Classical Philosophies of India and the West Author(s): Kalidas Bhattacharyya Reviewed work(s): Source: Philosophy East and

West, Vol. 8, No. 1/2 (Apr. - Jul., 1958), pp. 17-36 Published by: University of Hawai'i Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1397419 . Accessed: 14/09/2012 06:12
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KALIDAS BIHATTACHARYYA

Classical PlolphiSs

the Indiaand West of

CREATIVE THOUGHT IN Indiaended with Udayanain the we meanserious with the A.D.' By "creative tenth century thought" struggle clarification of as distinct fromformalistic of life and existence, problems India were of decided. issues Post-Udayana pre-eminentphilosophers already and always weremoreinserious, Occasionally they lyformalistic. original had But classical Indianphilosophy in form thanin matter. terested always was that concern and content life always placed problems profoundly, genuine orofthenature whether ofa commentary, aboveform.Every work, original oftruths orsectional, had a contribution to thefund whether of a widerange therecertainly and refutation discovered. were,as in all Analysis, proof, Butthese wereneverapotheosized. soundphilosophy. Logicwas usedonly was employed forthedisEven inference of discovery. as an instrument of truths. covery schooLThere tothe were other schools Nyiya-VaiSesika belonged Udayana in classical India,of course.The veryearlyschoolsin India are Sidhkhya, and of Buddhism, someforms Nyiya,Vaisesika, Jainism, Yoga, Mimirbsi, schools Different Vedintic a form ofGrammar. ofthephilosophy developed there theseearlierand laterschools laterin classicalIndia;' and between forms ofthegaivas, theVaisnavas, werethephilosophies etc.,andadditional ofthephilosophy ofGrammar. of classical Indianphilosophy The problems formulated cannotbe neatly as ethical, etc. metaphysical, theological, logical,psychological, A precise of philosophy division was unknown intothese"departments" to the Inas evenin theWestin earlier andifwiththeRenaissance in the dians, days, under and finally thispractice Westwe find beingrecognized presgrowing is desirable. suchdivision sureofworkit is stillan openquestion whether
'The period may be extended by another century to accommodate Riminuja and a few others. 'The Upanisads were not works of systematic philosophy.

17

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KALIDASBHATTACHARYYA

Ethicsand metaphysics Problems are inextricably connected. of existence arisebecauseof man'sconsciousness If manwerea mereitem of freedom. of Nature, at all Questioning Naturepresuphe wouldhave no problem he who questions has stepped aside and is conscious poses transcendence; of thattranscendence. is onewho answers. This consciousness Equallyfree of freedom has degrees, of freedom, onemay of course.Thoughconscious in a a turn As to Nature feel an in free one interest it. notyet may being in it a to it or theoretical or a practical either attitude, way reorganize study thatis notpossible fora mereitemofNature.This is whatman does. But four thevery of freedom, and then toward consciousness one mayalso turn thisfreedom in to realize themselves: (1) manmaytry possibilities present in thetheoretical thetheoretical (2) he may, attitude, attitude; re-interpret realize freedom in thepractical attitude, Nature; (3) he maytryto realize from himself willdissociating as free in other Nature;or (4) himself, words, as freely he may, realize himself in thepractical attitude, byreorganizwilling free wilL to his self-conscious Nature ing according wouldbe all philosophy as suchwere thekeynote of ethics, If freedom conthat ethics freedom are that the told we ethic-centric. Often, however, wouldgo freedom is onlyfreedom of will. If so,theselfas cognitive siders be some and there to be calledmetaphysics, overto another might discipline of freedom from ethics provided metaphysics, good groundforseparating Indianand clasClassical freedom. of cognitive will is entirely independent in bothsenses, freedom sical Western but,except interpreted philosophers3 ethics nonein Indiaunderstood and the earlier theMimirmsakas Buddhists, more insisted andtheS~hkhyas in thesecondsense.The Advaita Ved~ntins of will (vairsgya, freedom and regarded freedom on cognitive detachment) are the inward The Saivas held thatthetwo freedoms as onlyancillary.' Acof purity.5 a level at self the same of and theoutgoing superior aspects thesis The are intertwined." freedoms the two Yoga to cording RiAminuja, on this is notunivocal." point Evenwhen from ethics None of these metaphysics. separated philosophers so faris subordithemoralact,which is on cognitive theemphasis freedom, to thisfreedom conducive and, as what is necessarily nate,is understood ethics. is no it. there as in some independent Thus by therefore, wayinspired
'We mean philosophersprior to the eighteenthcentury. 'Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya, Studies in Philosophy, Vol. I (Calcutta: Progressive Publishers, 1956), section on "Studies in Yoga Philosophy," chap. 1. sHistory of Philosophy--Eastern and Western, S. Radhakrishnan, et al., eds. (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1952), VoL I, pp. 374, 384, 387-389, 404-406, 410. 'Cf. the theory of jfiinakarmasamsuccay (knowledge-cum-will approach). 'Krishnachndra Bhattacharyya, op. cit.

CLASSICALPHILOSOPHIES OF INDIA AND THE WEST

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we have seen, of ethics.Metaphysics, is metaphysics Neither independent and thisis equally freedom is bornof the desireto attain self-consciously, of comof ethics.Attainment and theultimate thefountain-head objective of ethics Details moksa is called freedom (liberation). only emerge plete conduct. is applied toempirical when metaphysics The wereexceptions. andtheearly The Mimirihsakas Buddhists, however, for reasonsto be seen later,discouraged latter, metaphysical speculation, aloneforthespiritual as modern almost ethics do, and prescribed positivists was different.9 of man." The Mimidisaprocedure amelioration Unambiguof the attitude to act. The fundamental ouslyit subordinated cognition with ethical (vidhi); (theselfas free)is toactin accordance principles spirit is cognitive, of theseprinciples intothenature and,if it is said thatinquiry is only thisinquiry tworeplies.First, theMImi-ilzs wouldoffer philosopher thisis in acts,and,second--and of usingthoseprinciples forthepurpose an is of these one themoreimportant injuncprinciples every point--since exist do notalready do this," or "You should in theform "Do this" they tion, realization Theirvery in knowledge. to be discovered beingis butpotential are relevant truths acts. Even metaphysical in concrete onlyin thecontext held thatthe of someact-actual or possible.The extreme Mimiriasakas a itself subtle action.It is is reveal truths these which is said to knowledge A near Western difficult to finda parallelto thisin classical philosophy. American is analogue pragmatism. between Nor did Indianphilosophy (of logicand psychology distinguish and analyzedin detaildifIt classified knowledge)exceptoccasionally. interconnections. their ofknowing ferent ways (pramana)and demonstrated another than logic. Even inference--and But thiswas more psychology method viz., postulation closelyallied to it, but not alwaysdistinguished, new as a methodof discovering understood primarily (arthhpatti)--was orrejection. ordisproof nota wayofproof )'o Not that (confirmation truths, to thesephilosophers. was unknown theconcept of proof Rather, they, parit in and AdvaitaVedinta,developed Mimirhsi, ticularly Nyiya-Vaisesika, theprovedness herewas whether Butthemainproblem meticulous detail."1 and apriminya) of a and falsity and therejectedness, i.e.,truth (primarnya and also of thatcognition characters are or are not additional cognition, as thecase maybe, is or is or falsity, theknowledge of thistruth whether
Outlinesof IndianPhilosophy 'M. Hiriyanna, (London: GeorgeAllen & Unwin Ltd., 1951), pp. 136-138. on Brahma Sutra1. i. 1, 2, 4. 'Cf. amikara's commentary StudiesI (Mysore:Kavyalaya 'oM. Hiriyanna, Publishers, Indian Philosophical 1957), pp. 65-70. & Co., 1956), and Rtligion(Calcuttz: Chakravarti Studies in Philosophy US. K. Maitra, Chatterjee pp. 151-164.

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notcausedby theverysame factors thatcausethatcognition.2 Exceptin these theories of truth in and also another viz.,tarka, (prdmmnya) concept, thatis, merecorroboration,1" of "logic"in Indianphilosophy. there is little less subordinate is always to,and,therefore, 'Tarkd' as merecorroboration, in importance than, discovery. If logicis concerned we haveseenhowmuch ofit was inference, onlywith in Indianphilosophy, it and in whatway. In theWest,however, permitted in addition, is often withjudgment whichare also and concept, concerned, in as theworkof reason.Evenin thissenselogicwas notwanting regarded was classicalIndian philosophy. there analyzed, carefully Everyconcept and compared withother The Indianmindwas consticlassified, concepts. was a keynote ofIndianthinking. logicalin thissense. Clarity rutionally and of inference or of judgment however, Throughout, logic,whether was only applicative subordinate. Indiansnever and, therefore, concept, intoa self-complete theoretical logic by itself study.Therewas developed as already a formal never said,the study, logicas an independent although, to Some Indianmindwas constitutionally distant logical. analogues formal found in the of bytheGrammarian study purelanguage logicare,however, werehardly Saivas. these But and comMim-itsakas, many philosophers, with of the Aristotelian formal type logic. parable in theWest tosaythat what thinkers It willnotbefar theaprioristic wrong these Purelanguage, is what would call purelanguage. call "thought" Indians and universal. It is is autonomous to theseIndianphilosophers, according and which clothethespokenlanguage, purein thesensethatgrosssounds when it are it in the is mind theimages which spoken, notmerely accompany to many of these thinkers-and have arguedout accidental; according they and images(and,according case-these sounds to some,evenconcrete their of pure language. Words have of the world) are self-concretions things Thattheword 17 meansthefactF in either semantic or syntactical import. a matter ofconvention, butthata wordmeanssomefact theworld is indeed of facts, a priori. This meaning is onlya priorianticipation is certain these not so far and whichfacts, are of therefore, independent purewords; a with also be classified And the same is true may priori. regard meanings that forsyntactical relations. Particular words to words stand conventionally factual butthere are also a priori forparticular stand relations, anticipations
"1Three stages oi vdk (speech) were recognized. They are vaikhari (gross), madbyyam (intermediate), and paiyanti (pure). Some stretched this philorophy to the limit and admitted a fourth stage, viz., pari (ultimate). S. Radhakrishnan, ed., History of Philosophy-Eastern and Western, VoL I, pp. 374, 412-418, 422, 423.

Sri Munsichandra Sinha,1955).

f"S. Bagchi, Inductive Reasonang--A Study of Tarks and its Role in Indian Logic (Calcutta:

a parallel discussion in LogicalPositivism. a We find

CLASSICAL OF INDIA AND THE WEST PHILOSOPHIES

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of relations, whichrelations and a priori.4This semantic are,therefore, ofpurelanguage somewhat with thetraditional study syntactical corresponds Western this was never and judgmentBut,first, an indepenlogicofterms dentstudy, in the of interest (ethicsand) metaphysics, and, beingalways waseverdeveloped. The entire no logicofthe formal second, study syllogism doctrine of Logos,and,to some of purelanguage theold Western suggests and purelanguage are Kant'stheory of thea priori; and,ifthought extent, as identical, it maybe saidthatthisparticular Indianline of thinking taken theentire in classical tradition Western rationalistic suggests philosophy. wereunsympathetic, Other and sometimes even Indiansystems, however, ofpure tothis andYoga (and, hostile, language.Nyiya-Vai"esika philosophy we presume, therefore, abjuredall transSithkhya also) unceremoniously and Vedintic it. cendental of systems quietly ignored philosophy language,15 Averseto all transcendental studied Nyiya-VaiSesika philosophy, language de novoand developed a newgrammar in linewithitsownmetaphysics. It is onlythe philosophers of theMimamisi in thewholetradition of school, Indianphilosophy, to purelanguage.But orthodox who adhered systematic in thestatus coulddo this because central interest oftheir ofethical they only to had theironly and (vidhi nisedha),which, according them, principles never that in scriptures hadto be properly source Naturally, they interpreted. formal considered logic. in ClassicalIndianphilosophers, interested then,were neversufficiently to material thesituation formal is diflogic. With regard logic,however, was interest in that But,evenso,their had abundant attitude ferent-they from thefollowing: This will be evident fundamentally psychological. "With theprobableexception of a few Buddhists, Indianphilosophers is a matter hold thatinduction of perception. WiththeGreeksalso, as is evident from Aristotle's treatment ofit,itis intuited, andin modern Western we find the resuscitated. Modern have asked thinkers Western logic problem whether is a form induction of inference, if how. and, so, They naturally it as inference-though tendto treat notformal. beTheycall it inference cause observed to form, according cases-positiveor negative--somehow a ground and thisground, forthegeneral them, they proposition, pointour, increases or decreases in strength in accordance with thenumber and quality of thecasesobserved. ButIndian almost in linewithAristotle, philosophers, thattheobserved have argued casesare onlypsychological aids to the disthe not a and of connection covery general (arundhati-nyiya), logicalground, casescan at most these as contributing addedthat be taken to thepsychologNydya Sutra I. 4, in S. Radhakrishnan and 'Yoga Satra I. 42; Yoga Bhisya I. 42, paragraph 2; 21aso C. A. Moore, eds., A Source Book in Indian Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton UniversityPress, 1957).

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the generalproposition. The of our conviction ical strength regarding as the chanceof possible error in proportion hold,increases they strength, of erroris not logic. Whatever the possibility diminishes. Diminishing Chances asserted ornon-perceptually--is is asserted-perceptually absolutely. that concern for need not are unless oferror, us, substantiated, they logically if it is of The wouldlead to unfounded logic, logic probability, skepticism. of error, aredegrees notof truth. is onlythelogicof error:we meanthere of oftheabsence is positive, which of truth If logicis a criterion notmerely assertion an absolute which is withdiscovery, (until coalesces it either error, forms the traditional or is thelogicof confirmation through contradicted), ofinference."'6 did notcaremuchforwhatin theWest is ThoughIndianphilosophers ofcognito thetruth sensitive were (or falsity) calledlogic, they particularly we confirmedness as either thistruth (of which understood tions.But they had concerned the factthatthecognition have already spoken) or merely we have meantthe former, not been contradicted (abidhita). When they When to as subordinated they psychology. admitted though seen,they logic, toend. True, from itwasall psychology thelatter, beginning meant however, a particthat thesimplefact with content wereriot evenpsychologically they also hadnotbeencontradicted. psychological prescribed ularcognition They notoccur.Specificthat contradiction in order measures might precautionary be knownas unit must that of case the in induction, they prescribed ally condition the limiting defined and they carefully conditional (nirupfdhika), for of prescriptions correct If by "logic" one meansthe study a the Indianshad developed at least (upfdthi). here one hasto admitthat knowledge, either are with it deals the norms more: is logic.Butlogicproper something if it is logic,thattheIndians The onlylogic, or postulates. over-empirical logic to theassociational is induction with connection in parallel developed ofHumeandJ.S. Mill. II alreadymentioned) (with the exceptions ClassicalIndianphilosophers likeethics, intoair-tight metaphysics, didnotdivide compartments philosophy a was for developing study unitary and them, Philosophy, logic. psychology, in the over-all the solutions but dovetailing kindsof problems different of freedom. oftherealization context in is said to have originated and Plato with as Aristotle, philosophy If,
"A in Our and Self"-Fifth Instalment, of Knowledge my "Indian Concepts quotedfrom passage Bulletin IV, 2. Research Heritage,

CLASSICAL OF INDIA AND THE WEST PHILOSOPHIES

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wonder and if somelaterWestern havesubstituted orunthinkers question forthiswonder, Indianthinkers areunanimous in believing that derstanding theorigin of philosophy is man'surgeforrealizing freedom. Mutewonder leads nowhere, are possibleonlythrough and question and understanding someconsciousness of freedom. Consciousness is ipso factoreflective. of freedom Different of this grades as consciousness taken in therefore be the ofreflecmay stages development tion. At whatever thebusiness of reflection is to distinguish elements stage, to thatreflection weregivenin a complex.At thelowest which prior stage, where is no morethanempirical reflection whatis distinguished in analysis, a form is generally feltas having beenalready known in thatform, though But eventhisempirical oftendevelops as indistinctly. analysis difficulties, whenthetic-tic soundof a clockis distinguished it has ceased, or onlyafter whena picture-puzzle is solved after someexercise of attention. In such cases it is difficult to assert thatwhatis now distinguished in a certain form was known in exactly thesame form.Different already sciences, including psyhavetried to overcome thesedifficulties and havesucceeded at least chology, Butat a stageofreflective someelements partially. analysis maycometo be whichare not,at thatstageof reflection, feltas having been distinguished knownin thatexactform.Space,time,number, previously logicalforms, and the different thatmetaphysics is said to deal with, categories including thecategories ofselfandGod,belongto this which disgroup.The analysis But these be called with the tinguishes may philosophical. immediately of from its a new separation philosophical analysis empirical counterpart, of crucial arisesforphilosophy. The realforus,unless problem importance we are sophisticated, is theactualempirical calledNature, world, including the worldof mind. If theelements distinguished byphilosophical analysis are notfeltas having in Nature in theforms beenknown in which are they nowdistinguished,cannot be calledreal. But,sincewe areas yet unable they to denythem, their status is peculiar.Theyonlydemand to be real-they real but be to are real as are feltas whait not only, ought yet.As such, they demands. be called or idealities seema partof Also,theynecessarily may thereflective thatdistinguishes consciousness them, they though equally apare notreal and yetarenot own. As they to of claim objectivity their pear be spoken of impersonally. Like thefalse cannot unrealities, they complete of exceptas the snake-as-it-is-for-me, these snakewhichcannotbe spoken are for what as me.17 to be referred idealities they only may in whichphilosophy findsitselfinitially, This is the predicament and
'"Me" meansthedistinguishing reflection.

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fromwhichin variouswaysit has tried to extricate itself.The history of in Indiaand theWest,is thestory of theseatempts. Broadly philosophy, there are foursucharttempts, andone or twomayhavesub-types. speaking, One attempt is to treattheseidealstructures as transcendent objects.Even in the distinguishing we reflection, though theynow have existence they, are told,nevertheless demand some kind of transcendence, independent ie., status as objects.In the West,Plato and all philosophers who follow him thisalternative. In India,we find the it in Sirhkhya, accept 8aivism, Yoga, of Grammar, of Buddhism. and someforms In India,however, philosophy thesetranscendent in the West. Theyare objectsare notthoserecognized and thecatenot always and never number, spaceand time, logicalforms, in Western The idealities(tattvas) normally goriesadmitted philosophy. which these Indian areeither as inSibkhya material, philosophers recognized and Yoga (and also in someforms of Buddhism), or forms of purelanas in the as of in or material The Saivism. both, Grammar, guage, philosophy idealities are (1) five elements, earth, air, fire, viz., water, (gross mahabhditas and ether-as-the-essence-of-sound), essences cor(subtle (2) five tanmitras to these),(3) elevenindriyax theprin(sensibilities), responding including associates sensations and is called mind (mnars), ciple thatunreflectively as theprinciple (4) thehalf-reflective (5) thought ego-sense (ahbarhkra), of reflection at therootof all (buddhi), and (6) theinchoate primalstuff these (pradhina)).None of thesetattvas, manas,abhakika,and including is subjective in theproper senseof the term;theyare all objects buddhi, areknown(introspectively, as thecasemaybe) as other they (jada), because thantheknowledge thatis revealing them.s8 III So muchforthefirst to getoutof the initial menattempt predicament tioned on page 23. The second is is its It to hold attempt exactly opposite. thatidealities demandmerger withpureconsciousness. In the West,the clear mention of pure consciousness is foundin Neo-Platonism first and, as is preferred that,in Descartes; long after and, whenthisconsciousness thetrue(or final) essence, thisis always on the groundthatit is a clear and distinct essence.Theremight also be other clearand distinct, essences, butnoneso clearand distinct as consciousness, so thattheirclarity and distinctness be taken as at of borrowed. It is the root this lies notion that might all idealism, whether or Kant or Fichte.Different it be thatof Berkeley
8"The knowledge (introspection), however, which reveils the taitvw nos. 3, 4, and 5, particularly no. 5, is subjective in the proper sense of the term. It is cailed purus..

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idealists have onlybeenin disagreement, each in his own way,as to why and in whatsenseconsciousness and in their underis most clearand distinct, of the nature idealists takeit as only of consciousness. standing Empiricist a substratum events-themental to these, states-and add,at most, psychic a substratum as onlya moreenduring event.But which, too,is understood the Kantians and Fichtreans understand it as over-natural, as thatwhichis never an objectlikemental their or buteversubstates enduring substrata, an act autonomous mental the holds that,running states, jective, through thesetogether as systematic Fichte objects.Kant tookit as a cognitive act;, itwith identified wilL to Berkeley and the Kantio-Fichteans, we have Roughly corresponding in IndiatheVijfianavida and theAdvaitaVedintins.BothpreBuddhists:9 on theground--only ferred thesubjective one among whilethe many--that is is indubitable. consciousness object contingent, But,whileto the Vijiiithesubjective navidaBuddhists was equivalent to mental theAdvaira states, as these revealed (mental Vedintins, treating objects objects bypureconcalledsaksin),insisted on autonomous consciousness as subsciousness, pure in theproper sense of theterm.This pureconsciousness is never an jective buteversubjective. thesubjective as thatwhichis reobject, Theydefined flectively self-illuminating (svaprakdla). The Vijiiinavdda Buddhists also differed with on someimportant Berkeley tookthevery mentalstates as self-revealing they points.UnlikeBerkeley, (svaprakaia),and did notbelievethattheseare knownby a self. The second pointof difference is thattheyneverdeniedexternality. With them, as even is so to them, externality, subjective, that,according externality, ofmental there aretwokinds states(vijnanas)--external (pravrttivij-ana) 2 and non-external us of Kant's doctrine of (ilayavijniana). This reminds as subjective and timeas theform of internal sense. space (externality) wouldneverhave admitted thatmental states as The AdvaitaVedintins are noticed suchare self-illuminating. These states, it is true, immediately as they doesnotprove that arenotobjects(to introspecthey ocutr.Butthat a kindofprimitive with andail depends tion). Theyareobjects self-evidence, on whatthisprimitive to. Siriikhya self-evidence believed reallyamounts thatit is due to thedominance of a peculiar called character, saitva-guna,
transcen"9Asinterpreted by the Hindus.Genuineand full-fledged Viiiinavida was undoubtedly different from W-e arenot referring dental(though to rhat. Vedinca). Advaita the is the inner is indeed of It sdksin (pure consciousness) Advaita Vedinta. "Alayauviiina not self-contained but nevera definite frommentalstatesit is being.Conceivedas dissociated I-feeling, In but as the innertone of thesestatesit renders moresubjective. themrelatively whollyindefnite, it as undeniable is yetwhollyexhausted in thesestaces. Kant's transcendental otherwords, apperception a he draw between would distinction act is verynearly of thisstatus, as puresubjective pure exceptthat and thought. sensibility

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whichtendsto make whatever Advaita objectit belongsto incandescent. adds that it is onlytheunreflective not this, Vedinta, denying stageofintroas genuine, is always reflective. (which however, which, Introspection spection stands at this is siksin, as fused consciousness) stage undistinguishedly pure with muchlikefire in a red-hot mental ironball. Not thatit is imstates, there. is a vagueword. WhattheAdvaita thinkers plicity present "Implicit" is thatit in its fullcharacter is present, meant though undistinguished, ie., confusion. To reflective mental states as objects. are presented Relative introspection, to extra-mental these mental states be called butthe objects, may subjective, to these relative is at more least itself, states, introspection subjective. Advaim adds that behindthisintrospection that thereis no further introspection holdit as an object.Thiswouldinvolve a regressru ad infinitum, and might of fact, thereis no introspection of introspection. Hence also, as a matter as suchis subjective intheproper sense oftheterm. introspection Between Kant and AdvaitaVedintathere is a difference. Kant did not takepureconsciousness and its (reason)-the transcendental apperception itself real Pure various he (existent). consciousness, held,is by forms--as as it real by itself when will stands as theoretical realized. only Otherwise, a is it itself transcendental "transcenonly presupposition, (cognitive), by ideal." The attitude of Advaita Vedintais different. If an essence dentally is reflectively a reality as demanding of it is distinguished distinguished, its own. True,thereality we started withis Nature, yet,sinceit is distinfrom outofthisNature, thereality Nature cannot be that itdemands guished is a transcendent Kant, too, couldnot again. What is demanded reality. in his metaphysics of morals, where, denyit and actually spokein itsfavor it was all a The Advaita wonder would Vedintin however, will-approach. why thecognitive to theover-natural be banned. should approach (jifzna-mrarga) is equally there thepossibility andpure ofpurecognition, Likepurewilling, is first to and, second,refers cognition self-illuminating, freely object-inas not Natureand notthispure cognition is wholly which, general, itself, indefinite (anirvacya). Once this indefinite object-in-general (aj/fana)is it is of no valueto admit another admitted, viz.,Nature, independent object, is notmerely which to be bracketed, as reducible intelbut, to,i.e.,as wholly in terms this is who for would one of, ligible object-in-general, nothing realize purecognition. As a transcendental Advaita to be Vedintahas a merit philosophy, rarely
"Reflection alone posits it as distinct introspection.

covered by nescience (aj~ina);21

and whereverthere is nesciencethereis

OF INDIA AND THE WEST PHILOSOPHIES CLASSICAL

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werefully aware in theWest. TheseVedintins in anysimilar found system

A anddemand or essence). between of thedistinction (ideality actuality it to realize to be,butnotyetis. Philosophers is what demand try ought in other in themeantime, order. ofa higher as an actuality, But, though wedded todifferent orders of remain until haverealized words it,they they of their existence solid the This is natural life, as-yet-unavoided actuality. to.This, called anevil, must besubmitted reality" which, "provisional though wasasto nothing come it. Thatultimately has nottranscended it would itfrom the this or learn couldeither to these sured infer Vedintins; they a manandinsuch ithastobeput Butinthe meantime upwith, scriptures. be notmerely realization march to thefinal not nerthat theonward may if in this done best be can accelerated. This probutpositively hampered These andconduct. of correct therules lifewe observe visional cognition the shadows also of contain are notmere rules they working hypotheses; that assumes the ultimate the forms are ultimate (and reality reality. They and ofcognition oftheempirical in thecontext andfalsely) reality freely stations arevarious There as thecontexts Theserules conduct. vary. vary Thisis theIndian to them. various rules andtherefore in life appropriate its duties ofstation and theory (adhikara).
mustbe made the bestuse of wiselyso long as one (vybvahsarika-sattd),

IV
mentioned The third on page23 is outof thetangle wayof coming atthe as subjective time. andobjective the demands same totreat (essences) isoftwo ofdualism andthe other kinds: oneisthe This solution, way again, is transcendental, is a dualism So longas philosophy thewayofmonism. absolutes. twoindependent view.It is difficult toaccept difficult Yet,Des-

of pre-established theingenious andLeibniz offered harmony, theory Simthe The subject relation understood and onlyteleologically." khya Yoga
This idea of the thatthe subject it in appropriate mayexperience ways.24 in theobject.Indeed, was notimplanted bythesubject subject's experience
reason and the thing-in-itself, may also be includedin thisgroup. "Kant, withhis subjective "M. Hiriyanna,Outlinesof Indian Philosophy, pp. 273, 274, 281; A Source Book in Indian Kiriki LVII. Phbilosophy--Simkbya is determined his deeds in by the desertof the subject acquired through 24Theappropriateness Thisis an important of karma. life. theprevious of aspectof theIndiantheory cycle

and Yoga in India were transcendental cartesin the West and Sidrikhya at painsto relatetheir twoabsolutes were the Where Cartesians dualists." to them, influence (purusa) and the object(pradhina) do not,according

this rich world inorder into anddevelops thelatter moves eachother; only

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KALIDAS BHATTACHARYYA

theobject couldhave no idea until it had developed intobuddhi(roughly, whatWestern call mind). The idea as eventhe nisusof the philosophers as theguiding is to be likened to one thatserves very primary development of biological It is thetelosof a movement, movements. wholly principle in that neither nor from outside consciously present spontaneous, coming which moves. So much for whether thequestion thetwoabsolutes-subject and objectinfluence each otheror not. S~ikhya and Yoga recognized another relation between them." When the absoluteobject-the primalstuff (praa relation beintobuddhi, there of identity dhina)-has developed appears tween thisnew form and puresubjectivity. that his mind is feels Everyone the At of such himself, subject. lowerstagesalso thereis the appearance The subject, on theone hand, and thesenses and thebody, on the identity. witheachother.Sitikhya and Yoga, and also Adother, appearidentified vaitaVedinta, thisidentification as a falseappearance. The subregarded areentirely andtheobject oneis never an object butalways jective disparate: the self-illuminating but always whiletheother is nevera subject subject, or to be revealed, could revealed, by (and also to) thissubject.Hencethere never be a real identification of thetwo. Whatever be the defects of thisphilosophy of Sitzhkhya and Yoga, it is not lessintelligible thanthephilosophies from Descartes to Leibniz.These in theWest wereequallyat painsto relatethought to extenphilosophers all sorts for thispurpose. sionanddevised ofhypotheses The Sizikhya-Yoga it can claiman additional is notmerely account another suchhypothesis: merit in thatit refers and itself to concrete by means experience elucidates of clearanalogies. Prior there to Descartes, was notmuchof subjectivity in theWest. This is whytheproblem in thepresent form did notgenerally arisein pre-Carthat was another earlier there tesian Europe.Butevenin those days problem was equallydifficult between essences It concerned of solution. therelation was alsoa majorprobandNature.Fundamentally, this (ideas= idealities) lem forthe pre-Kantians, These latter only Kant,and thepost-Kantians. and Naturewiththatbetween essence confounded the distinction between andobject.'" puresubjectivity
'2M. Hiriyanna, Outlinesof IndianPhilosophy, pp. 293, 294; A Source Bookof IndianPhilosophyXX. KarikA SJimkhya
"'Descartes was probably the frst confounder. It is through his influence that the word "idea" came to mean subjectivity.

CLASSICAL PHILOSOPHIES OF INDIA AND THE WEST V

29

If in Spinoza's theattributes of thought and extension do belong system to Substance, thiswouldbe a form But can they so of inclusive monism. belong? Pureconsciousness (thought)as neveran object(extension)and (thought) excludeeach object (extension) as neverpure consciousness entities could belongto a third other. Suchmutually exclusive if, entity and onlyif,they had something in common, were there words, if,in other classunder which some higher couldbe subsumed. But it is doubtful they a higher ifpureconsciousness andobject serious stand under and class, a more that in is commost of for believe this point those-Spinoza, example--who have heldat thesametimethatthese also belongto it as atmoncharacter tributes or, as some of them hold,as parts. Thereis definite antagonism, is impossible. Whatever the two,and so their so far,between unity unity a semblance. tobe is only there appears of theSirikhya, Hegel in theWest andphilosophers Yoga, and Advaita Vedinta schoolsin India wereawareof thisantagonism. But,whilethis all unity of pureconsciousness and objectas had led theIndiansto dismiss a A savior of contradictories. illusory, proclaimed unity Hegel,undaunted, hisdays in somequarters), forabouthalfa century (and stillso considered thedays ofhisdialectic. arenowover, particularly either Otherphilosophers of the monistic groupnow to be considered a condescendtheantagonism todisprove orstruggled itorprescribed ignored thatborders Leibnizwas one who on nihilism. ing indifference dangerously ofknowlwas guilty ofignoring involved.Withhisconcept theantagonism a as creative he he could over the act, believed edge silently pass antagonism. But thiswas deliberate if Spinozais over-simplification. Schelling--and, in a certain understood as a method of he, too-proposedindifference way, theopposition. But as thisindifference is neither consciousness transcending a blank, nor objectit is hardly morethana blank. If notexactly it is at
rFor Bhiskar2, see Yogendranach Tarka-Vedinta-Tirtha, the Absolute, in Our Heritage I. 2. The World as a Real Modification of

and Rimrnuja.2

In section IV we have considered of transcendental thedualistic systems were in There both India and theWest, however, philosophy. philosophers, who understood as monistically Withall their essences subjective-objective. and Schelling also to thisgroup, differences, Spinozaand Hegel belonged and extension do not in a way; and if in Spinoza of thought the attributes In India,we find he too falls in line withSchelling. belongto Substance of schools the of Bhiskara monists Vedintins in the 8aivas and such many

30

KALIDASBHATTACHARYYA

leastthequintessence in India TheMidhyamika of indefiniteness. Buddhists as Sinyavida. known and Chinaheldthis view. Theirviewis technically there is no opposition. to showthat Others, Riminuja however, struggled But is self-illuninating. to is one of them.Consciousness, him, according was notdethisself-illumination he so carefully defined thatconsciousness withthefactthata pastconsciousfrom barred beingan object. He started or inferred is onlyremembered man'sconsciousness nessof mineor another ofeternal its have not could andheldthatevenAdvaita as an object, theory whether as an known were this consciousness unless object, pureconsciousness is to the or of inference. of introspection self-illuminating According him, to itsown locus.28(The revealed stands of itsexistence thatwhichbyvirtue is theself.) locusofcognition the antagonism could overcome only becausehis notionof Riminuja was conveniently self-illumination naive. He hardlywent beyondwhat what we earliercalled "primitive called "enjoyment," Alexander beyond of the Nyiya-Vaisesika of mentalstates."Like the thinkers self-evidence thanmenother there is no consciousness-in-general that he assumed school, seif-illumias states themselves these he took unlike andyet, tal states, them, is thatreflective in histheory error introspection nating.The fundamental of mentalstates.Once self-evidence fromprimitive was not distinguished in at Vedintins it is distinguished, claimed, it, as the Advaira positsitself the mentalstates and, once it is so posited, least problematic autonomy; notthemselves cannotbutbe takenas objects, self-illuminating. andobiect, between contradiction to deny another We find subject attempt ofBhiskara.Their inthephilosophy and explicitly in Cartesianism in a way, or not,it is a thereis a contradiction whether idea was that, theoretically like the While the related. stand the do factthat two AdvaitaVedintins, as an illufact this so-called therefore would ancient in Eleatics reject days, there that therefore hold other the on and while hand, sion, Hegel would, and theCartesians and thefact, itself thecontradiction is no clashbetween How farthese as a divine thisstrange Bhiskara"putup with unity mystery. of God on howfartheinfinite werejustified capacity depends philosophers out to work be used he could in other could be stretched, words, whether, evencontradictions. theSaivasanalyzed Thewayinwhich wasmore TheSaiva30 claim rational. of consciousa a new revealed aspect, phase, self-transcending knowledge Meintimes in modern and which Kant and Brentano, Husserl, ness, Hegel,
"A 388. pp. 387, "Bhiskara tried, of course, to substantiate his thesislogically. "3We mean those !aivas who were monists of the type we are here considering. Outlinesof Indian Philosophy, SourceBookin IndianPhilosophy, pp. 546, 547; M. Hiriyanna,

CI.ASSICAL PHILOSOPHIES OF INDIA AND THE WEST

31

have profitably if onlyto render their ong,and Royce, might incorporated theories more The analysis is as follows: plausible. Thereis no knowledge of speech(vik), gross thatis notof someform or subtle,31 we areaware and speech where is theonly(cognitive)situation which ofthesubjective ofthat we areawareequally In speech, proper. again, as a is spokenof, thatwhichis meant,and thismeaningis apprehended whichwas alfunction of speechitself, not as something as its intention, forevery is speech.Speech, now,hasvarious ready known, knowledge stages of purirty--through its accompanivariousstagesit dissociates itself from itself etc.--andat each higher viz.,sounds, ments, images, stageit reveals as theessence of thelower. Yet, at every the highest one, stage, including its self-transcendence, the intention, continues. the meaning, The subtlest theinevitathesubjective has,therefore, undoubtedly speech, parexcellence, which is objectivity ble self-transcendence at thesubtlest. If Saivism is an intelligible to understand transcendental demands attempt as monistically there is another which, though subjective-objective, attempt moreintelligible. It is to take line altogether, is probably along a different as will Kantdid thisin thesecond thesubjective Critique," unambiguously In IndiatheMimirhsakas andFichte itintosystematic metaphysics. developed view. Withthem, of this thetranscendental demands aretheonly champions haveonlyto be madereal. As are onlyprinciples of work, which principles is thatNature are necessary theseprinciples (a priori),theironlyimport to them" them. The to mustbe reorganized phrase"according according are not real does not implythattheysubsist already They Platonically. lies in beingworked to be known.Theironlystatus out,and (bhbtavastu) areworked haveno being.Thatwe haveto reorganize before outthey they thatthere does not also presuppose to theseprinciples Natureaccording status of which Thevery a Nature tobe reorganized. wasalready next happens It is only which is to be so reorganized. Nature means relevant, pragmatically sometowill. (The Mimirisakas thaninstrumental is no more that cognition theprinciples of will.) Neither is even a form timesheld thatcognition nor what is called "given Nature" can subsistalone. What so subsists whichis subjective-objective. is thereorganized Nature, to Ameridoctrine similar As we havealready said,this is,in fundamentals, The Mimirhsakas held can pragmatism, but withone seriousdifference. to will. Onemayprovisionalis onlyultimately instrumental that knowledge interested in cognition at thisinstrumental and,remaining ly blink charaicer
5"The corresponding Western doctrine is chat all knowledge is judment. The merit of the gaiva theory is that speech is a simpler and more comprehensible concept than judgment (thought). "3Wich Kanc, of course, will was an act of withdrawl. So, he is out of the picture in this section.

32

KALIDASBHATTACHARYYA

as such,developcognitive But ultimately it will and metaphysics. science haveto be givenup,or theentire is translated into the to be study cognitive the exact this of will. in The Mimiihsi is, language opposition respect, of of will is really ethics Metaphysics positeof thatof AdvaitaVed-inta. is to be surrendered at bottom, Vedintathis ethics and forAdvaita conduct a synthesis of the forcognitive finally attempted RUiminuja metaphysics. butitwasas naiveas hisother two, attempts. All the Indianthinkers who wereforunderstanding the transcendental as monistically the of idendemands subjective-objective preached principle as we or much in form some and, other,33 tity-in-difference (bhedabheda) tenable whether ornot. at length in theWest,discussed itwas logically find thatoncetheprinciple of identity-inMuchas in theWest,again,we find was admitted fromthe transcendental difference pointof viewit cameto evenempirical to unlock usedas a master-key be tooeasily mysteries. VI of philosophy, in bothIndiaand theWest,we comeupon In thehistory a to getoutof made of philosophers stillanother by goodnumber attempt on page 23. It is deliberately to denythetranscenthetanglementioned two forms. has assumed of the demands.This attempt dentalcharacter thedesome have deniedonly the transcendental character but admitted mands(at least manyof these) inevitably as actualsthatcan be arrived theoughtat through neither thesimple ofinference. Theyrecognize process intuition. noranykindof transcendental to-becharacter of thesedemands a matter ofinference. of theso-called over-natural is,forthem, Metaphysics them and treat Thereare others, altogether again,who denythedemands as either or linguistic commonly though accepted, postulates only crude, to science and common or merely instrumental forms, life--inanycase,not as well as philosof anymetaphysical logicalpositivists, import.Modern one and thepragmatists of America--and of the schoolof Analysis ophers to thelatter add Locke,Berkeley, Hume,Mill,and Comte--belong might theonlyphiloswereprobably the earlyBuddhists group. AmongIndians, Either who might be classedwiththem. thedemands dismissed ophers they later as moonshine, or some of them, Buddhists included, many regarded themas whollyindefinite and therefore to philosophy and,for unamenable the thatmatter, Some Carvikas and to anyserious philosophers discipline. to theextreme thislineof thinking calledVaitandins carried point.All of
"RIminuia, ic is true, openly abjured bhedibbeds, but when he did this he had in mind the in spite of difference bhedjibbeda of the Mimizrisakas. He admitted substanciveaiffecciveunity (viis.ta) (bbeda).

OF INDIA AND THE WEST PHILOSOPHIES CLASSICAL

33

subtlearguments it shouldbe noted, offered them, staggeringly however, and analyses. to find one who might beit is difficult Western In classical philosophy weremany.All mentioned above. Butin Indiathere group longto thefirst the Vedintinsof the Midhva and Riminuja thinkers, Nyiya-Vaisesika so longas they andtheMimirisiphilosophers developed provisionschools," in this al cognitive also,as distinguished group.Siraikhya belong philosophy that itstaskwastoargue to theover-natural from Yoga,proclaimed tattvasr." as typical ofthisgroup. theNyiya-Vaiiesika later We consider philosopher calledphenomenological, to thetranscendental (sometimes Corresponding on scripin theWest,we had in Indiareliance method sometimes intuitive) did or sources of similar But tures Nyiya-Vaisesika authority. notrelypriwereconcerned. It truths evenwhensupersensuous on suchsources marily and on thebasisof chastened out itscase strictly always perception argued itself of justifying inference. It wentevento theextent authority thorough and inferThroughthesemethods---perception by meansof inference."8 andmetaphysics, a systematic ofknowledge ence-it developed every theory all goodempiricism, As in touch. was which free from the of mystic point it was held thateverything is an objectin thesenseof beingrevealable by its in thesamesense--it is equally in is also an object turn, which, cognition, as purely as was recognized revealed by introspection. Nothing subjective, standsin a thatknowledge It was admitted, however, self-illuminating. of whichit was revealed to the content by it, on account uniquerelation calledsubjective, andthething revealed an object.Hencepramina, the(cogan objectamong of discovery, was regarded as equally nitional)instrument are which are things, onlyusedin a way,muchas weights, objects, though was used as measures forweighing otherthings.This general standpoint intoelaborate of perception and (material)inference, theories developed inchrational. Some of the details of whichwereevery theoverwhelming thatmight be edifying to modern Western thinkers are thetheories details of indeterminate (nirvikalpa) and determinate (savikalpa) perception, whichroughly to the modern of acquaintance notions and percorrespond thetheories of induction and causation, and theanalysis ceptual judgment,3 of language.This analysis of languageand similar analyses, though along
solutionsof this problemraised on page 23 are not mutuallyexclusive. The "3The different schools of philosophy overlap,unless,of course,one solutionis the corresponding may therefore of another. exact opposite & Publishing Chakravarti, ed.,Y'tidiPpik (Calcutza: Metropolitan Printing 3SCf. Pulinbehari verses nos. I a.rdI5. HouseLtd.,1938), opening and thetaivas. withthe a~tude of theVedintins 'sThiswasin sharpcontrast thatit is perception inwould generally cauliL judgmental "Indian thinkers insisting perception, thantheconverse. volving thought, rather

34

KALIDAS BHATTACHARYYA

and theGrammarian other lines,by theMim~msithinkers philosophers38 as modern semantics as self-complete in theWest. were is equally andsolid, and well-knit, thorough, metaphysics and inference. All entities of the worldNyiya-Vai.esika through perception developed classified under several with internal andexternal-were theconcategories, as suchareonlynominal these that stant however, categories groups, warning, andsomenotevenempirical universals. Entities transcendent, nothing being areeither substances oftheworld or motion (dravya),or attributes universals or inherence final or or (g.ua), (karma), (sdmimnya), unique(samavdya), ness (vilesa), or negation(abhiva)." Each of theseconcepts wasthen as thoroughly as conceivable, and all metaphysical were analyzed questions with allowed tocrop upandbe dealt accordingly. VII Almost all problems--ethical, and metaphysical, religious, psychological, were tackled in classical Western and logical-which philosophy, many morethatare dealtwithin themodern of reduction West,viz.,positivistic thestudy of semantics, were etc., complex concepts, phenomenological study, treated as thoroughly as possible in classicalIndia. True,someof theimof Western did not even strike the Indians. portant problems philosophy of formal Theseare theproblems of all phenomlogic,thedetailed study or a priori thatare thoseidealities enological presuppositions, particularly with formallogic,and the philosophical that have connected problems was this modern of science. But the out of quitenadevelopment emerged in value Indian interested were tural. Classical philosophers superbly (puruin whatthey considered thehighest value,viz.,freedom srtha).,particularly those that from thisinterest. (moksa),anddiscussed only emerged problems diThis explains whyformal logicand the transcendental presuppositions withit wereexcluded.In Indianphilosophy we seldom connected rectly of apriority and its implications. Theirplacewas ocmeetwiththenotion were those of of theapriorities verdicts Naturally scriptures. only cupiedby were inscriptures. which found considered is concerned, is scarcely orpositivistic there So faras theempirical outlook betweenIndian and Westernphilosophies, difference except any serious in India. Indians thatmodern and its implications wereunknown science basedon inferior to the modern, had theirown science, though evidently different altogether. postulates
"'8 e may add Indian rhetoricians. '"S. Bhaduri, Studies in Nyiya-Vaiiieka stitute, 1947). Metaphysics (Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research In-

CLASSICAL PHILOSOPHIES OF INDIA AND THE WEST

35

of theWest were difference in approach.The transcendental philosophers first discovered and all seer-speakers. manner, in whatever apriorities They, In India,on the or unsystematically. thenexpressed them, systematically a learner, intent on was thatof a hearer, attitude other hand,thedominant or them discovered discovered but not havingyet discovering apriorities, themfully.This is whythey relied so muchon scriptures. Evento acquire a a right had to suchthat to listen to scriptures first they undergo training wouldnotbe distorted, thetruths one might to be discovered and,also,that This listening, called not submitblindly or be hypnotized. technically transcendental as alreadyconstituting was understood intuition, fravana, was notconsidered Buteventhis in themaking. enough.The hearer though thetruths, was required to go on continuously halfrealized, substantiating by means of arguments pro and con. (This secondprocesswas called manana.) But thiswas again to be followed viz., up by a third process, was to serve a double which callednididhyisana, thatof deepconcentration, if the philosopher-hearer's subconscious doubts, purpose.It was to dissipate was of concentration a sustained and,second, deepening anywerestillleft, and ultimately the considered deeperimplications capable of disclosing knownas jinanaThis last process, whole system of relevant apriorities. at andKantdeveloped was a process Platohinted to a degree which scidhana, in all seriousness treated and which is in modern times byphenomenologists, This logic of the transcendental and vicariously by manyexistentialists. and all Indiantranscenwas elaborated in detailby the Yoga of Patafijali, and will unlessthey had in themeantime dentalists, swungoverto feeling this method. adopted Yoga philosophies,4o practically of transcendental truths also self-demonstrative: The discovery was,thus, a system own. Indian oftheir evinced theinner dialectic ofthese apriorities and valid thatthislogicwas esoteric wereconscious, however, philosophers them to turned for the initiated. When, therefore, they expressing only never shrank from common they through logic. True, publicdemonstration some of theIndianthinkers, thatthesuperforexample, insisted Sazhkara,

we find a basic Whenwe consider transcendental however, philosophy,

us of Kantand cannot sensuous be proved reminding by ordinary logic, at added that Hegel. Butthey logicmay leastbe corroborative empirical truths even supersensuous (anagrahakatarka) bywayof halfestablishing views. andrefuting contrary reliance on testimony for this andthat Except by (Iabda-pram~na), only
until the end of msnans,had so swungover thoroughrationalists 'Many Indian philosophers, at the last stage. had done that,and Riminula partially. Patauijali openlysuggested it as an alternative. Nyiya-Vsiesi.ka

36

KALIDAS BHATTACHARYYA

andcycles ofbirth, ifsubstantiable, addtothefund ofWestern these, may much exbe ignored without and,ifunsubstantiable, loss, may philosophy, for ethical inIndia. cept speculations neednotbe one-way. The old Indian The traffic, however, philosophy enriched into maybe equally by (1) formal logic,(2) itsdevelopment thetranscendental ofa wholesystem of idealities, and (3) science, study materials either ofscience. Theintroduction ofnewer (4) philosophy way meansnewer clashes here and and there outlooks, inevitably mayoccur there. liesprecisely in Buttruth has to be faced, in philosophy andskill proper adjustment. Rational is never local. Butitmay be that philosophy peoples particular haveparticular bents ofmind, for ofphilosparticular types specific likings theproduct ofage-long bya maybe rational, ophy.Thisliking thinking also historical circumbe determined itmay irrational, particular people; by stances. even thedifferent infundaIt may be that ofphilosophy are, types alternative from them and choice the mentals, among genuine possibilities, be is therefore local butmerely notirrational existential. may Philosophy in anyofthese senses. It is doubtful, this of ifeven from however, point isa philosophy view there Indian: hasthrough India millenniums specifically almost all types in which thehisTheonly ofphilosophy. developed point Indian in sharp with torical stand thescience-inspired philosophies contrast is (erroneously) of themodem therefore, rWest, andwhich, philosophies that their is taken as thedistinctive Indian of thinkers, philosophies genius
But was thisnot also the characteristic were dominantly anthropocentric. with of course, the untilthe days of Descartes, of Westernphilosophies

transcendental is hardly there difference between the thinkers, anyserious attitudes in classical in the India,on theone hand,and those philosophical in Indiaalmost as many West,on theother.As in theWest,we find types ofphilosophy as areconceivable. If Indians hadspoken ofthelaw ofkarma

last pointto note is that whichever way philosophy proceeds--anthropohas equallyto facetheprobor not--eachcomplete centrically philosophy and in whichever order mostappropriate lemsof manand existence, proves of truth. productive

doubtful of the of the halfmythical exception philosophy pre-Sophistic wasanexception In India, there inNyiya-VaiSesika. Greek world? The too,