin-america.html]
Diplomatic Recognition of Taiwan. For

the PRC, the government of Taiwan represents an important issue of political legitimacy and internal security. Currently, 12 of the 23 nations in the world that diplomatically recognize the government of Taiwan are found in Latin America and the Caribbean. Although the People's Republic of China does not publicly threaten to block investment in or loans to countries that do not recognize the PRC, China repeatedly emphasizes the issue in its public diplomacy in the region, and makes such investments and market access difficult for those countries that do not recognize it, while simultaneously nurturing expectations regarding the opportunities that diplomatically recognizing the PRC could bring. When Costa Rica changed its diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the PRC in
May 2007, for example, it received an aid package that included an $83 million soccer stadium, the purchase of $300 million in government bonds, various highway, public works, and aid projects, and a $1 billion joint venture to expand the country's petroleum refinery, as well as PRC aid in facilitating access to Chinese markets by traditional Costa Rican products such as coffee. In part, such Chinese generosity was directed

toward the other countries in the region that still recognized Taiwan in order to demonstrate the types of benefits that could be made available if they too were to change their diplomatic posture.13 Although the PRC and Taiwan have informally agreed to refrain from the use of economic incentives to competitively "bid" for
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diplomatic recognition, since Costa Rica's switch, the allure of the PRC has prompted declarations of interest in changing diplomatic posture by Panamanian president Richard Martenelli, Paraguayan president Fernando Lugo, and Salvadoran president
Maricio Fuenesalthough all did so prior to assuming office.

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Ext heg/trade
Chinese influence in Latin America creates an alternative to free trade and US influence Ellis 12 [R. Evan, a professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the Center for
Hemispheric Defense Studies, with a research focus on Latin Americas relationships with external actors, including China, Russia, and Iran, The United States, Latin America and China: A Triangular Relationship?, Inter -American Dialogue, May]
Moving from economics to political and social interdependencies, it is important to note that Chinese

trade and investment with Latin American regimes indirectly undermine the ability of the United States to pursue its agenda in the region. This agenda focuses on multiple topics, from trade and respect for private property, to defense of the interests of US companies, to adherence to certain principles of democracy and human rights. With respect to trade and investment, the availability of the PRC as an alternative market was one factor leading Latin America away from the USoriented Free Trade Area of the Americas trading regime and, instead, toward establishment of a network of bilateral free trade
agreements. Under these agreements certain nations, such as Chile, Peru and Costa Rica, would attempt to both take advantage of the emerging Chinese market and serve as the link through which other nations in the region would do the same.11 Loans, investments and commodity

purchases from China have allowed regimes relatively hostile to the United States, such as Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador, to turn their backs on Western lending institutions like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. They also opened the way in some cases for default on loans, the nationalization of industries or other actions hostile to the interests of Western companies; in the short term, these regimes were able to sidestep the negative consequences that such actions bring from traditional capital markets. Over the long term, however, there is
potential for a feedback effect beneficial to the United States and other Western investors. High interest rates in the case of Ecuadoran loans12 and the questionable loan terms in Venezuela13 have already been used as political fodder by the opposition in those countries,14 increasing the likelihood that an explicit movement away from such loans and capital, and back to Western financial markets and institutions, may be on the agenda when changes in political regime occur in these states Chinese purchases, loans and investments in Latin America have undercut

the United States leverage in demanding adherence to certain practices of democracy, human rights and free trade. This is particularly relevant with respect to the nations in the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA). In contrast to Western governments and institutions, Chinese investors traditionally do not link their loans and investments to the political practices of the recipient states. That said, recognition of the PRC diplomatically is often an implicit condition, as is special treatment of Chinese investments and protection from expropriations and other administrative action for companies operating in the countryeven where such actions are being taken at the same time against Western companies. The economic success of the PRC, while pursuing relatively mercantilist policies and limiting democratic freedoms and Western-style human rights, sends a powerful message to Latin American regimes and societies that growth and prosperity can be achieved independent of adherence to Western economic proscriptions, political norms and human rights practices. It is important to distinguish the lesson from Beijing that prosperity can be achieved without heeding the United States from the concept of a specific Beijing Model that the West can follow. Latin American leaders do not have to believe that they can follow in Beijings footsteps, only that they do not have to follow in those of the United States.

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Ext heg/china war


Chinese investment in Latin America makes challenges to the US inevitable results in USChina war Ellis 12 [R. Evan, a professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the Center for
Hemispheric Defense Studies, with a research focus on Latin Americas relationships with external actors, including China, Russia, and Iran, The United States, Latin America and China: A Triangular Relationship?, Inter -American Dialogue, May]
Meanwhile, PRC

loans for regimes hostile to the United States, such as those of Hugo Chvez in Venezuela, Rafael Correa in these regimes with liquidity that they would not otherwise have. This indirectly helps them persist in policies that are potentially harmful to US interests, such as allegations that the
Ecuador and Evo Morales in Bolivia, provide

Venezuelan government provided support for the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) as well as to radical indigenous groups in Peru, Bolivia and elsewhere. Chinas willingness to sell low-cost arms to countries such as Venezuela has undermined the sales of K-8 and Y-8 aircraft to Venezuela, mentioned earlier, as well as sales of mobile radar systems, are the two highest-visibility examples.16

ability of the United States to work with its allies to impose arms-purchase controls on certain regimes. Chinese Chinese loans to Venezuela have also indirectly freed that governments funds in other areas, making it easier for it to acquire large quantities of military equipment from Russia, including Mi-17 helicopters, Su-24 fighter aircraft, Kalashnikov rifles, tanks and armored vehicles. Beyond the nations of ALBA, Chinese military training and educational opportunities for virtually all Latin American countries that diplomatically recognize the PRC have opened the door for officials of these militaries to obtain a diversity of experience, undercutting to some degree their interest in working with the United States as a military partner.17 Nonetheless, the relatively low level of
Chinese military engagement with the region to date has limited this impact. Expansion of Chinese humanitarian military initiatives to the region, including participation in the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Haiti (MINUSTAH), the Angel de Paz bilateral humanitarian exercise between Peru and the PRC in November 2010 and the visit of the hospital ship USS Comfort to the region in December 2011, represents an important additional dimension of this effect. At best, such initiatives send a subtle message to regional militaries that the United

States is not the only game in town, (although US failure to give greater priority to the region arguably undercuts US influence more than any Chinese initiative. At worst, these initiatives permit the Chinese to enhance their working knowledge of Latin Americas mili taries and facilities while allowing them the experience of operating in the region. The value of this experience would become obvious in the remote and undesirable event that the friendly competition between the PRC and United States turns more hostile and the Chinese seek to project a less benevolent military presence into the region. Chinese military engagement with the region is also likely to cause discomfort because of the United States traditionally close security relationship with countries in Latin America. The PRCs position may present particular challenges with respect to initiatives to ensure the security of Chinese companies and nationals.
The growing physical presence of Chinese companies in the region in the coming years is likely to drive them, and their government, to collaborate more closely with Latin American security forces in managing the risk that comes from operating in remote or dangerous areas in extractive industries and on construction projects. This is already happening in Honduras, where the Honduran military provides security for Chinese firm Sinohydrowork on the Patuca III hydroelectric project, as well as in Colombia, where China and the Colombian government coordinated to secure the release of the Great Wall Drilling Company oil crew kidnapped in Colombia in June 2011.18 In the course of protecting their companies and

nationals, Chinese private security firms may also inadvertently become involved in violence in the region, including controversial incidents in which locals are killed by those security forces.

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Ext impact turn magnifier/spills over


Instability caused by Chinese involvement in Latin America spills over to the US Ellis 12 [R. Evan, a professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the Center for
Hemispheric Defense Studies, with a research focus on Latin Americas relationships with external actors, including China, Russia, and Iran, The United States, Latin America and China: A Triangular Relationship?, Int er-American Dialogue, May]

Chinese engagement with the region ultimately impacts the United States in broader terms, because the United States is intimately tied to the region in geographical, human and economic terms. To the extent that PRC activities in Latin America inadvertently generate economic displacement and sociopolitical problems among nations in the region, the resulting turmoil potentially spills over to the United States. Examples could include future crises in countries that become heavily dependent on Chinese loans, such as Venezuela and Ecuador, or political tension sparked by displaced manufacturing sectors in countries such as Brazil and Mexico, or
controversy over the entry of Chinese firms into new extractive sectors such as agriculture in Brazil and Argentina or mining in Peru. Reciprocally, to the extent that Latin Americas exports to the PRC increase prosperity and bolster development, the US benefits: Latin America is able to purchase more US goods, and Latin American migration to the United States for economic reasons does not grow.21

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Ext impact turn prefer our ev


Latin America specialists are biased against US interests and so refuse to view China with suspicion Farnsworth 12 [Eric, vice-president of the Council of the Americas in WashingtonDC and from 1995 to 1998 was
In part, this is because most Latin

senior adviser to the White House special envoy for the Americas, Memo to Washington: China's Growing Presence in Latin America, American Quarterly]

America specialists in the policy community are not well versed in international relations theory or practice, and therefore do not focus on geostrategic issues (Sabatini, MarchApril 2012, Foreign

Affairs). They are development specialists, historians, human rights advocates, sociologists, Spanish (though generally not Portuguese) linguists, community activists, and the like. Some are uncomfortable with the idea that the U.S. has legitimate national interests

to pursue or values to promote, viewing the region through a historical filter that highlights the U.S. as the primary threat to the region rather than as a critical if imperfect driver of democratic governance and economic growth and opportunity. As a result, there may be a tendency to be suspicious of actions that promote U.S. economic and national security interests, including trade and investment expansion, counternarcotics programs, security assistance, and even democracy promotion in relation to Cuba and elsewhere. It is within this intellectual construct that they place the growing influence of extra-regional actors and also rising regional actors such as Brazil. This overwhelming bias in the policy and academic communitiesa bias that does not generally inform U.S. policy in other regions continues to put U.S. policy in the region at a disadvantage. It focuses on things we cannot fully change while neglecting
initiatives that would accrue to our benefit.

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Ext link defense


China wont threaten its relations with the US for Latin American oil Fergusson 12 [Robbie Murray, MS in China In The International Arena, The Chinese Challenge to the Monroe
Doctrine, http://www.e-ir.info/2012/07/23/does-chinese-growth-in-latin-america-threaten-american-interests/, 7/23]

Although China is thirsty for resources, it is aware that they do not always come without political cost. Unrest in the Western hemisphere does not help China such a scenario, or rocky bilateral relations with Washington, might threaten energy and other deliveries to China and thus impede the countrys domestic growth. [128] Keeping under the radar is one of the main tenets of the peaceful rise theory and China has no interest at all in confrontation. Consider the Venezuela-Exxon crisis mentioned earlier, where tankers of oil destined for the United States ended up being rerouted to China. David Winning suggests this is because China values its relations with Washington and will likely be loath to create new friction by being seen to benefit from the Venezuela-Exxon legal spat at a time when it is already coming under pressure for its oil investments in Sudan and Iran. [129] This highlights Chinas caution when it comes to invoking the ire of the United States. J.D Pollack thinks that not only should China and the U.S avoid irritating one another, but they actually have scope for cooperation on energy matters, such as preventing any disruption in supply, or encouraging enhanced energy exploration. [130] Even if such collaboration were improbable, for the short and medium term, Wan Jisi suggests the simple mantra that each country should be sensitive to the others energy needs and security interests worldwide. [131] When an issue is treated as being within the realm of exceptional politics, it is elevated in importance and dealt with as a security issue unnecessarily.

Latin America is not that important to China Tokatlian 7 [Juan Gabriel Tokatlian is a professor of international relations at the Universidad Torcuato Di Tella,
Argentina, Latin America, China, and the United States: a hopeful triangle, http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-protest/hopeful_triangle_4336.jsp]
Second, Latin are not closely intertwined, nor are they equally vital for all parties. The

America, China, and the United States do not constitute a strategic triangle: the bilateral ties of each pair reciprocal significance of Washington-Beijing relations is, for each side, greater than their respective relationships with Latin America. At the same time, the weight of the United States in the external and internal politics of Latin America is much more important than that of China, and Latin America is not among China's highest priorities when compared to other countries (particularly, the more developed ones) and regions (especially its closest periphery). Furthermore, the history and recent evolution of this triangle has not had notable implications for the international balance of power, nor does it appear that it will in the near future.

Economic engagement with Latin America is not zero-sum Shixue 9 [Jiang, Vice President, Chinese Association of Latin American Studies Professor, Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences Understanding Chinas Relations with Latin America, http://www.sinolatincapital.com/Upload/2009929184158.pdf, April]
At the testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere in June 2008, Erikson once again pointed out that While Chinas expansion into Latin America may imply a potential loss for some U.S. business

sectors, it is important to note that trade is not a zero sum game. To the extent that Chinas involvement is sparking economic growth in Latin America, it may contribute to economic stability and well-being in a manner that suits the U.S. desire to see a prosperous and healthy neighborhood.

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At ccp instability
The transition will be stable. Bruce Gilley 7, Assistant professor of political studies at Queen's University in Canada, and former contributing editor
at the Far Eastern Economic Review. Is China Stuck? Journal of Democracy, 18.1, January, Project Muse. Yet what if the CCP is actually quite responsive? What if it is in tune with popular demands, and finds ways to move and adapt as those demands change? In other words, what if the party stays or goes because of popular pressures? Pei himself recognizes this possibility. He cites "rising public dissatisfaction" (p.14) as one thing that would prod the regime to change. "A democratic opening may emerge in the end, but not as a regime-initiated strategy undertaken at its own choosing, but more likely as the result of a sudden crisis" (p. 44). Perhaps the word crisis is being used in two different senses here. One crisis and another can, after all, vary in urgency: There are crises and there are crises. The crisis of which Pei speaks seems to be of the more benign sort, a mere shift in public preferences that prods the regime to change. Such a crisis will not require democracy to rise upon the ashes of a razed public square, but rather will stir the regime to recognize that its time has come, and to do the right thing by going fairly gentle into that good night. If so, then the prospects for a relatively smooth democratic transition in China are bright and no collapse is likely.

Impacts to CCP collapse are fear-mongering --- instability ensures democracy Bruce Gilley 4, PhD Candidate Politics @ Princeton U. and Adjunct Prof. Intl. Affairs @ New School U. China's
Democratic Future: How it Will Happen and where it Will Lead, 2004, p. 115-116, Google Books
Would the entire PRC edifice simply collapse from the accumulated pressures of crisis and mass protest? In cross-country comparisons, "posttotalitarian" states like China are the most vulnerable to collapse because they are unable to respond creatively to protest and yet there is no organized opposition to assume control.49 The East German regime was a perfect example. It simply collapsed when huge defections from the state occurred at every level and there was no organized opposition ready to take over. In the German case, there was a neighboring fraternal state whose arms provided some cushion for the collapse. China would not have the same support. For this reason, the CCP and many of its supporters have warned of

the dangers of collapse in words designed to scare the regime's opponents into quiescence. Fear-mongering about the consequences of regime collapse in China has been a staple of PRC propaganda since reforms began. Deng said: "If the
political situation in China became unstable the trouble would spread to the rest of the world, with consequences that would be hard to imagine."50 Foreign scholars have taken up the histrionics with relish. One has worried about "societal disintegration" and even "the fragmentation of China into several competing politics."'1 Another warns: "At worst the resulting chaos from a collapsing China would have a profound effect on the stability of Asia and on the U.S. policy to guarantee the security of its Asian allies. At the least, China could turn to the West for economic relief and reconstruction, the price tag of which would be overwhelming."52 Yet these fears appear overblown or misplaced . First, as we saw in the last part, many of these dire descriptions are an accurate portrayal of China today . The problems of Party rule have created

the very crisis that the fear-mongers allude to. China already has an AIDs crisis, an illegal emigration crisis, a pollution crisis, and an economic crisis. Given its well-established state and social cohesion, China has far more to gain than to lose from political liberalization. Second, there is a good argument that governance in China will not collapse further even with a top leadership in crisis. The country actually functioned quite normally during the Cultural Revolution, when there was often no rule at the top, as a result of strong local governments and a social fabric that held together. At this stage, with popular protests in full swing, a military on good behavior and a regime trying to confront the possibility of change, there is no reason to believe that the country will abruptly disintegrate. As in 1989, in fact, there is every reason to believe that people will act better toward each other and that local governments will look kindly upon the movement, an outpouring of civic behavior linked to the ideals of democracy. Finally, as above, if we are concerned with the creation of a more just system, then some degree of "chaos" relating to unstable government may be a worthwhile price to pay, including for the world. Claims by some U.S. foreign policy analysts that "there is as great a 'threat' to US interests from a weak and unstable China as there is from a strong and antagonistic China"*' are based on a highly instrumental and even then flawed view of U.S.. and world, interests. A world community committed to the principles of justice through democracy has an overriding interest in its realization in China. To the extent that instability in China worsens conditions for greater justice there or abroad, it would indeed "threaten" world interests. But if the instability, despite its costs, leads to greater gains through a more just order in China and, through it, abroad, then this is very much in the world's interest. Few Americans, French, Croats, Romanians, South Africans, Filipinos. South Koreans, or
Indonesians would say the "chaos" of their democratic revolutions was not a price worth paying. China's people should be allowed to make the same choice.

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At china-taiwan war
No China-Taiwan warmultiple different checks DOD 7 Defense Departments annual threat assessment of China prepared for Congress (ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, 5/23, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/dod-2007.pdf, AG) China is deterred on multiple levels from taking military action against Taiwan. First, China does not yet possess the military capability to accomplish with confidence its political objectives on the island, particularly when confronted with the prospect of U.S. intervention. Moreover, an insurgency directed against the PRC presence could tie up PLA forces for years. A military conflict in the Taiwan Strait would also affect the interests of Japan and other nations in the region in ensuring a peaceful resolution of the cross-Strait dispute. Beijings calculus would also have to factor in the potential political and economic repercussions of military conflict with Taiwan. Chinas leaders recognize that a war could severely retard economic development. Taiwan is Chinas single largest source of foreign direct investment, and an extended campaign would wreck Taiwans economic infrastructure, leading to high reconstruction costs. International sanctions could further damage Beijings economic development. A conflict would also severely damage the image that Beijing has sought to project in the post-Tiananmen years and would taint Beijings hosting of the 2008 Olympics, for which Chinas leaders would almost certainly face boycotts and possibly a loss of the games. A conflict could also trigger domestic unrest on the mainland, a contingency that Beijing appears to have factored into its planning. Finally, Chinas leaders recognize that a conflict over Taiwan involving the United States would give rise to a long-term hostile relationship between the two nations a result that would not be in Chinas interests. Cross straight relations are at an all-time high no risk of escalatory war Kastner et al. 2009, (Dr. Scott, Prof @ U of Maryland, Phil Saunders, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Is a China-Taiwan Peace Deal in the Cards? 7/27) http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/07/27/is_a_china_taiwan_peace_deal_in_the_cards)

In 1995 and 1996, as China fired ballistic missiles across the Taiwan Strait, U.S. analysts joked that Beijing's military capabilities were so limited that an invasion would require a "million-man swim." An ambitious military modernization program has greatly improved Chinese military capabilities since then, but an even more remarkable shift has taken place in political relations with Taiwan over the last year. Since Ma Ying-jeou's inauguration as president of Taiwan in May 2008, mainland China and Taiwan have established direct shipping , air transport, and postal links; opened Taiwan to mainland tourists; and increased financial cooperation. The two sides are now negotiating a far-reaching economic cooperation agreement. This new atmosphere has greatly reduced the chances of a cross-strait confrontation that might draw the United States and China into a military conflict. Indeed, China and Taiwan recently announced plans for 100 swimmers to swim five miles from the Chinese city of Xiamen to the Taiwan-controlled island of Jinmen. The offshore islands -- once a Cold War flashpoint -- have become a symbol of the dramatic improvement in cross-strait relations. Leaders on both sides have expressed interest in consolidating the improved relationship by negotiating a peace agreement. The recent warming trend suggests that it is now worth thinking seriously about how a peace agreement might work and what implications it might have for the United States.

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At chinese economy
Chinese economy is resilient competition, entrepreneurship, and strengthened global institutions Overholt 2004 [William, Asia Policy Chair at the Center for Asia Pacific Policy of the RAND Corporation, Chinas
Economy, Resilience and Challenge, Harvard China Review, Spring 2004, http://www.rand.org/pubs/reprints/RP1116/RP1116.pdf] Along with the shift to domestic-led growth, other key factors have contributed to China's economic resilience. Competition is one. In recent years, Chinese leaders have been emphasizing competition, breaking up cartels at home and encouraging competition from
abroad. Although this emphasis has a long way to go, competition is why, for instance, China at the end of 2002 had over 200 million cell phone subscriptions at very low prices while India had only 10 million at higher prices. One might include under the rubric of competition the imposition of market pressures on state-owned firms. Employment in state and collective enterprises declined by 55 million in five years. China's total manufacturing employment has declined by 25 million in recent years -- about ten times the parallel decline that has occurred in the U.S.

This creates a vast shift of national resources out of unproductive activity into productive activity and thereby increases the economy's resilience. A highly entrepreneurial economy also contributes. From the beginning of Chinese reform, entrepreneurship has been not only encouraged but also required . At the local level, Beijing withdrew much of the previous budget
support and in return gave local officials and governments the right to start businesses and hold property' rights in them. At all levels, officials as well as private citizens became entrepreneurs. Teachers supported their schools and themselves by giving the students chicks and requiring them to raise chickens. Institutes of Marxism-Leninism started business consulting operations. This went too far. For instance, along with distributing Dr. Pepper and marketing Baskin Robbins ice cream, the army became the biggest smuggler in world history, and many recent reforms have sought to bring official entrepreneurship under control. (The army was largely removed from business.) The entrepreneurial spirit remains, and facilitates rapid adjustment to new conditions. In Beijing, virtually any student returning from abroad with an appropriate post-graduate degree can get a government entrepreneurship grant sufficient to equip an office for 10 people; the many who fail tend to go to work for those who succeed, potentially creating a critical mass of entrepreneurship. China's globalization makes it vulnerable to global trends, but this has been outweighed by gains in efficiency and ability to adjust. Since China is a low cost producer in many areas, it can often continue to grow even when others get squeezed. More importantly, the process of institutional globalization makes it resilient. China reaches around the world eclectically for best practice, as Japan did in the early Meiji period, remodeling its central bank after the U.S. Fed and its emergency response system after the U.S. FEMA, borrowing securities laws from Hong Kong and the U.S., choosing Taiwan's foreign portfolio investment regulations to be its own, creating huge-scale science parks modeled on Taiwan's Hsinchu with aspects of Silicon Valley thrown in, emulating France's defense procurement system, and adapting rule of law concepts from the West. Above all, China is sending its youth elite abroad for education, primarily in the U.S., to a degree probably unparalleled by any large country since the Romans turned their kids over to the Greeks. The results in China are the same as they were in Meiji Japan: growth and resilience. But globalization has gone further and faster in China than Japan could ever accept.

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At us-china relations
(US-Sino) relations are resilient despite disputes Denmark 10 ( center for a new American security fellow, transcript of Abraham denmarks remakrs about us-china
relations on NPRs morning edition, us seeks to revitalize ties with china, http://www.cnas.org/node/5539)
"If the U.S. was going to ask things of China, China was now in a position to ask things of the United States such things as agreeing to end arms sales to Taiwan, agreeing to stop having military exercises or reconnaissance missions close in to Chinese shoreline, near Chinese waters," Harding said. Harding said the U.S. hasn't agreed to do any of these things. Conversely, China hasn't addressed U.S. concerns over issues such as human rights, trade imbalance and the strength of its currency. Harding said he worries that those lingering, unresolved issues could fester. But he said that overall the U.S.-China relationship is resilient. He pointed to the economic turbulence of 2010, which many people speculated would lead to a breakdown in relations between the two countries. "I think many people thought that was going to be the result of the global downturn, resulting in [a] pretty open trade war," he said. "That didn't happen, and I think that it shows that despite all the differences and all the tensions, the two countries are highly interdependent."

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no link cuba
China doesnt care about Cuba Dominguez 6 [Jorge, Professor at Harvard University, Chinas Relations With Latin America: Shared Gains,
Asymmetric Hopes, Inter-American Dialogue, http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/china.pdf]

China itself employs verbal formulas to characterize the strategic value that it assigns to each country. Brazil ranks first. China explicitly ranks Cuba last, and Chile next to last. The ranking in strategic value generally matches the objective economic value of the bilateral relations, though on the economic dimension Chiles worth to China rises at the relative
expense of Argentina and Venezuela. The economies of China and the Latin American countries in this study are largely complementary. The main exception is between China and Mexico, whose economies are mostly competitive. The growth of Chinese imports in Argentina and Brazil has given rise to greater, though still limited, opposition to further expansion of trade with China.

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K of the DA
The DA is the logic of neocolonialism Ellis 12 [R. Evan, a professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the Center for
Hemispheric Defense Studies, with a research focus on Latin Americas rela tionships with external actors, including China, Russia, and Iran, The United States, Latin America and China: A Triangular Relationship?, Inter -American Dialogue, May]

Although the concept of a triangle to define the relationship among China, the United States and Latin America is not, in itself, morally offensive, it subtly advances a neocolonialist paradigm by suggesting that best way to understand Latin Americas complex relationships with important parties beyond the region is to focus on two countries, the United States and China. It also implies that the actions and decisions of these two actors will largely define outcomes for Latin America as the third leg of the triangle. This is flawed on two counts. First, as already noted, it conceals other possibilities, including a dynamic relationship between Latin America and multiple other global actors, creating space to have multi-dimensional relationships and achieve benefits from interactions that permit the growth of all parties. Second, it implies a logic, and perhaps even a legitimacy, for the United States and China to coordinate, not only with respect to their policies toward and activities in Latin America, but also in their management of Latin America as the two dominant stewards of the global order, just as Great Britain, France and Spain negotiated over colonies and subordinate states in a prior era.

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Counterplan

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1nc - cp
Text: The government of Mexico should privatize its oil industry. Privatization solves oil production, cooperation with the US and energy security LA Times 13 [Mexico weighs a new path to its oil; It edges toward letting foreigners invest in state -owned Pemex
and maybe drill there., March 5]

Mexico's ruling party has taken a step toward opening its state oil company to outsiders, a move that could eventually allow U.S. oil firms to drill south of the border. In an important test of Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto's sway
over resistant factions of his party, the Institutional Revolutionary Party has changed its bylaws to clear the way for changes at Petroleos Mexicanos, or Pemex. Pemex, a symbol of nationalist pride, is the top source of tax revenue for the Mexican government. But

its production of oil has been declining dramatically and the company is in dire need of outside expertise for deep-sea exploration. On Sunday, PRI, as the party is known, passed several changes that Pena Nieto needed for the reforms he promised as a hallmark of his administration. Chief and most difficult among them is opening the behemoth Pemex to private and foreign investment, long a taboo in this country. "It's a win-win situation" for Mexico and the U.S., said Fadel Gheit, a senior energy analyst at Oppenheimer & Co. "The Mexican government finally realized that banning international companies from participating in this sector was very ill-advised because they lack the technology, they lack the expertise, and they don't have enough money to put up the capital needed to grow production." U.S. oil companies are already familiar with the Gulf of Mexico, where Mexico's offshore oil reserves lie, Gheit said. But companies may be skittish after run-ins with Venezuela's President Hugo Chavez, who nationalized the assets of some foreign oil giants in recent years. "It will be larger oil companies -- the Exxons, the Shells" that invest in Pemex, Gheit said. "But they want to make sure the government doesn't pull the plug in a year or two because these investments are long-term and cost millions of dollars." Calls to Shell Oil Co. and Chevron Corp. were not

immediately returned. For Mexicans, the issue is deeply emotional as well as politically charged. The country nationalized its industry in 1938 in response to decades of perceived exploitation by foreign oil interests. Ever since, most Mexicans have considered public ownership of the country's most lucrative natural resource to be a cornerstone of their sovereignty. Mexico is one of the 10 largest oil producers in the world

and an important partner in the U.S. energy trade. But production has been sliding for nearly a decade because of steep declines in the country's main oil field, Cantarell, located in shallow waters off Campeche state. Pemex lacks the equipment and expertise to drill in deeper waters. Other oil-rich countries have struck deals with outsiders to develop their oil in exchange for a percentage of production. But Mexico's constitution prohibits such arrangements. Pena Nieto's plans for Pemex have already led the political left to accuse the government of trying to privatize the oil company.
The government insists that overall ownership of the oil business will remain in state hands; the proposed changes are expected to be presented to Congress late this year. "Let's show, with attitude, with action and with voice, that we are a new generation of PRI," Pena Nieto told his party. "This is an assembly of renewal and transformation." If the reforms pass, U.S. oil companies are well positioned to both refine

and consume the oil produced, said Bruce Bullock, executive director of Southern Methodist University's Maguire Energy Institute. In the long run, he said, such partnerships could help smooth big gyrations in gas prices. "The more oil we can get out of friendly places like Canada and Mexico, and the less oil we can get out of places like Venezuela and the Middle East, certainly the less volatile oil prices will be," he said. For Mexico, Sunday's vote was a significant gauge of whether Pena Nieto would be able to win the support of the more stubborn members of the party who remain wedded to old-style PRI nationalistic paternalism and who are not inclined to change the way Pemex is run.

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Ext: Pemex privat k2 mexican oil


Privatization is crucial to attract foreign investment and cooperation that solves the decline of the Mexican oil industry Miranda 9 [Martin, J.D. Candidate, 2010, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., University of California, Berkeley,
THE LEGAL OBSTACLES TO FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN MEXICO'S OIL SECTOR, 33 Fordham Int'l L.J. 206]
III. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PEMEX REFORM President

Calderon has successfully allowed more private participation in the oil sector without a constitutional fight, n162 but many experts believe the courts will ultimately strike down any hydrocarbon-related legislation further expanding foreign participation through risk contracts so long as Articles 27 and 28 of the Constitution remain unchanged. n163 The evolution of Brazil's state-

controlled oil company Petrobras appears to be viable blueprint for Pemex. n164 Following this model will require coalition building across political parties to (1) amend the Constitution to take oil related activities outside of the "strategic areas" exclusive to the Mexican State under Articles 27 and 28, n165 and (2) amend NAFTA by rescinding the Mexican oil sector's privileged status under chapter 6 of NAFTA. n166 In light of the Mexican oil sector's political and legal restraints to FDI, n167 any successful Pemex reform will likely depend on the Mexican government's ability to align the interests of foreign investors, politicians, and their constituencies. This is politically feasible only if increased production correlates with increased government revenue to ease the Mexican people's fear of losing control of Pemex, a symbol of national sovereignty. n168 President Zedillo's

deregulatory model for the electric power sector may also provide the government a way to modernize Mexico's oil sector at a controlled rate, while giving foreign companies the opportunity to satisfy the public's [*238] expectations based on their ability to increase oil production. n169 This would similarly require three stages: (1)

permitting foreign companies to produce oil and sell directly to the government as an IPP; n170 (2) allowing foreign companies to sell oil directly to customers in the wholesale market; n171 and (3) giving foreign companies complete control over their activities in specified territorial blocks that carry tax burdens. n172 In the initial phase, lawmakers could create a state-controlled distribution and regulatory regime, similar to Petrobras' ANP, to monitor Pemex's exploration, production, and refining companies. n173 Taking after the IPP model, foreign investors would then be allowed to finance their own exploration and production in Mexican reserves on the condition that they sell the oil they produce at the rate established by this new regulatory regime. n174 Pursuant to President Calderon's initial proposal, companies would retain ownership over oilrigs and refineries that they construct and finance. n175 Mexicans may be concerned that deregulating the oil sector would lead to the same results of the electric power sector reform in 1992, where ninety percent of all private investment came from foreign sources. n176 The majority of private investment in

the oil sector likely will come from foreign entities since international companies from industrialized nations typically have the financial resources and technical knowledge to perform these sophisticated contracts. n177

This is an unavoidable [*239] consequence that most developing countries must face when a state-run monopoly controls a complex sector of the economy for multiple decades. n178 Host governments can protect themselves by requiring foreign companies to train

local employees and place them in sophisticated technical positions. n179 This would protect Mexico's oil sector in the event foreign companies no longer see a profit incentive to remain in Mexico, potentially leaving Pemex ill-trained and undercapitalized. These provisions would enable Pemex to retain some of the technical expertise needed to stabilize an economic shift in the Mexico's oil sector. Expropriation risks in the foreign oil sector always
loom when a project requires a large amount of financing upfront. n180 Foreign companies can protect their investments through contractual provisions designed to discourage future expropriations by including clear provisions for international arbitration, and using international assets as collateral against future expropriations. n181 However, as the case in Venezuela demonstrates, the risk of entering a politically volatile oil sector with a history of prior expropriations may still discourage oil companies, which are hesitant to invest substantial resources in large projects on foreign soil. n182 The Mexican government's willingness to settle disputes within an internationally recognized process under NAFTA should provide some assurance for concerned foreign investors. n183 However, the reservations granted in chapter 6 still pose a barrier to reaching the goals of encouraging free trade and fair competition among NAFTA signatories. n184 If the Mexican government is dedicated to [*240] attracting FDI in the oil sector, then it must remove the oil sector's privileged status under chapter 6 of NAFTA. If the Mexican government is satisfied with the

success of the initial oil reform stage, it could advance to the second proposed stage that creates a regulatory framework to facilitate an open, competitive wholesale oil market, as former President Fox proposed for the electric power

sector in 2001. n185 In the third and final stage of reform the Mexican government, through its newly created regulatory regime, would begin granting specified territorial blocks to foreign companies to explore, produce, and sell the oil directly to the market. n186 This privilege would be coupled with taxes and export tariffs to sustain the incoming revenue that the government would receive from the sale of Mexican oil. n187 Following the

lead of Petrobras, shares in Pemex could eventually become publicly traded to alleviate some of the Mexican government's financial burden on the oil sector, while still allowing the Mexican government to own the majority of the voting shares. n188 Allowing some of Pemex's equity to be bought by private investors would also encourage the Mexican government to maximize profits for its shareholders, which would also be in line with the interests of the Mexican people if increased profits also result in increased revenue for the government to provide social services. Of course all of these steps would depend on the success of incremental reform, contingent on

the cooperation between the Mexican government and foreign private investors. The Supreme Court's decision to invalidate President Fox's 2001 decree puts the legality of virtually any private activity in Mexico's energy sector into question. n189 While this is a serious barrier to further privatization reform in the energy sector, investors might take comfort in the Court's autonomy to rule [*241] against the President on a major political

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issue. n190 For example, if a reactionary administration began to view NAFTA as a threat to Mexican sovereignty, the administration could try to abandon NAFTA and revert to re-nationalization policies. n191 In the event of such volatile change in Mexico's political landscape, the courts may be seen as one source of stability. More autonomy within the judicial branch should provide greater legitimacy in the eyes of prospective foreign investors. Yet the Supreme Court's interpretation of Article 27 calls into question the constitutionality of the electric power sector's entire deregulatory scheme. n192 It appears that only a constitutional amendment taking oil outside of the "strategic areas" exclusive to the Mexican state will establish a stable legal environment to attract foreign companies to Mexico's oil sector. n193 CONCLUSION The long-term solution to Pemex's

financial problems ultimately depends on its ability to reach oil reserves in the deepest waters in the Gulf of Mexico, but the company has little experience exploring these areas. n194 The October 2008 legislation allowed Pemex to hire foreign companies to explore and produce oil with incentive-based contracts, but companies are restricted from owning the oil or their facilities. n195 Private companies are likely not willing to partner with Pemex in the deepwater explorations projects only as a service company if they [*242] must also bear a significant financial burden without ownership rights. n196 Pemex's fate will impact the future of the entire country. n197 If the government is serious in reforming Pemex it will need to amend Articles 27 and 28 of the Mexican Constitution. n198 This will be an incredible challenge for politicians. Mexico no longer has a dominant political party, making constitutional change - which requires consensus building across distinct political parties - notably more difficult. n199 Still, there is great potential to restore this once thriving company back to prosperity, give the Mexican government increased legitimacy, and ensure the livelihood of the Mexican people.

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Ext: Privat solves


Privatization is key to Mexicos economy and attracting foreign investment Howell 7 [Jonathon, J.D. Candidate, May 2007, SMU's Dedman School of Law; Articles Editor of the International
Law Review Association, COMMENT AND CASENOTE: PRIVATIZATION OF PEMEX, 13 Law & Bus. Rev. Am. 461]
V. PRIVATIZATION OF MEXICO'S OIL INDUSTRY If

handled properly, privatization of Mexico's oil industry could have a tremendous impact on Mexico's economy. Similar to Argentina's formerly state-owned YPF, Pemex owns and controls Mexico's oil industry. n37 Like YPF, Pemex has a great number of financial problems, and, as a result, the government has incurred an enormous budget deficit. n38 Although there has been much debate over whether or not to privatize Pemex, Mexico's Congress continues to reject what ultimately seems inevitable - the privatization of Pemex. n39 Generally, advocates of privatization argue that without privatization Pemex's oil production will continually fail to meet demand and thus continue to cause a government budget deficit. n40 In contrast, opponents of privatization
express concern about foreign profiteering and do not believe that foreign investment would trickle down to the working class. n41 A. Arguments in Favor of Privatization of Mexico's Oil Industry Proponents of privatization contend that Mexico's excess oil reserves remain

untapped because Pemex lacks the financial backing and technology to develop its reserves. n42 This is especially frustrating, proponents argue, because Pemex's excess reserves are sufficient to keep thirty oil companies busy for the next five years. n43 [*466] Furthering proponents' arguments is the fact that Mexico has generated revenue, increased its gross domestic product, and paid down its debt with relative ease, by successfully privatizing other formerly stateowned industries. Mexico's essential goal in privatizing these industries was "to raise revenue and ease some of the fiscal problems of the government." n44 During this period of privatization, revenue "totaled more than $ 22 billion ... [and] more than doubled the revenues from privatization of any other developing country in the same period." n45 Additionally, during the last few years, "Mexico saved an estimated $ 1.3 billion a year in interest payments from its debt restructuring." n46 Also, inflation dropped from 180 percent to less than 20 percent over the course of four years. n47 And Mexico's gross domestic product more than doubled from 1.7 percent to 4 percent after Mexico sold its state-owned telecommunications company, Telemex. n48 B. Arguments Against Privatization of Mexico's Oil Industry Opponents of privatization use their stance as more of a political ploy. n49 Leading the charge against privatization are nationalist Congress members and union bosses. n50 The unions generate political support for nationalist Congress members in exchange for the power granted to union leaders. n51 These opponents of privatization choose to politically exploit the fact that many Mexicans view Pemex as a sacred symbol of sovereignty, instead of facing the harsh reality of Mexico's unstable economic conditions. n52 Specifically, union bosses reinforce this national sentiment by using government funds to provide public
services to Pemex workers. n53 Consequently, Mexico's citizens are compelled to support the union bosses in order to insure the continued receipt of the union benefits. n54 Ignoring the long-term effects, opponents of privatization point out the short-term hardships that privatization of Pemex would bring, including [*467] job loss, salary reductions, price increases, and foreign profiteering. n55 Nevertheless, even some nationalist

Congress members have admitted that some type of foreign investment in Mexico's oil market will be necessary in the future. n56 Despite Mexico's adoption and implementation of free market reforms throughout most of its economy, Pemex has been trapped in a political whirlwind and remains outside of the privatization process. n57 As long as Pemex controls Mexico's oil, Mexico's privatization process remains far from complete. C. Multiple Service Contracts
for Oil Production Although multiple service contracts for oil production are not an adequate substitute for privatization, these contracts are a positive step in the right direction. Due to Pemex's inefficiency, Mexico's oil demand will soon outweigh its production. n58

This reality will force Mexico to open up its oil industry if it wants to avoid incurring billions of dollars of debt. Mexico's economy would benefit greatly if the Mexican government implemented an outright privatization of Pemex. But proponents of privatization have failed to overcome its critics, let alone gain enough support to amend Mexico's

Constitution. Thus, Mexico is much more likely to allow the issuance of multiple service contracts than to implement outright privatization in the near future. Pemex's issuance of multiple service contracts, however, has many of the same benefits as privatization. First, foreign participation in the development of Mexico's oil would create significantly greater efficiency and increased revenue. In addition, foreign contractors would be capable of introducing new technologies to Mexico's oil industry, allowing for increased production. And, most importantly, Mexico's government and citizens will become more receptive to the idea of total privatization after the benefits of foreign investment manifest by way of a healthier, more stable Mexican economy. V. CONCLUSION In sum, the obstacles that must be overcome in order to achieve the privatization of Pemex are Mexico's archaic attitude of national patrimony and, in particular, the idea that Pemex is a symbol of Mexico's sovereignty. n59 [*468] It is this ideology

of nationalist petro-pride - expressed through Mexico's oil unions and opportunistic politicians - that has blocked privatization legislation and sought to maintain status quo at the expense of Mexico's citizens. n60 As a consequence, the inefficient oil industry is both dragging the rest of Mexico's economy down and suppressing Mexico's working class. n61 While the issuance of multiple service contracts is encouraging, full privatization is the

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only economic policy that has proven to be successful in Latin American countries such as Argentina and Mexico itself. n62 Mexico would undoubtedly benefit from Pemex's privatization because it would reduce its budget deficit and increase capital investment. n63 By increasing capital investment, Mexico could develop the technologies necessary to make use of its excess oil reserves, including technologies that would allow for deep-water drilling. n64 Arguments against privatization, like those emphasizing short-term unemployment, obviously ignore privatization's long-term benefits. n65 Once Mexico does decide to privatize Pemex, and it ultimately will, it is

important that Mexico follows Argentina's methodology. Therefore, Mexico's government should hire foreign law firms with expertise in the privatization process as consultants. n66 Additionally, Mexico's government should pursue a policy of swift, outright sales whenever possible, and grant concessions whenever an outright sale is either prohibited by law or some other obstacle. n67 Furthermore, Mexico's government should make sure that foreign investors are solvent and have the capacity to assume control of the enterprise before allowing a sale to take place. n68 Finally, Mexico's government must implement a policy to ensure that former government workers are not unduly jeopardized in the transition. n69 Because

Mexico would benefit from a stronger economy if it privatized Pemex, it is up to proponents of privatization to inform Mexico's citizens about the benefits of privatization. Without an understanding of these benefits, Mexico's citizens
will continue to view the idea of privatizing Pemex as handing over Mexico's oil to foreign investors.

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Ext: Privat k2 mexican econ


Pemex privatization is key to saving Mexicos oil industry and attracting foreign investment Jacobs 12 [Justin, Petroleum Economist, Mexico at the crossroads, July]
ENRIQUE Pea Nieto's victory in Mexico's July presidential election marked the return to power for the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) after 12 years in opposition and has set the stage for the next round of battles over much-needed energy reforms in the country. State-run

Pemex holds a monopoly over Mexico's oil and gas industry "" its control over the industry from field to forecourt was enshrined in the constitution after the industry's nationalisation in 1938. It is a model that, although inefficient and long the target of calls for change, kept the oil flowing for several decades. Mexicans took great pride in their country's ability to operate one of the world's largest oil industries without help from abroad, and the government saw little need to share the spoils. But calls for reforms to this model have grown louder in recent years as Pemex has proven unable to deal with the multitude of challenges facing Mexico's oil industry. Production has fallen precipitously, a wealth of deep-water and unconventional resources remain undeveloped, the country is forced to import fuel products because of a shortage in refining capacity and accusations persist of patronage and corruption in the industry. Outgoing president Felipe Calder3n made
the first push for major reform in 2008. In the face of widespread opposition, however, Calder3n decided to leave alone the issue of Pemex's constitutionally mandated role. Instead he pushed for reforms that would allow Pemex to offer private companies per-barrel fee-based service contracts, similar to those used in Iraq, Ecuador and elsewhere. He also proposed changes to Pemex that would give it more autonomy, but did not go so far as to offer it independence from the government. Even these limited reform proposals, though, met with stiff opposition. Many in Pea Nieto's PRI party opposed the reforms and the opposition Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) drummed up public opposition to private involvement in the oil sector. Limited reforms Nevertheless, Calder3n did manage to pass some limited, though still unprecedented, reforms. He had hoped to push for further restructuring later in his term, but after the initial bruising debate an increasingly bloody drug war and a slowing economy scuttled hope for any new initiatives. Most notably the 2008 reforms allowed Pemex to offer the incentive-based service

contracts to private companies. It was hoped that this would prove to be attractive enough to lure the foreign capital and, more importantly, technology needed for Mexico's increasingly challenging projects. Four years later, however, it is clear that those reforms did not go far enough. Pemex has held two auction rounds since the 2008 reforms that offered incentive-based contracts to boost production at several mature oilfields across the country. But the rounds attracted tepid interest, mostly from service companies comfortable with the contract structure. The rounds failed to attract serious interest from Western oil majors with the technology and operation experience Mexico needs. Now it is Pea Nieto's turn. He has not yet detailed his reform plans, saying that he would bring together policy experts to formulate a comprehensive strategy. But he has sketched out some fundamental reforms that could revitalise Mexico's oil industry. And the push for reforms could start soon as Pea Nieto looks to capitalise on the momentum gained through his election victory and the fact that he has an ally still in office in Calder3n. He
has said that he hopes to launch that effort even before he officially takes office in December, proposing that congress takes up reforms when it reconvenes in September. The first area of reform that Pea Nieto has said he will look at relates to changes to

the constitution that would allow the government to offer contracts to foreign investors giving them a stake in Mexico's oil reserves. Under the constitutional framework, Pemex has sole ownership over all Mexico's hydrocarbon reserves. Foreign
companies, particularly western majors, though, will need some way to book reserves under the various international regulatory standards to justify investment in the country. Although constitutional changes would be the industry's preferred path for reforms, there

is another option. A less ambitious deal that kept the service-contract model enabled by the 2008 reforms in

place, but allowed companies to be paid in oil rather than cash, enabling them to book reserves under US Securities Exchange Commission rules, could achieve the same aim. This approach, though, could put off potential investors by signalling that Mexico is not

fully committed to energy reform. The second area of reforms will look at the structure of Pemex and its role in the Mexico's oil business.
As Juan Carlos Zepeda Molina, the head Mexico's National Hydrocarbon's Commission, recently pointed out, Pemex is more of a government agency than it is a company. "Right now, the Mexican Constitution states that Pemex is not a company, it's a government office," he said. "It has some technical autonomy to do its job, but many other things are constrained and controlled by the government, because technically it is a part of that government." Reforming Pemex, then, would likely see it given much greater autonomy over its investment and

operational decision-making. Pea Nieto has said that he will consider going so far as to allow a minority of shares in Pemex to be traded on the stock market, similar to the private-public model championed in Latin America by Brazil's Petrobras and Colombia's Ecopetrol. That would take Pemex out of the energy ministry and go a long way towards encouraging greater efficiency and transparency, making it a much more attractive partner to foreign investors. Such fundamental reform to such an entrenched sector, however, poses an enormous political challenge. It
would require unwinding a system that has been accused of fostering inefficiency, patronage and corruption. And Pea Nieto will likely have to try to pass reforms without a majority in either the 128-seat Senate or the 500-seat Chamber of Deputies, let alone the two-thirds vote he would need to change the country's constitution. "We will have a diverse Congress where no party has an absolute majority and, as a result, all the parties will be responsible for coming to agreements," Pea Nieto said at a news conference after his election. "It is time to agree, not impose." One positive

sign of change is that a myriad of political and industry forces appear to be lining up behind major reforms in
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a way not seen in the past. Keeping those forces in line, though, will require deft politicking from Pea Nieto. It was members of Pea

Nieto's own PRI party that were some of the most vociferous opponents to reform in the past. PRI hardliners forced Calder3n into tempering his ambitious plans and Pea Nieto will first have to win over those in his own party that previously opposed reforms. If he is able to do that, Pea Nieto should find support in Calder3n's pro-business National Action Party (PAN), the largest of the opposition parties. Outgoing president Calder3n said that he would work with Pea Nieto to push through the more energy reforms that he was not able to pass. "Not only will I, and the government of the Republic, cooperate (with the PRI) but we will continue to push through reforms," Calder3n said after his party lost the general election to Pea Nieto. While PRI and PAN are likely to find common ground on energy reform, efforts to make constitutional changes could be complicated by opposition from the PRD. Led by leftist Andrs Manuel L3pez Obrador, the PRD has voiced support for giving Pemex greater autonomy, but opposes constitutional changes to allow foreign companies to own Mexico's oil reserves and would be unlikely to support plans to partly privatise Pemex. That will leave PRI and PAN looking for support from some of Mexico's minor parties to achieve deeper energy reforms. Backing for major reforms from Pemex itself, and the powerful oil workers union, could help sway uncertain lawmakers. Although both have in the past been loth to give up their iron grip on the lucrative industry, and some within are still opposed to opening up, continued struggles in the industry have pushed most to support the changes. "I believe (the 2008 reforms) are the first step for Mexico's exploration and

production industry... for deep water, for example, we will have to make some pretty big adjustments," Perez Chavez from Pemex said. Cantarell countdown The challenges for the industry to overcome are complex and numerous, but start with the
country's falling output. Oil and natural gas liquids production has fallen by around 25%, from a peak of 3.83 million barrels a day (b/d) in 2004 to 2.98 million b/d last year. And with the country's mature fields in decline, Mexico faces further production declines unless it is

able to find and develop new sources of production. The country's production woes hinge on the ageing super-giant Cantarell field.
Discovered in 1976 by a fisherman, for years Cantarell was the workhorse of Mexico's oil industry "" and has contributed nearly $500 billion to the country's treasury. Output from the field peaked at around 2.1 million b/d in the early 2000s. As expected, output from the field started to decline this decade, but the fall has been far steeper than Pemex expected. The field has produced an average of just 404,000 b/d of oil through the first seven months of this year, and while production appears to have stabilised, it is showing no signs of recovering. Since Cantarell's decline, the nearby KuMaloob-Zaap (KMZ) heavy-oil complex has taken over as Mexico's largest producing field. The government estimates that output from KMZ will rise steadily to a peak of 933,000 b/d in 2017. While oil production has fallen over recent years and faces an uncertain outlook, a strong economy

has fuelled rising oil demand. Mexico could even become a net oil importer by the latter half of this decade, a move that would be a blow to the country's accounts. Oil exports earned Mexico around $49.36 billion last year, roughly 15% of
the country's total export earnings and contribute 1.1 trillion pesos ($72 billion) to the treasury "" about a third of the government's revenue "" each year. It does not have to be, though. Mexico still has a number of potentially world-class resource plays. Mexico's deep-water section of

the Gulf of Mexico, which has yielded multi-billion barrel finds across the border in the US, remains virtually unexplored. Onshore, the country is thought to hold vast shale reserves stretching from the north, where the Eagle Ford shale play straddles the
US-Mexico border down the Gulf Coast. While explorers have invested billions of dollars and drilled thousands of wells in the Texas sector of the Eagle Ford shale, making it one of the most productive onshore plays in the US, the Mexican section is mostly undeveloped. Pemex

estimates that the country holds 113.9 billion barrels of oil equivalent (boe) of untapped oil "" 75% of which, about

85.9 billion boe, is thought to be in deep-water and shale formations. The company estimates Mexico's shale-gas reserves at 59.4 billion boe, more than the 53.7 billion boe the country has produced to date. Mexico's prospective deep-water resource is estimated at 26.5 billion boe. The problem,

however, is that these are technologically challenging and costly resources to develop, largely beyond Pemex's reach. "Pemex has to improve its execution capabilities," Jose Antonio Perez Chavez, a business development manager at the company, told a conference in Miami in late June. With the industry eager for new resource plays, reforms that gave companies a stake in Mexico's oil and made Pemex a more attractive partner could open the door to an influx of new investors.
"It's going to be a long process, and what we're advocating for is just for Mexico to take the next step... and if the next step provides an avenue for ExxonMobil to participate, we will," ExxonMobil chief executive Rex Tillerson said in June. He added, though, that his company had little interest in the service contracts that have been put on offer to date and that steps would need to be taken to allow foreign companies to round scheduled for the first half of the year and the shale round for the latter half. By that time the industry will likely know the state of reforms.

take a stake in Mexico's reserves. Pemex has said it hopes to hold both deep-water and shale licensing rounds in 2013, with the deep water Without action, Mexico, one of history's energy powerhouses, could be left to watch from the sidelines as unconventional and deep-water discoveries herald a golden age for energy production across the Americas.

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2ac cp card: causes instability


Privatization causes mass protests and instability in Mexico NYT 8 [State Oil Industry's Future Sets Off Tussle in Mexico, April 8]
A bitter debate over what to do about Mexico's ailing state oil monopoly has dominated national politics here in recent weeks, tapping strong emotions on both sides and resurrecting the political fortunes of the leftist leader who narrowly lost the
2006 presidential election. Revamping the oil company, Petroleos Mexicanos, or Pemex, is perhaps the greatest challenge facing the administration of President Felipe Calderon, a conservative economist who won the disputed 2006 election by a hairbreadth. At stake in the debate is not only the future of the Mexican economy but also the supply of oil to the United States. Last year, Mexico was the third largest supplier of crude imports to the American market, after Canada and Saudi Arabia. The government has neglected the public company for 20 years, siphoning off its profits. Now production is dropping, reserves are dwindling, and Pemex lacks the technology to go after undersea oil, the administration says. To reverse dropping production, Mr. Calderon and his conservative National Action Party favor permitting some form of joint ventures with private firms to allow Mexico to tap potential deep-water reserves. ''We have to act now, before it's too late,'' Mr. Calderon said last Thursday. But his rival, Andres Manuel Lopez

Obrador, the former Mexico City mayor and presidential candidate, has called any private investment in Pemex a threat to national security and has accused Mr. Calderon of secretly seeking to sell off the industry to private investors, a charge the president denies. ''The government, for 25 years, has acted in a deliberate manner, on purpose, to ruin Pemex because they have only one goal, to make Pemex into booty to be plundered and privatize the oil business,'' Mr. Lopez Obrador said in an interview. He has cast the president's proposals as a threat to national sovereignty, asserting Mexico ''would be condemned to quit being a country and would turn into a colony.'' The leftist leader has skillfully used the issue to catapult himself back onto center stage in national politics after a year of remaining on the fringes. At mass rallies, he has threatened blockades of roads, airports and oil wells by his followers if the president even introduces a bill to Congress. With leftists promising unrest, President Calderon warned last week that ignoring the company's problems would cause a catastrophe. Yet as of Monday afternoon, Mr. Calderon and his allies in Congress still have not submitted a bill, an indication of their fears of a tough legislative fight and of mass protests. Many members of Congress are growing restless as
Mr. Lopez Obrador continues to attract attention with his arguments. Ever since President Lazaro Cardenas nationalized the oil industry in 1938,

Pemex has been politically sacrosanct. Taking the oil fields back from foreign companies marked a high point in Mexican history. It was one of the few times Mexico's leaders stood up to business interests here and in the United States on behalf of the Mexican public. So any suggestion of selling off the company to private investors sparks strong protests, especially from left-leaning parties. ''In the rest of the world, oil is a commodity,'' said
Hermenegildo Castro, a Senate aide. ''In Mexico it is a symbol of sovereignty and nationalism.'' The trouble is the company is also broke and in debt, despite bringing in $100 billion in revenues last year and enjoying some of the highest crude oil prices in history. For decades Pemex has

been a cash cow for the government. It has milked the company's profits to pay for social programs, operating expenses and government salaries, allowing it to keep taxes low and providing presidents with enough largess to keep the political peace. About 40 percent of the federal budget comes from the oil company. Some years the taxes

the government has exacted from Pemex have forced the company to borrow to balance its budget. A corrupt oil-workers union with a penchant for no-show jobs and lavish perquisites has made matters worse. The government has starved Pemex so severely that company officials and the Calderon administration now say the oil giant has neither the money nor the expertise to explore risky, deep-water oil fields and must enter partnerships with foreign firms, something the Constitution prohibits. The lack of investment in exploration and refineries has left Mexico in dire straits. Oil production has been falling since 2005. Last year alone, it dropped 5.3 percent, to about 3.1 billion barrels a day. At the same time, Pemex has begun to exhaust Mexico's giant offshore Cantarell Field, one of the world's largest. Reserves are disappearing, too, as Pemex pumps oil faster than it can find new deposits. Even exports of crude are falling. To make matters worse, the company has failed to build a new refinery since the 1970s. Mexico now imports about 40 percent of its gasoline, mostly from the United States. Against this backdrop, Mr. Calderon's energy minister, Georgina Kessel, and Pemex's director, Jesus Reyes Heroles, unveiled a report last week that said Pemex needed to enter into joint ventures with other companies to increase its production. But the obstacles to such a reform in Congress are formidable. For starters, a bill that gives Pemex

more of its own profits to invest will mean either cutting government spending or raising taxes. Neither option appeals to lawmakers in any party. In addition, since President Calderon's party does not control Congress, he must persuade
members of the former governing party, the Institutional Revolutionary Party, or PRI, to support his bill. If any offer their support, and it is unclear how many will, the political price they exact from Mr. Calderon would be high, analysts say. Mr. Lopez Obrador, meanwhile, has

managed to define the debate broadly as a question of national sovereignty. No one in Congress wants to seem to be selling off Mexican oil reserves to foreign companies. ''They don't want to talk about anything that might be called privatization by Lopez Obrador,'' said David Shields, an author who has spent his career studying Pemex. Despite the
constitutional ban on foreign investment, the state oil company already buys technology and services from giant companies like Halliburton and Schlumberger. The Calderon administration has argued in the past that no foreign company is going to sell the technology for deepwater drilling without receiving some of the oil found in return, a position most industry analysts agree with. Recently, however, aides to the president have backed off that argument, saying they will propose contracts with cash incentives for discoveries rather than a percentage of production. Mr. Lopez Obrador and other left-wing critics argue that the answer lies not in hiring foreigners to explore deep waters but in letting Pemex

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keep its profits and purging it of the waste and corruption that hold it back. ''Pemex's principal problem is corruption, and that is not something that was brought even up in the government's diagnostic report,'' Mr.
Lopez Obrador said in the interview. ''Imagine if you diagnose a sick person, and you don't mention the principal problem. You cannot prescribe anything.''

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2ac cp card: affs a prerequisite


The TBA spills over to overall Mexican oil privatization its necessary to attract investors Inside Energy 4/29/13 [Obama officials endorse bill to enact US-Mexico agreement on gulf drilling, lexis]
"The

transboundary agreement could be a down payment on the promise of more fundamental reform," Pascual investors would have a framework to develop, cooperatively, resources crossing the US maritime border with Mexico. Such commercial engagement could capture resources that are currently not being developed because of legal uncertainty, and demonstrate that private investment produces resources and revenues that benefit the Mexican people and economy." The chairman of the subcommittee, Colorado Republican Doug
told the panel. "Private Lamborn, welcomed the administrations support for the bill (H.R. 1613), but said it should have come much sooner. I am deep ly disappointed that it has taken the administration more than a year since the agreement was signed to finally transmit to Congress something for us to consider, Lamborn said. The chairman also cautioned lawmakers to act carefully on the legislation. We must approach this hearing remembering that

approval of this agreement sets an important precedent for other similar transboundary hydrocarbon agreements that we may arrive at with other nations, he said. It is important to get it right so that we may, along with our ally Mexico, set an example on how together we may foster the shared goal of developing our nations Outer Continental Shelf for economic prosperity and economic security.

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2ac cp card: regulations take it out


Absent the plan- regulatory hurdles mean counterplans cant solve- federal agencies key Wood 13 (Duncan Wood, the Director of the Mexico Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for
Scholars, For 17 years, Dr. Wood was a professor and the director of the International Relations Program at the Instituto Tecnolgico Autnomo de Mxico (ITAM) in Mexico City, His research focuses on Mexican energy policy and North American relations, Growing Potential for U.S. - Mexico Energy Cooperation, January 2013)

The last major area for hydrocarbons cooperation between the U.S. and Mexico concerns regulation . As Mexico contemplates the opening of its oil and gas industries, an issue of considerable concern is that of strengthening the regulatory agency, the Comisin Nacional de Hidrocarburos (CNH) and of designing national regulations that will provide a level playing field between public and private sector actors, and will ensure the efficient and safe functioning of the industry. Of particular concern, given the experience of recent years, is to guarantee environmental protection and operationa l safety, especially in deep water exploration and production (E&P). Institutional ties between the CNH and U.S. regulatory agencies have been slowly developing since the creation of the Comisin in 2009,
and were particularly important in the context of t he Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement.

It is imperative that this cooperation is

consolidated and strengthened into the future , and offers a low cost opportunity in one of the least sensitive

areas of the Mexican oil and gas sector.

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case defense

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1nc relations adv


US-Mexico relations are high and resilient Barnes 11 [Joe, Bonner Means Baker Fellow James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy Rice University, OIL
AND U.S.MEXICO BILATERAL RELATIONS, April 29]

Official relations between Washington and Mexico are, in a word, friendly. The end of the Cold War resolved intermittent tensions between Washington and Mexico City on the latters commitment to non-alignment. The advent of major economic reforms, first under center-left Presidents de la Madrid and Salinas, and continuing with center-right Presidents Fox and Calderon, has narrowed ideological differences between the two countries. So has Mexicos emergence as a multiparty democracy. NAFTAthough still a subject of criticism in both countries and beset by lingering controversies, notably restrictions on Mexican freight trucks entering the United Statesappears to be a permanent keystone of the bilateral relationship.12 As a candidate for the U.S.
Democratic Party presidential nomination in 2008, then-U.S. Senator Barack Obama suggested the need to renegotiate the agreement. At the time, observers believed the suggestion to be mere political rhetoric.13 They were right. The Obama administration has made no steps to reopen the agreement. A major potential challenge to the U.S.-Mexico relationship border security in the wake of the

September 11 attackswas managed without undue damage to diplomatic and economic relations between the two countries. Though bilateral strains emerged at times, cooperation in intelligence-gathering and closer scrutiny of individuals and freight crossing the border improved. But the September 11 attacks, on balance, slowed progress
toward a more open border; at a minimum, the terrorist threat strengthened the arguments of those seeking to limit migration to the United States.

Cooperation is high now and sustainable Poli and Shirk 12 [Emily Edmonds-Poli & David A. Shirk, Political Science Professors-University of San Diego,
2012, Contemporary Mexican Politics, p. 298] The 1990s appeared to mark a new beginning for the relationship between the United States and all of Latin America. The end of the Cold War and a bipolar international environment allowed all countries to refocus their attention on issues of mutual interest, such as deepening democratic transitions and the emerging consensus regarding the need for neoliberal economic policies. While the 1990s did not, as some predicted, reduce the power asymmetries between the United States and its Latin American neighbors, it was a time in which the relations within the region were more balanced and mutually respectful than they had been in the past. In this spirit, Mexico and the United States began to work more cooperatively to solve what have historically been the most intractable bilateral problems: addressing the myriad issues surrounding illegal Mexican migration to the United States, reducing trade barriers, and combating drug trafficking. On all of these issues both Mexican and US policy makers openly acknowledged that solutions required bilateral cooperation and pledged to work together. Making good on
their promises, the Clinton and Zedillo administrations worked hard to emphasize the countries' similarities and common interests rather than stressing their differences. This effort paid off particularly well in the area of commerce with the implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) beginning in 1994.

US and Mexico are close allies wont change in the future De Sangibanes 9 [Francisco De Sangibanes, Department of War Studies-Kings College, 2009, "An End to US

Hegemony? The Strategic Implications of China's Growing Presence in Latin America," Comparative Strategy, 28:1, p. 31] Everything seems to indicate that Mexico will remain a close ally of the U.S . Indeed, the power gap that exists between these countries is simply too important for Mexico to even consider the possibility of balancing American power . Washington would never allow for the existence of a competitor that shares its borders ; the risks of doing so would be too high. Moreover, the Mexican economy is more compatible with the American economy than with that of the Chinese . After the creation of NAFTA, Mexico has taken full advantage of its proximity to the U.S. and now sends that market 87.6 percent of its total exports. Finally, opinion polls in Mexico indicate that the population has a positive image of the U.S. an approval rating of 53 percenta fact that would facilitate the continuation of an alliance with Washington.

The economys resilient --- innovations solve Leonhardt, New York Times, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2005 [David, October 8, Business Cycle Data]

MEMPHIS - The nearly empty Airbus 310 was coasting through the Alabama night sky when a message flashed in the cockpit. "DIVERT," it said, before using code to order the plane to land in Atlanta. The pilot banked the jet to the east and a half-hour later it was on the ground. There, its cargo door opened up to a group of waiting FedEx employees who began filling it with 17,000 pounds of cargo. It had been a busy day for Georgia businesses, and FedEx's regular nightly flights from Atlanta to the company's Memphis hub were overbooked with packages. So the local crew made a call to a sprawling, low-slung room here at headquarters, where people hunch over computer screens showing weather maps and flight plans, and asked

the nation's economy has become so much more resilient. Think of it as the FedEx economy, a system that constantly recalibrates itself to cope with surprises. The U nited S tates has endured an almost biblical series of calamities in recent years - wars,
for help from the five empty FedEx jets that roam over the United States every night. The recent birth of that small fleet, at a multimillion-dollar price tag, explains a lot about how

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hurricanes, financial scandals, soaring oil prices and rising interest rates - but the economy keeps chugging along at an annual growth rate of roughly 3 percent. It has been able to do so with the help of technology that allows businesses to react ever more quickly to changes. But with little notice, those reactions have also created a new feature of the business cycle: the micro-recession. When one of them strikes, activity slows for a few weeks, sometimes in just certain sectors or regions, as companies adjust to a dip in demand. It has happened much more often in the last few years than in earlier expansions, but growth has picked up each time, thanks in part to the adjustments that businesses have made. No company embodies this change, for better and worse,
quite like FedEx. When Alan Greenspan, the Federal Reserve chairman, sees Frederick W. Smith, FedEx's chief executive, during halftime of Washington Redskins games, Mr. Greenspan uses the company's vast reach to check in on the economy. "He always asks, 'We still O.K.?' " said Mr. Smith, a part-owner of the team whose stadium suite abuts the one Mr. Greenspan uses. More formally, Federal Reserve staff members rely on FedEx and the nearly six million packages it delivers every day for real-time data that helps set interest rate policy. The company's around-the-world flights - fuller coming from Asia than going to it - are the shipping lanes of the global economy, bringing goods from Chinese factories to American shelves in just days. FedEx technology helps Procter & Gamble managers send more Crest to Wal-Mart whenever somebody buys a tube, and the managers can then watch the replacement move through the supply chain from their computer screens.

All this - combined with financial innovations that allow companies to hedge their bets and, some say, the deregulation of pivotal transportation industries - has helped mute the economy's swings. The business cycle has certainly not been eliminated, as some dreamers suggested during the 1990's boom, but recessions really do seem to happen less often . There have been only two recessions in the last two decades. From the late 1960's through the early 80's, the economy endured four of them, including two of the deepest in decades, which left millions of people out of work. "The more flexible an economy, the greater its ability to self-correct after inevitable, often unanticipated disturbances," Mr. Greenspan argued in a recent speech. "The impressive performance of the U.S. economy over the past couple of decades, despite shocks that in the past would have surely produced marked economic contraction, offers the clearest evidence of the benefits of increased market flexibility." Of course, new technologies and global shipping lanes are also big reasons that job growth has been so disappointing during this expansion
and that the gains from recent economic growth have gone mainly to highly skilled white-collar workers. In Woodbridge, N.J., for example, a large FedEx shipping center can sometimes seem void of human beings. And revenue at the express-shipping division has grown almost 30 percent since 2002, while the full-time work force has declined slightly. The number of parttime workers has grown. Across the economy, quick reactions, like asking workers to put in more hours one week and fewer the next, have helped lead to the business cycle's new hiccups. Mr. Smith calls them "mini-recessions."

Economic collapse doesnt cause war --- lack of resources prevent military conflict Bennett and Nordstrom, Department of Political Science Professors at Pennsylvania State, 2000 [Scott and Timothy,

Foreign Policy Substitutability and Internal Economic Problems in Enduring Rivalries, Journal of Conflict Resolution, February, Ebsco]
In this analysis, we focus on using economic conditions to understand when rivalries are likely to escalate or end. Rivalries are an appropriate set of cases to use when examining substitutability both because leaders in rival states have clearly substitutable choices and because rivalries are a set of cases in which externalization is a particularly plausible policy option.7 In particular,

when confronted with domestic problems, leaders in a rivalry have the clear alternatives of escalating the conflict with the rival to divert attention or to work to settle the rivalry as a means of freeing up a substantial amount of resources that can be directed toward solving internal problems. In the case of the diversion option,
rivals provide logical, believable actors for leaders to target; the presence of a clear rival may offer unstable elites a particularly inviting target for hostile statements or actual conflict as necessary. The public and relevant elites already consider the rival a threat or else the rivalry would not have continued for an extended period; the presence of disputed issues also provides a casus belli with the rival that is always present. Rivals also may provide a target where the possible costs and risks of externalization are relatively controlled. If the goal is diversion, leaders willwant to divert attention without provoking an actual (and expensive)war. Over the course of many confrontations, rival states may learn to anticipate response patterns, leading to safer disputes or at least to leaders believing that they can control the risks of conflict when they initiate a new confrontation. In sum, rivals provide good targets for domestically challenged political leaders. This leads to our first hypothesis, which is as follows: Hypothesis 1: Poor economic conditions lead to diversionary actions against the rival.

Conflict settlement is also a distinct route to dealing with internal problems that leaders in rivalries may pursue when faced with internal problems . Military competition between states requires large amounts of resources, and rivals require even more attention. Leaders may choose to negotiate a settlement that ends a rivalry to free up important resources that may be reallocated to the domestic economy . In a guns versus butter world of economic trade-offs, when a state can no longer afford to pay the expenses associated with competition in a rivalry, it is quite rational for leaders to reduce costs by ending a rivalry . This gain (a peace dividend) could be achieved at any time by ending a rivalry. However, such a gain is likely to be most important and attractive to leaders when internal conditions are bad and the leader is seeking ways to alleviate active problems . Support for policy change away from continued rivalry is more likely to develop when the economic situation sours and elites and masses are looking for ways to improve a worsening situation. It is at these times that the pressure to cut military investment will be greatest and that state leaders will be forced to recognize the difficulty of continuing to pay for a rivalry . Among other things, this argument also encompasses the view that the cold war ended because the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics could no longer compete economically with the United States. Hypothesis 2: Poor economic conditions increase the probability of rivalry termination. Hypotheses 1 and 2 posit opposite behaviors in response to a single cause (internal economic problems). As such, they
demand a research design that can account for substitutability between them.

US isnt key to the global economy --- decoupling solves Hong, writer for Xinhua, 2008 [Liu, Rise of emerging markets shapes global economic map, Xinhua, 8/24,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-08/25/content_9706441.htm]
WASHINGTON, Aug. 24 (Xinhua) -- In the past, a sharp slowdown in the United States would trigger a severe decline in world growth. But now the dynamic of the world has changed with a fundamental shift being under way. TRADE WITH EMERGING ECONOMIES HAS SAVED AMERICA FROM RECESSION "

We are experiencing the first episode in history of reverse coupling, in which the rest of the world pulls the U.S. forward rather than the opposite," said Fred Bergsten, director of the Peterson Institute for International Economics, a leading think tank in the U nited S tates. Bergsten told Xinhua that he believed that "trade has saved America from recession" because "the improvement in trade balance has accounted for the totality of U.S. economic growth over the three quarters." Bergstan's opinion was echoed by many U.S. economists and officials. U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson has repeatedly stressed that he believes the U.S. economy will not fall into a recession, given that the world economy, especially the economy in the emerging countries, is

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fundamentally strong. In spite of the pronouncements of many observers that recession had already set in, the U.S. economy grew at an annual rate of 1.9percent in the
second quarter of this year, up from a 0.6-percent increase in the first quarter and a 0.2-percent decline in the fourth quarter last year. The U.S. Federal Reserve has concluded that the showing was mainly due to the strong growth of U.S. exports, especially the exports to emerging markets.

China, the biggest emerging market, is now contributing more to global demand than the U nited S tates, said Jim O'Neill, chief economist at Goldman Sachs, noting that add on the BRICs, namely Brazil, Russia, India and China, the impact grows. The strong dynamism of domestic demand in emerging and developing economies has provided a "trade shock absorber," enabling a robust
expansion of U.S. exports over the past year even as U.S. domestic demand has slowed, also said a recent report by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). EMERGING MARKETS TRANSFORMED INTO LOCOMOTIVES OF WORLD ECONOMY

Analysts believe there have been two important shifts in the growth dynamic of the global economy. The first is that emerging economies have been transformed into locomotives of the world economy, as China has accounted for about one-quarter of global growth over the past five years, according to data provided by the IMF. The BRICs have accounted for almost half of global growth and all the emerging and developing economies together for about two-thirds, compared with about half in the 1970s. Secondly, the pattern of trade has changed. Almost half of exports from emerging and developing economies are now directed towards other such economies, with rising intra-regional trade within emerging Asia most notable. "While some U.S. companies may have cut jobs by outsourcing to China, think of how many more jobs they might be cutting if they were
losing money or barely profitable," said Zachary Karabell, president of River Twice Research. Africa has also benefited from the emerging economies. Investment commitments in Africa by emerging financiers jumped from less than 1 billion dollars per year before 2004 to 8 billion dollars in 2006 and 5 billion in 2007 dollars, said a recent report by the World Bank. Growing infrastructure commitments by emerging countries in Africa are helping address the huge infrastructure deficit of the continent, Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili, the World Bank's vice president

the global economy has clearly decoupled itself from the U nited S tates and world growth is likely to approach 4 percent in both 2008 and 2009 in spite of the sharp slowdown in the U nited S tates, said Bergstan. "The traditional relationship where the world catches cold when the U.S. sneezes' no longer holds ," he noted. "China now plays a decisive role in the world economy as indicated by its dominant role in global economic growth ," he told
for the Africa region told Xinhua. As a result, Xinhua.

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1nc instability adv


Macroeconomic factors and political stability are improving and current growth is sustainable Joseph Hogue 5-30-2012; provides investment research and analysis through his firm, Efficient Alpha. He has appeared as a guest on
BloombergTV for his analysis of Latin American securities and holds the Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA) designation.Mexican economy in contrast to its negative stereotypes http://emergingmoney.com/mexico/mexican-economy-eww/

The diverse Mexican economy has been growing at a sustainable pace of 3.5-5.5% over the past three years. The political mood seems to be shifting incrementally in the direction of further liberalization. Ties to relatively strong neighbors the U.S. and the rest of Latin America position the Mexican economy well relative to other emerging markets more dependent on floundering Europe or slowing China. The drug killings may even simmer down with the expected return to power this July of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). U.S. investors willing to look past stereotypes will find a range of modern industries in Mexico issuing easily tradable American Depository Receipts (ADRs). The
composition of the iShares MSCI Mexico Investable Market ETF (EWW, quote) offers a snapshot of the Mexican economy excluding oil, which remains largely nationalized. Consumer staples account for 32% of the ETFs holdings, telecommunications 24% and materials 15%.A number

of large transportation firms are also publicly traded. The macroeconomic and political outlooks for Mexico are both positive. This means the Mexican economy should outperform other emerging markets over the next 12 months, though probably underperforming the Andean region of Latin America. Inflation was running at 3.5% annually as of April 2012, near the bottom of Mexicos historical range. That means the usually conservative central bank is considering stimulus measures if global growth weakens further. The expected victory of the PRI in the July presidential poll (and return to power after a lame-duck period in December) also looks positive for investors. The PRIs 70-year rule was interrupted under charges of widespread corruption in 2000. The partys roots are socialist, but it has in recent decades embraced market reforms and moved to the center. Its presidential candidate, Enrique Pea Nieto, has run on a platform of reforms including partial privatization of state oil monopoly PEMEX, along the lines of Brazils Petrobras. Nieto also supports liberalizing employment laws. While the full extent of promised reforms is doubtful, Nietos pro-market rhetoric is welcome. Opening the oil sector to more private contractors could increase capital spending on infrastructure and accelerate GDP growth for the Mexican economy. The caveat is that these effects will be longer-term, while equity performance over the next year remains more
dependent on growth in the United States and global headline risks.

Organized crime in Mexico makes Mexican oil production unstable drug crime is a prerequisite to PEMEX reform Morales 11 [Isidro PhD, PROFESSOR, MONTERREY INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY AND HIGHER
EDUCATION, ENERGY TRADE AND SECURITY ISSUES AT THE MEXICOU.S. BORDER]
Last but not least, there

are other externalities affecting the investment climate in both the gas and oil industries, dealers and organized crime have already negatively impacted these industries. Abduction of oil workers in the Burgos basin has already been reported by the press. Workers have become hostages of kidnappers who demand money that will fund the activities of drug barons operating under rivalry and pressure (Watkins 2010, 31). If the federal government is unable to curb the activities of these organizations in such a key area, most probably private investors will be discouraged from participating as partners of Pemex, regardless of the incentives they might have in their contracts. Illegal and clandestine seizures of oil and gas have also been reported by Pemex and the Ministry of
apart from those linked to environmental concerns. Drug Defense. While in 2005 Pemex reported 136 illegal pipeline taps, in 2010 the figure grew to 668. Eighty percent of the illegal pipeline taps are located in the states of Veracruz, Estado de Mexico, Nuevo Leon, Sinaloa, and Tamaulipas, territories dominated by organized crime organizations and drug barons (Jimenez 2011; Soto 2011). Illegal seizures include both crude oil and petroleum products that are sold at clandestine sites or through official outlets via a network of corrupt Pemex employees and retailers (Herrera 2011). Black markets for fuel are not only scattered around the country illegal sales have also been reported in Guatemala and the United States (Watkins 2010, 31; Jimenez 2011). Oil theft represents around

US$2.3 billion in annual losses to Pemex (El Universal, August 2, 2010), and in December 2010 provoked a major explosion just 60 kilometers east of Mexico City, killing 29 people (Alfaro 2010). If the U.S. and Mexican governments fail to cooperate in order to keep the illegal activities of organized crime at bay, pipelines and other critical infrastructure will remain vulnerable targets to be exploited by criminal organizations (Morales 2011). The answer is elusive. Setting aside the short- to

mid-term evolution of oil prices, the major challenge that will confront the company in the remaining years of the current presidential administration is how, on the one hand, to redress the technological and organizational quandaries negatively affecting oil recovery and production in the Chicontepec fields and on the other hand, how to insulate the evolution of the overall energy sector from the mounting activities of organized crime. The closer President Calderon is to the end of his administration, the weaker will he be as he addresses those two major quandaries. Thus, in the years to come,

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Mexicos energy sector will remain vulnerable to price fluctuations in international markets, to the unpredictable evolution of oil production in the Chicontepec fields, and to the mounting uncertainties unleashed by drug barons in Mexico, mainly in the northern region where nonassociated gas is being extracted. This explains why, for both the

United States and Mexico, it is necessary to work out a formula of shared -governance and cooperation to insulate, if not resolve, the mutual concerns of the two countries regarding security at the border (violence and drug trafficking for the United States and arms trafficking and drug consumption in the United States for Mexico). Fortunately, Washington has already realized that Mexicos security is linked t o U.S. securitya shared concern it calls intermestic. The recognition of this interdependence either on the origin and outcome of illegal activities of organized crime is crucial in order to build up a new architecture of bilateral cooperation between the two countries.

No production decline Mexico has plenty in reserves Robert Campbell, 5-22-2012; Reuters Market Analyst, Mexico is no longer an oil basketcase: Campbell
http://www.petroleumworld.com/storyt12052302.htm The following may be taken as heresy by oil perma-bulls but let's get it out in the open: it's

time to scrap, or at the very least rigorously question, the assumption that Mexican oil production will dramatically fall sometime this decade. A predicted sharp fall in Mexican oil output has long underpinned part of one of the bullish theses behind strong oil prices: non-OPEC crude oil output is weak and getting weaker. Of course, Mexico is not the only part of the non-OPEC supply picture. But it is a big player. The country remains one of the world's biggest oil producers and exporters. The decline of nearly 25 percent in Mexican crude oil production capacity between 2004 and 2008 was a watershed event for oil supplies. But the problem is that analysts still assume that similar declines must inevitably come in the future. A glance at market balances uniformly assume sharp declines in Mexican oil output
over the next decade, projecting forward a rerun of the dramatic fall in production experienced by Mexico between 2006-08 onto the future.

Consider the facts. Mexican crude oil production, while still a far cry from its peak, has been fairly stable, oscillating between 2.5 million and 2.6 million barrels per day since mid-2009. Total liquids production, which adds condensates and natural gas liquids to crude output, has edged down, to just over 2.9 million bpd, but is off only 40,000 bpd from 2010 levels. Yet forecasters still assume steep drops in Mexican output. For instance, the 2010 Annual Energy Outlook published by the U.S. Energy

Information Administration forecast Mexican liquids production would be only 2.31 million bpd in 2012.The EIA's 2011 forecast revised these views, but still assumes a decline in Mexican liquids output. The reference case calls for 2012 production to fall to 2.7 million bpd, or 2.8 million bpd in the high oil price scenario. Yet looking forward in the 2011 EIA forecast, steep declines are still projected, with output falling below 2 million bpd by 2019. The 2012 forecast again revises its view of Mexican output higher, in some cases sharply, but the medium-term forecast still calls for steep declines. The EIA is not alone. Similar forecasts have been made (and revised) in recent years by the International Energy Agency and private oil market analysts. OUT OF INTENSIVE CARE At least for now, the narrative on Mexico remains the same. Whatever state oil monopoly Pemex has done to keep production flat for the last three years is really just a pause in the inevitable decline. Of course this is not to say that all is well in Mexico's oil industry. Pemex remains grossly overstaffed, inefficient, bureaucratic and subject to political interference. Proven oil reserves continue to

decline, albeit at a far slower pace than a few years ago.

Partial privatization solves PEMEX reform Joao Peixe 7-15-2012; writer for Oilprice.com Can Enrique Pea Nieto's Energy Reforms Make Mexico a Major Oil Exporter?

http://oilprice.com/Latest-Energy-News/World-News/Can-Enrique-Pea-Nietos-Energy-Reforms-Make-Mexico-a-Major-Oil-Exporter.html

All oil reserves are state property, and Mexico has huge potential, however, the only company, Petrleos Mexicanos (PEMEX), with the rights for exploration, processing, and selling of the oil, do not have the resources to maximise extraction.
Since 2004 Mexican oil output has fallen by 25%, which is a problem as the government receives nearly a third of its revenue from the oil industry.

Pea Nieto has decided to encourage growth in the sector by opening it up to foreign investors, specifically Brazils Petrobras. In an interview with the Financial Times back in 2011 he said that PEMEX can achieve more, grow more and do more through alliances with the private sector. In order to open the industry to private investors such as Petrobras, Pea Nieto must pass a reform agenda through the nations congress; a congress where his party does not hold a majority. This means that he will rely upon support from opposition parties to gain the necessary two-thirds vote that he needs to
achieve his plans.

Ongoing PEMEX reform opens up shale and deepwater oil to exploration that solves production issues Eric Martin and Carlos Manuel Rodriguez, 7-13-2012; reporters for Bloomberg Businessweek in Mexico City, Mexico May Finally Get
a Modern Oil Industry http://interamericansecuritywatch.com/mexico-may-finally-get-a-modern-oil-industry/

Opening up the oil sector may boost gross domestic product by as much as 0.8 percent a year, according to research firm Capital Economics. Combined with the discovery of significant amounts of shale gas in northern Mexico, tapping deepwater oil could create an era of low energy costs for the country. Inviting outsiders to
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invest in Pemex could also transform the psychology of business in Mexico . To change Pemex, Pea Nieto will have to
challenge entrenched interests, from the unions to local officials, who have all benefited from Pemexs largesse. If he succeeds he could tackle other monopolies and duopolies in power generation, telecom, and cable television that make life so expensive for Mexicans.

High oil prices overcome revenue shortfalls Market News International 5-9-2011; High Oil Prices Lift Pemex Profits, Challenges Remain http://imarketnews.com/node/30466
MEXICO CITY (MNI) - State

oil company Petroleos Mexicanos (Pemex) is reaping huge earnings due to rising world oil prices, but analysts and company officials agree that steep challenges remain due to the government's tax take, meeting promised production increases, money losing subsidiaries and attracting companies via its new contract model. Mexico's basket of oil sold at $110.86 late last week, up from $80.60 at the end of last year, and $71.45 in early May 2010. But the increase was largely caused by factors which have little to do with Mexico. Investors are stampeding into commodities as low interest rates allow them to borrow in developed economies and park the money in appreciating goods. Meanwhile, the Pemex quarterly
report released last week showed production, at 2.57 million barrels per day actually fell 1% compared with the first quarter of 2010, although average exports rose 10% to 1.37 million bpd. Still, with prices on the rise, the company posted net earnings of

billion in the first quarter, up from 1 billion during the same period year earlier.

4.2

Alt cause to Mexico instabilitymigration barriers

Littlefield 2009 (Edward, Council on Hemispheric Affairs, "As Mexicos Problems Mount: The Impact of the Economic Recession on Migration Patterns from Mexico") As migration from, and remittances to, Mexico have decreased as a result of the current recession, the Mexican economy ominously worsens - Migration, remittances, and the national economy should be considered as integral components in the debate over whether Mexico deserves to be classified as a failed state, and what should be United States policy The Mexican economy and many of its national institutional structures may be on the brink of collapse. While drug war violence has dominated the recent news about the possible irreversible status as a society beyond remediation, the topic of immigration has been either marginalized or used to further promote
fears that the conflict may spread to the United States. Drugs, national security, and economic recession have replaced immigration reform on the United States policy agenda. However, the current financial crisis, and its impact south of the borde r, is intricately linked to matters of immigration, security, and Mexicos very cohesion.

No impact to heg
Goldstein 2011, Professor IR at American University [Joshua S. Goldstein, Professor emeritus of international relations at American University, Thing Again: War, Sept/Oct 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/08/15/think_again_war?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full] Nor do shifts in the global balance of power doom us to a future of perpetual war. While some political scientists argue that an increasingly multipolar world is an increasingly volatile one -- that peace is best assured by the predominance of a single hegemonic power, namely the United States -- recent geopolitical history suggests otherwise. Relative U.S. power and worldwide conflict have waned in tandem over the past decade. The exceptions to the trend, Iraq and Afghanistan, have been lopsided wars waged by the hegemon, not challenges by up-and-coming new powers. The best precedent for today's emerging world order may be the 19thcentury Concert of Europe, a collaboration of great powers that largely maintained the peace for a century until its breakdown and the bloodbath of World War I.

Heg fails
Mastanduno 9 (Michael, Professor of Government at Dartmouth, World Politics 61, No. 1, Ebsco) During the cold war the United States dictated the terms of adjustment. It derived the necessary leverage because it provided for the security of its economic partners and because there were no viable alter natives to an economic order centered on the United States. After the cold war the outcome of adjustment struggles is less certain because the United States is no longer in a position to dictate the terms. The United States, notwithstanding its preponderant power, no longer enjoys the same type of security leverage it once possessed, and the very success of the U.S.-centered world economy has afforded Americas supporters a greater range of international and domestic economic options. The claim that the United States is unipolar is a statement about its cumulative economic, military, and other capabilities.1 But preponderant capabilities across the board do not guarantee effective influence in any given arena. U.S. dominance in the international security arena no longer translates into effective leverage in the international economic arena. And although the United States remains a dominant international economic player in absolute terms, after the cold war it has found itself more vulnerable and constrained than it was during the golden economic era after World War II. It faces rising economic challengers with their own agendas and with greater discretion in international economic policy than Americas cold war allies had enjoyed. The United States may continue to act its own way, but it can no longer count on getting its own way.

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Technical barriers prevent bioterror Jonathan Tucker, director of the CBW Nonproliferation Project at Center for Nonprolif Studies at Monterey Instit, and Amy Sands, assoc director, July/August 1999, http://www.bullatomsci.org/issues/1999/ja99/ja99tucker.html

One reason there have been so few successful examples of chemical or biological terrorism is that carrying out an attack requires overcoming a series of major technical hurdles: gaining access to specialized chemicalweapon ingredients or virulent microbial strains; acquiring equipment and know-how for agent production and dispersal; and creating an organizational structure capable of resisting infiltration or early detection by law enforcement. Many of the microorganisms best suited to catastrophic terrorismvirulent strains of anthrax or deadly viruses such as smallpox and Ebolaare difficult to acquire. Further, nearly all viral and rickettsial agents are hard to produce, and bacteria such as plague are difficult to weaponize so that they will survive the process of delivery. As former Soviet bioweapons scientist Ken Alibek wrote in his recent memoir, Biohazard, The most virulent culture in a
test tube is useless as an offensive weapon until it has been put through a process that gives it stability and predictability. The manufacturing technique is, in a sense, the real weapon, and it is harder to develop than individual agents.9 The capability

to disperse microbes and toxins over a wide area as an inhalable aerosol the form best suited for inflicting mass casualties requires a delivery system whose development would outstrip the technical capabilities of all but the most sophisticated terrorists. Not only is the dissemination process for biological agents inherently complex, requiring specialized equipment and expertise, but effective dispersal is easily disrupted by environmental and meteorological conditions. A large-scale attack with anthrax spores against a city, for example, would require the use of a
crop duster with custom-built spray nozzles that could generate a high-concentration aerosol cloud containing particles of agent between one and five microns in size. Particles smaller than one micron would not lodge in the victims lungs, while

particles much larger than five microns would not remain suspended for long in the atmosphere.

No impact to Mexican instability

Seelee and Shirt, 10 *director of the Mexico Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars AND ** fellow at the center and an associate professor at the University of San Diego (Andrew Selee, David Shirk, 3/27/10, " Five myths about Mexico's drug war ", Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/03/26/AR2010032602226.html) The country has certainly seen a big rise in drug violence, with cartels fighting for control of major narcotics shipment routes -especially at the U.S. border and near major seaports and highways -- and branching into kidnapping, extortion and other illicit activities. Ciudad Juarez, in particular, has been the scene of major battles between two crime organizations and accounted for nearly a third of drug-linked deaths last year.

But the violence is not as widespread or as random as it may appear. Though civilians with no evident ties to the drug trade have been killed in the crossfire and occasionally targeted, drug-related deaths are concentrated among the traffickers.

(Deaths among military and police personnel are an estimated 7 percent of the total.) A major reshuffling of leaders and alliances is occurring among the top organized crime groups, and, partly because of government efforts to disrupt their activities, violence has jumped as former allies battle each other. The bloodshed is also geographically concentrated in key trafficking corridors, notably in the states of Sinaloa, Chihuahua and Tamaulipas. While the violence underscores weaknesses in the government's ability to maintain security in parts of the country, organized crime is not threatening to take over the federal government. Mexico is not turning into a failed state.

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1nc oil spills adv


Their only internal link evidence to global spillover says that fishing, overconsumption, and Cuba are alt-causes Brenner 8
(Jorge Brenner, Guarding the Gulf of Mexicos valuable resources, SciDevNet, 3 -14-2008, http://www.scidev.net/en/opinions/guarding-the-gulf-of-mexico-s-valuable-resources.html)
The economic

embargo is widely considered as the main barrier to international marine research and conservation programmes in the Gulf. But, given that the Gulf is enclosed by three countries, an integrated view of governance of common resources should prevail over the political strategies of the individual countries. This common responsibility is often overlooked. We have abused the region's ecological resources in treating them as a source of wealth while failing to share responsibility for their conservation. In my opinion, this misunderstanding of the concept of the commons owned by everyone and no one has probably caused more damage than the economic embargo imposed on almost self-sufficient Cuba.
Rich in biodiversity and habitats The Gulf of Mexico is rich in biodiversity and unique habitats, and hosts the only known nesting beach of Kemp's Ridley, the world's most endangered sea turtle. The Gulf's circulation pattern gives it biological and socioeconomic importance: water from the Caribbean enters from the south through the Yucatan Channel between Cuba and Mexico and, after warming in the basin, leaves through the northern Florida Strait between the United States and Cuba to form the Gulf Stream in the North Atlantic that helps to regulate the climate of western Europe.

About one-third of the Gulf is a broad continental shelf, which provides a wealth of fisheries. Intensive fishing is the biggest factor interfering with the Gulf's environment, and is an area where the three governments should cooperate in managing this international resource.

Individual ecosystems are resilient

Ridder 2008 PhD, School of Geography and Environmental Studies, University of Tasmania (Ben, Biodiversity And Conservation, 17.4, Questioning the ecosystem services argument for biodiversity conservation) *ES = environmental services

That the low resilience assumption is largely false is apparent in the number of examples of species extinctions that have not brought about catastrophic ecosystem collapse and decline in ES, and in the generally limited ecosystem influence of species on the cusp of extinction. These issues have been raised by numerous authors, although given the absence of systematic attempts to verify propositions of this sort, the evidence assembled is usually anecdotal and we are forced to trust that an unbiased account of the situation has been presented. Fortunately a number of highly respected people have discussed this topic, not least being the prominent conservation biologist David Ehrenfeld. In 1978 he described the conservation dilemma, which arises on the increasingly frequent occasions when we encounter a threatened part of Nature but can find no rational reason for keeping it (Ehrenfeld 1981, p. 177). He continued with the following observation: Have there been permanent and significant resource effects of the extinction, in the wild, of John Bartrams great discovery, the beautiful tree Franklinia alatamaha, which had almost vanished from the earth when Bartram first set eyes upon it? Or a thousand species of tiny beetles that we never knew existed before or after their probable extermination? Can we even be certain than the eastern forests of the United States suffer the loss of their passenger pigeons and chestnuts in some tangible way that affects their vitality or permanence, their value to us? (p. 192) Later, at the first conference on biodiversity, Ehrenfeld (1988) reflected that most species do not seem to have any conventional value at all and that the rarest species are the ones least likely to be missed by no stretch of the imagination can we make them out to be vital cogs in the ecological machine (p. 215). The appearance of comments
within the environmental literature that are consistent with Ehrenfeldsand from authors whose academic standing is also worthy of respectis uncommon but not unheard of (e.g.,

Tudge 1989; Ghilarov 1996; Sagoff 1997; Slobodkin 2001; Western 2001).

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If they beat our resiliency claims, then legal remedies cant solve oil spills paradigm shift key
Craig 11 [Legal Remedies for Deep Marine Oil Spills and Long-Term Ecological Resilience: A Match Made in Hell, Robin Kundis Craig, Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Environmental Programs, Florida State University College of Law, 12/20/2011, BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW]
176 The Deepwater Horizon Commission had several other recommendations for governance

reforms, although it largely chose to hew close to existing law and policy, tinkering with existing structures rather than promoting a different and more precautionary philosophical approach. 177 More important for purposes of this Article, however, is the Commissions
unquestioned assumption of the Gulfs continuing ability to recover from massive oil spills (resilience in the first sense). In particular, its environmental recommendations seek to ensure, inter alia, that [t]he environment and the economy of

the Gulf region recovers as completely and as quickly as possible, not only from the direct impacts of the spill, but from the decades of degradation that proceeded it. 178 This is natural resources laws first-sense resilience dependence in action an unwarranted assumption that human actions are unlikely to push ecosystems over ecosystem thresholds into different structures and functions that, generally, will have significantly reduced value to the humans that
depend on the current ecological state. As William C. Clark, Dixon D. Jones, and C.S. Holling have noted, A system which is globally stable is admirable for blind trialand-error experimentation: it will always recover from any perturbation. It is this paradigm of an infinitely forgiving Nature that has been assumed implicitly in the past . . . . 179 Nevertheless, as a result of this first-sense resilience dependence, the laws and

policies governing offshore oil drilling (and many other kinds of natural resource management) base their regulatory and liability regimes on the assumption that violators can in fact make the public and the environment whole. 180 What would happen instead if we incorporated full resilience theory into our laws? As Brian Walker and David Salt have discussed at length, Resilience thinking presents an approach to managing natural resources that embraces human and natural systems as complex systems continually adapting through cycles of change. 181 In addition to adopting a systems perspective on ecosystem management, resilience thinking fully incorporates the implications of resilience in the second sense (potential ecological regime shifts) the recognition that [s]ocio-ecological systems can exist in more than one kind of stable state. If a system changes too much, it crosses a threshold and begins behaving in a different way, with different feedbacks between its component parts and a different structure. 182 Resilience thinking therefore seeks notas is true under current management paradigmsto tweak the operations of an ecosystem in order to optimize particular products or functions 183 (for example, oil production in the Gulf). Rather, it seeks to more humbly recognize that [t]he complexity of the many linkages and feedbacks that make up a socio-ecological system is such that we can never predict with certainty what the exact response will be to any intervention in the system. 184 In other words, resilience thinking acknowledges what is particularly true with respect to marine

ecosystems: most of the time, we have only the most simplistic of understandings of what our actions do to the ecosystems that we both impact and depend upon. 185 Operationalizing resilience thinking is not easy, especially given current natural resources management norms and paradigms. However, some of the ways in which it might make a difference to our current laws governing offshore oil

drilling are: Comprehensive ecosystem surveys should precede resource development and exploitation rather than follow them. While resilience thinking teaches us that we will never completely understand the complex functioning,

interactions, and responses of ecosystemsfor example, Clark, Jones, and Holling consider management surprises inevitable 186 that acknowledgement of human limitation should not become an excuse for operating completely blindly. Indeed,

the process of learning, often embodied in the inclusion of adaptive management, is generally considered a critical component of resilience thinking and management.

Too many alt causes

Pynn 7 (Larry, staff writer at The Vancouver Sun, Global warming not biggest threat: expert, The Vancouver Sun, http://www2.canada.com/vancouversun/news/story.html?id=6e2988da-31ab-4697-810d-7a008306d571&p=1)
"We all worry about climate change, as we should, but it doesn't mean we shouldn't worry about protecting habitat," says James Grant, a biology professor at Concordia University in Montreal and co-author of a new report on threats to endangered species in Canada. "The really immediate causes right now for many species are things like farming, urbanization and habitat loss caused by the direct things we do." Research by Grant and his pupils shows the biggest threat is habitat loss at 84 per cent, overexploitation 32 per cent, native species interactions 31 per cent, natural causes 27 per cent, pollution 26 per cent, and introduced species 22 per cent. On average, species

are threatened by at least two of the six categories. Human activities representing the biggest source of habitat loss and pollution are not industrial resource extraction, but agriculture at 46 per cent and urbanization at 44 per cent. "Farming is

huge," Grant said in an interview. "The Prairies are one of the most affected habitats in the world. We've turned them into wheat fields." The southern

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Okanagan-Similkameen is another example, home to about one-third of species at risk in B.C. as well as a thriving agricultural industry, including vineyards, and increased urban development.

Litany of alt causes Bruno 10, associate professor UNC Chapel Hill, [John F., May 3, Biodiversity Loss Continues Unabated Despite
International Efforts, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-f-bruno/biodiversity-loss-continu_b_561699.html] Betting on biodiversity loss is a pretty sure thing. The earth'splant and animal species are disappearing at a sobering rate due to pressures including habitat loss, climate change, pollution and over-harvesting. Despite a few success stories and steps in the right direction, we are falling far short of stemming these losses. Biodiversity is the entire range of biological variety in the world, including the
diversity of genotypes, species and ecosystems. It can be measured on levels from DNA molecules all the way up to broad taxonomic categories such as families and phyla. Monitoring the fate of any of these aspects of biodiversity at a global scale is a daunting task. Thus, we know little about the rates and patterns of biodiversity loss or the effectiveness of global mitigation plans such as the 2002 Convention on Biological Diversity. Dr. Stuart Butchart of the UNEP World Conservation Monitoring Centre and BirdLife Internationaltackled the problem by assembling aninternational team of conservation scientists (that I was part of) to calculate trends in global biodiversity. The idea was to assemble several dozen indices that we had sound, long term data for including population trends for birds and other vertebrates and the loss of habitats such as forests, seagrass beds and coral reefs. As we recently reported in Science magazine, our analysis indicates that biodiversity has continued to decline over the past four decades with no detectable abatement for most indices. This is largely due to increased pressures resulting from human population growth, economic development and globalization but it also seems clear that our international response to the biodiversity crisis has been inadequate. Every aspect of biodiversity on earth is unique. The species that we have already driven extinct, from the Dodo to the Tasmanian Tiger, can never be resurrected or replaced. As a field ecologist, I have been lucky to experience and work on some truly wondrous examples of the earth's biodiversity from the tide pools of the Pacific Northwest to rainforests in Costa Rica to alpine habitats in the Rocky Mountains. The downside of my otherwise fantastic job is that I witness the degradation of nature firsthand. The coral reefs of the Florida Keys of today bear little resemblance to the underwater jungles patrolled by large sharks that I snorkeled over as a kid 35 years ago. Over the last two decades I have observed and documented striking biodiversity losses even on isolated and

seemingly untouched reefs.

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At terrorism add-on
No impact to terrorism Friedman 6 MIT security studies program (Ben, 2/19, The War on Hype, http://sfgate.com/cgibin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2006/02/19/INGDDH8E2T1.DTL&type=printable, AG)
By any statistical measure, the terrorist threat to America has always been low. As political scientist John Mueller notes, in most years allergic reactions to peanuts, deer in the road, and lightening have all killed about the same number of Americans as terrorism. In 2001, their banner year, terrorists killed one twelfth as many Americans as the flu and one fifteenth the number killed by car accidents. Most experts dismiss this history. They contend that because both weapons technology and Sunni extremism are spreading, the terrorist danger is ahistorical. But while both these trends are real, we should not leap to the conclusion that the threat is growing or greater than more mundane dangers. There is no obvious reason to believe that September 11 was the start of an era of ever deadlier terrorism, rather than its high-water mark. Both terrorism and unconventional weapons have existed for a long time, but terrorists have always done their damage conventionally . Today the remnants of al Qaeda and its fellow-travelers appear to lack the organizational capacity to operate in the United States or harness complex weapons technologies. This argument does not endorse complacency among government officials. Even a small threat of nuclear terrorism should provoke a better organized non-proliferation policy than the United States now has. Nor does this argument imply that another terrorist massacre in America is unlikely. If enough people try, eventually some attack may well succeed. But attacks are likely to be rare and conventional, on the scale of the London attacks, not apocalyptic nightmares. Even if attacks killing thousands were certain, the risk to each of us would remain close to zero, far smaller than many larger risks that do not alarm us, or provoke government warnings, like driving to work every day. And if something far worse than Sept. 11 does occur, the country will recover.

No retaliation public anxiety Huddy et al 05 (Leonie, Department of Political Science SUNY at Stony Brook Amer. Journal Poli. Sci., Vol 49, no
3)
The findings from this study lend further insight into the future trajectory of support for antiterrorism measures in the United States when we consider the potential effects of anxiety. Security threats in this and other studies increase support for military action (Jentleson 1992; Jentleson and Britton 1998; Herrmann, Tetlock, and Visser 1999). But anxious respondents were less supportive of belligerent military action against

terrorists, suggesting an important source of opposition to military intervention. In the aftermath of 9/11, several factors were consistently related to heightened levels of anxiety and related psychological reactions, including living close to the attack
sites (Galea et al. 2002; Piotrkowski and Brannen 2002; Silver et al. 2002), and knowing someone who was hurt or killed in the attacks (in this study). It is difficult to say what might happen if the United States were attacked again in the near future. Based on our results, it is plausible that a future threat or actual attack directed at a different geographic region would broaden the number of individuals directly affected by terrorism and concomitantly raise levels of anxiety. This could, in turn, lower support for overseas military action . In contrast, in the absence of any additional attacks levels of anxiety are likely to decline slowly over time (we observed a slow decline in this study), weakening opposition to future overseas military action. Since our conclusions are based on analysis of reactions to a single event in a country that has rarely felt the effects of foreign terrorism, we should consider whether they can be generalized to reactions to other terrorist incidents or to reactions under conditions of sustained terrorist action. Our answer is a tentative yes, although there is no conclusive evidence on this point as yet. Some of our findings corroborate evidence from Israel, a country that has prolonged experience with terrorism. For example, Israeli researchers find that perceived risk leads to increased vilification of a threatening group and support for belligerent action (Arian 1989; Bar-Tal and Labin 2001). There is also evidence that Israelis experienced fear during the Gulf War, especially in Tel Aviv where scud missiles were aimed (Arian and Gordon 1993). What is missing, however, is any evidence that anxiety tends to undercut support for belligerent antiterrorism measures under conditions of sustained threat. For the most part, Israeli research has not examined the distinct political effects of anxiety.

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At latin American instability add-on


No impact to Latin American instability
Hartzell 2000 (Caroline A., 4/1/2000, Middle Atlantic Council of Latin American Studies Latin American Essays, Latin America's civil wars: conflict resolution and institutional change. http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-28765765_ITM) Latin America has been the site of fourteen civil wars during the post-World War II era, thirteen of which now have ended. Although not as civil war-prone as some other areas of the world, Latin America has endured some extremely violent and destabilizing intrastate conflicts. (2) The region's experiences with civil wars and their resolution thus may prove instructive for other parts of the world in which such conflicts continue to rage. By examining Latin America's civil wars in some depth not only might we better understand
the circumstances under which such conflicts are ended but also the institutional outcomes to which they give rise. More specifically, this paper focuses on the following central questions regarding Latin America's civil wars: Has the resolution of these conflicts produced significant institutional change in the countries in which they were fought? What is the nature of the institutional change that has taken place in the wake of these civil wars? What are the factors that are responsible for shaping post-war institutional change?

Instabilitys inevitabledrug trafficking Grudgings 2009 (Stuart, Rueters, Latin America ex-leaders urge reform of US drug war, http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSN11358345)
RIO DE JANEIRO, Feb 11 (Reuters) - The

war against drugs is failing and the U.S. government should break with "prohibition" policies that have and stoke violence, three former Latin American presidents said on Wednesday. The respected former presidents urged the United States and Latin American governments to move away from jailing drug users to debate the legalization of marijuana and place more emphasis on the treatment of addicts . Former Colombian President
achieved little more than cram its prisons Cesar Gaviria said there was no meaningful debate over drugs policy in the United States, despite a broad consensus that current policies had failed. "The problem today in the U.S. is that narco-trafficking is a crime and so any politician is fearful of talking about narco-trafficking or talking about policies because they will be called soft," he said. Gaviria has joined with former Brazilian President Fernando Henrique Cardoso and former Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo to try to change the debate on drugs in Latin America, where trafficking gangs have killed tens of thousands of people and weakened democracies through corruption.

From Mexico's gang wars to the drug-funded FARC guerrilla group in Colombia and daily shoot-outs between gangs and police in Rio de Janeiro's shantytowns, much of the region is scarred by drug violence and many believe U.S. policies have failed. A United Nations meeting in Vienna next month will frame international drugs policy for the next 10 years, and the three former presidents, whose group
is called the Latin American Commission on Drugs and Democracy, said it is time for change. They pointed to falling street prices for cocaine and still high levels of consumption in the United States despite decades of policies focused on punishing users and cutting supplies from Latin American countries such as Colombia. 'PREJUDICES, FEARS' The presidents' commission released a report calling on governments to refocus policies toward treating users, move toward decriminalizing marijuana, and invest more in education campaigns. It said current policies were rooted in "prejudices, fears and ideological visions" that inhibited debate. Even as the group met in Rio on Wednesday, police arrested 51 people in a major operation in the city and other states against a suspected drug smuggling ring that sent cocaine to Europe and brought back synthetic drugs like Ecstasy. Organized crime has flourished around drugs and is now threatening the stability

of Mexico, where a spiraling war between rival gangs killed more than 5,700 people last year. Cardoso, one of Latin America's most respected figures, said U.S. leadership was essential to break the cycle of drug-related crime and violence. "It will be almost impossible to solve Mexico's problems and other countries' problems without a more ample, comprehensive set of policies from the U.S. government," he said. Despite winning power on broad promises of change, drugs policy featured little in U.S. President Barack Obama's election campaign and there
are few indications that he will embark on a major overhaul. Gaviria said Washington appeared increasingly isolated in its repressive approach as Latin America and Europe move toward treating drug abuse as a health problem rather than a crime. (Editing by Raymond Colitt and Kieran Murray)

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At cybersecurity add-on
No impact to cyberterror Green 2 editor of The Washington Monthly (Joshua, 11/11, The Myth of Cyberterrorism,
http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2001/0211.green.html, AG) There's just one problem: There is no such thing as cyberterrorism--no instance of anyone ever having been killed by a terrorist (or anyone else) using a computer. Nor is there compelling evidence that al Qaeda or any other terrorist organization has resorted to computers for any sort of serious destructive activity. What's more, outside of a Tom Clancy novel, computer security specialists believe it is virtually impossible to use the Internet to inflict death on a large scale , and many scoff at the notion that terrorists would bother trying. "I don't lie awake at night worrying about cyberattacks ruining my life," says Dorothy Denning, a computer science professor at Georgetown University and one of the country's foremost cybersecurity experts. "Not only does [cyberterrorism] not rank alongside chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons, but it is not anywhere near as serious as other potential physical threats like car bombs or suicide bombers." Which is not to say that cybersecurity isn't a serious problem--it's just not one that involves

terrorists. Interviews with terrorism and computer security experts, and current and former government and military officials, yielded near unanimous agreement that the real danger is from the criminals and other hackers who did $15 billion in damage to the global economy last year using viruses, worms, and other readily available tools. That figure is sure to balloon if more isn't done to protect vulnerable computer systems, the vast majority of which are in the private sector. Yet when it comes to imposing the tough measures on business necessary to protect against the real cyberthreats, the Bush administration has balked. Crushing BlackBerrys When ordinary people imagine cyberterrorism, they tend to think along Hollywood plot lines, doomsday scenarios in which terrorists hijack nuclear weapons , airliners, or military computers from halfway around the world. Given the colorful history of federal boondoggles--billion-dollar weapons systems that misfire, $600 toilet seats--that's an understandable concern. But, with few exceptions, it's not one that applies to preparedness for a cyberattack. "The government is miles ahead of the private sector when it comes to cybersecurity," says Michael Cheek, director of intelligence for iDefense, a Virginia-based computer security company with government and private-sector clients. "Particularly the most sensitive military systems." Serious effort and plain good fortune have combined to bring this about. Take nuclear weapons. The biggest fallacy about their vulnerability, promoted in action thrillers like WarGames, is that they're designed for remote operation. "[The movie] is premised on the assumption that there's a modem bank hanging on the side of the computer that controls the missiles," says Martin Libicki, a defense analyst at the RAND Corporation. "I assure you, there isn't." Rather, nuclear weapons and other sensitive military systems enjoy the most basic form of Internet security: they're "air-gapped," meaning that they're not physically connected to the Internet and are therefore inaccessible to outside hackers. (Nuclear weapons also contain "permissive action links," mechanisms to prevent weapons from being armed without inputting codes carried by the president.) A retired military official was somewhat indignant at the mere suggestion: "As a general principle, we've been looking at this thing for 20 years. What cave have you been living in if you haven't considered this [threat]?" When it comes to cyberthreats, the Defense Department has been particularly vigilant to protect key systems by isolating them from the Net and even from the Pentagon's internal network. All new software must be submitted to the National Security Agency for security testing. "Terrorists could not gain control of our spacecraft, nuclear weapons, or any other type of high-consequence asset," says Air Force Chief Information Officer John Gilligan. For more than a year, Pentagon CIO John Stenbit has enforced a moratorium on new wireless networks, which are often easy to hack into, as well as common wireless devices such as PDAs, BlackBerrys, and even wireless or infrared copiers and faxes. The September 11 hijackings led to an outcry that airliners are particularly susceptible to cyberterrorism. Earlier this year, for instance, Sen. Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.) described "the absolute havoc and devastation that would result if cyberterrorists suddenly shut down our air traffic control system, with thousands of planes in mid-flight." In fact, cybersecurity experts give some of their highest marks to the FAA, which reasonably separates its administrative and air traffic control systems and strictly air-gaps the latter. And there's a reason the 9/11 hijackers used box-cutters instead of keyboards: It's impossible to hijack a plane remotely, which eliminates the possibility of a high-tech 9/11 scenario in which planes are used as weapons. Another source of concern is terrorist infiltration of our intelligence agencies. But here, too, the risk is slim. The CIA's classified computers are also air-gapped, as is the FBI's entire computer system. "They've been paranoid about this forever," says Libicki, adding that paranoia is a sound governing principle when it comes to cybersecurity. Such concerns are manifesting themselves in broader policy terms as well. One notable characteristic of last year's Quadrennial Defense Review was how strongly it focused on protecting information systems.

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At energy security add-on


Mexicos not key to energy security Barnes 11 [Joe, Bonner Means Baker Fellow James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy Rice University, OIL
AND U.S.MEXICO BILATERAL RELATIONS, April 29]
Still, it

is important to put the projected decline in Mexican oil production into perspective. Mexico may be an important producer, but its petroleum output represents less than 5% of the world total. In terms of the Western Hemisphere, any decline in its production over the next 25 years is likely to offset by increased productions elsewhere, notably Brazil and Canada. An eventual turnaround in Venezuelan productionalmost certainly associated with Hugo Chavezs exit from poweris also possible. Venezuela, unlike Mexico, possesses vast oil reserves; it could, under the right circumstances, significantly increase its output. Venezuela, not Mexico, today surely represents the great lost opportunity of hemispheric petroleum production. Opening up additional U.S. coastal areas and nature preserves in Alaska could also help partially offset the decline in Mexico. By way of yet another comparison: The projected decline in Mexican production is significantly less than the decline in North Sea production between 1999 and 2007. This is not to downplay the importance for the United States of volume and diversity of supply to world oil markets. It does suggest, however, that the slow decline of Mexican production is unlikely to precipitate a crisis in international oil markets. This is particularly true as many observers are already predicting decreasing Mexican output. World markets are well aware of the troubled condition of Mexicos oil sector. The only surprise would be if Mexico were to increase its petroleum output.

More evidenceeven if US had zero imports, it cant isolate from global price shocks World Politics Review 8 (4/22, U.S. Energy Independence: Myths and Reality,

http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/article.aspx?id=1981) Energy independence can insulate the United States from the global oil market. The global oil market is not problem-free, but it should be recognized that even if the U.S. did not import a single barrel of crude oil from a foreign supplier, the fungible nature of the global oil market means that the United States cannot insulate itself from global oil market fundamentals or from geopolitical developments in oil-producing regions. An attack on an oil export terminal in Saudi Arabia would drive up the price of oil in the United States, and eventually gasoline prices, even if the U.S. didn't import any oil from that country. The U.S. might be able to reduce its dependence on imported oil over the next few decades, but rapidly growing oil demand from non-OECD Asian economies such as China and India is likely to keep global demand for Middle Eastern oil healthy for the foreseeable future. China is already the second-largest oil market in the world and the International Energy Agency projects that by 2030 developing Asian economies will be consuming more oil than the U.S. and Canada combined. The United States might be able to source its oil closer to home from friendly countries such as Canada and Mexico, but Middle East producers are primed to supply the rapidly growing oil markets of Asia. Iran, for example, cannot export oil to the United States because of American sanctions, but 50 percent of its oil exports end up in Japan, China and South Korea. Saudi Arabia is also becoming a major oil supplier for the growing economies of China and India. The interdependent nature of the global oil market means that no single national market can insulate itself from market dynamics elsewhere. Geology also needs to be factored in when considering calls for energy independence. According to published estimates by the BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2007, the Middle East contains just over 60 percent of the world's known oil reserves, with Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, and Kuwait alone having just over half of the world's total reserves. Output growth from non-OPEC producers will not change the fact that the world will be largely dependent on the Middle East for the bulk of its supplies for the foreseeable future, and that Middle East producers are well-placed to supply the oil hungry markets of Asia.

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