BLAST EFFECTS AND RELATED THREATS T.

Krauthammer1 ABSTRACT This paper contains a brief summary of blast effects and related threats, and provides an overview of how these effects are related to force protection and homeland defense. Also provided are conclusions and recommendations on addressing these urgent and vital needs. Introduction The purpose of R&D for the development of protective measures against explosions is to improve existing capabilities and to create methods and products that could perform efficiently under anticipated threats. Furthermore, one should not only consider the physical environment that could be associated with explosive incidents but also an overall hostile environment which may include a large number of parameters. Also, the definition of failure is related closely to operational concepts, mission and serviceability of a facility. Therefore, such parameters should be considered during the planning of the required R&D. Other factors which may, and usually do, affect the defensive performance of a facility are related to psychological aspects of human behavior, and they should be considered in the overall process of system assessment. Nevertheless, the main thrust of this paper is aimed at a review of explosive effects and related threats in support of developing realistic engineering recommendations for guiding future assessment, design and research activities in the field of protective construction, based on available data. Furthermore, in order to simplify and narrow the scope of this paper it was decided to concentrate on the parameters which an architect and/or engineer would need for the design and/or retrofit a structural system. One needs to have specific information on the loading environment in which the structure is expected to perform (e.g., load-time histories, radiation levels, temperature-time histories, chemical/bacteriological (CB) conditions, etc). Naturally, such environments can be defined only if an analysis of the threat or hazard is available. Then, one must put these in the context of known and/or anticipated threats. Here, because of the symposiums theme, the focus will be more on terrorist attack than on traditional military operations. Since 1983, the United States has been subjected to international terrorism on a grand scale when powerful explosive devices were used against the US Embassy and the Marine Corps Barracks in Lebanon. US government and military personnel deployed overseas and various other US organizations became the target of international terrorists, desiring the United States to abandon its vital strategic interests in the Middle East. Besides the attacks against US facilities in the early Prof. of Civil Engineering, Dir. Protective Technology Center, Penn State University, University Park, PA 16802, USA 1
1

1980s, in November 1995, a car bomb exploded in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, killing five Americans who were working in the of offices of the Saudi Arabian National Guard. A few months later, in June 1996, terrorists detonated the largest known truck bomb (more than 20,000 lbs of high explosives) near Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. The explosion killed 19 US service personnel living in a high-rise apartment building at the Khobar Towers military complex. Hundreds more were injured. These incidents were followed by explosive attacks in August 1998 against US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and, in October 2000, against USS Cole in Yemen. Although the previous terrorist attacks were directed against US land-based facilities, the USS Cole incident highlights the fact that US Navy ships and other sea-based facilities are a target for terrorist attack. Prior to 1993, the United States had been relatively unaffected by terrorism within its borders. Then, in February1993, the US was attacked by externally-supported terrorist who targeted the Word Trade Center, and in April 1995, America was shocked by the devastating attack by homegrown terrorists against the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. These attacks brought terrorism home to the US. The horrific terrorist attacks against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in September 2001 changed forever the way various federal, state and local government agencies, and many other organizations would look at security and protection of occupants of their buildings. In todays environment, despite the end of the Cold War, the needs to protect both military facilities and civilian populations from enemy attack have not diminished. This rapidly evolving change in threats is expected to continue well into the 21st Century. Furthermore, we noted an increasing need to protect civilian populations against terrorism and social/subversive unrest. This situation is true for many parts of the world, and it may exceed the previous reasons for the development of protective technologies (i.e., related to military-sponsored work on fortifications). Unlike the global politically and ideologically motivated conflicts of the past, dominated by well-organized military powers, most of the armed conflicts in the last few years have been localized and dominated by social, religious and/or ethnic causes. This means that well-understood and reasonably-predictable military operations are replaced by much less understood and less predictable terrorist activities. Such activities are carried out by determined individuals or small groups that have a wide range of backgrounds and capabilities. They are directed against well-selected targets, and they are aimed at inflicting considerable economic damage and loss of lives. As demonstrated by recent tragic incidents in the US, the term low intensity conflict is a misnomer. Such activities, despite involving a few individuals or small groups, have devastating consequences. They can adversely affect national and international stability. Defending society against terrorism requires a well planned layered approach, combining innovative intelligence and law enforcement capabilities and effective protective technologies. The future of R&D in protective technology must be reshaped accordingly. Careful attention must be devoted to facilities whose failure could severely disrupt the social and economic infrastructure of nations. One must employ innovative approaches that combine theoretical, numerical and experimental approaches, and to conduct these activities in a well-coordinated collaborative activity between government, academic, and private organizations. Although this 2

paper reviews the state of the practice in blast effects and related threats, it will not address in detail many other important threats that must be considered for effective force protection activities. Many of these issues are addressed in several publications on this subject (e.g., Conrath et al. 1999, ASCE 1985, Department of the Army 1986 and 1990, etc.). Blast Effects Blast effects are associated with either nuclear or conventional explosive devices. Although small nuclear devices (e.g., tactical size) could be used by terrorists, the corresponding effects will not be addressed here. The interested reader can find useful information in other sources (e.g., ASCE 1885). Scaling laws are used to predict the properties of blast waves from largescale explosions based on tests on a much smaller scale (Johansson and Persson 1970, Baker 1973, Baker et al. 1983). The most common form of blast scaling is Hopkinson-Cranz or cuberoot scaling (Hopkinson 1915, Cranz 1926). It states that self-similar blast waves are produced at identical scaled distances when two explosive charges of similar geometry and of the same explosive, but of different sizes, are detonated in the same atmosphere. It is customary to use as a scaled distance a dimensional parameter, Z, as follows: Z = R/E1/3, or Z = R/W1/3 (1)

where R is the distance from the center of the explosive source, E is the total heat of detonation of the explosive, and W is the total weight of a standard explosive such as TNT. Blast data at a distance R from the center of an explosive source of characteristic dimension d will be subjected to a blast wave with amplitude of P, duration td, and a characteristic time history. The integral of the pressure-time history is the impulse i. The Hopkinson-Cranz scaling law then states that such data at a distance ZR from the center of a similar explosive source of characteristic dimension Zd detonated in the same atmosphere will define a blast wave of similar form with amplitude P, duration Ztd and impulse Zi. All characteristic times are scaled by the same factor as the length scale factor Z. In Hopkinson-Cranz scaling, pressures, temperatures, densities, and velocities are unchanged at homologous times. The Hopkinson-Cranz scaling law has been thoroughly verified by many experiments conducted over a large range of explosive charge energies. Limited reflected impulse measurements (Huffington and Ewing 1985) showed that Hopkinson-Cranz scaling may become inapplicable for Z < 0.4 ft/lb1/3 (0.16 m/kg1/3). The character of the blast waves from condensed high explosives is remarkably similar to those of TNT, and these curves can be used for other explosives by calculating an equivalent charge weight of the explosive required to produce the same effect as a spherical TNT explosive. In general, the equivalent weight factors found by comparing airblast data from different high explosives vary little with scaled distance, and also vary little dependent on whether peak overpressure or side-on impulse is used for the comparisons. When actual comparative blast data exist, these data can be used to determine a single number for TNT equivalence by averaging. When no such data exist, comparative values of heats of detonation H for TNT and the explosive in question can be used to predict TNT equivalence (US Department of the Army, Navy and Air Force 1990, U.S. Department of Energy 1992, Conrath et al. 1999). 3

The theoretical heats of detonation for many of the more commonly used explosives are listed in various sources (e.g., Appendix A of U.S. Department of Energy 1992), along with TNT equivalency factors. This method of computing TNT equivalency is related primarily to the shock wave effects of open-air detonations, either free-air or ground bursts, as shown in Table 1. Limitations of this approach have been discussed in such publications (e.g.., Conrath et al. 1999). Typical sources of compiled data for airblast waves from high explosives are for spherical TNT explosive charges detonated under standard sea level. The data are scaled according to the Hopkinson-Cranz (or cube-root) law. An acceptable set of standard airblast curves for the positive-phase blast parameters is shown in Figures 1 and 2 (Kingery and Bulmash 1984, Department of the Army 1986, US Departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force 1990). The procedures in TM 5-855-1(Department of the Army 1986) have been implemented in the computer code ConWep (Hyde 1993) that can be used for calculating a wide range of weapon and explosive effects. Unconfined Explosions The blast curves in Figures 1 and 2 define the various scaled blast parameters as a function of the scaled distance Z = R/W1/3 up to a value of 100 ft/lb1/3 (39.7 m/kg1/3) . For most protective structures or even light structures, damage is relatively superficial beyond this scaled distance. The use of the charge weight W refers to TNT-equivalent weights. Figure 1presents the scaled form of the following parameters: Peak side-on overpressure, Ps (psi), side-on specific impulse, is (psi-ms), Shock arrival time, ta (ms), Positive phase duration, td (ms), peak normally reflected overpressure, Pr (psi), normally reflected specific impulse, ir (psi-ms), shock front velocity, U (ft/ms), wave length of positive phase, LW (ft). The normally reflected pressure and impulse are greater than the corresponding side-on values because of the pressure enhancement caused by arresting flow behind the reflected shock wave. Various sources (e.g., U.S. Department of Energy 1992) present methodologies for calculating such parameters. Normally reflected blast wave properties usually provide upper limits to blast loads on structures, but one may have to consider cases blast waves that also strike at oblique angles. The effects of the angle of incidence versus the peak reflected pressure Pr and the reflected impulse ir are shown in Figures 3 and 4. In these figures the angle is 0 for a head on (i.e., normal) incidence and 90 when the wave travels parallel to the wall. For an explosive charge detonated on the surface of the ground, one can use the free-air curves to determine blast wave parameters by adjusting the charge weight in the ground burst to account for the enhancement from the ground reflection. For a perfect reflecting surface, the explosive weight is simply doubled. When significant cratering takes place, a reflection factor of 1.8 is more realistic. This simple approach is recommended for an explosion at or very near the ground surface. This approach is still valid. However, a large volume of test data are available and have been compiled from tests using hemispherical TNT charges on the ground surface. From these data, blast curves for the positive-phase blast parameters were developed and are widely used as the standard for ground bursts. Consequently, these curves (U.S. Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force 1990) are presented here as Figure 4. Structures subjected to the explosive output of a surface burst will usually be located in the pressure range where the plane wave concept can be applied. Therefore, for a surface burst, the blast loads acting on structure 4

surface are calculated as described for an air burst except that the incident pressures and other positive-phase parameters of the free-field shock environment are obtained from Figure 4. Table 1. Averaged free-air equivalent weights (Conrath et al. 1999).
Explosive Equivalent Weight, Pressure (lbm 1) 0.82 1.09 1.11 1.20 1.37 1.14 1.17 1.14 1.38 1.20 1.06 1.13 1.7 1.29 1.27 1.42 1.38 1.50 0.90 1.07 1.06 1.36 1.00 1.07 Equivalent Weight, Impulse (lbm 1) 1.076 0.98 1.3 1.19 1.09 1.16 0.97 1.15 1.11 1.2 1.00 1.14 1.00 0.93 1.10 1.00 0.96

Pressure Range (psi 2) 1-100 5-50 5-50 100-1,000 10-100 5-50 5-20 5-25 5-100 3-20 5-30 100-1,000 5-30 5-100 5-100 5-600 100-1,000 3-20 5-100 Standard 5-100

ANFO Composition A-3 Composition B Composition C-4 Cyclotol (70/30) HBX-1 HBX-3 H-6 Minol II Octol (70/30, 75/25) PBX - 9404 PBX - 9010 PETN Pentolite

Picratol Tetryl Tetrytol (Tetryl/TNT) (75/25, 70/30, 65/35) TNETB TNT TRITONAL

1 To convert pounds (mass) to kilograms, multiply by 0.454 2 To convert pounds (force) per square inch to kilopascals, multiply by 6.89

Figure 1.

Positive phase airblast parameters for a spherical TNT detonation in free-air at sea level (U.S. Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force 1990).

For the normally reflected parameters, the structural element would be perpendicular to the direction of the shock wave for Figure 4 to apply. Otherwise, the wave will strike the structure at an oblique angle. When a plane wave strikes a structure at an angle of incidence, the oblique reflected pressures will be a function of the shock strength. Although incident blast wave properties usually provide upper limits to blast loads on structures, the more usual case of loading of large, flat surfaces is represented by waves that strike at oblique incidence. Also, as a blast wave from a source some distance from the ground reflects from the ground, the angle of incidence must change from normal to oblique. 6

Figure 2.

Positive phase airblast parameters for a hespherical TNT detonation in free-air at sea level (U.S. Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force 1990).

Confined Explosions Confined and contained explosions that occur within structures normally develop complicated pressure-time histories on the inside surfaces. Such loading cannot be predicted exactly, but approximations and model relationships exist to define blast loads with a good confidence. These include procedures for determination of blast loads due to initial and reflected shocks, quasi-static pressure, directional and uniform venting effects, and vent closure effects. The loading from a high-explosive detonation within a confined (vented) or contained (unvented) structure consists of two almost distinct phases. The first phase is the reflected blast loading, 7

Figure 3.

Reflected pressure as a function of angle of incidence (U.S. Department of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, 1990)

Figure 4.

Reflected impulse as a function of angle of incidence (U.S. Department of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, 1990) 8

which typically consists of an initial high-pressure, short-duration, reflected wave plus several later reflected pulses. The second is called the gas loading phase. Shock Pressure Incident and reflected shocks inside structures consist of the initial high-pressure, short-duration reflected wave, plus several later reflected shocks which are a result of reverberation of the initial shock within the structure. These later pulses are usually attenuated in amplitude because of an irreversible thermodynamic process. These are complicated in wave forms because of the involved reflection process within the structure, whether vented or unvented. The simplest case of blast wave reflection is that of normal reflection of a plane shock wave from a plane, rigid surface. In this case, the incident wave moves at velocity U through still air at ambient conditions. The conditions immediately behind the shock front are those for the free-air shock wave. When the incident shock wave strikes the plane, rigid surface, it is reflected and moves away from the surface with a velocity Ur into the flow field and compressed region associated with the incident wave. In the reflection process, the incident particle velocity us is arrested (us = 0 at the reflecting surface), and the pressure, density, and temperature of the reflected wave are all increased above the values in the incident wave. The overpressure at the wall surface is termed the normally reflected overpressure and is designated Pr. Following the initial internal blast loading, the shock waves reflected inward will usually strengthen as they implode toward the center of the structure, and then attenuate as they move through the air and re-reflect to load the structure again. The second shocks will usually be somewhat less in strength than the initial pulse, and after several such reflections, the shock wave phase of the loading will be over. SHOCK (NCEL, 1988) is a computer code for estimating internal shock loads. This code can be used to calculate the blast impulse and pressure on all or part of a cubicle surface which is bounded by one to four rigid reflecting surfaces. The code calculates the maximum average pressure on the blast surface from the incident and each reflected wave and the total average impulse from the sum of all the waves. The duration of this impulse is also calculated by assuming a linear decay from the peak pressure. This code based on the procedures in TM 51300 (U.S. Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force 1990). Shock impulse and pressure are calculated for each grid point for the incident wave and for the shock reflecting off each adjacent surface. The program includes a reduced area option which allows determination of average shock impulse over a portion of the blast surface or at a single point on the surface. The code calculates blast parameters for scaled standoff distances (R/W1/3) between 0.2 (0.079 m/kg1/3) and 100.0 ft/lb1/3 (39.7 m/kg1/3). The program does not account for gas pressure load contributions. This is handled by using a separate method (i.e., the FRANG code) to predict the quasi-static portion of the load history and combining the two curves to form the complete pressure-time history. It is important to note that the shock and quasi-static pressures are not added where they overlap, but are merely intersected to define the load history. The BLASTX code (Britt 1992), treats the combined shock wave (including multiple reflections off walls) and explosive gas pressure produced by the detonation of a conventional high 9

explosive in a closed or vented, rigid or responding (walls are allowed to fail under gas pressure loading), rectangular, cylindrical, or L-shaped rooms. The code allows the propagation of shocks and gas into adjacent rectangular or box-shaped spaces. The shock wave effects can be calculated only for bare, spherical TNT explosive charges; however, the gas pressure model can treat an arbitrary mixture of several explosive components. The code does have the capability to treat multiple non simultaneous explosions in a room, modifications of shock arrival times and peak pressures to account for Mach stem effects, and the option to obtain pressure and impulse wave forms averaged over a number of target points on a wall. As with SHOCK, it does not account for movement of any of the walls or the roof, although recent versions of the code do allow openings to occur based on defined failure criteria and as created by combined shock and gas pressures. Gas pressures are propagated through failed surfaces. Shocks are not vented through failed openings, however. Another code is BLASTINW, a forerunner to BLASTX, is described in the literature (U.S. Department of Energy 1992). Initial shock loads are predicted using free-field curve fits to blast data (Kingery and Bulmash 1984) and are converted to wall shock loads using results from hydrocode calculations (Hikida and Needham 1981, Needham 1983). This shock wave reflection model is in good agreement with the standard TNT pressure and impulse peak values for reflection at normal incidence over the pressure range from 1 to 90,000 psi (7 to 621 MPa). The code has been validated for selected cases for pressure up to about 1,000 psi (7 MPa) at oblique reflection angles. Effects of wall reflections are accounted for by postulating the detonation of image charges behind each wall, with proper timing. Wave forms for the loads are obtained by fits to modified exponential decays for positive phases, and exponential times sine functions for negative phases. The code purports to properly handle Mach reflections, and it does account for loads from multiple shock reflections for all walls in the assumed closed room. The gas pressure model has been validated up to high pressure levels for TNT and PETN and to lower levels for other explosives (Britt 1989). Gas Pressure When an explosion from a high-explosive source occurs within a structure, the blast wave reflects from the inner surfaces of the structure, implodes toward the center, and re-reflects one or more times. The amplitude of the re-reflected waves usually decays with each reflection, and eventually the pressure settles to what is termed the gas pressure loading realm. When considering poorly vented or unvented chambers, the gas load duration can be much longer than the response time of the structure, appearing nearly static over the time to maximum response. Under this condition, the gas load is often referred to as a quasi-static load. When considering vented chambers, the gas pressure drops quickly in time as a function of room volume, vent area, mass of vent panels, and energy release of the explosion, and depending on the response time of structural elements under consideration, may not be considered quasi-static. The gas load starts at time zero and overlaps the shock load phase without adding to the shock load, as illustrated in Figure 5, where the shock phase and the gas phase are idealized as such as that shown and which should be used in design. They intersect at the load time pair (Pi, Ti) to 10

p Figure 5. Typical combined shock and gas load (U.S. Department of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, 1990)

form the bilinear load history, such as that shown and that should be used in design. Since the shock and gas loading are parts of the entire load history, although they are calculated separately, they should not be considered separately in design or analysis Various procedures are available for predicting the peak gas pressure in a structure (e.g., ConWep, Hyde 1993). One such curve is provided in TM 5-1300 (U.S. Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force 1990), as shown in Figure 6. The charge weight to free volume ratio has to be computed, as described in TM 5-1300 (U.S. Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force 1990).

Figure 6.

Peak gas pressure for TNT detonation in unvented chambers (U.S. Department of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, 1990) 11

Alternatively, the computer code FRANG (Wager and Connett 1989) can be used to calculate a time history of gas pressure and impulse which results from an explosion inside a rectangular room. The code considers the effect of the escape of gas from the room through vents, both uncovered and covered by a frangible panel. The vent area is a function of the frangible panel displacement with time while the uncovered vents have a constant vent area. The required input for the code includes charge weight and type, room volume, covered and uncovered vent areas, covered vent perimeter, unit surface weight of frangible panel, initial recessed depth of the panel, shock impulse on the panel, and the analysis time step. Ballistic Attack Another class of threats is related to ballistic attack. Information on various weapon systems that could be used for such applications can be found in several sources (e.g., Department of the Army 1986, Conrath at al. 1999), and the following summary is based on information from those references. Ballistic threats are specified in terms of a projectile's caliber, its impact velocity, its impact kinetic energy, and the number of such impacts to be expected or tested. Such threats are divided into the categories of ?small arms? (which is taken to include projectile calibers up to, but not including, 12.7 mm or .50 caliber) and ?larger caliber? (which includes projectiles of 12.7 mm or greater). A standard establishes four ballistic levels, as described in Table 2. Tests for the three small arms ratings consist of three shots near the center of the sample, while the test for the high-powered rifle consists of a single impact near the center of the sample. Nevertheless, there are other standards for such ordnance (e.g., The National Institute of Justice, NIJ, or U.S. Department of State, Naval Civil Engineering Laboratory), as shown in Table 3 and Table 4. All of the projectiles of Tables 2 through 4 are commercially available or are U.S. military rounds. Each of the specifications cited is intended to be used for the qualification of structural components designed to defeat the specified projectiles. The .50 and its 12.7 mm counterpart has been widely distributed and adopted by almost all countries. Ammunition has been manufactured in many countries, and it has bullet weight between about 500 and 700 grains, and muzzle velocities between about 2800 and 3500 fps. All these rounds represent projectiles that may be encountered during a ballistic attack, and one can compute their penetration into various materials by using procedures in various manuals (e.g., Department of the Army 1986), or with the computer code ConWep (Hyde 1993). Ground Shock Usually, ground shock is not a significant issue for terrorist incidents, since such attacks involve above ground explosions. Nevertheless, one may have to consider ground shock for special cases (e.g., if a threat might include a buried charge). This paper will not address this issue beyond providing a reference to other sources that contain such information (e.g., ASCE 1985, Department of the Army 1986). Also, one could use ConWep (Hyde 1993) for assessing such effects. 12

Table 2. Ratings of bullet-resisting material per UL-752 Power Rating Weapon Projectile/Weight (grains)/Type 130/Metal Case 158/Lead 240/Lead 220/Soft Point Muzzle Velocity (fps )1 1,230 1,450 1,470 2,410 Kinetic Energy (ft-lb) 457 740 1,150 2,830

Medium-Small Arms High-Small Arms Super-Small Arms High-Rifle

1 2

Super 38 Automatic .357 Magnum Revolver .44 Magnum Revolver 30-06 Rifle

To convert feet to meters, multiply by 0.3048 To convert foot-pounds (force) to joules, multiply by 1.356 Fragmentation Effects

Fragmentation effects are expected to be associated with explosions and terrorist attacks. These effects are complicated, but they can be assessed by using the procedures in several manuals (e.g., Department of the Army 1986, Department of the Army, Navy and Air Force 1990, US Department of Energy 1992, etc.). The procedures in these manuals enable one to estimate the penetration of explosively driven fragments into various typical construction materials. These fragments could be from either military munitions or from improvised devices. Since these procedures are empirical and require the use of various tables and charts, it is more useful to employ the computer code ConWep (Hyde 1993) for quick assessments. The combined effects of fragments and blast is even more complicated, and the available practical approaches for assessing such effects are limited.

13

Table 3. Threat level ratings per NIJ 0108.01 Armor Type Ammunition Bullet Weight (grains) 40 158 158 124 158 124 240 124 150 166 Nominal Bullet Velocity (fps) 1,050 850 1,250 1,090 1,395 1,175 1,400 1,400 2,750 2,850 Nominal Kinetic Energy (ft-lb) (E = 0.5mv2) 100 255 550 330 685 380 1,050 540 2,520 3,000

I II-A II III-A

22 LRHV Lead 38 Special RN Lead 357 Magnum JSP 9-mm FMJ 357 Magnum JSP 9-mm FMJ 44 Magnum Lead SWC Gas Checked 99-mm FMJ 7.62-mm M80 FMJ (308 Winchester) Cal .30 AP M2

III IV

Table 4. Ballistic ratings per SD-STD-01.02 Ballistic Rating Cartridge Nominal Velocity (fps) 1,400 1,325 2,750 3,185 1,325 2,750 2,850 1,325 Kinetic Energy (ft-lb) (E = 0.5mv2) 500 NA 2,470 1,240 NA 2,520 2,980 NA

Minimum Standard Submachine Gun 12-Gauge Shotgun Rifle Standard Rifle 12-Gauge Shotgun Rifle Standard (AP) Rifle, AP 12 Gauge Shotgun

9-mm, 115-grain FMJ (Steel Jacket) #4 Buck Shot 7.62-mm NATO, M80 Ball 147 grains 5.56-mm, M193, Ball 55 grains #4 Buck Shot 7.62-mm AP, M61, 150-grain 30-06, AP, M2, 165-grain #4 Buck Shot 14

Conclusions and Recommendations Defending society against terrorism requires a well planned layered approach. Besides the serious needs for innovative intelligence and law enforcement capabilities to counter such threats, society must invest in the development of effective protective technologies. Such technologies, that are vital for insuring the safety of people and the preservation of valuable assets, are the last layer of defense against this type of incidents. The future of R&D in protective technology must be reshaped accordingly. The study of heavily fortified military facilities may no longer be the main area of concern (although the technology in this area must be kept relevant). Careful attention must be devoted to typical civilian facilities whose failure could severely disrupt the social and economic infrastructure of nations. We lack essential knowledge on how such facilities (office buildings, schools, hospitals, power stations, etc.) behave under blast, shock, impact and fire loads. Many materials and components that are typically used in such buildings were never studied for these applications. Furthermore, one must not employ only empirical approaches to address these issues (e.g., using high explosive tests to observe consequences). One must employ innovative approaches that combine theoretical, numerical and experimental approaches, and to conduct these activities in a well-coordinated collaborative activity between government, academic, and private organizations. Furthermore, this development must be conducted in the context of multi-protective technology, addressing the complementary needs and potential benefits of addressing natural hazards and threats associated with human activities. This general field is one of the last frontiers in engineering that provides both tremendous challenges and the potential for great achievements. To address these issues, one must establish comprehensive long- and short-term R&D activities in protective technology, and to develop innovative and effective blast, shock, impact and fire mitigation technologies. These are required to insure the safety of government, military and civilian personnel and facilities under evolving terrorist threats. Furthermore, to launch effective technology transfer and training vehicles that will insure that the required knowledge and protective technologies will be fully and adequately implemented. Since this evolving threat affects many countries and it endangers the stability of the entire world, the required R&D should be conducted in a collaborative multinational framework. References ASCE, Design of Blast Resistant Buildings in Petrochemical Facilities, American Society of Civil Engineers, 1997. ASCE, Design of Structures to Resist Nuclear Weapons Effects, American Society of Civil Engineers, Manual No. 42, 1985. Baker, W.E., Explosions in Air, Wilfred Baker Engineering, San Antonio, 2nd Printing, 1983. 15

Baker, W.E., Cox, P.A., Westine, P.S., Kulesz, J.J., Strehlow, R.A., Explosion Hazards and Evaluation, Elsevier, 1983. Britt, J.R., Enhancements of the BLASTX Code for Blast and Thermal Propagation in Protective Structures: BLASTX Version 2.0, prepared for U.S. Army Engineer Waterways Experiment Station, Vicksburg, MS, by Science Applications International Corporation, November 2, 1992. Conrath, E.,J., Krauthammer, T., Marchand, K.A., and Mlakar, P.F., Structural Design for Physical Security, ASCE, 1999. Cranz, C., Lehrbuch der Ballistik, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1926. Department of the Army, Fundamentals of Protective Design for Conventional Weapons, Technical Manual TM 5-855-1, November 1986. Departments of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, Structures to Resist the Effects of Accidental Explosions, Revision 1 (Department of the Army Technical Manual TM 5-1300, Department of the Navy Publication NAVFAC P-397, Department of the Air Force Manual AFM 88-22), November 1990. Hikida, S., and Needham, C.E., Low Altitude Multiple Burst (LAMB) Model; Vol I: Shock Description, S-Cubed-R-81-5067, S-Cubed, 1981. Hokanson, J.C., Esparza, E.D., Wenzel, A.B. and Price, P.D., Blast Effects of Simultaneous Multiple-Charge Detonations, Contractor Report ARLCD-CR-78032 (AD-E400 232), U.S. Army ARRADCOM, Dover, NJ, October 1978. Hopkinson, B., British Ordnance Board Minutes, 13565, 1915. Huffington, N.J., Jr., and Ewing, W.O., Reflected Impulse Near Spherical Charges, Technical Report BRL-TR-2678, U.S. Army BRL, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, September 1985. Hyde, D.W., User Guide for Microcomputer Code ConWep, Instruction Report SL-88-1, US Army, Waterways Experiment Station, April 1988 (Revised 22 February 1993). Johansson, C.H. and Persson, P.A., Detonics of High Explosives, Academic Press, 1970. Kingery, C.N., and Bulmash, G., Airblast Parameters from TNT Spherical Air Burst and Hemispherical Surface Burst, Technical Report ARBRL-TR-02555, U.S. Army ARDC-BRL, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, April 1984. NCEL, SHOCK Users Manual, Version 1.0, Naval Civil Engineering Laboratory, Port Hueneme, CA, January 1988. 16

U.S. Department of Energy, A Manual for the Prediction of Blast and Fragment Loadings on Structures, Revision 1, DOE/TIC-11268, Albuquerque Operations Office, July 1992. Wager, P., and Connett, J., FRANG User's Manual, Naval Civil Engineering Laboratory, Port Hueneme, CA, May 1989.

17