Venezuela Advantage Bidirectional File

1AC

US-Venezuelan Relations
Advantage # __ is US-Venezuela Ties are low because US leads-from-behind. That vacuum causes laundering and Iran prolif. Kickstarting ties key. Noriega 12
Roger F. Noriega was ambassador to the Organization of American States from 2001-2003 and assistant secretary of state from 2003-2005. He is a visiting fellow at the American Enterprise Institute After Chvez, the Narcostate April 11th http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/04/11/after_chavez_the_narcostate?page=0,0

Venezuelan leader Hugo Chvez has tried for 10 months to conceal the fact that he is losing his bout with cancer, determined to appear in command of his revolutionary regime and the nation's future. This past Holy Week, however,
television cameras captured him pleading for his life before a crucifix in his hometown church, his mother looking on without the slightest glint of hope on her face. Chvez's raw emotion startled his inner circle and led some to question his mental health. As a result, according to my sources inside the presidential palace, Minister of Defense Gen. Henry Rangel Silva has developed a plan to impose martial law if Chvez's deteriorating condition causes any hint of instability. Pretty dramatic stuff. So why isn't anyone outside Venezuela paying attention? Some cynics in that country still believe Chvez is hyping his illness for political advantage, while his most fervent followers expect him to make a miraculous recovery. The democratic opposition is cautiously preparing for a competitive presidential election set for Oct. 7 -- against Chvez or a substitute. And policymakers in Washington and most regional capitals are slumbering on the sidelines. In my estimation, the

approaching death of the Venezuelan caudillo could put the country on the path toward a political and social meltdown. The military cadre installed by Chvez in January already is behaving like a de facto regime determined to hold onto power at all costs. And Havana, Tehran, Moscow, and Beijing are moving to protect their interests. If U.S. President Barack Obama were to show some energetic engagement
slide, reverse Chvismo's as Chvez fades,

he could begin to put the brakes on

Venezuela's

destructive agenda, and reclaim a role for the United States in its own

neighborhood. But if he fails to act, there will be hell to pay. Sources close to Chvez's medical team tell me that for
months, his doctors have been doing little more than treating symptoms, trying to stabilize their workaholic patient long enough to administer last-ditch chemo and radiation therapies. In that moment of Chvez's very public prayer for a miracle, he set aside his obsession with routing his opposition or engineering a succession of power to hardline loyalists. Perhaps he knows that his lieutenants and foreign allies are behaving as if he were already dead -- consolidating power, fashioning a "revolutionary junta," and plotting repressive measures. One of them is longtime Chvista operator and military man Diosdado Cabello, who was installed by Chvez to lead the ruling party as well as the National Assembly in January. Cabello's appointment was meant to reassure a powerful cadre of narcomilitares -- Gen. Rangel Silva, Army Gen. Cliver Alcal, retired intelligence chief Gen. Hugo Carvajal, and half a dozen other senior officers who have been branded drug "kingpins" by the U.S. government. These ruthless men will never surrender power and the impunity that goes with it -- and they have no illusions that elections will confer "legitimacy" on a Venezuelan narco-state, relying instead on billions of dollars in ill-gotten gain and tens of thousands of soldiers under their command. Chavismo's civilian leadership -- including Foreign Minister Nicols Maduro, Vice President Elas Jaua, and the president's brother, Adn Chvez, the governor of the Chvez family's home state of Barinas -- are eager to vindicate their movement's ideological agenda at the polls this fall. Maduro is extraordinarily loyal to the president, and is considered by Venezuelan political observers as the most viable substitute on the ballot. Above all, these men crave political power and will jockey to make themselves indispensable to the military leaders who are calling the shots today. Cuba's Fidel and Ral Castro are desperate to preserve the life-blood of Venezuelan oil that sustains their bankrupt regime. According to a source who was briefed on conversations in Cuba, Ral has counseled Chvez to prepare to pass power to a "revolutionary junta"; Venezuelans who are suspicious of the Castros expect them to pack the junta with men loyal to Havana. Cabello does not trust the Castros, but with thousands of Cuban intelligence officers and triggermen on the ground in Venezuela, the Castro brothers are a force to be reckoned with. The Chinese have provided more than $20 billion in quickie loans to Chvez in the last 18 months, which are to be repaid by oil at well below the market price. Most of these funds were paid into Chvez's slush funds before the Chinese knew of his terminal condition. Another $4 billion is being negotiated now, but my sources in the Venezuelan Foreign Ministry say the Chinese are demanding new guarantees. Beijing also is angling to ensure that any post-Chvez government will honor its sweetheart deals. However, these predatory contracts are being scrutinized by leading opposition members of the National Assembly. Iran

is more dependent than ever on its banks and other ventures in Venezuela as a means to launder billions in funds to evade tightening international financial sanctions. Companies associated with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Qods Force, and illicit nuclear and ballistic missile programs have invested millions in infrastructure in shadowy facilities

throughout Venezuela. Tehran will struggle to keep its beachhead near U.S. soil, which is vital to its survival strategy in the critical
months ahead. Russia is considering making $1-2 billion in payments in the weeks ahead to lock in natural gas and oil deals signed with Chvez. Some in Moscow, however, are weary of the Venezuelan shakedown, particularly because they know that Chvez's days are numbered. Russian firms are deciding now whether to double down on the Chvez regime, which has been a reliable customer of more than $13 billion in Russian arms, or wait to see if a successor government will honor its agreements in the oil and gas sector. The Soviet-style succession that corrupt Chavistas and their Cuban handlers are trying to impose on the Venezuelan people is anything but a done deal. There is room and time for friends of democracy to play a constructive role. Cabello and company, my sources tell me, are far more likely to resort to unconstitutional measures and repression if they can count on support from Moscow and Beijing. The Chavistas intend to promise continued cheap oil and sweetheart contracts to leverage this support. Discreet U.S. diplomacy -- working in concert with like-minded allies -- can help scuttle these plans. The Chinese and Russians may not be eager to defend yet another violent pariah regime, and Washington should rally Latin American leaders to draw the line against a Syria scenario in the Western Hemisphere. At the heart of the Chavista strategy is a narco-state, led by men with well-documented ties to narco-trafficking. The White House should instruct U.S. law enforcement agencies to smash the foundations of this regime. One Venezuelan general or corrupt judge in a witness box in a U.S. federal courthouse will strike the regime at the very top and destroy any illusion of legitimacy or survivability. U.S. intelligence agencies

have been virtually blind to the Iranian presence in Venezuela. If they were instructed to kick over the rocks to see what is crawling underneath, I am convinced that they would discover a grave and growing threat against the security of the United States and its allies in the region. Such evidence will help motivate Venezuela's neighbors to take a stand against an even more unaccountable regime taking shape in Caracas. Venezuela's military is not a monolith, and Chvez has
undermined his own succession strategy by giving the narco-generals such visible and operational roles. The fact that the narco-generals will be more willing to resort to unconstitutional measures and repression to keep power and carry the "narco" label sets them apart from the rankand-file soldiers and institutionalist generals. The United States military still carries a lot of weight with these men. A simple admonition to respect their constitution and serve their people may split the bulk of the force away from the narcos and deny them the means to impose their will. (Institutionalist generals may react in a similar way to news that Iran is conducting secret operations on Venezuelan territory that are both unconstitutional and a dangerous provocation.) There

is much the United States and the international community can do without interfering in Venezuela's internal politics. Although the leaders of the democratic opposition are
determined to keep their distance from Washington, they must at least show the flag in the United States and other key countries to elicit the solidarity they deserve. Moreover, anyone who thinks the opposition can take on Cuba, China, Russia, Iran, drug traffickers, and Hezbollah without international backing is just not thinking straight. Unfortunately, the career U.S. diplomats

in Washington responsible for Venezuela have spent the last two years downplaying the mess there and the three years before that neglecting it altogether. So if there is any hope for U.S. leadership, it will require the attention of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton or President Obama. Alas, in our own neighborhood, " leading from behind" is not an option .

Nows a key time for the kick start US engagement can break Venezuelan-Iran nexus. Noreiga 13
Roger F. Noriega was ambassador to the Organization of American States from 2001-2003 and assistant secretary of state from 2003-2005. He is a visiting fellow at the American Enterprise Institute Washington Times March 07, 2013 http://www.aei.org/article/foreign-anddefense-policy/regional/latin-america/igniting-the-post-chavez-explosion/

The next few days and weeks stand as a signal moment for the United States to re-seize its traditional leadership role in the Americas on behalf of democratic and free-market development. An abdication of that leadership would mean the continuation of a lawless Venezuelan government in cahoots with Cuba, Iran and drug traffickers to the detriment of all decent people in the region

Plan kick-starts ties no embargo, more refineries, and better Venezuelan transit routes. Benjamin-Alvarado 10
Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado, PhD of Political Science, University of Nebraska, 2010, Cubas Energy Future: Strategic Approaches to Cooperation, a Brookings Publication obtained as an ebook through MSU Electronic Resources page 122

U.S. cooperation with Cuba in energy just may create an opportunity for the United States to improve its relations with Venezuela, if it can demonstrate that it can serve as a partner (or at a minimum, a supporter) of the Petrocaribe energy consortium. The United States could provide much-needed additional investment capital in the development of upstream, downstream, and logistical resources in Cuba that simultaneously addresses Petrocaribe objectives, diversifies regional refining capacity, and adds storage and transit capabilities while enhancing regional cooperation and integration modalities. This does not mean that the United States has to dismantle the nearly fifty-year-old embargo against Cuba, but the United States will have to make special provisions that create commercial and trade openings for energy development that serve its broad geostrategic and national security goals, as it has in the case of food and medicine sales to Cuba.

Post-Chavez, the US wants to be more active. Improved US-Venezuelan ties would scuttle Iranian prolif efforts. Jones 13
Steve Jones is a professor of history at Southwestern Adventist University. He specializes in American foreign policy and military history. Steve has fifteen years editorial experience in newspapers and magazines and another sixteen as a college professor. He regularly teaches a class in foreign policy. He is the author of The Right Hand Of Command: Use And Disuse Of Military Staffs In The Civil War, and several book chapters and encyclopedia entries on elements of warfare and its relation to foreign policy and social change. Steve received a B.A. in journalism from Northwestern Oklahoma State University in 1988. He earned an M.A.(1990) and Ph.D.(1997) in American history, both from Oklahoma State University. He did post-doctorate work in political science at the University of Texas at Arlington. Does Chavez' Death Mean Better Relations Between U.S. and Venezuela? US Foreign Policy About.com March 7th http://usforeignpolicy.about.com/od/alliesenemies/a/DoesChavez-Death-Mean-Better-Relations-Between-U-s-And-Venezuela.htm

Venezuela And Iran While the U.S. State Department isn't holding its collective breath, it would like to see better relations between the two countries in the post-Chavez era. That would enable the United States to leverage Venezuela against Iran as it continues attempts to prevent Iran from achieving nuclear weapons. Venezuela and Iran became allies during the Chavez' tenure, and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad visited Venezuela in 2012. The two countries signed various trade and financial agreements. The U.S. has deployed an array of sanctions against Iran. Venezuela's help could help strangle resources that support Iran's nuclear program.
According the the State Department, the United States sanctioned Venezuela in 2011 for "delivering at least three cargoes of reformate, a blending component for gasoline, to Iran between December 2010 and March 2011." U.S. and Venezuelan Trade Nevertheless, the United States and Venezuela do carry on bi-lateral trade. The State Department explains that the U.S. is Venezuela's "most important trading partner," with shipments including "machinery, organic chemicals, agricultural products, optical and medical instruments, autos and auto parts."

Iran Prolif causes Mideast nuclear arms race. Results in nuclear war Allison 6
Graham, Prof of Government at Harvard, The Will to Prevent, Fall, Harvard International Law Review, page lexis Meanwhile, Iran is testing the line in the Middle East. On its current trajectory, the Islamic Republic will become a nuclear weapons state before the end of the decade. According to the leadership in Tehran, Iran is exercising its inalienable right to build Iranian enrichment plants and make fuel for its peaceful civilian nuclear power generators. These same facilities, however, can continue enriching uranium to 90 percent U235, which is the ideal core of a nuclear bomb. No one in the international community doubts that Irans hidden objective in building enrichment facilities is to build nuclear bombs. If

Iran crosses its nuclear finish line, a Middle Eastern cascade of new nuclear weapons states could trigger the first multi-party nuclear arms race, far more volatile than the Cold War competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. Given Egypts historic role as the leader of the Arab Middle East, the prospects of it living unarmed alongside a nuclear Persia are very low. The IAEAs reports of clandestine nuclear experiments hint that Cairo may have considered this possibility. Were Saudi Arabia to buy a dozen nuclear warheads that could be mated to the Chinese medium-range ballistic missiles it purchased

secretly in the 1980s, few in the US intelligence community would be surprised. Given Saudi Arabias role as the major financier of Pakistans clandestine nuclear program in the 1980s, it is not out of the question that Riyadh and Islamabad have made secret arrangements for this contingency. Such a multi-party nuclear arms race in the Middle East would be like playing Russian roulettedramatically increasing the likelihood of a regional nuclear war. Other nightmare scenarios for the region include an accidental or unauthorized nuclear launch from Iran, theft of nuclear warheads from an unstable regime in Tehran, and possible Israeli preemption against Irans nuclear facilities, which Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert has implied, threatening, Under no
circumstances, and at no point, can Israel allow anyone with these kinds of malicious designs against us to have control of weapons of destruction that can threaten our existence.

Iranian-sponsored attack will hit US soil. Iran-Venzuelan ties key. Noriega 12

Roger F. Noriega was ambassador to the Organization of American States from 2001-2003 and assistant secretary of state from 2003-2005. He is a visiting fellow at the American Enterprise Institute Testimony before the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Iran's influence and activity in Latin America February 16, 2012 http://67.208.89.102/speech/foreign-and-defense-policy/regional/latin-america/iransinfluence-and-activity-in-latin-america/ Since you announced your inquiry, the

Director of National Intelligence, James R.Clapper, testified earlier this month that Iranian officials at the highest levels are now more willing to conduct an attack in the United States. General Clapper also reported that Irans so-called supreme leader Ali Khamenei was probably aware of the bizarre plot discovered last October to conspire with supposed Mexican drug cartel leaders to commit a terrorist bombing in the heart of our Nations capital. Only because American law enforcement officials were willing to set aside conventional wisdom about how and where Iran would wage war against us were they able to thwart that attack. Iranian officials have made no secret of the regimes intention to carry its asymmetrical struggle to the streets of the United States and Europe. For example, in a May 2011 speech in Bolivia, Irans Defense Minister
Ahmad Vahidi promised a tough and crushing response to any U.S. offensive against Iran. In the same week in early January that Iran caught the worlds attention by threatening to close the Strait of Hormuz and brandishing shore-to-sea cruise missiles in a 10-day naval exercise, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad announced a five-nation swing through Latin America aimed at advancing its influence and operational capabilities on the U.S. doorstep. To comprehend what Iran is up to, we must set aside conventional wisdom about its ambitions, strategies and tactics and follow the evidence where it leads. General Clappers public statement represents a dramatic break with the skeptics in the foreign policy establishmentincluding too

many U.S. diplomatswho have failed to appreciate the breadth and depth of Irans activities in the Western Hemisphere. The Intelligence Communitys fresh assessment of Irans willingness to wage an attack on our soil leads to the in escapable conclusion that Teherans activities near our homeland constitute a very real threat that can no longer be ignored. The next logical question is, W hat is that
hostile regime doing with the support of its trusted allies very close to our borders? In my capacity as a Visiting Fellow at the A merican Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (AEI) , I am coordinat ing an ongoing effort to answer th at very question. I cooperate with a team of experienced experts who are committed to monitor ing and exposing Irans activities in Latin America i n order to inform the public as well as policy makers who are responsible for protecting our national securit y . To date, we have conducted dozens of interviews with experts from throughout the world and with eyewitnesses on the ground in the region. We also have obtained reams of official V enezue lan and Iranian documents, only a few of which we have published to support our conclusions. Our exhaustive work lead s us to the following conclusions: Venezuelan strongman Hugo Chvez and Iranian leader Mahmoud Ahmadinejad are conspiring to wage an asymmetrical struggle aga inst U.S. secur ity and to abet Irans illicit nuclear program . Their clandestine activities pose a clear and present danger to regional peace and security. Iran has provided Venezuela conventional weapon system s capable of attacking the United States and our allies in the region. Iran has used $30 billion in economic ventures in Venezuela as means to launder money and evade international financial sanctions . Since 2005, Iran has found uranium in Venezuela , Ecuador and other countries in the region and is conducting sus picious mining operations in some uranium - rich areas. Two terrorist networks one home - grown Venezuelan clan and another cultivated by Mohsen Rabbani, a notorious agent of the Qods Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps proselytize, fund - raise, recruit, and train operatives on behalf of Iran and Hezbollah in many countries in the Americas. Hezbollah conspires with drug - trafficking networks in South America as a means of raising resources and sharing tactics. The Venezuelan state - owned airline, Co nviasa, operates regular service from Caracas to Damascus and Teheran providing Iran, Hezbollah, and associated narco - traffickers a surreptitious means to move personnel , weapons, contraband and other materiel . Mr. Chairman, o ur project has shared substantial information about these aforementioned threats with U.S. government officials either directly or through Members of Congress. Quite frankly, too often the attitude we have encountered has been one of skepticism or indifference. To offer jus t two example s , we understand that U.S. executive branch

officials have continued to misinform Members of Congress about the existence of Conviasa flights between Venezuela and the terror states of Syria and Iran. Many months ago, we provided U.S. officia ls the name and contact information of a reliable Venezuelan source with privileged information about those ongoing flights. Unfortunately, th at source was never contacted. A nd Congressional staff members tells us that executive branch officials continue to provide vague or misleading answers to direct questions on this relatively simple subject of whether those Conviasa flights continue . Another example of this official indifference: Almost seven years after the first reports that Iran was seeking ur anium in Venezuela , U.S. officials are still unable or unwilling to state clearly whether Iran is mining uranium in Venezuela notwithstanding documen tation revealed by our project over a year ago regarding Iranian mining in the uranium - rich Roraima Basin i n eastern Venezuela . That U.S. officials do not know whether Iran is supporting its illicit nuclear program with uranium from Venezuela is in comprehensible. That they do not care enough to find out is unacceptable. I believe that the Executive branch beginning in the waning days of the last administration and continuing today has been slow to recognize or respond to this multidimensional threat . At long last, it is time for our national security agencies to get smart and get busy. Mr. Chairman, I a m convinced that Congressional attention, such as this hearing, is essential to encourage Executive branch agencies to act. For example, sanctions last year against Venezuelas state - owned petroleum company for transactions with Iran were the direct resul t of pressure by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, acting in part on information provided by my project. Representative Jeff Duncan (R - SC) has introduced H.R. 3783, the Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere Act of 2012, which will require the Executive branch to report to Congress on Irans activities in a host of areas and to provide a strategy for countering this threat. I believe that such a thorough, Congressionally - mandated review will require the Executive branch to apply additional ne eded intelligence resources to collect on subject matters in Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador and beyond. Once they understand the scope and depth of the problem, I hope for a whole - of - government response to prot ect our security, our interests and our allies a gainst the threat posed by Iran, Hezbollah and their support network in the Americas. Of course, my project at AEI is prepared to cooperate with this policy review by providing the Subcommittee documents and analysis regarding suspicious transactions an d installations operated by Iran in Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia and elsewhere in the region. BACKGROUND AND DISCUSSION Irans

push into the Western Hemisphere is part of a global strategy to break its diplomatic isolation, develop new sources of strategic materials, evade international sanctions and undermine U . S . influence. To these ends, Iran expanded the number of its embassies in the region from six in 2005 to ten in 2010. iv The real game -changer, however, has been the alliance developed between Iran s Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Venezuela s Hugo Chvez. In the last seven years, Iran has begun to take full advantage of its Venezuelan partner . Chvezs petro-diplomacy has paved the way for Ahmadinejad to cultivate partnerships with anti-U.S. regimes in Cuba, Ecuador, Bolivia, Nicaragua et al. Today, a shadowy network of commercial and industrial enterprises in several countries affords Iran a physical presence in relatively close proximity to the United States. Iran is well positioned to use its relationships with these countries to pose a direct threat to U.S. territory, strategic waterways and American allies. Iran also has provided the Venezuelan military with weapon systems that give Chvez unprecedented capabilities to threaten its neighbors and the United States.

That causes the U.S. lash out, precipitating global war Schwartz-Morgan 1
Nicole, Assistant Professor of Politics and Economics at Royal Military College of Canada, 10/10/2001, Wild Globalization and Terrorism, http://www.wfs.org/mmmorgan.htm

The terrorist act can reactivate atavistic defense mechanisms which drive us to gather around clan chieftans. Nationalistic sentiment re-awakens, setting up an implacable frontier which divides "us" from "them," each group solidifying its cohesion in a rising hate/fear of the other group. (Remember Yugoslavia?) To be sure, the allies are trying for the moment to avoid the language of polarization, insisting that "this is not a war," that it is "not against Islam," "civilians will not be targeted." But the word "war" was pronounced, a word heavy with significance which forces the
issue of partisanship. And it must be understood that the sentiment of partisanship, of belonging to the group, is one of the strongest of human emotions. Because

the enemy has been named in the media (Islam), the situation has become emotionally volatile. Another spectacular attack, coming on top of an economic recession could easily radicalize the latent attitudes of the United States, and also of Europe, where racial prejudices are especially close to the surface and ask no more than a pretext to burst out. This is the Sarajevo syndrome: an isolated act of madness becomes the pretext for a war that is just as mad, made of ancestral rancor, measureless ambitions, and armies in search of a war. We should not be fooled by our expressions of good will and charity toward the innocent victims of this or other distant wars. It is our own comfortable circumstances which permit us these

benevolent sentiments. If conditions change so that poverty and famine put the fear of starvation in our guts, the human beast will reappear. And if epidemic becomes a clear and present danger, fear will unleash hatred in the land of the free, flinging missiles indiscriminately toward any supposed havens of the unseen enemy . And on the other side, no matter how profoundly complex and differentiated Islamic nations and tribes may be, they will be forced to behave as one clan by those who see advantage in radicalizing the conflict, whether they be
themselves merchants or terrorists.

2AC Backlines

***A-to No US Leverage/ Maduro wont engage

( ) US has leverage on Iran issues Maduros slim victory proves. Crdenas 13
Jos R. Crdenas is an associate with the consulting firm VisionAmericas, based in Washington, D.C. From 2004-2009, he served in various senior positions in the U.S. Department of State, the National Security Council, and the U.S. Agency for International Development, where he served as Acting Assistant Administrator for Latin America and the Caribbean Venezuelas contested election is an opportunity for U.S. policy Foreign Policy Tuesday, April 16, 2013 http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/04/16/venezuela_s_contested_election_is_an_opportunity_for_us_policy

A surprising thing happened on the way to the coronation of Venezuelan Vice President Nicolas Maduro as the designated heir to chavismo, the movement created by the obstreperous former President Hugo Chvez, who succumbed to
cancer last month. Evidently, a good number of the Venezuelan people decided that bread-and-butter issues like inflation, shortages of basic goods, electricity blackouts, and soaring street crime were more important to them than the circuses Chvez regularly supplied. Challenger Henrique Capriles, who lost the presidential election to Chvez last October by some 11 percentage points,

narrowly missed an

epic upset , losing this time to Chvez's chosen successor by a count of 50.7 to 49.1 percent of the vote. Capriles has rejected the official
tally and demanded a recount of the paper receipts of each Venezuelan vote. "We are not going to recognize the result," he said, "until every vote is counted, one by one." He has also called for peaceful street demonstrations outside the electoral council offices. In welcome developments, both the Obama administration and the Organization of American States have backed the call for an audit of the election results. Maduro's reaction was predictable, rejecting any recount and accusing Capriles of "coup-mongering." He has no doubt calculated that a recount is more dangerous to the continuation of chavismo than trying to tackle Venezuela's myriad post-Chvez challenges while dogged with questions about his legitimacy. Not only must he address declining socio-economic conditions -- including soaring inflation, a bloated public sector, a crippled private one, electricity blackouts, shortages of basic goods, and one of the highest homicide rates in the world -- he must also deal with a reinvigorated opposition while attempting to manage a movement that is splintering under the weight of corruption and competing interests. Already, Maduro has been put on notice that he is under scrutiny from his own side. Diosdado Cabello, the powerful head of the National Assembly and long-seen as a Maduro rival within chavismo, said of the election: "These results require deep self-criticism ... Let's turn over every stone to find our faults, but we cannot put the fatherland or the legacy of our commander [Chvez] in danger." What is clear is that Venezuela's

contested election likely presages a period of political turmoil not seen in the country since 2002, when an extraordinary opportunity for the United States to actively defend its regional interests. No one is advocating that the Obama administration engage in mud-slinging contests with Hugo Chvez wannabes, but neither should we remain silent on matters of principle and U.S. security. For example, the Iranian presence in Venezuela, including the existence of a number of suspicious industrial facilities, and the prodigious use of Venezuelan territory for drug shipments to the United States and Europe have been tolerated for too long without any effective
Chvez was briefly ousted from power. But it also presents

U.S. response . (Several high-ranking associates of the late President Chvez have been designated as "drug kingpins" by the U.S. Treasury
Department. Maduro's

shaky standing today within Venezuela means there is increased leverage for the

United States to hold the government accountable for its threats to regional stability . It is not likely Maduro will be able to withstand the pressure coming not only from the opposition and his own coalition, but from the United States as well. That can come in the form of more designations and indictments of Venezuelan officials involved in drug trafficking and violating sanctions against Iran, but also repeated public calls to disassociate his government from these criminal activities.

Yes, Iran = threat in Venezuela

( ) Iran is a threat Neg cites a report thats flawed. Crdenas 13
Jos R. Crdenas is an associate with the consulting firm VisionAmericas, based in Washington, D.C. From 2004-2009, he served in various senior positions in the U.S. Department of State, the National Security Council, and the U.S. Agency for International Development, where he served as Acting Assistant Administrator for Latin America and the Caribbean Soft-Pedaling the Iranian Threat in the Americas Foreign Policy Magazines Blog: Shadow Government June 28th http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/blog/12823 Three months after Southcom commander Gen. John F. Kelly told the House Armed Services Committee that the United States needs to be "extremely concerned" about Iran's expanding presence in the Western Hemisphere, the

State Department has just informed

Congress that Iran's regional influence is "waning." Indeed, even though around the same time Kelly told an audience at
the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) that he is constantly approached by his regional counterparts requesting any information he can provide them on Iranian activities in the hemisphere, the State Department is reporting to Congress that it "will work closely with and inform our partners in the hemisphere about malign Iranian activities." The

State Department's assertions come in a two-page unclassified annex to a long-awaited classified report to Congress mandated by the bipartisan Countering Iran in the
Western Hemisphere Act, signed into law by President Barack Obama late last year. It directs the secretary of state to "conduct an assessment of the threats posed to the United States by Iran's growing presence and activity in the Western Hemisphere and submit to the relevant congressional committees the results of the assessment and a strategy to address Iran's growing hostile presence and activity in the Western Hemisphere." Granted, the bulk of the

report is classified, but it is not difficult to conclude that its tone is unlikely to diverge much from the unclassified annex -- and that is deeply disturbing. Especially when just last month an Argentine prosecutor added to the growing paper trail on Iran's nefarious activities in the Americas by releasing a 500-page report detailing how Iran has systematically built a clandestine intelligence network throughout the region "designed to sponsor, foster and execute terrorist attacks." The prosecutor, Alberto Nisman, who investigated
the notorious 1994 bombing of the AMIA Jewish community center in Buenos Aires, provides compelling evidence of covert Iranian activity in numerous countries, including Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, Chile, Colombia, Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, and Suriname. Undoubtedly, the Nisman report will be a focus of attention when the House Homeland Security Committee holds a hearing on July 9 on the State Department report. Already, Rep. Jeff Duncan (R-S.C.), who sponsored the Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere Act and is chairing the hearing, has expressed his displeasure with the unclassified annex. He said in a statement, "I believe that the Administration has failed to consider the seriousness of Iran's presence here at home." Ironically, one of the objectives of Duncan's legislation was to foster better interagency cooperation on addressing the Iranian presence in the hemisphere. I attended the CSIS forum with General Kelly and can unequivocally say he gave no impression that his concerns about Iran in the hemisphere were "waning." He quite rightly pointed out how easy it is for anyone wishing to do the United States harm to meld with the criminal networks that can move anything to the United States' borders within days or hours: drugs, people, contraband, anything.... By this time, the

penetration of the Western Hemisphere by Iran -- and its proxy, Hezbollah -- should be a subject beyond debate, especially after the assessment by the director of national intelligence, James Clapper, following the 2011 Iranian plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador in Washington, D.C.,
"that some Iranian officials -- probably including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei -- have changed their calculus and are now more willing to conduct an attack in the United States in response to real or perceived U.S. actions that threaten the regime." In this light,

there
whether the

remains no defensible reason for the State Department to continue to soft-pedal the issue,
sensitivities of some Latin American governments. Congress is right to demand accountability on the matter.

department believes for some reason that it complicates negotiations over Iran's illegal pursuit of nuclear weapons or because it offends the

Iran is playing for the

highest stakes; it is high time the United States did as well.

( ) Iran is a threat in Latin America Negs report flawed. Goodman 13

Internally critiquing a report from the US State Department cited by the Neg Joshua Goodman is a Rio de Janeiro-based reporter covering Latin America for Bloomberg News Irans Influence Waning in Latin America, State Department Says Bloomberg News June 26th http://www.businessweek.com/news/2013-06-26/iran-s-influence-waning-in-latin-america-state-department-says

The findings disappointed some Republican lawmakers who say President Barack Obamas administration is underestimating the threat from Iran. The report comes as the U.S. takes a wait-and-see approach to President-elect Hassan Rohani, who has vowed to seek more dialog with the U.S. I believe the Administration has failed to consider the seriousness of Irans presence here at home, said Congressman Jeff Duncan, a Republican from South Carolina who wrote the legislation requiring the State Department report. I question the methodology that was used in developing this report .

Internal Links to Prolif advantage

***Caracas-Tehran-led anti-US alliance key to Iran Prolif. Noriega 12
Roger F. Noriega was ambassador to the Organization of American States from 2001-2003 and assistant secretary of state from 2003-2005. He is a visiting fellow at the American Enterprise Institute Testimony before the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Iran's influence and activity in Latin America February 16, 2012 http://67.208.89.102/speech/foreign-and-defense-policy/regional/latin-america/iransinfluence-and-activity-in-latin-america/ Bracing for a potential showdown over its illicit nuclear program and emboldened by inattention from Washington in

Latin America,

Iran has sought strategic advantage in our neighborhood . It also is preparing to play t he terrorism card exploit ing its new ties with Venezuelan operatives, reaching into Mexico, and activating a decades - old network in Argentina, Brazil and Chile . Even as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) affirmed in a recent report that foreign support is crucial to Irans capability of developing a nuclear weapon , xvi U.S. diplomatic, intelligence and security agencies apparently are in the dark on whether Iran is extracting ore from vast uranium basins in Venezuela, Ecuador or Bolivia or whether Argentina has resumed nuclear technology - sharing with
Teheran.

Iran Prolif Coming now

( ) Iran prolif coming in the Squo Samay Live 13
(Samay Live a leading Hindi news portal this report is internally quoting The Institute for Science and International Security This same article is released on Agence France Presse and is basically an international wire release. January 15, 2013 lexis)

Iran is on track to produce material for at least one nuclear bomb by mid-2014 as sanctions hit its economy but fail to stop the atomic program, said a US think tank, further adding that Islamic republic could reach 'critical capability' within this time frame without detection by the West.

( ) Iran will get the bomb. Prefer CIA operatives. Turnage 13

(James Turnage. managing editor at Guardian Express internally quoting Reza Kahlili, former CIA spy in Iran The Guardian Express May 21st The parenthetical in the body of the evidence is from the original article http://guardianlv.com/2013/05/iranian-nuclear-program-may-beinevitable/) (According

to a report by Reza Kahlili, former CIA spy in Iran, published in WND.) Is the United States government hiding the reality of Irans nuclear program? Is it inevitable that they will have the ability to build and launch these weapons of mass destruction in the very near future? The answer , according to one of Americas
foremost experts on nuclear weapons

is yes. He based his opinion after examining aerial views of Irans nuclear

facility called Quds. In an exclusive March 20 report with updates on March 24, March 25 and April 10, WND revealed the vast Quds site. Iranian scientists are trying to perfect nuclear warheads at this underground facility previously unknown to the West. WND has a source inside Irans Ministry of Defense. He says that the facility is approximately 14 miles long and
7.5 miles wide. Inside the compound are two facilities built deep inside the mountain. Inside these hardened tunnels are 380 missile silos/garages. The facilities are surrounded by barbed wire, 45 security towers and several security posts. The most frightening part of his story is that Iran

has already succeeded in increasing uranium stockpiles into weapons grade. Their source said them in the final stages of completing more sophisticated weapons than United States DOD experts previously believed. An unnamed source, who worked as an expert for the U.S. Nuclear Agency, told
that this weapons grade metal places WND that the facilities appear similar to what he inspected in Russia. These hardened tunnels are used to house missiles which can be quickly deployed, and are defensible from aerial attack. I understand exactly what Iran has at the site (including) a very important part of the structures the apparent hardened underground stub tunnels for secure storage of mobile systems which can be quickly moved to launching sites. The source said that Iran is working in close collaboration with North Korea, and certain members involved in the Chinese programs to develop weapons. He said that soon he will be able to reveal the context of their association. He said he will also be able to pass along information as to the plans and timing of Iran and North Koreas efforts to arm missiles with nuclear warheads. Fritz Ermarth, who served in the CIA and as chairman of the National Intelligence Council, reviewed the satellite photos and said, This imagery strongly suggests that Iran is working on what we used to call an objective force, a deployed force of nuclear weapons on mobile missiles, normally based in deep underground sites for survivability against even nuclear attack, capable of rapid deployment. This open-source analysis by itself illustrates that Iran is very serious about building survivable facilities for its nuclear enterprise, said Dr. Peter Vincent Pry, the executive director of the Task Force on National and Homeland Security, a congressional advisory board. Pry, who has served with the House Armed Services Committee and in the CIA, also reviewed the imagery and added, The location of the site amid an Iranian missile armory, protected by a vast array of defensive and offensive missiles, is consistent with the intelligence reporting that the site is for the final stages of nuclear weapons development. The complex appears to be the most heavily protected site in Iran. Reza Kahlili (who revealed the Quds site) has provided the West with one of the most critical pieces of evidence of the Iranian governments drive to break out its nuclear development into a fully operational capability, said Maj. Gen. Thomas G. McInerney (Ret.). All Israel and the West, a

the red lines have been crossed. Beware America,

nuclear Iran is here!

A-to Iran Prolif not bad/no domino

( ) Iran Prolif causes war and does cause domino effect. Cirincione 6
Joseph Cirincione is the director for nonproliferation at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace The Continuing Problem of Nuclear Weapons Issues in Science & Technology Spring http://www.issues.org/22.3/cirincione.html

The world would be a more dangerous place with nuclear weapons in Iran. A Persian power with a keen sense of its 2,500-year history, Iran occupies a pivotal position straddling the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf. The country has the largest population in the Middle East, the worlds third largest oil reserves, the second largest natural gas reserves, and aspirations to again become the regions major power. Add nuclear weapons, and this mixture become highly combustible. There is no evidence that Iran currently possesses any nuclear devices or even enough fissile material (highly enriched
uranium or plutonium) to produce such weapons. But for the past two decades Iran has been engaged in a secret, multifaceted program to assemble the equipment and facilities necessary to make these nuclear materials. Iranian officials have justified this effort as part of an ambitious plan to build 20 nuclear reactors. Though controversial enough in and of itself, Irans activities also include the pursuit of several nuclear material production technologies that, if mastered, could provide Tehran with the ability to enrich uranium for fuel rods and to process these fuel rods for disposal. If these facilities are completed, Iran would become only the sixth nation in the world able to convert uranium into gas commercially and only the ninth to be able to enrich that gas for fuel. These same facilities could be used to enrich uranium and to extract plutonium for weapons use. That is the crux of the issue: Do other nations trust that Irans program is, as they claim, entirely peaceful? In 2002, an Iranian opposition group revealed that the countrys nuclear program was much more extensive than Tehran had previously declared to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The IAEA inspections have provided a clearif still incompletepicture of the program. However, after three years of intensive investigations, the IAEA reported in September 2005 and reaffirmed in February 2006 that it is still not in a position to conclude that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran. Irans failure to cooperate fully with inspections and to disclose all of its past activities caused the IAEA Board of Governors on February 6 to vote overwhelmingly to report Iran to the UN Security Council. Iran maintains that all its nuclear activities, even those previously hidden from the IAEA, are intended for peaceful purposes, and it has agreed to place all its nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards. Moreover, in 2003 Iran signed and pledged to implement the IAEAs Additional Protocol, which includes expanded inspection rights and tools. Iran suspended these more intrusive inspections in February 2006, after the IAEA vote. Within Iran, the program is now fused with passionate nationalism. Irans program is a source of national pride across the political spectrum, with both conservatives and reformers supporting development of full nuclear fuel cycle capabilities as an inherent right accorded by the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Irans radical new president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, now addresses rallies of tens of thousands of followers chanting for nuclear power. This potentially explosive domestic political dynamic greatly complicates efforts to convince Iranian officials to end the pursuit of these sensitive nuclear programs. The danger is not that Iran would build and use a nuclear weapon against the United States or its allies. Iranian leaders know that such an act would be regime suicide, as a powerful counterattack would follow immediately. This is not a nuclear bomb crisis, but a nuclear regime crisis. The danger is that a

nuclear-armed Iran would lead other states in the Gulf and Middle East, including possibly Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and even Turkey, to reexamine their nuclear options. This potential wave of proliferation would seriously challenge regional and global security and undermine the worldwide effort to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. If the international
community is unable or unwilling to impose penalties on Iran, and if Tehran continues its nuclear development unconstrained, the nuclear chain reaction from the region could ripple around the globe.

( ) Iran prolif causes instability and nuclear conflict. Inbar 6

(Professor of Political Science at Bar-Ilan Un iversity and the Director of the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies The Need To Block A Nuclear Iran, MERIA Journal, March, http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2006/issue1/jv10no1a7.html)

Iran's nuclear program coupled with long-range delivery systems, in particular, threatens regional stability in the Middle East. Iran's possesses the Shehab-3 long-range missile (with a range of 1,300 kilometers) that can probably be nuclear-tipped and is working on extending the range of its ballistic ar senal. American allies, such as Israel, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Gulf States are within range, as well as several important U.S. bases. The Chief of the ID F Intelligence
Department , Maj. Gen. Aharon Zeevi (Farkash) reported that Iran has also acquired 12 cruise missiles with a range of up to 3,000 kilometers and with an ability to carry nuclear warheads. [14] Further

improvements in Iranian missiles would initially put most European capitals, and eventually, the North American continent, within range of a potential Iranian attack. Iran has an ambitious satellite launching program based on the use of multi-stage, solid prope llant launchers, with

intercontinental ballis tic missile properties to enable the l aunching of a 300-kilogram satellite within two years. If

Iran achieves

this goal, it will put many more states at risk of a future nuclear attack .

Yes, US Lashout
U.S. lashout will kill hundreds of millions Easterbrook 1
(Greg, Fellow at the Brookings Institute, CNN, America's New War: Nuclear Threats, 11-1-2001, http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0111/01/gal.00.html) EASTERBROOK: Well, what held through the Cold War, when the United States and Russia had thousands of nuclear weapons pointed at each other, what held each side back was the fact that fundamentally they were rational. They knew that if they struck, they would be struck in turn. Terrorists may not be held by this, especially suicidal terrorists, of the kind that al Qaeda is attempting to cultivate. But I think, if I could leave you with one message, it would be this: that the search for terrorist atomic weapons would be of great benefit to the Muslim peoples of the world in addition to members, to people of the United States and Western Europe, because if

an atomic warhead goes off in Washington, say, in the current environment or anything like it, in the 24 hours that followed, a hundred million Muslims would die as U.S. nuclear bombs rained down on every conceivable military target in a dozen Muslim countries. And that -- it is very much in the interest the Muslim peoples of the world that atomic weapons be kept out of the
hands of Islamic terrorists, in addition to being in our interests.

1NC Frontline

1NC
( ) Iran doesnt have sinister activities in Venezuela Goodman 13
Internally citing a report from the US State Department Joshua Goodman is a Rio de Janeiro-based reporter covering Latin America for Bloomberg News Irans Influence Waning in Latin America, State Department Says Bloomberg News June 26th http://www.businessweek.com/news/2013-06-26/iran-s-influence-waning-in-latin-america-state-department-says

The U.S. stepped up its monitoring of Irans presence in Latin America in a bid to isolate the country over its nuclear program and after President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad forged closer ties with anti-American allies of the late Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez. While Irans outreach bears watching, claims about more sinister activities are unproven, said Christopher Sabatini, senior policy director at the Council of the Americas. Its a shame that in such a dynamic hemisphere in which we have so many diplomatic initiatives that for some -- especially Congress -attention to the region has boiled down to mostly spurious charges about Iranian infiltration, Sabatini
said via e-mail. Ahmadinejad made repeated trips to Latin America after taking office in 2005, most recently to Caracas to attend Chavezs funeral in March and the inauguration of his successor, Nicolas Maduro, a month later.

( ) Iran prolif not inevitable prefer expert reporters. Hibbs 13

(Mark Hibbs is a former journalist who has been covering nuclear proliferation issues for more than 30 years. In 2006, The Atlantic's William Langewiesche wrote that Hibbs "must rank as one of the greatest reporters at work in the world today." Hibbs is now a Bonn-based senior associate with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace This article is an interview of Hobbs by The Atlantic Is a Nuclear Iran Inevitable ? The Atlantic April 12th http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/04/is-a-nuclear-iran-inevitable/274924/) You mention that there are countries like Iran that don't necessarily pursue the path to the bomb in terms of months or years -- they pursue it in terms of slow progress that reaches a kind of momentum where it's almost irreversible. Do

you think that we've reached the point with Iran where they've slowly built their capability to the point that it's inevitable that they get the bomb, unless there's something major like war, an attack or some sort of internal social breakdown that prevents them from getting there? No, I don't believe that. I think that most analysts would conclude that between the period of around the middle of the 1980s and today, there have been forces in Iran that have led certain people in the decision-making structure to try to have a nuclear weapons capability. There are probably others in the system who didn't want that. Iran is by no means a monolithic country. ...Iran right now has a decision to make. It has acquired considerable nuclear capability which have brought them very far along down a path towards obtaining a nuclear weapons capability. There's no question about that in my mind. But right now it's up to Iran to decide whether it's going to draw a red line there, or whether it's going to cross it. And I think there's no consensus right now about which direction Iran's going to move in.

( ) Maduro wont engage with the US Shinkman 13

Paul National Security Reporter at U.S. News & World Report internally quoting Doug Farah, a former Washington Post investigative reporter who is now a senior fellow at the Virginia-based International Assessment and Strategy Center. Iranian-Sponsored Narco-Terrorism in Venezuela: How Will Maduro Respond? US News and World Report April 24th http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/04/24/iranian-sponsored-narco-terrorism-in-venezuela-how-will-maduro-respond?page=2

[Maduro] has been and will continue to be forced to take all the unpopular macroeconomic steps and corrections that are painful, but Chavez never took," Farah says. "There is going to be, I would guess, a great temptation to turn to [the elites] for money." "Most

criminalized elements of the Boliavarian structure will gain more power because he needs them," he says, adding "it won't be as chummy a relationship" as they enjoyed with the ever-charismatic Chavez. U.S. officials might try to engage the new Venezuelan president first in the hopes of improving the strained ties between the two countries. But Maduro has never been close with the senior military class in his home country, and will likely adopt a more confrontational approach to the United States to prove his credentials to these Bolivarian elites. "Maybe if he were operating in different circumstances, he could be a pragmatist," Farah says. "I don't think he can be a pragmatist right now."

( ) Iran Prolif not dangerous and wouldnt cascade. Hobbs& Moran 12

Dr Christopher Hobbs is a Leverhulme Research Fellow at the Centre for Science and Security Studies within the Department of War Studies at King's College London. Matthew Moran is a Research Associate at the Centre for Science and Security Studies within the Department of War Studies at King's College London. He is currently working on a MacArthur-funded postdoctoral project that explores the relationship between nuclear, nationalism and identity and how these issues impact on policy-making. Guardian: Julian Borgers Security Blog 12-19-12 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/julian-borger-global-security-blog/2012/dec/19/iran-nuclear-middle-east-arms-race Inevitably, Iran's nuclear defiance has provided ammunition for the war-mongerers advocating a pre-emptive attack on Iran. Prominent

commentators such as Matthew Kroenig, claim that, at the very least, a nuclear-armed Iran would prompt a 'proliferation cascade' in the Middle East. If Iran acquires nuclear weapons whatever form that scenario may take - its regional rivals will follow suit. The argument here is seductive; it is easier to assume the worst than to hope for the best. The problem is, we find that the counter-argument is more compelling. The idea that 'proliferation begets proliferation' is not new. Dire forecasts on the
seemingly inevitable increase in the number of nuclear weapon states have been made since the dawn of the nuclear age. In 1963, for example, US President JF Kennedy predicted that there might be up to twenty-five nuclear weapons powers within the next decade. However, proliferation has proven to be historically rare, with the number of nuclear weapons states expanding only slightly from five in 1964 to nine in 2006 following North Korea's nuclear test. The

flawed logic of 'proliferation begets proliferation' is clearly demonstrated in North East Asia where North Korea's nuclear weapons have not provoked Japan or South Korea, countries with advanced civil nuclear programmes, to follow suit despite a long history of regional conflict and volatile
relations. In this case, strong security alliances with the United States incorporating extended nuclear deterrence have played an important role in dissuading these countries from going nuclear. Ironically, the

Middle East itself offers further evidence that nuclear proliferation is not inevitable. Noted for its policy of nuclear opacity (neither confirming nor denying its nuclear arsenal), Israel acquired nuclear weapons in the late 1960s and over four decades later still remains the only nuclear power in the region. Now the threat posed by Iran to its neighbours is arguably greater given Tehran's aggressive posturing and regional ambitions.
However our research finds that those states deemed most likely to go nuclear due to their proximity to Iran and their suspected past interest in acquiring nuclear weapons (namely Turkey, Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia), would have little to gain and much to lose by embarking down such a route. Take Saudi Arabia, for example. Iran has long been at political and ideological odds with the kingdom across the Gulf. And

at

first sight, it seems likely that Saudi Arabia would follow Iran down the nuclear path. In February, Saudi
officials were reported as claiming that Riyadh would launch a "twin-track nuclear weapons programme" in the event of a successful Iranian nuclear test. An article published in the London Times in February [] described a scenario whereby Saudi Arabia would attempt to purchase warheads from abroad while also adding a military dimension to its planned civil nuclear programme at home. Look

more closely,

however, and there is a much stronger case to be made against Saudi nuclearisation. Beyond the Kingdom's primitive nuclear infrastructure the country lacks sufficient experience and expertise in practically all areas of the nuclear fuel cycle Saudi Arabia's political and strategic context does not favour the acquisition of nuclear weapons. From a security
perspective, the relationship between Saudi Arabia and the United States has held firm since the 1940s, despite a number of challenges most notably the participation of a number of Saudi nationals in the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The relationship barters Saudi oil for US conventional arms and an implicit commitment to Saudi's defence. In recent years, the role of Washington as the silent guarantor of Riyadh's security has grown apace with the structural changes in the Middle East. The fall of the pro-Saudi Mubarak regime in Egypt; protests and instability in Bahrain and Yemen; the collapse of the pro-Saudi government in Lebanon; and civil war in Syria have upended the established regional order and made Riyadh's position less secure. In this context, and given the determination of the United States to prevent nuclear proliferation in the region, a

move by Saudi Arabia to acquire nuclear weapons holds few positives for Riyadh's security calculus. From and economic perspective, Saudi Arabia's policy outlook exemplifies Etel Solingen's seminal theory on the relationship between economic liberalism and nuclear restraint. Solingen argues that political coalitions favouring the reduction of state control over markets and increased privatisation and foreign investment are less likely to adopt a nuclear posture that would endanger their economic interests. In this regard, Saudi Arabia's emphasis on facilitating the growth of foreign investment is significant. Riyadh has cultivated extensive trade relations with most international powers, keen to attract foreign investment as a means of reducing over-reliance on oil and gas, increasing employment opportunities for the local population (population growth of almost two percent equates to a need for some 200,000 new jobs per year), and reinvigorating the Saudi private sector. The acquisition of nuclear weapons would have far-reaching consequences, stalling progress and bringing progressive economic isolation, thus drastically changing the nature of the kingdom's international trade relations. Saudi's interests are best served by nuclear restraint. In an article published in the latest issue of The International Spectator, we argue that there are strong arguments for nuclear restraint in the cases of other regional players as well. From security guarantees and the provision of advanced conventional weapons - in December 2011, following the United States agreed a $1.7 billion deal to upgrade Saudi Arabia's Patriot missile defence system, for example to facilitating increased integration into the international economy, there are a range of measures that can persuade a state to forgo nuclear weapons. Ultimately, many

see a domino-effect as the logical response to Iranian nuclearisation. But when the is substantial evidence to suggest that regional proliferation is not a very likely outcome at all.
stakes are this high, it is important to look at all sides of the debate. From another perspective, there

( ) US wont respond with nuclear lash-out. Washington Post 7

(Thursday, August 2, 2007 Obama says no nuclear weapons to fight terror http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/08/02/AR2007080201375_pf.html)
Presidential hopeful Barack Obama

said Thursday he would not use nuclear weapons "in any circumstance" to fight terrorism in Afghanistan and Pakistan, drawing criticism from Hillary Rodham Clinton and other Democratic rivals." I think it would be a profound mistake for us to use nuclear weapons in any circumstance," Obama said, with a pause, "involving civilians." Then he quickly added, "Let me scratch that. There's been no discussion of nuclear weapons. That's not on the table."

2NC-1NR Backlines

Extensions Irans activities arent dangerous

( ) Irans activities in Venezuela arent profitable or dangerous. Goodman 13
Internally citing a report from the US State Department Joshua Goodman is a Rio de Janeiro-based reporter covering Latin America for Bloomberg News Irans Influence Waning in Latin America, State Department Says Bloomberg News June 26th http://www.businessweek.com/news/2013-06-26/iran-s-influence-waning-in-latin-america-state-department-says

Under Ahmadinejads watch, Iran added embassies in Latin America and more than doubled trade with Brazil, the regions biggest economy. With Chavez, Ahmadinejad signed more than 100 accords to support everything
from a campaign to build homes in Venezuela to a joint venture to manufacture bicycles, which Chavez jokingly referred to as atomic twowheelers. The

two countries also established in Caracas the Banco Internacional de Desarrollo, which accused by the U.S. of being a vehicle for the Ahmadinejad governments funding of the Middle Eastern terrorist group Hezbollah. Yet with Irans economy crippled by sanctions, many of the projects havent gotten off the ground. For example, pledges from 2007 and 2008 to help build
together with its main Iranian shareholder, Bank Saderat, is a $350 million deep-water port off Nicaraguas Atlantic coast and an oil refinery in Ecuador have yet to materialize. Nor has it built what former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton warned would be a huge embassy in Managua. That hasnt prevented the Obama administration from trying to curb Irans influence. In 2011, it imposed sanctions on state-owned oil company Petroleos de Venezuela SA for defying sanctions on Iran. It also implicated an Iranian man working out of Mexico in a plot to kill Saudi Arabias ambassador to Washington.

( ) Irans influence in Latin America decreasing and not supporting terror. Goodman 13
Internally citing a report from the US State Department Joshua Goodman is a Rio de Janeiro-based reporter covering Latin America for Bloomberg News Irans Influence Waning in Latin America, State Department Says Bloomberg News June 26th http://www.businessweek.com/news/2013-06-26/iran-s-influence-waning-in-latin-america-state-department-says

Iran isnt actively supporting terrorist cells in Latin America and its influence is waning in the region
after almost a decade of promises to increase investment, according to a State Department report. While Irans interest in Latin America is a concern, sanctions

have undermined efforts by the Islamic republic to expand its economic and political toehold in the region, according to the unclassified summary of yesterdays report. As a result of diplomatic outreach, strengthening of allies capacity, international nonproliferation efforts, a strong sanctions policy, and Irans poor management of its foreign relations, Iranian influence in Latin America and the Caribbean is waning,
according to the report.

Extension Nuclear Iran wont cause War or Domino

( ) Iran Prolif not dangerous wouldnt cause instability or domino effect. Keck 12
(Zachary Keck is deputy editor of e-International Relations and an editorial assistant at The Diplomat. His commentary has appeared at Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, World Politics Review and Small Wars Journal False Prophets of Nuclear Proliferation National Interest April 5th http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/false-prophets-nuclear-proliferation-6725) Even as other issues surrounding Irans nuclear program are debated, there

is a wide-ranging consensus in the West that an Iranian bomb would precipitate a regional nuclear-arms race, if not a global one. Senators Lindsay Graham (R-SC),
Robert Casey (D-PA) and Joseph Lieberman (I-CT) said as much in the pages of the Wall Street Journal in March. Similarly, British foreign secretary William Hague worries that if Iran acquires a nuclear weapon, the most serious round of nuclear proliferation to date would commence. And recently in the New York Times, Ari Shavit of Haaretz stated matter-of-factly that an Iranian bomb will bring about universal

there is no evidence to support these apocalyptic prophecies . history nor contemporary circumstances indicate that an Iranian atomic weapon would be a nuclear catalyst. Historical Precedents To begin with, fears of an impending
nuclear proliferation. Fortunately for mankinds sake, Although some precautionary actions might be prudent, neither nuclear tipping point have been a regular feature of the nuclear age. The CIA is a case in point. Whereas in 1957 the agency predicted ten countries could go nuclear within a decade, by 1975 it concluded that logically nuclear proliferation would only subside when all political actors, state and non-state, are equipped with nuclear armaments. A quarter century and one nuclear power later (both South Africa and Pakistan acquired a nuclear-weapons capability during this time, but South Africa dismantled all its nuclear weapons by 1991), CIA director George Tenet announced in 2003 that we had entered a new world of proliferation and warned the domino theory of the twen ty-first century may well be nuclear. The 1960s were equally remarkable. As a presidential candidate in 1960, for example, John F. Kennedy foresaw ten, fifteen, or twenty nations acquiring a nuclear capability by the 1964 election. The following year, the Kennedy administration was so certain a Chinese nuclear test would trigger a global wave of nuclear proliferation that it considered simply giving Beijings neighbors defensive nuclear weapons. Although not a single additional nuclear power emerged by 1963, President Kennedy remained haunted by the feeling that there would be fifteen or twenty of them by 1975 and possibly twenty-five by the end of that decade. And yet nearly half a century after the Cuban missile crisis there are only nine nuclear-weapon states, five more than when Kennedy was elected and two of which already had advanced nuclear weapon programs during his presidency. During the same time interval, four states have voluntarily given up their nuclear arsenals and an estimated forty nations have not built them despite possessing the technical capability to do so. Still, just because nuclear forbearance has been the norm thus far doesnt necessarily mean this will continue into the future. In fact, according to Shavit, an Iranian bomb would force Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt to acquire their own. Similarly, President Barack Obama is almost certain that if Iran gets nuclear weapons, its neighbors will be compelled to do the same. Once again, theres not much evidence to support these assertions.

Although a few countries have built nuclear weapons because a rival acquired them, these are the exceptions to the general rule. Of the quantitative studies done on reactive proliferation, none have found a nuclear-armed rival makes a state more likely to even initiate a nuclear-weapons program, much less succeed. Furthermore, as the political scientist Jacques Hymans documents in a forthcoming book, despite the diffusion of
technology, nuclear aspirants have become increasingly inefficient and unsuccessful over time. Its therefore not surprising that in-depth case studies of Turkeys, Egypts and Saudi Arabia's nuclear prospects have found no cause for concern. Turkey is the most capable of building nuclear weapons but already has a nuclear deterrent in the form of an estimated ninety nuclear warheads hosted on its territory for the United States. This is far more than what it is capable of producing indigenously. Additionally, its hard to square Turkeys supposed nuclear ambitions with the recent removal of its entire stockpile of highly enriched uranium. Egypt is far less capable of building a bomb than Turkey. Indeed, it already had a dysfunctional nuclear program during the 1960s that was abandoned despite Israel, its archenemy at the time, acquiring a nuclear capability. Even before the onset of the Arab Spring, proliferation analyst Jim Walsh argued it was not likely that Egypt will seek, let alone acquire, nuclear weapons. In the aftermath of Mubaraks overthrow, any government in Cairo will be preoccupied with im proving the lot of its people, lest it too wind up on trial. Achieving economic growth will require sustained access to foreign capital, markets and financial assistance, none of which would be forthcoming if Cairo initiated a nuclear-weapons program. Given its long-standing rivalry with Tehran, Saudi Arabia is certainly the most alarmed by the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran. Moreover, Saudi Prince Turki al-Faisal, former head of intelligence and ambassador to the United States and the United Kingdom, has repeatedly warned that if Iran is allowed to get nuclear weapons, the kingdom may well do the same. Of course, this might be what a nation would say if it wanted Washington to cut off the head of the snake in Tehran. In fact, as Nuclear Threat Initiative concludes, no convincing evidence exists . . . that Saudi Arabia is attempting to develop, or has the motivation to develop, a nuclear weapons program. Similarly, in his comprehensive study that included fieldwork inside the kingdom, Ibrahim Al-Marashi found little evidence . . . that Saudi Arabia would seek to engage directly in a regional nuclear arms race. If Saudi Arabia did pursue nuclear weapons, however, it would be almost certain to fail. Even those most concerned about a Saudi bomb dont claim it can build one itself. Rather, they contend Riyadh will buy a ready-made nuclear deterrent from Pakistan. Pakistans willingness to take this unprecedented action is based on pure speculation, past Saudi aid to Pakistan and a host of unsubstantiated claims, most notably those made by Mohammed al-Khilewi, a Saudi diplomat at the UN who defected in 1994. In seeking to gain asylum into the United States, al-Khilewi told U.S. authorities that in exchange for financial aid, Pakistan had agreed to provide Riyadh with a nuclear deterrent should the need ever

arise. Besides al-Khilewis obvious motives for fabricating this story, its doubtful Islamabad would uphold its end of the alleged bargain. After all, in the wake of 9/11 Washington gave Islamabad $22 billion to fight terrorism and later found Osama bin Laden living amongst Pakistans military cadets. Furthermore, Pakistani leaders are exceedingly paranoid their nuclear arsenal would not withstand an Indian or U.S. first strike. Its therefore difficult to imagine them willingly parting with any nuclear warheads. Even if Islamabad did have some to spare, Riyadh would be an unlikely recipient. Given the worlds dependence on Saudi crude, Pakistan would be the target of exceptionally harsh and unrelenting international condemnation, including from its all-weather friend China, which has recently been getting 20 percent of its oil supplies from Riyadh. Iran would also be outraged and almost certain to respond by aligning itself squarely with India. Pakistani leaders have gone to great lengths to avoid this outcome, and they wouldnt suddenly invite it just to keep a promise their predecessors might have made. If Iran

does acquire nuclear weapons, theres no reason to think a regional nuclear-arms race would follow. Washington and its allies have avoided this outcome in the past, and nothing suggests this time would be different.

Extensions US wont respond with nuclear lash-out

( ) Obama wont retaliate with nuclear weapons Crowley 10
(Michael Crowley, Senior Editor the New Republic, Obama and Nuclear Deterrence, Jan 10th http://www.tnr.com/node/72263) The Los Angeles Times ran an important story yesterday about the

Obama administration's Nuclear Posture Review, which evaluates U.S. policy towards the use of nuclear weapons. Apparently there's a debate inside the
administration--one that is splitting the civilians from the generals--not just about the size of our nuclear stockpile but also how we conceive of possible first-strike and retaliatory policies. A

core issue under debate, officials said, is whether the United States should shed its long-standing ambiguity about whether it would use nuclear weapons in certain circumstances, in hopes that greater specificity would give foreign governments more confidence to make their own decisions on nuclear
arms. Some in the U.S. argue that the administration should assure foreign governments that it won't use nuclear weapons in reaction to a biological, chemical or conventional attack, but only in a nuclear exchange. Others argue that the United States should promise that it would never use nuclear weapons first, but only in response to a nuclear attack. As the story notes, some experts

don't place much weight on how our publicly-stated doctrine emerges because they don't expect foreign nations to take it literally. And the reality is that any decisions about using nukes will certainly be case-by-case. But I'd still like to see some wider discussion of the underlying questions, which are among the most consequential that policymakers can consider. The questions are particularly vexing when it comes to terrorist groups and rogue states. Would we, for instance, actually nuke Pyongyang if it sold a weapon to terrorists who used it in America? That implied threat seems to exist, but I actually doubt that a President Obama--or any president, for that matter--would go through with it.

( ) Nuclear retaliation wont happen. Bremmer 4

(Ian Bremmer is the president of Eurasia Group, the leading global political risk research and consulting firm. Bremmer has a PhD in political science from Stanford University (1994), and was the youngest-ever national fellow at the Hoover Institution. He presently teaches at Columbia University, and has held faculty positions at the EastWest Institute and the World Policy Institute, 9-13-2004, New Statesman, Suppose a new 9/11 hit America)

What would happen if there were a new terrorist attack inside the United States on 11 September 2004? How
would it affect the presidential election campaign? The conventional wisdom is that Americans - their patriotic defiance aroused - would rally to President George W Bush and make him an all but certain winner in November. But consider the differences between the context of the original 9/11 and that of any attack which might occur this autumn. In 2001, the public reaction was one of disbelief and incomprehension. Many Americans realised for the first time that large-scale terrorist attacks on US soil were not only conceivable; they were, perhaps, inevitable. A majority focused for the first time on the threat from al-Qaeda, on the Taliban and on the extent to which Saudis were involved in terrorism. This time, the public response would move much more quickly from shock to anger; debate over how America should respond would begin immediately. Yet it

is difficult to imagine how the Bush administration could focus its response on

an external enemy. Should the US send 50,000 troops to the Afghan-Pakistani border to intensify the hunt for Osama Bin Laden and
'step up' efforts to attack the heart of al-Qaeda? Many would wonder if that wasn't what the administration pledged to do after the attacks three years ago. The

president would face intensified criticism from those who have argued all along that Iraq was a And what if a significant number of the terrorists responsible for the pre-election attack were again Saudis? The Bush administration could hardly take military action against the Saudi government at a time when crude-oil prices are already more than $45 a barrel and global supply is stretched to the limit. While the Saudi royal family might
distraction from 'the real war on terror'. support a co-ordinated attack against terrorist camps, real or imagined, near the Yemeni border - where recent searches for al-Qaeda have concentrated - that would seem like a trivial, insufficient retaliation for an attack on the US mainland. Remember how the Republicans criticised Bill Clinton's administration for ineffectually 'bouncing the rubble' in Afghanistan after the al-Qaeda attacks on the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in the 1990s. So what kind of response might be credible? Washington's concerns about Iran are rising. The 9/11 commission report noted evidence of co-operation between Iran and al-Qaeda operatives, if not direct Iranian advance knowledge of the 9/11 hijacking plot. Over the past few weeks, US officials have been more explicit, too, in declaring Iran's nuclear programme 'unacceptable'. However, in the absence of an official Iranian claim of responsibility for this hypothetical terrorist attack, the

domestic opposition to such a war and the

international outcry it would provoke would make quick action against Iran unthinkable. In short, a decisive response from Bush could not be external. It would have to be domestic. Instead of Donald Rumsfeld, the defence
secretary, leading a war effort abroad, Tom Ridge, the homeland security secretary, and John Ashcroft, the attorney general, would pursue an anti-terror campaign at home. Forced to use legal tools more controversial than those provided by the Patriot Act, Americans would experience stepped-up domestic surveillance and border controls, much tighter security in public places and the detention of a large number of suspects. Many Americans would undoubtedly support such moves. But concern for civil liberties and personal freedom would ensure that the government would have nowhere near the public support it enjoyed for the invasion of Afghanistan.

( ) The U.S. wont retaliate with nuclear weaponsit makes no sense Spring 1
(Baker, Research Fellow at Heritage Foundation, Heritage Backgrounder 1477, Sept 20, http://www.heritage.org/Research/MissileDefense/BG1477.cfm)

Nuclear retaliation is not appropriate for every kind of attack against America. Some opponents of missile
defense believe that the United States has an effective nuclear deterrent that, if necessary, could be used to respond to attacks on the homeland. But no

responsible U.S. official is suggesting that the United States consider the use of nuclear weapons in response to the horrific September 11 attacks. In most cases of attack on the United States, the nuclear option would not be appropriate, but a defense response will almost always be appropriate. The United States
needs to be able to resort to defensive options.