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Human Action, Apriorism, & an Integrated Philosophy

Will Porter 3/3/2014

Praxeology, Truth, & Argumentation


There is a philosophical controversy within the Praxeological Austrian School of economics that is seldom discussed. At first glance, it seems to involve a purely Epistemological issue, but when analyzed in detail it appears to encompass more than just a theory of knowledge and it sheds light on an issue of vital importance. This quarrel was between two of the most monumental and heroic social philosophers to ever live, Murray N. Rothbard and his great mentor, Ludwig von Mises. No matter which side is taken, the core tenets of Praxeological theory remain intact, the question concerned is simply what kind of knowledge does Praxeology provide? What is the nature of this knowledge? Both of the aforementioned thinkers considered Praxeology a unique intellectual discipline, but the precise properties of the knowledge it furnished was a minor object of debate. Praxeology offers a priori insights that are far more than mere definitional claims, or tautologies. Unlike the claim All bachelors are unmarried, the logical implications of human action can actually provide real discovery that has relevance to observable reality and particularly for the science of economics (as well as the social sciences in general). Since these facts can actually yield discovery in the real world, they are also synthetic, not analytic. It is the synthetic a priori which this paper will discuss in detail, rather than its definitional non-empirical discovery-yielding counterpart. Ludwig von Mises categorized two fundamentally distinct branches of scientific knowledge, that which is a priori, and that which is a posteriori. The natural sciences must deal with a posteriori truth, or empirical claims that only have relevance to specific observation and experimentation. The method of induction is employed by the empirical sciences, where particular observations of certain selected phenomena are made; and from these observations general laws extrapolated. Here, a theory must be established and/or refuted on the basis of observational factors alone. Theories are only hypothetical for the natural sciences. The mind (and/or technology) cannot always immediately grasp all of the available empirical data relevant to the theory in question. The only way to attain knowledge about phenomena external to the mind is through observation, and the human senses are indeed fallible. We cannot have 100% complete certainty about any given hypothesis. There is always the possibility that some relevant data has been overlooked. The hypothetical status of totally empirical science is, however, not necessarily a shortcoming. It is simply the nature of a posteriori knowledge and the way that natural scientists must proceed in their attempt to ascertain truth about reality. In contrast, Mises also considered certain sciences to be a priori disciplines. Knowledge about economics and the social sciences involve knowledge about human choice-making. Such knowledge can only be discovered purely through reflective reasoning on the nature of things, and particularly for Mises, the nature of human action.

Because a priori knowledge is verified or refuted on the basis of logic alone, nothing learned from past, present, or future observations could ever affect its validity. In fact, it is precisely because the nature of human action is not actually observable through the senses that discovering anything about it must be through a priori, reflective, logical means; or in the words of Mises, discursive reasoning. Since these reflective truths in the a priori sciences arent only analytic definitions, they must be deemed synthetically meaningful, having some relevance to reality as we experience it. They are unique in that they are knowable just by thinking and reasoning about things, yet they can also yield empirical discoveries about the world around us (again, as opposed to mere tautologies which, while logically valid, tell us nothing new about reality). By contemplating the nature of man as a choice-maker (aka actor), we are able to derive various truthclaims such as Humans act and All action consists of means and ends, as well as more complex truths such as the Law of Diminishing Marginal Utility and the various economic propositions derived from this concept of choice-making. The first of these claims, I.E. Humans act, is the most fundamental truth for Praxeology. It is termed the Action Axiom and it serves as the fundamental (and undeniable) starting point from which many other truths can be logically derived. An axiom is a claim which is undeniable as in the act of denying it, one must affirm it. Obviously any attempt to deny the claim that Humans act would itself constitute an action, therefore no denial could ever be argumentatively successful. The Action Axiom also provides the basis for various existential principles, such as the Principle of Causality (the general existence of cause and effect) and the Laws of Logic (Existence, Identity, and [Non] Contradiction; but more on logic below). Next to the Action Axiom itself, all of the other subsequently derived a priori facts may as well be deemed axioms, since in the very act of denying them one must affirm them. For instance any denial at allas already mentionedwould have to be an action, necessarily using means and ends, and which as well sought to inflict a cause to reap its effect. In this way, these truths are argumentatively undeniable and logically incontestable, their denial amounts to a demonstration of their validity (aka a performative contradiction). Anything derived from an axiom must also attain a similar truth-status. Such things are logically implicit in the axiom itself so they could not be detached from it as far as their truth-status goes. The crux of the issue at hand is to determine just what kind of knowledge these a priori truths provide and what type of cognition is required to grasp them. As we have seen, Mises himself termed this knowledge as a priori, knowable before any particular experience. The Laws of Logic, the Principle of Causality, the existence of human action and all of its logical corollaries, all of these ideas were considered by Mises to be laws of thought, since no particular experience could ever be at variance with them.

The mind cannot even fathom the idea of something that is in conflict with the three logical laws, some change that didnt occur on the basis of cause and effect, nor could the mind fathom the idea of purposeful behavior which wasnt structured upon a means-ends framework. These laws are simply inescapable for rational thought. They arent necessarily self-evident, however, in that their discovery isnt an easy task, but once somebody is made aware of these laws and understands their meaning, they cannot be denied with any rational coherence. In this sense, Mises compared the propositions of Praxeology to be akin to Kants categories of thought, these were facts which are to be understood via discursive reasoning, not observed through the senses or any empirical exercise. Although the following explanation of Murray Rothbards divergence from Mises may seem like a negligible matter of semantics, we will see how his differing position offers significant implications in multiple areas of philosophy, more than are at first apparent. Rothbard was not fond of the strict labeling of all knowledge as analytic/synthetic, and a priori/a posteriori. Rather than taking an explicit Dualist position, where there is a clear distinction between a priori and empirical cognition, Rothbard took a Monist stance on Epistemology (as far as I can tell, somewhat similar to the Randian-Objectivist account). Knowledge, thought Rothbard, was all empirical. But those claims which are said by Praxeology to be true a priori are discovered through a radically empirical method, different from the typical notion of observation. Where von Mises refers to inner-reflection as a categorically different type of cognition, Rothbard considers even this kind of reasoning to be an (inner) experience, thus making the knowledge attained from this exercise empirical. Just because this experience takes place inside of our head doesnt mean it isnt still some kind of experience. But this alone doesnt seem to resolve anything. Rothbard himself admits that there is something unique about reflecting on human nature and action; it indeed does have the distinctive property of being a priori (irrefutable on the grounds of any particular observation or [external] experience, but by logic alone). Despite his differing position, Rothbard himself still used the term a priori when referring to the knowledge Praxeology yields. While all attainment of knowledge is done via experience, there still must be something peculiar about a priori knowledge; it has a unique truth-status. In contemplating what Rothbards position truly means, it appears that, for him, the difference between observational knowledge and reflective reasoning is only a matter of availability rather than one concerning the properties of categorically distinct types of knowledge. The knowledge about human action that is attainable a priori is knowledge which every conceivable actor inherently has access to, just by thinking about choice-making. In the Rothbardian sense, reflective reasoning is a type of experience or observation, the only difference with Praxeology is that the knowledge it provides is always immediately ascertainable.

Any actor, if they wanted to, could verify and observe these truths purely through their reasoning. Since this knowledge concerns mans universal nature as an actor, all of the data one must observe to understand it is always readily at hand (in mind), assuming the entity is indeed a human being (who cannot escape acting). Praxeologys conclusions are, indeed, inescapable, since nobody can decide to not make-choices, or act. Rational man is plagued until his demise with choice. So long as his mind can grasp his environment, he is forced to navigate and act within these surroundings to sustain his own life. Rational action is mans fundamental faculty for survival. Consequently, because action is unavoidable, all actors must be able to attain knowledge about it just through reasoning on its nature. This may be difficult to do, one may not be able to come up with these insights on the spot, or at any particular time at all. The only point here is that once these truths are expressed or made apparent to someone; there is no possibility of ever finding some subsequent empirical data which could ever refute them. All that one needs to know to validate them is knowledge which all actors must have possession of, even if, as is often the case, only on an intuitive level; I.E. these things are taken is ultimate-givens which are so obvious nobody would even think to contemplate them (more on this below). So instead of calling Praxeology laws of thought, Murray Rothbard termed them laws of existence. As said by author and philosopher Gennady Stolyarov, all knowledge is concerned with the same existence, and so in some way must be considered the same body of information. All valid claims to knowledge are, most fundamentally, existential laws, not merely impediments or restrictions on the mind of man, forcing him to think in some particular way (in the Kantian sense). Logically-verifiable synthetic truths are not merely valid in some mental or Epistemological vacuum, but must be thought of as assumptions about existence itself. Mises, in many ways, was a Kantian. His theory of knowledge had a very similar form to Immanuel Kants in that the idea of categories was employed. The categories of thought/action were laws which mans mind simply could not forego. Kants position was essentially that man can only grasp reality as it is rendered to him through the senses and through the categories of thought. Such categories were like a pair of eyeglasses which one could never remove, filtering sensuous data through the categories of the mind into something understandable for the rational agent; structured in some coherent way. This, however, seems to imply a sort of Idealism, where the human mind somehow creates reality for man. Kant claimed the objects of our experience are not the things in themselves, but only some kind of distorted version that our mind presents to us, conceptually structured based on the categories of thought so it can actually be understood. It is not always clear exactly what Kant was trying to say, but some interpretations of his work show his position as one that claimed some kind of unbridgeable gap between the world that man experiences and the real world of things in themselves. For Mises, then, Kants categories of thought became the categories of action. Kants model of an active mind which met reality with its own structure now becomes the actors mind, the mind of the choice-maker. The mind grasps reality in order to render it into knowledge useful for choice and structures thought into concepts, which are fundamentally constrained by the Laws of Logic, Causality and the rest of the structure of a priori truths that Praxeology provides.

Mises probably didnt endorse the Kantian Idealism, but it is possible that the position may still be forced in that direction. If the mind is restrained by the categories of thought, it leaves an opening for the idea that reality (in Kants terms, the noumena) is unknowable and that man only grasps a faint reflection of it. On this point it would seem, however, that Occams razor falls on Rothbards side. Reality as it is understood through human experience may be fundamentally different from the world of things in themselves, that much is conceded. But since we could never have access to things in themselves, it seems unjustified to make the assumption that they must be completely different, and that our cognition distorts real reality. On a functional level, the only reality that we would ever have to grasp (at least for action to take place) is precisely the reality that experience offers information about, since we could obviously never step outside of experience to experience something. The only reality that we ever can, or will, know is the one which is filtered through our mind. There is no use in speculating on what things in themselves might be like. Since our knowledge finds its function in the act of choice-making, for any successful action (where a means effectively achieve the desired end) to take place, our knowledge must consist of facts relevant to existence itself. It is existence after all that action must navigate through to satisfy our own wants, needs, and desires. If the mind could only present some mediocre distorted version of reality, how could it navigate or guide the physical body through reality in order to inflict concrete, definite, changes into it? If one holds to the Kantian idea of a distorting mind which cannot grasp anything real, it forces one into the corner of a total Solipsism, where only the mind exists. Once adopting such a position, reality is merely a dream, somehow disconnected from any mind or brain. This immediately strikes one as a seemingly-flawed position. How could one ever validate the claim that only they exist, or only their mind exists? It seems neither logic nor any empirical investigation could ever shed light on such a fanciful speculation, and we should therefore spend no more time on it (at least in the field of philosophy). Rothbards account of Praxeology as laws of existence indeed does have merit. However, as said above, it is knowledge which must grasp existence to make action possible, so these same laws would also have to be considered laws of thought simultaneously, in the Kantian/Misesian sense. The laws of thought are those of logic, causality, the existence of action with means and ends (along with the rest of actions logical corollaries) as well as the a priori of argumentation. Argumentation is an important concept and is as well derived from action. Argumentation is the peculiar class of action which consists of the expression of truth claims; the pure formulation of knowledge (using language) for other rational-thinking entities to consider and contemplate. Argumentation itself, as a phenomenon, cannot actually be observed, but only understood by one whom already knew what it meant to argue.

Similar to action, the meaning of argumentation can only be discovered by reasoning on its nature, the nature of an agent claiming to profess something about that which exists; to profess truth. Let us take a brief aside to contemplate what even this means. A truth-claim is an extremely profound revolution in the animal kingdom, a first for all Earth species. Before usbefore reason, before actionthere were only non-rational creatures, essentially driven by instinct alone. While these beings could navigate space, and in some cases even create social hierarchies (wolves, various monkeys and primates), they could never plan into the future, could never set definite ends which would be reached through consciously-chosen, definite, means. They live on a somewhat day-to-day, or even moment-to-moment, basis and have no real awareness of time or the scarcity of their own being; the impending doom which hangs, like a specter, over all living things. It is only man who is uniquely aware of this. Due to this conscious awareness of his own existence and needs, as well as the scarce reality around him, he formulates his ideas towards purposefully attaining those ends which satisfy his wants and sustain his life. Bears do not plan to hibernate, wolves do not plan a hunt, but man, in contrast, cannot escape such planning. Because of this faculty of reason, man is able to grasp various facets of existence in order to incorporate them into his plans, I.E. his means and ends. The expression of this knowledge is a truth-claim, and two or more parties expressing truth claims in opposition to one another can be said to be engaged in an argument. As will be seen below, the same principles about truth-validity that are derived from argumentation are also implicit in the concept of action itself, I.E. always assumed as manifest in the existence which action must navigate (rather than only as constraints on human knowledge/cognition as Kant seemed to imply). This is where we begin to see Metaphysical insights shine through, but before we can fully comprehend that we must return to elucidating the nature of argumentation. Obviously one could never validly argue that one cannot argue. This gives argumentation an axiomatic status. Nobody could claim that they didnt know the meaning of truth-validity. To argue at all implies that one does understand that claims can be valid or invalid, true or false. One could never argue that one doesnt understand what it means to argue, or what truth meant. If any actor is a language-user, they could not employ meaningful language to claim that they didnt know that language had meaning. In this way, argument is similar to action in that one never attains data about eithers meaning through observation. Only can reflective reasoning tell us anything about both argument and/or action. Moreover, it is only through argumentation that truth claims can be raised and decided upon. But if two or more disputants are going to debate over the validity of a claim, it must be assumed that some kind of standard is in place (this has vital importance for Ethics concerning truth-justification based on a normative standard, rather than the existential truth-standard we speak of at present, but that is for another discussion).

Such a standard would have to be objectively ascertainable for all disputants in order for a truth to be understood between them. The laws of logic serve as that standard (Existence/Consciousness, Identity, Contradiction). And, in fact, no argument could ever be made which didnt already assume these laws to be true. To even formulate a proposition one must first assume that Existence exists. If this proposition is to make a case for or against something, it must also be assumed that Existence consists of more than one thing (I.E. Identity). To affirm or negate anything at all, one assumes that there is a diversity of entities in existence, that all things have their own various properties. To formulate an argument at all, distinctions between various concepts and entities must be made. Finally, it is assumed that Claims about existence cannot be contradictory. If contradictions were permissible, two mutually exclusive arguments could be both true at once. Everyone could have their own truth, thereby eliminating the meaning of truth in the first place. This isnt to say that all people are perfectly logical all of the time, though. It is often the case that people have incorrect reasoning and make improper connections between various ideas. But, nonetheless, the concepts of Existence, Identity, and Contradiction could never be denied, since any denial would necessarily assume them in order to argue any case in the first place. Argument deals with knowledge claims. Ultimately, these claims can be deemed true or false on the basis of the logical laws (as well as further relevant empirical data if needed). As has been shown, any argument whatsoever must employ these logical laws to negate or affirm anything. Such laws of thought are, indeed, the most basic standard of truth for any proposition. But since knowledge must be about something (that exists), it seems these laws also must transcend the Teleological-Epistemological realm of thought, into the realm of external, physical existence. Although thought is itself the result of a physiological process, ideas are themselves immaterial and intangible. The realm of material existence is fundamentally different than that of ideas, concepts, and the mind. The logical laws (the basic standard of truth) that immutably apply to the realm of propositions and ideas must in some way also apply to material existence. For what would truth even mean other than that which gives accurate account for some facet of existence? The type of synthetic a priori truth which is attained by Praxeology via inner-cognition cannot be considered valid only in an Epistemological-mental vacuum, applying to the realm of knowledge only. These truths have relevance beyond the mind, into the fundamental qualities of existence itself (an existence which the human mind is capable of grasping).

Metaphysics & Action


The validity and immutability of the three logical laws isnt only assumed in any proposition or argument, but also in the course of any action. The notions of both truth and choice-making (behavior) wouldnt be coherent if reality didnt conform to the same basic laws that knowledge must conform to. Any action/choice obviously assumes first that something exists; otherwise thered be nobody to choose and nothing to choose between. The existence of consciousness or the existence of the choice-maker must be assumed as well, since of course there has to be chooser if any choice is to be made. Existence and Consciousness can be considered two facets of the same logical law, arguably the very most fundamental knowledge there could possibly be. The notion of Identity is implied here as well; the claim that reality is made up of separate entities which all have their own distinct properties. (At least on the scale that human perception and action take place in. One could perhaps argue that all of existence is made up of totally homogenous sub-atomic particles or something of the like, but that has no importance for the existential assumptions that are necessary for the action which sustains human life. The mind deals with the level of reality which action must take place in. Maybe this is what Kant meant by things in themselves though; the way existence simply exists on all scales, all at once. Our mind does not deal with the quantum or atomic aspect of things, or with the cosmic, astronomical scale of space, but somewhere comfortably in between. While science and technology can always aid our understanding, the human mind simply lacks the capability to fathom gargantuan spatial distances, nor infinitesimal atoms, Planck-lengths or Quark particles. Science can shed light on the natures and traits of these things, but the human mind cannot imagine personally experiencing what they would be like, purposeful action does not function or interact on such scales.) To illustrate how action must assume the Identity principle, if 100% of existence was exclusively only the property A", the choice between A and A would be no choice at all. Nor could any distinction be made between the choice-maker and the reality which he interacts in. If the choice-maker is somehow exactly the same in every conceivable way to everything else that exists, there could never be any choice between two possible states of affairs. The concept of valuation (which guides choice-making) or even of a person at all disappears. Here, all would be one, a singularity, and action is clearly impossible in such a reality.

There must be at least the property A and the property B, even if thats just the choice-maker and the rest of the reality he exists in. But even from a moments experience of reality we can immediately recognize the immense diversity of objects, entities, beings; lots of things in existence. Action, in fact, would have to assume much more than A and B for any of the complex series of every-day actions to be possible, using a vast diversity of means and ends. Identityassumed in all purposeful goalreaching behavioris implicit in all of interact-able reality. Finally, it is assumed that mutually exclusive things cannot occur simultaneously, I.E. that contradictions are not tenable. A contradiction is just another way of saying that which cannot/does not exist. A contradiction is an inherently unimaginable concept. One could not even fathom what a 100% red and 100% green object would look like, these are mutually exclusive properties. Choice, then, would as well lose meaning if two mutually exclusive (contradictory) courses of action could be taken at once. It is because reality exists, has identity, and does not allow for contradictions that certain things cannot be possible. One cannot simultaneously go to Chicago and to London, there has to be a choice of where to guide ones own scarce body. The idea of going to two distinct and remote places simultaneously is vaguely imaginable, but in the context of human action, one could not comprehend the idea of implementing two completely exclusive means and ends in two different places at once. Action deals with a non-contradictory reality. Never could an actor experience any sort of contradiction other than one made in a fallacious proposition! One may, for example, refute the claim that 2+2=4 using advanced mathematical techniques, changing the topological properties and meanings of the symbols involved to attain a different outcome, but this could never refute the fact that an entire science of engineering has been based in the fundamental principles of geometry and arithmetic. Such a discipline has constant successful real-world application in the construction of massive feats of human ingenuity. Engineers who build large structures must assume a contradiction-free environment. The logical reasoning used in these applied areas of mathematics also do not allow for contradictions. How could the engineers be successful so consistently if these logical assumptions about contradiction didnt also actually apply to material reality itself? The only way structures could be built based on mathematical reasoning is if the assumptions behind the mathematics had some fundamental existential application. It is a fine example of the synthetic a priori at work! (On a somewhat tangential point, this is where Hans Hoppes claim comes in that arithmetic and geometry are part of the Praxeological synthetic a priori realm of knowledge. Hoppe maintains that there are areas of mathematics which are not synthetic in this way, but he goes on to say that these areas must be considered meaningless analytic symbol games having no relevance to observable reality. There have been objections that some kind of non-Euclidian geometry has been discovered somewhere in the universe, but no scientist could have ever discovered such a thing were his instruments not themselves structured according to Euclidian geometry!

Geometry, in a way, constrains observable reality [in the context of how action must deal with it] somewhat analogously to how the laws of logic constrain propositions for the realm of thought. Similar to how one could not imagine a proposition that didnt assume the three logical laws, one could not imagine a form or entity which was not describable or expressible in the terms of geometric planes, shapes, and lines. Further, action, too, in this very same way is constrained by the conclusions of Praxeology. All actions can be described on the basis of means and ends, etc. This helps illustrate how these are truly existential laws) Synthetic a priori truths are fundamental facts of existence. We require an Epistemological theory to come to our conclusions about these kinds of facts and their nature, but once such conclusions are grasped, they have immediate Metaphysical import. It appears that in the case of our minimal squabble mentioned in the first section of this essay, both Mises and Rothbard were correct. Synthetic a priori truths represent both laws of thought and of reality. These serve as the most fundamental cornerstones to human knowledge, as no observation or experience could be grasped without the implicit use of these concepts (whether one explicitly realizes it or not). Metaphysics is often derided as a fraudulent enterprise, making mystical speculation about the unknowable tapestry of reality. But it seems clear that everyone must make all kinds of Metaphysical assumptions to even keep themselves alive. We must tie our shoes, cross the street, interact with others, feed and clothe ourselves, etc. Reality must be navigated and grasped; in each action we take we make fundamental assumptions about the universe around us. We assume cause and effect, we assume existence, we assume identity, we assume the impermissibility of contradiction, we assume action, and we assume all of the unobservable, immaterial prerequisites for any action to be taken in the first place. Without the implicit assumption of the validity of these truths, experience would be utterly un-cognizable, un-graspable. Without these assumptions, no rational creature could possibly survive. Metaphysics and Epistemology must be said to be two sides of the same coin. Existence is only known by means of knowledge, and knowledge only consists of (potentially correct or incorrect) conceptual representations of existence. The truth-standard for knowledge is only a standard insofar as it grounds truth in existence. A proposition is true or false on the basis of whether or not it accurately accounts for some selected aspect of reality. When we distinguish a priori knowledge, the action categories, from all other knowledge, we isolate the most vital assumptions our minds must make about reality. In an Assertoric sense, we can say because (rather than if) action consistently takes place, the assumptions one must make in every conceivable instance of action must actually reflect the real nature of existence. As said above, without making these bare-bones assumptions, no action or knowledge could ever be possible.

Existence must be interacted with using knowledge about that existence. So rather than being mere figments of the mind, the logical laws are existential laws which reflect some basic, unavoidable, facts about the universe. Just as one could not imagine a knowledge/truth-claim that didnt assume the three logical laws as the standard for all propositions, one also cannot imagine a situation where action didnt assume the same logical laws to be in place, embedded in reality itself. Since human action is the unique concept which serves as an intermediary between the Teleological realm of thought and the Causal realm of existence, all of the truths we can derive from it must have some unique status in their validity. It shows where knowledge and reality must fundamentally match up for any human/rational understanding to occur whatsoever. Reality must be ascertainable by the mind if action is to be possible. While there obviously remain many things still unknown, if the human mind is to grasp anything at all about the universe around it, the laws of logic must be assumed to be implicit aspects of reality, making knowledge about reality attainable. The fundamental Metaphysical tenet we can derive from an action-based Epistemology is that existence is real, that existence is knowable and that existence is Causal. Any speculation beyond this is illegitimate. It is in this sense that Praxeology constrains what can be said about Metaphysics. Rothbards terming of Praxeology as laws of existence seems to have relevance to more than just a theory of knowledge, but a joint theory of knowledge and existence. Knowledge must concern existence, and the very of function of knowledge is to grasp existence and allow choice-making to occur. Neither knowledge nor existence can be thought of in a vacuum, one is either meaningless or unknowable without the other. Because economics, or the social sciences in general, must study human action, and because human action is the totally unique concept which marks the boundary between thought and reality, Ludwig von Mises seems to have accidentally provided a profound Rationalist account of Epistemology-Metaphysics. Not accidental in the sense that he didnt realize what he was doing, but in the way that he was merely trying to justify the legitimacy of economic science. His primary objective was not to construct a philosophical system, but rather an economic methodology. In realizing that action can only be meaningfully understood with a priori reasoning, Mises found the precise concept where logically absolute truths could be discovered about empirical reality (rather than mere definitions like All bachelors are single).

Logic has been often thought of (by likes of Empiricist-Positivists) as merely an arbitrary construct of the mind, having nothing to do with observable reality. But with action we can see that the most fundamental tents of logicas they are implicit in the assumptions required for action to take place reflect not only an arbitrary mental construct, but basic properties of existence (on the macro-scale, the scale of existence which action must grapple with and inflict changes into). To grasp reality, humans must bring to bear their faculties of sensory perception as well as their faculties of reason. While the capacity for sensory input exists in many animal species, the ability to reason is unique only to man. Choice-making only comes about because of reason, because of a conscious awareness of ones own existence, ones own life, and of the reality that one is surrounded by. The concept of action, then, isnt merely some way of wording or defining things, but it is a fundamental plight of our beings nature. Choice-making is the mark of a rational being, a being that is capable of ascertaining the world in order to inflict the proper changes to reap their desired effects. Action is the product of reason. Things in themselves arent inherently logical or conceptual in any way, but insofar as the human mind can render information about reality into knowledge, the laws of logic must be assumed as implicit to existence. With no rational being to experience some aspect of reality, the thing in itself simply is. But as soon as some rational agent comes in contact with that aspect of existence, he must be able to grasp and understand it on the basis of all of the logically necessary truths weve discussed up until this point. No matter how mysterious, or difficult to grasp, something might be, one can always at the very least say that it exists, that it has its own properties, that it cannot be itself and its opposite, that any changes made with it will occur on the basis of cause and effect, and if the thing is itself a rational agent, we can say that it acts with means and ends, and all of the other corollaries of rational purposeful action.

There is one caveat or exception to everything said above. While the general existence of cause and effect must be understood as necessary to the reality which action must take place in, causality isnt something which is applicable to the realm of human knowledge, the knowledge that guides action. It may simply be that mankind has not yet reached the point to discover the precise causal laws which would account for the interaction between external stimuli and internal thought. As far as ideas go, the very same stimuli may cause radically different reactions/ideas in various rational subjects. The operation of exactly how ideas are provoked, what causes them, where they come from, is unknown as of yet. No scientist can predict the ideas which will be inspired by some external event. Knowledge indeed guides action, and since future knowledge is necessarily not yet known (or even knowable until that future becomes the present), no future action can ever be systematically predicted on the basis of cause and effect. Therefore no hypothetical inductive reasoning can be used in any systematic way in the prediction or analysis of human action. The existence of cause and effect, or Causality, must then be assumed to be implicit in the external physical reality, but not in the Teleological realm of ideas.

In order to really make things clear, it may be helpful to simply list the core principles weve derived in the course of this essay. --Metaphysically, from examining what every actor must assume in any action, external reality must be considered to: 1. Exist 2. Have Identity 3. Not allow Contradictions 4. Be structured Causally --Epistemologically, for one to make any proposition or claim to knowledge, one must assume that: 1. Things Exist 2. Things have Identity 3. Things cannot be themselves and their opposites at once (cannot Contradict)

Human action is the mental and the practical combination of these two lists. The knowledge which guides action must, on a fundamental level, match the reality that action must navigate. The mind applies these fundamental logical principles of knowledge in the course of any given action. These principles are considered so absolutely true because they are manifest in reality itself. Such an application of knowledge is, however, more often intuitive assumption, rather than an active line of reasoning. Rather than explicitly thinking at every instance Existence exists, etc., these laws are simply taken as ultimate givens, facts which are so incredibly obvious that nobody would ever imagine questioning them. We can clearly see that any Epistemological theory would immediately have to account for some Metaphysical truths at the same time. There is no such thing as pure knowledge. Knowledge must always be knowledge about something. It begins to become apparent that Epistemologys true, or primary, task is to pick out exactly the type of knowledge which must be present in all knowledge about anything whatsoever. The laws weve been discussing are pieces of knowledge which must be contained in all prior knowledge and also assumed before attaining any other new knowledge.

This special kind of synthetic a priori truth is essentially in line with Immanuel Kants account of his categories of thought, they truly constitute the very structure of our reasoning. The vast majority of human knowledge is information derived through sensory input. In this sense the Humeian Skeptics are correct. But unlike other animals, the human mind is equipped with a fundamental capacity to grasp conceptual knowledge about existence as well as with a sensory manifold. The laws of logic are bits of truth embedded in every rational mind, this is our reason. The ability to extrapolate concepts from precepts comes directly from every rational minds capability of recognizing that existence exists, that existence is made up of separate entities which all have their own identity, their own properties, their own form, color, volume, mass, etc., and that within such an existence, no entity can exclusively be both an A and a non-A at once. This human capacity to filter sensuous stimuli through a basic framework of absolute logical assumptions renders the external world rationally-understandable. Other animals can navigate their environment to sustain their own lives, but it is only man who understands this environment. Man has the ability to recognize the inherent diversity of things in existence and to conceptually isolate certain facets of it. These facets are, in other words, the various entities which make up the universe. When we can conceptually isolate an entity, our ideas about entities now have a distinct mental form. (At the dawn of human rationality, before language, conceptual thought may have simply been pictorial representations. Maybe this was the earliest form of a concept, a mental image of the entity in question. It is indeed difficult to imagine a rational being that does not have language to express ideas or think about his concepts with, but this is nonetheless mere speculation and somewhat off topic.) After conceptually isolating, meaning is attached to an idea, which gives rise to the possibility for language. The meaning that every idea represents can be attached to sound and script so that knowledge can be expressed and understood between rational beings. Every rational agent constantly employs the mental process of conceptual isolation of existential entities; the meaning of language is inherently fathomable for any rational mind in that concepts themselves constitute meaning attached to a certain idea. Language is the expression of that meaning. Action is simply the description of how a rational entity must behave. Because he cannot escape meaning, every instance of rational life consists of conceptual isolation, always thinking about some facet of existence. Obviously he could not think about all of existence at once or none of it at all, so he is forced into grappling with the objects of his surroundings, at least in order to sustain his own life through action. Once experience has rendered sensory stimulus into conceptual ideas, various combinations of these concepts can be made so that one can at least imagine things which he has not yet experienced. But nevertheless to survive, rational beings must always seek to consciously understand the reality around them, grasping ideas about the universe is inevitable.

Because he is forced into rational awareness of the world, every purposeful behavior he engages in must consist of a means and an end. His involuntary awareness makes every action one that seeks to attain something purposely aimed at. Rational beings have an inherent understanding of Causality. To achieve their end, all actors must inflict the proper cause, or change, into the external world. As mentioned above, this understanding may not be intellectual or explicit, but always at least inherent and implicit. All actors understand that certain facets of reality have to be interfered with in order to bring about some desired state of affairs, some end. While their implicit use is unavoidable, the explicit understanding and discovery of the laws of logic, Causality, etc. must come from reflecting on what it means to act. Only from the concept of action can these laws be rationally-derived. Action is the behavioral exemplification of our rational ability. It is the only way which our internal ideas and thoughts can be implemented into physical reality. Obviously we live in a matter-over-mind kind of a universe, and so our mind must implicitly grasp that reality in some certain, fixed, way. The nature of reality cannot be changed by the mind. To survive, the mind must guide a physical body through the world in a way which is compatible with such a nature. We cannot get around the intrinsic knowledge of our own existence and of the Identity principle; it is precisely the knowledge which allows for any rational cognition to take place whatsoever. Rational consciousness is consciousness which can fathom its own existence and the notion of identity in other entities (also important is the capacity to purposely resist instinctual urges, which man still has vestigial traces of). Sensory data is filtered through the laws of thought/existence into ideas. Ideas can be connected with other ideas to become knowledge. Since this knowledge is structured fundamentally on the basis of existential laws, it becomes useful for action. Action can use knowledge as its guide because such knowledge has been filtered through our implicit and valid assumptions about reality. The mind orders sense-data into knowledge which is always understood with the background assumptions of the logical-existential laws underlying it. This is what makes knowledge useful for choice-making behavior and this is what gives knowledge its function in the first place.

Ethics, Politics, & an Integrated Rationalist System


The works of Ludwig von Mises, Murray Rothbard, and Hans-Hermann Hoppe have provided much profound insight into the unique nature of Praxeological philosophy. What began with Mises as a humble inquiry into economic methodologyitself a groundbreaking accomplishmenteventually emerged as a fully integrated Rationalist system of thought. Epistemology-Metaphysics is a joint study completely elucidated by contemplating the idea of human action; purposive ends-aiming behavior. Ethics and Politics also seem to congregate into a joint study. While this paper will not approach Ethics systematically, the idea of argumentation can be analyzed with the same form of reasoning as was used for Epistemology-Metaphysics, but from the vantage point of Ethics instead.

The fact that argumentation involves trying to justify a claim has normative implications, beyond the existential implications examined in the present work. Just as with existential claims, when one tries to justify the validity of a norm, they themselves immediately assume various ethical norms in the very act of arguing (the same way one demonstrates the validity of the logical laws just by arguing). This exercise results in the conclusion that individualist private property rightsthe non-aggression principle, and the right to acquire ownership over previously un-owned homesteaded goodsare the only ethical principles that can ever be argumentatively justified. One could not even engage in debate or discourse if they didnt implicitly assume the validity of these norms. In any instance of genuine argumentation, where the speakers truly intend to persuade one another, non-aggression and nonviolence have to be assumed as proper ethical conduct. This is a very simplified version of the HoppeianHabermasian discourse ethic, but it serves to illustrate how the Rationalist-Praxeological approach can provide an Ethical framework (without violating the is-ought rule). After deriving the 3 normative principles outlined above, one can apply these conclusions to the realm of Politics. Ethics is applicable to small-scale human relations between individuals, Politics deals with the larger-scale interactions. But if our Ethical theory tells us that aggression is totally unjustifiable by means of reason, our Political philosophy should not be at variance with the branch of thought which precedes it. Individual inter-relations are truly the only kind of relations. Nations or classes dont act as single entities, but are made up wholly of individual people. Nothing magical happens when looking at a whole society in a Political context, the same ethical rules that apply to individuals must apply here too. Since all governments are inherent violators of the non-aggression private property ethic, one is forced to adopt an anarchist or anti-statist Political framework. This is the libertarian Political philosophy and a large body of work surrounds all of the difficult questions that arise when dealing with non-statist social organization. Incidentally, Austrian economics is based in the exact same body of Praxeology which everything in this essay concerns. On the Political scale, Austrian economics provides a theory which elegantly explains the functioning of the market system, I.E. the non-coercive, non-state-ruled, social system. The concept of human action provides a complete framework of philosophy. Epistemology and Metaphysics are illuminated by pondering the nature of the actors mind and the logical implications and assumptions which surround human action. Also, argumentation, as a subset of action, provides insights about truth-validity and the way the rational mind must approach existential propositions. Ethics and Politics are derived from the concept of normative justification, made in the course of an argument. Non-aggression carries from Ethics into Politics as anarcho-libertarianism. Complementing the libertarian Political philosophy is the value-free science of (Austrian) economics, as established via Praxeology. This study demonstrates the effectiveness of a property-rights system for achieving material welfare and facilitating the attainment of ends for the masses of individuals in a society.

From the division of labor, money as medium of exchange, labor-saving devices resulting from reinvestment and accumulated capital, as well as the function of interest rates as an investment coordinator, the study of the market furnishes a slew of discoveries on the superiority of the peaceful political-economic order. The libertarian stateless society exemplifies such a social system. The anarcho-libertarian-Praxeologist has an immense intellectual arsenal behind him. From a theory of knowledge and existence, to an Ethical-social, political-economic theory, the Praxeological system is well on its way to becoming fully-integrated, shedding light on many important branches of philosophy and thought. Another step forward for the Rationalist project can be taken if further work is done to refine the somewhat brief outline sketched out above. A unification of Epistemology-Metaphysics to EthicsPolitics is a lofty task indeed, but in laying the groundwork for this in the course of this essay, it appears to be a goal that is perfectly within-reach.

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