In order to delineate the specific difference of man as a spiritual subject, de Finance begins with an analysis of the varying levels

of being (del reale) according to the law: Each thing must reveal what it is and what it is worth in its action1. The first level is that of material being. Seemingly deprived of interiority, it is a relative being that is completely oriented towards the exterior. Its metaphysical condition is that of spatiality, characteristic of those beings which are innately outside of themselves (fuori di s), possessing almost no axiological value. These considerations, however, do not presume to put into doubt its value on a transcendental level, merely that in this case its value is completely dependent on its quantity and nothing more. Likewise, the negation of interiority is not to be interpreted as absolute. In so far as an existing being, having its proper actuality, the individual material exercises an act that is truly its own; still this shadow of interiority is entirely subordinated to the exteriority. It is a being-for-the-universe (essere-per-luniverso), unable to act as an agent; rather, it must be activated by the surrounding environment. In the next level, a new orientation appears: endowed with a more secure and intense interiority, living beings impose a certain order upon matter and its mutation. Its individuality inaugurates a new sense of autonomy. One that is certainly still dependent upon the totality of the physical word and its laws; yet these are assumed and directed by a new order. More than an addition to the already present physical-chemical energies, life unites, informs, and orientates these according to its proper end, becoming, to a certain degree, cause of itself. Now, as the intensity of interiority increase, so too does the efficiency of its exterior orientation. On the one hand, the relationship between this inner unity and its end is to be called a tendency, or an appetite: the effort of being to maintain and develop itself2. With natural appetite, we come upon an elementary form of intentionality through which the being reaches out to that which is valuable in so far as it fills an emptiness, the absence of desired perfection. On the other hand, in the fact that they are capable of generation, livings beings exhibit a superior form of transitivity which not only exercises an exterior effect (as possible in the case of the mineral beings), but one that is in addition fruit of an interior exercise. The greater distinction between interiority and exteriority, in turn, forces us to
1

De Finance J., Saggio sullagire umano, cit., p. 217: Ogni cosa deve, nel suo agire, rivelare ci che e ci che vale. 2 19

recognize that there is more to know that what it is hic et nunc, and within we see a sort of imitation of what will become characteristic of the spirit: a project of itself [that goes] beyond itself3. In the level that follows, the characteristics of immanence and autonomy are understood on completely superior level when applied to the sensibile consciousness, the best defining characteristic of animality. The immanent and directing idea (idea immanente e direttrice) of the animal no longer merely informs its material structure, diffusing its presents throughout; it rather distances itself interiorly from it, becoming both freer and more domineering, that is, more cause of its actions. The faculty of movement offers a clear sign of this in its spatial autonomy, unlike that of the vegetal being, and permits a greater dominion over its life and environment. As in the case of the living being, the animal is more than what it is, in the sense that it its greater than its realizations. Along with the characteristics of the natural appetite and generation, here, we come across an original novelty in the order of beings4: with the sensible consciousness appears a certain openness towards others that allow them to be interiorized, to be interiorly present as objects. This in turn implies a certain subjectivity. As a new level of intentionality, the objects are grasped not only as needs, but now as desired beings. The animal is aware of his needs and experiments a certain prefigured absence of the desired beings, configuring a sort of affectivity intentionally oriented toward the other5. To be precise, however, the animals semi-freedom is a very limited in so far as the superior psychological echelon is ironically oriented towards the inferior biological finality. It is unaware and subject to its diverse psychological states and while its sensibile consciousness renders it more efficient in the acquisition of the biological ends, the animal itself does not establish those ends Whats more, the interior presence of the object is always reduced according to its empirical and utilitarian dimensions. They are never grasped in themselves nor for themselves. As such, we have come across a high level of naturalistic determinism, yet have yet to discover an interiority in proper sense that will only become manifest in the subject, in the I of man.

3 4

22 See the principle of novelty, p. 24 5 31

Finally, we arrive at the case of human being and one of the his specific characteristics to which de Finance dedicates the entire first chapter: motivation. The intentionality which animates mans capacity to represent objects is qualitatively superior in so far as it is exceeds to the need-based and sensibile restrictions of the animalistic intentionality, possessing a deeper and rational orientation towards being in itself. The subject-object relationship is thus defined with greater precision and enriched. The object no longer exists in so far as it physically responds to negatively inscribed desire, as in the case of the natural appetite, nor is it something unconsciously desired as valuable, as in the case of the sensible appetite. The spiritual appetite is, instead, able to reflect and therefore desire thematically its formal object6. Man is thus able to not only represent his object of desire but also to realize why he desires it, the motivation for such desire. This capacity to acknowledge the object in itself and its honest, objective value, in addition to the reflective awareness of such value all the more human in so far as it is perceived means that man reaches a new level of causality concerning his actions. The binds of determinism that constrict the biological and psychological levels are broken, such that we can affirm an authentic finality in mans action, highlighting his unique teleological character: This finality regards the complete dominion of human action, even when the end doesnt seem to be proposed or wanted as such7. [Speak of the original intention, p. 63?] This teleological character allows the will to remain faithful to it proper projects. This is, however, conditioned and qualified by the demand, or appeal, made of the subject by the appearance of a value. Recognizable only by the incarnate spirit, that which was considered to be merely pleasurable to lesser beings is now attributed with an axiological status. Aware of its value, and appreciating it as such, man receives the appeal which mobilizes his forces in view of putting the possible valente into existence8. This value is presented not only as and object of desire in so far as it perfective, that is, capable of actuating the perfectible subject. It is also presented as an object of love, possessing an intrinsic perfection9 which justifies its own existence even without the appreciation of the subject, an example being a beautiful piece of art10. The characteristic of mobilization is to be understand analogically as type of efficient cause by which
6 7

50 59 8 75 9 See p. 81 10 See p. 75

the good truly acts through and overabundance of his act of being11, imposing itself upon the subject, actuating and specifying his originally impulse (slanico)12. [maestry of his own act? P. 107] This capacity to propose for himself a certain end to reach or a certain value to realize is put into practice constantly by man, proposing not only one end, but many. This wanting of another thing (volere-unaltra-cosa) takes place on two axises, one horizontal, designated by de Finance as the passage (passaggio), and another vertical, or overcoming (superamento). While the animal is capable of the passage, continually skipping from one object or value to another object, to another value of the same order13, it is proper of man to give rise to new values, situating himself on different levels of being14. Man is a restless being, impulsed to open himself up to ever greater horizons, undergoing the relentless experience of the insufficiency offered by that which is passing and superficial. Albeit obscurely in many cases, man, reflecting back on the nature and extent of his desire, from sphere to sphere, elevates himself to the absolute sphere, where, the entire Ideal posses by itself the proper moving virtue15. The desire of this Ideal, inscribed in the structure of the voluntas ut natura, comes to constitute the primum movens of human acting16. What is, now, the meaning of this Ideal? The Ideal is to explained by de Finance to be the finality towards which the subject tends and which has been interiorized with his being17. It is perfection in so far as absent, an absence, however, that is lived and consciousness; one which resides in the consciouss horizon as a perpetual invitation18. That said, it nevertheless is non-existing and as an object of loves adhesion there must be an Existent, from which such Idea borrows its force of attraction19. At first glance, it seems to be an expression of the subject itself, but the subject completed, integrated and blossomed in the full
11 12

100 See p. 109. 13 113: Per passaggio intendiamo lo slittamento continuo da un oggetto o da un valore, ad un alto oggetto, ad un altro valore dello stesso ordine. 14 115: Al contrario, proprio delluomo far sorgere nuovi valori situandosi su differenti livelli di essere. 15 117: Lo spirito, di sfera in sfera, si eleva fino alla sfera assoluta, dove, lIdeale intero possiede da se stesso la propria virt motivante. 16 116 17 p. 141: la sua finalit si interiorizzata col suo essere. 18 See p. 141-142. 19 p. 142.

actuation of his possibilities20. Still, inscribed in mans nature is his openness to others, or whats more, his openness to Being (Essere). Therein lies a radical tendency or impulse, previous to all desires, that pushes man beyond himself, towards others, yes, but even further. He too, and much more so than the plants and animals, is radically more than what he is finitely21. This Existent, then, from which the originario impulse (slancio) withdraws all its vigor can be non other than God, the true Ideal and supreme motor of action.

20

p. 157: LIdeale del soggetto, ancora il soggetto stesso, ma il soggetto compiuto, integrato, sbocciato nella piena attuazione dei suoi possibili. 21 See p. 180.