Vous êtes sur la page 1sur 56

TANADA VS.

TUVERA 136 SCRA 27 FACTS: Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus in compelling respondent public officials to publish and/ or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letter of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders. The general rule in seeking writ of mandamus is that it would be granted to a private individual only in those cases where he has some private or particular interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be protected, independent of that which he holds with the public at large," and "it is for the public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved. The legal capacity of a private citizen was recognized by court to make the said petition for the reason that the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land. ISSUE: Whether publication in the Official Gazette is still required considering the clause in Article 2 unless otherwise provided. HELD: Unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not with the publication requirement which cannot be omitted as public needs to be notified for the law to become effective. The necessity for the publication in the Official Gazette of all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, was affirmed by the court on April 24, 1985. This is necessary to provide the general public adequate notice of the various laws which regulate actions and conduct as citizens. Without this, there would be no basis for Art 3 of the Civil Code Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith. WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.

PEOPLE VS. QUE PO LAY 94 PHIL 640 FACTS: The charge was that the appellant who was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of U.S. Dollars, U.S. Checks and U.S. Money orders amounting to about $7,000.00 failed to sell the same to the Central Bank through its agents within one day following the receipt of such foreign exchange as required by Circular No. 20. The appeal is based on the claim that said circular was not published in the Official Gazette prior to the act or omission imputed to the appellant, and that consequently, said circular had no force and effect. It is contended that Commonwealth Act No. 638 and Act 2930 both require said circular to be published in the Official Gazette, it being an order or notice of general applicability. Whether or not circulars and regulations such as Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank should be published before becoming effective. Circulars and regulations, especially like Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank which prescribes a penalty for its violation, should be published before becoming effective. Before the public may be bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must be published and the people officially and specifically informed of said contents and its penalties. Thus, in the eyes of the law, there was no circular to be violated and consequently, the accused committed no violation of the circular and the trial court may be said to have no jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

HELD:

GARCIA VS. RECIO G.R. No. 138322 (2 October 2001) FACTS: March 1, 1987 Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal. May 18, 1989 a decree of divorce was issued by an Australian family court June 26, 1992 respondent became an Australian citizen January 12, 1994 petitioner a Filipina and respondent got married in Cabanatuan City. In their application of marriage, respondent was declared single and Filipino. October 22, 1995 onwards petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior dissolution of marriage. Their conjugal assets were divided in Australia. March 3, 1998 petitioner filed a complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage in the court a quo on the ground of bigamy respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her in 1994. He averred that he had revealed to petitioner his prior marriage and its dissolution thus he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner. July 7, 1998 respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia because the marriage had irretrievably broken down. Respondent prayed that the Complaint be dismissed on the ground that it has no state of action. Thereafter, the trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in Australia was valid and recognized in the Philippines. Whether or not the divorce obtained by the respondent in Australia ipso facto capacitated him to remarry. The court cannot conclude that respondent who was then a naturalized Australian citizen was legally capacitated to marry petitioner. Neither can the court grant petitioners prayer to declare her marriage null and void on the ground of bigamy. After all it may turn out that under Australian law he was really capacitated to marry petitioner as result of the divorce decree. The SC laid down the following basic legal principles; a marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce decree obtained abroad because of Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE:

HELD:

D.M. CONSUNJI, INC. V. COURT OF APPEALS 357 SCRA 248 FACTS: November 2, 1990 Jose Juego, a construction worker of D.M. Consunji, Inc. fell fourteen floors from the Renaissance Tower in Pasig City to his death. November 25, 1990 PO3 Rogelio Villanueva of the Eastern Police District investigated the tragedy and filed a report stating that the platform where the deceased was on board and performing work fell due to the removal or getting loose of the pin which was merely inserted to the connecting points of the chain block and platform but without safety lock. May 9, 1991 The deceaseds widow, Maria Juego, filed in the RTC of Pasig a complaint for damages against the deceaseds employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The RTC rendered the decision in favour of the widow. The CA affirmed the decision of RTC in toto. On appeal, D.M. Consunji seeks the reversal of the CA. Whether or not Maria Juego can still claim damages with the D.M. Consunji, Inc. apart from the death benefits she claimed in the State Insurance Fund. The respondent is not precluded from the recovering damages under the Civil Code. Maria Juego is unaware of petitioners negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits from the State Insurance Fund. She filed the civil complaint for damages after she received a copy of the police investigation report and the Prosecutors Memorandum dismissing the Criminal Complaint against petitioners personnel. The Supreme Court remanded to the RTC of Pasig to determine whether the award decreed in its decision is more than that of the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC). Should the award decreed by the trial court be greater than that awarded by ECC, payments already made to private respondent pursuant to the Labor Code shall be deducted therefrom.

ISSUE:

HELD:

CUI V. ARELLANO UNIVERSITY 2 SCRA 205 FACTS: Emeterio Cui took his preparatory law course at Arellano University. He then enrolled in its College of Law from First Year (SY 1948 1949) until first semester of his Fourth Year. During these years, he was awarded scholarship grants of the said University amounting to a total of P1,033.87. He transferred and took his last semester as a law student at Abad Santos University. To secure permission to take the bar, he needed his transcript of records from the respondent university but it refused to issue the TOR until he had take the bar without Arellanos issuance of his TOR. August 16, 1949 The Director of Private Schools issued Memorandum No. 38 addressing all heads of private schools, colleges, and universities. Part of the Memorandum states that the amount in tuition and other fees corresponding to their scholarships should not be subsequently charged to the recipient students when they decide to quit school or to transfer to another institution. Scholarships should not be offered merely to attract and keep students in a school. Whether or not Emeterio Cui can refund the P1,033.87 payment for the scholarship grant provided by Arellano University. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and another one shall be entered sentencing defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P1,033.87 with interest as well as the costs and dismissing defendants counterclaim. The Memorandun of the Director of Private Schools is not a law where the provision set therein was advisory and not mandatory in nature. Moreover, the stipulation in question, asking previous students to pay back the scholarship grant if they transfer before graduation, is contrary to public policy, sound policy and good morals or tends clearly to undermine the security of individual rights. Thus, null and void.

ISSUE:

HELD:

MICIANO VS. BRIMO 50 PHIL 867 FACTS: The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. Brimo is in question in this case. The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of his brothers, opposed it. The court, however, approved it. The errors which the oppositor-appellant assigns are the following: a. The approval of said scheme of partition; b. The denial of his participation in the inheritance; c. The denial of the motion of reconsideration of the order approving the partition; d. The approval of the purchase made by Pietro Lanza of the deceaseds business and the deed of transfer of said business; and e. The declaration that the Turkish Laws are impertinent to this cause. Whether or not Philippine Laws will be the basis on the distribution of Joseph Brimos estates. THEREFORE, the orders appealed from are modified and it is directed that the distribution of this estate be made in such a manner as to include the herein appellant as one of the legatees, and the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator is approved in all other respects without any pronouncements as to costs. Intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.

ISSUE:

HELD:

PILAPIL VS. IBAY SOMERA 174 SCRA 653 FACTS: Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married with private respondent, Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler, Federal Republic of Germany. They have a child who was born on April 20, 1980 and named Isabella Pilapil Geiling. Conjugal disharmony eventuated in private respondent and he initiated a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January 1983. The petitioner then filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the RTC Manila on January 23, 1983. The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to the petitioner. On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed 2 complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that while still married to Imelda, latter had an affair with William Chia as early as 1982 and another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983. Whether private respondent can prosecute petitioner on the ground of adultery even though they are no longer husband and wife as decree of divorce was already issued. The law specifically provided that in prosecution for adultery and concubinage, the person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody else. Though in this case, it appeared that private respondent is the offended spouse, the latter obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, and said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in so far as he is concerned. Thus, under the same consideration and rationale, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner and has no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

ISSUE:

HELD:

ROEHR VS. RODRIGUEZ 404 SCRA 495 FACTS: Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen, married private respondent Carmen Rodriguez, a Filipina, on December 1980 in Germany and their marriage was ratified on February 1981 in Negros Oriental. They had two daughters namely Carolynne and Alexander Kristine. Private respondent filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on August 1996 before the RTC of Makati City on February 1997 but it was denied on the same year. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was also denied. He filed a motion for certiorari with the CA but the appellate court denied the petition and remanded the case to the RTC. Meanwhile, petitioner obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg-Blankenese promulgated on December 1997 which states that the parental custody is granted to the father. In view of said decree, petitioner filed a Second Motion to Dismiss on May 1999 on the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit as a decree of divorce had already been promulgated dissolving the marriage of petitioner and respondent. On July 1999, petitioners motion to dismiss was granted. Private respondent filed a motion for partial reconsideration with a prayer that the case proceed for the purpose of determining the issues of the custody of children and the distribution of the properties between the petitioner and respondent. Whether or not respondent judge gravely abused her discretion when she assumed and retained jurisdiction over the present case despite the fact that petitioner has already obtained a divorce decree from German court. WHEREFORE, the orders of the RTC of Makati Branch 149 issued on September 30, 1999 and March 31, 2000 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. General rule: Divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are recognizable in our jurisdiction but the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and support of children, must still be determined by our courts. Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment, such as the award of custody to petitioner by the German court, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:

HELD:

NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN VS. REYES 452 SCRA 532 FACTS: ISSUE: Whether or not Ruby Lim acted abusively in asking Roberto Reyes, a.k.a. Amay Bisaya to leave the party where he was not invited by the celebrant threof thereby becoming liable Articles 19 and Article 21 of the Civil Code. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition filed by Ruby Lim and Nikko Hotel Manila Garden is GRANTED. Ms. Lim did not abuse her rights to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party to which he was not invited, and she cannot be made liable to pay for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Parenthetically, the manner by which Ms. Lim asked Mr. Reyes to leave was likewise acceptable and humane under the circumstances. Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the Principle of Abuse of Rights, is not a panacea for all human hurts and social grievances. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be responsible. On the other hand, Article 20 refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the following elements: (1) There is an act which is legal; (2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order or public policy; and (3) it is done with intent to injure.

HELD:

SPS. QUISUMBING VS. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY 380 SCRA 195 FACTS: Plaintiffs Spouses Antonio and Lorna Quisumbing are owners of a house and lot located at No. 94 Greenmeadows Avenue, Quezon City. March 3, 1995, 9:00 am defendant-appellants inspectors headed by Emmanuel C. Orlino were assigned to conduct a routine-on-the-spot inspection of all single phase meters at Greenmeadows Avenue and the house of the plaintiffs was inspected after observing standard operating procedure of asking permission from the latter, through their secretary, was granted. The secretary witnessed the inspection. After the inspection, defendants inspectors discovered that the terminal seal of the meter was missing; the meter cover seal was deformed; the meter dials of the meter was mis-aligned and there were scratches on the meter base plate. The meter turned out to be tampered. Defendant had to temporarily disconnect the electric services of plaintiffs. After an hour, defendant inspector Orlina returned to the residence of the plaintiff and informed them that the meter had been tampered and unless they pay the amount of P178,875.01 representing the differential billing, their electric supply would be disconnected. However, on the same day at around 2pm, defendant officer through a two-way radio instructed its service inspector to reconnect the electric service. March 6, 1995 plaintiffs filed a complaint for damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injuction despite the immediate reconnection, to order defendant to furnish electricity to the plaintiffs alleging that defendant acted with wanton, capricious, malicious and malevolent manner in disconnecting their power supply which was done without due process and without due regard of their rights, feelings, peace of mind, social and business reputation. a. Whether or not such disconnection entitled petitioners to damages. b. Whether or not petitioners are liable for the billing differential computed by respondent. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby PARTLY GRANTED. a. Basic is the rule that to recover actual damages, not only must the amount of loss be capable of proof; it must also be actually proven with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof or the best evidence obtainable. Moral damages may be recovered when the rights of individuals, including the right against deprivation of property without due process, are violated. Exemplary damages are not given to enrich one party and impoverish another but to serve as a deterrent against or as a negative incentive to socially deleterious actions. b. The Court holds that despite the basis for the award of damages the lack of due process in immediately disconnecting petitioners electrical supply respondents counterclaim for the billing differential is still proper. The respondent should be given what is rightfully deserves.
10

ISSUE:

HELD:

GASHEEM SHOOKAT BAKSH VS. COURT OF APPEALS 219 SCRA 115 FACTS: ISSUE: Whether or not damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the challenged decision, the instant petition is hereby DENIED, with costs against petitioner. The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. However, damages pursuant to Article 21 may be awarder not because of promise to marry but because of fraud and deceit behind it and the wilful injury to respondents honor and reputation which followed thereafter.

HELD:

11

TENCHAVEZ VS. ESCAO 15 SCRA 355 FACTS: ISSUES: Whether or not the parents of the respondent alienated her affection and influenced her conduct toward her husband resulting to annulment of her marriage to petitioner. An action for alienation of affections against the parents of one consort does not lie in the absence of proof of malice or unworthy motives on their part. Article 26 of the Civil Code of the Philippines states that every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbours and other persons.

HELD:

12

ABUNADO VS. PEOPLE 426 SCRA 562 FACTS: The records show that on September 18, 1967, Salvador married Narcisa Arceno at the Manila City Hall before Rev. Tiangco. In 1988, Narcisa left for Japan to work but returned to the Philippines in 1992, when she learned that her husband was having an extra-marital affair and has left their conjugal home. Narcisa found Salvador in Quezon City cohabiting with Fe Plato. She also discovered that on January 10, 1989, Salvador contracted a second marriage with Zenaida Bias before Judge Panontongas in San Mateo, Rizal. An annulment case was filed by Salvador against Narcisa on January 19, 1995. A case of bigamy was filed by Narcisa against Salvador and Zenaida on May 18, 1995. On May 18, 2001, the trial court convicted petitioner Salvador Abunado for bigamy and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment of six years and one day, as minimum, to eight years and one day, as maximum. Petitioner Zenaida was acquitted for insufficiency of evidence. Petitioner Salvador is now before us on petition for review. Whether or not petitioners claim for annulment/declaration of nullity of maariage was a prejudicial question, hence, the proceedings in the bigamy case should be suspended during the pendency of the annulment case. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 26135, finding petitioner Salvador S. Abunado guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy, and sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of 2 years, 4 months and one day of prision correccional as minimum, to 6 years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum, is AFFIRMED. Costs de oficio. A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. The rationale being the principle of suspending a criminal case in view of a prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated.

ISSUE:

HELD:

13

QUIMIGING VS. ICAO 34 SCRA 132 FACTS: Appellant, Carmen Quimiging, assisted by her parents, sued Felix Icao in the court below. In her complaint, it was averred that the parties were neighbours in Dapitan City, and had close and confidential relations; that defendant Icao, although married, succeeded in having carnal intercourse with plaintiff several times by force and intimidation and without her consent, that as a result she became pregnant, despite efforts and drugs supplied by defendant, and plaintiff had to stop studying. Hence she claimed support at P120.00 per month, damages and attorneys fees. Defendant moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action since the complaint did not allege that the child has been born; and after hearing arguments, the trial judge sustained defendants motion and dismissed the complaint. Thereafter, plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to allege that as a result of the intercourse, plaintiff had later given birth to a baby girl; but the court ruled that no amendment was allowable, since the original complaint averred no cause of action. Hence, plaintiff appealed directly to this court. Whether or not the child is considered born applying Article 40 of the Civil Code. WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside. A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its own for all purposes favourable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The unborn child, therefore, has a right to support from its progenitors even if the said child is only en vetre de sa mere. Just as a conceived child, even if as yet unborn, may receive donations as prescribed by Article 742 of the same Code, and its being ignored by the parent in his testament may result in preterition of a forced heir that annuls the institution of the testamentary heir, even if such child should be born after the death of the testator (Article 854, Civil Code).

ISSUE: HELD:

14

GELUZ VS. COURT OF APPEALS 2 SCRA 801 FACTS: ISSUE: Whether or not the husband of a woman, who voluntarily procured her abortion, could recover damages from the physician who caused the same. The decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint ordered dismissed, without costs. The damages which the parents of an unborn child can recover are limited to moral damages for the illegal arrest of the normal development of the foetus, i.e., on account of distress and anguish attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of their parental expectations, as well as to exemplary damages, if the circumstances should warrant them (Article 2230, New Civil Code).

HELD:

15

DE JESUS VS. SYQUIA 58 PHIL 866 FACTS: Cesar Syquia, unmarried scion of a prominent family in Manila, met Antonia Loanco when she was hired as cashier in his brothers barber shop in Tondo, Manilaand amorous relation followed as a consequence of which Antonia became pregnant and had a son on June 17, 1931. The defendant was a constant visitor at the home of Antonia in the early months of her pregnancy, and on the eve of a departure trip abroad, Cesar gave Antonia a letter addressed to the priest stating that the unborn child is his son and should be named after him. When Antonia was able to leave the hospital after giving birth, Syquia took her, with her mother and the baby, to a house at No. 551 Camarines Street, Manila, where they lived together for about a year in regular family style, all household expenses, including gas and electric light being defrayed by Syquia. In course of time, however, the defendants ardour abated and when Antonia began to show signs of a second pregnancy, the defendant decamped, and he is now married to another woman. When the time came for christening the child, the defendant, who had charged of the arrangements for this ceremony, caused the name Ismael Loanco to be given to him instead of Cesar Syquia, Jr., as was at first planned. The trial court entered a decree requiring the defendant to recognize Ismael Loanco as his natural child and to pay maintenance for him at the rate of fifty pesos per month, with costs, dismissing the action in other respects. Whether or not the note to the padre in connection with the other letters written by the defendant to Antonia during her pregnancy proves acknowledgement of paternity. Whether or not the trial court erred in holding that Ismael Loanco had been in the uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child, justified by the conduct of the father himself, and that as a consequence, the defendant in this case should be compelled to acknowledge the said child.

ISSUE:

16

LIMJOCO VS. INTESTATE OF FRAGANTE 80 PHIL 776 FACTS: Pedro Fragante, a Filipino citizen at the time of his death, applied for a certificate of public convenience to install and maintain an ice plant in San Juan Rizal. His intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining the proposed service. The Public Service Commission issued a certificate of public convenience to Intestate Estate of the deceased, authorizing said Intestate Estate through its special or Judicial Administrator, appointed by the proper court of competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate the said plant. Petitioner claims that the granting of certificate applied to the estate is a contravention of law. Whether or not the estate of Fragante may be extended an artificial judicial personality. The estate of Fragante could be extended an artificial judicial personality because under the Civil Code, estate of a dead person could be considered as artificial juridical person for the purpose of the settlement and distribution of his properties. It should be noted that the exercise of juridical administration includes those rights and fulfillment of obligation of Fragante which survived after his death. One of those surviving rights involved the pending application for public convenience before the Public Service Commission. Supreme Court is of the opinion that for the purposes of the prosecution of said case No. 4572 of the Public Service Commission to its final conclusion, both the personality and citizenship of Pedro O. Fragrante must be deemed extended, within the meaning and intent of the Public Service Act, as amended, in harmony with the constitution: it is so adjudged and decreed.

ISSUE:

HELD:

17

DUMLAO VS. QUALITY PLASTIC PRODUCTS, INC. 70 SCRA 472 FACTS: Judgement for Civil Case T-662 was rendered on February 28, 1962 ordering defendants Soliven, Pedro Oria, Laurencio, Sumalbag and Darang to pay solidarity Quality Plastics the sum of P3,667.03 plus legal rate of interest from November 1958 before its decision became final or else Quality Plastics is hereby authorized to foreclose the bond. Defendants failed to pay the amount before the limit given. Oria's land, which was covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 28732 and has an area of nine and six-tenths hectares, was levied upon and sold by the sheriff at public auction on September 24, 1962 which he has given as security under the bond. Apparently, Oria died on April 23, 1959 or long before June 13, 1960. Quality Plastics was not aware on Orias death. The summons and copies of complaint was personally served on June 24, 1960 by a deputy sheriff to Soliven which the latter acknowledged and signed in his own behalf and his co-defendants. Dionisio, Fausta, Amado and Benjamin, all surnamed Dumlao and all testamentary heirs in Oria's duly probated will, sued Quality Plastic Products, Inc on March 1, 1963 for the annulment of the judgment against Oria and the execution against his land (T873). Dionisio also sued in his capacity as administrator of Orias testate estate.

ISSUE:

Whether judgment against Oria and execution against his land be annulled on the ground of lack in juridical capacity.

HELD:

WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is reversed and set aside. Its judgment in Civil Case No. T-662 against Pedro Oria is declared void for lack of jurisdiction. The execution sale of Oria's land covered by OCT No. 28732 is also void. Quality Plastics upon receiving the summons on T-873 just learned that Oria was already dead prior case T-662 was filed. The Dumalaos agreed in their stipulation that indeed Quality Plastics was unaware of Orias death and that they acted in good faith in joining Oria as a co-defendant. However, no jurisdiction was acquired over Oria, thus, the judgment against him is a patent nullity. Lower courts judgment against Oria in T-662 is void for lack of jurisdiction over his person as far as Oria was concerned. He had no more civil personality and his juridical capacity which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations was lost through death. The fact that Dumlao had to sue Quality Plastics in order to annul the judgment against Oria does not follow that they are entitiled to claim attorneys fees against the corporation.
18

MO YA LIM YAO VS. COMMISSION OF IMMIGRATION 41 SCRA 292 FACTS: Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a nonimmigrant on 8 February 1961. In the interrogation made in connection with her application for a temporary visitor's visa to enter the Philippines, she stated that she was a Chinese residing at Kowloon, Hongkong, and that she desired to take a pleasure trip to the Philippines to visit her great grand uncle, Lau Ching Ping. She was permitted to come into the Philippines on 13 March 1961 for a period of one month. On the date of her arrival, Asher Y. Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake, among others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized period of stay in this country or within the period as in his discretion the Commissioner of Immigration or his authorized representative might properly allow. After repeated extensions, Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to 13 February 1962. On 25 January 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen. Because of the contemplated action of the Commissioner of Immigration to confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the expiration of her authorized stay, she brought an action for injunction. At the hearing which took place one and a half years after her arrival, it was admitted that Lau Yuen Yeung could not write and speak either English or Tagalog, except for a few words. She could not name any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name except one, Rosa. She did not know the names of her brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-law. As a result, the Court of First Instance of Manila denied the prayer for preliminary injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung appealed. ISSUE: Whether or not Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen. Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4. Whether the alien woman requires to undergo the naturalization proceedings, Section 15 is a parallel provision to Section 16. Thus, if the widow of an applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not required to go through a naturalization proceedings, in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege.

HELD:

19

FRIVALDO VS. COMELEC FACTS: On March 20, 1995, private respondent Juan G. Frivaldo filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the office of Governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections. On March 23, 1995, petitioner Raul R. Lee, another candidate, filed a petition with the Comelec praying that Frivaldo "be disqualified from seeking or holding any public office or position by reason of not yet being a citizen of the Philippines," and that his Certificate of Candidacy be cancelled. On May 1, 1995, the Second Division of the Comelec promulgated a Resolution granting the petition. The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo remained unacted upon until after the May 8, 1995 elections. So, his candidacy continued and he was voted for during the elections held on said date. On May 11, 1995, the Comelec en banc affirmed the aforementioned Resolution of the Second Division.On June 9, 1995, Lee filed a (supplemental) petition praying for his proclamation as the dulyelected Governor of Sorsogon. In an orderdated June 21, 1995, but promulgated according to the petition "only on June 29, 1995," the Comelec en bane directed "the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Sorsogon to reconvene for the purpose of proclaiming candidate Raul Lee as the winning gubernatorial candidate in the province of Sorsogon on June 29,1995 x x x." Accordingly, at 8:30 in the evening of June 30,1995, Lee was proclaimed governor of Sorsogon. Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new petition praying for the annulment of the June 30, 1995 proclamation of Lee and for his own proclamation. He alleged that on June 30, 1995, at 2:00 in the afternoon, he took his oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after "his petition for repatriation under P.D. 725 which he filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization in September 1994 had been granted." As such, when "the said order (dated June 21, 1995) (of the Comelec) x x x was released and received by Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 at 5:30 o'clock in the evening, there was no more legal impediment to the proclamation (of Frivaldo) as governor x x x." In the alternative, he averred that pursuant to the two cases of Labo vs. Comelec, the Vice-Governor not Lee should occupy said position of governor. Issues: 1. WON Frivaldo's "judicially declared" disqualification for lack of Filipino citizenship a continuing bar to his eligibility to run for, be elected to or hold the governorship of Sorsogon. 2. WON the proclamation of Lee, a runner-up in the election, valid and legal in light of existing jurisprudence? HELD: 1. "Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered res judicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again, as the occasion demands." 2.) "The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office." Second. As we have earlier declared Frivaldo to have seasonably re-acquired his citizenship and inasmuch as he obtained the highest number of votes in the 1995 elections, henot Lee should be proclaimed. Hence, Lee's proclamation was patently erroneous and should now be corrected.
20

UYTENGSU VS. REPUBLIC FACTS: Petitioner-appellee was born, of Chinese parents, in Dumaguete, Negros Oriental on October 6, 1927, where he also finished his primary and secondary education. He went to the United States, where, from 1947 to 1950, he was enrolled in the Leland Stanford Junior University, in California. In April of the same year he returned to the Philippines for four (4) months vacation. Then, to be exact, on July 15, 1950, his present application for naturalization was filed. Forthwith, he returned to the United States and took a postgraduate course, in chemical engineering, in another educational institution. He finished this course in July 1951; but did not return to the Philippines until October 13, 1951. Petitioner contends, and the lower court held, that the word residence, as used in the aforesaid provision of the Naturalization Law, is synonymous with domicile, which, once acquired, is not lost by physical absence, until another domicile is obtained, and that, from 1946 to 1951, he continued to be domiciled in, and hence a resident of the Philippines, his purpose in staying in the United States, at that time, being, merely to study therein. ISSUE: Whether or not the application for naturalization may be granted, notwithstanding the fact that petitioner left the Philippines immediately after the filing of his petition and did not return until several months after the first date set for the hearing thereof. While, generally speaking, domicile and residence mean one and the same thing, residence combined with intention to remain, constitutes domicile while an established abode, fixed permanently for a time for business or other purposes, constitutes a residence, though there may be an intent, existing all the while, to return to the true domicile. Where the petitioner left the Philippines immediately after the filing of his petition for naturalization and did not return until several months after the first date set for the hearing thereof, notwithstanding his explicit promise, under oath, that he would reside continuously in the Philippines from the date of the filing of his petition up to the time of his admission to Philippine citizenship, he has not complied with the requirements of section 7 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, and, consequently, not entitled to a judgment in his favor.

HELD:

21

IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS 248 SCRA 292 FACTS: Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte where she studied and graduated high school in the Holy Infant Academy from 1938 to 1949. Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte for the 1995 Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and also a candidate for the same position, filed a Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. The petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation, wrote seven months under residency, which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. She arrived at the seven months residency due to the fact that she became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa in said months. Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency requirement to be eligible in running as representative of the First District of Leyte.

ISSUE:

HELD:

Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The court are in favor of a conclusion supporting petitoners claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte despite her own declaration of 7 months residency in the district for the following reasons: 1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imeldas domicile of origin by operation of law when her father brought them to Leyte; 2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose. In the absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of origin should be deemed to continue. 3. A wife does not automatically gain the husbands domicile because the term residence in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law. When Imelda married late President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home and not domicilium necessarium. 4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired right to choose a new one only after the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning to the country clearly indicated that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice. To add, petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while living in her brothers house, an act, which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested. She even kept close ties by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important milestones. WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE.
22

FAMILY CODE STAR PAPER CORPORATION VS. SIMBOL 487 SCRA 228 FACTS: Petitioner was the employer of the respondents. Under the policy of Star Paper the employees are: 1. New applicants will not be allowed to be hired if in case he/she has a relative, up to the 3rd degree of relationship, already employed by the company. 2. In case of two of our employees (singles, one male and another female) developed a friendly relationship during the course of their employment and then decided to get married, one of them should resign to preserve the policy stated above. Respondents Comia and Simbol both got married to their fellow employees. Estrella on the other hand had a relationship with a co-employee resulting to her pregnancy on the belief that such was separated. The respondents allege that they were forced to resign as a result of the implementation of the said assailed company policy. The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC ruled in favor of petitioner. The decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the decision. ISSUE: Whether the prohibition to marry in the contract of employment is valid HELD: Petitioners contend that their policy will apply only when one employee marries a co-employee, but they are free to marry persons other than co-employees. The questioned policy may not facially violate Article 136 of the Labor Code but it creates a disproportionate effect and under the disparate impact theory, the only way it could pass judicial scrutiny is a showing that it is reasonable despite the discriminatory, albeit disproportionate, effect. The failure of petitioners to prove a legitimate business concern in imposing the questioned policy cannot prejudice the employees right to be free from arbitrary discrimination based upon stereotypes of married persons working together in one company. Lastly, the absence of a statute expressly prohibiting marital discrimination in our jurisdiction cannot benefit the petitioners. The protection given to labor in our jurisdiction is vast and extensive that we cannot prudently draw inferences from the legislatures silence that married persons are not protected under our Constitution and declare valid a policy based on a prejudice or stereotype. Thus, for failure of petitioners to present undisputed proof of a reasonable business necessity, we rule that the questioned policy is an invalid exercise of management prerogative. Corollary, the issue as to whether respondents Simbol and Comia resigned voluntarily has become moot and academic. In the case of Estrella, the petitioner failed to adduce proof to justify her dismissal. Hence, the Court ruled that it was illegal. Petition was denied.

23

PHILIPPINE TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE COMPANY VS. NATIONAL LABORS COMMISSION AND GRACE DE GUZMAN 272 SCRA 296 FACTS: Grace de Guzman, private respondent, was initially hired as areliever by PT&T, petitioner, specifically as a Supernumerary ProjectWorker, for a fixed period due to a certain employee whos having amaternity leave. Under the agreement she signed, her employment was toimmediately terminate upon the expiration of the agreed period. Thereafter, PT&T again hired Grace as reliever for the succeeding periods,this time as a replacement to an employee who went on leave. Thereliever status was then formally completed until she was asked again to join PT&T as a probationary employee covering 150 days. In the jobapplication form, she indicated in the portion of the civil status therein thatshe was single although she had contracted marriage a few months earlier.Grace has also made the same representation on her two successivereliever agreements. The branch supervisor of PT&T having discovered thediscrepancy sent Grace a memorandum requiring her to explain the saiddiscrepancy and she was reminded about the companys policy of notaccepting married women for employment. In her reply, she stated thatshe wasnt aware of such policy at that time and all along she hadntdeliberately hidden her true civil status. However, PT&T remainedunconvinced of this reasoning pledge by Grace and thus she was dismissedfrom the company. Grace contested by initiating a complaint for illegaldismissal and with a claim for non-payment of cost of living allowances. Whether or not PT&T is liable against Graces illegal dismissal dueto certain company policy. Marriage as a special contract cannot be restricted bydiscriminatory policies of private individuals or corporations. Wheres acompany policy disqualified from work any woman worker who contractsmarriage, the Supreme Court invalidated such policy as it not only runsafoul the constitutional provision on equal protection but also on thefundamental policy of the State toward marriage. The danger of such policy against marriage followed by PT&T isthat it strike at the very essence, ideals and purpose of marriage as aninviolable social institution and ultimately of the family as the foundation of the nation. Therefore, PT&T is deemed liable for Graces illegal dismissaland the latter shall claim for damages.

ISSUE:

HELD:

24

ESTRADA VS. ESCRITOR

FACTS:

In a sworn letter-complaint, Alejandro Estrada, complainant, wroteto Judge Caoibes Jr. requesting for an investigation of rumors thatrespondent Soledad Escritor, court interpreter of Las Pias, is living with aman not her husband. Judge Caoibes referred the letter to Escritor, whostated that there is no truth as to the veracity of the allegation andchallenged Estrada, to appear in the open and prove his allegation in theproper court. Judge Caoibes set a preliminary conference and Escritormove for inhibition to avoid bias and suspicion in hearing her case. In theconference, Estrada confirmed that he filed a letter-complaint fordisgraceful and immoral conduct under the Revised Administrative Codeagainst Escritor for that his frequent visit in the Hall of Justice in Las Piaslearned Escritor is cohabiting with another man not his husband.Escritor testified that when she entered judiciary in 1999, she wasalready a widow since 1998. She admitted that shes been living withLuciano Quilapo Jr. without the benefit of marriage for 20 years and thatthey have a son. Escritor asserted that as a member of the religious sectknown as Jehovahs Witnesses, and having executed a Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness (which allows members of the congregation whohave been abandoned by their spouses to enter into marital relations) jointly with Quilapo after ten years of living together, her conjugalarrangement is in conformity with her religious beliefs and has theapproval of the congregation, therefore not constituting disgraceful andimmoral conduct. Whether or not Escritor is administratively liable for disgraceful andimmoral conduct. Escritor cannot be penalized. The Constitution adheres to thebenevolent neutrality approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause, provided that itdoes not offend compelling state interests. The OSG must thendemonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive means possible sothat the free exercise clause is not infringed any more than necessary toachieve the legitimate goal of the state. In this case, with no iota of evidence offered, the records are bereft of even a feeble attempt to showthat the state adopted the least intrusive means. With the Solicitor Generalutterly failing to prove this element of the test, and under these distinctcircumstances, Escritor cannot be penalized. The Constitution itself mandates the Court to make exemptions incases involving criminal laws of general application, and under these distinct circumstances, such conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized forthere is a case for exemption from the law based on the fundamental rightto freedom of religion. In the area of religious exercise as a preferredfreedom, man stands accountable to an authority higher than the state.

ISSUE:

HELD:

25

GOITIA VS. CAMPOS-RUEDA FACTS: Eloisa Goitia, plaintiff-appellant, and Jose Campos-Rueda,defendant, were legally married in the city of Manila. They establishedtheir residence 115 Calle San Marcelino, where they lived together forabout a month. However, the plaintiff returned to the home of her parents. The allegations of the complaint were that the defendant, onemonth after they had contracted marriage, demanded plaintiff to performunchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs in which the latter rejectthe said demands. With these refusals, the defendant got irritated andprovoked to maltreat the plaintiff by word and deed. Unable to induce thedefendant to desist from his repugnant desires and cease of maltreatingher, plaintiff was obliged to leave the conjugal abode and take refuge inthe home of her parents. The plaintiff appeals for a complaint against her husband forsupport outside of the conjugal domicile. However, the defendant objectsthat the facts alleged in the complaint do not state a cause of action. Whether or not Goitia can claim for support outside of the conjugaldomicile. Marriage is something more than a mere contract. It is a newrelation, the rights, duties and obligations of which rest not upon theagreement of the parties but upon the general law which defines andprescribes those rights, duties and obligations. When the object of amarriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of theparties and productive of no possible good to the community, relief insome way should be obtainable. The law provides that defendant, who is obliged to support thewife, may fulfill this obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or bymaintaining her in his own home at his option. However, the option givenby law is not absolute. The law will not permit the defendant to evade orterminate his obligation to support his wife if the wife was forced to leavethe conjugal abode because of the lewd designs and physical assaults of the defendant, Beatriz may claim support from the defendant for separatemaintenance even outside of the conjugal home.

ISSUE: HELD:

26

WASSMER VS. VELEZ

FACTS:

Francisco Velez, defendant, and Beatriz Wassmer, plaintiff-appellant, following their mutual love, decided to get married onSeptember 4, 1954. Two days before the wedding, defendant left a note toBeatriz stating therein the postponement of their wedding due toopposition of defendants mother and that he will be leaving. But onSeptember 3, 1954, defendant sent another telegram stated that he will bereturning very soon for the wedding. However, defendant did not appearnor was he heard from again.Beatriz sued defendant for damages and in silence of thedefendant, trial court granted the petition and ordered the defendant topay Beatriz actual, moral and exemplary damages. On June 21, 1955defendant filed a petition for relief from orders, judgments andproceedings and motion for new trial and reconsideration. Beatriz movedto strike it cut but the court ordered the parties and their attorneys toappear for the stage of possibility of arriving at an amicable settlement.Defendant wasnt able to appear but instead on the following day hiscounsel filed a motion to defer for two weeks the resolution on defendantspetition for relief. It was granted but again defendant and his counsel failedto appear. Another chance for amicable settlement was given by the courtbut this time defendants counsel informed the court that chances of settling case amicably were nil. Whether or not the trial court erred in ordering the defendant topay plaintiff damages. The case at bar is not a mere breach of promise to marry becauseit is not considered an actionable wrong. The mere fact the couple havealready filed a marriage license and already spent for invitations, weddingapparels, gives the plaintiff reason to demand for payment of damages. The court affirmed the previous judgment and ordered the defendant topay the plaintiff moral damages for the humiliation she suffered, actualdamages for the expenses incurred and exemplary damages because thedefendant acted fraudulently in making the plaintiff believe that he willcome back and the wedding will push through.

ISSUE:

HELD:

27

COSCA VS. PALAYPAYON

FACTS:

Complainants alleged that Palaypayon solemnized marriages even without the requisite of a marriage license. Hence, the following couples were able to get married just by paying the marriage fees to respondent Baroy: Alano P. Abellano & Nelly Edralin; Francisco Selpo & Julieta Carrido; Eddie Terrobias & Maria Gacer; Renato Gamay & Maricris Belga; Arsenio Sabater & Margarita Nacario; Sammy Bocaya & Gina Bismonte. As a consequence, the marriage contracts of the following couples did not reflect any marriage license number. In addition, Palaypayon did not sign the marriage contracts and did not indicate the date of solemnization reasoning out that he allegedly had to wait for the marriage license to be submitted by the parties which happens usually several days after the marriage ceremony. Palaypayon contends that marriage between Abellano & Edralin falls under Article 34 of the Civil Code thus exempted from the marriage license requirement. According to him, he gave strict instructions to complainant Sambo to furnish the couple copy of the marriage contract and to file the same with the civil registrar but the latter failed to do so. In order to solve the problem, the spouses subsequently formalized the marriage by securing a marriage license and executing their marriage contract, a copy of which was then filed with the civil registrar. The other five marriages were not illegally solemnized because Palaypayon did not sign their marriage contracts and the date and place of marriage are not included. It was alleged that copies of these marriage contracts are in the custody of complainant Sambo. The alleged marriage of Selpo & Carrido, Terrobias & Gacer, Gamay & Belga, Sabater & Nacario were not celebrated by him since he refused to solemnize them in the absence of a marriage license and that the marriage of Bocaya & Bismonte was celebrated even without the requisite license due to the insistence of the parties to avoid embarrassment with the guests which he again did not sign the marriage contract. An illegal solemnization of marriage was charged against the respondents.

ISSUE: Whether the marriage solemnized by Judge Palaypayon were valid. HELD: Article 4 of the Family Code pertinently provides that in the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio whereas an irregularity in the formal requisite shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally, and administratively liable. Bocaya & Besmontes marriage was solemnized without a marriage license along with the other couples. However, considering that there were pictures from the start of the wedding ceremony up to the signing of the marriage certificates in front of him. The court held that it is hard to believe that it was simulated. On the other hand, Judge Palaypayon admitted that he solemnized marriage between Abellano & Edralin and claimed it was under Article 34 of the Civil Code so the marriage license was dispensed with considering that the contracting parties executed a joint affidavit that they have been living together as husband and wife for almost 6 years already.

28

NAVARRO VS. DOMAGTOY

FACTS:

Mayor Rodolfo Navarro filed an administrative case against Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy. Complainant contended that Domagtoy displayed gross misconduct as well asinefficiency in office and ignorance of the law when he solemnized the weddings of Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first wife, and Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario, which was solemnized at the respondents residence which does not fall within his jurisdictional area. Respondent judge seeks exculpation from his act of having solemnized the marriage between Gaspar Tagadan, a married man separated from his wife, and Arlyn Borga by stating that he merely relied on the Affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each other for almost seven years. With respect to the second charge, he maintains that in solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and Del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Family Code and that article 8 thereof applies to the case in question. Whether or not the respondent judge may be held liable for solemnizing marriages which did not comply with the requisites in the Family Code. The Court held that even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the present spouse was already dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a subsequent marriage. In this case, Tagadan was not able to present a summary proceeding for the declaration of the first wifes presumptive death thus, he is still considered married to his first wife.A marriage can only be considered beyond the boundaries of the jurisdiction of the judge in the following instances: (1) at the point of death;(2) in remote places; or (3) upon request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect. None of these were complied with therefore there is an irregularity.

ISSUE:

HELD:

29

ARANAS VS. JUDGE OCCIANO

FACTS:

Petitioner Mercedita Mata charged respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of the Law, via a sworn Letter-Complaint, for solemnizing themarriage between petitioner and her late groom (Ret.) Commodore Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage license, among others.Since the marriage is a nullity, petitioners right, upon Orobias death, to inherit the vast properties left by Orobia was not recognized. Petitioner was likewise deprived of receiving the pensions of Orobia.Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent for hisillegal acts and unethical misrepresentations, which caused her so muchhardships, embarrassment and sufferings. The case was referred by the Office of the Chief Justice to the Office of the Court Administrator, which required the respondent to comment on the complaint.Respondent averred, among others, that before starting the ceremony, he examined the documents submitted to him by the petitioner and he discovered that the parties did not possess the requisite marriage license so he refused to solemnize the marriage. However, due to theearnest pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors, and the delivery of theprovisions for the occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of human compassion. After the solemnization, respondent reiterated the need for the marriage license and admonished the parties that their failureto give it would render the marriage void. Petitioner and Orobia assuredthe respondent that they would give the license to him, but they never did.He attributed the hardships and embarrassment petitioner suffered as dueto her own fault and negligence. Whether or not respondents guilty of solemnizing a marriagewithout a marriage license and outside his territorial jurisdiction. Respondent judge should be faulted for solemnizing a marriagewithout the requisite marriage license. In People vs. Lara, the SupremeCourt held that a marriage, which preceded the issuance of the marriage license, is void, and that subsequent issuance of such license cannot render or even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in casesprovided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizingofficer the authority to conduct marriage. Respondent judge did notpossess such authority when he solemnized the marriage of the petitioner. Judges, who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate inweddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judgesolemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultantirregularity in the formal requisite, which while it may not affect thevalidity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official toadministrative liability.

ISSUE:

HELD:

30

VDA. DE CHUA VS. CA FACTS: Roberto Chua was the common-law husband of Florita A. Vallejoand had two illegitimate sons with her. On 28 May 1992, Roberto Chua died intestate in Davao City. Upon the death of Roberto, Vallejo filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City a petition for the guardianship and administration over the persons and properties of the two minors. Herein petitioner filed for its dismissal, claiming that she was the sole surviving heir of the decedent being his wife; and that the decedent was a resident of Davao City and not Cotabato City, which means that the said court was not the proper forum to settle said matters. The petitioner failed to submit the original copy of the marriage contract and the evidences that she used were: a photocopy of said marriage contract, Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the name of Roberto L. Chua married to Antonietta Garcia, and a resident of DavaoCity; Residence Certificates from 1988 and 1989 issued at Davao City indicating that he was married and was born in Cotabato City; Income Tax Returns for 1990 and 1991 filed in Davao City where the status of the decedent was stated as married; passport of the decedent specifying that he was married and his residence was Davao City. The trial court ruled that she failed to establish the validity of marriage, and even denied her petition. This was latter appealed to the appellate court, but it decided in favor of herein respondents. Whether or not the trial and appellate court is correct on their ruling on the validity of marriage of Antonietta Garcia to Roberto Chua. The Supreme Court held that the lower court and the appellate court are correct in holding that petitioner herein failed to establish the truth of her allegation that she was the lawful wife of the decedent. The best evidence is a valid marriage contract which the petitioner failed to produce. Transfer Certificates of Title, Residence Certificates, passports and other similar documents cannot prove marriage especially so when the petitioner has submitted a certification from the Local Civil Registrar concerned that the alleged marriage was not registered and a letter from the judge alleged to have solemnized the marriage that he has not solemnized said alleged marriage. The lower court correctly disregarded the Photostat copy of the marriage certificate which she presented, this being a violation of the best evidence rule, together with other worthless pieces of evidence. A valid, original marriage contract would be the best evidence that the petitioner should have presented. Failure to present it as evidence would make the marriage dubious.

ISSUE:

HELD:

31

REPUBLIC VS. CA AND CASTRO G.R. NO. 103047 FACTS: Angelina Castro, with her parents unaware, contracted a civil marriage with Edwin Cardenas. They did not immediately live together and it was only upon Castro found out that she was pregnant that they decided to live together wherein the said cohabitation lasted for only 4 months. Thereafter, they parted ways and Castro gave birth that was adopted by her brother with the consent of Cardenas. The baby was brought in the US and in Castros earnest desire to follow her daughter wanted to put in order her marital status before leaving for US. She filed a petition seeking a declaration for the nullity of her marriage. Her lawyer then found out that there was no marriage license issued prior to the celebration of their marriage proven by the certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig. ISSUE: Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence resorted to by Castro is sufficient to establish that no marriage license was issued to the parties prior to the solemnization of their marriage. HELD: The court affirmed the decision of CA that the certification issued by the Civil Registrar unaccompanied by any circumstances of suspicion sufficiently prove that the office did not issue a marriage license to the contracting parties. Albeit the fact that the testimony of Castro is not supported by any other witnesses is not a ground to deny her petition because of the peculiar circumstances of her case. Furthermore, Cardenas was duly served with notice of the proceedings, which he chose to ignore. Under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private respondent Castro sufficiently established the absence of the subject marriage license.

32

VAN DORN VS. ROMILLO 139 SCRA 139 FACTS: Alice Reyes Van Dorn, a Filipino Citizen and private respondent, Richard Upton, a US citizen, was married in Hong Kong in 1979. They established their residence in the Philippines and had 2 children. They were divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982 and petitioner remarried, this time with Theodore Van Dorn. A suit against petitioner was filed on June 8, 1983, stating that petitioners business in Ermita Manila, the Galleon Shop, is a conjugal property with Upton and prayed therein that Alice be ordered to render an accounting of the business and he be declared as the administrator of the said property. ISSUE: Whether or not the foreign divorce between the petitioner and private respondent in Nevada is binding in the Philippines where petitioner is a Filipino citizen. HELD: Private respondent is no longer the husband of the petitioner. He would have no standing to sue petitioner to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is estopped by his own representation before the court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. Furthermore, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. Petitioner is not bound to her marital obligations to respondent by virtue of her nationality laws. She should not be discriminated against her own country if the end of justice is to be served.

33

REPUBLIC VS. ORBECIDO G.R. NO. 154380 FACTS: Cipriano Orbecido III was married with Lady Myros Villanueva on May 24, 1981 at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Ozamis City. They had a son and a daughter named Kristoffer and Kimberly, respectively. In 1986, the wife left for US bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Orbecido discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen and learned from his son that his wife sometime in 2000 had obtained a divorce decree and married a certain Stanley. He thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. ISSUE: HELD: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code.

The court ruled that taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, Article 26 Par.2 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. Hence, the courts unanimous decision in holding Article 26 Par 2 be interpreted as allowing a Filipino citizen who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired a citizenship and remarried, also to remarry under Philippine law.

34

PACETE VS. CARIAGA 231 SCRA 321 Facts: Concepcion Alanis petitioned for the declaration of nullity of the m a r r i a g e between her husband Enrico Pacete and Clarita de la Concepcion, as well as for legal separation between her and Pacete. A l a n i s averred that she was m a r r i e d t o P a c e t e i n 1938 and that they had a child named Consuelo however, Pacete contracted in 1948 a second marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion and she found out this marriage only on 1979.During her marriage to Pacete, the latter acquired properties consisting of large tracts of land, fishponds and several motor vehicles wherein he fraudulently placed the several pieces of property either in his name and Claritaand other "dummies" The reconciliation between her and Pacete was impossible since he obviously favoured to continue living with Clarita. The decree of legal Separation wa s issued 5 months after filing the petition since the respondents failed to file an answer. Issue: Whether or not the court erred in their decision for issuing a decree of legal separation 5 months after filing the petition. H e l d : Yes, according to Article 58 of the Family Code, An action for legal separation must in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition," evidently in order to afford the parties a "cooling-off" period. In this per iod, the court must exhaust their effort in getting the parties to reconcile. The court improperly declared the judgement especially declaring Pacete in default due to failure in filing an answer. The decision was nullified and set aside.

35

MACADANGDANG VS COURT OF APPEALS 108 SCRA 314 FACTS: Petitioner Antonio Macadangdang and respondent Filomena Macadangdang got married in 1946 and had 6 children. In Davao they started a business and gave them good fortune however, their marriage became bitter and her husband had an illicit affair. Respondent judge ordered to pay petitioner P10,000.00 while the liquidation of properties are being processed. He wa also ordered to submit a list of possible administrators however he is still asking for reconsideration to retian his position as administrator of the conjugal properties and contends that the j u d g e m e n t o n J a n u a r y 4 , 1 9 7 3 i s n o t y e t f i n a l a n d e x e c u t o r y. I s s u e : W h e t h e r o r n o t t h e d e c i s i o n i n J a n u a r y 4 , 1 9 7 3 i s n o t ye t f i n a l a n d e x e c u t o r y. Held: No, the law clearly stated that it is final and executor. According to Article 63 of the family code (formerly Article 106 of the civil code) which enumerates the effects of legal separation where the separation and liquidation of properties are inevitable and will automa tically go after the issuance of the said decree. The petition was dismissed.

36

TY vs. CA G.R. No. 127406 November 27, 2000 F a c t s : Respondent Edgardo Reyes married Anna Villanueva both in a civil and church wedding. H o w e v e r , t h e i r m a r r i a g e w a s d e c l a r e d v o i d a b i n i t i o f o r l a c k o f m a r r i a g e l i c e n s e . Respondent subsequently wed p e t i t i o n e r O f e l i a T y in 1979 in a civil ceremony which is before the Judicial declaration of marriage was issued. A church ceremony came after i n 1982. They were blessed with 2 children. In 1991, respondent filed a petition that their m a r r i a g e b e d e c l a r e d v o i d a b i n i t i o f o r l a c k o f m a r r i a g e license and that he was still married to Anna Maria when they got married because the declaration of nullity of marriage was not yet issued. Ofelia averred that lack of marriage license in their marriage is false and proved that there is such. Issue: Whether or not petitioner may claim damages for filing baseless complaint for annulment of marriage and breach o f marital obligation. Ruling: The Supreme Court held that she cannot be awarded for damages because it is absurd that the payment where the payment will come from is from the conjugal fund. The law does not provide any action for damages for breach of mar ital obligation for husband and wife. The petition was granted and declared that their marriage is valid and subsisting.

37

AGAPAY VS PALANG 276 SCRA 341 Facts: Miguel Palang married Carlina on 1949 and had a daughter. A couple of months after their wedding, he went to Hawaii to work. In 1972, He went back to Pangasinan for good but he did not live with Carlina and their child. On 1973, Miguel contracted his second marriage with petitioner, Erlinda Agapay who is just 19 years old at that time. They bought an agricultural land and registered it under their name two months before their wedding and in 1975 Erlinda allegedly bought a house in land registered under her name. Herein respondents filed a complaint to recover the ownership of the above stated parcels of land. The lower court ruled in favour of the Petitioner however it was reversed by the Court of Appeals because of invalid donation. Issue: Whether or not there is invalid donation. Held: The marriage of Carlina and Miguel is still valid and subsisting when Miguel contracted his second marriage. When they bought the agricultural land they are still cohabiting and Erlinda is incapable of contributing financially to buy the land because shes only 19 years old and it was also proved that Miguels money was used to buy the house and lot. According to article 87 of the Family Code the prohibition against donation is also applicable to common law relationships.

38

MATABUENA VS CERVANTES 38 SCRA 284 FACTS: Matabuena and Petrolina Cervantes are Common law spouses when Felix donated a parcel of land to respondent.Six years after the donation was made ,they got married. After the death of Felix, Petitoner Cornelia Matabuena as the sister of the deceased filed a case to nullify the donation. Issue: Whether or not the prohibition against donation set by Article 133 of the Civil Code (article 87 of the Family Code) applies to common law relationships. Held: Yes, the prohibition also applies to common law marriages as established in Buenaventura vs Bautista wherein the Court stated in their decision that intent of the law for applying this prohibition is to protect the donor from fear of undue and improper pressure therefore it shall also be applicable to common law relationships.

39

BA FINANCE CORPORATION VS. COURT OF APPEALS 161 SCRA 608 FACTS: Augusto Yulo loaned from petitioner and presented a promissory note signed by him as representative of A & L Industries and a special power of attorney from his wife Lily Yulo allegedly authorizing her husband in getting the loan however Augusto falied to pay the loan. Consequently, BA Finance Corporation filed a case against the spouse. In Lilys defense, she stated that when the loan was secured,they were already abandoned by Augusto for 5 months. Issue: Whether or not A&L is liable for the obligation of Augusto to BA Finance Corporation. Held: A &L cannot be held liable because it part of the conjugal properties of the spouses Yulo. It can only be held liable if the family benefited according to Article 94 of the Family Code. Augusto abandoned his family months before he secured the loan and it was proved that the signature of Lily is forged.

40

MARMONT RESORT HOTEL VS GUIANG 168 SCRA 373 FACTS: Marmont Resort Hotel and Maris trading executed a Memorandum of Agreement wherein the latter shall install the water resources of the said resort. After 5 months, they contracted the 2nd memorandum of agreement wherein parts of the land of the Guiang will be used and that they shall be compensated with the consent given by Aurora Guiang and her husband as witness. After a while, the water supply of marmont became inadequate and asked permission to enter in Guiangs property to do some drilling but it was not grant ed. The resort sued the spouses however the husband of Aurora denied that he gave his consent. Issue: Whether or not the spouses can be held liable for the damages done against Marmont. Held: Yes. It spouses stopped because during the pre trial, they agreed by stipulation of facts that they are aware of the Memorandum of Agreement and Auroras husband gave his consent by being the witness. The case was remanded to determine the amount of the damages.

41

UY VS COURT OF APPEALS G.R. NO. 109557 Facts: Dr Ernesto Jardeleza had a medical condition wherin he became comatose. Gilda, his wife petitioned to be the administrator of the properties and asking the court to allow the sale of one of their properties to support the medical treatment and hospital fees of Dr. Jardeleza. The lower court granted the petion however, her son Teodoro filed a motion for reconsideration contending that it should be in accordance with rule on special proceeding of the Revised Rules of Court and not under the provisions on summary proceedings. He also avers that selling the property is not needed because they have enough money to support it. Issue: Whether or not Gilda may assume sole power of administration of properties following the rule on summary proceeding. Held: The proper proceeding must be judicial guardianship proceeding of the Revised Rules of Court since the non-consenting spouse is incapacitated and not because of abandonment. To sale of land was void due to lack of due process.

42

DELA CRUZ VS DELA CRUZ 130 PHIL 124 FACTS: Estrella and Serverino dela Cruz are married in 1961 and owned parcels of land in Bacolod and Silay Negros Occidental. Severino frequently leaves their abode due their expanding business but as time goes by he seldom go return their home until Estrella filed a complaint alleging his husband abandoned her and his children and that he abused his position as administrator of the conjugal properties. However, Severino denies her wifes accusation. In fact, he was sending monthly support to her and his children monthly and the reason that she seldom goes home its become his wife is quarrelsome and always alleging him that he has a mistress. Issue: Whether or not Severino abandoned his family. Held: Severino did not abandon his family and did not abuse the administration of their conjugal property. In fact, he worked hard so their business will grow and he provided monthly support to his family. There must be real abandonment and not mere separation according to the Supreme Court.

43

DEL MUNDO VS COURT OF APPEALS 97 SCRA 373

Facts: Agripino Alvarez married Alejandra Martin and had 4 children. After Alejandra died, Agripino married Isidra Dela Cruz and had one daughter. After Agripino died, Isidra and her daughter sold a property in Rizal to Petioner and adjucated the proceed equally to themselves. The children of Agripino in his first marriage sold 4/10 of the same land to Simplicio Bacos and when they found out that it was sold already they filed a case to nullify the sale. Isidra avers that the property is a paraphernal property. Issue: Whether or not the property is a paraphernal property of Isidra. Held: It is was found out that the land in question is a paraphernal property of Isidra. The court held that if it was a conjugal property, the lower court should have liquidated the conjugal properties and divided it in half wherein half of the properties must be given to Isidra being the spouse and half to the heir. By this, it will not be complicated. The sale made by Isidra cannot be rendered void until all the liquidation is finished.

44

VILLANUEVA VS INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT 192 SCRA 21 FACTS: Spouses Graciano and Nicolasa Aranas has a parcel of land and after they died their 2 sons, Modesto and Federico divided the property equally with themselves. Modesto married Victoria Comorro but they are childless. Modestesto however had 2 illegitimate children, Dorothea and Teodoro who procured a loan using their fathers property to Jesus Bernas and failed to pay such loan. After one month, Consolacion Villanueva and Raymund Arand filed a petition to be co- owners of the land after finding out the will of Victoria. Issue: Whether or not the land that was inherited by Modesto from his parents form part of the conjugal property of Modesto and Victoria. Held: The land is an exclusive property of Modesto as it is acquired by gratuitous title according to Article 109 of the Family Code.

45

BPI VS POSADAS 56 PHIL 215 FACTS: Adolphe Oscar Schuetze, a German National married Rosario Gelano. Adolphe secured an insurance with Sun Life Assurance Company of CANDA. The company paid his widow P20,150.00 amounting the insurance policy the deceased paid. Rosario gave the money to the Bank of Philippines because it the administrator of the properties of the deceased and the money was returned back to Rosario. Repondent, Juan Posadas Jr, Collectior of the Internal Revenue charged P20,150 for inheritance tax. Petitoner avers that the insurance policy is not subject to inheritance tax because the money used to pay the premium is conjugal properties. Issue: Whether or not the Insurance was form part of the conjugal properties. Held: Yes, it forms part of the conjugal property except for the first payment wherein Adolphe made such payment when he was still unmarried therefore it is partly paraphernal and partly conjugal.

46

JOCSON VS COURT OF APPEALS 170 SCRA 333 FACTS: Emilio and Alejandra Jocson married and had two children, Moises and Agustina, Alejandra died first intestate followed by Emilio who also died intestate. Emilio, in his lifetime executed 3 documents wherein almost all of his assets and 1/3 of his share in Alejandras assets to Agustina. Moises questions the validity of the sale because the properties are allegedly conjugal properties the deceased spouses as these properties are registered as Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete Issue: Whether or not the questioned properties are conjugal properties. Held: Moises may cite Article 160 of the Civil Code where all property of the marriage is presumed part of the conjugal partnership, he must first establish that these properties were acquired during the marriage. Although the properties are registered Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete, it is not a conclusive evidence that the properties are part of the conjugal partnership. The petition was dismissed.

47

WONG VS IAC 200 SCRA 792 Facts: On 1964, Romario Henson married Katrina Pineda and had 3 children. In 1971, Romario purchased a parcel of land from his father. In 1972, Katrina consigned jewelries from Anita Chan worth P321,830.95 however she failed to return the jewelries. Anita released a check however it bounced due to lack of funds. Anita Chan and Ricky Wong filed a case againt the Spouses Henson. 4 lots were executed which are registered under Romario Henson married to Katrina Pineda Issue: Whether or not the debt of Katrina must be paid by the conjugal properties even if Romario has no knowledge of it. Held: The properties were acquired during the marriage and there is no clear evidence where the money that was used to purchase those lands came from. Without any contrary to dispute the properties as exclusive properties, such properties shall be presumed part of the conjugal partnership however these properties cannot be held liable for the debt of one spouse as it is not proved that the family benefited from the act.

48

ZULUETA VS PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS 49 SCRA 1 Facts: Mr. and Mrs. Zulueta along with their child had boarded a flight from Wake Island to Philippines. While waiting for their flight, Mr. Zulueta went to the loo which is 400 yards away from the terminal and came back late. Captain Zetner became impatient and arrogant and had 3 out of 4 of their suit cases were unloaded as well as Mr. Zulueta. The Zuluetas filed a case against the said carriage and awarded them damages. Mrs. Zuleta had entered an agreement worth P50,000 with the said company since the spouses are already separated however it was not allowed by the Supreme Court because wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership if the husband gave no consent. Issue: Whether or not the damages form part of the conjugal partnership. Held: Yes it forms part of the conjugal partnership because the money that was used to pay for their ticket that bound them in contact with the respondent is a conjugal property.

49

JOVELLANOS VS CA 210 SCRA 126 FACTS: In 1955, Daniel Jovellanos and Philippine American Life Insurance Company entered a lease and conditional sale agreement over Lot 8with a bungalow. Daniel Jovellanos was married to Leonor Dizon during that time and had 3 children. Daniel married respondent Annette Jovellanos and had 2 children after Leonors death. On 1971, petitioner Mercy Jovellanos got married and made a house on the backside portion of the land. On 1975, Philamlife gave Daniel a deed of absolute sale thereafter donated to the petitioners lot and bungalow. Daniel died years after. Annette Jovellanos avers that the land was acquired during their marriage which is part of their conjugal property. Petitioners contend that the properties were purchased by their parents in their fathers first marriage. On 1989, the ordered the liquidation of the partnership and declared share of ownership of the heirs by applying Article 118 of the FC which provides Property bought on installment paid partly from exclusive funds of either or both spouses and partly from conjugal funds belongs to the buyer or buyers if full ownership was vested before the marriage and to the conjugal partnership if such ownership was vested during the marriage. In either case, any amount advanced by the partnership or by either or both spouses shall be reimbursed by the owner or owners upon liquidation of the partnership Issue: Whether or not the property forms part of the second marriage. Held: The property belongs to the conjugal partnership of the second marriage because the full payment was made during that time. However, Anette is still liable to reimburse the amount of money paid for in the amortization.

50

AYALA INVESTMENTS VS CA

FACTS: Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) procured al loan from petitioner wherein Alfredo Ching being the Vice president of PBM is made liable if in case the loan is not paid. PBM failed to pay their debt and thereafter a writ of execution was issued. The sheriff sent notice of sheriff sale of 3 of their properties to the Ching spouses. ISSUE: Whether or not the conjugal properties of the Ching spouses can be held liable for the loan. HELD: No, the congal properties cannot be held liable because it did not benefited the family. Mr. Ching was held liable out of his profession and it is only the company who benefited from it.

JOHNSON AND JOHNSON VS. CA AND VINULUAN

FACTS: Respondent Delilah Vinluan, owner of Vinluan Enterprises, is retails Johnson products incurred an obligation to petitioner. Johnson & Johnson. Respondent filed a complaint against Vinluan spouses for damages. Issue: Whether or not Mr. Vinluan must be held liable with the obligation incurred by his wife. Held: No. The husband cannot be held liable because he did not gave his consent and the obligation incurred did not benefit the family. The exclusive properties of Mrs. Vinluan can be only held liable but the exclusive properties of Mr Vinluan and the conjugal properties.

51

LACSON VS DIAZ 14 SCRA 183 FACTS: Respondent incurred an obligation with herein petiotioner. In the courts decision respondent was ordered to pay P132,718.30 wherein his employee was advised to deduct 1/3 from his wage which shall serve as his payment until the full amount is paid. The respondent avers that the obligation he incurred was during his 1st marriage and not his 2nd marriage and that the monthly deduction in his salary infringes article 163 which states that The payment of debts contracted by the husband or the wife before the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership. Issue: whether or not the debt o the respondent cannot be paid out by the conjugal properties in his second marriage. Held: Accoridng to the Supreme Courts decision, As a general rule, therefore, debts contracted by the husband or the wife before the marriage, 2 as well as fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed thereon, are not chargeable to the conjugal partnership. However, such obligations may be enforced against the conjugal assets if the responsibilities enumerated in Article 161 3 of the new Civil Code have already been covered, and that the obligor has no exclusive property or the same is insufficient. Considering that the enforceability of the personal obligations of the husband or wife, against the conjugal assets, forms the exception to the general rule, it is incumbent upon the one who invokes this provision or the creditor to show that the requisites for its applicability are obtaining. The case was remanded.

GARCIA VS MANZANO FACTS: Gonzalo Garcia, a veterenarian and Consolacion Manzano, a business woman are husband and wife. After a while, they have been living separately since 1948. Garcia filed a petition for separation of property alleging that her wife, being the administrator of their conjugal properties abused her position. Issue: Whether or not the petition for separation of the conjugal properties must be granted. Held: According to Article 134 of the family code, the separation of properties can be availed before marriage via settlement or within the marriage if there is sufficient. There being no sufficient cause, the petition was dismissed.

52

DELA CRUZ VS DELA CRUZ FACTS: Estrella and Serverino dela Cruz are married in 1961 and owned parcels of land in Bacolod and Silay Negros Occidental. Severino frequently leaves their abode due their expanding business but as time goes by he seldom go return their home until Estrella filed a complaint alleging his husband abandoned her and his children and that he abused his position as administrator of the conjugal properties. However, Severino denies her wifes accusation. In fact, he was sending monthly support to her and his children monthly and the reason that she seldom goes home its become his wife is quarrelsome and always alleging him that he has a mistress. Issue: Whether or not Severino abandoned his family. Held: Severino did not abandon his family and did not abuse the administration of their conjugal property. In fact, he worked hard so their business will grow and he provided monthly support to his family. There must be real abandonment and not mere separation accordi ng to the Supreme Court.

TODA JR. VS CA 183 SCRA 713 FACTS: On 1951, Benigno Toda, Jr. and Rose Marie Tuason-Toda got married and begot two children. On 1979, Rose Marie filed a petition for termination of conjugal partnership due to mismanagement and dissipation of conjugal funds against petitioner. On April 1,1981, a joint petition for judicial approval of dissolution of conjugal partnership under Article 191 of the Civil Code which was signed by the parties on March 30, 1981 The said petition including the compromise agreement therein were approved by the trial court in its order of June 9, 1981. ISSUE: When is the affectivity date of the agreement? HELD: The agreement took effect on June 9, 1981, the date the trial court approved it. According to Article 190 of the Civil Code, in the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements, the separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place save in virtue of a judicial order.

53

VALDES VS RTC 260 SCRA 221 FACTS: In 1971, Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez got married and was blessed with five children. In 1992, Valdez filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage on the grounds of psychological incapacity. The petition was granted. Stella and Joaquin by default were placed in the custody of their mother and the older children may chose which parent they want to stay. The parties are also directed to the liquidation of their property by Article 147 of the Family Code and to comply to Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the same code. Issue: Whether or not the property regime should be based on Article 147 of the Family Code Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the property relations of a void marriage shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership Any assets acquired during the union is presumed to have been acquired through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate financially in the acquisition of the property is still considered contributed through the care and maintenance of their family.

AGAPAY VS PALANG

Facts: Miguel Palang married Carlina on 1949 and had a daughter.A couple of months after their wedding, he went to Hawaii to work. In 1972, He went back to Pangasinan for good but he did not live with Carlina and their child. On 1973, Miguel contracted his second marriage with Petioner, Erlinda Agapay who is just 19 years old at that time. They bought an agricultural land and registered it under their name two months before their wedding and in 1975 Erlinda allegedly bought a house in land registered under her name. Herein respondents filed a complain to recover the ownership of the above stated parcels of land. The lower court ruled in favour of the Petitioner however it was reversed by the Court of Appeals because of invalid donation. Issue: Whether or not there is invalid donation. Held: The marriage of Carlina and Miguel is still valid and subsisting when Miguel contracted his second marriage. When they bought the agricultural land they are still cohabiting and Erlinda is incapable of contributing financially to buy the land because shes only 19 years old and it was also proved that Miguels money was used to buy the house and lot. According to article 87 of the Family Code the prohibition against donation is also applicable to common law relationships.

54

JUANLIZA VS JOSE

FACTS: Eugenio Jose was legally married to Socorro Ramos but had been living with with appellant, Rosalia Arroyo, for sixteen years in relationship. Eugenio Jose,the owner and operator of the jeepney got involved in an accident of collision with a freighttrain of the Philippine National Railways on November23, 1969 which resulted in the 7 death and 5 physical injuries of its passengers ISSUE: whether or not Rosalia who can be held jointly and severally liable for damages with the Jose. HELD: The Supreme Court held that the co-ownership in Article 144 of the Civil Code states that the man and the woman cohabiting must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. In the case at bar, Eugenio Jose marriage to Socorro Ramos is still valid and subsisting which is an impediment for him and Rosalia to contract marriage. The jeepney is part of the conjugal partnership of Jose and his legal wife and Rosalia cannot be held liable.

TUMLOS VS FERNANDEZ FACT: Spouses Fernandez sought an action for ejectment against the Tumlos. The Spouses authorized the Tumlos to reside in the apartment building since 1989with on rent. Guillerma Tumlos agreed to pay P1,600/mo while the others promised to pay P1,000/mo for the rental however such payment did not transpire. When the Fernandez demanded the payment from the Tumlos but said demand were ignored. The Spuses filed a case and In Guillermas answer to the complaint, claiming that she is a co-owner and co-vendee of the apartment building. Guillerma alleged that she and Mario Fernandez had an amorous relationship, and that they purchased the building as their love nest. ISSUE: Whether or not that Guillerma is also the co-owner of the property in question. RULING: Mario is legally married to another woman and she also failed to prove her contribution in purchasing the property pursuant to article 148 of the Family Code since they ate cohabiting with legal impediment.

55

DOCENA VS LAPESURA Facts: Casiano Hombria filed a case against spouses Antonio and Alfreda Docena for the recovery of a parcel of land against them. The petitioners claimed ownership of the land because they have lived there for a long time already. . The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioners however the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court and ordered the them to depart from the land leased from Casiano. . Issue: Whether or not joint management or administration does require that the husband and the wife always act together. Ruling: Each spouse may validly exercise full power of management alone, subject to the intervention of the court in proper cases. It is believed that even under the provisions of the Family Code, the husband alone could have filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition to contest the writs of demolition issued against the conjugal property with the Court of Appeals without being joined by his wife. The signing of the attached certificate of non-forum shopping only by the husband is not a fatal defect. The signing petitioner here made the certification in his behalf and that of his wife. The husband may reasonably be presumed to have personal knowledge of the filing or non-filing by his wife of any action or claim similar to the petition for certiorari and prohibition given the notices and legal processes involved in a legal proceeding involving real property.

56

Vous aimerez peut-être aussi