Emergency Usa1

Standards Council Meeting
Agenda
July 29-August 1, 2013

NFPA
1 Batterymarch Park
Quincy, MA 02169
(617) 770-3000

13-8-1 Act on the issuance of NFPA 25, Standard for the Inspection, Testing, and
Maintenance of Water-Based Fire Protection Systems, with an issuance date of
August 1, 2013 and an effective date of August 21, 2013, as acted on at the
Association Meeting, with six amendments as follows:
13-8-1-a Amendment No. 25-1 (CAM 25-4): Accept an Identifiable Part of Proposal 25-47.
(FAILED TC ballot) See Attachment 13-8-1-a
13-8-1-a-1
APPEAL
Appeal of K. Isman of National Fire Sprinkler Association, requesting the Council
uphold the Association Action to Accept an Identifiable part of Proposal 25-47.
This motion (CAM 25-4) passed on the floor of the Association Meeting but failed
TC ballot. See SA 13-8-1-a-1 ADDITION
13-8-1-a-1-a Comment received by W. Koffel, Chair of the Inspection, Testing, and
Maintenance of Water-Based Systems Committee on the appeal by K. Isman.
(CAM 25-4) See SA 13-8-1-a-1-a ADDITION
13-8-1-a-2 Two comments received on the Appeal filed by K. Isman in support of the Appeal.
See SA 13-8-1-a-2 ADDITION
13-8-1-b Amendment No. 25-2 (CAM 25-5): Accept Comment 25-32. (FAILED TC
ballot) See Attachment 13-8-1-b
13-8-1-b-1
APPEAL
uphold the Association Action to Accept Comment 25-32. This motion (CAM 25-
5) passed on the floor of the Association Meeting but failed TC ballot. See SA 13-
8-1-b-1 ADDITION
13-8-1-b-1-a Comment received by W. Koffel, Chair of the Inspection, Testing, and
(CAM 25-5) See SA 13-8-1-b-1-a ADDITION
13-8-1-b-2 One comment received on the Appeal filed by K. Isman in support of the Appeal.
See SA13-8-1-b-2 ADDITION
13-8-1-c Amendment No. 25-3 (CAM 25-7): Accept Comment 25-34. (FAILED TC
ballot) See Attachment 13-8-1-c
13-8-1-c-1
APPEAL
8-1-c-1 ADDITION
13-8-1-c-1-a Comment received by W. Koffel, Chair of the Inspection, Testing, and
(CAM 25-7) See SA 13-8-1-c-1-a ADDITION
13-8-1-c-2 One comment received on the Appeal filed by K. Isman in support of the Appeal.
See SA 13-8-1-c-2 ADDITION
July 22, 2013 Supplemental Agenda July 29-August 1, 2013 Page 1 of 1861
Supplemental Agenda

13-8-1-d Amendment No. 25-4 (CAM 25-9): Accept Comment 25-44. (FAILED TC
ballot) See Attachment 13-8-1-d
13-8-1-d-1
APPEAL
8-1-d-1 ADDITION
13-8-1-d-1-a Comment received by W. Koffel, Chair of the Inspection, Testing, and
(CAM 25-9) See SA 13-8-1-d-1-a ADDITION
13-8-1-e Amendment No. 25-5 (CAM 25-17): Accept Comment 25-99. (FAILED TC
ballot) See Attachment 13-8-1-e
13-8-1-e-1
APPEAL
17) passed on the floor of the Association Meeting but failed TC ballot. See SA
13-8-1-e-1 ADDITION
13-8-1-e-1-a Informational ballot on CAM 25-17 See SA 13-8-1-e-1-a ADDITION
13-8-1-f Amendment No. 25-6 (CAM 25-19): Accept Comment 25-107. (FAILED TC
ballot) See Attachment 13-8-1-f
13-8-1-f-1
APPEAL
uphold the Association Action to Accept Comment 25-107. This motion (CAM
25-19) passed on the floor of the Association Meeting but failed TC ballot. See
SA 13-8-1-f-1 ADDITION
13-8-1-f-1-a Comment received by W. Koffel, Chair of the Inspection, Testing, and
Maintenance of Water-Based Systems Committee on the appeal by K. Isman. SA
13-8-1-f-1-a ADDITION
13-8-1-g
APPEAL
Appeal of R. Huggins of American Fire Sprinkler Association, requesting the
Council reject Comment 25-162. This motion (CAM 25-29) was not pursued by
the submitter of the CAM at the Association Meeting. See Attachment 13-8-1-g
13-8-1-g-1 One comment received on the Appeal filed by R. Huggins in support of the
Appeal. See Attachment 13-8-1-g-1
13-8-1-g-1-a Comment received by W. Koffel, Chair of the Inspection, Testing, and
Maintenance of Water-Based Systems Committee on the appeal by R. Huggins.
(CAM 25-29) See SA 13-8-1-g-1-a ADDITION
13-8-1-g-2
APPEAL
accept Comment 25-162. This motion (CAM 25-29) was not pursued by the
submitter of the CAM at the Association Meeting. See SA 13-8-1-g-2 ADDITION
13-8-1-h
APPEAL
Appeal of W. Koffel of Koffel Fire Protection Engineers, requesting the Council
amend the text in 8.3.4.3 of NFPA 25 to correlate with NFPA 20. See Attachment
13-8-1-h
13-8-1-h-1 Two comments received on the Appeal filed by W. Koffel in support of the
Appeal. See Attachment 13-8-1-h-1
13-8-2 Act on the issuance of NFPA 58, Liquefied Petroleum Gas Code, with an issuance
date of August 1, 2013 and an effective date of August 21, 2013, as acted on at the
Association Meeting, with two amendments as follows:
13-8-2-a Amendment No. 58-1 (CAM 58-2): Accept Proposal 58-73. (PASSED TC ballot)
See Attachment 13-8-2-a
13-8-2-b Amendment No. 58-2 (CAM 58-3): Accept Comment 58-50. (FAILED TC
ballot) See Attachment 13-8-2-b
13-8-2-b-1
APPEAL
Appeal of R. Fredenburg of North Carolina Department of Agriculture and
Consumer Services, Standards Division, requesting the Council accept Comment
58-50. This motion (CAM-58-3) passed on the floor of the Association Meeting
but failed TC ballot. See SA13-8-2-b-1 ADDITION
13-8-2-b-2 Comment received by F. Mortimer, Chair of the Liquefied Petroleum Gases
Committee on the appeal by R. Fredenburg. (CAM 58-3) See SA 13-8-2-b-2
ADDITION
13-8-3 Act on the issuance of NFPA 70, National Electrical Code
, with an issuance date

of August 1, 2013 and an effective date of August 21, 2013, as acted on at the
Association Meeting, with eleven amendments as follows:
13-8-3-a Amendment No. 70-1 (CAMs 70-2 and 70-3): Related Motions to Reject
Comments 2-33 and 2-34. (FAILED TCC ballot PASSED Panel ballot) See
Attachment 13-8-3-a See SA 13-8-3-a
13-8-3-b
APPEAL
Appeal of M. Hirschler of GBH International, requesting the Council overturn the
Association action, and accept Comment 3-21. This motion (CAM 70-5) failed on
the floor of the Association Meeting. See Attachment 13-8-3-b See SA 13-8-3-b
13-8-3-c

Amendment No. 70-2 (CAMs 70-7, 70-8, 70-9 and 70-10): Related Motions to
Reject Comments 6-4, 6-5, 6-6 and 6-7. (PASSED TCC ballot FAILED Panel
ballot) See Attachment 13-8-3-c See SA 13-8-3-c
13-8-3-d
APPEAL
Appeal of T. Lindsey of Travis Lindsey Consulting Services, Inc., requesting the
Council Reject Comment 6-37. This motion (CAM 70-12) failed on the floor of
the Association Meeting. See Attachment 13-8-3-d SA 13-8-3-d
13-8-3-d-1 Two comments received on the Appeal filed by T. Lindsey. See Attachment 13-8-
3-d-1
13-8-3-d-2 Comment received by S. Cline, Chair of NEC Panel 6, on the appeal by T.
Lindsey. (CAM 70-12). See SA 13-3-d-2 ADDITION
13-8-3-e

Amendment No. 70-3 (CAM 70-13): Accept Comment 7-14. (PASSED TCC
ballot FAILED Panel ballot) See SA 13-8-3-e
13-8-3-f

ballot FAILED Panel ballot) See Attachment 13-8-3-f See SA 13-8-3-f
13-8-3-g

Amendment No. 70-5 (CAM 70-21): Group Amending Motion to accept Proposal
12-129 and accept Comment 12-60. (PASSED TCC ballot FAILED Panel ballot)
See Attachment 13-8-3-g See SA 13-8-3-g
13-8-3-g-1
APPEAL
Appeal of T. Wysocki of Guardian Services, Inc., requesting the Council uphold
the Association action and accept Proposal 12-129 and Comment 12-60. This
motion (CAM 70-21) passed on the floor of the Association Meeting but failed TC
ballot. See SA 13-8-3-g-1 ADDITION
13-8-3-g-1-a Comment received by T. Croushore, Chair of NEC Panel 12, on the appeal by T.
Wysocki. (CAM 70-21). See SA 13-3-g-1-a ADDITION
13-8-3-g-1-b Additional information regarding the jurisdiction of combustibles in raised floor
areas of computer rooms. See SA 13-8-3-g-1-b ADDITION
13-8-3-g-2 Appeal of S. McCluer of Schneider Electric Information Technology, requesting
the Council uphold the Association action and accept Proposal 12-129 and
Comment 12-60. This motion (CAM 70-21) passed on the floor of the Association
Meeting but failed TC ballot. See SA 13-8-3-g-2 ADDITION
13-8-3-g-2-a Comment received by T. Croushore, Chair of NEC Panel 12, on the appeal by T.
Wysocki. (CAM 70-21). See SA 13-3-g-2-a ADDITION
13-8-3-g-2-b One comment received on the Appeals filed by S. McCluer and S. Kaufman in
support of the Appeals. See SA13-8-3-g-2-b ADDITION
13-8-3-g-3 Appeal of S. Kaufman representing The Society of the Plastics Industry,
requesting the Council accept Proposal 12-129 and revert back to ROP text. A
motion (CAM 70-21) passed on the floor of the Association Meeting but failed TC
ballot to accept Proposal 12-129 and Comment 12-60. See SA 13-8-3-g-3
ADDITION
13-8-3-h

ballot PASSED Panel ballot) See SA 13-8-3-h
13-8-3-i

Amendment No. 70-7 (CAMs 70-25 and 70-26): Related Motions to accept
Comments 13-46 and 13-54. (PASSED TCC ballot FAILED Panel ballot) See
Attachment 13-8-3-i See SA 13-8-3-i
13-8-3-i-1
APPEAL
Appeal of J . Conrad of RSCC Wire & Cable LLC, requesting the Council overturn
the Association action on CAMs 70-25 and 70-26; and reject Comments 3-46 and
13-54, this related motion passed on the floor of the Association Meeting. See
Attachment 13-8-3-i-1
13-8-3-j

Amendment No. 70-8 (CAMs 70-27 and 70-28): Related Motions to accept
Attachment 13-8-3-j See SA 13-8-3-j
13-8-3-j-1
APPEAL
the Association action on CAMs 70-27 and 70-28; and reject Comments 13-59 and
13-62, this related motion passed on the floor of the Association Meeting. See
Attachment 13-8-3-j-1
13-8-3-k

Amendment No. 70-9 (CAM 70-29): Accept Comment 13-76. PASSED TCC
ballot FAILED Panel ballot) See Attachment 13-8-3-k See SA 13-8-3-k
13-8-3-k-1
APPEAL
the Association action on CAM 70-29 and reject Comment 13-76, this motion
passed on the floor of the Association Meeting. See Attachment 13-8-3-k-1
13-8-3-l

Amendment No. 70-10 (CAM 70-31 and 70-32): Related Motions to accept
Attachment 13-8-3-l See SA 13-8-3-1
13-8-3-l-1
APPEAL
the Association action on CAM 70-31 and 70-32; and reject Comments 13-101
and 12-102, this related motion passed on the floor of the Association Meeting.
See Attachment 13-8-3-l-1
13-8-3-m
APPEAL
Appeal of D. Wechsler of the American Chemistry Council, requesting the
Council overturn the Association action, and accept an Identifiable Part of
Comment 14-56. This motion (CAM 70-36) failed on the floor of the Association
Meeting. See Attachment 13-8-3-m See SA 13-8-3-m
13-8-3-m-1 Comment received by R. J ones, Chair of Code Making Panel 14 on CAM 70-36
Appeal. See Attachment 13-8-3-m-1
13-8-3-m-2 Comments received by outgoing Chair J . Stallcup and incoming Chair W. Fiske of
the Electrical Safety in the Workplace Committee on the appeal by D. Wechsler.
(CAM 70-36) See SA 13-8-3-m-2 ADDITION
13-8-3-n

Amendment No. 70-11 (CAM 70-37): Accept Proposal 15-62 as modified by
Panel. (PASSED TCC ballot PASSED Panel ballot) See Attachment 13-8-3-n
See SA 13-8-3-n
13-8-3-o
APPEAL
Appeal of W. Vernon of Mazzetti Engineers, requesting the Council overturn the
NEC Panel 15 action and reject Proposal 15-64 which would return 517.30(E) to
previous edition text. No public comment was received on Proposal 15-64
resulting in the only person eligible to file a NITMAM would have been the
submitter. See Attachment 13-8-3-o
13-8-4 Act on the issuance of NFPA 96, Standard for Ventilation Control and Fire
Protection of Commercial Cooking Operations, with an issuance date of August 1,
2013 and an effective date of August 21, 2013, as acted on at the Association
Meeting, with one amendment as follows:
13-8-4-a Amendment No. 96-1 (CAM 96-3): Reject Comment 96-8. (PASSED TC ballot)
See Attachment 13-8-4-a
13-8-5 Act on the issuance of NFPA 130, Standard for Fixed Guideway Transit and
Passenger Rail Systems, with an issuance date of August 1, 2013 and an effective
date of August 21, 2013, as acted on at the Association Meeting, with one
amendment as follows:
13-8-5-a

Amendment No. 130-1 (CAM 130-1): Return a portion of a Report in the form of
an Identifiable part of Proposal 130-115 and related Comment 130-1. (PASSED
TC ballot) See Attachment 13-8-5-a
13-8-5-b
APPEAL
Appeal of A. Ramirez of Underwriters Laboratories requesting the Council
overturn the Association Action and Reject an Identifiable Part of Comment 130-
165. This motion (CAM 130-2) failed on the floor of the Association Meeting.
See Attachment 13-8-5-b
13-8-6 Act on the issuance of NFPA 502, Standard for Road Tunnels, Bridges, and Other
Limited Access Highways, with an issuance date of August 1, 2013 and an
effective date of August 21, 2013, as acted on at the Association Meeting, with one
13-8-6-a

Amendment No. 502-1 (CAM 502-1): Return a portion of a Report in the form of
Proposal 502-42 and related Comment 502-12. (PASSED TC ballot) See
Attachment 13-8-6-a
13-8-6-b
APPEAL
Appeal of A. Ramirez of Underwriters Laboratories requesting the Council
overturn the Association Action and Reject an Identifiable Part of Comment 502-
27. This motion (CAM 502-2) failed on the floor of the Association Meeting. See
Attachment 13-8-6-b
13-8-7 Act on the issuance of NFPA 801, Standard for Fire Protection for Facilities
Handling Radioactive Materials, with an issuance date of August 1, 2013 and an
effective date of August 21, 2013, as acted on at the Association Meeting, with one
13-8-7-a Amendment No. 801-1 (CAM 801-1): Accept Comment 801-16. (PASSED TC
ballot) See Attachment 13-8-7-a
13-8-8 Act on the issuance of NFPA 1061, Standard for Professional Qualifications for
Public Safety Telecommunicator, with an issuance date of August 1, 2013 and an
effective date of August 21, 2013, as acted on at the Association Meeting, with no
amendments. No Attachment
13-8-8-a
APPEAL
Appeal of C. McDuffie of APCO International requesting the Council overturn the
Association action and accept Comment 1061-2, accept Comments 1061-3 and
1061-4, and accept the motion to return the entire document. These motions
(CAMs 1061-1, 1061-2 and 1061-18) failed on the floor of the Association
Meeting. See Attachment 13-8-8-a
13-8-8-a-1 Comment received by J . Kilby-Richards, Chair of the Public Safety
Telecommunications Personnel Professional Qualifications Committee and W.
Peterson, Chair of the Professional Qualifications Correlating Committee on the
appeal of C. McDuffie. See Attachment 13-8-8-a-1
13-8-9 Administratively Withdrawn
13-8-10 Administratively Withdrawn
13-8-11 The 2013 Revision Cycle Consent Documents were letter balloted by the Council
with an issuance date of May 28, 2013 and an effective date of J une 17, 2013 as
shown below: No action is necessary

51B Standard for Fire Prevention During Welding, Cutting, and Other Hot
Work
56 Standard for Fire and Explosion Prevention During Cleaning and
Purging of Flammable Gas Piping Systems
77 Recommended Practice on Static Electricity
306 Standard for the Control of Gas Hazards on Vessels
403 Standard for Aircraft Rescue and Fire-Fighting Services at Airports
412 Standard for Evaluating Aircraft Rescue and Fire-Fighting Foam
Equipment
610 Guide for Emergency and Safety Operations at Motorsports Venues
Standard for the Installation of Lightning Protection Systems
780 Standard for the Installation of Lightning Protection Systems
1002 Standard for Fire Apparatus Driver/Operator Professional Qualifications
1021 Standard for Fire Officer Professional Qualifications
1026 Standard for Incident Management Personnel Professional Qualifications
1031 Standard for Professional Qualifications for Fire Inspector and Plan
Examiner
1033 Standard for Professional Qualifications for Fire Investigator
1143 Standard for Wildland Fire Management

The following 2014 Revision Cycle Consent Documents were letter balloted by
the Council:
1720 Standard for the Organization and Deployment of Fire Suppression
Operations, Emergency Medical Operations and Special Operations to the
Public by Volunteer Fire Departments with an issuance date of June 28,
2013 and an effective date of July 18, 2013
790 Standard for Competency of Third-Party Field Evaluation Bodies with an
issuance date of July 5, 2013 and an effective date of July 25, 2013
791 Recommended Practice and Procedures for Unlabeled Electrical
Equipment Evaluation with an issuance date of July 5, 2013 and an
effective date of July 25, 2013
1123 Code for Fireworks Display with an issuance date of July 26, 2013 and an
effective date of August 15, 2013
1851 Standard on Selection, Care, and Maintenance of Protective Ensembles for
Structural Fire Fighting and Proximity Fire Fighting with an issuance date
of July 26, 2013 and an effective date of August 15, 2013
No Attachment
13-8-12 Act on the issuance of proposed Tentative Interim Amendment (TIA) to Section
9.3.3 of the 2010 edition of NFPA 37, Standard for the Installation and Use of
Stationary Combustion Engines and Gas Turbines (TIA No. 1101).
13-8-12-a Text of proposed TIA No. 1101. See Attachment 13-8-12-a
13-8-12-b Ballot results of TIA No. 1101. PASSED the TC ballot on both technical merit
and emergency nature. See Attachment 13-8-12-b
13-8-12-c No comments received. No Attachment
6.6.3 of the 2010 and proposed 2014 editions of NFPA 37, Standard for the
Installation and Use of Stationary Combustion Engines and Gas Turbines (TIA
No. 1102).
13-8-13-c One comment was received. See Attachment 13-8-13-c
6.12.9 of the proposed 2014 edition of NFPA 58, Liquefied Petroleum Gas Code
(TIA No. 1095).
13-8-15 Act on the issuance of proposed Tentative Interim Amendment (TIA to sections
11.1.1, A.11.1.1 and 11.15.2 of the 2014 edition of NFPA 58, Liquefied Petroleum
Gas Code. (TIA No. 1079)

STAFF NOTE: At the March, 2013 Standards Council Meeting, TIA No. 1079
on NFPA 58, Liquefied Petroleum Gas Code, was proposed for the 2011 and 2014
editions. In the Regulations Governing Committee Projects (Regs) at Section 5.9,
TIAs shall apply to the document existing at the time of issuance, except in the
case of a document undergoing revisions where a TIA can apply to the existing
and next edition of the document. Since the 2014 edition of NFPA 58 had not
been submitted for issuance, the Council did not issue a TIA on the 2014 edition at
the time of issuing a TIA on the 2011 edition. The proposed TIA was to be placed
on the agenda for issuance concurrently with the 2014 edition of NFPA 58.
13-8-16 Act on the issuance of proposed Tentative Interim Amendment (TIA) to Sections
516.3(A)(1)(a) and 516.10(A) of the proposed 2014 edition of NFPA 70, National
Electrical Code
(TIA No. 1096).

13-8-16-b Ballot results of TIA No. 1096. PASSED the Panel ballot on both technical merit
and emergency nature; PASSED the CC ballot on correlation and emergency
nature. See Attachment 13-8-16-b
445.20 of the proposed 2014 edition of NFPA 70, National Electrical Code
(TIA
No. 1097).
13-8-17-b Ballot results of TIA No. 1097. FAILED the Panel ballot on both technical merit
and emergency nature; FAILED the CC ballot on correlation and emergency
13-8-17-d
APPEAL
Appeal of J . Harding of Portable Generator Manufacturers Association requesting
that the Council issue the proposed TIA to NFPA 70 (TIA No. 1097). See
Attachment 13-8-17-d See SA 13-8-17-d
10.2.3.6(5) and A.10.2.3.6 (5) of the 2012 and proposed 2015 edition of NFPA 99,
Health Care Facilities Code (TIA No. 1104).

STAFF NOTE: Please note that TIA No. 1104 on NFPA 99, Health Care
Facilities Code, is being proposed for the 2012 and the 2015 editions. In the
Regulations Governing the Development of NFPA Standards (Regs) at Section 5.9,
TIAs shall apply to the document existing at the time of issuance, except in the
case of a document undergoing revisions where a TIA can apply to the existing
and proposed editions. NFPA 99 is expected to be an A2014 document. If this
TIA on the 2012 edition is issued by the Standards Council, the proposed TIA for
the 2015 edition will be placed on a future Council agenda for consideration of
issuance concurrently with the 2015 edition of NFPA 99.
13-8-18-c Five comments were received. See Attachment 13-8-18-c
5.4.10, 6.3.3.2.10, 7.7.10, A.5.4.10.3, A.6.3.3.2.10.2 and A.7.7.10.2 of the 2010
and proposed 2014 editions of NFPA 130, Standard for Fixed Guideway Transit
and Passenger Rail Systems, (TIA No.1080).

STAFF NOTE: At its March 6-7, 2013 meeting the Council voted to defer action
on issuing proposed Tentative Interim Amendment (TIA) to Sections 5.4.10,
6.3.3.2.10, 7.7.10, A.5.4.10.3, A.6.3.3.2.10.2 and A.7.7.10.2 of the 2010 and
proposed 2014 editions of NFPA 130, Standard for Fixed Guideway Transit and
Passenger Rail Systems, (TIA No.1080). The Council directed the Technical
Committee seek further input from the National Electrical Code (NEC) Correlating
Committee and NEC Code Making Panel 13 on whether this TIA, if issued, would
cause any correlation issues with documents that report through the National
Electrical Code Project.
13-8-19-a Text of proposed TIA No. 1080 and Minute Item from March, 2013 meeting (13-
3-11). See Attachment 13-8-19-a
13-8-19-b Ballot results of TIA No. 1080. PASSED TC ballot on both technical merit and
emergency nature. See Attachment 13-8-19-b
13-8-19-c Four public comments were received. See Attachment 13-8-19-c
13-8-19-d
APPEAL
Appeal of A. Schaefer of Underwriters Laboratories requesting the Council not
issue TIA No. 1080 on NFPA 130, Standard for Fixed Guideway Transit and
Passenger Rail Systems. See Attachment 13-8-19-d
13-8-19-d-1 Comments on appeal from the Chairs of Fixed Guideway Transit and Passenger
Rail Systems and Road Tunnel and Highway Fire Protection. See Attachment 13-
8-19-d-1
13-8-19-e Report of the NEC Correlating Committee and NEC Code Making Panel 13. See
Attachment 13-8-19-e
13-8-19-f Informational ballot See Attachment 13-8-19-f
12.1.2 and A.12.1.2 of the 2011 and proposed 2014 editions of NFPA 502,
Standard for Road Tunnels, Bridges, and Other Limited Access Highways, (TIA
No. 1083).

STAFF NOTE: At its March 6-7, 2013 meeting the Council voted to defer action
on issuing proposed Tentative Interim Amendment (TIA) to Sections 12.1.2 and
A.12.1.2 of the 2011 and proposed 2014 editions of NFPA 502, Standard for Road
Tunnels, Bridges, and Other Limited Access Highways, (TIA No. 1083). The
Council directed the Technical Committee seek further input from the National
Electrical Code (NEC) Correlating Committee and NEC Code Making Panel 13 on
whether the TIA, if issued, would cause any correlation issues with documents that
report through the National Electrical Code Project.
13-8-20-a Text of proposed TIA No. 1083 and Minute Item from March, 2013 meeting (13-
3-11). See Attachment 13-8-20-a
13-8-20-b Ballot results of TIA No. 1083. PASSED TC ballot on both technical merit and
emergency nature. See Attachment 13-8-20-b
13-8-20-c Three public comments were received. See Attachment 13-8-20-c
13-8-20-d
APPEAL
Appeal of A. Schaefer of Underwriters Laboratories requesting the Council not
issue TIA No. 1083 on NFPA 502, Standard for Road Tunnels, Bridges, and Other
Limited Access Highways. See Attachment 13-8-20-d
13-8-20-d-1 Comments on appeal from the Chairs of Fixed Guideway Transit and Passenger
Rail Systems and Road Tunnel and Highway Fire Protection. See Attachment 13-
8-20-d-1
13-8-20-e Report of the NEC Correlating Committee and NEC Code Making Panel 13. See
13-8-20-f Informational Ballots. See SA 13-8-20-f ADDITION
13-8-21 Act on the issuance of proposed Tentative Interim Amendment (TIA) to various
Sections of the 2013 edition of NFPA 1951, Standard on Protective Ensembles for
Technical Rescue Incidents (TIA No. 1098).
13-8-21-c No comments were received. No Attachment
8.2.5(1) of the 2013 edition of NFPA 1951, Standard on Protective Ensembles for
Technical Rescue Incidents (TIA No. 1099).
Sections of the 2013 edition of NFPA 1971, Standard on Protective Ensembles for
Structural Fire Fighting and Proximity Fire Fighting (TIA No. 1100).
Sections of the 2013 edition of NFPA 1981, Standard on Open-Circuit Self-
Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) for Emergency Services (TIA No. 1111).
and emergency nature; PASSED/FAILED the CC ballot on correlating and
emergency nature. See SA 13-8-24-b ADDITION
13-8-24-c Six comments were received to date. Comment Closing Date is August 12, 2013.
See SA 13-8-24-c ADDITION
Sections of the 2013 edition of NFPA 1982, Standard on Personal Alert Safety
Systems (PASS) (TIA No. 1112).
and emergency nature; PASSED/FAILED the CC ballot on correlating and
emergency nature. See SA 13-8-25-b ADDITION
13-8-25-c One comment was received to date. Comment Closing Date is August 12, 2013.
See SA 13-8-25-c ADDITION
Sections of the 2012 edition of NFPA 2112, Standard on Flame-Resistant
Garments for Protection of Industrial Personnel Against Flash Fire (TIA No.
1105).
13-8-27
APPEAL
Appeal from G. Cahanin of Gregory J . Cahanin Fire Code Consulting requesting
the Council expunge a task group memorandum summary from being published
with Public Input 25 on NFPA 33-2011 and direct the NFPA 13 Technical
Committee to establish a new task group to review the indoor portion of Public
Input 25 on NFPA 33-2011. See Attachment 13-8-27
13-8-27-a Copy of Public Input 26 submitted by G. Cahanin. See Attachment 13-8-27-a See
SA 13-8-27-a
13-8-27-b Correspondence between G. Cahanin and Secretary of the Standards Council. See
Attachment 13-8-27-b See SA13-8-27-b
13-8-27-c Report of the Task Group from NFPA 13 on Membrane Structures. See
Attachment 13-8-27-c
13-8-27-d Comment received by T. Euson, Chair of the Technical Committee on Finishing
Processes, on the Appeal of G. Cahanin. See Attachment 13-8-27-d
13-8-28 At the March 2013 meeting, the Council reviewed the request of William Reilly of
Victaulic that NFPA establish a new standard for the application of hybrid, gas,
and fine water droplet systems. After review of all the material before it, the
Council voted to publish a notice to solicit public comments on the need for the
project, information on resources on the subject matter, those interested in
participating, if established, and other organizations actively involved with the
subject. The Council was specifically looking for manufacturers that are actively
developing hybrid droplet systems and whether there are enough common
installation practices and procedures available to support a standard, and the
intended application for this technology. The Council is also seeking input on
whether the subject matter could be covered by an existing technical committee or
possibly through the creation of a new document.

The comment period has passed and twenty-two comments were received. See SA
13-8-28
13-8-28-a Review the correspondence from the Code Fund concerning an information
gathering project on hybrid water mist systems that will be undertaken as a student
project with the University of Maryland. See SA 13-8-28-a ADDITION
13-8-29 Consider the request of Chief Kenneth Richards on behalf of the Technical
Committee on Fire Service Training that NFPA establish a new standard for
training structures, props, and equipment. See Attachment 13-8-29
13-8-30 Consider the request from Brian Montgomery, Chair of the Non-structural Fire
Fighting SCBA Committee to approve a Committee Scope. This Committee was
approved by the Council at their October, 2012 meeting. The proposed scope is as
follows:
Proposed Committee Scope: This Committee shall have primary
responsibility for documents on respiratory equipment, including breathing
air, for emergency response personnel other than those involved in
structural fire fighting operations, during incidents involving hazardous or
oxygen deficient atmospheres. These types of operations include tactical
law enforcement, confined space, and hazardous materials response
operations. This Committee shall also have primary responsibility for
documents on the selection, care and maintenance of respiratory equipment
and systems by emergency services organizations and personnel.
See Attachment 13-8-30 See SA 13-8-30
13-8-31 Consider requests from NFPA Committees to change revision cycles for the
following documents:
Doc Current Next Cycle Permanent or Revision Cycle For
No. Edition Rev Cycle Change One Time Move Each Document
10 2013 F2015 F2015 to F2016 Permanent Move 3 to 4 year cycle
31 2011 F2014 F2014 to F2015 One Time Move 4 to 5 year cycle
37 2010 F2013 F2017 to F2016 Permanent Move 4 to 3 year cycle
96 2014 A2016 A2016 to F2016 One Time Move 3 to 3 year cycle
See Attachment 13-8-31
13-8-32 Report of the Membership Task Group (M. Snyder, Chair)
13-8-32-a Act on pending applications for Committee Members. See SA13-8-32-a
13-8-32-b Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting Committees request approval for their
Guidelines for Additional Clarification of Interest Classifications for NFPA
Technical Committee Members and reclassification of members. See SA 13-8-32-
b
13-8-32-c Appeal from E. Bonifas of Alarm Detection Systems requesting the Council re-
evaluate some members of the Signaling Systems for the Protection of Life and
Property - Supervising Station Fire Alarm and Signaling Systems Committee. See
SA 13-8-32-c ADDITION
13-8-33 Report of the Policy and Procedures Task Group (J . Milke, Chair) See SA 13-8-33
13-8-34 Report of the Recording Secretary on the Minutes for the March 2013. No
Attachment
13-8-35 Review the dates and locations of upcoming Council Meetings, as follows:

October 22-23, 2013 (REVISED)
(TG Meeting 8:00 AM on October 22) San Diego, CA

March 5-6, 2014
(TG Meeting 8:00 AM on March 5) San J uan, Puerto Rico

August 11-14, 2014
(TG Meeting 12:00 PM on August 11) Quincy, MA

October 28-29, 2014
(TG Meeting 8:00 AM on October 28) TBD
13-8-36 Consider the request of Barry Badders, Chair of the Fire Test Committee that
NFPA consider the establishment of a new test method to evaluate fire/ignition
resistance of upholstered furniture subject to a flaming ignition source. The
proposed scope for the documents is as follows:

Proposed Document Scope: This document would provide a test method
to evaluate fire/ignition resistance of upholstered furniture subject to a
flaming ignition source.
See SA 13-8-36 ADDITION
13-8-37 Consider the request of the Confined Space Safe Work Practices Committee to
enter a new document NFPA 350, Guide for Safe Confined Space Entry and Work
into the Fall 2015 revision cycle. The Council approved the establishment of this
proposed document at the March 2007 Council Meeting.

Proposed Document Scope: This guide is intended to protect workers
who enter into confined spaces for inspection or testing or to perform
associated work from death and from lifethreatening and other injuries
or illnesses and to protect facilities, equipment, nonconfined space
personnel, and the public from injuries associated with confined space
incidents.
See SA 13-8-37 ADDITION

Item 13-8-4

ASSOCIATION AMENDMENT BALLOT RESULTS
DATE: July 8, 2013

AMENDMENT (96-3)

Document: NFPA 96, Standard for Ventilation and Fire Protection of Commercial Cooking Operations

Motion: To Reject Comment 96-8 and thereby Accept Proposal 96-17

TC FINAL Ballot Results
According to 4.7.1 in the NFPA (RGCP), the final results show this Amendment HAS achieved the
necessary
2
/
3
majority vote. The number of affirmative votes needed to obtain a recommendation to issue
the Amendment is 17 [29 (eligible to vote) 4 (ballots not returned) 0 (abstentions) =25 0.66 =16.5]
29 Eligible to Vote
4 Not Returned (Besal, Buchanan, Kohout, Lopes)

22 Agree
3 Do Not Agree (Conroy, Murphy, Reisman)
0 Abstain

TC Action: PASS

Attachment 13-8-4-a
1 of 16
Attachment 13-8-4-a
2 of 16
Attachment 13-8-4-a
3 of 16
Attachment 13-8-4-a
4 of 16
REJECT Comment 96-8
_______________________________________________________________
96-8 Log #18 Final action: Accept in Principle
(4.2.3.3)
_______________________________________________________________
Submitter: David A. de Vries, Firetech Engineering Inc.
Comment on Proposal No: 96-17
Recommendation: Reject the proposal and revert to the 2011 text.
Substantiation: The substantiation does not address the issue. A wood stud
framed wall, even when covered with a limited combustible material such as
gypsumwall board, still requires appropriate clearance between the exhaust
systemand the combustible wood studs even if the gypsumwall board can
be covered with a non-combustible material, such as those listed in the 2011
text, and reduce the clearance to zero with minimal risk of fire. A sheet metal
backsplash over gypsumwall board on a steel stud framed wall does not need
to be a listed assembly.
Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle
Revise text as follows:
4.2.3.3 Zero clearance to limited-combustible materials, shall be permitted
where protected by metal lath and plaster, ceramic tile, quarry tile, other
noncombustible materials or assembly of noncombustible materials, or
materials and products that are listed for the purpose of reducing clearance by
one of the following:
(a) metal lath and plaster
(b) ceramic tile
(c) quarry tile
(d) other noncombustible materials or assembly of noncombustible
materials.
(e) other materials and products that are listed for the purpose of reducing
clearance
Committee Statement: It is not reasonable for materials that are
noncombustible to be listed as noncombustible.
Number Eligible to Vote: 28
Ballot Results: Affirmative: 24 Negative: 1
Ballot Not Returned: 3 Caraway, J r., L., Lopes, J ., Reisman, M.
Explanation of Negative:
SLOAN, D.: I amvoting negative on this Comment based on my agreement
with the proposed language and Substantiation for Proposal 96-17 Log#10.
The Proposal substantiation stated In actuality noncombustible materials
or assemblies of noncombustible materials were not intended to be used to
reduce clearances unless they too were so listed. A sheet of lightweight steel,
although noncombustible, may not adequately protect a combustible wall when
the steel is adhered directly onto it. The Committee originally agreed with this
substantiation and Accepted the proposal such that noncombustible materials
or assembly of noncombustible materials were required to be listed for the
purpose of reducing clearance reducing clearance.
However, during this ROC, the wording was changed to permit any or all
noncombustible materials or assembly of noncombustible materials. While
I continue to be in favor of keeping the traditional widely used methods
(metal lath and plaster, ceramic tile, and quarry tile), I believe that that not
all noncombustible materials or assembly of noncombustible materials would
ensure zero clearance to limited combustibles.
Backup Proposal 96-17
_______________________________________________________________
96-17 Log #10 Final Action: Accept
(4.2.3.3)
_______________________________________________________________
Submitter: R. T. Leicht, Delaware State Fire Marshals Office
Recommendation: Revise text to read as follows:
4.2.3.3 Zero clearance to limited-combustible materials shall be permitted
where protected by metal lath and plaster, ceramic tile, quarry tile, other
noncombustible materials or assembly of noncombustible materials, or
materials and products that are listed for the purpose of reducing clearance one
of the following:
4.2.3.3.1 metal lath and plaster
4.2.3.3.2 ceramic tile
4.2.3.3.3 quarry tile
4.2.3.3.4 other noncombustible materials or assembly of noncombustible
materials that are listed for the purpose of reducing clearance
4.2.3.3.5 other materials and products that are listed for the purpose of
reducing clearance
Substantiation: As currently written, the paragraph has been misinterpreted
at times as though the phrase listed for the purpose of reducing clearance
only referred to materials and products. In actuality noncombustible materials
or assemblies of noncombustible materials were not intended to be used to
reduce clearances unless they too were so listed. A sheet of lightweight steel,
although noncombustible, may not adequately protect a combustible wall when
the steel is adhered directly onto it.
Committee Meeting Action: Accept
Ballot Results: Affirmative: 25
Ballot Not Returned: 4 Demers, D., Gibbons, J r., C., Lopes, J ., Schumacher,
M.
Attachment 13-8-4-a
5 of 16
1 vot e. Bal l ot i ng wi l l be cl osed i n 5 seconds.
2 Bal l ot i ng i s cl osed. Mot i on f ai l s, 129 t o
3 19. Thank you.
4 Let ' s pr oceed wi t h t he di scussi on on
5 Cer t i f i ed Amendi ng Mot i on 96- 3. Mi cr ophone 3,
6 pl ease.
7 MR. HI RSCHLER: Mar cel o Hi r schl er ,
8 GBH I nt er nat i onal , and I move t o r ej ect
9 Comment 96- 8.
10 MR. McDANI EL: Thank you. Ther e' s a mot i on on
11 t he f l oor t o r ej ect Comment 96- 8. I s t her e a
12 second?
13 A VOI CE: Second.
14 MR. McDANI EL: We do have a second. Pl ease
15 pr oceed wi t h t he di scussi on on t he mot i on.
17 GBH I nt er nat i onal , speaki ng on behal f of NAFRA.
18 Let me t r y t o expl ai n. Thi s i s not an
19 i ssue r el at ed wi t h def i ni t i ons. Thi s i s a
20 t echni cal i ssue. So l et me expl ai n what we' r e
21 t al ki ng about her e.
22 We' r e t al ki ng about t hat t he comment
23 r equi r es t hat t he cl ear ance t o l i mi t ed- combust i bl e
24 mat er i al s be pr ot ect ed by mat er i al s - -
102
1 noncombust i bl e mat er i al s l i st ed f or t he pur pose of
2 r educi ng cl ear ance. Ther e ar e no noncombust i bl e
3 mat er i al s l i st ed f or t he pur pose of r educi ng
4 cl ear ance f r omf ur naces. Thi s j ust somet hi ng t hat
5 makes no sense.
Page 87
Attachment 13-8-4-a
6 of 16
6 And i f you go t o Page 96- 5 of t he Repor t
7 of Comment s, you see an ext ensi ve negat i ve f r om
8 Mr . Dwayne Sl oan of Under wr i t er s Labor at or i es, one
9 of t he Commi t t ee member s, expl ai ni ng t hi s. I woul d
10 ur ge your suppor t on t hi s mot i on. Thank you.
11 MR. McDANI EL: Mr . Lei cht , woul d you l i ke t o
12 pr esent t he Commi t t ee' s posi t i on?
13 MR. LEI CHT: Yes. I f you do r ef er t o t he
14 or i gi nal pr oposal t hat was made, t he i nt ent of t hat
15 pr oposal was t o t ake what seemed t o be a l engt hy
16 sent ence t hat had a l ot of comment s, a l ot of
17 phr ases i n i t , and l i st t he f our speci f i c ar eas t o
18 be l i st ed i n ki nd of a bul l et - poi nt f ashi on. What
19 t hi s - - and t hat pr oposal was accept ed and bal l ot ed
20 and got t he t wo- t hi r ds bal l ot .
21 We had a ser i es of comment s t hat came
22 back. I want t o poi nt out t hat t hi s comment
23 act ual l y does achi eve what t he pr oposal i ni t i al l y
24 was supposed t o do; however , t he comment havi ng
103
1 been r ej ect ed by t he Commi t t ee, i t di d r ecei ve t he
2 t wo- t hi r ds vot e necessar y t o back t hat deci si on.
3 MR. McDANI EL: Thank you, Mr . Chai r man. Let ' s
4 pr oceed wi t h t he di scussi on Cer t i f i ed Amendi ng
5 Mot i on 96- 3. Mi cr ophone Number 2, pl ease. St at e
6 your name af f i l i at i on and whet her you' r e f or or
7 agai nst t he mot i on.
8 MR. HOPPER: Thank you. Howar d Hopper , UL,
9 speaki ng i n f avor of t he mot i on on t he f l oor .
Page 88
Attachment 13-8-4-a
7 of 16
10 Now as poi nt ed out by Mr . Hi r schl er , our
11 r epr esent at i ve on t hi s Commi t t ee vot ed agai nst
12 Comment 96- 8 because we agr ee wi t h t he l anguage
13 t hat r esul t ed f r omPr oposal 96- 17 whi ch f or med t he
14 basi s f or t he cont ent .
15 The l anguage t hat we woul d l i ke t o see i n
16 t he st andar d i s r ef l ect ed i n t he l ast col umn of t he
17 or ange handout t hat t he member shi p shoul d have
18 r ecei ved ear l i er t oday whi ch i s basi cal l y t he
19 l anguage i n Pr oposal 96- 17. Now t he or i gi nal
20 pr oposal i ncl uded a number of opt i ons t hat can be
21 used t o achi eve zer o cl ear ances. One i ncl uded
22 usi ng noncombust i bl e mat er i al s or assembl i es of
23 noncombust i bl e mat er i al s t hat ar e l i st ed f or t he
24 pur pose of r educi ng cl ear ances t o
104
1 l i mi t ed- combust i bl e mat er i al s.
2 Now t he comment r evi sed t he pr oposal t o
3 al l ow an opt i on t o al l ow basi cal l y any
4 noncombust i bl e mat er i al t o be used t o r educe
5 cl ear ances t o zer o whet her i t ' s been i nvest i gat ed
6 or l i st ed or not . So i f you t hi nk about i t , you
7 can now t ake a pi ece of sheet met al , put i t agai nst
8 a combust i bl e const r uct i on, and you can r educe your
9 cl ear ances t o zer o. We' r e not r eal l y sur e t he
10 t echni cal basi s f or doi ng t hat .
11 And al so when we l ooked at t he Commi t t ee' s
12 st at ement , i t sai d i t ' s not r easonabl e f or
13 mat er i al s t hat ar e noncombust i bl e t o be l i st ed as
14 noncombust i bl e. I t hi nk i f you r ead t he wor di ng,
Page 89
Attachment 13-8-4-a
8 of 16
15 t hat ' s not what happened. They' r e l i st ed f or
16 r educed i nst al l at i on cl ear ances.
17 So t he mot i on bef or e you addr esses our
18 concer ns. We f eel t hat t he Commi t t ee got i t r i ght
19 wi t h Pr oposal 96- 17 and woul d ur ge you t o vot e i n
20 f avor of t he mot i on on t he f l oor . Thank you.
21 MR. McDANI EL: Thank you. Mi cr ophone Number 5,
22 pl ease. St at e your name, af f i l i at i on and whet her
23 you' r e f or or agai nst t he mot i on, pl ease.
24 MR. CONROY: Thank you, Mr . Chai r man.
105
1 Mar k Conr oy, Br ooks Equi pment , member of t he
2 96 Commi t t ee. I ' mi n opposi t i on t o t hi s mot i on.
3 The ROC t ext and t he pr evi ous edi t i on ar e
4 t he same. Onl y t he ROC r ef or mat s or f or mat s t he
5 i nf or mat i on as a l i st so t hat i t ' s easi er t o
6 compr ehend f or t he casual r eader of t he st andar d.
7 The Commi t t ee accept ed i n pr i nci pl e
8 ROC 96- 8 due t o t he sensi bl e and r easonabl e
9 ar gument pr ovi ded i n t he subst ant i at i on, and I
10 encour age t he member shi p t o r ead t hat
11 subst ant i at i on.
12 The t echni cal ar gument t oday t hat I ' m
13 pr esent i ng i s i f met al l at h and pl ast er , cer ami c
14 t i l e, quar r y t i l e ar e accept abl e, t hen why ar en' t
15 ot her noncombust i bl e mat er i al s or an assembl y of
16 noncombust i bl e mat er i al s accept abl e? And t hat ' s
17 what i s pr esent ed i n t he ROC.
18 The t opi c of cl ear ance i s addr essed i n t he
Page 90
Attachment 13-8-4-a
9 of 16
19 cur r ent St andar d 96 i n Sect i on 4. 2. 1, and i t says,
20 " Wher e encl osur es ar e not r equi r ed, hoods, gr ease
21 r emoval devi ces, exhaust f ans, and duct s shal l have
22 at l east a cl ear ance of at l east 18 i nches t o
23 combust i bl e mat er i al s, 3 i nches t o l i mi t ed
24 combust i bl e mat er i al s, and 0 i nches t o
106
1 noncombust i bl e mat er i al . "
2 The sect i on we ar e t al ki ng about her e i s a
3 cl ar i f i cat i on of t he l ast pi ece. I f you r educe t he
4 cl ear ance t o zer o, i f you' r e deal i ng wi t h
5 noncombust i bl e mat er i al or assembl i es of
6 noncombust i bl e mat er i al , you r eal l y don' t even need
7 a l i st of noncombust i bl e mat er i al as i t ' s pr ovi ded
8 i n t he st andar d. The i mpor t ant par t of t he
9 sent ence i s ot her combust i bl e mat er i al s or pr oduct s
10 t hat ar e l i st ed f or t he pur pose of r educi ng
11 cl ear ance.
12 I ur ge t he member shi p t o r evi ew t he
13 subst ant i at i on, pr ovi ded wi t h comment . I f you
14 agr ee wi t h t hat subst ant i at i on, you wi l l vot e i n
15 opposi t i on t o t hi s mot i on. Thank you.
16 MR. McDANI EL: Mi cr ophone Number 3, pl ease.
17 Woul d you st at e your name, af f i l i at i on and whet her
18 you' r e f or or agai nst t he mot i on.
19 MS. BREWER: Sar ah Br ewer . I amr epr esent i ng
20 t he I nt er nat i onal Fi r est op Counci l , and I ' m
21 speaki ng i n f avor of t he mot i on t oday.
22 I FC f avor s t hi s mot i on f eel i ng t hat
23 wi t hout t hi s l anguage t he ROC t ext coul d
Page 91
Attachment 13-8-4-a
10 of 16
24 pot ent i al l y cause a hazar dous condi t i on. Goi ng
107
1 back t o t he poi nt made ear l i er wi t h r egar d t o
2 speci f yi ng a mat er i al t hat i s mer el y noncombust i bl e
3 may not be suf f i ci ent t o ensur e i t ' s appr opr i at e
4 f or cl ear ance r educt i on i n ever y case.
5 The poi nt - - t he exampl e t hat was j ust
6 pr ovi ded t hat i t mi ght be suf f i ci ent f or concr et e
7 but may not be appr opr i at e f or usi ng sheet met al ,
8 and I t hi nk t hat exampl e was ar t i cul at ed f ur t her i n
9 t he or i gi nal ROP i n t he subst ant i at i on t hat sai d,
10 " A sheet of l i ght - wei ght st eel , al t hough
11 noncombust i bl e, may not adequat el y pr ot ect a
12 combust i bl e wal l when t he st eel i s adher ed di r ect l y
13 t o i t . "
14 The poi nt her e t hat I ' mmaki ng i s t he
15 mot i on i s pr oposi ng t hat bot h combust i bl e and
16 noncombust i bl e mat er i al s and/ or assembl i es woul d
17 need t o be l i st ed f or t he pur pose of cl ear ance
18 r educt i on; and t hat l i st i ng pr ocess ver i f i es t he
19 cl ear ance r educt i on per f or mance based on t he
20 conf i gur at i on of how i t woul d be i nst al l ed i n t he
21 f i el d and t hat conf i gur at i on woul d be def i ned i n
22 t he l i st i ng.
23 So t he wor di ng on t hi s poi nt i n t he mot i on
24 i s i mpor t ant so t hat t hese mat er i al s ar e cor r ect l y
108
Page 92
Attachment 13-8-4-a
11 of 16
1 i nst al l ed i n t he mar ket and woul d t hen per mi t t he
2 wor di ng t hat mi r r or s t he or i gi nal ROP whi ch t he
3 Commi t t ee had vot ed t o accept . Thank you.
5 pl ease. St at e your name and af f i l i at i on and
6 whet her you' r e f or or agai nst t he mot i on, pl ease.
7 MR. WI LLSE: Pet er Wi l l se wi t h XL Gl obal Asset
8 Pr ot ect i on Ser vi ces, and I t hi nk I r i se i n mot i on
9 - - f or t he mot i on.
10 I f you t ake a l ook at t he ROP Page 96- 5 at
11 4. 2. 3. 3. 4, i t says, " Ot her noncombust i bl e mat er i al s
12 or assembl y of noncombust i bl e mat er i al s t hat ar e
13 l i st ed f or t he pur pose of r educi ng cl ear ance. " But
14 yet i f you go t o t he ROC on Number D, t hat l ast
15 par t of t hat sent ence i s omi t t ed.
16 So I ' mnot t oo sur e whet her i t was an
17 er r or i n t he ROC and i t ' s supposed t o be pi cked up
18 by t he ROP or what , but t hi s amendi ng mot i on wi l l
19 make i t so i t ' s posi t i ve. Thank you.
20 MR. McDANI EL: Thank you. I s t her e any ot her
21 di scussi on? Mi cr ophone Number 5, pl ease. Pl ease
22 st at e your name, af f i l i at i on and whet her you' r e f or
23 or agai nst t he mot i on.
24 MR. CONROY: Mar k Conr oy, Br ooks Equi pment ,
109
2 The pr evi ous speaker was wonder i ng i f i t
3 was a mi st ake; and, i ndeed, i t was no mi st ake on
4 t he par t of t he Commi t t ee. The Commi t t ee made an
Page 93
Attachment 13-8-4-a
12 of 16
5 i nf or med deci si on t hat what was i n t he pr evi ous
6 edi t i on i s cor r ect . The ROC i s j ust r ef or mat t i ng
7 what ' s i n t he cur r ent edi t i on of t he st andar d. Let
8 me put my gl asses back on.
9 I woul d l i ke t o r epeat what t he submi t t er
10 sai d i n t he l ast sent ence of t he subst ant i at i on i n
11 t he ROC, " A sheet met al backspl ash over gypsum
12 wal l boar d on a st eel st ud f r ame wal l does not need
13 t o be a ' l i st ed assembl y' . "
15 pl ease. St at e your name, af f i l i at i on and f or or
16 agai nst t he mot i on, pl ease.
18 GBH I nt er nat i onal , speaki ng i n suppor t of t he
19 mot i on.
20 Let me cl ar i f y. What t he ROC says on
21 number - - t he f our t h, i t ' s a D i nst ead of bei ng a 4
22 i n t he ROC, " Ot her noncombust i bl e mat er i al s or
23 assembl y of noncombust i bl e mat er i al s. " What t he
24 ROP says, " Ot her noncombust i bl e mat er i al s or
110
1 assembl y of noncombust i bl e mat er i al s t hat ar e
2 l i st ed f or t he pur pose of r educi ng cl ear ance. "
3 That ' s t he bi g di f f er ence. That ' s what we want t o
4 change. We want t hose t o be l i st ed f or t he
5 pur pose. Pl ease suppor t t he mot i on. Thank you.
6 MR. McDANI EL: Thank you. Mi cr ophone, 2
7 pl ease.
8 MR. WI LLSE: Pet e Wi l l se wi t h XL Gl obal Asset
9 Pr of essi onal Ser vi ces. Then I ' mt ot al l y conf used
Page 94
Attachment 13-8-4-a
13 of 16
10 because i f I ' ml ooki ng at t he ROC, i f somet hi ng i s
11 supposed t o be t aken out f r omwhat i s i n t he ROP,
12 i sn' t i t supposed t o be st r i cken al so as a mat t er
13 of pr ocedur e?
14 MR. McDANI EL: Mi cr ophone 5.
15 MR. CONROY: Thank you, Mr . Chai r man.
16 Mar k Conr oy, Br ooks Equi pment , i n opposi t i on t o t he
17 mot i on.
18 I bel i eve t he ROC t ext i s cor r ect and i t
19 shoul d not be a r equi r ement f or ot her
20 noncombust i bl e mat er i al s or assembl y of
21 noncombust i bl e mat er i al s t o be l i st ed. I t hi nk
22 t hat t he Commi t t ee debat ed t hi s at l engt h. They
23 r evi ewed t he comment . The comment st at es t hat
24 cl ear l y, and t he Commi t t ee made an i nf or med
111
1 deci si on t o st i ck wi t h what ' s i n t he cur r ent
2 edi t i on of NFPA 96.
3 MR. McDANI EL: Thank you. Mi cr ophone 3,
4 pl ease. Pl ease st at e your name, af f i l i at i on and
5 whet her you' r e f or or agai nst t he mot i on.
6 MS. BREWER: Agai n, Sar ah Br ewer , r epr esent i ng
7 t he I nt er nat i onal Fi r est op Counci l speaki ng i n
8 f avor of t he mot i on.
9 One l ast comment . I woul d di sagr ee wi t h
10 t he pr evi ous speaker i n t hat i t appear s t o me t hat
11 t he Commi t t ee r easoni ng dur i ng t he ROC may have
12 been mi si nt er pr et ed of t he pr oponent s i n 10. Thei r
13 comment was t hat t he l i st i ng was r equi r ed i n t he
Page 95
Attachment 13-8-4-a
14 of 16
14 r evi sed l anguage had not hi ng t o - - t hat t he l i st i ng
15 of noncombust i bl e mat er i al s as bei ng
16 noncombust i bl e, and r eal l y t hi s has not hi ng t o do
17 wi t h l i st i ng noncombust i bl e mat er i al . I t ' s
18 noncombust i bl e. I t has t o do wi t h l i st i ng
19 mat er i al s f or t he pur pose of use of r educi ng
20 cl ear ances. And, agai n, t hat ' s t he poi nt i n t er ms
21 of maki ng sur e t hese mat er i al s ar e appl i ed
22 cor r ect l y i n t he f i el d so t hat t he way t hey' r e
23 i nst al l ed ar e bet t er def i ned. Thank you.
24 MR. McDANI EL: Mi cr ophone Number 5, pl ease.
112
1 MR. CONROY: Mar k Conr oy, Br ooks Equi pment ,
2 agai nst t he mot i on. The pr evi ous speaker sai d t hat
3 t he Commi t t ee mi sunder st ood t he i nt ent of t he
4 submi t t er . I ' l l r ead t he r ecommendat i on. I t says,
5 " Rej ect t he pr oposal and Rever t t o t he 2011 t ext . "
6 The Commi t t ee, i n essence, has done t hat . I t ' s
7 j ust t he r ef or mat t i ng.
8 MR. McDANI EL: Thank you. Mi cr ophone number 2.
9 MR. J AEGER: Thomas J aeger . I cal l t he
10 quest i on.
11 MR. McDANI EL: We have a mot i on t o cal l t he
12 quest i on. Can we have a second?
14 MR. McDANI EL: We' l l pr oceed t o t he vot e on
15 cal l i ng t he quest i on. 1 f or t he mot i on, and 2 t o
16 r ej ect .
17 A VOI CE: I s t hat t he mot i on or t he quest i on?
18 MR. McDANI EL: On t he quest i on. 1 i s i n f avor
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Attachment 13-8-4-a
15 of 16
19 of t he mot i on t o accept t he cal l t he quest i on; 2 i s
20 t o r ej ect i t . Pl ease r ecor d your vot e. 5 seconds.
21 Vot i ng i s cl osed. And t he mot i on i s t o
22 accept t o cal l t he quest i on, 130 t o 32.
23 So we' l l pr oceed t o t he vot i ng on t he
24 amendi ng mot i on. Bef or e we vot e, l et me r est at e
113
1 t he mot i on. The mot i on on t he f l oor i s t o r ej ect
2 Comment 96- 8. Pl ease r ecor d your vot e 1 i n f avor
3 of t he mot i on, accept , or 2, opposed t he mot i on,
4 r ej ect . Pl ease r ecor d your vot e. Bal l ot i ng wi l l
5 cl ose i n 5 seconds.
6 Bal l ot i ng i s cl osed. The mot i on passes,
7 86 t o 63.
8 Let ' s pr oceed wi t h t he di scussi on of
10 pl ease.
11 MR. SI WY: Good af t er noon. My name i s
12 Chr i s Si wy ( phonet i c) . I ' mher e r epr esent i ng
13 Mr . J ohn Char t i er , Chai r of t he Nor t heast er n
14 Regi onal Fi r e Code Devel opment Commi t t ee. I ' mher e
15 t o ask f or t he accept ance of Amendi ng Mot i on 96- 4.
16 MR. McDANI EL: Thank you. Ther e i s a mot i on on
17 t he f l oor t o r et ur n a por t i on of a r epor t i n t he
18 f or mof i dent i f i abl e par t s of Pr oposal 96- 50 and
19 r el at ed Comment s 96- 22 and 96- 24. I s t her e a
20 second?
22 MR. McDANI EL: We have a second. Pl ease
Page 97
Attachment 13-8-4-a
16 of 16
Item 13-8-5

DATE: July 8, 2013

AMENDMENT (130-1)

Document: NFPA 130, Standard for Fixed Guideway Transit and Passenger Rail Systems

Motion: To Return a portion of a Report in the form of an Identifiable Part of Proposal 130-115 and related
Comment 130-1

necessary
2
/
3
the Amendment is 16 [32 (eligible to vote) 7 (ballots not returned) 1 (abstention) =24 0.66 =15.84]
32 Eligible to Vote
7 Not Returned (Krempasky, Mao, Markos, Middlebrook, Sandu, Sorensen, Weng)

22 Agree (Giblin w/comment)
2 Do Not Agree (Harrison, Thomas)
1 Abstain (Zicherman)

TC Action: PASS

Attachment 13-8-5-a
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Attachment 13-8-5-a
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Attachment 13-8-5-a
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Attachment 13-8-5-a
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Attachment 13-8-5-a
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RETURN FOR FURTHER STUDY: Return a
portion of a Report in the form of identifiable
part(s) of a proposal and related comment(s).
______________________________________________________________
130-1 Log #81 Final Action: Accept in Principle
(Entire Document)
_______________________________________________________________
Submitter: Harold A. Locke, Locke & Locke Inc.
1.1.1 This standard shall cover life safety fromfire and fire protection
requirements for underground, surface, and elevated fixed guideway
transit and passenger rail systems, including but not limited to stations,
trainways, emergency ventilation systems, vehicles, emergency procedures,
communications, control systems, and vehicle storage areas.
3.3.12 Critical Velocity. The minimumsteady-state velocity of the ventilation
airflow moving toward the fire within an enclosed trainway tunnel or
passageway that is required to prevent backlayering at the fire site.
3.3.23 Guideway. That portion of the fixed guideway transit or passenger
rail line systemincluded within right-of-way fences, outside lines of curbs
or shoulders, underground tunnels and stations, cut or fill slopes, ditches,
channels, and waterways, and including all appertaining structures.
3.3.35 Point of Safety. A point of safety is one of the following: (1) an
enclosed a fire-separated exit that leads to a public way or safe location outside
the station, trainway, or vehicle; (2) an at-grade point beyond the vehicle,
enclosing station, or trainway; (3) any other approved location.
5.2.3.1.1* Stair and Escalator Enclosure. Stairs and escalators used by
passengers shall not be required to be
enclosed fire-separated.
5.5.6.3.1.2* In computing the means of egress capacity available on platforms,
corridors, and ramps, 300 mm(12 in.) shall be deducted at each sidewall and
450 mm(18 in.) at open platformedges that are open to the trainway.
5.5.6.3.2.5 (3) For enclosed stations, at least one enclosed fire-separated exit
stair or exit passageway shall provide continuous access fromthe platforms to
the public way.
5.7.4.3 Where underground enclosed stations include more than one platform
level (such as crossover subway lines), there shall be a cross-connection pipe
of a minimumsize of 100 mm(4 in.) in diameter between each standpipe
system, so that supplying water through any fire department connection will
furnish water throughout the entire system.
5.7.6.1 Underground Enclosed stations shall be provided with a fire command
center in accordance with NFPA 72.
5.7.6.2 The ventilation systems at adjacent tunnels trainways and stations shall
be permitted to be omitted fromthe controls of the fire command center.
6.2.2 Means of Egress Underground from Enclosed Trainways.
6.2.2.2.1 Within underground or enclosed trainways, the maximumdistance
between exits shall not exceed 762 m(2500 ft).
6.2.2.2.2 For exit stairs serving underground or enclosed trainways, the width
of exit stairs shall not be required to exceed 1120 mm(44 in.).
6.2.2.3.1 Cross-passageways shall be permitted to be used in lieu of emergency
exit stairways to the surface where trainways in tunnels are divided by a
minimumof 2 hour -rated fire walls separations or where trainways are in twin
bores.
6.2.2.3.2 Where cross-passageways are utilized in lieu of emergency exit
stairways, the following shall apply:
(2)* Cross-passageways shall not be farther than 244 m(800 ft) fromthe
station or tunnel portal of the enclosed trainway.
(4) Openings in open Cross-passageways shall be separated fromthe
trainway protected with self-closing fire door assemblies having a fire
protection rating of 1hours with a self-closing fire door.
(6) A ventilation systemfor the contaminated tunnel incident trainway shall
be designed to control smoke in the vicinity of the passengers.
6.2.2.4.2 Doors in the means of egress shall comply with the following:
(2) Be adequate to withstand positive and negative pressures caused by
passing trains and tunnel the emergency ventilation system.
6.2.5.1 The requirements of 6.2.5.2 through 6.2.5.3.2 shall apply to all
underground or enclosed trainways that are greater than 30.5 m(100 ft) in
length or 2 car lengths, whichever is greater.
6.2.7.1* Blue light stations shall be provided at the following locations:
(5) In underground enclosed trainways as approved
6.2.8.1 Underground or eEnclosed trainways greater in length than the
minimumlength of one train shall be provided with directional signs as
appropriate for the emergency procedures developed for the fixed guideway
transit or passenger rail systemin accordance with Chapter 9.
6.2.8.2 Signs indicating station or portal directions shall be installed at
maximum25 m(82 ft) intervals on either side of the underground or enclosed
trainways.
6.2.8.4 Points of exit fromelevated and underground or enclosed trainways
shall be marked with internally or externally illuminated signs.
6.3.1.1 Underground (Subways)Enclosed Trainways.
6.3.1.1.5.1 Rail ties used in underground or enclosed locations, except as
permitted in 6.3.1.1.5.2 or 6.3.1.1.5.3, shall be noncombustible materials,
which comply with the requirements of ASTM E 136.
6.3.1.1.5.3 Rail ties and tie blocks in underground or enclosed track sections
shall be permitted to be of wood encased in concrete such that only the top
surface is exposed.
6.3.1.1.7.2 Ancillary areas shall be separated fromtrainway areas within
underground enclosed trainway sections by a
minimumof 2-hour fire-resistive construction.
6.3.2.2* Emergency ventilation meeting the tenability criteria for occupied
areas shall not be required in storage track areas where the storage track does
not open has no openings along its length to passenger track trainway areas
and where an engineering analysis indicates that a fire on a train in the storage
track area will not impact passengers or passenger areas.
6.3.3.1.2 Life safety and fire protection criteria for the subsysteminstalled
in the trainway shall conformto the requirements for underground enclosed
trainways that are listed in 6.4.2.
6.5.2.1 An approved fire standpipe systemshall be provided in underground
enclosed fixed guideway transit or passenger rail systemtrainways where
physical factors prevent or impede access to the water supply or fire apparatus,
where required by the authority having jurisdiction.
6.5.2.4 Identification numbers and letters conforming to the systemsectional
identification numbers and letters of the fixed guideway transit or passenger
trainway systemshall be provided at each surface fire department connection
and at each hose valve on the standpipe lines.
6.5.2.4.1 Identifying signs shall be affixed to underground or enclosed trainway
walls at each hose outlet valve or shall be painted directly on the standpipe in
white letters next to each hose outlet valve.
6.5.2.4.2 Exposed tunnel standpipe lines and identification signs shall be
painted as required by the authority having jurisdiction.
6.5.3 Standpipe Installations in Tunnels Under Safeguards During
Construction.
6.5.3.1 A standpipe systemshall be installed in tunnels enclosed trainways
under construction in accordance with NFPA 241.
6.5.3.1.1 A standpipe systemshall be installed before the tunnel enclosed
trainway has exceeded a length of 61 m(200 ft) beyond any access shaft or
portal and shall be extended as work progresses to within 61 m(200 ft) of the
most remote portion of the tunnel enclosed trainway.
6.5.3.7* Illumination level in of enclosed trainways under construction shall
not be less than 2.7 lx (0.25 ft-candles) at the walking surface.
6.5.4 Portable Fire Extinguishers. Portable fire extinguishers shall be
provided in such numbers, sizes, and types and at such locations in tunnels
enclosed guideways as determined by the authority having jurisdiction.
6.6.2 Vehicle Roadway Terminations. Vent or fan shafts utilized for
ventilation of tunnels enclosed trainways shall not terminate at grade on any
vehicle roadway.
7.1.2.1 For length determination, all contiguous enclosed trainway and
underground systemstation segments between portals shall be included.
7.1.2.2 A mechanical emergency ventilation systemshall be provided in the
following locations:
(2) In a systemunderground or enclosed trainway that is greater in length
than 305 m(1000 ft)
7.1.2.3 A mechanical emergency ventilation systemshall not be required in the
(2) Where the length of an underground or enclosed trainway is less than or
equal to 61 m(200 ft)
7.1.2.4 Where supported by engineering analysis, a nonmechanical emergency
ventilation systemshall be permitted to be provided in lieu of a mechanical
emergency ventilation systemin the following locations:
(1) Where the length of the underground or enclosed trainway is less than or
equal to 305 m(1000 ft) and greater than 61 m(200 ft).
7.2.2 Point-extract ventilation systems shall be permitted subject to an
engineering analysis that demonstrates the systemwill confine the spread of
smoke in the tunnel enclosed trainway to a length of 150 m(500 ft) or less.
7.2.6* The time-of-tenability criteria for stations and tunnels trainways shall
be established and approved. For stations, the time shall be greater than the
calculated egress time used to establish egress capacity in 5.5.6.
7.3.1 The ventilation systemfans that are designated for use in fire emergencies
shall be capable of satisfying the emergency ventilation requirements to
move tunnel trainway air in either direction as required to provide the needed
ventilation response.
7.7.9 For electrical substations and distribution rooms serving emergency
ventilation systems where the local environmental conditions require the use of
mechanical ventilation or cooling to maintain the space temperature below the
electrical equipment operating limits, such mechanical ventilation or cooling
systems shall be designed so that failure of any single air moving or cooling
unit does not result in the loss of the electrical supply to the tunnel emergency
ventilation fans during the specified period of operation.
8.5.1.2.2 Vehicles that travel through tunnels enclosed trainways and have
a roof that is constructed of a combustible material shall require a fire
hazard analysis to demonstrate that rapid fire spread to passenger and crew
compartments or local roof collapse is not possible during the exposure period.
8.6.1 General Construction. All motors, motor control, current collectors, and
auxiliaries shall be of a type and
construction suitable for use on fixed guideway transit and passenger rail
systemvehicles.
Attachment 13-8-5-a
6 of 20
B.7.1 The inclusion of platformedge screens is a design option that is effective
for comfort control in stations as well as for smoke control in tunnels enclosed
trainways. When used, the screens should meet both fire resistivity and
structural strengths relative to the train and ventilation systemdrafts and the
operational efficiency requirements.
B.7.2 In a tunnel trainway-to-station evacuation scenario, access to the platform
level fromthe trainway should be considered.
B.8 Nonfire Tunnel Ventilation for Enclosed Trainways.
Where trains might be stopped or delayed in a tunnel an enclosed trainway
for a period of time, the vehicle ventilation systemshould be capable of
maintaining an acceptable level of patron comfort. If not operating in a fire
emergency scenario, the tunnel emergency ventilation fans can be used to
augment the vehicle systemcapability. Velocities should consider the comfort
levels of employees required to be in the tunnels enclosed trainways.
C.1.2 Calculating Evacuation Time. The total evacuation time is the sumof
the walking travel time for the longest exit route plus the waiting times at the
various circulation elements. The tunnel trainway can be considered as an
auxiliary exit fromthe station under certain fire scenarios.
C.1.4 Side-Platform Station Sample Calculation. The sample side-platform
station is a subway an enclosed station with a concourse above the platform
level but below grade. (See Figure C.1.4.) The platformis 183 m(600 ft) long
to accommodate the train length. The vertical distance fromgrade to concourse
is 8 m(26 ft). The concourse is 5.5 m(18 ft) above the platform.
D.1 Introduction. This annex provides additional information on the hazards
associated with burning vehicles and the impact of a burning vehicle on the
evacuation of passengers and crew to a point of safety. Emergency evacuation
froma vehicle containing a fire could include exiting a vehicle containing the
fire to an adjacent vehicle, exiting the train into the operating environment
(station, tunnel trainway, etc.) where the train is located, and moving through
the operating environment to the point of safety. Chapter 8 contains minimum
prescriptive requirements that are intended to provide sufficient time for
passengers and crew to safely evacuate froma train containing a fire. This
annex provides guidance for designing and evaluating train fire performance. A
fire involving a train will have an impact on the conditions in the operating
environment, and this type of fire is often used to design emergency systems in
operating environments. Chapters 5 through 7 provide requirements on design
of the operating environment to ensure that passengers can safely egress to a
point of safety.
D.4 Vehicle Fire Heat Release Rate History. The heat release rate history of a
vehicle fire should include the heat release rate during all stages of the fire.
Fires inside of vehicles that are allowed to grow sufficiently large can reach
flashover, where all of the items inside of the vehicle ignite. The largest heat
release rates are expected after flashover occurs (i.e., post-flashover). The heat
release rate during post-flashover is particularly important since many tunnel
enclosed trainway and station smoke control systemdesigns are based on the
maximumexpected heat release rate.
The heat release rate of the vehicle fire will also affect the heat that
passengers could be exposed to during evacuation. The magnitude of the heat
release rate during post-flashover will be a function of the amount of air drawn
into the vehicle, the material fire properties, and the potential heat release rate
of the burning fuels inside of the vehicle.
D.4.3 The heat release rate of the train fire will also affect the amount of heat
the passengers are exposed to during the evacuation. Larger heat release rate
fires will produce longer flames that could extend out of the vehicle openings.
If the vehicle is inside a tunnel an enclosed trainway, these flames could
impinge on the ceiling and extend down away fromthe burning vehicle.
Radiation fromthese flames to nearby evacuating passengers could be
significant.
E.3.3 Step 3: Evaluate Specific Vehicle Fire Scenarios.
The location of the train must be also considered in the analysis. For
example, the fire risk to occupants is greater if the train is located between
stations or within a tunnel an enclosed trainway.
Substantiation: Regardless of the Committee Statement to proposal 130-115
Log #225 in the ROP, this proposal has validity in that it addresses a concern
that has been raised in several recent cycles; therefore, the above revisions are
offered for consideration.
Revise existing text as follows:
requirements for underground, surface, and elevated fixed guideway transit and
passenger rail systems, including but not limited to stations, trainways,
emergency ventilation systems, vehicles, emergency procedures,
3.3.23 Guideway. That portion of the fixed guideway transit or passenger rail
line systemincluded within right-of-way fences, outside lines of curbs or
shoulders, underground tunnels and stations, cut or fill slopes, ditches,
5.2.4.1 5.2.3.1.1* Stairs and Escalators Enclosure. Stairs and escalators used
by passengers shall not be required to be enclosed fire-separated.
8.11.1* General. The requirements of this section shall apply to fixed
guideway and passenger rail systemvehicles designed to meet the engineering
analysis option permitted by Section 8.2 and to meet the goals and objectives
stated in Sections 4.2 and 4.3.
9.3 Emergencies. The emergency management plan shall address the following
types of emergencies:
(7) Tunnel f Flooding frominternal or external sources
9.4* Emergency Procedures. An emergency procedure shall be developed to
address specifically the various types of emergencies that might be experienced
on the systemand shall include, but not be limited to, the following:
(8) Fire and smoke emergency information and procedures to be provided,
including the following:
(b) Location of train in tunnel enclosed trainway and fire location on train
A.6.2.2.2 Previous editions of NFPA 130 addressed this requirement by
prescribing the maximumtravel distance to an exit. The intent of this
requirement was often misinterpreted. NFPA 101 requires, at a minimum, that
two means of egress be provided within a building or structure and prescribes
the maximumtravel distance to an exit. This same requirement is applied
in NFPA 130. Where two means of egress are required, the maximumtravel
distance to an exit occurs at the midpoint. For example, in a building with two
exits, in the event of a fire adjacent to an exit rendering that exit unavailable,
NFPA 101 recognizes that an individual in proximity to the affected exit must
travel twice the prescribed exit travel distance to the alternate exit. Since two
means of egress are required at fromany one point in a tunnel an enclosed
guideway, the exits cannot be more than twice the travel distance, or 762 m
(2500 ft) apart.
A.7.1.1 Separate ventilation systems for tunnels and underground enclosed
trainways and stations can be provided but are not required. Annex B provides
information on types of mechanical systems for normal and emergency
ventilation of trainways and stations and information for determining a tenable
environment.
A.9.4 Tunnels Enclosed trainways more than 610 m(2000 ft) in length should
be equipped with emergency tunnel
evacuation carts (ETECs) at locations to be determined by the authority having
jurisdiction. ETECs should be capable of carrying a capacity of at least four
stretchers and a total weight capacity of at least 453.5 kg (1000 lb). ETECs
should be constructed of corrosion-resistant materials, be equipped with a
deadman brake, and safely operate on the rail tracks in the tunnel enclosed
trainway.
B.1 General.
Current technology is capable of analyzing and evaluating all unique
conditions of each property to provide proper ventilation for normal operating
conditions and for pre-identified emergency conditions. The same ventilating
devices might or might not serve both normal operating conditions and pre-
identified emergency requirements. The goals of the subway emergency
ventilation systemfor an enclosed trainway, in addition to addressing fire and
smoke emergencies, are to assist in the containment and purging of hazardous
gases and aerosols such as those that could result froma chemical/biological
release.
B.3 Configurations.
Enclosed stations and trainways might be configured with the following
characteristics:
(1) High or low ceilings
(2) Open or doored entrances
(3) Open or screened platformedges
(4) End-of-station or mid-tunnel fan shafts
(5) End-of-station or mid-tunnel vent shafts
(6) Single, double, or varying combinations of tracks in tunnels
(7) Intersecting tunnels enclosed trainways
(8) Multilevel stations
(9) Multilevel tunnels enclosed trainways
(10) Varying depths below the surface
(11) Varying grades and curvatures of tracks and tunnels trainways
(12) Varying blockage ratios of vehicles to tunnel enclosed trainway cross-
section
(13) Varying surface ambient conditions
(14) Varying exit points to surface or points of safety
B.4.2 Draft control can be achieved by the placement of shafts along the tunnel
length of the enclosed trainway between stations. Shafts can be arranged with
the fan shafts at the ends of stations, with vent shafts mid-tunnel if required
or with vent shafts at the ends of stations and fan shafts mid-tunnel. End-of-
station shaft configurations should be related to the station geometries in the
consideration of patron comfort in the station relative to train piston draft
effects.
B.5.2 Temperature control and ventilation for ancillary areas housing special
equipment should reflect the optimumoperating conditions for the specific
equipment to ensure the availability of critical equipment and should also give
consideration for intermittent occupancy by maintenance personnel. These
systems should be separate fromthe emergency ventilation systemfor stations
and tunnels enclosed trainways and should be considered in the design of the
emergency ventilation system.
Attachment 13-8-5-a
7 of 20
shaft or portal and shall be extended as work progresses to within 61 m(200 ft)
of the most remote portion of the tunnel enclosed trainway.
6.2.1.6 6.5.3.7* Illumination level in of enclosed trainways under construction
shall not be less than 2.7 lx (0.25 ft-candles) at the walking surface.
6.4.5 6.5.4 Portable Fire Extinguishers. Portable fire extinguishers shall be
enclosed trainways guideways as determined by the authority having
jurisdiction.
7.2.6* The time-of-tenability criteria for stations and tunnels trainways shall be
established and approved. For stations, the time shall be greater than the
shall be capable of satisfying the emergency ventilation requirements to move
tunnel trainway air in either direction as required to provide the needed
7.7.3 7.7.9 For electrical substations and distribution rooms serving emergency
A.6.3.1.4 A.6.2.2.2 Previous editions of NFPA 130 addressed this requirement
by prescribing the maximumtravel distance to an exit. The intent of this
the maximumtravel distance to an exit. This same requirement is applied in
NFPA 130. Where two means of egress are required, the maximumtravel
trainway guideway, the exits cannot be more than twice the travel distance, or
762 m(2500 ft) apart.
B.8 Non-Emergency Tunnel Ventilation for Enclosed Trainways.
Where trains might be stopped or delayed in a tunnel an enclosed trainway for
a period of time, the vehicle ventilation systemshould be capable of
levels of employees required to be in the tunnels trainways.
Committee Statement: Revisions are necessary to provide consistent
terminology and to eliminate sections that are not referenced elsewhere in the
ROP.
Ballot Not Returned: 4 Grizard, W., Middlebrook, T., Thomas, M., Weng, L.
KOFFEL, W.: I amvoting negative on certain aspects of the Committee
Action regarding the change fromenclosed exit to fire-separated exit. The
change, which occurs in several locations, should not be made. NFPA 130
refers to NFPA 101 which provides the criteria for an exit enclosure. Changing
to fire-separated is not a defined concept in either NFPA 130 or NFPA 101 (or
the IBC for that matter). Do the other limitations on exit enclosures contained
in NFPA 101 (openings, penetrations, use, etc.) apply? What are the
requirements for the fire separation (fire resistance rating, continuity, etc.)?
There is no mention to the separation being a fire barrier (or possibly a fire
partition which is a defined termin the IBC).
Comment on Affirmative:
LOCKE, H.: Further to Mr. Koffels and Mr. Nelsens ballot comments
regarding terminology related to enclosure vs. fire separation, the following
amendments to the language proposed in ROC Comment 130-1 are required:
3.3.35: A point of safety is one of the following: (1) an enclosed exit enclosed
by fire-resistive construction that leads to a public way or safe location outside
5.3.4.2 5.5.6.3.1.2* In computing the means of egress capacity available on
platforms, corridors, and ramps, 300 mm(12 in.) shall be deducted at each
sidewall and 450 mm(18 in.) at open platformedges that are open to the
trainway.
5.3.5.5 5.5.6.3.2.5 (3) For enclosed stations, at least one enclosed fire-separated
exit stair or exit passageway shall provide continuous access fromthe
platforms to the public way.
5.4.5.4 5.7.4.3 Where underground enclosed stations include more than one
platformlevel (such as crossover subway lines), there shall be a cross-
connection pipe of a minimumsize of 100 mm(4 in.) in diameter between
each standpipe system, so that supplying water through any fire department
connection will furnish water throughout the entire system.
5.4.1.1 5.7.6.1 Underground Enclosed stations shall be provided with a fire
command center in accordance with NFPA 72.
5.4.1.2 5.7.6.2 The ventilation systems at adjacent tunnels trainways and
stations shall be permitted to be omitted fromthe controls of the fire command
center.
6.3.1.4 6.2.2.2.1 Within underground or enclosed trainways, the maximum
distance between exits shall not exceed 762 m(2500 ft).
6.3.2.3 6.2.2.2.2 For exit stairs serving underground or enclosed trainways, the
width of exit stairs shall not be required to exceed 1120 mm(44 in.).
6.3.1.5 6.2.2.3.1 Cross-passageways shall be permitted to be used in lieu of
emergency exit stairways to the surface where trainways in tunnels are divided
by a minimumof 2 hourrated fire walls separations or where trainways are in
twin bores.
6.3.1.6 6.2.2.3.2 Where cross-passageways are utilized in lieu of emergency
exit stairways, the following shall apply:
(3)(4) Openings in open Cross-passageways shall be separated fromthe
(5)(6) A ventilation systemfor the contaminated tunnel incident trainway shall
6.3.3.10 6.2.2.4.2 Doors in the means of egress shall comply with the
following:
6.3.5.8 6.2.5.1 The requirements of 6.2.5.2 through 6.2.5.3.2 shall apply to all
6.4.2.1 6.2.7.1* Blue light stations shall be provided at the following locations:
6.3.5.5 6.2.8.1 Underground or eEnclosed trainways greater in length than the
6.3.5.6 6.2.8.2 Signs indicating station or portal directions shall be installed at
trainways.
6.3.5.3 6.2.8.4 Points of exit fromelevated and underground or enclosed
trainways shall be marked with internally or externally illuminated signs.
6.2.8.1 6.3.1.1.5.1 Rail ties used in underground or enclosed locations, except
as permitted in 6.3.1.1.5.2 or 6.3.1.1.5.3, shall be noncombustible materials.
6.2.8.3 6.3.1.1.5.3 Rail ties and tie blocks in underground or enclosed track
sections shall be permitted to be of wood encased in concrete such that only the
top surface is exposed.
6.2.4.1 6.3.1.1.7.2 Ancillary areas shall be separated fromtrainway areas within
underground enclosed trainway sections by a minimumof 2-hour fire-resistive
construction.
6.4.6.3 6.3.2.2* Emergency ventilation meeting the tenability criteria for
occupied areas shall not be required in storage track areas where the storage
track does not open has no openings along its length to passenger track
trainway areas and where an engineering analysis indicates that a fire on a train
in the storage track area will not impact passengers or passenger areas.
6.4.4.1 6.5.2.1 An approved fire standpipe systemshall be provided in
underground enclosed fixed guideway transit or passenger rail system
trainways where physical factors prevent or impede access to the water supply
or fire apparatus, where required by the authority having jurisdiction.
6.4.4.7 6.5.2.4 Identification numbers and letters conforming to the system
sectional identification numbers and letters of the fixed guideway transit or
passenger trainway systemshall be provided at each surface fire department
connection and at each hose valve on the standpipe lines.
6.4.4.8 6.5.2.4.1 Identifying signs shall be affixed to underground or enclosed
trainway walls at each hose outlet valve or shall be painted directly on the
standpipe in white letters next to each hose outlet valve.
6.4.4.9 6.5.2.4.2 Exposed tunnel standpipe lines and identification signs shall
be painted as required by the authority having jurisdiction.
6.2.1 6.5.3 Standpipe Installations in Tunnels Under Safeguards During
Construction.
6.2.1.1 6.5.3.1 A standpipe systemshall be installed in tunnels enclosed
trainways under construction in accordance with NFPA 241.
6.2.1.2 6.5.3.1.1 A standpipe systemshall be installed before the tunnel
enclosed trainway has exceeded a length of 61 m(200 ft) beyond any access
Attachment 13-8-5-a
8 of 20
the public way.
level (such as crossover subway lines), there shall be a cross-connection pipe of
a minimumsize of 100 mm(4 in.) in diameter between each standpipe system,
so that supplying water through any fire department connection will furnish
water throughout the entire system.
6.2.2.2.2 For exit stairs serving underground or enclosed trainways, the width of
exit stairs shall not be required to exceed 1120 mm(44 in.).
bores.
(2)* Cross-passageways shall not be farther than 244 m(800 ft) fromthe station
or tunnel portal of the enclosed trainway.
(4) Openings in open Cross-passageways shall be separated fromthe trainway
protected with self-closing fire door assemblies having a fire protection rating
of 1hours with a self-closing fire door.
(6) A ventilation systemfor the contaminated tunnel incident trainway shall be
designed to control smoke in the vicinity of the passengers.
(2) Be adequate to withstand positive and negative pressures caused by passing
trains and tunnel the emergency ventilation system.
trainways.
permitted in 6.3.1.1.5.2 or 6.3.1.1.5.3, shall be noncombustible materials, which
comply with the requirements of ASTM E 136.
surface is exposed.
construction.
6.3.2.2* Emergency ventilation meeting the tenability criteria for occupied areas
shall not be required in storage track areas where the storage track does not
open has no openings along its length to passenger track trainway areas and
where an engineering analysis indicates that a fire on a train in the storage track
area will not impact passengers or passenger areas.
6.3.3.1.2 Life safety and fire protection criteria for the subsysteminstalled in
the trainway shall conformto the requirements for underground enclosed
Construction.
enclosing station, or trainway; (3) any other approved location. 5.2.4.1: Stairs
and escalators used by passengers shall not be required to be enclosed or
separated by fire-resistive construction fromthe adjoining space. 5.3.5.5: For
enclosed stations, at least one enclosed exit stair or exit passageway that is
enclosed by fire-resistive construction shall provide continuous access fromthe
MARKOS, S.: Thank you, Mr. Locke for your follow-up, to address this
long-time concern over several cycles and willingness to provide the necessary
effort to clarify the usage of the terms. Relating to Mr. Koefells ROC vote
comment, I agree that the issue he identified re change fromenclosed to
fire-separated for 3.3.35, 5.2.3.1.1* and 5.5.6.3.2.5 (3) accepted with
renumbering for the latter 2 cases to be 5.2.4.1 and 5.3.5.5 should be addressed
but NOT at the expense of not accepting all of the remainder of the Comment,
the clarifications for which has been a LONG time coming in terms of the
usage and meaning of enclosed, underground, tunnel etc., as used
throughout the 2010 standard.
NELSEN, J .: I think I appreciate the intent of this comment however in my
opinion it is inappropriate to replace the termenclosed as it relates to exits
and/or exit stairs with fire-separated as proposed. This proposed new
terminology is not used in NFPA 101, NFPA 5000 or the IBC/IFC; in fact in
the IBC fire separation refers to the physical distance between two buildings,
a building and the public way or a building and the property line. In that
regard, I amnot sure that the proposed changes related to the termenclosed
are consistent with the Committee Statement that the Revisions are necessary
to provide consistent terminology...
_______________________________________________________________
130-115 Log #225 Final Action: Reject
(Chapter 6)
_______________________________________________________________
Submitter: Stephanie H. Markos, US Department of Transportation/Volpe
Center
Recommendation: Review usage of terms underground, enclosed, and
underwater as in this Chapter and Chapter 5.
Substantiation: While specific definitions for enclosed and underground
as well as elevated stations are contained in the definitions section (3.4.44
AND 3.4.45)., these terms are not defined for the guideway or trainway. There
are numerous times that it is unclear as to why one or the other termor both is
used. Sometimes enclosed is included in the requirement, along with
underground,. See 6.2.2.2.1 and 6.2.2.2.2; 6.2.5.1, 6.2.8.1 6.2.8.2, 6.8.
Enclosed alone is used in 6.2.4.2.1 and 6.2.5.1. Underwater is used in
section 6.3.1.1.7.1, but u underwater is used in 6.3.1.1.7.2. Moreover, 6.3.3.1
has the heading title of Underground (Subways). But enclosed is used in
several items, along with underground in the same sentence. Also note that
Underwater is not necessarily underground if it is a trainway drilled
through rock.
Committee Meeting Action: Reject
Committee Statement: The proposal does not contain any proposed language
for change as required by the regulations governing committee projects.
Ballot Not Returned: 2 Grizard, W., Weng, L.
LOCKE, H.: Regardless of the Committee Statement, this proposal has
validity in that it addresses a concern that has been raised in several recent
cycles; therefore, the following NFPA 130 revisions are offered for
consideration.
shoulders, underground tunnels and stations, cut or fill slopes, ditches, channels,
and waterways, and including all appertaining structures.
3.3.35 Point of Safety. A point of safety is one of the following: (1) an enclosed
a fire-separated exit that leads to a public way or safe location outside the
station, trainway, or vehicle; (2) an at-grade point beyond the vehicle, enclosing
station, or trainway; (3) any other approved location.
passengers shall not be required to be enclosed fire-separated.
Attachment 13-8-5-a
9 of 20
constructed of corrosion-resistant materials, be equipped with a deadman
brake, and safely operate on the rail tracks in the tunnel enclosed trainway.
B.1 General.
Current technology is capable of analyzing and evaluating all unique conditions
of each property to provide proper ventilation for normal operating conditions
and for pre-identified emergency conditions. The same ventilating devices
might or might not serve both normal operating conditions and pre-identified
emergency requirements. The goals of the subway emergency ventilation
systemfor an enclosed trainway, in addition to addressing fire and smoke
emergencies, are to assist in the containment and purging of hazardous gases
and aerosols such as those that could result froma chemical/biological release.
B.3 Configurations.
characteristics:
section
the fan shafts at the ends of stations, with vent shafts mid-tunnel if required or
with vent shafts at the ends of stations and fan shafts mid-tunnel. End-of-station
shaft configurations should be related to the station geometries in the
effects.
Where trains might be stopped or delayed in a tunnel an enclosed trainway for a
period of time, the vehicle ventilation systemshould be capable of maintaining
an acceptable level of patron comfort. If not operating in a fire emergency
scenario, the tunnel emergency ventilation fans can be used to augment the
vehicle systemcapability. Velocities should consider the comfort levels of
employees required to be in the tunnels enclosed trainways.
point of safety.
6.5.3.7* Illumination level in of enclosed trainways under construction shall not
be less than 2.7 lx (0.25 ft-candles) at the walking surface.
6.6.2 Vehicle Roadway Terminations. Vent or fan shafts utilized for ventilation
of tunnels enclosed trainways shall not terminate at grade on any vehicle
roadway.
(2) In a systemunderground or enclosed trainway that is greater in length than
305 m(1000 ft)
8.5.1.2.2 Vehicles that travel through tunnels enclosed trainways and have a
roof that is constructed of a combustible material shall require a fire hazard
analysis to demonstrate that rapid fire spread to passenger and crew
auxiliaries shall be of a type and construction suitable for use on fixed guideway
transit and passenger rail systemvehicles.
8.11.1* General. The requirements of this section shall apply to fixed guideway
and passenger rail systemvehicles designed to meet the engineering analysis
option permitted by Section 8.2 and to meet the goals and objectives stated in
Sections 4.2 and 4.3.
(2500 ft) apart.
environment.
be equipped with emergency tunnel evacuation carts (ETECs) at locations to be
determined by the authority having jurisdiction.
ETECs should be capable of carrying a capacity of at least four stretchers and a
total weight capacity of at least 453.5 kg (1000 lb). ETECs should be
Attachment 13-8-5-a
10 of 20
maximumexpected heat release rate. The heat release rate of the vehicle fire
will also affect the heat that passengers could be exposed to during evacuation.
The magnitude of the heat release rate during post-flashover will be a function
of the amount of air drawn into the vehicle, the material fire properties, and the
potential heat release rate of the burning fuels inside of the vehicle.
fires will produce longer flames that could extend out of the vehicle openings. If
the vehicle is inside a tunnel an enclosed trainway, these flames could impinge
on the ceiling and extend down away fromthe burning vehicle. Radiation from
these flames to nearby evacuating passengers could be significant.
The location of the train must be also considered in the analysis. For example,
the fire risk to occupants is greater if the train is located between stations or
within a tunnel an enclosed trainway.
MARKOS, S.: This is the second cycle that I have identified (see the actual
proposal) the consistency issues and confusing unclear reasons by some review
to underwater and of the use of the terms enclosed, elevated as well, as
underground, and underwater win the various chapter of require a careful
technical review by. Accordingly, I will provide the Committee the Proposal for
130-114, that contains the proposal for reordering Chapter 6 that contains a
extra side column so you can better review and see and thus more clearly see
and understand what my reasons were and are.
MIDDLEBROOK, T.: The TC should address this issue during this cycle. H.
Locke has proposed language in his response to this log which should be
considered by the TC at the ROC.
Attachment 13-8-5-a
11 of 20
RETURN FOR FURTHER STUDY: Return a
portion of a Report in the form of identifiable
part(s) of a proposal and related comment(s).
______________________________________________________________
(Entire Document)
_______________________________________________________________
Submitter: Harold A. Locke, Locke & Locke Inc.
requirements for underground, surface, and elevated fixed guideway
transit and passenger rail systems, including but not limited to stations,
trainways, emergency ventilation systems, vehicles, emergency procedures,
3.3.23 Guideway. That portion of the fixed guideway transit or passenger
rail line systemincluded within right-of-way fences, outside lines of curbs
or shoulders, underground tunnels and stations, cut or fill slopes, ditches,
passengers shall not be required to be
enclosed fire-separated.
the public way.
level (such as crossover subway lines), there shall be a cross-connection pipe
of a minimumsize of 100 mm(4 in.) in diameter between each standpipe
system, so that supplying water through any fire department connection will
furnish water throughout the entire system.
6.2.2.2.2 For exit stairs serving underground or enclosed trainways, the width
of exit stairs shall not be required to exceed 1120 mm(44 in.).
bores.
(4) Openings in open Cross-passageways shall be separated fromthe
(6) A ventilation systemfor the contaminated tunnel incident trainway shall
trainways.
permitted in 6.3.1.1.5.2 or 6.3.1.1.5.3, shall be noncombustible materials,
surface is exposed.
underground enclosed trainway sections by a
minimumof 2-hour fire-resistive construction.
6.3.2.2* Emergency ventilation meeting the tenability criteria for occupied
areas shall not be required in storage track areas where the storage track does
not open has no openings along its length to passenger track trainway areas
and where an engineering analysis indicates that a fire on a train in the storage
track area will not impact passengers or passenger areas.
6.3.3.1.2 Life safety and fire protection criteria for the subsysteminstalled
in the trainway shall conformto the requirements for underground enclosed
Construction.
6.5.3.7* Illumination level in of enclosed trainways under construction shall
not be less than 2.7 lx (0.25 ft-candles) at the walking surface.
6.6.2 Vehicle Roadway Terminations. Vent or fan shafts utilized for
ventilation of tunnels enclosed trainways shall not terminate at grade on any
vehicle roadway.
(2) In a systemunderground or enclosed trainway that is greater in length
than 305 m(1000 ft)
7.2.6* The time-of-tenability criteria for stations and tunnels trainways shall
be established and approved. For stations, the time shall be greater than the
shall be capable of satisfying the emergency ventilation requirements to
move tunnel trainway air in either direction as required to provide the needed
8.5.1.2.2 Vehicles that travel through tunnels enclosed trainways and have
a roof that is constructed of a combustible material shall require a fire
hazard analysis to demonstrate that rapid fire spread to passenger and crew
auxiliaries shall be of a type and
construction suitable for use on fixed guideway transit and passenger rail
systemvehicles.
Attachment 13-8-5-a
12 of 20
Where trains might be stopped or delayed in a tunnel an enclosed trainway
for a period of time, the vehicle ventilation systemshould be capable of
levels of employees required to be in the tunnels enclosed trainways.
point of safety.
maximumexpected heat release rate.
The heat release rate of the vehicle fire will also affect the heat that
passengers could be exposed to during evacuation. The magnitude of the heat
release rate during post-flashover will be a function of the amount of air drawn
into the vehicle, the material fire properties, and the potential heat release rate
of the burning fuels inside of the vehicle.
fires will produce longer flames that could extend out of the vehicle openings.
If the vehicle is inside a tunnel an enclosed trainway, these flames could
impinge on the ceiling and extend down away fromthe burning vehicle.
Radiation fromthese flames to nearby evacuating passengers could be
significant.
The location of the train must be also considered in the analysis. For
example, the fire risk to occupants is greater if the train is located between
stations or within a tunnel an enclosed trainway.
Substantiation: Regardless of the Committee Statement to proposal 130-115
Log #225 in the ROP, this proposal has validity in that it addresses a concern
that has been raised in several recent cycles; therefore, the above revisions are
offered for consideration.
Revise existing text as follows:
shoulders, underground tunnels and stations, cut or fill slopes, ditches,
5.2.4.1 5.2.3.1.1* Stairs and Escalators Enclosure. Stairs and escalators used
by passengers shall not be required to be enclosed fire-separated.
8.11.1* General. The requirements of this section shall apply to fixed
guideway and passenger rail systemvehicles designed to meet the engineering
analysis option permitted by Section 8.2 and to meet the goals and objectives
stated in Sections 4.2 and 4.3.
the maximumtravel distance to an exit. This same requirement is applied
in NFPA 130. Where two means of egress are required, the maximumtravel
(2500 ft) apart.
environment.
be equipped with emergency tunnel
evacuation carts (ETECs) at locations to be determined by the authority having
jurisdiction. ETECs should be capable of carrying a capacity of at least four
stretchers and a total weight capacity of at least 453.5 kg (1000 lb). ETECs
should be constructed of corrosion-resistant materials, be equipped with a
deadman brake, and safely operate on the rail tracks in the tunnel enclosed
trainway.
B.1 General.
Current technology is capable of analyzing and evaluating all unique
conditions of each property to provide proper ventilation for normal operating
conditions and for pre-identified emergency conditions. The same ventilating
devices might or might not serve both normal operating conditions and pre-
identified emergency requirements. The goals of the subway emergency
ventilation systemfor an enclosed trainway, in addition to addressing fire and
smoke emergencies, are to assist in the containment and purging of hazardous
gases and aerosols such as those that could result froma chemical/biological
release.
B.3 Configurations.
characteristics:
section
the fan shafts at the ends of stations, with vent shafts mid-tunnel if required
or with vent shafts at the ends of stations and fan shafts mid-tunnel. End-of-
station shaft configurations should be related to the station geometries in the
effects.
Attachment 13-8-5-a
13 of 20
shaft or portal and shall be extended as work progresses to within 61 m(200 ft)
of the most remote portion of the tunnel enclosed trainway.
6.2.1.6 6.5.3.7* Illumination level in of enclosed trainways under construction
shall not be less than 2.7 lx (0.25 ft-candles) at the walking surface.
6.4.5 6.5.4 Portable Fire Extinguishers. Portable fire extinguishers shall be
enclosed trainways guideways as determined by the authority having
jurisdiction.
A.6.3.1.4 A.6.2.2.2 Previous editions of NFPA 130 addressed this requirement
by prescribing the maximumtravel distance to an exit. The intent of this
trainway guideway, the exits cannot be more than twice the travel distance, or
762 m(2500 ft) apart.
B.8 Non-Emergency Tunnel Ventilation for Enclosed Trainways.
Where trains might be stopped or delayed in a tunnel an enclosed trainway for
a period of time, the vehicle ventilation systemshould be capable of
levels of employees required to be in the tunnels trainways.
Committee Statement: Revisions are necessary to provide consistent
terminology and to eliminate sections that are not referenced elsewhere in the
ROP.
KOFFEL, W.: I amvoting negative on certain aspects of the Committee
Action regarding the change fromenclosed exit to fire-separated exit. The
change, which occurs in several locations, should not be made. NFPA 130
refers to NFPA 101 which provides the criteria for an exit enclosure. Changing
to fire-separated is not a defined concept in either NFPA 130 or NFPA 101 (or
the IBC for that matter). Do the other limitations on exit enclosures contained
in NFPA 101 (openings, penetrations, use, etc.) apply? What are the
requirements for the fire separation (fire resistance rating, continuity, etc.)?
There is no mention to the separation being a fire barrier (or possibly a fire
partition which is a defined termin the IBC).
LOCKE, H.: Further to Mr. Koffels and Mr. Nelsens ballot comments
regarding terminology related to enclosure vs. fire separation, the following
amendments to the language proposed in ROC Comment 130-1 are required:
3.3.35: A point of safety is one of the following: (1) an enclosed exit enclosed
by fire-resistive construction that leads to a public way or safe location outside
5.3.4.2 5.5.6.3.1.2* In computing the means of egress capacity available on
platforms, corridors, and ramps, 300 mm(12 in.) shall be deducted at each
sidewall and 450 mm(18 in.) at open platformedges that are open to the
trainway.
5.3.5.5 5.5.6.3.2.5 (3) For enclosed stations, at least one enclosed fire-separated
exit stair or exit passageway shall provide continuous access fromthe
5.4.5.4 5.7.4.3 Where underground enclosed stations include more than one
platformlevel (such as crossover subway lines), there shall be a cross-
connection pipe of a minimumsize of 100 mm(4 in.) in diameter between
each standpipe system, so that supplying water through any fire department
connection will furnish water throughout the entire system.
5.4.1.1 5.7.6.1 Underground Enclosed stations shall be provided with a fire
command center in accordance with NFPA 72.
5.4.1.2 5.7.6.2 The ventilation systems at adjacent tunnels trainways and
stations shall be permitted to be omitted fromthe controls of the fire command
center.
6.3.1.4 6.2.2.2.1 Within underground or enclosed trainways, the maximum
distance between exits shall not exceed 762 m(2500 ft).
6.3.2.3 6.2.2.2.2 For exit stairs serving underground or enclosed trainways, the
width of exit stairs shall not be required to exceed 1120 mm(44 in.).
6.3.1.5 6.2.2.3.1 Cross-passageways shall be permitted to be used in lieu of
emergency exit stairways to the surface where trainways in tunnels are divided
by a minimumof 2 hourrated fire walls separations or where trainways are in
twin bores.
6.3.1.6 6.2.2.3.2 Where cross-passageways are utilized in lieu of emergency
exit stairways, the following shall apply:
(3)(4) Openings in open Cross-passageways shall be separated fromthe
(5)(6) A ventilation systemfor the contaminated tunnel incident trainway shall
6.3.3.10 6.2.2.4.2 Doors in the means of egress shall comply with the
following:
6.3.5.8 6.2.5.1 The requirements of 6.2.5.2 through 6.2.5.3.2 shall apply to all
6.4.2.1 6.2.7.1* Blue light stations shall be provided at the following locations:
6.3.5.5 6.2.8.1 Underground or eEnclosed trainways greater in length than the
6.3.5.6 6.2.8.2 Signs indicating station or portal directions shall be installed at
trainways.
6.3.5.3 6.2.8.4 Points of exit fromelevated and underground or enclosed
trainways shall be marked with internally or externally illuminated signs.
6.2.8.1 6.3.1.1.5.1 Rail ties used in underground or enclosed locations, except
as permitted in 6.3.1.1.5.2 or 6.3.1.1.5.3, shall be noncombustible materials.
6.2.8.3 6.3.1.1.5.3 Rail ties and tie blocks in underground or enclosed track
sections shall be permitted to be of wood encased in concrete such that only the
top surface is exposed.
6.2.4.1 6.3.1.1.7.2 Ancillary areas shall be separated fromtrainway areas within
construction.
6.4.6.3 6.3.2.2* Emergency ventilation meeting the tenability criteria for
occupied areas shall not be required in storage track areas where the storage
track does not open has no openings along its length to passenger track
trainway areas and where an engineering analysis indicates that a fire on a train
in the storage track area will not impact passengers or passenger areas.
6.4.4.1 6.5.2.1 An approved fire standpipe systemshall be provided in
underground enclosed fixed guideway transit or passenger rail system
trainways where physical factors prevent or impede access to the water supply
or fire apparatus, where required by the authority having jurisdiction.
6.4.4.7 6.5.2.4 Identification numbers and letters conforming to the system
sectional identification numbers and letters of the fixed guideway transit or
passenger trainway systemshall be provided at each surface fire department
connection and at each hose valve on the standpipe lines.
6.4.4.8 6.5.2.4.1 Identifying signs shall be affixed to underground or enclosed
trainway walls at each hose outlet valve or shall be painted directly on the
standpipe in white letters next to each hose outlet valve.
6.4.4.9 6.5.2.4.2 Exposed tunnel standpipe lines and identification signs shall
be painted as required by the authority having jurisdiction.
6.2.1 6.5.3 Standpipe Installations in Tunnels Under Safeguards During
Construction.
6.2.1.1 6.5.3.1 A standpipe systemshall be installed in tunnels enclosed
trainways under construction in accordance with NFPA 241.
6.2.1.2 6.5.3.1.1 A standpipe systemshall be installed before the tunnel
enclosed trainway has exceeded a length of 61 m(200 ft) beyond any access
Attachment 13-8-5-a
14 of 20
the public way.
level (such as crossover subway lines), there shall be a cross-connection pipe of
a minimumsize of 100 mm(4 in.) in diameter between each standpipe system,
so that supplying water through any fire department connection will furnish
water throughout the entire system.
6.2.2.2.2 For exit stairs serving underground or enclosed trainways, the width of
exit stairs shall not be required to exceed 1120 mm(44 in.).
bores.
(2)* Cross-passageways shall not be farther than 244 m(800 ft) fromthe station
or tunnel portal of the enclosed trainway.
(4) Openings in open Cross-passageways shall be separated fromthe trainway
protected with self-closing fire door assemblies having a fire protection rating
of 1hours with a self-closing fire door.
(6) A ventilation systemfor the contaminated tunnel incident trainway shall be
designed to control smoke in the vicinity of the passengers.
(2) Be adequate to withstand positive and negative pressures caused by passing
trains and tunnel the emergency ventilation system.
trainways.
permitted in 6.3.1.1.5.2 or 6.3.1.1.5.3, shall be noncombustible materials, which
comply with the requirements of ASTM E 136.
surface is exposed.
construction.
6.3.2.2* Emergency ventilation meeting the tenability criteria for occupied areas
shall not be required in storage track areas where the storage track does not
open has no openings along its length to passenger track trainway areas and
where an engineering analysis indicates that a fire on a train in the storage track
area will not impact passengers or passenger areas.
the trainway shall conformto the requirements for underground enclosed
Construction.
enclosing station, or trainway; (3) any other approved location. 5.2.4.1: Stairs
and escalators used by passengers shall not be required to be enclosed or
separated by fire-resistive construction fromthe adjoining space. 5.3.5.5: For
enclosed stations, at least one enclosed exit stair or exit passageway that is
enclosed by fire-resistive construction shall provide continuous access fromthe
MARKOS, S.: Thank you, Mr. Locke for your follow-up, to address this
long-time concern over several cycles and willingness to provide the necessary
effort to clarify the usage of the terms. Relating to Mr. Koefells ROC vote
comment, I agree that the issue he identified re change fromenclosed to
fire-separated for 3.3.35, 5.2.3.1.1* and 5.5.6.3.2.5 (3) accepted with
renumbering for the latter 2 cases to be 5.2.4.1 and 5.3.5.5 should be addressed
but NOT at the expense of not accepting all of the remainder of the Comment,
the clarifications for which has been a LONG time coming in terms of the
usage and meaning of enclosed, underground, tunnel etc., as used
throughout the 2010 standard.
NELSEN, J .: I think I appreciate the intent of this comment however in my
opinion it is inappropriate to replace the termenclosed as it relates to exits
and/or exit stairs with fire-separated as proposed. This proposed new
terminology is not used in NFPA 101, NFPA 5000 or the IBC/IFC; in fact in
the IBC fire separation refers to the physical distance between two buildings,
a building and the public way or a building and the property line. In that
regard, I amnot sure that the proposed changes related to the termenclosed
are consistent with the Committee Statement that the Revisions are necessary
to provide consistent terminology...
_______________________________________________________________
(Chapter 6)
_______________________________________________________________
Submitter: Stephanie H. Markos, US Department of Transportation/Volpe
Center
Recommendation: Review usage of terms underground, enclosed, and
underwater as in this Chapter and Chapter 5.
Substantiation: While specific definitions for enclosed and underground
as well as elevated stations are contained in the definitions section (3.4.44
AND 3.4.45)., these terms are not defined for the guideway or trainway. There
are numerous times that it is unclear as to why one or the other termor both is
used. Sometimes enclosed is included in the requirement, along with
underground,. See 6.2.2.2.1 and 6.2.2.2.2; 6.2.5.1, 6.2.8.1 6.2.8.2, 6.8.
Enclosed alone is used in 6.2.4.2.1 and 6.2.5.1. Underwater is used in
section 6.3.1.1.7.1, but u underwater is used in 6.3.1.1.7.2. Moreover, 6.3.3.1
has the heading title of Underground (Subways). But enclosed is used in
several items, along with underground in the same sentence. Also note that
Underwater is not necessarily underground if it is a trainway drilled
through rock.
Committee Statement: The proposal does not contain any proposed language
for change as required by the regulations governing committee projects.
LOCKE, H.: Regardless of the Committee Statement, this proposal has
validity in that it addresses a concern that has been raised in several recent
cycles; therefore, the following NFPA 130 revisions are offered for
consideration.
shoulders, underground tunnels and stations, cut or fill slopes, ditches, channels,
and waterways, and including all appertaining structures.
3.3.35 Point of Safety. A point of safety is one of the following: (1) an enclosed
a fire-separated exit that leads to a public way or safe location outside the
station, trainway, or vehicle; (2) an at-grade point beyond the vehicle, enclosing
station, or trainway; (3) any other approved location.
passengers shall not be required to be enclosed fire-separated.
Attachment 13-8-5-a
15 of 20
constructed of corrosion-resistant materials, be equipped with a deadman
brake, and safely operate on the rail tracks in the tunnel enclosed trainway.
B.1 General.
Current technology is capable of analyzing and evaluating all unique conditions
of each property to provide proper ventilation for normal operating conditions
and for pre-identified emergency conditions. The same ventilating devices
might or might not serve both normal operating conditions and pre-identified
emergency requirements. The goals of the subway emergency ventilation
systemfor an enclosed trainway, in addition to addressing fire and smoke
emergencies, are to assist in the containment and purging of hazardous gases
and aerosols such as those that could result froma chemical/biological release.
B.3 Configurations.
characteristics:
section
the fan shafts at the ends of stations, with vent shafts mid-tunnel if required or
with vent shafts at the ends of stations and fan shafts mid-tunnel. End-of-station
shaft configurations should be related to the station geometries in the
effects.
Where trains might be stopped or delayed in a tunnel an enclosed trainway for a
period of time, the vehicle ventilation systemshould be capable of maintaining
an acceptable level of patron comfort. If not operating in a fire emergency
scenario, the tunnel emergency ventilation fans can be used to augment the
vehicle systemcapability. Velocities should consider the comfort levels of
employees required to be in the tunnels enclosed trainways.
point of safety.
6.5.3.7* Illumination level in of enclosed trainways under construction shall not
be less than 2.7 lx (0.25 ft-candles) at the walking surface.
6.6.2 Vehicle Roadway Terminations. Vent or fan shafts utilized for ventilation
of tunnels enclosed trainways shall not terminate at grade on any vehicle
roadway.
(2) In a systemunderground or enclosed trainway that is greater in length than
305 m(1000 ft)
8.5.1.2.2 Vehicles that travel through tunnels enclosed trainways and have a
roof that is constructed of a combustible material shall require a fire hazard
analysis to demonstrate that rapid fire spread to passenger and crew
auxiliaries shall be of a type and construction suitable for use on fixed guideway
transit and passenger rail systemvehicles.
8.11.1* General. The requirements of this section shall apply to fixed guideway
and passenger rail systemvehicles designed to meet the engineering analysis
option permitted by Section 8.2 and to meet the goals and objectives stated in
Sections 4.2 and 4.3.
(2500 ft) apart.
environment.
be equipped with emergency tunnel evacuation carts (ETECs) at locations to be
determined by the authority having jurisdiction.
ETECs should be capable of carrying a capacity of at least four stretchers and a
total weight capacity of at least 453.5 kg (1000 lb). ETECs should be
Attachment 13-8-5-a
16 of 20
maximumexpected heat release rate. The heat release rate of the vehicle fire
will also affect the heat that passengers could be exposed to during evacuation.
The magnitude of the heat release rate during post-flashover will be a function
of the amount of air drawn into the vehicle, the material fire properties, and the
potential heat release rate of the burning fuels inside of the vehicle.
fires will produce longer flames that could extend out of the vehicle openings. If
the vehicle is inside a tunnel an enclosed trainway, these flames could impinge
on the ceiling and extend down away fromthe burning vehicle. Radiation from
these flames to nearby evacuating passengers could be significant.
The location of the train must be also considered in the analysis. For example,
the fire risk to occupants is greater if the train is located between stations or
within a tunnel an enclosed trainway.
MARKOS, S.: This is the second cycle that I have identified (see the actual
proposal) the consistency issues and confusing unclear reasons by some review
to underwater and of the use of the terms enclosed, elevated as well, as
underground, and underwater win the various chapter of require a careful
technical review by. Accordingly, I will provide the Committee the Proposal for
130-114, that contains the proposal for reordering Chapter 6 that contains a
extra side column so you can better review and see and thus more clearly see
and understand what my reasons were and are.
MIDDLEBROOK, T.: The TC should address this issue during this cycle. H.
Locke has proposed language in his response to this log which should be
considered by the TC at the ROC.
Attachment 13-8-5-a
17 of 20
5 ROC.
6 The pr esi di ng of f i cer wi l l now pr oceed
7 wi t h t he Cer t i f i ed Amendi ng Mot i ons.
8 MR. HARRI NGTON: Thank you, Mr . Sandu. So
9 we' l l now pr oceed wi t h t he di scussi on on t he
10 Cer t i f i ed Amendi ng Mot i ons on NFPA 130.
11 Mi cr ophone 3.
12 MR. KOFFEL: Bi l l Kof f el , Kof f el & Associ at es,
13 speaki ng f or mysel f . I woul d l i ke t o move
14 Cer t i f i ed Amendi ng Mot i on 130- 1 whi ch i s t o r et ur n
15 a por t i on of t he r epor t i n t he f or mof an
16 i dent i f i abl e par t of Pr oposal 130- 115 and r el at ed
17 Comment 130- 1.
19 MR. HARRI NGTON: Second. You may pr oceed.
20 MR. KOFFEL: Thank you, Mr . Chai r man. Bef or e I
21 pr oceed, a di scl ai mer . I si t on t hi s Commi t t ee
22 r epr esent i ng AFAA, but I amnot her e t oday
23 r epr esent i ng AFAA. I al so have some cl i ent s t hat
24 woul d be af f ect ed by t hi s, and t hat i s t he Gl azi ng
245
1 I ndust r y Code Commi t t ee and t he Fi r e Subcont r act or s
2 I nt er nat i onal Associ at i on. Agai n, I amnot
3 r epr esent i ng ei t her of t hose t wo or gani zat i ons.
4 My pur pose t oday i s mer el y cor r el at i on.
5 NFPA 130 i s of t en appl i ed as an al t er nat i ve met hod
6 f or compl i ance wi t h t he Bui l di ng Code or t he Li f e
7 Saf et y Code. I n f act , NFPA 130 r ef er ences t he Li f e
8 Saf et y Code f or means of egr ess r equi r ement s and
Page 210
Attachment 13-8-5-a
18 of 20
9 says compl y wi t h t he Li f e Saf et y Code except as
10 modi f i ed her ei n.
11 The pur poses of t hi s mot i on i s i n t wo
12 par agr aphs t o r et ai n t he l anguage of " encl osed
13 exi t " . That i s a def i ned t er mi n t he Bui l di ng Code
14 and t he Li f e Saf et y Code. The t er m
15 " f i r e- separ at ed" i s not . By r et ai ni ng encl osed
16 exi t , you get t he f i r e- r esi st i ve r at i ng. You get
17 t he cont i nui t y of t he f i r e bar r i er s. You get
18 l i mi t at i ons on openi ngs. You get how t he openi ngs
19 ar e t o be pr ot ect ed. You get how t o pr ot ect
20 penet r at i ons; and you get l i mi t at i ons on t he use of
21 t hat exi t and cl osur e.
22 You get none of t hat wi t h t he wor d
23 " f i r e- separ at ed" .
24 Someone asked me why I di d not change
246
1 ot her par agr aphs. I t r i ed t o be ver y car ef ul and
2 onl y appl y t hi s t o t he t wo speci f i c par agr aphs t hat
3 I bel i eve sol el y appl y t o encl osed exi t s. You wi l l
4 not e, t hi s i s consi st ent wi t h my negat i ve bal l ot
5 dur i ng t he r eci r cul at i on. Sever al Commi t t ee
6 member s added a comment suppor t i ng at l east t he
7 concept , not necessar i l y t he exact l anguage, but
8 t he concept of my negat i ve bal l ot comment i ncl udi ng
9 t he or i gi nal submi t t er of t he comment .
10 I encour age you t o suppor t t he mot i on.
11 MR. HARRI NGTON: Thank you. Mr . Sandu, woul d
12 you l i ve t o gi ve t he Commi t t ee' s posi t i on?
13 MR. SANDU: These i ssues wer e br ought up i n t he
Page 211
Attachment 13-8-5-a
19 of 20
14 pr evi ous mot i on i n 502 - - I don' t .
15 MR. HARRI NGTON: No comment ? Thank you. So
16 wi t h t hat , we' l l open up t he f l oor f or debat e on
17 t he mot i on. Pl ease pr ovi de your name and
18 af f i l i at i on and whet her you' r e goi ng t o speak i n
19 suppor t of or agai nst t he mot i on. Mi cr ophone 2.
20 MR. CONRAD: J ames Conr ad, RSCC Wi r e & Cabl e.
21 I ' mon t he t ask gr oup f or NFPA 130 but not a vot i ng
22 member . Let me make t hat cl ear . We di scussed t hi s
23 wi t h sever al member s, and we suppor t t he mot i on on
24 t he f l oor . Thank you.
247
1 MR. HARRI NGTON: Thank you. Mi cr ophone 3.
3 GBH I nt er nat i onal , f or NAFRA. I suppor t t he
4 mot i on.
5 J ust t o make cl ear , t he t er m
6 " f i r e- separ at ed exi t " i s not used i n any Code or
7 t he NFPA or I BC. Pl ease suppor t t he mot i on.
8 MR. HARRI NGTON: I s t her e any f ur t her
9 di scussi on on Mot i on 130- 1?
10 So seei ng none, we' l l move t o a vot e.
11 Bef or e we vot e, l et me r est at e t he mot i on. So t he
12 mot i on on t he f l oor i s t o r et ur n a por t i on of a
13 r epor t i n t he f or mof an i dent i f i abl e par t of
14 Pr oposal 130- 115 and r el at ed Comment ed 130- 1.
15 Pl ease r ecor d your vot e, 1 i n f avor of t he mot i on
16 t o accept or 2, opposed t o t he mot i on, r ej ect . So
17 vot i ng st ar t s. 5 seconds.
Page 212
Attachment 13-8-5-a
20 of 20
1
Maynard, Mary
Subject: UL Appeal - NFPA 130 Standard for Fixed Guideway Transit and Passenger Rail Systems
From: Ramirez, Alfredo M. [mailto:Alfredo.M.Ramirez@ul.com]

Sent: Wednesday, J uly 03, 2013 1:48 PM
To: Cronin, Amy
Cc: Fuller, Linda; Maynard, Mary; Lakomiak, Neil
Subject: UL Appeal - NFPA 130 Standard for Fixed Guideway Transit and Passenger Rail Systems
Ms.Cronin,
InaccordancewiththeRegulationsGoverningCommitteeProjects,Section1.6,AppealstotheCouncil,Iamfilingthe
followingappeal:
1.Name,affiliationandaddressofapplicant:
AlfredoRamirez
UnderwritersLaboratories
333PfingstenRd
Northbrook,IL60062
2.Particularactiontowhichappealrelates:
2013TechnicalSessionflooractiononCertifiedAmendingMotion1302
3.Argumentssettingforththegroundsfortheappeal:
InformationrelatedtoNFPA130ROC#130165
InformationrelatedtoTIA1080forNFPA130
TechnicalSessiontranscriptrelatingto2013NFPATechnicalSession,CertifiedAmendingMotion1302
Additionalinformationtobeprovided.
4.Precisereliefrequested:
IamappealingtotheStandardsCounciltooverturntheactionstakenbytheNFPA130TechnicalCommitteeon
A2013ROC#130165andtheAssociationMembershipatthe2013TechnicalSessionregardingCertified
AmendingMotion1302
Atthistime,Iamrequestingahearingonthisappeal.
Regards
Al Ramirez
Regulatory Services Regional Manager
----------------------------------------------
UL LLC
333 Pfingsten Road
Northbrook, IL 60062-2096 USA
T: 847.664.2905
F: 847.313.2905
Attachment 13-8-5-b
1 of 7
REJECT AN IDENTIFIABLE PART OF
Comment 130-165
_______________________________________________________________
130-165 Log #CC15 Final Action: Accept
(12.5, A.12.5)
_______________________________________________________________
Submitter: Technical Committee on Fixed Guideway Transit and Passenger
Rail Systems,
Recommendation: Revise text as follows:
12.5* Fire-resistive cables. Power Supply for Emergency Ventilation
Fans See Chapter 7
12.6 12.5.1 Fire-resistive cables shall be certified or listed as having been be
listed and have a minimum1-hour fire resistance rating in accordance with
ANSI/UL 2196 and shall be installed per the listing requirement. tested in a
totally enclosed furnace using the ASTM E-119 time temperature curve.
12.5.2 The cables shall demonstrate functionality for no less than 1 hour as
described in the ANSI/UL 2196 test standard.
12.5.3 The cables and systems shall comply with the following:
a) Be tested as a complete systemof conductors, cables and raceways as
applicable, using a sample no shorter than 3.0 m(9.84 ft).
b) For fire-resistive cables intended for installation in a raceway, be tested in
the type of raceway in which they are intended to be installed.
c) Have installation instructions that describe the tested assembly and only the
components included in the tested assembly are acceptable for installation.
A.12.5 When selecting a fire-resistive cable, it is important to understand how
it will be installed and if it was tested as a complete system, including splices.
Cables that are exposed (not embedded in concrete) should be protected
using either a raceway or an armor/sheath (see 12.4.1). There are two basic
configurations of fire-resistive cables. Cables enclosed by a metallic sheath or
armor, such as Type MI or Type MC, are installed without raceways. Cables
that are installed in a raceway, such as Type RHW-2, Type TC or Type CM
are tested as a complete system. Regardless of the fire test standard used to
evaluate fire-resistive cables that will be installed in a raceway, it is important
to consider that the cables are only one part of the system. Other components
of the systeminclude but are not limited to: the type of raceway, the size of
raceway, raceway support, raceway couplings, boxes, conduit bodies, splices
where used, vertical supports, grounds, and pulling lubricants. Each cable type
should be tested to demonstrate compatibility. Only those specific types of
raceways tested should be acceptable for installation. Each cable type that is
intended to be installed in raceway should be tested in both a horizontal and
vertical configuration while demonstrating circuit integrity.
Substantiation: The Technical Committee has taken this action to revise
Sec. 12.5 in order to address the recent actions of UL pertaining to the listing
of products tested to their standard UL2196. The UL action has invalidated
standard requirements in Chapter 12 by making the listing requirements
unattainable as written. Specifically, as of Sept 12, 2012, UL has withdrawn
all cable certifications (listings) to this test standard. Recent fire testing has
demonstrated failure modes such as hot-dipped galvanized coatings on the
interior surface of the raceways potentially causing premature failure of copper
fire-resistive cable systems. NFPA 130 currently allows the use of fire resistive
cable listed in accordance with UL2196 Standard for Safety for Test for Fire
Resistive Cables 2012.
_______________________________________________________________
(Chapter 12 (New))
_______________________________________________________________
Submitter: Gil Shoshani, RSCC
Recommendation: Consolidate wiring requirements fromChapters 5, 6 and 7
to new Chapter 12.
In Chapter 5 the consolidation is fromsection 5.4 to 5.4.10. Section 5.4.11
renamed Emergency Power and the section was renumbered. (See attachment
2 - section 5.4 changes)
In Chapter 6 the consolidation is fromsection 6.3.3.1.3 to 6.3.3.2.10. Section
6.3.3 renamed Emergency Power and the section was renumbered. Deleted
section 6.3.3.1.1 and 6.3.3.1.2 since they are already covered in section 6.4
power traction. (See attachment 3 - section 6.3.3 changes)
In Chapter 7 the consolidation is fromsection 7.7.2 to 7.7.8 and 7.7.10.
Section 7.7 renamed Emergency Power and the section was renumbered.
Proposed New Chapter 12
Chapter 12 Wire and Cable Requirements
12.1 Wire and Cable. This applies to all chapters except of vehicle wiring
found in chapter 8.
12.1.1 All wiring materials and installations other than for traction power shall
conformto the requirements of NFPA 70.
12.1.2 The additional requirements in 12.2 through 12.6 apply to all areas
except non underground trainways.
12.2 Wiring Requirements.
12.2.1 Overcurrent elements that are designed to protect conductors serving
emergency equipment motors (pumps, etc.), emergency lighting, and
communications equipment that are located in spaces other than the main
electrical distribution systemequipment rooms shall not depend on thermal
properties for operation.
12.3 Wire and Cable Requirements.
12.3.1 All conductors shall be insulated.
12.3.1.1 Ground wire installed in a metallic raceway shall be insulated.
12.3.1.2 Other ground wires shall be permitted to be bare.
12.3.2 All insulations shall conformto NFPA 70 and shall be moisture- and
heat-resistant type carrying temperature ratings corresponding to either of the
following conditions:
(1) 75C (167F) for listed fire-resistive cables
(2) 90C (194F) for all other applications
12.3.2.1 All insulated conductors and cables shall be listed for wet locations.
12.3.3 All wires and cables used shall be listed as being resistant to the spread
of fire and shall have reduced smoke emissions, by complying with 12.3.3.1 or
12.3.3.2.
12.3.3.1 All wires and cables shall comply with the FT4/IEEE 1202 exposure
requirements for cable char height, total smoke released, and peak smoke
release rate of ANSI/UL 1685.
12.3.3.2 Wires and cables listed as having adequate fire resistant and low-
smoke-producing characteristics, by having a flame travel distance that does
not exceed 1.5 m(5 ft) and generating a maximumpeak optical density of
smoke of 0.50 and a maximumaverage optical density of smoke of 0.15 when
tested in accordance with NFPA 262 shall be permitted for use instead of the
wires and cables specified in 5.4.5.1.
12.4 Wiring Installation Methods
12.4.1 Conduits, raceways, ducts, boxes, cabinets, and equipment enclosures
shall be constructed of noncombustible materials in accordance with the
requirements of ASTM E 136. In stations, other materials when encased in
concrete shall be acceptable.
12.4.2 All conductors, except radio antennas, shall be enclosed in their entirety
in armor sheaths, conduits, or enclosed raceways, boxes, and cabinets except in
ancillary areas
12.4.2.1* Conductors in conduits or raceways shall be permitted to be
embedded in concrete or run in concrete electrical duct banks, but they shall
not be installed exposed or surface mounted in air plenums unless cables are
listed fire-resistive cables in accordance with 12.6
12.4.3 The emergency circuits shall be protected fromphysical damage by
systemvehicles or other normal systemoperations and fromfires in the system
for a period of not less than 1 hour.
12.4.3.1 The circuits shall be protected fromASTM E119 fire conditions by
any of the following:
(1) Suitable embedment or encasement
(2) Routing external to the interior underground portions of the system
facilities
(3) Diversity in systemrouting (such as separate redundant or multiple circuits
separated by a 1-hour fire barrier) so that a single fire or emergency event will
not lead to a failure of the system
(4) Use of a listed fire-resistive cable systemwith a minimum1-hour rating in
accordance with 12.6
12.5 Power Supply for Emergency Ventilation Fans. See Chapter 7.
12.6 Fire-resistive cables shall be listed and have a minimum1-hour fire-
resistive rating in accordance with ANSI/UL2196 and shall be installed per the
listing requirements.
Proposed Revisions to Section 5.4
5.4 Emergency Power Wiring Requirements.
5.4.1 All wiring materials and installations within stations other than for
traction power shall conformto requirements of NFPA 70 and, in addition,
shall satisfy the requirements of 5.4.2 through 5.4.9.
requirements of ASTM E 136.
5.4.2.1 Other materials when encased in concrete shall be acceptable.
heat-resistant type carrying temperature ratings corresponding to either of the
5.4.5 All wires and cables used shall be listed as being resistant to the spread
of fire and shall have reduced smoke emissions, by complying with 5.4.5.1 or
5.4.5.2.
Attachment 13-8-5-b
2 of 7
6.3.3.2.5.1 All wires and cables shall comply with the FT4/IEEE 1202
exposure requirements for cable char height, total smoke released, and peak
smoke release rate of ANSI/UL 1685-2007.
6.3.3.2.5.2 Wires and cables listed as having adequate fireresistant and low-
tested in accordance with NFPA262, shall be permitted for use instead of the
wires and cables specified in 6.3.3.2.5.1.
6.3.3.2.6* All conductors, except radio antennas, shall be enclosed in their
entirety in armor sheaths, conduits, or enclosed raceways, boxes, and cabinets
except in ancillary areas.
6.3.3.2.6.1* Conductors in conduits or raceways shall be permitted to be
embedded in concrete or run in concrete electrical stalled, exposed, or
surfacemounted in air plenums unless cables are listed fire-resistive cables in
accordance with 5.4.10.
6.3.3.2.7 Overcurrent elements that are designed to protect conductors
serving emergency equipment motors (pumps, etc.), emergency lighting, and
communications equipment and that are located in spaces other than the main
6.3.3.2.8 The emergency lighting and communications circuits shall be
protected fromphysical damage by systemvehicles or other normal system
operations and fromfires in the systemfor a
period of not less than 1 hour. The circuits shall be protected fromASTM E119
fire conditions by any of the following:
(2) Routing external to the interior underground portions of the system
facilities
(4) Use of a listed fire-resistive cable systemwith a minimum1-hour rating in
accordance with 6.3.3.2.10
6.3.3.2.9 Power Supply for Emergency Ventilation. See Chapter 7.
6.3.3.2.10 Fire-resistive cables used for emergency lighting and communication
shall be listed and have a minimum1-hour fire-resistive rating in accordance
with ANSI/UL 2196 and shall be installed per the listing requirements.
6.3.3 Emergency Power
6.3.3.2.11 6.3.3.1 Emergency Power. Enclosed trainways shall be such that, in
the event of failure of the normal supply to, or within, the system, emergency
power shall be provided with emergency power in accordance with Article 700
of NFPA 70, and Chapter 4 of NFPA 110. The supply systemfor emergency
purposes, in addition to the normal services to the trainway, shall be one or
more of the types of systems described in subsections 700.12(A) through
700.12(E) of NFPA 70.
6.3.3.2.11.1 6.3.3.2 The following systems shall be connected to the
emergency power system:
(1) Emergency lighting
(2) Protective signaling systems
(3) Emergency communication system
(4) Fire command center
6.3.3.3 The emergency lighting and communications circuits shall be protected
fromphysical damage by systemvehicles or other normal systemoperations
and fromfire as described in 12.4.3
Proposed revisions to Section 7.7
7.7 Emergency Power and Wiring.
7.7.1 The design of the power for the emergency ventilation systemshall
comply with the requirements of Article 700 of NFPA 70.
7.7.1.1 Alternatively, the design of the power for the emergency ventilation
systemshall be permitted to be based upon the results of the electrical
reliability analysis as per 7.2.3(6), as approved.
7.7.1.2 The emergency ventilation circuits routed through the station public
areas and trainway shall be protected fromphysical damage by fixed guideway
transit or passenger rail vehicles or other normal operations and fromfire as
described in 12.4.3
7.7.2 All wiring materials and installations shall conformto the requirements of
NFPA 70 and, in addition, shall satisfy the requirements of 7.7.3 through 7.7.8.
7.7.4.3 All thicknesses of jackets shall conformto NFPA 70.
heat-resistant types carrying temperature ratings corresponding to either of the
7.7.6 All wires and cables used in emergency ventilation circuits shall be listed
as being resistant to the spread of fire and shall have reduced smoke emissions,
by complying with 7.7.6.1 or 7.7.6.2.
5.4.5.2 Wires and cables listed as having adequate fireresistant and low-smoke-
producing characteristics, by having a flame travel distance that does not
exceed 1.5 m(5 ft) and generating a maximumpeak optical density of smoke of
0.50 and a maximumaverage optical density of smoke of 0.15 when tested in
accordance with NFPA 262 shall be permitted for use instead of the wires and
cables specified in 5.4.5.1.
ancillary areas or other nonpublic areas.
5.4.6.1* Conductors in conduits or raceways shall be permitted to be embedded
in concrete or run in concrete electrical duct banks, but they shall not be
installed exposed or surfacemounted in air plenums unless cables are listed
fire-resistive cables in accordance with 5.4.10.
5.4.7 Overcurrent elements that are designed to protect conductors serving
emergency equipment motors (pumps, etc.), emergency lighting, and
communications equipment that are located in spaces other than the main
5.4.8 The emergency lighting and communications circuits shall be protected
fromphysical damage by systemvehicles or other normal systemoperations
and fromfires in the systemfor a period of not less than 1 hour. The circuits
shall be a listed fireresistive cable systemwith a minimum1-hour rating,
in accordance with 5.4.10, and shall be protected fromASTM E 119 fire
conditions by any of the following:
(2) Routing external to the interior underground portion of the systemfacility
5.4.9 Power Supply for Emergency Ventilation Fans. See Chapter 7.
5.4.10 Fire-resistive cables shall be listed and have a minimum1-hour fire-
resistive rating in accordance withANSI/UL2196 and shall be installed per the
5.4.11 5.4.1Emergency Power. Emergency power in accordance with Article
700 of NFPA 70, and Chapter 4 of NFPA 110 shall be provided for enclosed
stations.
5.4.11.1 5.4.1.1The supply systemfor emergency purposes, in addition to the
normal services to the station building, shall be one or more of the types of
systems described in subsections 700.12(A) through 700.12(E) of NFPA 70.
5.4.11.2 5.4.1.2 The emergency power systemshall have a capacity and rating
sufficient to supply all equipment required to be connected by 5.4.11.4 5.4.1.4
5.4.11.3 5.4.1.3 Selective load pickup and load shedding shall be permitted in
accordance with NFPA 70.
5.4.11.4 5.4.1.4 The following systems shall be connected to the emergency
power system:
(1) Emergency lighting
(2) Protective signaling systems
(3) Emergency communication system
(4) Fire command center
5.4.1.5 The emergency lighting and communications circuits
shall be protected fromphysical damage by systemvehicles or
other normal systemoperations and fromfire as described in 12.4.3
Proposed revisions to 6.3.3
6.3.3 Wiring Requirements. (See Section 5.4.)
6.3.3.1* General.
6.3.3.1.1 Traction power shall include the wayside pothead, the cable between
the pothead and the contact (third) rail or overhead wire, the contact rail
supports, and special warning and identification devices.
the trainway shall conformto the requirements for underground trainways that
are listed in 6.4.2.
6.3.3.1.3 All wiring materials and installations other than those for traction
power shall conformto the requirements of NFPA 70.
6.3.3.2 Underground (Subways).
6.3.3.2.1 All wiring materials and installations within trainways, other than for
traction power, shall conformto the requirements of NFPA 70 and, in addition,
shall satisfy the requirements of 6.3.3.2.2 through 6.3.3.2.9.
6.3.3.2.2 Conduits, raceways, ducts, boxes, cabinets, and equipment enclosures
6.3.3.2.3 All conductors shall be insulated.
6.3.3.2.3.1 Ground wire installed in a metallic raceway shall be insulated.
6.3.3.2.3.2 Other ground wires shall be permitted to be bare.
6.3.3.2.4 All insulations shall conformto NFPA 70 and shall be moisture- and
heat-resistant types carrying temperature ratings corresponding to either of the
6.3.3.2.4.1 All insulated conductors and cables shall be listed for wet locations.
6.3.3.2.5 All wires and cables used, other than traction power cables, shall
be listed as being resistant to the spread of fire and shall have reduced smoke
emissions, by complying with 6.3.3.2.5.1 or 6.3.3.2.5.2.
Attachment 13-8-5-b
3 of 7
12.3 Insulated Wire and Cable Requirements.
heat-resistant type carrying temperature ratings of 90C (194F)
12.3.2 All insulated conductors and cables shall be listed for wet locations.
12.3.3 In other than open station, all wires and cables used shall be listed as
being resistant to the spread of fire and shall have reduced smoke emissions, by
complying with 12.3.3.1 or 12.3.3.2.
12.3.3.2 Wires and cables listed as having adequate fire resistant and low-
tested in accordance with NFPA 262 shall be permitted for use instead of the
wires and cables specified in 12.3.3.1
12.4 Wiring Installation Methods
requirements of ASTM E 136. In stations, other materials when encased in
concrete shall be acceptable.
ancillary areas
12.4.2.1 Only wiring methods consisting of Type MI cable without an overall
nonmetallic covering, Type MC cable employing a smooth or corrugated
impervious metal sheath without an overall nonmetallic covering, electrical
metallic tubing, flexible metallic tubing, intermediate metal conduit, or rigid
metal conduit without an overall nonmetallic covering shall be installed
in supply and exhaust shafts that are part of the emergency ventilation air
distribution system.
12.4.3 The emergency power, lighting and communications circuits shall be
protected fromphysical damage by systemvehicles or other normal system
operations and fromfires in the systemfor at least 1 hour, but not less than
the time of tenability, when exposed to fire conditions corresponding to the
time-temperature curve in the ASTM E 119 fire resistance test by any of the
following:
(1) Circuits embedded in concrete or protected by a fire barrier system
in accordance with UL 1724. The cables or conductors shall maintain
functionality at the temperature within the embedded conduit or fire barrier
system.
(2) Routing of circuits outside the underground portion of the system.
(3) Diversity in systemrouting (such as separate redundant circuits or
multiple circuits separated by a fire barrier with a fire resistance rating so that a
single fire or emergency event will not lead to a failure of the system.
(4) All circuits consist of listed fire-resistive cable systems with a fire
resistance rating in accordance with12.6
12.5 Power Supply for Emergency Ventilation Fans. See Chapter 7.
12.6 Fire-resistive cables shall be listed and have a minimum1-hour fire-
Committee Statement: The Technical Committee agrees to consolidate
all wire and cable requirements into a new revised Chapter 12 along with
consolidation of Chapter 5, 6 & 7.
MONTFORT, R.: See comments on proposal 130-54 (Log #58).
7.7.6.1 All wires and cables shall comply with the FT4/ IEEE 1202 exposure
7.7.6.2 Wires and cables listed as having adequate fireresistant and low-smoke-
producing characteristics, by having a flame travel distance that does not
exceed 1.5 m(5 ft) and generating a maximumpeak optical density of smoke
of 0.50 and a maximumaverage optical density of smoke of 0.15 when tested
in accordance with NFPA262, shall be permitted for use instead of the wires
and cables specified in 7.7.6.1.
7.7.7* The emergency ventilation circuits routed through the station public
areas and trainway shall be protected fromphysical damage by fixed guideway
transit or passenger rail vehicles or other normal operations and fromfires in
the systemfor a period of not less than 1 hour.
7.7.7.1 The circuits shall be protected fromASTM E 119 fire conditions by any
of the following:
(2) Routing of such conductors external to the interior underground portion of
the systemfacility
separated by a 1-hour fire barrier so that a single fire or emergency event will
(4) Be a listed fire-resistive cable systemwith a minimum1-hour rating in
accordance with 7.7.10
7.7.7.2 Except in ancillary areas or other nonpublic areas, encased conductors
shall be enclosed in their entirety in armor sheaths, conduits, or enclosed
raceway boxes and cabinets.
7.7.7.3 Conductors in conduits or raceways shall be permitted to be embedded
in concrete or to run in concrete electrical duct banks.
7.7.8 Overcurrent elements that are designed to protect conductorsserving
motors for both emergency fans and related emergency devices that are located
in spaces other than the main electrical distribution systemequipment rooms
shall not depend on thermal properties for operation.
unit does not result in the loss of the electrical supply to the tunnel ventilation
fans during the specified period of operation.
7.7.10 Fire-resistive cables shall be listed and have a minimum1-hour fire-
Substantiation: The new Wire and Cable Chapter 12 combines the wiring
requirements fromChapter 5, 6 and 7 into one chapter for ease of use,
eliminates redundancy and offers a single point of reference for all wire and
cable. The new Wire and Cable chapter excludes vehicle wiring found in
Chapter 8. The new chapter is a consolidation of the existing requirements with
editorial changes made for clarity. No substantive changes have been made.
Revise text to read as follows:
Chapter 12 Wiring & Cable Requirements
12.1 Wire and Cable. This applies to all chapters except of vehicle wiring
found in chapter 8.
12.1.1* All wiring materials and installations other than for traction power
shall conformto the requirements of NFPA 70 except as herein modified in this
standard.
12.1.2 The additional requirements in 12.2 through 12.6 apply to all areas
except non underground trainways.
12.2 Ground Wires.
12.2.1 Ground wire installed in a metallic raceway shall be insulated.
12.2.2 Other ground wires shall be permitted to be bare.
Attachment 13-8-5-b
4 of 7
1 wor ked on t he t ask gr oup t hat wor ked on t hi s i ssue.
2 Thi s i s t he same i ssue t hat we j ust deal t
3 wi t h i n NFPA 502. The same ar gument s. I j ust want
4 t o cl ar i f y because you al l br ought up t he i ssue
5 about t he Nat i onal El ect r i cal Code. The Nat i onal
6 El ect r i cal Code f or pr ot ect i on of syst ems cal l s f or
7 el ect r i cal ci r cui t pr ot ect i ve syst ems. I n 130, we
8 say f ol l ow t he Nat i onal El ect r i cal Code except as
9 amended her ei n.
10 We do not cal l t hese el ect r i cal ci r cui t
11 pr ot ect i ve syst ems f or a ver y speci f i c r eason.
12 El ect r i cal pr ot ect i ve syst ems consi st s of t wo
13 pr oduct s. One ar e wr aps, sl ow t o heat t r ansf er
14 down i nt o i t ; and t he ot her one i s f i r e- r esi st i ve
15 cabl es. Wr aps ar e not r at ed f or t unnel s, t he wet
16 envi r onment s t hat go al ong wi t h t he t unnel s. So
17 t her ef or e, we do not r ecogni ze t hemi n NFPA 130,
18 j ust t o cl ar i f y.
19 Agai n, I speak i n opposi t i on of t he mot i on
20 on t he f l oor , and t hat i s t he Commi t t ee' s posi t i on.
21 MR. HARRI NGTON: Thank you f or t he Commi t t ee' s
22 posi t i on. So, at t hi s poi nt , we' l l open up debat e
23 on t he mot i on. Agai n, pl ease pr ovi de your name and
24 af f i l i at i on and whet her you speak i n suppor t of or
251
1 agai nst t he mot i on. Okay. I s t her e any di scussi on
2 on Mot i on 130- 2 t o r ej ect an i dent i f i abl e par t of
3 Comment 130- 165? Does not appear t o be.
Page 215
Attachment 13-8-5-b
5 of 7
4 Do you have any f i nal comment s, Mr . Chai r ?
5 MR. SANDU: No, si r .
6 MR. HARRI NGTON: Okay. So seei ng none, we' l l
7 move on t o t he vot e at t hi s poi nt . Bef or e we vot e,
8 l et me r est at e t he mot i on t hat we' r e goi ng t o be
9 addr essi ng. The mot i on on t he f l oor i s t o r ej ect
10 an i dent i f i abl e par t of Comment 130- 165. Pl ease
11 r ecor d your vot e, 1 i n f avor of t he mot i on t o
12 accept , or 2, opposed t o t he mot i on t o r ej ect . The
13 vot i ng st ar t s. Cl osi ng i n 5 seconds.
14 Vot i ng cl osed. And t hat mot i on f ai l s.
15 Do we have any f ur t her di scussi on on
16 document NFPA 130? Seei ng none, we' l l move on t o
17 t he next document . Thank you, Mr . Sandu.
18 MR. SANDU: Thank you.
19 MR. HARRI NGTON: Bef or e we begi n t he next
20 document , I woul d l i ke t o i nt r oduce J ames Mi l ke,
21 member of t he St andar ds Counci l , who wi l l be t he
22 pr esi di ng of f i cer f or t he l ast document of t he day.
23 MR. MI LKE: I t i s my pl easur e t o pr esi de over
24 t he next r epor t . That i s t he Techni cal Commi t t ee
252
1 on I nspect i ons, Test i ng and Mai nt enance of
2 Wat er - Based Syst ems. Her e t o pr esent t he Commi t t ee
3 r epor t i s Commi t t ee Chai r Wi l l i amKof f el of
4 Kof f el & Associ at es, Col umbi a, Mar yl and. The
5 Commi t t ee r epor t s can be f ound i n t he bl ue 2013
6 Annual Revi si on Cycl e ROP and ROC. The Cer t i f i ed
7 Amendi ng Mot i ons ar e cont ai ned i n t he Mot i ons
8 Commi t t ee r epor t s and behi nd me on t he scr een.
Page 216
Attachment 13-8-5-b
6 of 7
TABLE A
Certified Amending Motions on Documents for the June 2013 Association Technical Meeting
(Note: The motions are presented in the order or presentation recommended by the Motions Committee)

Document #4 NFPA 130, Standard for Fixed Guideway Transit and Passenger Rail Systems A2013
Motion
Seq #
NITMAM
Log #
Section/Para
Person(s) Authorized to Make the
Motion
Certified Amending
Motion**
Motion Committee Notes and
Comments**
130-2
1114 12.5 and A.12.5 Alfredo M. Ramirez, UL LLC Reject an Identifiable Part of
Comment 130-165. The
Identifiable Parts are Sections
12.6 (formerly 12.5.1),
12.5.2, 12.5.3, and Annex.
If successful, this motion seeks to retain ROC
title 12.5, Fire Resistive Cables and return the
remainder of Section 12.5 and associated annex
material to ROP text.
Attachment 13-8-5-b
7 of 7
Item 13-8-6

DATE: July 8, 2013

AMENDMENT (502-1)

Document: NFPA 502, Standard for Road Tunnels, Bridges, and Other Limited Access Highways

Motion: To Return a portion of a Report in the form of Proposal 502-42 and related Comment 502-12

necessary
2
/
3
the Amendment is 12 [26 (eligible to vote) 7 (ballots not returned) 2 (abstentions) =17 0.66 =11.22]
26 Eligible to Vote
7 Not Returned (Dix, Ingason, Kroboth, LeBlanc, Rohena, Ruiz, Sprakel)

17 Agree
0 Do Not Agree
2 Abstain (Fitzpatrick, Plotkin)

TC Action: PASS

Attachment 13-8-6-a
1 of 13
Attachment 13-8-6-a
2 of 13
Attachment 13-8-6-a
3 of 13
Attachment 13-8-6-a
4 of 13
RETURN A PORTION OF A REPORT IN THE
FORM OF A PROPOSAL AND RELATED
COMMENT(S) OF Comment 502-12
_______________________________________________________________
(4.5, A.4.5)
_______________________________________________________________
Submitter: Technical Committee on Road Tunnel and Highway Fire
Protection,
4.5(7)* In addition to physical protection fromincidents, the method of routing
and providing protection to fire-life safety critical copper and fiber data
communication cables and related components shall consider include in the
design both the performance of the thermal protection and the thermal rating
performance of the cable and other transmission related equipment.
A.4.5(7) Fire rating of separations in U.S. jurisdictions typically includes
structural withstand and flame passage duration requirements. Thermal
insulation performance is often omitted. Typically Depending on manufacturer,
fiber optic strands experience excessive attenuation at temperatures ranging
fromas low as 70C (158F) to possibly
200C (392F) 257F (125C), and the fiber ceases to convey signal. No fire
rated fiber optic cable is currently available. Similarly, no fire rated category
copper Ethernet cable is currently available. It is essential to the continued
fire-life safety systemfunction during an emergency that the communication
systemdesign considers the thermal insulation performance of fire rated
separations for related components and of the embedment for copper and fiber
data communication cables. Where insulation performance is insufficient for
the design fire heat exposure, other means should be employed to maintain
conditions within the thermal limits of the systemcables and components.
A.12.1.2 The actual duration required for the circuits to be operative will
depend upon the duration required for the circuits to be operative for the
emergency evacuation and rescue phase and, in some circumstances,
incident management and structural protection. Factors such as the length of
the tunnel, evacuation pathways, the use of fixed water-based fire suppression
systems, and the proximity of emergency services may influence this period of
time. See also A.4.5(7).
Substantiation: These changes retain the intent of the original proposal while
addressing the concerns of Comment 502-13 (Log #8).
Ballot Not Returned: 2 LeBlanc, D., Sturm, P.
Related Comment 502-13
_______________________________________________________________
(4.5(7),A.4.5(7), A.12.1.2)
_______________________________________________________________
Submitter: Marcelo M. Hirschler, GBH International
Recommendation: Delete text to read as follows:
communication cables and related components shall consider the thermal rating
of the cable and other transmission related equipment.
insulation performance is often omitted. Typically, fiber optic strands
experience excessive attenuation at temperatures ranging from158F (70C)
to 257F (125C), and the fiber ceases to convey signal. No fire rated fiber
optic cable is currently available. Similarly, no fire rated Category copper
Ethernet cable is currently available. It is essential to the continued fire-life
safety systemfunction during an emergency that the communication system
design considers the thermal insulation performance of fire rated separations
for related components and of the embedment for copper and fiber data
communication cables. Where insulation performance is insufficient for
Reject this proposal.
Substantiation: This proposal presents incorrect information, is misleading
and is unenforceable.
1. Optical fiber cables are listed by UL to UL 1651 (Standard for Optical
Fiber Cable), a standard that does not contain a specification for a temperature
rating. Therefore listed optical fiber cables do not have a required temperature
rating and would automatically be prohibited fromuse in any application in the
control and communication system, if the section were to be attempted to be
enforced.
2. For Bellcores GR-20 (Generic Requirements for Optical Fiber and Optical
Fiber Cable) standard, optical fiber cables are assessed for aging at 85C for
168 hours as well as for aging with cycling of up to 70C and down to -40C
several times.
3. Searching the web it is pretty easy to find optical fiber cables that are
designed to be used at high temperatures. In a quick search I have found one
company that advertises two types of optical fiber cables intended for use at
high temperatures (one for use at 150C and one for use at 200C). Another
company offers various optical fiber cables suitable for use up to 302F (i.e.
150C). Clearly the statement that the cables have problems when used at
temperatures of 158F (70C) is incorrect.
4. The only location in NFPA 502 (2011) where there is a requirement for
any cables to have a particular temperature rating is in Section 12.2.1.1. It
requires that the temperature ratings for the cables be consistent with the
conditions of application. That covers everything that is needed with regard to
all cables, without introducing new prejudices.
5. The proposed requirement in Section 4.5(7) is a blanket statement intended
to prejudice users of cables.
6. The language is unenforceable as the statement shall consider is not
something that an authority having jurisdiction can enforce.
Committee Statement: The information added for the original proposal is
still valid and the Committee has added additional information to 4.5(7) and
A.4.5(7) to address this comment. See Committee Comment 502-12 (Log
#CC2) for further information.
Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1
Explanation of Abstention:
MARINO, A.: I do not have the electrical knowledge to make an informed
decision on this item.
_______________________________________________________________
502-42 Log #CP31 Final Action: Accept
(4.5(7), A.4.5 (7), and A.12.1.2 (New))
_______________________________________________________________
Protection,
Recommendation: Add the following new material:
4.5 (7) In addition to physical protection fromincidents, the method of routing
A.4.5 (7) Fire rating of separations in U.S. jurisdictions typically includes
experience excessive attenuation at temperatures ranging from158F (70C
) to 257F (125 C), and the fiber ceases to convey signal. No fire rated fiber
time. See also A4.5(7).
Substantiation: Emergency communications and control systems are
increasingly relying upon high speed digital cables and components. The
data cables used for communication are in many cases copper or fiber
optic Ethernet, with fiber optic used for longer connection lengths. Several
interrelated issues of concern arise fromthis shift.
1. Fiber optic strands are composed of a concentric glass layer over a glass
core of differing index of refraction. This difference is what retains the light
signal within the fiber. The indices are affected by temperature rise. At a
temperature of approximately 158 F (70C), a shift in the refraction indices
causes excessive attenuation, and the fiber ceases to convey signal. While
Attachment 13-8-6-a
5 of 13
within the physical limits of the cable material this effect is reversible on
cooling, that is of no help during an incident. Currently no fire rated fiber optic
cable is available.
2. Ethernet over copper typically uses Category 5 or Category 6 cable. The
cable performance is dependent upon cable impedances, attenuation, cross talk
and other electrical properties. Currently no fire rated Cat 5 or Cat 6 copper
Ethernet cable is available.
3. US practice in regard to fire rated separations includes required durations
for the separation to remain physically intact and for the prevention of passing
flame. The thermal performance of the separation is not addressed. The
protected non-incident side can contain fire life safety critical equipment with
operating temperature limitations, such as critical electrical or communications
rooms or the critical digital cables and components described above. In these
cases, the rated separations thermal performance is critical. Either the thermal
impedance (insulating value and thermal mass) need to be sufficient for the
intended duration, or other means of maintaining temperatures below rated
performance limits in the protected element(s) is required.
Ballot Not Returned: 2 Kroboth, III, J ., LeBlanc, D.
Attachment 13-8-6-a
6 of 13
RETURN A PORTION OF A REPORT IN THE
FORM OF A PROPOSAL AND RELATED
COMMENT(S) OF Comment 502-12
_______________________________________________________________
(4.5, A.4.5)
_______________________________________________________________
Protection,
communication cables and related components shall consider include in the
design both the performance of the thermal protection and the thermal rating
performance of the cable and other transmission related equipment.
insulation performance is often omitted. Typically Depending on manufacturer,
fiber optic strands experience excessive attenuation at temperatures ranging
fromas low as 70C (158F) to possibly
200C (392F) 257F (125C), and the fiber ceases to convey signal. No fire
rated fiber optic cable is currently available. Similarly, no fire rated category
copper Ethernet cable is currently available. It is essential to the continued
fire-life safety systemfunction during an emergency that the communication
systemdesign considers the thermal insulation performance of fire rated
separations for related components and of the embedment for copper and fiber
data communication cables. Where insulation performance is insufficient for
Substantiation: These changes retain the intent of the original proposal while
addressing the concerns of Comment 502-13 (Log #8).
Related Comment 502-13
_______________________________________________________________
(4.5(7),A.4.5(7), A.12.1.2)
_______________________________________________________________
Submitter: Marcelo M. Hirschler, GBH International
Recommendation: Delete text to read as follows:
experience excessive attenuation at temperatures ranging from158F (70C)
to 257F (125C), and the fiber ceases to convey signal. No fire rated fiber
Reject this proposal.
Substantiation: This proposal presents incorrect information, is misleading
and is unenforceable.
1. Optical fiber cables are listed by UL to UL 1651 (Standard for Optical
Fiber Cable), a standard that does not contain a specification for a temperature
rating. Therefore listed optical fiber cables do not have a required temperature
rating and would automatically be prohibited fromuse in any application in the
control and communication system, if the section were to be attempted to be
enforced.
2. For Bellcores GR-20 (Generic Requirements for Optical Fiber and Optical
Fiber Cable) standard, optical fiber cables are assessed for aging at 85C for
168 hours as well as for aging with cycling of up to 70C and down to -40C
several times.
3. Searching the web it is pretty easy to find optical fiber cables that are
designed to be used at high temperatures. In a quick search I have found one
company that advertises two types of optical fiber cables intended for use at
high temperatures (one for use at 150C and one for use at 200C). Another
company offers various optical fiber cables suitable for use up to 302F (i.e.
150C). Clearly the statement that the cables have problems when used at
temperatures of 158F (70C) is incorrect.
4. The only location in NFPA 502 (2011) where there is a requirement for
any cables to have a particular temperature rating is in Section 12.2.1.1. It
requires that the temperature ratings for the cables be consistent with the
conditions of application. That covers everything that is needed with regard to
all cables, without introducing new prejudices.
5. The proposed requirement in Section 4.5(7) is a blanket statement intended
to prejudice users of cables.
6. The language is unenforceable as the statement shall consider is not
something that an authority having jurisdiction can enforce.
Committee Statement: The information added for the original proposal is
still valid and the Committee has added additional information to 4.5(7) and
A.4.5(7) to address this comment. See Committee Comment 502-12 (Log
#CC2) for further information.
Ballot Results: Affirmative: 23 Abstain: 1
Explanation of Abstention:
MARINO, A.: I do not have the electrical knowledge to make an informed
decision on this item.
_______________________________________________________________
(4.5(7), A.4.5 (7), and A.12.1.2 (New))
_______________________________________________________________
Protection,
Recommendation: Add the following new material:
4.5 (7) In addition to physical protection fromincidents, the method of routing
A.4.5 (7) Fire rating of separations in U.S. jurisdictions typically includes
experience excessive attenuation at temperatures ranging from158F (70C
) to 257F (125 C), and the fiber ceases to convey signal. No fire rated fiber
time. See also A4.5(7).
Substantiation: Emergency communications and control systems are
increasingly relying upon high speed digital cables and components. The
data cables used for communication are in many cases copper or fiber
optic Ethernet, with fiber optic used for longer connection lengths. Several
interrelated issues of concern arise fromthis shift.
1. Fiber optic strands are composed of a concentric glass layer over a glass
core of differing index of refraction. This difference is what retains the light
signal within the fiber. The indices are affected by temperature rise. At a
temperature of approximately 158 F (70C), a shift in the refraction indices
causes excessive attenuation, and the fiber ceases to convey signal. While
Attachment 13-8-6-a
7 of 13
within the physical limits of the cable material this effect is reversible on
cooling, that is of no help during an incident. Currently no fire rated fiber optic
cable is available.
2. Ethernet over copper typically uses Category 5 or Category 6 cable. The
cable performance is dependent upon cable impedances, attenuation, cross talk
and other electrical properties. Currently no fire rated Cat 5 or Cat 6 copper
Ethernet cable is available.
3. US practice in regard to fire rated separations includes required durations
for the separation to remain physically intact and for the prevention of passing
flame. The thermal performance of the separation is not addressed. The
protected non-incident side can contain fire life safety critical equipment with
operating temperature limitations, such as critical electrical or communications
rooms or the critical digital cables and components described above. In these
cases, the rated separations thermal performance is critical. Either the thermal
impedance (insulating value and thermal mass) need to be sufficient for the
intended duration, or other means of maintaining temperatures below rated
performance limits in the protected element(s) is required.
Attachment 13-8-6-a
8 of 13
20 Tunnel and Hi ghway Fi r e Pr ot ect i on i s pr esent ed f or
21 adopt i on and can be f ound i n t he Repor t on
22 Pr oposal s and t he Repor t on Comment s f or t he 2013
23 Annual Meet i ng Revi si on Cycl e.
24 The Techni cal Commi t t ee has publ i shed a
220
1 r epor t consi st i ng of par t i al r evi si on of NFPA 502,
2 St andar d f or Road Tunnel s, Br i dges and Ot her
3 Li mi t ed Access Hi ghways. The r epor t was submi t t ed
4 t o l et t er bal l ot of t he Techni cal Commi t t ee t hat
5 consi st s of 26 vot i ng member s. The bal l ot r esul t s
6 can be f ound on Pages 502- 2 t o 502- 37 of t he Repor t
7 on Pr oposal s and Pages 502- 2 t o 502- 13 of t he
8 Repor t on Comment s.
10 wi t h t he Cer t i f i ed Amendi ng Mot i ons.
11 MR. HARRI NGTON: Thank you, Mr . Connel l . Let ' s
12 now pr oceed wi t h t he di scussi on on t he Cer t i f i ed
13 Amendi ng Mot i ons on NFPA 502. Mi cr ophone 3.
15 GBH I nt er nat i onal , f or NAFRA, and I move t o r et ur n
16 a por t i on of a r epor t i n t he f or mof Pr oposal
17 502- 42 and r el at ed Comment 502- 12.
18 MR. HARRI NGTON: Thank you. So we have a
19 mot i on on t he f l oor t o r et ur n a por t i on of a r epor t
20 i n t he f or mof Pr oposal 502- 42 and r el at ed Comment
21 502- 12. I s t her e a second?
23 MR. HARRI NGTON: So we have a second. Go ahead
24 and pr oceed.
Page 189
Attachment 13-8-6-a
9 of 13
221
1 MR. HI RSCHLER: Fi r st of al l , l et me cl ar i f y.
2 Thi s has not hi ng t o do wi t h al l t he st uf f about
3 def i ni t i ons. Thi s i s a pur el y t echni cal i ssue.
4 I t ' s an i ssue of par t i cul ar i nt er est of t he
5 Nat i onal El ect r i cal Code member s.
6 What t hi s i s, t he Commi t t ee has put
7 t oget her some wor di ng t hat woul d have suggest ed
8 t hat f i ber opt i c cabl e cannot be used f or a var i et y
9 of r easons and cannot be used at t emper at ur es above
10 70 degr ees C. As I poi nt out ext ensi vel y i n my
11 comment t o t hat ef f ect , whi ch i s Comment 502- 13 on
12 Pages 502- 3 and 502- 4 of t he Repor t on Comment s,
13 t hey say t hi s i s i ncor r ect because we can use
14 f i ber opt i c cabl e up t o 200 degr ees C or mor e
15 dependi ng on t he way t he cabl e i s l i st ed.
16 The r eason t hat t hi s went t hr ough - - t o
17 gi ve you a l i t t l e bi t of hi st or y - - i s t hat
18 NFPA 130 and NFPA 502 ver y of t en f ol l ow t hi ngs - -
19 have a consi st ent member shi p and do si mi l ar
20 act i ons. I usual l y at t end t he meet i ngs of
21 NFPA 130. I r ar el y at t end 502. 130 met af t er 502.
22 502 t ook t hi s act i on. Next week - - 130 met , t ook
23 appr opr i at e act i on, and I have no obj ect i on what
24 t hey di d, and 130 i s per f ect l y f i ne. What t hey di d
222
1 i n 502 i s i ncor r ect and needs t o be r evi sed. Thank
Page 190
Attachment 13-8-6-a
10 of 13
2 you.
3 MR. HARRI NGTON: Thank you. Mr . Connel l , woul d
4 you l i ke t o gi ve t he Commi t t ee' s posi t i on?
5 MR. CONNELL: No comment , Mr . Chai r man.
6 MR. HARRI NGTON: Thank you. So, at t hi s poi nt ,
7 we' l l open up debat e on t he mot i on. Mi cr ophone 3.
8 MR. KAUFMAN: I ' mDr . St anl ey Kauf man. I ' ma
9 member f r omCabl eSaf e. I r epr esent t he I nsul at i ng
10 Cabl e Engi neer s Associ at i on on Panel 16, and t hey
11 have asked me t o come her e t o suppor t t hi s mot i on.
12 I al so consul t wi t h t he Communi cat i ons Cabl e and
13 Conduct i vi t y Associ at i on who l i kewi se have asked me
14 t o come her e t o suppor t t hi s mot i on f or a ver y
15 si mpl e r eason.
16 What t he t ext says t hat was passed by t he
17 panel i s wr ong. The st at ement s about opt i cal f i ber
18 cabl es ar e wr ong. I f t hey go f or war d, we' l l have
19 an NFPA St andar d wi t h wr ong i nf or mat i on. I t says,
20 t hese cabl es have excessi ve at t enuat i on as l ow as
21 70 degr ees C. Your st andar d, r un- of - t hemi l l ,
22 ever yday t el ephone opt i cal f i ber cabl e wor ks at
23 70 degr ees C. I f i t di dn' t , you woul d not have
24 t el ephone ser vi ce i n Ar i zona.
223
1 So t hi s needs t o be suppor t ed so i ncor r ect
2 i nf or mat i on does not go f or war d.
3 MR. HARRI NGTON: Thank you. Any f ur t her
4 di scussi on on Mot i on 502- 1 t o r et ur n a por t i on of
5 t he r epor t i n t he f or mof Pr oposal 502- 42 and
Page 191
Attachment 13-8-6-a
11 of 13
6 r el at ed comment 502- 12?
7 Not seei ng any, Mr . Chai r , do you have any
8 f i nal comment s?
9 MR. CONNELL: No, Mr . Chai r man, I do not .
10 MR. HARRI NGTON: Okay. So bef or e we t ake our
11 vot e, l et me r est at e t he mot i on t hat we' r e goi ng t o
12 be deal i ng wi t h. The mot i on on t he f l oor i s t o
13 r et ur n a por t i on of a r epor t i n t he f or mof
14 Pr oposal 502- 42 and r el at ed Comment 502- 12.
15 So pl ease r ecor d your vot e, 1 i n f avor of
16 t he mot i on, accept , or 2, opposed t o t he mot i on,
17 r ej ect . Vot i ng st ar t s now. Vot i ng cl oses i n
18 5 seconds.
19 The bal l ot i ng i s cl osed. And t hat mot i on
20 passes. Mot i on passes.
21 Now we' r e goi ng t o pr oceed wi t h t he
22 di scussi on on Cer t i f i ed Amendi ng Mot i on 502- 2.
23 Mi cr ophone 2.
24 MR. RAMI REZ: Hel l o. My name i s Al Rami r ez
224
1 wi t h UL. I woul d l i ke t o speak i n suppor t of
2 Mot i on 502- 2.
3 A VOI CE: Second.
4 MR. HARRI NGTON: We have a second, pr oceed.
5 MR. RAMI REZ: I f successf ul , t hi s mot i on wi l l
6 r ej ect an i dent i f i abl e par t of Comment 502- 27. The
7 i dent i f i abl e par t s ar e t he r evi si ons t o
8 Sect i on 12. 1. 2 and associ at ed new annex mat er i al .
9 As i t was ment i oned dur i ng t he di scussi on
10 at t he NEC, I t hi nk t he Code Commi t t ee f or 502 was
Page 192
Attachment 13-8-6-a
12 of 13
Floor Action on Certified Amending Motions
Documents for the June 2013 Association Technical Meeting

Document #8 NFPA 502, Standard for Road Tunnels, Bridges, and Other Limited Access Highways A2013
Motion
Seq #
NITMAM
Log #
Time Section/Para
Person(s) Authorized to Make
the Motion
Certified Amending
Motion**
Floor Action
502-1
1088 4.5(7) Marcelo M. Hirschler, GBH
International
Return a portion of a
Report in the form of
Proposal 502-42 and
related Comment 502-12.
PASSED
89-47

Attachment 13-8-6-a
13 of 13
1
Maynard, Mary
Subject: UL Appeal - NFPA 502 Standard for Road Tunnels, Bridges, and Other Limited Access
Highways
From: Ramirez, Alfredo M. [mailto:Alfredo.M.Ramirez@ul.com]

To: Cronin, Amy
Cc: Fuller, Linda; Maynard, Mary; Lakomiak, Neil
Subject: UL Appeal - NFPA 502 Standard for Road Tunnels, Bridges, and Other Limited Access Highways
Ms.Cronin,
InaccordancewiththeRegulationsGoverningCommitteeProjects,Section1.6,AppealstotheCouncil,Iamfilingthe
followingappeal:
1.Name,affiliationandaddressofapplicant:
AlfredoRamirez
UnderwritersLaboratories
333PfingstenRd
Northbrook,IL60062
2.Particularactiontowhichappealrelates:
2013TechnicalSessionflooractiononCertifiedAmendingMotion5022
3.Argumentssettingforththegroundsfortheappeal:
InformationrelatedtoNFPA502ROC#50227
InformationrelatedtoTIA1083forNFPA502
TechnicalSessiontranscriptrelatingto2013NFPATechnicalSession,CertifiedAmendingMotion5022
Additionalinformationtobeprovided.
4.Precisereliefrequested:
IamappealingtotheStandardsCounciltooverturntheactionstakenbytheNFPA502TechnicalCommitteeon
A2013ROC#50227andtheAssociationMembershipatthe2013TechnicalSessionregardingCertified
AmendingMotion5022
Atthistime,Iamrequestingahearingonthisappeal.
Regards
Al Ramirez
Regulatory Services Regional Manager
----------------------------------------------
UL LLC
333 Pfingsten Road
Northbrook, IL 60062-2096 USA
T: 847.664.2905
Attachment 13-8-6-b
1 of 20
REJECT AN IDENTIFIABLE PART OF
Comment 502-27
_______________________________________________________________
(12.1.2, A.12.1.2 (1))
_______________________________________________________________
Protection,
Recommendation: Revise the existing text as follows:
12.1.2* Emergency circuits installed in a road tunnel and ancillary areas shall
remain functional for a period of not less than 1 hour, for the anticipated fire
condition, by meeting one of the following methods:
(1)* Fire-resistive cables shall be certified or listed as having been listed for
2 hours in accordance with ANSI/UL/2196 or other equivalent internationally
recognized standards to 950C (1742F) when approved by the AHJ . tested in
a totally enclosed furnace using the ASTM E-119 time temperature curve and
which demonstrate functionality for no less than 2 hours as described in the
ANSI/UL 2196 test standard and as follows:
a) Tested as a complete systemof conductors, cables and raceways as
applicable, using a sample no shorter than 3.0 m(9.84 ft).
b) Fire-resistive cables intended for installation in a raceway are tested in the
type of raceway in which they are intended to be installed.
c) Each fire-resistive cable systemhave installation instructions that outline the
test procedure and only the components stated in the test report are acceptable
for actual installations.
(2) Circuits embedded in concrete are protected by a 2-hour fire barrier system
in accordance with UL 1724. The insulation for cables or conductors shall be
thermoset and shall be suitable to maintain functionality at the temperature
within the embedded conduit or fire barrier system.
(3) Routing external to the roadway
(4) Diversity in systemrouting as approved (such as separate redundant or
multiple circuits separated by a 1-hour fire barrier) so that a single fire or
emergency event will not lead to a failure of the system.
Add the following annex text as follows:
A.12.1.2
The actual duration required for the circuits to be operative will depend
upon the duration required for the circuits to be operative for the emergency
evacuation and rescue phase and, in some circumstances, incident
management and structural protection. Factors such as the length of the tunnel,
evacuation pathways, the use of fixed water-based fire suppression systems,
and the proximity of emergency services may influence this period of time. See
also A4.5(7).
(1) When selecting a fire-resistive cable, it is important to understand how it
will be installed and if it was tested as a complete system, including splices.
Cables that are exposed (not embedded in concrete) should be protected using
either a metallic raceway or an armor/sheath (see 12.3.1).There are two basic
configurations of fire-resistive cables. Cables enclosed by a metallic sheath or
armor, such as Type MI or Type MC, are installed without raceways. Cables
that are installed in a raceway, such as Type RHW-2, Type TC or Type CM
are tested as a complete system. Regardless of the fire test standard used to
evaluate fire-resistive cables that will be installed in a raceway, it is important
to consider that the cables are only one part of the system. Other components
of the systeminclude but are not limited to: the type of raceway, the size of
raceway, raceway support, raceway couplings, boxes, conduit bodies, splices
where used, vertical supports, grounds, and pulling lubricants. Each cable type
should be tested to demonstrate compatibility.
Only those specific types of raceways tested should be acceptable for
installation. Each cable type that is intended to be installed in raceway should
be tested in both a horizontal and vertical configuration while demonstrating
circuit integrity.
Substantiation: The Technical Committee has taken this action to revise
Sec. 12.1.2* in order to address the recent modification of UL pertaining to
their standard UL2196. The UL action has invalidated standard requirements
in Chapter 12 by making the listing requirements unattainable as written.
Specifically, as of Sept 12, 2012, UL has withdrawn all cable certifications
(listings) to this test standard. Recent fire testing has demonstrated failure
modes such as hot-dipped galvanized coatings on the interior surface of the
raceways potentially causing premature failure of copper fire-resistive cable
systems. NFPA 502 currently allows the use of fire resistive cable listed in
accordance with UL2196 Standard for Safety for Test for Fire Resistive Cables
2012.
CONNELL, W.: Editorial: Proposed text in 12.1.2* (1)* is not literate as
used in context of overall paragraph. Please revise as follows:
Revise 12.1.2* (1)* a) to read: Fire-resistive cables used for emergency circuits
shall be tested as part of a complete systemincluding the conductors, cables,
and raceway (if utilized) using a sample no shorter than 3.0 m(9.84 ft).
Revise 12.1.2* (1)* b) to read: Fire-resistive cables intended for installation
in a raceway, shall be tested in the type of raceway in which they are to be
installed.
Revise 12.1.2* (1)* c) to read: Documentation certifying that the fire-resistive
cable systemtesting required herein shall be made available to the AHJ .
DIX, A.: I amvery concerned that there is a disconnection between the
testing regime which is suggested and the need for circuit performance in
a fire emergency. I do not want to support this change in the absence of
important information about the link between the test method and the required
performance. I also note that such information probably does not exist and that
there is an urgent need for certainty. I amNOT negative to the need for the
amendment, just hesitant about the substance of its effect.
PLOTKIN, D.: Editing issues in substantiation text. Believe should read as:
The Technical Committee has taken this action to revise Sec. 12.1.2* in order
to address the recent modification of UL pertaining to their standard UL2196.
The UL action has invalidated standard requirements in Chapter 12 by making
the listing requirements unattainable as written. Specifically, as of September
12, 2012, UL has withdrawn all cable certifications (listings) to this test
standard. Recent fire testing has demonstrated failure modes such as hot-dipped
galvanized coatings on the interior surface of the raceways potentially causing
premature failure of copper fire-resistive cable systems. NFPA 502 currently
allows the use of fire resistive cable listed in accordance with UL2196
Standard for Safety for Test for Fire Resistive Cables 2012.
_______________________________________________________________
(Chapter 12)
_______________________________________________________________
Submitter: Ed Morel, Genesis Transportaiton Lighting
Recommendation: In NFPA 502-2008 there is the following:
11.3 Materials
11.3.1 Materials that are manufactured for use as conduits, raceways, ducts,
cabinets, and equipment enclosures and their surface finish materials, as
installed, shall be capable of being subjected to temperatures up to 316(600F)
for 1 hour without supporting combustion and without loss of structural
integrity.
Substantiation: Is there anything in the current 2011 issue that replaces this? I
have looked but have not seen anything.
In NFPA 502-2011 Chapter 12, Electrical Systems, there appears to be
conflicts and contradictions regarding the wiring used in a tunnel. There
have been installations that utilize electrical cord with quick disconnect type
connectors (Brad Harrison or TPC). This is to facilitate both the ease of
installation of the lighting systemand if necessary, for maintenance reasons,
the removal of a luminaire.
However, 502-2011 is not specific to this type of wiring and if it will be
acceptable. Many agencies and design engineers are concerned about the
legalities and safety of such wiring and would like to see it addressed more
specifically.
The technical committee accepts the following new language:
12.1.2* Emergency circuits installed in a road tunnel and ancillary areas
shall remain functional for a period of not less than 1 hour for the anticipated
fire condition, meeting one of the following methods:
(1) A fire-resistive cable listed for 2 hours in accordance with ANSI/UL 2196
or other equivalent internationally recognized standards to 950C (1742F)
when approved by the AHJ .
(2) Circuits embedded in concrete or protected by a 2-hour fire barrier system
in accordance with UL 1724. The cables or conductors shall be thermo-set
and shall be suitable to maintain functionality at the temperature within the
embedded conduit or fire barrier system.
not lead to a failure of the system.
Committee Statement: The proposal does not reference the current standard.
The technical committee has considered the concern stated and has addressed it
in the proposed text.
NELSEN, J .: In my opinion the annex note should refer the reader to NFPA
1620, Standard for
Pre-Incident Planning rather than NFPA 1600, Disaster/Emergency
Management and Business Continuity Programs or at least perhaps both.
Attachment 13-8-6-b
2 of 20
6 r el at ed comment 502- 12?
7 Not seei ng any, Mr . Chai r , do you have any
8 f i nal comment s?
9 MR. CONNELL: No, Mr . Chai r man, I do not .
10 MR. HARRI NGTON: Okay. So bef or e we t ake our
11 vot e, l et me r est at e t he mot i on t hat we' r e goi ng t o
12 be deal i ng wi t h. The mot i on on t he f l oor i s t o
13 r et ur n a por t i on of a r epor t i n t he f or mof
14 Pr oposal 502- 42 and r el at ed Comment 502- 12.
15 So pl ease r ecor d your vot e, 1 i n f avor of
16 t he mot i on, accept , or 2, opposed t o t he mot i on,
17 r ej ect . Vot i ng st ar t s now. Vot i ng cl oses i n
18 5 seconds.
19 The bal l ot i ng i s cl osed. And t hat mot i on
20 passes. Mot i on passes.
21 Now we' r e goi ng t o pr oceed wi t h t he
22 di scussi on on Cer t i f i ed Amendi ng Mot i on 502- 2.
23 Mi cr ophone 2.
24 MR. RAMI REZ: Hel l o. My name i s Al Rami r ez
224
1 wi t h UL. I woul d l i ke t o speak i n suppor t of
2 Mot i on 502- 2.
3 A VOI CE: Second.
4 MR. HARRI NGTON: We have a second, pr oceed.
5 MR. RAMI REZ: I f successf ul , t hi s mot i on wi l l
6 r ej ect an i dent i f i abl e par t of Comment 502- 27. The
7 i dent i f i abl e par t s ar e t he r evi si ons t o
8 Sect i on 12. 1. 2 and associ at ed new annex mat er i al .
9 As i t was ment i oned dur i ng t he di scussi on
10 at t he NEC, I t hi nk t he Code Commi t t ee f or 502 was
Page 192
Attachment 13-8-6-b
3 of 20
11 pr essed wi t h t he i ssue t hat when we r el eased our
12 publ i c not i ce and de- l i st ed some pr oduct s, t hey
13 t ook some act i on assumi ng ot her t hi ngs mi ght
14 happen; but St andar d UL 2196 whi ch was used t o
15 eval uat e t hose cabl es ar e st i l l act i ve, bei ng
16 wor ked on. So I t hi nk t he wor k was based on t hat
17 assumpt i on. I don' t t hi nk t hey di d anyt hi ng wr ong,
18 but we di d go and cont i nue wi t h a di f f er ent pat h.
19 The r eason f or r et ai ni ng t he cur r ent
20 l anguage i n t he i dent i f i ed sect i ons of 502 i s t o
21 mai nt ai n a l evel of saf et y t hat was or i gi nal l y
22 est abl i shed i n 502. I f t hi s mot i on i s not
23 successf ul , t he f ol l owi ng pr oposed edi t or i al poi nt s
24 woul d l i kel y r educe t he saf et y, per f or mance of
225
1 emer gency ci r cui t s.
2 The wor d " cer t i f i ed" t hat i s i ncl uded i n
3 t he r evi sed Sect i on 12. 1 of 502 i s not cur r ent l y
4 def i ned by t he Code and may be mi sunder st ood or
5 cause conf usi on i n t he appl i cat i on of t he i mpact ed
6 Code sect i ons. I nt r oduci ng a new pr oduct i n t he
7 eval uat i on pr ocess wi t hout def i ni ng i t and maki ng
8 i t an NFPA of f i ci al t er ml i st ed t hat appear s i n t he
9 subj ect 502 may be mi sused or mi sappl i ed and
10 possi bl y r educe t he saf et y of t he over al l
11 i nst al l at i on and assessment of t he cabl e' s
12 compl i ance. The sol e use of t he t er m" l i st ed" i s
13 appr opr i at e f or t he nat ur e of t hi s pr oduct .
14 Removi ng t he phr ase i n accor dance wi t h
Page 193
Attachment 13-8-6-b
4 of 20
15 UL 2196 wi l l onl y r equi r e f i r e endur ance t est i ng t o
16 E119. The addi t i onal hose and el ect r i cal conduct or
17 t ensi l e st r engt h t est of UL 2196 wi l l be omi t t ed.
18 The hose st r eamas r ef er enced i n 2196 i s i nt ended
19 t o subj ect t he syst emand i mpact cool i ng ef f ect s.
20 I n summar y, i f you agr ee t o r ej ect
21 i dent i f i ed Pr oposal 502, t he sect i on i mpr ovi sed, i t
22 woul d become i nconsi st ent wi t h t he r equi r ement s of
23 NFPA Codes t hat i ncl ude cr i t i cal saf et y ci r cui t
24 i nsul at i on r equi r ement s, l i ke 70, 101 - - 72, par don
226
1 me, et cet er a. The l at est edi t i on of NEC, by t he
2 way, was r ecent l y compl et ed, and t he cr i t i cal
3 el ect r i cal i nsul at i on r equi r ement s wer e l ef t i nt act
4 i ncl udi ng r ef er ences t o UL 2196. Thank you.
5 MR. HARRI NGTON: Thank you. Mr . Connel l , woul d
6 you l i ke t o gi ve t he Commi t t ee' s posi t i on?
7 MR. CONNELL: Yes. Thank you, Mr . Chai r .
8 Fi r e- r esi st i ve cabl e r equi r ement s wi t hi n
9 NFPA 502 per t ai n speci f i cal l y t o r oad t unnel l i f e
10 saf et y syst ems i ncl udi ng emer gency t unnel
11 vent i l at i on, emer gency l i ght i ng, and emer gency
12 communi cat i on syst ems. Per t he r equi r ement s of
13 t hi s st andar d, t hese syst ems ar e r equi r ed t o r emai n
14 oper at i onal f or a per i od of at l east one hour
15 dur i ng desi gn f i r e condi t i ons t hat ar e t ypi cal l y i n
16 t he or der of 100 megawat t s or above.
17 Because of t he sever i t y of t hese pot ent i al
18 f i r es, al l emer gency ci r cui t s ar e r equi r ed t o be
19 r at ed f or t wo hour s t o t emper at ur es up t o
Page 194
Attachment 13-8-6-b
5 of 20
20 1850 degr ees Fahr enhei t . The suppor t t unnel l i f e
21 saf et y syst ems, si gni f i cant l y l ong r uns of l i f e
22 saf et y cr i t i cal power and communi cat i on ci r cui t s
23 ar e necessar y. I n addi t i on, t hese ci r cui t s must be
24 physi cal l y pr ot ect ed f r omt he sever e envi r onment al
227
1 and oper at i onal condi t i ons t hat ar e commonl y f ound
2 i n r oad t unnel s whi ch i s t ypi cal l y accompl i shed by
3 i nst al l i ng t hese emer gency ci r cui t and met al l i c
4 r aceways.
5 Back i n J ul y of 2011, a l eadi ng cabl e
6 manuf act ur er i dent i f i ed a def i ci ency exper i enced i n
7 t hei r f i r e- r esi st i ve cabl e pr oduct t est i ng at UL.
8 Dur i ng t hi s t est i ng, a ci r cui t f ai l ur e mode was
9 det er mi ned t o be caused by t he i nt er act i on of t he
10 copper conduct or wi t h t he gal vani zed coat i ng of t he
11 condui t . When t he gal vani zed condui t was exposed
12 t o t emper at ur es gr eat er t han 800 degr ees
13 Fahr enhei t , t he mel t i ng t emper at ur e of zi nc, t he
14 mol t en zi nc r eact ed wi t h t he copper conduct or
15 f or mi ng br ass pl ugs basi cal l y r esul t i ng i n a
16 pr emat ur e f ai l ur e of t he t est ci r cui t .
17 Si x mont hs l at er i n J anuar y of 2012, t he
18 502 Techni cal Commi t t ee convened f or t hei r Repor t
19 on Pr oposal s meet i ng at whi ch t he si gni f i cance and
20 i mpact of t hi s i ssue was di scussed i n gr eat det ai l .
21 But wi t h st i l l no i nf or mat i on or gui dance pr ovi ded
22 by UL at t hat t i me, t he Commi t t ee was unabl e t o
23 t ake any act i on and, i nst ead, agr eed t o r econsi der
Page 195
Attachment 13-8-6-b
6 of 20
24 t he i ssue at t hei r ROC meet i ng l at er i n t he year
228
1 assumi ng some gui dance woul d be avai l abl e by t hat
2 t i me.
3 I n J une of 2012, UL f i nal l y i ssued publ i c
4 i nf or mat i on r egar di ng t he val i dat i on t est f i ndi ngs
5 and, i n addi t i on, i ssued a r evi si on t o t he FHI T
6 gui de i nf or mat i on i ndi cat i ng t hat al l condui t and
7 condui t f i t t i ngs t hat come i n cont act wi t h
8 f i r e- r esi st i ve cabl es shoul d have an i nt er i or
9 coat i ng f r ee of zi nc.
10 I n Sept ember of 2012, UL wi t hdr ew al l of
11 i t s i ssued l i st i ngs f or el ect r i cal ci r cui t
12 pr ot ect i ve syst ems compr i sed of f i r e- r esi st i ve
13 cabl es r egar dl ess of t hei r i nt ended condui t syst em
14 i nst al l at i on and al so, at t hat t i me, announced t hey
15 wer e no l onger of f er i ng cer t i f i cat i on t o
16 ANSI / UL 2196. Per t hi s act i on by UL, manuf act ur er s
17 wer e no l onger al l owed t o appl y t he UL l i st i ng mar k
18 t o t hei r pr oduct .
19 However , ANSI / UL 2196 was not wi t hdr awn
20 and r emai ned a val i d t est st andar d wi t hout any
21 modi f i cat i on. And UL al so al l owed cabl e
22 manuf act ur er s pr i or t o t hat dat e t o mai nt ai n i t s
23 l i st i ng and ul t i mat el y be i nst al l ed.
24 Fi nal l y, on Sept ember 17t h of 2012,
229
Page 196
Attachment 13-8-6-b
7 of 20
1 UL announced t he avai l abi l i t y of an i nt er i m
2 cer t i f i cat i on pr ogr amf or f i r e- r esi st i ve cabl es.
3 Thi s new pr ogr amagai n of f er ed cabl e manuf act ur er s
4 cer t i f i cat i on t o t hei r f i r e- r esi st i ve cabl es i n
5 accor dance wi t h t est i ng pr e ANSI / UL 2196. However ,
6 as a par t of t hi s act i on, UL al so acknowl edged t hat
7 t he i nt er r el at i onshi p bet ween al l var i abl es of t he
8 cabl e and/ or syst emconst r uct i on ar e not under st ood
9 by al l or addr essed i n t he cur r ent t est st andar ds
10 and, t her ef or e, i nt r oduced a new set of gui del i nes
11 so t hat t he t est i ng i s conduct ed speci f i c t o t he
12 i nt ended cabl e and syst emconst r uct i on.
13 MR. HARRI NGTON: Mr . Connel l , i f you coul d wr ap
14 t hi ngs up shor t l y. Thank you.
15 MR. CONNELL: Yes, Mr . Chai r man.
16 To addr ess t he compl exi t y of t hi s i ssue,
17 t he TC has pr oposed r evi si ons t o 502 t hat ar e
18 consi st ent wi t h t he addi t i onal UL 2196 t est
19 r equi r ement s i mpl ement ed by UL under t hei r pr oposed
20 I nt er i mTest i ng Pr ogr amand, most i mpor t ant l y, t o
21 ensur e t hat t he newl y i dent i f i ed t est i ng var i abl es
22 ar e f ul l y under st ood and account ed f or when t est i ng
23 pr oduct s i nt er nat i onal l y.
24 MR. HARRI NGTON: I t hi nk we' r e goi ng t o have t o
230
1 st op at t hi s poi nt , Mr . Connel l . Thank you f or t he
2 Commi t t ee' s posi t i on.
3 MR. CONNELL: Mr . Chai r man, coul d I st at e t he
4 Commi t t ee' s posi t i on?
5 MR. HARRI NGTON: I bel i eve you di d. You' ve had
Page 197
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8 of 20
6 your al l ot t ed t i me. Thank you. We can come back
7 l at er as a wr ap up.
8 Wi t h t hat , we' l l open up debat e on t he
9 mot i on. Pl ease pr ovi de your name and af f i l i at i on
10 and whet her you' r e speaki ng i n suppor t of or
11 agai nst t he mot i on. So Mi cr ophone 4.
12 MR. CONRAD: J ames Conr ad, RSCC Wi r e & Cabl e.
13 I speak i n opposi t i on of t he mot i on on t he f l oor .
14 I ama 502 Commi t t ee member as wel l .
15 Let me j ust r ead you a l i t t l e bi t what i s
16 i n t he UL I nt er i mTest Pr ogr am. I n t hei r t est
17 pr ogr amunder sampl e sel ect i on, i t says, " I n
18 gener al , si nce t he i nt er r el at i onshi p bet ween al l
19 var i abl es of t he cabl es and t he syst em
20 const r uct i ons ar e not under st ood by al l and
21 addr essed i n t he st andar d" - - t hat ' s UL 2196
22 St andar d - - " i t wi l l not be possi bl e t o conduct
23 r epr esent at i ve t est i ng at t hi s t i me. " And t hen
24 t hey gi ve a whol e l aundr y l i st of i t ems t hat need
231
1 t o be t est ed i f you go t o UL I nt er i mPr ogr am.
2 Now, r emember , what t he 502 Commi t t ee di d
3 i s we r ewor ded i t , t hat t akes some of t hese
4 r equi r ement s and add i t i nt o t he 502 l anguage. We
5 say - - 502 i s an i nt er nat i onal st andar d. We have
6 member s f r omei ght di f f er ent count r i es. And t o say
7 " t est i n accor dance wi t h UL 2196" coul d be ver y,
8 ver y danger ous because l et me j ust r ead a coupl e
9 t hi ngs qui ckl y why you don' t want t o go 2196 j ust
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Attachment 13-8-6-b
9 of 20
10 st r ai ght out .
11 I n 2196, 4, Sampl e Sel ect i ons, 4- 1, each
12 desi gn of cabl e, mul t i pl e conduct or ver sus si ngl e,
13 t wi st ed ver sus st r ai ght l ace, shi el ded ver sus
14 unshi el ded, bar e gr ound ver sus i nsul at ed gr ound,
15 st r anded ver sus sol i d conduct or , l owest vol t age
16 ver sus hi ghest vol t age. An addi t i onal sel ect i on
17 you may go i n t o l ook at shal l i ncl ude smal l est
18 conduct or , mi ni mumnumber of conduct or s, mi ni mum
19 i nst al l at i on t hi ckness, mi ni mumi nst al l at i on
20 bet ween conduct or s, and mi ni mumi nst al l at i on
21 bet ween t he conduct or s i n t he j acket .
22 Has anybody hear d how t o t est cabl es i n a
23 r aceway or a condui t i n t hi s Commi t t ee her e t oday?
24 No. We cannot say t oday " i n accor dance wi t h 2196" .
232
1 Mi nd you t hat UL even says i t i n t hei r pr ogr am.
2 What t he 502 Commi t t ee has done i s we sai d we want
3 t o i dent i f y t he l engt h of t he sampl e. We want t o
4 t el l you t o t est i t i n t he r aceway t hat wi l l be
5 used. Fol l ow 2196 pr ot ocol , t he whol e st andar d,
6 not j ust t he f i r e por t i on.
7 We never amended i t . You do t he f i r e.
8 You do t he hose st r eam, and you do t he t ensi l e
9 st r engt h t est i ng. Wi t hout t hese addi t i onal
10 r equi r ement s i n t he 502 i dent i f i abl e st andar d, we
11 ar e goi ng t o l eave peopl e out t her e i n t he dar k
12 wi t hout a pr oper l y t est ed pr ogr am, especi al l y our
13 i nt er nat i onal par t ner s.
14 Agai n, Mr . Chai r man, I move i n opposi t i on
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Attachment 13-8-6-b
10 of 20
15 on t hi s and ur ge t he body t o do t he same. Thank
16 you.
19 GBH I nt er nat i onal , speaki ng f or NAFRA, and i n
20 suppor t of t he mot i on.
21 My r easoni ng f or suppor t i ng t hi s mot i on i s
22 t hat I i nvi t e - - my exper t i se i s i n t he ar ea of
23 f i r e t est i ng. We si t ar ound i n t he NFPA Fi r e Test
24 Commi t t ee. We si t ar ound i n t he ASME Fi r e
233
1 St andar ds Commi t t ee, and we spend numer ous hour s
2 di scussi ng t he exact det ai l s of how we wr i t e t est
3 met hods and wi t h exact det ai l s of how t est met hods
4 shoul d be r un.
5 What t hi s l anguage i n 502, and we' l l see
6 t he same i n 130 because t hey' r e consi st ent , al l i t
7 says i s t est ed i n a t ot al l y encl osed f ur nace usi ng
8 t he E119 t emper at ur e cur ve, and t hat ' s i t . That ' s
9 not enough. I t i s not appr opr i at e f or a Commi t t ee
10 whose exper t i se i s not i n t est i ng t o devel op and
11 wr i t e t wo or t hr ee l i nes and t hose t wo or t hr ee
12 l i nes shoul d r epr esent a pr oper f i r e t est or any
13 ot her t ype of t est . That ' s why we send t hat t o t he
14 appr opr i at e Commi t t ee.
15 I ur ge you t o appr ove t he mot i on and
16 di sappr ove t he change t hat Commi t t ee 502 made.
17 Thank you.
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Attachment 13-8-6-b
11 of 20
19 MS. RUI Z: I amAna Rui z f r omTD&T, LLC. I ' ma
20 member of Techni cal Commi t t ee 502. I ' magai nst t he
21 mot i on. I ' man i nt er nat i onal member , and I r eal l y
22 t hi nk t hat t hi s t hi ng shoul d be done f or t he
23 i nt er nat i onal st andar ds f or al l over t he wor l d, not
24 j ust t he way i t ' s bei ng done r i ght now. I ' m
234
1 agai nst t he mot i on. That ' s i t .
3 MR. WALTON: Thank you. Ed Wal t on,
4 r epr esent i ng Pr i st i em( phonet i c) . I ' magai nst t he
5 mot i on. I ' magai nst t he mot i on because i t woul d
6 r et ur n t he l anguage back t o wher e UL i s t he onl y
7 r ef er ence l abor at or y, and t he use of wor ds
8 " cer t i f i ed" and " l i st ed" woul d al most make t hema
9 sol e sour ce.
10 I ami mpr essed wi t h t he wor k t hat t he
11 Commi t t ee di d by expandi ng t he t est i ng cr i t er i a
12 f r oma cabl e t o a syst emwhi ch i s exact l y what was
13 r esol ved, whi ch f ound t he pr obl emi n t he f i r st
14 pl ace and has r esol ved t hat pr obl emi n t he f ut ur e.
15 So I ' magai nst t he mot i on. Thank you.
17 MR. RAMI REZ: Yes, I j ust want t o ask f i r st t he
18 Commi t t ee - -
19 MR. HARRI NGTON: Coul d you i dent i f y your sel f ?
20 MR. RAMI REZ: Al Rami r ez wi t h UL.
21 MR. HARRI NGTON: And speaki ng f or t he mot i on?
22 MR. RAMI REZ: I ' mspeaki ng f or t he mot i on.
23 I di dn' t hear i f t he Commi t t ee was f or t he
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12 of 20
24 mot i on or agai nst t he mot i on at t he end of t he
235
1 Chai r ' s t est i mony.
2 MR. HARRI NGTON: I know I di d have t o cut hi m
3 of f as he r an out of hi s al l ot t ed t i me. I ' mgoi ng
4 t o gi ve hi mt i me t o wr ap up l at er .
5 MR. RAMI REZ: Okay.
6 MR. HARRI NGTON: Si nce you r ai sed t hat
7 quest i on, maybe i t ' s a good t i me now f or t he
8 benef i t of t he body t o do t hat . Mr . Chai r , back t o
9 you.
10 MR. CONNELL: Wel l , I guess knowi ng what we
11 know now about demonst r at ed f i r e- r esi st i ve cabl e
12 f ai l ur es dur i ng f i r e t est i ng condi t i ons when
13 i nst al l ed i n a st eel condui t wi t h zi nc i nt er i or
14 coat i ngs, about t he l ack of any t est st andar ds t hat
15 speci f i cal l y addr ess t hi s i ssue, and t hat UL
16 t hemsel ves wi l l not f ol l ow t he cur r ent ANSI / UL 2196
17 wi t hout t hei r own modi f i cat i ons si mi l ar t o t hose
18 now bei ng pr oposed by 502, t hat as Chai r man of t he
19 Techni cal Commi t t ee, I bel i eve we woul d be
20 i r r esponsi bl e t o r ever t t o t he l anguage of t he ROP
21 as pr oposed whi ch was devel oped si x mont hs pr i or t o
22 any of t hese i ssues or cr i t i cal act i ons by UL
23 wi t hout any acknowl edgment of any of t he t est i ng
24 concer ns i ncl uded i n t hat ROP document , and I ask
236
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Attachment 13-8-6-b
13 of 20
1 f or your vot e i n opposi t i on t o t hi s mot i on.
2 MR. HARRI NGTON: Thank you. Sor r y f or cut t i ng
3 you of f ear l i er . Mi cr ophone 3.
5 GBH I nt er nat i onal , and I ami n suppor t of t he
6 mot i on.
7 I j ust want t o cl ar i f y one t hi ng t hat was
8 st at ed by one of t he opponent s i n t hat t hi s woul d
9 make UL t he onl y l ab. That i s i ncor r ect . I don' t
10 wor k f or UL. I have no cont r act wi t h UL or
11 anyt hi ng l i ke t hat , but t he f act t hat you l i st t wo
12 UL st andar ds, any nat i onal l y cer t i f i ed t est i ng l ab
13 can i nst i t ut e a UL st andar d. You don' t have t o be
14 UL t o l i st UL st andar ds.
15 So i n r esponse t o comment f r omMs. Rui z
16 t hat she' s i n f avor of usi ng i nt er nat i onal l y
17 r ecogni zed dat a, i n f act , i n t hat case, she shoul d
18 have been on t he si de t hat suppor t s t he mot i on
19 because t hat ' s what t hi s l anguage says, and t hat i s
20 t he par t t hat gi ves me some hear t ache because I ' m
21 agai nst t hat l anguage, but I ' mmor e agai nst t he
22 l anguage pr oduced by t he Commi t t ee t o i nvent a t est
23 met hod on t he f l y, and I hope you suppor t t he
24 mot i on. Thank you.
237
2 MR. CONRAD: J ames Conr ad, RSCC Wi r e & Cabl e,
3 member of 502. I speak i n opposi t i on of t he
4 mot i on.
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14 of 20
5 I j ust want t o make sur e t hat ever ybody
6 has seen t he wor di ng t hat t he Commi t t ee has dr af t ed
7 dur i ng t he comment st age. Mar cel o ment i oned t hat
8 i t says demonst r at e f unct i onal i t y as descr i bed i n
9 . 196, t est of t one codes f ur nace t o E119; and t hen
10 we go on t o say, t est as a compl et e syst emof
11 conduct or s, cabl es, and r aceways as appl i cabl e
12 usi ng a sampl e no shor t er t han ar ound t he 10 f eet .
13 B, f i r e- r esi st i ve cabl es i nt ended t o be i nst al l ed
14 i n a r aceway ar e t o be t est ed i n t he t ype of
15 r aceway i n whi ch t hey ar e i nt ended t o be i nst al l ed.
16 Remember what cr eat ed t hi s whol e i ssue.
17 We f ound out when you t ook cabl es t hat wer e
18 pr e- r el eased t est ed and t he EMT and you i nst al l ed
19 t hemi n r i gi d met al condui t , t hey f ai l ed. They
20 f ai l ed 100 per cent of t he t i me.
21 And t hen we go on t o say, C, each
22 f i r e- r esi st i ve cabl e syst emshal l have i nst al l at i on
23 i nst r uct i ons t hat out l i ne t he t est pr ocedur es and
24 onl y t he component s st at ed i n t hese t est r epor t s
238
1 ar e accept abl e f or act ual i nst al l at i on.
2 I shoul d r ead i t agai n what UL says i n
3 t hei r I nt er i mPr ogr am. They say t hat t hey don' t
4 under st and t he i nt er r el at i onshi p bet ween t he cabl es
5 and t he condui t s and t he syst ems. Agai n, 2196
6 doesn' t even t el l you how t o ment i on or how t o t est
7 a cabl e i n a r aceway. I t onl y ment i ons a r aceway
8 f our t i mes; once i n t he scope, one about CI cabl e,
9 once i n t he obser vat i on, and once f or t hi s ver t i cal
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15 of 20
10 t ensi l e st r engt h t est .
11 Ther e i s no gui del i ne i n UL 2196. And t o
12 l eave i t t o say " t est i n accor dance wi t h 2196" and
13 t hi nk t hat anot her l ab somewher e el se i n t he wor l d
14 wi l l get a good pr oduct t hat wi l l pass a t est i n
15 t he f i el d under r eal f i r e condi t i ons i s mi sl eadi ng
16 and i t ' s absol ut el y wr ong. I ur ge t he body t o vot e
17 agai nst t hi s mot i on. Thank you, Mr . Chai r man.
19 MR. RAMI REZ: Al Rami r ez wi t h UL speaki ng i n
21 Agai n, t he document t hat J i mr ef er s t o i s
22 out t her e i n t he publ i c and peopl e ar e goi ng t o be
23 abl e t o use i t . I t does def i ne how we - - UL
24 det er mi ned syst ems t hat we' r e l ooki ng at , make sur e
239
1 t hat we do i dent i f y t he ot her component s as t he
2 Chai r ment i oned. I t hi nk i t i s ver y compl et e i n
3 nat ur e.
4 We al so do l i st pr oduct s. We have l i st ed
5 t wo pr oduct s cur r ent l y t o you al l , 2196, under t he
6 I nt er i mCer t i f i cat i on Pr ogr am, and t hat coul d be
7 f ound i n our on- l i ne cer t i f i cat i on di r ect or y under
8 FHI T.
9 The st andar d, agai n as I st at ed bef or e,
10 shoul d be used i n i t s ent i r et y because, as you
11 hear d t he r eadi ngs, t he pr oposed t ext of t hi s par t
12 of Sect i on 12. 1, i t ' s i ncompl et e because i t j ust
13 r ef er s t o t hat f i r e t est , t hat E119 t est . And i t
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Attachment 13-8-6-b
16 of 20
14 doesn' t cover t he ot her par t s of UL 2196 whi ch ar e
15 ver y i mpor t ant t o al so appl y t o t hose cr i t i cal
16 syst ems. Thank you.
18 MR. WALTON: To qui ckl y cl ar i f y t he poi nt .
19 Ed Wal t on agai nst t he mot i on.
20 When I sai d bef or e any l ab can t est t he
21 UL 2196 bef or e t he t est , but onl y UL can of f er an
22 UL l i st i ng or UL cer t i f i cat i on t o t hat document .
23 Thank you.
240
1 MR. J AMES: Bob J ames, Under wr i t er s
2 Labor at or i es. J ust t o addr ess t wo poi nt s, and I am
3 f or t he mot i on.
4 The l ast poi nt i s def i ni t i ons f or l i st i ng
5 and cer t i f i cat i on come f r omNFPA. We j ust happen
6 t o use t hat t er mas wel l , but ot her l abs can use
7 t hei r own t er mi nol ogy. But t he l i st i ng def i ni t i on
8 t o be l i st ed i s par t of NFPA' s def i ni t i ons, not
9 somet hi ng t hat we cr eat ed.
10 The ot her pi ece was t hat t her e was a
11 cr i t i ci smt o t he t est cr i t er i a and what we f ol l ow
12 based on component s not bei ng i dent i f i ed i n t he
13 t est i ng. And t he r eal i t y i s t hat t he
14 manuf act ur er s, when t hey come t o us wi t h t hei r
15 pr oduct s, wi l l t el l us how t hey' r e goi ng t o i nst al l
16 i t . That way, we' r e not l i mi t i ng t he manuf act ur er
17 t o have t o put i t i n condui t or not .
18 So, agai n, we' r e bei ng f l exi bl e so t he
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Attachment 13-8-6-b
17 of 20
19 manuf act ur i ng communi t y can come t o us f or t hei r
20 cer t i f i cat i ons. Thank you.
22 MR. CONRAD: J ames Conr ad, RSCC Wi r e & Cabl e
23 agai n, member of NFPA 502.
24 I was on t he t ask gr oup t hat wor ked on
241
1 t hi s ext ensi vel y. I was par t of t he r esear ch t eam
2 t hat di scover ed t he whol e zi nc i ssue. We have no
3 i nt ent i on of shor t - cut t i ng 2196. I t i s pr obabl y
4 t he most st r i ngent f i r e t est i n t he wor l d i n our
5 opi ni on. That i s why we r et ai ned 2196 i n t her e.
6 We don' t t ake except i on t o any par t of i t .
7 I f you r ead 2196 i n t he scope, i t t al ks about
8 demonst r at i ng f unct i onal i t y. We t ook wor ds f r om
9 t hat . And I have i ssues wi t h UL t r yi ng t o convi nce
10 you t hat we ar e shor t - cut t i ng i t . I wi l l quot e
11 what we wr ot e, " Demonst r at e f unct i onal i t y f or no
12 l ess t han t wo hour s as descr i bed i n ANSI / UL 2196
13 t est st andar d. "
14 We have not modi f i ed anyt hi ng i n t her e
15 except we added r equi r ement s t hat ar e not cur r ent l y
16 i n t her e t hat UL - - and I appl aud t hemf or t hei r
17 I nt er i mTest Pr ogr am. I agr ee 100 per cent wi t h
18 t hei r I nt er i mTest Pr ogr am.
19 The t r oubl e i s t hi s i s an i nt er nat i onal
20 st andar d. Go t o a l ab ar ound t he wor l d, handl e
21 2196. I f t hey don' t have an I nt er i mTest Pr ogr am,
22 you' r e goi ng t o get a cabl e t hat wi l l not sur vi ve a
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Attachment 13-8-6-b
18 of 20
23 f i r e. Thank you, Mr . Chai r . I speak i n opposi t i on
24 of t he mot i on.
242
2 MR. LALOCA: St eve Lal oca ( phonet i c) ,
3 r epr esent i ng mysel f . I woul d l i ke t o mot i on - -
4 r equest or cal l t he vot e.
5 A VOI CE: Second.
6 MR. HARRI NGTON: We have a second. Cal l i ng t he
7 quest i on i s not a debat abl e mot i on. So at t hi s
8 t i me, we' l l t ake a vot e on t hat . You can r ecor d
9 your vot e as 1 i n f avor of t he mot i on t o cal l t he
10 quest i on, and 2, opposed t o t he mot i on of cal l i ng
11 t he quest i on. We' r e j ust deal i ng wi t h t he cal l of
12 t he quest i on i t emat t hi s poi nt . The vot i ng st ar t s
13 now. Cl osi ng i n 5 seconds.
14 Bal l ot i ng cl osed. And t hat mot i on passes
15 t o cal l t he quest i on.
16 So at t hi s poi nt , we' l l move on t o t he
17 vot e. So now you' r e vot i ng on t he mot i on i n f r ont
18 of you whi ch i s 502- 2 t o r ej ect an i dent i f i abl e
19 par t of Comment 202- 27. Agai n, you' r e goi ng t o
20 r ecor d your vot e, 1 i n f avor of t he mot i on t o
21 accept or 2, opposed t o t he mot i on, r ej ect . Vot i ng
22 st ar t s. Cl osi ng i n 5 seconds.
23 Vot i ng cl osed. And t hat mot i on f ai l s.
24 Any di scussi on on 502? Seei ng none, we' l l
243
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Attachment 13-8-6-b
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TABLE A
(Note: The motions are presented in the order or presentation recommended by the Motions Committee)

Document #5 NFPA 502, Standard for Road Tunnels, Bridges, and Other Limited Access Highways A2013
Motion
Seq #
NITMAM
Log #
Section/Para
Person(s) Authorized to Make the
Motion
Certified Amending
Motion**
Motion Committee Notes and
Comments**
502-2
1113 12.1.2(1) and A.12.1.2 Alfredo M. Ramirez, UL LLC Reject an Identifiable Part of
Comment 502-27. The
Identifiable Parts are the
revisions to Section 12.1.2(1)
and associated new annex
material.
If successful, this motion seeks to return to ROP
text for Section 12.1.2(1) to read as follows:
12.1.2* Emergency circuits installed in a
road tunnel and ancillary areas shall remain
functional for a period of not less than 1 hour
for the anticipated fire condition, meeting one
of the following methods:
(1) A fire-resistive cable listed for 2 hours in
accordance with ANSI/UL 2196 or other
equivalent internationally recognized
standards to 950C (1742F) when approved
by the AHJ .
Attachment 13-8-6-b
20 of 20
Item 13-8-7

DATE: July 8, 2013

AMENDMENT (801-1)

Document: NFPA 801, Standard for Fire Protection for Facilities Handling Radioactive Materials

Motion: To Accept Comment 801-16

necessary
2
/
3
the Amendment is 16 [28 (eligible to vote) 3 (ballots not returned) 1 (abstention) =24 0.66 =15.84]
28 Eligible to Vote
3 Not Returned (Kassawara, Najafi, Richter, J r.)

23 Agree
1 Do Not Agree (Davis)
1 Abstain (Bolliger)

TC Action: PASS

Attachment 13-8-7-a
1 of 24
Attachment 13-8-7-a
2 of 24
Attachment 13-8-7-a
3 of 24
Proposal 801-16 Accept Comment
________________________________________________________________
801-16 Log #36 Final Action: Accept in Principle in Part
(Chapter 7)
________________________________________________________________
Submitter: Andrew Minister, Battelle Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
7.1* General.
7.1.1 Flammable and Combustible Liquids and Gases.
7.1.1.1 Flammable and combustible liquids shall be stored and handled in
accordance with NFPA 30, Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code.
7.1.1.2 Flammable and combustible gases shall be stored and handled in
accordance with NFPA 54, National Fuel Gas Code; NFPA 55, Compressed
Gases and Cryogenic Fluids Code; and NFPA 58, Liquefied Petroleum Gas
Code.
7.1.1.3* In As determined by fire hazards analysis, combustible gas analyzers
shall be installed in enclosed spaces with the potential for accumulation of
combustible gases enclosed spaces in which combustible gas could accumulate
outside of the storage vessels, piping, and utilization equipment, combustible-
gas analyzers that are designed for the specific gas shall be installed .
A.7.1.1.3 Enclosed spaces refers to any enclosure within a building, including
gloveboxes, hot cells, caves, plenums, etc.
7.1.1.4* As determined by fire hazards analysis, Fflammable and combustible
liquids in enclosed spaces in which vapors have the potential to accumulate
outside of the storage vessels, piping, and utilization equipment shall be
installed with combustible-vapor analyzers appropriate for the vapors
generated.
A.7.1.1.4 See the explanation for enclosed spaces under A.7.1.1.3.
7.1.1.5 The analyzer specified by Section 7.1.1.3 or Section 7.1.1.4 shall be set
to alarm at a concentration no higher than 25 percent of the lower flammable
explosive limit.
7.1.1.6 Safety controls and interlocks for combustible, flammable liquids and
flammable gases and their associated delivery systems shall be tested on a
predetermined schedule and after maintenance operations.
7.1.1.7 Hydraulic fluids used in presses or other hydraulic equipment shall be
the fire-resistant fluid type.
7.1.1.8 Solvents.
7.1.1.8.1* Where a flammable or combustible solvent is used, it shall be
handled in a system that does not allow uncontrolled release of vapors.
7.1.1.8.2 Approved oOperating controls and limits appropriate for the hazard
shall be established.
7.1.1.8.3 An approved fixed fire-extinguishing system shall be installed or its
absence justified to the satisfaction of the AHJ by fire hazards analysis.
7.1.1.8.4* Solvent distillation and recovery equipment for flammable or
combustible liquids shall be isolated from areas of use by 3-hour fire barriers
of appropriate rating for the hazard.
7.1.1.8.5* In order to ensure the operation of process evaporators, such as
Plutonium Uranium Reduction and Extraction (PUREX), means shall be
provided to prevent entry of water-soluble solvents into the evaporators.
7.1.2 Specialized Processes and Equipment
7.1.2.1 Furnaces or Ovens used in facilities handling radioactive materials shall
comply with the applicable requirements of NFPA 86, Standard for Ovens and
Furnaces, NFPA 86C, Standard for Industrial Furnaces using a Special
Processing Atmosphere, or NFPA 86D, Standard for Industrial Furnaces using
Vacuum as an Atmosphere, as appropriate.
7.1.2.2 NFPA 115, Standard for Laser Fire Protection shall apply to processes
and systems utilizing lasers.
7.1.2.3 Incinerators shall be in accordance with NFPA 82, Standard on
Incinerators and Waste and Linen Handling Systems and Equipment
7.1.3 Special Materials.
7.1.3.1 Combustible metals shall be stored and handled in accordance with
NFPA 484, Standard for Combustible Metals.
7.1.3.2* Operating controls and limits for the handling of pyrophoric materials
shall be established to the satisfaction of the AHJ.
7.1.3.3 A supply of an appropriate extinguishing medium shall be available in
all areas where fines and cuttings of pyrophoric materials are present.
7.1.3.4 Solid and liquid oxidizing agents shall be stored and handled in
accordance with NFPA 430, Code for the Storage of Liquid and Solid
Oxidizers.
7.1.3.5 Fissile materials shall be used, handled, and stored with provisions to
prevent the accidental assembly of fissile material into critical masses.
7.1.3.5.1 Fissile materials shall be arranged such that neutron moderation and
reflection by water shall not present a criticality hazard.
7.1.3.5.2* For locations where fissile materials might be present and could
create a potential criticality hazard, combustible materials shall be excluded .
7.1.4 Hot Cells, Caves, and Glove Boxes, and Hoods .
7.1.4.1* AllAs determined by fire hazards analysis, hot cells, caves, and glove
boxes, and hoods shall be provided with fire detection in accordance with
NFPA 72.
A.7.1.4.1 Sprinkler water flow indication can serve as a possible means of fire
detection.
7.1.4.2* As determined by fire hazards analysis, Ffire suppression shall be
provided in all hot cells, caves, and glove boxes, and hoods
A.7.1.4.2 The preferred selected method of automatic suppression has to be
compatible with the fire hazards and consider interaction between the
suppression agent and materials that are present (e.g., reactive metals). The
selection of a fire suppression system must address the potential for the spread
of radioactive materials due to pressurization of the enclosure or by the
flooding of the enclosure wil liquid fire suppression methods such as water .
Accessibility for inspection, maintenance, and testing in radiation or
contamination environments must also be considered in the design. Selected
systems should be is an automatic sprinkler system, although other methods of
suppression can also be permitted when installed in accordance with the
applicable NFPA standard. Refer to Section 5.10 for drainage provisions.
7.1.4.3 Hot Cells and Caves.
7.1.4.3.1 Hot cells and caves shall be of noncombustible construction. Where
combustible shielding is necessary for the radiation hazard, appropriate fire
protection features shall be installed as determined by fire hazards analysis.
7.1.4.3.2 Where hydraulic fluids are used in master slave manipulators, fire
resistant fluids shall be used.
7.1.4.3.3 Combustible materials inside the cells and caves shall be kept to a
minimum.
7.1.4.3.4 If explosive concentrations of gases or vapors are present, an inert
atmosphere shall be provided, or the cell or cave and its ventilation system
shall be designed to withstand pressure excursions.
7.1.4.4* Glove Boxes and Hoods.
7.1.4.4.1 The glove boxes, including windows, and hoods shall be of
noncombustible construction. Where combustible shielding is necessary for the
radiation hazard, appropriate fire protection features shall be installed as
determined by fire hazards analysis.
7.1.4.4.2* The number of gloves shall be limited to the minimum necessary to
perform the operations.
A.7.1.4.4.2 Gloves are typically the most easily ignitable component of
gloveboxes and, therefore, should be minimized. When gloves fail, potential
loss of confinement can result.
7.1.4.4.32* When the gloves are not being used, they shall be withdrawn and
secured outside the box if fire hazards are present inside the box.
A.7.1.4.4.32 Securing of the gloves outside the box positions them such that
fixed fire suppression in the room can be more ef fective and that they do not
contribute to the fuel loading in the glovebox or provide a source of ignition to
other fuels in the glovebox. Positioning them outside also reduces potential for
gloves contributing to fires inside the glovebox.
7.1.4.4.43* When the gloves are no longer needed for operations, they shall be
removed and glove port covers installed if fire hazards are present inside the
box.
A.7.1.4.4.3 Gloves should be removed if work has been completed and no
additional work requiring access to the glovebox via use of the specific gloves
is identified, the glove box will not remain in-service, or fire hazards remaining
in the glovebox dictate that the gloves be removed. Gloves should not be
removed strictly because immediate or short term use is unnecessary.
Unnecessary removal of gloves creates unnecessary generation of radioactive
wastes as well as potential exposures to radioactive materials during change-
out activities.
7.1.4.4.54 Doors shall remain closed when not in use.
7.1.4.4.65 The concentration of combustibles shall be limited to the quantity
necessary to perform the immediate task.
7.1.4.4.76* Fixed inerting systems shall not be utilized in lieu of fire
suppression system
A.7.1.4.4.76 Fire suppression should be considered in addition to fixed inerting
systems to address potential concerns during glovebox maintenance or failure
of inerting systems.
7.1.4.4.87 If fixed extinguishing systems are utilized, the internal pressurization
shall be calculated in order to prevent gloves from failing or being blown of f
effects of system discharge on glovebox integrity shall be considered in
evaluating the design of the system.
7.1.4.4.98* As determined by fire hazards analysis, Aa means shall be provided
to restrict the passage of flame between glove boxes and hoods that are
connected.
7.1.4.5 Hoods.
7.1.4.5.1* Fume hoods containing radioactive materials shall meet the
requirements of NFPA 45, Standard on Fire Protection for Laboratories Using
Chemicals. Lining materials shall be compatible with the chemical
environment, and capable of decontamination.
A.7.1.4.5.1 Fume hoods provide minimal capability to confine radioactive
materials. The fire hazard is generally associated with the chemicals in-use and
NFPA 45 provides the necessary requirements for design and fire protection of
fume hoods.
7.1.4.5.2 Combustible materials shall not be stored in fume hoods and should
be the minimum necessary to support the work activity.
7.1.4.5.3 Radioactive contaminated combustible waste shall not be stored or
allowed to accumulate in fume hoods. Procedures for timely waste
characterization and removal shall be established.
7.1.5* Construction, Demolition, and Renovation. Construction, demolition,
and renovating activities that conform to the requirements of NFPA 241,
Standard for Safeguarding Construction, Alteration, and Demolition
Operations, such as the following:
Attachment 13-8-7-a
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appropriate level of protection for the hazards and configurations unique to the
facility. The importance of the FHA and flexibility in the application of
requirements for the variability in nuclear facility hazards is the primary basis
for the proposed changes and this approach is consistent with Chapter 4 and 6
of this standard. Additional discussion of the specific changes follows:
Sections 7.1.1.3 and 7.1.1.4 is revised to indicate that gas- or vapor -analyzers
should be installed if determined by fire hazards analysis. There are options to
designing protection against combustible gases and vapors that do not involve
the complexities of installing and maintaining analyzers. The standard is not
clear on the conditions that must be assumed for installation of the analyzers
(e.g., normal operation, upset conditions, ventilation on or of f). The standard
provides no guidance relative to the design, installation, operation, or response
to analyzer output or alarms. In the case of laboratory operations, the types of
gases or vapors may change frequently with work activities or new projects.
The changing configuration of the work space, equipment, and materials does
not support use of these types of devices in most cases.
Section 7.1.1.5 The use of the term lower flammable limit is consistent with
the terminology that is used in NFPA 30. Although both terms have the same
meaning, the reference to flammable limits when referring to hazards
associated with flammable liquids should follow NFPA 30. If lower
flammable limit is not used, lower explosive limit needs to be defined.
Section 7.1.1.8.2 is revised to provide flexibility to implement appropriate level
of control if necessary. Approved is deleted as this implies the AHJ must
accept the limits that are established, which is not consistent with typical
practice. Controls and limits on use solvent is typically established in user
procedures. The exception may be where permitting is required for quantities
that exceed fire code or other similar regulatory thresholds.
Section 7.1.1.8.4 is revised to allow flexibility. Arbitrarily establishing a 3-hour
separation does not allow for consideration of the magnitude of the hazard.
Solvent distillation can be as small as 0.25 liter or on a much lar ger scale. Fire
protection should be provided at a level appropriate for the hazard.
Section 7.1.3.5 is deleted on the basis that control of fissile materials is
governed by its own set of regulatory requirements and national standards.
These criticality specific requirements and standards encompass the issues of
neutron moderation or configuration changes that might occur as a result of
automatic or manual suppression actions. These requirements in NFPA 801 for
criticality are not appropriate for a fire protection standard, are not suf ficiently
complete to address the criticality hazard, and are covered in other governing
regulations.
Sections 7.1.4.1, 7.1.4.2 and associated Annex A content is revised to base the
selection and installation of fire detection and suppression on the basis of the
fire hazards analysis. The committees substantiation for the significant change
to require ALL hot cells, caves, and gloveboxes to have automatic fire
suppression systems was not substantiated based on number of fires, significant
fires, or any other data that justified the change to require all hot cells, caves,
and gloveboxes to have automatic fire suppression systems. There has to be a
graded approach to determining which hot cells, caves, and gloveboxes need to
have automatic fire suppression systems. The fire hazards analysis is the
correct tool for evaluating the hazards and determining the whether or not a hot
cell, cave, or glovebox needs automatic fire suppression. The variability of hot
cell, cave, and glovebox design and operations demands the capability to
engineer appropriate protection based on the specific configuration, use, and
hazards. Our laboratory operates may caves that have not fire hazards
associated with them and it would be very expensive to install and maintain
automatic fire suppression systems when there is no value added. Spread of
radioactive materials associated with the activation of a fire suppression system
also has to be considered in the selection of an automatic fire suppression
system. Hoods have been separated from these requirements into a separate
section (discussed later) because they do not serve the same purpose or
function relative to radioactive material confinement and shielding. The
application of suppression systems must be done with consideration for
material compatibilities, hazards, post-actuation cleanup, and inspection testing
and maintenance of the systems in radiation environments.
Sections 7.1.4.3.1 and 7.1.4.4.1 are revised to note that combustible shielding
may be necessary in some applications, particularly where neutron shielding is
necessary. Fire protection for these applications should be based on the fire
hazards analysis.
Section 7.1.4.4.2 is deleted because regulating the necessary number of gloves
is impractical and isnt considered in an integrated manner with the other fire
hazards that are present. Gloveboxes are generally designed to place gloves
where they are needed. This level of control should be left to the operating
entity as part of overall fire hazards management.
Section 7.1.4.4.2 (renumbered) and Section 7.4.4.3 are similarly revised to
provide a more practical level of control for gloves. Not all gloveboxes
necessarily have significant fire hazards.
Section 7.1.4.4.7 (renumbered) is revised to focus the requirement on
evaluating the extinguishing system effects on glovebox integrity, not simply
over-pressurization. Under fire conditions, glove failure may occur prior to
system actuation so glove failure from over -pressurization is not necessarily
governing. The extinguishing system is designed according the hazard present
and the appropriate rate of application of agent. The objective to extinguish the
fire may not support the objective of protecting the box, but the impacts on box
integrity should be understood and the design should consider these impacts
appropriately.
(a) Scaffolding, formworks, decking, temporary enclosures, temporary
containment structures, and partitions used inside buildings shall be
noncombustible or fire retardant treated.
(b) If wood is used, it shall be one of the following:
i. Listed, pressure-impregnated, fire-retardant lumber
ii. Treated with a listed fire-retardant coating
iii. Timbers 15.2 cm 15.2 cm (6 in. 6 in.) or lar ger
(c) Tarpaulins (fabrics) and plastic films shall be certified to conform to the
weather-resistant and flame-resistant materials described in NFPA 701,
Standard Methods of Fire Tests for Flame Propagation of Textiles and Films.
A.7.1.5 The use of noncombustible or fire-retardant concrete formwork is
especially important for large structures where large quantities of forms are
used. Pressure-impregnated fire-retardant lumber should be used in accordance
with its listing and the manufacturer s instructions. Where exposed to the
weather or moisture (e.g., concrete forms), the fire retardant used should be
suitable for this exposure. Fire-retardant coatings are not acceptable on walking
surfaces or surfaces subject to mechanical damage. Use of fire-retardant paint
requires special care. Inconsistent application and exposure to weather can
reduce the effectiveness of fire-retardant coatings. Large timbers are
occasionally used to support large pieces of equipment during storage or
maintenance. The size of these timbers makes them dif ficult to ignite, and they
do not represent an immediate fire threat.
7.2* Hospitals.
7.2.1 The appropriate form of fire protection for areas where radioactive
materials exist in hospitals shall be based on the fire hazards analysis.
7.2.2 Precautions shall be taken, as required, if the radioactive materials are
stored or used in ways that cause them to be more susceptible to release from
their containers.
7.3 Uranium Enrichment, Fuel Fabrication, and Fuel Reprocessing
Facilities.
7.3.1 General. Special hazards related to protection from fire shall be
controlled by a defense in depth strategy that utilizes a combination of the
following:
(1) Location and separation
(2) Safe operating procedures
(3) Fixed detection and suppression systems
(4) Inerting
(5) Any other methods acceptable to the AHJ
7.4 Laboratories.
7.4.1* The requirements of Sections 7.1.1 and 7.1.3 are applicable to
laboratories where the requirements of NFPA 45 do not provide sufficient fire
protection and control of the material hazards or when determined by fire
hazards analysis.
A.7.4.1 Laboratories, such as those involved in research and development,
often work with small quantities of chemicals and radioactive materials in any
given operation or work activity. Laboratories frequently change configurations
of hazardous and radioactive materials as well as associated laboratory
equipment and confinement in support of constantly changing projects. These
often changing conditions and the quantities of materials present do not lend
themselves to the controls specified in Sections 7.1.1 and 7.1.3 for gas and
vapor analyzers, safety controls and interlocks, control of solvents, and control
of handling and storage of combustible metals. NFPA 45 provides adequate
controls for most laboratory operations involving chemical hazards in the
presence of radioactive materials. Additional fire protection that may be
required is determined by fire hazards analysis.
7.4.1 The requirements of NFPA 45 shall also be applicable.
7.4.2 Laboratories which handle pyrophoric materials shall comply with 7.1.3.
7.4.32 Laboratory enclosures shall comply with the requirements for hot cells,
gloveboxes and hoods unless otherwise justified in the a FHA concludes that the
amount of radioactive material is inconsequential .
7.5 Research and Production Reactors.
7.5.1 Reactivity control shall be capable of inserting negative reactivity to
achieve and maintain subcritical conditions in the event of a fire.
7.5.2 Inventory and pressure control shall be capable of controlling coolant
level such that fuel damage as a result of a fire is prevented.
7.5.3 Decay heat removal shall be capable of removing heat from the reactor
core such that fuel damage as a result of fire is prevented.
7.5.4 Vital auxiliaries shall be capable of performing the necessary functions in
the event of a fire.
7.5.5 Process monitoring shall be capable of providing the necessary indication
in the event of a fire.
7.6 Facilities Handling Waste (Reserved)
7.7 Accelerators (Reserved)
7.8 Process Facilities (Reserved)
7.9 Irradiation Facilities (Reserved)
Substantiation: The term nuclear facilities as applicable to NFPA 801
represents an extremely broad spectrum of facilities with tremendous variation
in mission, function, design, operations, hazardous chemicals, radioactive
material inventories, fire risks and protection needs. The types of facilities
covered by NFPA 801 and the requirements of this chapter may include small
research and development laboratories, large processing facilities, or non-
power reactors. The fire protection needs for these facilities are as varied as the
facilities themselves. For this reason, inflexible, prescriptive fire protection
requirements do not meet the specific facility and hazard protection needs and
the fire hazards analysis becomes paramount in defining and evaluating the
Attachment 13-8-7-a
5 of 24
7.1.5.3.1 Procedures for timely waste characterization and removal shall be
established.
7.4.3 Laboratory enclosures shall comply with the requirements for gloveboxes
and hoods. unless the FHA concludes that the amount of radioactive material is
inconsequential.
D.1.2.3 FSSA Publications. Fire Suppression Systems Association, 5024 R
Campbell Blvd., Baltimore, Maryland 21236-5974, USA.
Guide to Estimating Enclosure Pressure and Pressure Relief Vent Area for
Applications Using Clean Agent Fire Extinguishing Systems, 2nd Edition,
January 2010.
Committee Statement: The committee addressed Section 7.1.1.3 and Section
7.1.1.4 under the action taken on Committee Comment 801-17 (Log #13) and
Committee Comment 801-18 (Log #14). Section 7.1.1.5 and Section 7.1.1.8.2
were accepted with the addition of a clarifying annex statement to Section
7.1.1.8.2. Section 7.1.1.8.3 and Section 7.1.1.8.4 were previously addressed
by Committee Comment 801-19 (Log #15) and Committee Comment 801-20
(Log #16). Section 7.1.3.5 and associated subparagraphs were retained with
modifications by actions taken on Committee Comment 801-22 (Log #18)
and because those requirements for fissile materials are appropriate within
the scope of the standard. Additional criticality requirements may also be
applicable from other codes and standards. Section 7.1.4 retained the term
hoods as it is specifically defined and within the scope of in the standard. A
new section for fume hoods was accepted and a definition, extracted from the
2011 edition of NFPA 45, was created to clarify the distinction from hoods.
Section 7.1.4.1 was dispositioned by the action taken on Committee Comment
801-23 (Log #19). Section 7.1.4.2 was rejected, based on the philosophy that
requirements should be deterministic and not developed by the FHA. A.7.1.4.2
was accepted, revised, and merged with the previous language created under
Committee Comment 801-24 (Log #20). Section 7.1.4.3.1 was rejected, based
on the philosophy that requirements should be deterministic and not developed
by the FHA. Section 7.1.4.4 retained the term hoods as it is specifically defined
and within the scope of in the standard. Section 7.1.4.4.1 and Section 7.1.4.4.2
with associated annex were rejected with Section 7.1.4.4.1, as previously
addressed under Committee Comment 801-28 (Log #21). Section 7.1.4.4.3 was
rejected because the gloves once withdrawn reduce the combustible loading
within the glovebox. Section 7.1.4.4.4 and associated annex was rejected
because the fire presence inside the box is not well-definable and fails to
address the external hazard. Section 7.1.4.4.8 was accepted with new annex
material provided. Section 7.1.4.4.9 was rejected, based on the philosophy
that requirements should be deterministic and not developed by the FHA.
Section 7.1.4.5 and associated subparagraphs were accepted with the heading
being changed to fume hoods with the section being renumbered to Section
7.1.5. Section 7.4.1 and associated annex, along with 7.4.2, was rejected to
retain the original language as the committee believed the original language
to sufficiently address the issue. Section 7.4.3 was accepted and modified
to delete the entire paragraph as the intent of the language was unclear . A
reference was added to Annex D for the FSSA guide under A.7.1.4.4.7.
Ballot Not Returned: 2 Kassawara, R., Najafi, B.
_______________________________________________________________
(Chapter 7)
_______________________________________________________________
Submitter: William B. Till, Jr., Savannah River Nuclear Solutions, LLC
Chapter 7 Special Hazards in Nuclear Facilities
7.1* General.
7.1.1 Flammable and combustible liquids shall be stored and handled in
7.1.2 Flammable and combustible gases shall be stored and handled in
accordance with NFPA 54, National Fuel Gas Code; NFPA 55, Standard for
the Storage, Use, and Handling of Compressed Gases and Cryogenic Fluids in
Portable and Stationary Containers, Cylinders, and Tanks; and NFPA 58,
Liquefied Petroleum Gas Code.
7.1.3 Solid and liquid oxidizing agents shall be stored and handled in
Oxidizers.
7.1.4 Combustible metals shall be stored and handled in accordance with NFPA
484, Standard for Combustible Metals.
7.1.5 Fire protection for laboratories involved with radioactive materials shall
be in accordance with NFPA 45, Standard on Fire Protection for Laboratories
Using Chemicals.
7.1.6 Ovens, furnaces, and incinerators involved with radioactive materials
shall be in accordance with the requirements of NFPA 82, Standard on
Incinerators and Waste and Linen Handling Systems and Equipment, and
NFPA 86, Standard for Ovens and Furnaces.
7.1.7 Combustion and safety controls and interlocks shall be tested after
maintenance activities, and at other intervals in accordance with the equipment
manufacturers recommendations.
Section 7.1.4.4.8 (renumbered) is revised to base the design of restrictions
between gloveboxes on the fire hazards analysis. Gloveboxes come in all sizes
and connection restrictions are not always necessary relative to the hazards
present. There is usually an air lock with 2 doors between the glovebox and
any other connected hoods, so proper operation of the air lock would prevent
direct passage of flames.
Section 7.1.4.5 is a new proposed section on hoods. Hoods in the context of
radioactive material handling and use are significantly dif ferent than hot cells,
gloveboxes, and caves. Hoods provide no shielding or significant confinement
capability for work with radioactive materials and the hazards associated with
radioactive materials in hoods are generally dominated by the hazards of the
chemicals. Hoods are designed and tested to remove vapors and not to confine
radioactive materials. On this basis, NFPA 45, which has extensive requirement
for hoods, should be the governing standard. Where additional protection is
necessary, the fire hazards analysis required elsewhere in this standard will
govern the determination. The placement of detection and/or fire suppression in
most fume hoods has not been established as being necessary unless operations
with open containers of flammable liquids are performed. Due to the nature of
the operations that are typically performed in fume hoods, there are no specific
types of fire detection or fire suppression that would provide reliable detection
and /or suppression for all types of hazardous materials that are typically used
in fume hoods. NFPA 45 8.10 does not require automatic fire suppression
for fume hoods unless there is a hazard present that warrants automatic fire
suppression.
Section 7.4.1 and A.7.4.1 are revised to identify NFPA 45 as the governing
standard for fire protection in laboratories using chemicals in the presence of
radioactive materials as opposed to the requirements in Sections 7.1.1 and 7.1.3
unless NFPA 45 is not sufficient in its requirements or additional protection is
specified by a fire hazards analysis. Protection against the chemical hazards
in laboratory-scale work activities will generally provide the necessary
protection against loss of control or confinement of radioactive materials. The
requirements for hot cells, gloveboxes and hoods are followed unless otherwise
justified.
Committee Meeting Action: Accept in Principle in Part
Revise only the specifically-identified (making no changes to those paragraphs
not shown here) submitted text, add new definition Section 3.3.X, and the
reference to Annex D to read as follows:
3.3.X Fume Hood. A ventilated enclosure designed to contain and exhaust
fumes, gases, vapors, mists, and particulate matter generated within the hood
interior. [45; 2011]
7.1.1.5 The analyzer specified by Section 7.1.1.3 or Section 7.1.1.4 shall be set
to alarm at a concentration no higher than 25 percent of the lower flammable
explosive limit.
7.1.1.8.2* Approved oOperating controls and limits appropriate for the hazard
shall be established.
A.7.1.1.8.2 This requirement is not intended to allow quantities of materials
that exceed requirements in other applicable codes and standards.
A.7.1.4.2 The preferred selected method of automatic suppression should
be compatible with the fire hazards and consider interaction between the
suppression agent and materials that are present (e.g., reactive metals). The
selection of a fire suppression system should address the potential for the
spread of radioactive materials due to pressurization of the enclosure or by
the flooding of the enclosure with liquid fire suppression methods such as
water. Accessibility for inspection, maintenance, and testing in radiation or
contamination environments should also be considered in the design. Selected
systems should be is an automatic sprinkler system, although other methods
of suppression can also be permitted when installed in accordance with the
applicable NFPA standard. Refer to Section 5.10 for drainage provisions.
7.1.4.4.87* If fixed extinguishing systems are utilized, the internal
pressurization shall be calculated in order to prevent gloves from failing or
being blown off effects of system discharge on glovebox integrity shall be
considered in evaluating the design of the system.
A.7.1.4.4.7 Some system discharge variables to be considered are enclosure
pressures during a non-fire discharge, potential fire size, heat output created
by the fire event, the latent heat of the suppression agent, potential impact to
the ventilation system, evaporation rate of the suppression agent and expansion
ratio of the agent. Additional information can be found in the Guide to
Estimating Enclosure Pressure and Pressure Relief Vent Area for Applications
Using Clean Agent Fire Extinguishing Systems by the Fire Suppression
Systems Association.
7.1.5 Fume Hoods.
7.1.5.1* Fume hoods containing radioactive materials shall meet the
requirements of NFPA 45, Standard on Fire Protection for Laboratories Using
Chemicals.
7.1.5.1.1 Lining materials shall be compatible with the chemical environment
and capable of decontamination.
A.7.1.5.1 Fume hoods provide minimal capability to confine radioactive
materials. The fire hazard is generally associated with the chemicals in-use and
NFPA 45 provides the necessary requirements for design and fire protection of
fume hoods.
7.1.5.2 Combustible materials shall not be stored in fume hoods and should be
the minimum necessary to support the work activity.
7.1.5.3 Radioactive contaminated combustible waste shall not be stored or
allowed to accumulate in fume hoods.
Attachment 13-8-7-a
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7.4.4.9* A means shall be provided to restrict the passage of flame between
glove boxes and hoods that are connected.
7.4.5 Research and Production Reactors.
7.4.5.1 Reactivity control shall be capable of inserting negative reactivity to
7.4.5.2 Inventory and pressure control shall be capable of controlling coolant
7.4.5.3 Decay heat removal shall be capable of removing heat from the reactor
7.4.5.4 Vital auxiliaries shall be capable of performing the necessary functions
7.4.5.5 Process monitoring shall be capable of providing the necessary
indication in the event of a fire.
Replace with the following
Chapter 7 Facilities, Processes, and Special Hazards
7.1* General.
7.1.1 Flammable and Combustible Liquids and Gases
accordance with NFPA 54, National Fuel Gas Code; NFPA 55, Standard for
the Storage, Use, and Handling of Compressed Gases and Cryogenic Fluids in
Portable and Stationary Containers, Cylinders, and Tanks; and NFPA 58,
Liquefied Petroleum Gas Code
7.1.1.3 In enclosed spaces in which combustible gas could accumulate outside
of the storage vessels, piping, and utilization equipment, combustible-gas
analyzers that are designed for the specific gas shall be installed.
7.1.1.4 Flammable and combustible liquids in enclosed spaces in which vapors
have the potential to accumulate outside of the storage vessels, piping, and
utilization equipment shall be installed with combustible-vapor analyzers
appropriate for the vapors generated.
7.1.1.5 The analyzer specified by 7.1.1.3 or 7.1.1.4 shall be set to alarm at a
concentration no higher than 25 percent of the lower explosive limit.
7.1.1.8 Solvents.
7.1.1.8.2 Approved operating controls and limits shall be established.
absence justified to the satisfaction of the AHJ.
combustible liquids shall be isolated from areas of use by 3-hour fire barriers.
7.1.2.1 Furnaces or Ovens used in facilities handling radioactive materials shall
comply with the applicable requirements of NFPA 86 Standard for Ovens and
Furnaces, 86C Standard for Industrial Furnaces using a Special Processing
Atmosphere or 86DStandard for Industrial Furnaces using Vacuum as an
Atmosphere as appropriate.
7.1.3.2* Operating controls and limits for the handling of pyrophoric
materials shall be established to the satisfaction of the AHJ.
7.1.3.3 A supply of an appropriate extinguishing medium shall be available
in all areas where fines and cuttings of pyrophoric materials are present.
7.1.3.4 Solid and liquid oxidizing agents shall be stored and handled in
Oxidizers.
7.1.3.5.2 * For locations where fissile materials might be present and could
create a potential criticality hazard, combustible materials shall be excluded.
7.1.4 Hot Cells, Caves, Glove Boxes, and Hoods.
7.1.4.1 All hot cells, caves, glove boxes, and hoods shall be provided with fire
detection in accordance with NFPA 72.
7.1.4.2* Fire suppression shall be provided in all hot cells, caves, glove
boxes, and hoods
7.1.4.3.1 Hot cells and caves shall be of noncombustible construction.
7.1.4.3.2 Where hydraulic fluids are used in master slave manipulators, fire-
7.1.8* Accident Involving Fissionable Materials. Fissile materials shall be
used, handled, and stored with provisions to prevent the accidental assembly of
fissile material into critical masses.
7.2* Hospitals.
their containers.
Facilities.
7.3.1 General. Special hazards related to fire problems shall be controlled by
at least one of the following:
(1) Location
(3) Fixed protection systems
(4) Inerting
7.3.2* Flammable and Combustible Liquids and Gases.
7.3.2.1 In enclosed spaces in which combustible gas could accumulate outside
7.3.2.1.1 The analyzer shall be set to alarm at a concentration no higher than 25
percent of the lower explosive limit.
7.3.2.2 Flammable and combustible liquids in enclosed spaces in which vapors
have the potential to accumulate outside of the storage vessels, piping, and
utilization equipment shall be installed with combustible-vapor analyzers
7.3.2.2.1 The analyzer shall be set to alarm at a concentration no higher than 25
percent of the lower explosive limit.
7.3.2.5 Solvents.
7.3.3 Pyrophoric Materials.
7.3.3.1* Operating controls and limits for the handling of pyrophoric materials
shall be established to the satisfaction of the AHJ.
7.3.3.2 A supply of an extinguishing medium shall be available in all areas
where fines and cuttings of pyrophoric materials are present. (See Section 7.1.)
7.4 Hot Cells, Caves, Glove Boxes, and Hoods.
7.4.1 All hot cells, caves, glove boxes, and hoods shall be provided with a
means of fire detection if used in the handling of pyrophoric materials,
oxidizers, or organic liquids.
7.4.2* Fire suppression shall be provided in all hot cells, caves, glove boxes,
and hoods that contain combustible metals or or ganic liquids in quantities that
have the potential to cause a breach of the hot cells, glove boxes, hoods, or
caves.
7.4.3 Hot Cells and Caves.
7.4.3.1 Hot cells and caves shall be of noncombustible construction.
7.4.3.2 Where hydraulic fluids are used in master slave manipulators, fire-
7.4.3.3 Combustible concentrations inside the cells and caves shall be kept to a
minimum.
7.4.3.4 Where combustibles are present, a fixed extinguishing system shall be
installed in the cell or cave.
7.4.3.5 If explosive concentrations of gases or vapors are present, an inert
7.4.4* Glove Boxes and Hoods.
7.4.4.1 The glove box, windows, and hoods shall be of noncombustible
construction.
7.4.4.2 The number of gloves shall be limited to the minimum necessary to
7.4.4.3 When the gloves are not being used, they shall be tied outside the box.
7.4.4.4 When the gloves are no longer needed for operations, they shall be
removed and glove port covers installed.
7.4.4.5 Doors shall remain closed when not in use.
7.4.4.6 The concentration of combustibles shall be limited to the quantity
7.4.4.7 Where combustibles are present, a fire suppression system or fixed
inerting system shall be provided.
7.4.4.8 If fixed extinguishing systems are utilized, the internal pressurization
shall be calculated in order to prevent gloves from failing or being blown of f.
Attachment 13-8-7-a
7 of 24
7.1.4 is the section on hot cells, caves, gloveboxes and Hoods and is similar
to the original 7.4.
7.1.4.1 is revised to better clarify the intent of the original 7.4.1. The
technical justification is as follows: The previous wording allowed fire
detection schemes which may not be ef fective and provides no specific criteria
to enable the user to discern the true intent. Examples include thermal wells for
heat detectors with no regard to changes in RTI, use of air sampling systems
intended for radiological or contamination control purposes which do not alert
the appropriate emergency responders not initiate the correct response of the
collocated workers. Detection should be provided for early notification of fires
involving all materials, not just specific ones.
Section 7.1.4.2 is revised as originally conflicted with the original section
7.4.3.4 and 7.4.4.7 which states that suppression was only required for those
applications involving combustible metals or organic liquids. The original text
is deleted under this proposal to coincide with a separate proposal for section
7.4.2. The new language for 7.1.4.4.7 is provided to address another issue
and the annex material for 7.4.4.7 is proposed as both the justification for the
proposal and to aid the user in determining the intent of the requirement. The
technical justification is as follows: Gloveboxes are most vulnerable, typically,
at the gloveports and therefore require very little in the way of combustibles to
reach the point where the gloves would be the breach point. Defining quantities
of combustibles which are sufficient to cause failure is the opposite of the most
appropriate method for a fire protection standard the suppression system
should be required unless it can be conclusively demonstrated, to the AHJ, that
it is not required. Additionally, it does not protect against temporary additions
of materials which invalidate the earlier assessment.
7.1.4.4.3 is the original 7.4.4.3 rewritten to better protect the integrity of the
gloves. Tying the gloves outside the box results in glove fatigue. Common
industrial practices including Velcro straps, or similar appurtenances to
ensure the gloves remain outside of the box. It is important that the gloves
be positioned outside of the glovebox because they are, for gloveboxes
constructed of noncombustible materials as directed by this standard, the most
easily ignitable component and if they burn inside, fixed fire suppression
systems will be less likely to be ef fective. If they are positioned outside the
plane of the glovebox face, the suppression system can be more ef fective and
combustibles inside the glovebox will be more dif ficult to ignite.
Section 7.1.5 is replaced with a new section, 7.4 applicable to laboratories
with the following justification:
NFPA 45, 2011 specifically excludes hazards associated with radioactive
materials: 1.1.2 This standard shall not apply to the following: (7)*Hazards
associated with radioactive materials, as covered by NFPA 801, Standard for
Fire Protection for Facilities Handling
Radioactive Materials. Laboratories working with nuclear materials have
unique concerns and should be addressed under this document since NFPA 45
does not apply. However, the typical fire protection concerns associated with
laboratories shall apply so NFPA 45 should be applicable just expanded to
address the radioactive materials. This relocates the statement to a new section
7.4.6, and adds new requirements for laboratories.
Replace chapter 7 in its entirety and revise text to read as follows:
Chapter 7 Facilities, Processes, and Special Hazards
7.1* General.
7.1.1 Flammable and Combustible Liquids and Gases
accordance with NFPA 54, National Fuel Gas Code; NFPA 55, Compressed
Gases and Cryogenic Fluids Code; and NFPA 58, Liquefied Petroleum Gas
Code
7.1.1.3* In enclosed spaces in which combustible gas could accumulate outside
A.7.1.1.3 Enclosed spaces refers to any enclosure within a building, including
gloveboxes, hot cells, caves, plenums, etc.
7.1.1.4* Flammable and combustible liquids in enclosed spaces in which
vapors have the potential to accumulate outside of the storage vessels, piping,
and utilization equipment shall be installed with combustible-vapor analyzers
A.7.1.1.4 See the explanation for enclosed spaces under A.7.1.1.3.
7.1.1.5 The analyzer specified by 7.1.1.3 or 7.1.1.4 shall be set to alarm at a
concentration no higher than 25 percent of the lower explosive limit.
7.1.1.8 Solvents.
minimum.
7.1.4.4.1 The glove box, windows, and hoods shall be of noncombustible
construction.
7.1.4.4.2 The number of gloves shall be limited to the minimum necessary to
7.1.4.4.3 When the gloves are not being used, they shall be withdrawn and
secured outside the box.
7.1.4.4.4 When the gloves are no longer needed for operations, they shall be
7.1.4.4.7* Fixed inerting systems shall not be utilized in lieu of fire suppression
system
7.1.4.4.9* A means shall be provided to restrict the passage of flame between
7.2* Hospitals.
their containers.
Facilities.
7.3.1 General. Special hazards related to fire problems shall be controlled by
at least one of the following:
(1) Location
(3) Fixed protection systems
(4) Inerting
7.4 Laboratories
7.4.2 Laboratories which handle pyrophoric materials shall comply with 7.4.7
and hoods unless the FHA concludes that the amount of radioactive material is
inconsequential.
Substantiation: Chapter 7 is re-written here to correct section misalignments
and to group the applicable portions into the correct applications. For example,
in the current edition of the document, Flammable and Combustible Liquids
and Gases are addressed in 7.3.2 which is a subset of 7.3 Uranium Enrichment,
Fuel Fabrication and Fuel Reprocessing facilities. The requirements provided
in 7.3.2 and others should be more broadly applicable,
Title changed to better reflect the purpose of the chapter . For example, a
hospital is not a special hazard in a nuclear facility but rather a type of facility
with potential radioactive material considerations
Section 7.1 is rewritten to provide general fire protection guidance for
radiological facilities and is intended to be applied to all of the subsequent
sections.
The new section 7.1.1 takes the old section 7.3.2 which previously only
applied to Uranium Enrichment, Fuel Fabrication, and Fuel Reprocessing
Facilities, and consolidates it into a section applicable to all applications.
It also incorporates other sections such as the old 7.1.1 and 7.1.2 such that
requirements are collocated within the same section as the first two paragraphs
and 7.1.1.5 consolidates the original requirements from 2 sections, (7.3.2.1.1
and 7.3.2.2.1) into a single requirement applicable to both flammable gases and
liquids.
The new section 7.1.2 builds on the original requirements found in 7.1.6 of
the 2008 edition but separates the equipment and references the appropriate
standards.
New section 7.1.3 combines the original 7.1.3 and 7.1.4 into one section
such that all requirements for pyrophoric and oxidizing materials are located
together. 7.1.3.2 and 7.1.3.3 are relocated from 7.3.3 which was originally only
applicable to Uranium Enrichment, Fuel Fabrication and Fuel Reprocessing
facilities. New 7.1.3.5 is placed in new special material section and subsequent
sections relocate similar requirements from Chapter 6 (6.1.4 and 6.1.6)
Attachment 13-8-7-a
8 of 24
(a) Scaffolding, formworks, decking, temporary enclosures, temporary
containment structures, and partitions used inside buildings shall be
noncombustible or fire retardant treated.
(b) If wood is used, it shall be one of the following:
i. Listed, pressure-impregnated, fire-retardant lumber
ii. Treated with a listed fire-retardant coating
iii. Timbers 15.2 cm 15.2 cm (6 in. 6 in.) or lar ger
(c) Tarpaulins (fabrics) and plastic films shall be certified to conform to the
weather-resistant and flame-resistant materials described in NFPA701, Standard
Methods of Fire Tests for Flame Propagation of Textiles and Films.
A.7.1.5 A.4.3(9) The use of noncombustible or fire-retardant concrete
formwork is especially important for large structures (e.g., reactor buildings
and turbine generator pedestals) where large quantities of forms are used.
Pressure-impregnated fire-retardant lumber should be used in accordance with
its listing and the manufacturer s instructions. Where exposed to the weather
or moisture (e.g., concrete forms), the fire retardant used should be suitable for
this exposure. Fire-retardant coatings are not acceptable on walking surfaces or
surfaces subject to mechanical damage.
Use of fire-retardant paint requires special care. Inconsistent application and
exposure to weather can reduce the ef fectiveness of fire-retardant coatings.
Large timbers are occasionally used to support lar ge pieces of equipment
during
storage or maintenance. The size of these timbers makes them dif ficult to
ignite, and they do not represent an immediate fire threat.
7.2* Hospitals.
their containers.
Facilities.
7.3.1 General. Special hazards related to protection from fire shall be
controlled by a defense in depth strategy that utilizes a combination of the
following:
(1) Location and separation
(3) Fixed detection and suppression systems
(4) Inerting
7.4 Laboratories
7.4.2 Laboratories which handle pyrophoric materials shall comply with 7.1.3.
and hoods unless the FHA concludes that the amount of radioactive material is
inconsequential.
7.6 Facilities Handling Waste (Reserved)
7.7 Accelerators (Reserved)
7.8 Process Facilities (Reserved)
7.9 Irradiation Facilities (Reserved)
Committee Statement: The committee agreed with the suggested changes, but
made editorial corrections and some technical revisions. Separation was added
to 7.3.1(1) to clarify the intended use of location as a means of separating
special hazards. The cross reference in 7.4.2 that pointed to 7.4.7 was corrected
to refer to 7.1.3. Annex notes were added to 7.1.1.3 and 7.1.1.4 to clarify
enclosed spaces. An annex note was added to 7.1.4.4.2 to express the reason
why the number of gloves in a glovebox are required to be at the minimum
necessary for operations. An annex note was added to 7.1.4.4.3 to explain the
reason for withdrawing and securing gloves from a glovebox when not in use.
A reference was added to A.7.1.4.2 for drainage requirements. An annex note
was added to 7.1.4.1 to indicate that sprinklers can be used as a possible means
of fire detection. An annex note was added to 7.1.4.4.7 to indicate the use of
fixed suppression to provide a mitigation function that is in addition to fixed
inerting systems. Scaffolding requirements were removed from 4.3(9) to be
addressed as part of the special hazards provisions, rather than be included as a
broad-sweeping general requirement.
The committee recognized that there are facilities that handle radioactive
materials that are not addressed by the standard and added reserved sections for
possible inclusion. Interested parties are encouraged to submit comments that
add appropriate requirements for those particular facility sections in Chapter 7
(See 7.6 through 7.9 of 801-47 (Log #38).
7.1.2.1 Furnaces or Ovens used in facilities handling radioactive materials
shall comply with the applicable requirements of NFPA 86, Standard for Ovens
and Furnaces, NFPA 86C Standard for Industrial Furnaces using a Special
Processing Atmosphere, or NFPA 86DStandard for Industrial Furnaces using
Vacuum as an Atmosphere as appropriate.
7.1.3.2* Operating controls and limits for the handling of pyrophoric
materials shall be established to the satisfaction of the AHJ.
7.1.3.3 A supply of an appropriate extinguishing medium shall be available
in all areas where fines and cuttings of pyrophoric materials are present.
7.1.3.4 Solid and liquid oxidizing agents shall be stored and handled
in accordance with NFPA 430, Code for the Storage of Liquid and Solid
Oxidizers.
create a potential criticality hazard, combustible materials shall be excluded.
7.1.4 Hot Cells, Caves, Glove Boxes, and Hoods.
7.1.4.1* All hot cells, caves, glove boxes, and hoods shall be provided with fire
detection in accordance with NFPA 72.
A.7.1.4.1 Sprinkler water flow indication can serve as a possible means of fire
detection.
7.1.4.2* Fire suppression shall be provided in all hot cells, caves, glove
boxes, and hoods
A.7.1.4.2 The preferred method of suppression is an automatic sprinkler
system, although other methods of suppression can also be permitted when
installed in accordance with the applicable NFPA standard. Refer to Section
5.10 for drainage provisions.
7.1.4.3.1 Hot cells and caves shall be of noncombustible construction.
7.1.4.3.2 Where hydraulic fluids are used in master slave manipulators, fire-
minimum.
7.1.4.4.1 The glove box, windows, and hoods shall be of noncombustible
construction.
7.1.4.4.2* The number of gloves shall be limited to the minimum necessary to
A.7.1.4.4.2 Gloves are typically the most easily ignitable component of
gloveboxes and, therefore, should be minimized. When gloves fail, potential
loss of confinement can result.
7.1.4.4.3* When the gloves are not being used, they shall be withdrawn and
secured outside the box.
A.7.1.4.4.3 Securing of the gloves outside the box positions them such that
fixed fire suppression in the room can be more ef fective and that they do not
contribute to the fuel loading in the glovebox or provide a source of ignition to
other fuels in the glovebox. Positioning them outside also reduces potential for
gloves contributing to fires inside the glovebox.
7.1.4.4.4 When the gloves are no longer needed for operations, they shall be
7.1.4.4.7* Fixed inerting systems shall not be utilized in lieu of fire suppression
system
A.7.1.4.4.7 Fire suppression should be considered in addition to fixed
inerting systems to address potential concerns during glovebox maintenance or
failure of inerting systems.
7.1.4.4.9* A means shall be provided to restrict the passage of flame between
4.3(9) 7.1.5* Construction, Demolition, and Renovation. Construction,
demolition, and renovating activities that conform to the requirements of NFPA
241, Standard for Safeguarding Construction, Alteration, and Demolition
Operations, such as the following:
Attachment 13-8-7-a
9 of 24
assembly of a critical mass. In many cases, the areas are designed to be
critically safe even when completely submerged in water. Emergency planning
should include the effects of fire-fighting water on critically safe areas,
assuming disruption of the contents by the accident or by fire hoses. If manual
fire fighting poses a potential hazard under the worst conditions, then it is
essential that any required fire-extinguishing capability be self-contained and
automatic in operation.
Experience to date has shown that such reactions have been self-limiting but
do result in minor distribution of radioactive products over the immediate area
accompanied by a brief, very intense burst of nuclear radiation that could be
lethal.
create a potential criticality hazard, combustible materials shall be minimized
and controlled excluded.
Committee Statement: The committee moved the annex A.7.1.8 (2008)
from Section 7.1.3.5.2 to A.7.1.3.5, as it was moved in the ROP, as the more
appropriate associated paragraph. Section 7.1.3.5.2 was not deleted, but was
revised to remove some ambiguity and allow for some amount of combustibles
in use with fissile material.
________________________________________________________________
(7.1.4.2)
________________________________________________________________
Submitter: Wayne Holmes, Burlington, NC
7.1.4.2* Fire suppression shall be provided in all hot cells, caves, glove boxes,
and hoods as determined by the FHA.
Substantiation: Not all enclosure need fire suppression. In some cases, it may
be necessary to prohibit fire suppression in some enclosures. The need for
detection depends on the degree of hazard. Fire suppression should be provided
for enclosures based on the hazard as determined by the FHA.
Reject the submitted change and revise A.7.1.4.2 as follows:
Small hot cells, caves, gloveboxes, and hoods containing limited amounts
of combustibles, minimal potential for ignition, and limited quantities of
radioactive materials, can be analyzed to demonstrate an equivalent level of
safety.
Committee Statement: The committee did not agree with deferring to the
FHA as the default position. The committee recognizes that there may be
situations where fire suppression is not necessary and cites some considerations
in the annex. Relief from this requirement can be obtained through AHJ under
the equivalency rule of 1.5 (2008).
________________________________________________________________
(7.1.4.2)
________________________________________________________________
Submitter: Neal T. Hara, Idaho National Laboratory
Recommendation: Comment to Accept in Principle and revise proposed new
Section 7.1.4.2 as follows:
7.1.4.2* Fire suppression shall be provided in all hot cells, caves, glove boxes,
and hoods as determined by the fire hazard analysis
Substantiation: Per the accepted ROP 801-52, a Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA)
will be required to analyze hazards associated with all hot cells, caves, glove
boxes, and hoods. The FHA determines what type of suppression is necessary
for these enclosures. This same analysis should also be allowed to determine if
internal suppression is necessary.
The requirement for providing fire suppression for the inside of an enclosures
listed in the proposed Section 7.1.4.2 is overly conservative. Application of
the rigid requirement has and will continue to result in substantial costs for
systems that may only provide a negligible increase in protection, especially
for those small systems with minimal amounts of radioactive materials or other
fire hazards.
The committees stance concerning the intention that all glove boxes, caves,
hot cells, and hoods require fire suppression systems is highly prescriptive and
requires application of the requirements without an allowance to evaluate the
risk to personnel and facilities from fire and/or release of radioactive materials.
The following two existing sections indicate that it is the intent of the standard
is to base the protection on risk and not a prescriptive requirement:
4.2.3 The evaluation shall consider acceptable means for separation or control
of hazards, the control or elimination of ignition sources, and the suppression
of fires.
Ballot Not Returned: 2 Holmes, W., Najafi, B.
HUBERT, D.: The submitted language for Section 7.1.4.4.8 is not a
completed direction. Just by performing a internal pressurization calculation
will not prevent gloves from falling or being blown of f. Some type of Action
must be implemented.
STREIT, J.: While I agree that Chapter 7 requires reor ganization and
re-numbering to correct and clarify applicability to the types of facilities, I
disagree with the following proposed changes:
[1] I disagree with the assertion contained in new A.7.1.1.3 and A7.1.1.4 that
flammable/combustible gas/vapor analyzers or detectors are to be installed
in glove boxes, caves, hot cells, etc. This was not the historical intent of the
Standard to require this level of protection; these enclosures are typically
subject to additional protective measures (like inerting) in response to these
types of hazards.
[2] 7.1.2.1 -- furnaces and ovens have been consolidated into one Code, NFP A
86.
[3] 7.1.3.5.1 -- delete or revise this section to account for proper intent. In
some production and research reactors, the nuclear material is intended to
be moderated/reflected by water. In some situations, water must be excluded
as part of the criticality safety program due to process requirements or
experimental protocols. If the intent of this section is to assure that criticality
safety and fire protection programs integrate for complementary safety benefit,
then this section or an Annex should state this expectation.
[4] 7.1.3.5.2 -- although this section is unchanged from previous editions,
it should be revised to minimize combustibles to the extent practical and
sufficient for current operations or something similar. Complete exclusion of
combustibles is not always achievable.
[5] 7.1.4.1 -- there must be a fire hazard present to warrant a fire detection
system. As written, the criteria/conditions for when a detection system must be
provided has been dropped from the long-standing requirement language. As
written, detection is required regardless as a universal requirement. An FHA
should establish the need based on hazards present.
[6] 7.1.4.2 -- there must be a fire hazard present and of suf ficient size to
cause a loss of confinement and/or unacceptable damage to the confinement
system, or pose a large loss potential, to warrant a fire suppression or inerting
system. As written, the criteria/conditions for when a suppression (or inerting)
system must be provided has been dropped from the long-standing requirement
language. As written, detection is required regardless as a universal
requirement without consideration of the hazards or risks. An FHA should
establish the need based on hazards present. Inerting can be ef fective for this -
see comments on 7.1.4.4.7.
[7] 7.1.4.4.7 -- disagree with the change that precludes the use of inerting
systems as an option for fire protection within glove boxes, hot cells, caves,
hoods etc. A fixed inerting system, which may be present due to pyrophoric or
reactivity hazards, flammability/explosive atmospheres, or needed for material
or process quality assurance reasons, can be provided with high reliability
(NFPA 801 can describe the performance expectations for this, including
inerting gas spare capacity/rate/duration, local and remote monitoring,
local and remote signaling, etc) to provide an ef fective fire prevention and
extinguishing system. This is a dramatic change from the previous expectations
of the Standard.
[8] A.7.1.4.4.9 -- suggest adding doors to the list of possible features that
could provide this function.
[9] 7.1.5 -- revise ...activities shall {delete that} conform... to make a
complete sentence.
Related Comments 801-22, 801-24, 801-25, 801-
27, 802-29, and 801-32
________________________________________________________________
(7.1.3.5.2)
________________________________________________________________
Submitter: Wayne Holmes, Burlington, NC
Recommendation: Delete Section 7.1.3.5.2 in its entirety.
Substantiation: The requirement expressed in Section 7.1.3.5.2 is an absolute.
All combustible materials must be excluded where fissile material might be
present. This is not necessary, is difficult to achieve, and, in many cases might
be impossible. The intent of this paragraph is adequately covered by other
requirements in NFPA 801 and will be addressed in any FHA that evaluates
requirements for protection of combustible materials.
Revise the and 7.1.3.5, A.7.1.3.5, 7.1.3.5.2 as follows:
7.1.3.5* Fissile materials shall be used, handled, and stored with provisions to
A.7.1.8 A.7.1.3.5 Since water is a reflector and moderator of neutrons, it is
theoretically possible that an arrangement of subcritical fissionable material
could be made critical by the introduction of water . Storage containers,
shelving, and storerooms are required to be designed to prevent the accidental
Attachment 13-8-7-a
10 of 24
________________________________________________________________
(7.4.4.8)
________________________________________________________________
Submitter: Technical Committee on Fire Protection for Nuclear Facilities,
Recommendation: Revise 7.1.4.4.7 and create new 7.1.4.4.7.1 as follows:
7.1.4.4.87* If fixed extinguishing systems are utilized, the internal
pressurization shall be calculated in order to prevent gloves from failing or
being blown off effects of system discharge on glovebox integrity shall be
considered in evaluating the design of the system.
7.1.4.4.7.1 The activation of the system shall not create a positive or negative
enclosure pressure that will compromise enclosure containment integrity; this
includes but is not limited to, failure to the enclosure structure, the gloves or
glove attachment points, ventilation system or enclosure pressurization system.
Substantiation: The committee chose the additional wording to further address
the enclosure integrity in relation to the fire suppression system activation. The
change to 7.1.4.4.7 coordinates the action taken under Log #36.
Backup Proposals 801-66, 801-2, 801-3
_______________________________________________________________
(7.4.4.9 and 7.4.4.9.1 (New) )
_______________________________________________________________
Submitter: Neal T. Hara, Idaho National Laboratory
Recommendation: Insert new steps 7.4.4.9 and 7.4.4.9.1. Renumber existing
7.4.4.9 and associated Annex to 7.4.4.10:
7.4.4.9 If explosive concentrations of gases or vapors are present in a glove
box, an inert atmosphere shall be provided.
7.4.4.9.1 Alternate fire protection measures may be used if documented in a
fire hazards analysis and approved by the AHJ.
Substantiation: There have been past events where explosions or deflagrations
have occurred within glove boxes, resulting in potential hazards to personnel. A
similar step, for explosive atmospheres, currently exists for hot cells and caves
(step 7.4.3.5) and should also be applied to glove boxes. Also, this allowance
for the fire hazard analysis to dictate protection is also consistent with many
other requirements described in NFPA 801.
Further revise 7.1.4.3.4 from 801-47 (Log #38) to read as follows:
7.1.4.3.4 During normal or abnormal operating conditions, if there is potential
for combustible gases or vapors to be present in excess of 25 percent of the
lower flammability limit, then an inerting atmosphere shall be provided.
7.1.4.3.4.1 During normal or abnormal operating conditions involving hot
cells, hoods, or caves, if there is potential for combustible gases or vapors to be
present in excess of 25 percent of the lower flammability limit, then ventilation
shall be permitted as an alternative method to 7.1.4.3.
Committee Statement: The committee agrees with the proponent and has
accepted the notions being suggested by the action taken on 801-47 (Log #38)
and further modified paragraph 7.1.4.3.4 to incorporate the suggestions being
presented here. 7.1.4.3.4, as revised here, will be inserted in 7.1.4.3 of 801-47
(Log #38) and subsequent paragraphs will be renumbered. 7.1.4.3.4 of 801-47
(Log #38) will be deleted.
_______________________________________________________________
(Entire Document )
_______________________________________________________________
Recommendation: Revise throughout the standard:
Pre-Fire Plan Pre-Incident Fire Plan.
Substantiation: The committee revised the term to be consistent with NFPA
1620, Standard for Pre-Incident Planning.
6.7.1* Fire suppression systems and equipment shall be provided in all areas of
a facility as determined by the fire hazards analysis.
The following newly proposed and accepted section 6.1.1 also indicates that a
graded approach commensurate with the hazard is appropriate (ROP 801-40):
6.1.1 A fire hazards analysis shall be performed to determine the fire protection
requirements for the facility, using a graded approach based on the hazard
presented by the facility.
The substantiation supporting this section goes on to state that a one-size-fits-
all approach is not the best approach for facilities that span a wide spectrum of
risk. This same approach should be used for hot cells, caves, glove boxes and
hoods.
The committee stance is also not consistent with many other portions of the
standard that base the level of protection on the risk as analyzed by the FHA.
Other examples within the current version of NFPA 801, where fire protection
features are determined by the fire hazard analysis, include but are not limited
to the following sections 5.4, 5.7.2, 5.9.2.1, 5.9.3.3, 5.9.4.2, 5.9.4.3, 5.9.5.5,
5.9.5.9, 5.9.5.12, 6.1.1, 6.1.2, 6.1.3, 6.2.2, 6.4.1, 6.4.2, 6.5.1, and 6.8.2.
Reject the submitted change and revise A.7.1.4.2 as follows:
Small hot cells, caves, gloveboxes, and hoods containing limited amounts
of combustibles, minimal potential for ignition, and limited quantities of
radioactive materials, can be analyzed to demonstrate an equivalent level of
safety.
Committee Statement: The committee did not agree with deferring to the
FHA as the default position. The committee recognizes that there may be
situations where fire suppression is not necessary and cites some considerations
in the annex. Relief from this requirement can be obtained through AHJ under
the equivalency rule of 1.5 (2008).
________________________________________________________________
(7.1.4.3.4.1)
________________________________________________________________
Recommendation: Revise 7.1.4.3.4.1 of ROP 801-66 as follows:
7.1.4.3.4 During normal or abnormal operating conditions, if there is potential
for combustible gases or vapors to be present in excess of 25 percent of the
lower flammability limit, then an inerting atmosphere shall be provided.
7.1.4.3.4.1 During normal or abnormal operating conditions involving hot
cells, hoods, or caves, if there is potential for combustible gases or vapors to be
present in excess of 25 percent of the lower flammability limit, then ventilation
shall be permitted as an alternative method to 7.1.4.3 7.1.4.3.4.
Substantiation: This editorially corrects the cross reference as it appears in
ROP 801-66.
________________________________________________________________
(7.1.4.4.1)
________________________________________________________________
Recommendation: Revise 7.1.4.4.1 and add a new annex note as follows:
7.1.4.4.1* The glove box, windows, and hoods shall be of noncombustible
construction.
A.7.1.4.4.1 The potential number of considerations for glovebox construction
based on the process, the materials, and associated hazards are vast and
complex, involving both internal and external hazards, fire scenarios, and
associated protection measures. Because of this, detailed analysis would
be required to use alternative material. The user should refer to the NFPA
Research Foundation document, Glovebox Fire Protection: A Literature
Review in regards to the detailed analysis. The link for the report can be
found here:
http://www.nfpa.org/assets/files//PDF/Research/RFLiteratureReview.pdf
Substantiation: The committee added clarifying annex material that addresses
the nature and historical perspective with regards to the nature of combustible
and noncombustible materials.
Attachment 13-8-7-a
11 of 24
_______________________________________________________________
(Chapter 1)
_______________________________________________________________
Submitter: Ivan Bolliger, Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission
1.1.1*
A.1.1.1
Annex A Explanatory Material A.1.1.1 The objectives of this standard are
to reduce personal hazards, provide protection from property damage, and
minimize process interruption resulting from fire
ADD
1.3 Goals.
1.3.1 Nuclear Safety Goal. The nuclear safety goal shall be to provide
reasonable assurance that a fire during any operational mode and plant
configuration will not prevent the plant from achieving and maintaining the
fissionable material in a safe and stable condition.
1.3.2 Radioactive and Hazardous Material Release Goal. The radioactive
and hazardous material release goal shall be to provide reasonable assurance
that a fire will not result in the release of radiological or hazardous material
that adversely affects the public, plant personnel, or the environment.
1.3.3* Life Safety Goal. The life safety goal shall be to provide reasonable
assurance that loss of life in the event of fire will be prevented for facility
occupants.
1.4 Performance Objectives.
1.4.1 Nuclear Safety Objectives. In the event of a fire during any operational
mode and plant configuration, the plant nuclear safety objectives shall be as
follows:
(1) Reactivity control capable of achieving and maintaining subcritical
conditions
(2) Cooling capable of achieving and maintaining decay heat removal
(3) Fission product boundary capable of maintaining fundamental fuel
geometry
(4) Heat transfer medium inventory control capable of maintaining the
necessary quantity of heat transfer medium
1.4.2 Radioactive and Hazardous Material Release Objective. The
radiological and hazardous material release objective shall be to prevent
exposure, uncontrolled release, or unacceptable dispersion of hazardous
substances, nuclear material, or radioactive material, due to fires.
1.4.3 Life Safety Objectives. The life safety objectives shall be to protect
occupants not intimate with the initial fire development from loss of life and
improve the survivability of those who are intimate with the fire development,
as well as to provide protection for Personnel required to carryout manual
actions to achieve the nuclear safety objectives and emer gency personnel.
Substantiation: It is recommended that goals and objectives be added to the
administration section of NFPA 801 so that they are clear and unambiguous
for the responsible persons (Sentence 1.2.2) and to facilitate the proposal and
review of equivalencies (Sentence 1.5).
Modifying the goals and objectives from the current Annex note reflects the
current practice of NFPA 805 and 806.
It is recommended that the radioactive release goal and objective be modified
to include other hazardous materials as it is often the case that the use or
modification of radioactive materials (such as at mines, mills, conversion
facilities and processing facilities) involves suffignificanties quantities of other
hazardous materials (such as hydrogen, hydrofluoric acid, propane, kerosene,
etc). These additional hazardous materials should also be considered in relation
to the fire protection goals and objectives of the Standard and within the fire
hazard analysis.
Revise text to add an annex note to 4.2 that reads as follows:
4.2*
A.4.2 An FHA, in the context used in this standard, should serve as an
evaluation tool for design and therefore should include a goal-oriented
approach, particularly when discussing topics when there are no deterministic
requirements in this standard. The evaluation should address goals and
objectives that include the following:
(1) Nuclear Safety Goal. The nuclear safety goal should be to provide
assurance that radioactive materials should be maintained in a safe and stable
condition in the event of a fire.
(2) Radioactive and Hazardous Material Release Goal. The radioactive and
hazardous material release goal should be to provide reasonable assurance that
a fire will not result in the release of radiological or hazardous material that
adversely affects the public, plant personnel, or the environment.
(3) Life Safety Goal. The life safety goal should be to provide reasonable
assurance that loss of life in the event of fire will be prevented for facility
occupants.
(4) Nuclear Safety Objectives. In the event of a fire during any operational
mode and process configuration, the nuclear safety objectives should be as
follows:
(a) Reactivity control capable of achieving and maintaining subcritical
conditions
(b) Cooling capable of achieving and maintaining decay heat removal
(c) Fission product boundary capable of maintaining fundamental fuel
geometry
(d) Heat transfer medium inventory control capable of maintaining the
necessary quantity of heat transfer medium
(e) Preventing subcritical fissionable material becoming critical by the
introduction of water and concurrent violation with safe separation of
subcritical masses
(f) Maintain monitoring of safety functions
(5) Radioactive and Hazardous Material Release Objective. The
radiological and hazardous material release objective should be to prevent
exposure, uncontrolled release, or unacceptable dispersion of hazardous
substances, nuclear material, or radioactive material, due to fires.
(6) Life Safety Objectives. The life safety objectives should be to protect
occupants not intimate with the initial fire development from loss of life and
improve the survivability of those who are intimate with the fire development,
as well as to provide protection for Personnel required to carryout manual
actions to achieve the nuclear safety objectives and emer gency personnel.
Committee Statement: The suggested text was moved to the annex as it
applied to the FHA as there are performance-oriented objectives to the design
process. Annex note A.1.1.1 was retained because it is still appropriate.
Additional examples were added to A.4.2(4)(e) and A.4.2(4)(f) incorporate a
broader range of facilities. The committee notes that this may be incomplete
and invites additional discussion in the form of public comments for
consideration at the ROC.
STREIT, J.: Recommend adding to the end of A.4(5) the following clause
- ...due to fires, fire suppression system activation, and/or subsequent fire
suppression/extinguishment operations to complete the scope of concern with
moderator-controlled areas.
Attachment 13-8-7-a
12 of 24
4 pr oceed wi t h t he di scussi on on t he Cer t i f i ed
5 Amendi ng Mot i on on NFPA 801. Mi cr ophone 6, pl ease.
6 MR. MI NI STER: My name i s Andr ew Mi ni st er ,
7 Bat t el l e Paci f i c Nor t hwest Nat i onal Labor at or i es,
8 and I move t o accept Comment 801- 16.
9 MR. BRADLEY: Thank you. Ther e' s a mot i on on
10 t he f l oor t o accept Comment 801- 16. I s t her e a
11 second?
13 MR. BRADLEY: We have a mot i on and we have a
14 second. Pl ease pr oceed wi t h t he di scussi ons on t he
15 mot i on.
16 MR. MI NI STER: I ' ve been a pr ot ect i on f i r e
17 engi neer f or 38 year s, and I have wor ked i n t he
18 nucl ear f i r e pr ot ect i on i ndust r y f or 32 year s
19 i ncl udi ng t he anal ysi s and desi gn of speci al
20 hazar ds and nucl ear f aci l i t i es.
21 Thi s mot i on seeks t o i ncor por at e changes
22 t o t he ROP r evi si ons t hat wer e made t o Chapt er 7 by
23 appr ovi ng my comment s t hat wer e made on t he ROP.
24 These wer e ver y ext ensi ve changes made t o
67
1 Chapt er 7, and i f you l ook at t he ROP and t he ROC,
2 t hey cover mor e t han a page of t hat ver y f i ne
3 pr i nt .
4 ROP 801- 47 was wr i t t en t o r evi se maj or
5 por t i ons of Chapt er 7. Chapt er 7 addr esses speci al
6 hazar ds i n nucl ear f aci l i t i es. I n t he ROP
7 r evi si on, t he Commi t t ee made maj or changes t o t he
Page 57
Attachment 13-8-7-a
13 of 24
8 cont ent of Chapt er 7 and t o t he basi s of how f i r e
9 pr ot ect i on i s appl i ed t o speci al hazar ds i n nucl ear
10 f aci l i t i es.
11 The speci al hazar ds t hat my mot i on
12 pr i mar i l y addr esses ar e hot cel l s, gl ove boxes,
13 hoods, and caves. The 2008 edi t i on and pr evi ous
14 edi t i ons of NFPA 801 eval uat e t he hazar ds of hot
15 cel l s, gl ove boxes, hoods, and caves f r oma
16 det er mi ni st i c per spect i ve i n whi ch a f i r e hazar d
17 anal ysi s i s used t o det er mi ne t he hazar d and appl y
18 t he appr opr i at e l evel s of f i r e pr ot ect i on and f i r e
19 suppr essi on based on t he hazar ds t hat wi l l be
20 pr esent i n t hem.
21 The ROP changed t he f i r e pr ot ect i on f or
22 hot cel l s, gl ove boxes, hoods, and caves f r oma
23 det er mi ni st i c anal ysi s t o pr escr i pt i ve r equi r ement s
24 f or t he use of combust i bl e gas anal yzer s,
68
1 i nst al l at i on of t hr ee- hour f i r e- r at ed bar r i er s f or
2 sol vent di st i l l at i on of r ecover y equi pment , and
3 i nst al l at i on of aut omat i c f i r e suppr essi on i n al l
4 hot cel l s, gl ove boxes, hoods, and caves wi t h no
5 r egar d t o whet her a hazar d exi st s t hat woul d
6 r equi r e t hi s t ype of pr ot ect i on or not .
7 The t er m" nucl ear f aci l i t i es" as
8 appl i cabl e t o 801 r epr esent s an ext r emel y br oad
9 spect r umof f aci l i t i es wi t h t r emendous var i at i ons
10 i n mi ssi on, f unct i on, desi gn, oper at i ons, hazar dous
11 chemi cal s, r adi oact i ve mat er i al , i nvent or i es, f i r e
12 r i sks, and pr ot ect i on needs. The t ypes of
Page 58
Attachment 13-8-7-a
14 of 24
13 f aci l i t i es cover ed by NFPA 801 and t he r equi r ement s
14 of t hi s chapt er may i ncl ude smal l r esear ch and
15 devel opment l abor at or i es, l ar ge pr ocessi ng
16 f aci l i t i es, or nucl ear non- power ed r eact or s.
17 The f i r e pr ot ect i on needs of t hese
18 f aci l i t i es ar e as var i ed as t he f aci l i t i es
19 t hemsel ves. For t hi s r eason, i nf l exi bl e
20 pr escr i pt i ve f i r e pr ot ect i on r equi r ement s do not
21 meet t he speci f i c f aci l i t y and hazar d pr ot ect i on
22 needs, and t he f i r e hazar ds anal ysi s becomes
23 par amount i n def i ni ng and eval uat i ng t he
24 appr opr i at e l evel of pr ot ect i on of hazar ds and
69
1 conf i gur at i ons uni que t o t hese f aci l i t i es.
2 The i mpor t ance of t he FHA and f l exi bi l i t y
3 of t he appl i cat i on of r equi r ement s f or t he
4 var i abi l i t y and nucl ear f aci l i t y hazar ds i s t he
5 pr i mar y basi s f or t he pr oposed changes, and t hi s
6 appr oach i s consi st ent wi t h ot her r equi r ement s f or
7 per f or mance- based f i r ehouse anal ysi s - -
8 MR. BRADLEY: Your t i me i s up. Wi l l you pl ease
9 f i ni sh?
10 MR. MI NI STER: - - 5, 6 of t he st andar d. I ur ge
11 you t o vot e i n f avor of t hi s mot i on.
12 MR. BRADLEY: Mr . Ti l l , woul d you l i ke t o of f er
13 t he Commi t t ee' s posi t i on?
14 MR. TI LL: Yes, si r . Thank you. The Commi t t ee
15 as par t of t he 2013 Revi si on of NFPA 801 consi der ed
16 a compl et e r evi si on of Chapt er 7 of t he pr evi ous
Page 59
Attachment 13-8-7-a
15 of 24
17 edi t i on of t he document t o cor r ect numer ous er r or s
18 and t o i ncor por at e di r ect l y r el at abl e r esear ch on
19 t he subj ect . I n f act , near l y 25 per cent of t he
20 publ i c i nput on t he document was on Chapt er 7.
21 I t shoul d be not ed t hat t he Commi t t ee used
22 i t s i nput t o t hi s r evi si on of NFPA 801, t he NFPA
23 Resear ch Foundat i on Pr oj ect Repor t on Gl ove Box
24 Fi r e Pr ot ect i on. Thi s pr oj ect was i ni t i at ed at t he
70
1 r equest of t he Techni cal Commi t t ee t o ensur e t hat
2 al l avai l abl e r esear ch on t he subj ect of f i r e
3 pr ot ect i on and, par t i cul ar l y, gl ove boxes, but al so
4 i ncl udi ng many of t he f aci l i t i es under t he pur vi ew
5 of NFPA 801 was i dent i f i ed t o suppor t t he t echni cal
6 ar gument s wi t hi n t he st andar d.
7 The r epor t was compl et ed i n Sept ember of
8 2010 and i ncl udes l essons l ear ned f r omnumer ous
9 i nci dences i n t hese t ypes of f aci l i t i es. The
10 Commi t t ee, wi t h no descendi ng vot es, adopt ed t he
11 speci f i c por t i ons of t he comment and t hi s was
12 r eaf f i r med not once, but t wi ce, t he l at est bei ng
13 t he meet i ng i n Apr i l of t he Techni cal Commi t t ee.
14 Speci f i cal l y, t he i ssue of NFPA 801
15 appl i cabi l i t y was pr evi ousl y r esol ved vi a a t ask
16 gr oup appoi nt ed expr essl y f or t hat pur pose. The
17 t ask gr oup r epor t ed i t s r ecommendat i on dur i ng t hi s
18 r evi si on Cycl e, and as t he speaker has not ed, t he
19 wi de appl i cabi l i t y of t he document f r omhospi t al s
20 t o nucl ear r esear ch pr oduct i on r eact or s, i ndeed,
21 i l l ust r at es how br oad t he document i s appl i ed
Page 60
Attachment 13-8-7-a
16 of 24
22 acr oss t he ar ea of f aci l i t i es handl i ng r adi oact i ve
23 mat er i al s.
24 The r equest ed f l exi bi l i t y of a
71
1 per f or mance- based appr oach based on r esul t s of f i r e
2 hazar ds anal ysi s was r ej ect ed on t he gr ounds t hat
3 i t was not ed pr evi ousl y t hat t he scope of 801 i s,
4 i ndeed, br oad; and t her e wer e concer ns on t he par t s
5 of t he r egul at or y aut hor i t i es on t he abi l i t y t o
6 r each appr opr i at e t echni cal concl usi ons especi al l y
7 i n l i ght of t he f act t hat t he aut hor i t y havi ng
8 j ur i sdi ct i on does not gener al l y r evi ew nor appr ove
9 t hese document s.
10 The common appr oach of al l owi ng t he AHJ t o
11 appr ove devi at i ons was deemed suf f i ci ent f or t hose
12 cases wher e t he r equi r ement s may be st r i ngent based
13 on t he r i sk. Thi s appr oach ensur es adequat e
14 anal ysi s accept abl e t o t he AHJ .
15 The pr oposed l anguage appl i cabl e t o hoods
16 speci f i cal l y devi at es f r omt he t ype addr essed i n
17 t he document . A new def i ni t i on was added as par t
18 of r esol ut i on of t he mot i on submi t t er ' s comment .
19 The adopt i on of t hese changes woul d
20 r equi r e subst ant i al r evi si on of t he document s
21 speci f i cal l y wi t h r egar d t o devi at i on of
22 r equi r ement s based on f i r e hazar ds anal ysi s
23 det er mi nat i on.
24 The Commi t t ee r espect f ul l y r ecommends
Page 61
Attachment 13-8-7-a
17 of 24
72
1 r ej ect i on of t he mot i on, and t hanks you f or t he
2 suppor t of t he Techni cal Commi t t ee' s ef f or t s.
3 MR. BRADLEY: Thank you, Mr . Ti l l . Wi t h t hat ,
4 we wi l l open t he debat e on t he mot i on. Pl ease
5 pr ovi de your name and af f i l i at i on and whet her you
6 ar e speaki ng i n suppor t or agai nst t he mot i on.
7 Mi cr ophone Number 6.
8 MR. MI NI STER: Andr ew Mi ni st er , Bat t el l e
9 Paci f i c Nor t hwest Nat i onal Labor at or i es i n f avor of
10 t he mot i on.
11 I n t he subst ant i at i on pr ovi ded i n t he ROP
12 and t he r ej ect i on of my comment i n t he ROC, t he
13 Commi t t ee di d not pr ovi de any subst ant i ve evi dence
14 t hat t her e wer e needs f or t he change t o go t o a
15 pr escr i pt i ve r equi r ement f r omt he det er mi ni st i c
16 per spect i ve.
17 Fi r e hazar ds anal ysi s has been used ver y
18 successf ul l y f or many, many year s t o anal yze t he
19 hazar ds and appl y appr opr i at e l evel s of cont r ol .
20 Fi r e hazar ds anal ysi s has pr oven t o be ver y
21 ef f ect i ve i n t he f act t hat t he number of f i r es
22 r el at ed t o gl ove boxes, hot cel l s, caves, and hoods
23 has gone down si nce t he maj or f i r es t he DOE had i n
24 t he ' 60s and ' 70s, and t her e has not been any
73
1 ser i ous f i r es or ser i ous event s wi t h r adi oact i ve
2 r el eases or cont ami nat i ons i n t he l ast t en year s
Page 62
Attachment 13-8-7-a
18 of 24
3 t hat woul d j ust i f y such a si gni f i cant change.
4 MR. BRADLEY: Mi cr ophone Number 3, pl ease.
5 Pr ovi de your name and af f i l i at i on and whet her
6 you' r e speaki ng i n suppor t or agai nst t he mot i on.
7 MS. MAKEY: Nancy Makey, Bat t el l e, I daho
8 Nat i onal Lab, speaki ng f or t he mot i on.
9 We ar e a nat i onal nucl ear r esear ch
10 f aci l i t y. We deal wi t h t hi s Code al l t he t i me.
11 The f i r ehouse' s anal ysi s i s our met hodol ogy f or
12 det er mi ni ng t he pr oper suppr essi on and cont r ol
13 met hodol ogy we ar e goi ng t o i mpl ement .
14 Pr escr i pt i ve, gi vi ng us speci f i cs t hat we have t o
15 f ol l ow i s not pr oduct i ve because we deal wi t h so
16 many di ver se mat er i al s, one si ze does not f i t al l .
17 We have t o do t hi s anal ysi s anyway t o be
18 abl e t o det er mi ne what i s appr opr i at e. Somet i mes
19 i t ' s gaseous suppr essi on syst ems. Somet i mes i t ' s a
20 manual suppr essi on such as a dr y powder . Somet i mes
21 i t ' s a combi nat i on of l ot s of t hi ngs, cont r ol l i ng
22 combust i bl es, i ner t at mospher es. We use what i s
23 appr opr i at e f or t he mat er i al t hat we ar e deal i ng
24 wi t h.
74
1 Tel l i ng us t o use spr i nkl er s cr eat es
2 pr obl ems f or us t hat somet i mes makes t hi ngs wor se
3 t han t he f i r e we' r e t r yi ng t o pr ot ect agai nst .
4 Wat er i n t he nucl ear wor l d can of t en cause
5 cr i t i cal i t i es. That i s not somet hi ng we l i ke t o
6 see. Al so, wat er can cr eat e pr essur e i n a ver y
7 smal l ar ea such as a gl ove box. You get l eaks, you
Page 63
Attachment 13-8-7-a
19 of 24
8 now have cont ami nat i on spr ead wher e you don' t want
9 i t .
10 Pr escr i bi ng t o us t hat we have t o f ol l ow a
11 speci f i c set of r ul es devi at es f r oma phi l osophy
12 and a met hodol ogy t hat has been pr oven by hi st or y
13 t o wor k. So why ar e we changi ng now because
14 somebody has deci ded i t ' s a good i dea?
15 I ask you, pl ease suppor t t hi s mot i on.
16 Ther e i s no basi s t hat we can f i nd t hat suppor t s
17 t hat we shoul d go back t o a pr escr i pt i ve
18 met hodol ogy. Thank you.
19 MR. BRADLEY: Thank you. Mi cr ophone 6, pl ease.
20 St at e your name, af f i l i at i on, whet her you' r e
21 speaki ng f or or agai nst t he mot i on.
22 MR. BARI LO: My name i s Ni ck Bar i l o f r omt he
23 Paci f i c Nor t hwest Nat i onal Labor at or y, speaki ng i n
24 f avor of t he mot i on. I al so woul d l i ke t o say t hat
75
1 I ' ve been a f i r e pr ot ect i on engi neer f or nucl ear
2 and r adi ol ogi cal f aci l i t i es f or 28 year s.
3 Cur r ent l y, NFPA 801 r equi r es a document ed
4 f i r e hazar ds anal ysi s t o be per f or med f or new and
5 exi st i ng f aci l i t i es handl i ng r adi oact i ve mat er i al s
6 t o ensur e t hat f i r e pr event i on and f i r e pr ot ect i on
7 r equi r ement s have been eval uat ed. The FHA i s used
8 i n t he st andar d t o det er mi ne f i r e separ at i on
9 di st ances, cont r ol of hazar ds, i ncl udi ng t he
10 st or age and use of r adi oact i ve mat er i al s as t hey,
11 under f i r e or expl osi on condi t i ons, can r esul t i n
Page 64
Attachment 13-8-7-a
20 of 24
12 sever e hazar ds, t he cont r ol or el i mi nat i on of
13 i gni t i on sour ces, vent i l at i on cont r ol , and
14 suppr essi on of f i r es.
15 I n gener al , NFPA 801 as cur r ent l y
16 suppor t ed by t he Commi t t ee gi ves br oad l at i t ude t o
17 usi ng t he FHA t o det er mi ne r equi r ement s. NFPA 801
18 speci f i es t hat t he FHA shal l be used t o det er mi ne
19 f i r e ar ea separ at i on, pr ot ect i on of combust i bl e
20 shi el di ng, f i r e r at i ng of duct s, f i l t er f i r e
21 pr ot ect i on, f i r e det ect i on and suppr essi on of HEPA
22 f i l t er syst ems, smoke cont r ol met hods, dr ai nage
23 vol ume, f aci l i t y f i r e pr ot ect i on, f aci l i t y
24 spr i nkl er pr ot ect i on, f i xed f i r e pr ot ect i on, wat er
76
1 suppl y, wat er suppl y means, and hydr ant s, st and
2 pi pes, f i r e det ect i on syst ems, and f i r e suppr essi on
3 syst emgener al l y.
4 I woul d ur ge t hat ever yone vot e i n f avor
5 of t hi s pr oposed amendment . Thank you.
6 MR. BRADLEY: Thank you. Mi cr ophone Number 6,
7 pl ease st at e your name, af f i l i at i on and whet her
8 you' r e speaki ng f or or agai nst t he mot i on, pl ease.
9 MR. WALKER: Shakur Wal ker , Br owns Fer r y
10 Nucl ear Faci l i t y. For t hose of you who know about
11 f i r e pr ot ect i on and about f i r e, you mi ght have
12 hear d about Br owns Fer r y bef or e.
13 I ' l l be br i ef . Thi s i s my f i r st
14 conf er ence, and I ' ve been r evi ewi ng t hi s. Bei ng
15 t hat TBA and Br owns Fer r y i s becomi ng NFPA
16 compl i ant , f r omwher e we' r e comi ng f r om, f r omwher e
Page 65
Attachment 13-8-7-a
21 of 24
17 t he Br owns Fer r y f i r e ki nd of st ar t ed, i t makes
18 sense t o suppor t t hi s mot i on.
19 So I under st and t hat i t i s a bi t br oad,
20 but you ar e deal i ng wi t h a l ot of f aci l i t i es t hat
21 ar e pr et t y much cust omj obs. You have 81, 000s t hat
22 ar e comi ng out now t hat ar e mor e st andar di zed and,
23 i n t i me, we mi ght be abl e t o r evi si t t hi s and
24 debat e on i t agai n. But f or r i ght now, I suggest
77
1 humbl y t o suppor t t hi s mot i on. Thank you.
2 MR. BRADLEY: I s t her e any f ur t her di scussi on?
3 Yes, I see Mi cr ophone Number 4, pl ease. St at e your
4 name, af f i l i at i on and whet her you' r e f or or agai nst
5 t he mot i on.
6 MR. DUNCAN: My name i s Ken Duncan. I amwi t h
7 Per f or mance Desi gn Technol ogi es, and I ' mspeaki ng
8 i n suppor t of t he mot i on even t hough I ' mst andi ng
9 by a r ed mi cr ophone.
10 I t seems t o me t hat our ent i r e i ndust r y
11 has been wor ki ng f or t he l ast t wo decades t o
12 devel op a bet t er per f or mance way of doi ng our f i r e
13 pr ot ect i on so t hat we do j ust enough, not t oo
14 l i t t l e and not t oo much. And i t seems t o me t hat
15 goi ng back t o a mor e pr escr i pt i ve appr oach as t hi s
16 l at est r evi si on i n 801 has done i s a st ep backwar d
17 r at her t han a st ep f or war d.
18 I agr ee whol ehear t edl y wi t h t he comment
19 made t hat one si ze f i t s al l does not appl y t o t he
20 wi de r ange of nucl ear power - - not nucl ear power ,
Page 66
Attachment 13-8-7-a
22 of 24
21 excuse me - - t he r adi oact i ve mat er i al s or r adi at i on
22 r i sks t hat ar e associ at ed wi t h t he wi de var i et y of
23 f aci l i t i es t hat 801 i s i nt ended t o cover . So I
24 whol ehear t edl y suppor t t he mot i on.
78
1 MR. BRADLEY: Thank you. I s t her e any f ur t her
2 di scussi on on Mot i on 801- 1?
3 Chai r , do you have any f i nal comment s?
4 MR. TI LL: I do, si r . A key component of
5 per f or mance- based desi gn appr oaches i s r esear ch of
6 whi ch t her e i s ver y l i t t l e of l at e i n t he
7 l i t er at ur e f or f aci l i t i es of t hi s t ype. However ,
8 t he most r ecent r esear ch done on t hi s subj ect has
9 val i dat ed t he appr oach t he Techni cal Commi t t ee i s
10 t aki ng.
11 A key component of an adequat e FHA i s t he
12 knowl edge of t he speci f i c hazar d. Ther e wer e
13 sever al exampl es avai l abl e t o t he Techni cal
14 Commi t t ee wher e pr epar at i on of FHAs f or some
15 f aci l i t i es under t he scope of NFPA 801 wer e not
16 pr epar ed by such per sons. Resear ch i n t hi s ar ea by
17 such not abl e par t i es as Fact or y Mut ual suppor t ed
18 t he concl usi ons and t he appr oach t aken i n t hi s
19 edi t i on of t he st andar d.
20 And agai n, i n cl osi ng, t he Commi t t ee agai n
21 had no di ssent i ng vot es af t er consi der abl e
22 di scussi on and r evi ew of t hi s appr oach.
23 MR. BRADLEY: Thank you, Mr . Chai r . Bef or e we
24 vot e, l et me r est at e t he mot i on. The mot i on on t he
Page 67
Attachment 13-8-7-a
23 of 24
79
1 f l oor i s t o accept Comment 801- 16. Pl ease r ecor d
2 your vot e 1 i n f avor of t he mot i on t o accept or 2,
3 oppose t he mot i on, r ej ect . Pl ease r ecor d your
4 vot es. 5 seconds.
5 The bal l ot i ng i s cl osed. Thank you. The
6 r esul t s of t he vot e ar e i n f avor , 95; opposed, 61.
7 The mot i on car r i es.
8 I s t her e any f ur t her di scussi on on
9 NFPA 801? Seei ng none, we' l l move on t o t he next
10 document . Thank you, Mr . Ti l l .
11 The next r epor t under consi der at i on t hi s
12 af t er noon i s t hat of t he Techni cal Commi t t ee on
13 Pyr ot echni cs. Her e t o pr esent t he Commi t t ee r epor t
14 i s St andar ds Counci l member Mi chael Snyder . The
15 Commi t t ee r epor t s can be f ound i n t he bl ue 2013
16 Annual Revi si on Cycl e ROP and ROC. The Cer t i f i ed
17 Amendi ng Mot i ons ar e cont ai ned i n t he Mot i ons
18 Commi t t ee r epor t and behi nd me on t he scr een.
19 We' l l pr oceed i n t he or der of t he mot i on
20 sequence number pr esent ed. Mr . Snyder .
21 MR. SNYDER: Good af t er noon, Mr . Chai r , l adi es
22 and gent l emen. The r epor t of t he Techni cal
23 Commi t t ee on Pyr ot echni cs i s pr esent ed f or adopt i on
24 and can be f ound i n t he Repor t of Pr oposal s and t he
80
1 Repor t of Comment s f or t he 2013 Annual Meet i ng
2 Revi si on Cycl e. The Techni cal Commi t t ee has
Page 68
Attachment 13-8-7-a
24 of 24
Item 13-8-8

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
Derek K. Poarch
poarchd@apcointl.org

HEADQUARTERS
J. Rhett McMilli an, Jr. Buildi ng
351 North Williamson Boulevard
Daytona Beach, FL 32114-1112
386-322-2500

EXECUTIVE OFFICES
Gregory T. Riddle Bui ldi ng
1426 Prince Street
Alexandria, VA 22314
571-312-4400

www.apcointl.org

BOARD OF DIRECTORS
2012 2013

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Presi dent
Terry Hall
hallt@yorkcounty.gov

Fi rst Vice Presi dent
Gigi Smith
gsmith@vecc9-1-1.com

Second Vice President
J ohn W. Wright
rfanalyst@gmail.com

Immedi ate Past President
Gregory T. Riddle, RPL
gregg@griddle911.com

East Coast Region
David W. Clemons
J ames J . McFarland

Gul f Coast Region
Martha K. Carter
Matthew J . Stillwell, RPL, ENP

Nort h Central Region
J ulie J . Righter, ENP
Robin Tieman, RPL

Western Region
Kimberly D. Burdick, RPL
Peggy A. Fouts, ENP

Commercial Advisory Council
Don Whitney

!uly 2, 2013

naLlonal llre roLecLlon AssoclaLlon
SLandards Councll
1 8aLLerymarch ark
Culncy, MA 02169-7471

lease accepL Lhe followlng appeal on behalf of ACC lnLernaLlonal.

"#$ %&'() &**+,+&-+./) &/0 &001(22 .* -3( &44(,,&/-

CrysLal Mcuuffle
CommunlcaLlons CenLer and 9-1-1 Servlces Manager
ACC AnSl SecreLarlaL
ACC lnLernaLlonal
331 n Wllllamson Ave.
uayLona 8each, lL 32114

"5$ 6-&-('(/- +0(/-+*7+/8 -3( 4&1-+9:,&1 &9-+./ -. ;3+93 -3( &44(&, 1(,&-(2

a. nl1MAM 1061-1 /Log 1037: nlA Modlfy Lhe LlLle of Lhe 1061 documenL Lo
be llmlLed Lo Lhe poslLlon of LelecommunlcaLor.
b. nl1MAM 1061-2 / Log 1038 & 1039 (comblned): nlA reverL Lhe Lechnlcal
commlLLee scope and purpose for sLandard 1061 Lo lLs orlglnal scope and
reference Lhe approprlaLe ACC Amerlcan naLlonal SLandards for
quallflcaLlons of poslLlons ouLslde of LelecommunlcaLor.
c. nl1MAM 1061-1/ Log 1078: 8eLurn LnLlre 8eporL and sLandard Lo prevlous
edlLlon LexL.

"<$ =18:'(/- 2(--+/8 *.1-3 -3( 81.:/02 *.1 -3( &44(&,

1he lnLenL of our appeal ls Lo asslsL wlLh Lhe orlglnal, agreed upon paLh LhaL
was declded afLer Lhe flrsL [olnL meeLlng of Lhls commlLLee, ACC SLandards
uevelopmenL CommlLLee and ACC CommunlcaLlons CenLer SLandards
CommlLLee. 1he goal was Lo allgn 1061 wlLh ubllc SafeLy 1elecommunlcaLor
and for each sLandard Lo compllmenL Lhe oLher. ACC has lnvesLed numerous
hours of research lnLo our sLandards ln Lhe form of CccupaLlonal Analysls,
whlch are conducLed LhroughouL Lhe counLry. 1he resulLlng proflle charLs
were provlded Lo nlA ln a good falLh efforL Lo collaboraLe and ensure nlA
Attachment 13-8-8-a
1 of 27

was aware of ACC's work for oLher poslLlons ln Lhe communlcaLlons cenLers.

As sLandards wrlLlng enLlLles, lL ls lmporLanL LhaL we conslder Lhe lmpacL of
confllcLlng and/or dupllcaLlng sLandards. 1he goal of boLh organlzaLlons
should be Lo provlde Lhe publlc safeLy communlLy wlLh solld and unlversally
accepLed sLandards.

1he poslLlon of ACC ls LhaL Lhe addlLlon of CommunlcaLlons 1ralnlng Cfflcer,
CommunlcaLlons 1ralnlng CoordlnaLor, CuallLy Assurance CoordlnaLor,
Supervlsor and Manager are beyond Lhe orlglnal lnLended scope of 1061 and
dupllcaLes of exlsLlng ACC AnS. Whlle ACC and nlA conducLed broad
dlscusslons on a range of Loplcal sub[ecLs, full collaboraLlve efforLs were
llmlLed Lo ubllc SafeLy 1elecommunlcaLor.

uurlng Lhe process of nl1nAM, one of Lhe ma[or facLors provlded Lo Lhe
membershlp Lo undersLand Lhe lssues was LhaL Lhe furLher revlew and updaLe
of Lhe documenL would delay Lhe release of Lhe documenL. We belleve LhaL
Lhe rush Lo geL ouL a documenL should noL penallze Lhe publlc safeLy
communlLy wlLh confllcLlng sLandards.

AnoLher argumenL made ln Lhe publlc dlscusslon was LhaL Lhe currenL
documenL ls wrlLLen ln nlA sLyle, and can be used by Lhe ro8oard. We feel
LhaL Lhls ls noL adequaLe reason Lo penallze Lhe publlc safeLy communlLy wlLh
confllcLlng sLandards.

As lndlcaLed by Lhe Llmellne below, ACC has made conLlnued efforLs Lo
collaboraLe wlLh nlA on Lhe 1061 SLandard.

>(9? #@) 5AA@: Conference Call wlLh nlA. 1oplcs lncluded llrsL llne
Supervlsor, S1 v. 1061 and 1221.

B(C1:&17 #D) 5AAE: ACC and nlA meL ln Crlando llorlda - represenLaLlves
from SuC and CCSC presenL aL Lhe meeLlng. ulscusslon was llmlLed Lo allgnlng
1061 and S1.

B(C1:&17) 5A#5: CommenLs flled on nlA 1061 8eporL on roposals
lndlcaLlng dupllcaLlon and confllcL wlLh S1.

F&193 5<) 5A#5: Call held wlLh nlA 1061 CommlLLee Lo dlscuss commenLs
flled. 1he commlLLee re[ecLed Lhe ma[orlLy of commenLs.

G9-.C(1 5A#5H nl1MAM's flled wlLh nlA (noLlce of lnLenL Lo make a moLlon
aL an AssoclaLlon 1echnlcal MeeLlng)
Attachment 13-8-8-a
2 of 27

I:/( 5A#<: ACC represenLaLlves aLLended Lhe 1echnlcal MeeLlng and made
Lhe moLlons lndlcaLed ln Lhe nl1MAM's - All were voLed down.

"J$ 6-&-('(/- .* -3( 41(9+2( 1(,+(* 1(K:(2-(0
&? 8equesL Lhe documenL be reLurned Lo lLs orlglnal scope and conLenL.
C? nlA remove poslLlons oLher Lhan LelecommunlcaLor from 1061.
9? Allow for collaboraLlon beLween ACC and nlA for revlslons Lo 1061

"L$ M3(-3(1 & 3(&1+/8 ./ -3( &44(&, +2 C(+/8 1(K:(2-(0
?es. A hearlng ls requesLed on Lhls maLLer.

Slncerely,

CrysLal Mcuuffle
SecreLarlaL Lo ACC SLandards uevelopmenL CommlLLee
mcdufflec[apcolnLl.org
919-623-6864

Attachment 13-8-8-a
3 of 27
Comment 1061-2 (Title) Accept
________________________________________________________________
1061-2 Log #7 PQU-PST Final Action: Reject
(Title)
________________________________________________________________
Submitter: Crystal McDuffie, APCO International
NFPA 1061 Standard for Professional Qualifications for Public Safety
Telecommunicator Telecommunications Personnel.
Substantiation: The change in title is beyond the scope of NFPA 1061.
Recommend change back to Public Safety Telecommunicator to maintain
scope of document. APCO ANS and Candidate ANS already exist for proposed
additional positions identified (Core Competencies and Minimum Training
Standards for each of the following positions: Public Safety Communications
Training Officer (CTO), Quality Assurance Evaluator (QAE), Training
Coordinator (TC), and Supervisor and Core Competencies for Public Safety
Communications Manager/Director). Expanding the scope of this document
duplicates APCOs scope of standards development.
While APCO and NFPA conducted broad discussions on a number
of topical subjects, full collaborative efforts were limited to Public
Safety Telecommunicator.
Committee Statement: The scope of this standard was expanded by the SC at
the August 2011 meeting, therefore the Committee believes it is appropriate to
leave the levels as proposed.
Ballot Not Returned: 1 Phelps, S.
ADAMS, C.: I believe the changes are beyond the scope of NFPA 1061. The
expansion into additional public safety communication positions are outside
of the Public Safety Telecommunicators qualifications and thereby causes
a duplication with an existing ANS supported through APCO. Although the
original intent was to collaborate and harmonize with existing and developing
standards, it is not occurring and, instead, is creating a liability of duplication.
By doing so, NFPA 1061 is developing new and/or making revisions that
are outside its scope. NFPA 1061 revisions were conducted by the technical
committee in June 2011 without any comprehensive process to identify the
appropriate qualifications for the positions upon which it has expanded its
standard. The scope of NFPA 1061 was not addressed or changed until
August 2011 and, therefore, I do not believe the committee had the proper
authority to make revisions based upon the existing scope nor based upon its
procedure for the development of its standards as JPRs are conducted without
well-rounded input of individuals performing the task(s) as are those developed
within the scope of the ANSI accredited, APCO Internationals Standards
Development Committee which utilizes a nation-wide occupational analysis
process inclusive of high performing individuals specific to the position for
which the standard addresses.
1061-2 Log #CP3 PQU-PST Final Action: Accept
(Title)
Submitter: Technical Committee on Public Safety Telecommunicator
Professional Qualifications,
NFPA 1061 Standard for Professional Qualifications for Public Safety
Telecommunicator Telecommunications Personnel.
Substantiation: The committee has chosen to change the title of this document
to reflect changes in the industry since the inception of this document, as
well as to address changes to the various levels of qualifications within this
document.
Ballot Not Returned: 2 Adams, C., Vinciguerra, R.
Attachment 13-8-8-a
4 of 27
Comment 1061-3 (1.1 Scope) Accept
________________________________________________________________
(1.1)
________________________________________________________________
1.1 Scope.
This standard identifies the minimum job performance requirements for
personnel working in public safety telecommunications public safety
telecommunicators.
Substantiation: The proposed change is beyond the scope of NFPA 1061.
scope of document. APCO ANS and Candidate ANS already exist for proposed
additional positions identified [APCO ANS 3.101.1-2007 and candidate APCO
ANS 3.101.2-201x: Core Competencies and Minimum Training Standards for
Communications Training Officers (CTO); APCO candidate ANS 3.102.1-
201x: Core Competencies and Minimum Training Standards for Public Safety
Supervisors; APCO candidate ANS 3.104.1-201x: Core Competencies and
Minimum Training Standards for Public Safety Communications Training
Coordinators; APCO ANS 1.106.1-2009: Core Competencies for Public
Safety Communications Manager/Director, APCO candidate ANS 3.106.1-
201x: Core Competencies and Minimum Training Standards for Public Safety
Communications Quality Assurance Evaluator (QAE)].
While APCO and NFPA conducted broad discussions on a number of
topical subjects, full collaborative efforts were limited to Public Safety
Telecommunicator. Expanding the scope of this document duplicates APCOs
scope of standards development as filed with ANSI.
Committee Statement: The scope of this standard was expanded by the SC at
the August 2011 meeting, therefore the Committee believes it is appropriate to
leave the levels as proposed.
ADAMS, C.: The changes to NFPA 1061 creates a duplication with existing
APCO standards developed and/or currently in development. This addition to
NFPA 1061 is beyond the scope of the standard. The expansion of the scope in
August 2011 occurred after the technical committees meeting and, therefore,
the technical committee was developing work outside its scope at the time.
That scope should remain in effect to allow for harmonization and to prevent
duplication which is occurring with other standards (in particular , APCO
standards). I also do not believe the Submitter s comments were addressed.
(1.1)
1.1 Scope.
This standard identifies the minimum job performance requirements
for personnel working in public safety telecommunications public safety
telecommunicators.
Substantiation: This change was made due to the fact that this document
addresses other qualifications other than the public safety telecommunicator
and how this document and committee is looking at the industry from a holistic
perspective.
Attachment 13-8-8-a
5 of 27
Comment 1061-4 (1.2 Purpose) Accept
________________________________________________________________
(1.2)
________________________________________________________________
1.2 Purpose.
The purpose of this standard is to ensure that persons meeting the requirements
of this standard are qualified to serve as in public safety Telecommunicators
centers.
Substantiation: The proposed change is beyond the scope of NFPA 1061.
scope of document. APCO ANS already exist for proposed additional positions
identified. Expanding the scope of this document duplicates APCOs scope
of standards development. This document should address various functional
positions (not rank) of Telecommuncator (calltaker, emergency services
dispatcher, fire services dispatcher and law enforcement dispatcher).
While APCO and NFPA conducted broad discussions on a number of
topical subjects, full collaborative efforts were limited to Public Safety
Telecommunicator.
Committee Statement: The sentence was worded to the persons working in
the centers, not the centers themselves.
ADAMS, C.: The changes to NFPA 1061 creates a duplication with existing
APCO standards developed and/or currently in development; does not allow
for harmonization within the original scope of NFPA 1061. This addition to
NFPA 1061 is beyond the scope of the standard. The expansion of the scope in
August 2011 occurred after the technical committees meeting and, therefore,
the technical committee was developing work outside its scope at the time.
That scope should remain in effect to allow for harmonization and to prevent
duplication which is occurring with other standards (in particular, APCO
standards). The committee statement that, [the] sentence was worded to the
persons working the centers, not the centers themselves does not address the
comment that the change is beyond the scope, that other standards exist for the
positions identified and the scope of the document duplicates another ANSI
standards developer whose scope is public safety communications. I also do
not believe the Submitters comments were addressed.
(1.2)
1.2 Purpose.
The purpose of this standard is to ensure that persons meeting the
requirements of this standard are qualified to serve as in public safety
Telecommunicators centers.
Substantiation: The committee has made this change to reflect that this
document will now address various levels or qualifications of personnel that
serve in public safety communications centers.
Attachment 13-8-8-a
6 of 27
11 Mr . Chai r , l adi es and gent l emen of t he J ur y, t he
12 r epor t of t he Cor r el at i ng Commi t t ee on Pr of essi onal
13 Qual i f i cat i ons and t he Techni cal Commi t t ee on
14 Publ i c Saf et y Tel ecommuni cat or Pr of essi onal
15 Qual i f i cat i ons i s pr esent ed f or adopt i on and can be
16 f ound i n t he Repor t on Pr oposal s and t he Repor t on
17 Comment s f or t he 2012 Fal l Meet i ng Revi si on Cycl e.
18 The Techni cal Commi t t ee and Cor r el at i ng
19 Commi t t ee has publ i shed a r epor t consi st i ng of a
20 par t i al r evi si on of NFPA 1061 St andar d of
21 Pr of essi onal Qual i f i cat i ons f or Publ i c Saf et y
22 Tel ecommuni cat or . The r epor t was submi t t ed t o
23 l et t er bal l ot of bot h t he Techni cal Commi t t ee t hat
24 consi st s of seven vot i ng member s and t he
26
1 Cor r el at i ng Commi t t ee t hat consi st s of seven
2 member s. The bal l ot r esul t s can be f ound on
3 Pages 1061- 4 t o 1061- 17 of t he Repor t on Pr oposal s
4 and Pages 1061- 2 t o 1061- 35 of t he Repor t on
5 Comment s.
7 wi t h t he Cer t i f i ed Amendi ng Mot i on.
8 MR. OWEN: Thank you, Ms. Ki l by- Ri char ds.
9 Let ' s now pr oceed wi t h t he di scussi on on
10 Cer t i f i ed Amendi ng Mot i on on NFPA 1061. Woul d t he
11 maker of t he mot i on - - f i r st mot i on pl ease come t o
12 t he mi cr ophone, pl ease?
13 MS. McDUFFI E: Cr yst al McDuf f i e wi t h APCO
14 I nt er nat i onal , speaki ng i n f avor of t he mot i on.
15 Thank you f or t he oppor t uni t y t o addr ess t he
Page 22
Attachment 13-8-8-a
7 of 27
16 commi t t ee. APCO st r i ves f or a cont i nued - -
17 MR. OWEN: J ust one moment , ma' am. We need t o
18 have t he mot i on seconded. So we have t he mot i on.
19 Do we have a second? Thi s i s t o appr ove 1061- 1.
20 Do we have a second?
22 MR. OWEN: We have a mot i on and a second. Now
23 pl ease pr oceed.
24 MS. McDUFFI E: Okay. Cr yst al McDuf f i e wi t h
27
1 APCO I nt er nat i onal speaki ng i n f avor of t he mot i on.
2 Thank you f or t he oppor t uni t y t o addr ess t he
3 commi t t ee.
4 APCO st r i ves f or a cont i nued, cohesi ve,
5 and posi t i ve wor ki ng r el at i onshi p wi t h NFPA. Thi s
6 pr oposed change i n t i t l e t o i ncl ude communi cat i ons
7 per sonnel out si de of j ust t he t el ecommuni cat or
8 posi t i on al l ows f or dupl i cat i on and conf l i ct wi t h
9 exi st i ng and/ or candi dat e APCO Amer i can Nat i onal
10 St andar ds. APCO Amer i can Nat i onal St andar ds and
11 Canada Amer i can Nat i onal St andar ds al r eady exi st
12 f or pr oposed addi t i onal posi t i ons i dent i f i ed, cor e
13 compet enci es and mi ni mumt r ai ni ng st andar ds f or
14 t r ai ni ng coor di nat or , super vi sor , communi cat i ons
15 t r ai ni ng of f i cer , qual i t y assur ance eval uat or , and
16 manager di r ect or .
17 Whi l e APCO and NFPA conduct ed br oad
18 di scussi ons on a number of t opi cal subj ect s, f ul l
19 col l abor at i ve ef f or t s wer e l i mi t ed t o publ i c saf et y
Page 23
Attachment 13-8-8-a
8 of 27
20 t el ecommuni cat or . Expandi ng t he scope of t hi s
21 document dupl i cat es APCO' s scope of st andar ds
22 devel opment . APCO asks t hat t he t i t l e be r et ur ned
23 t o t he or i gi nal t i t l e of 1061, Publ i c Saf et y
24 Tel ecommuni cat or .
28
1 MR. OWEN: Thank you. Ms. Ki l by- Ri char ds,
2 woul d you l i ke t o of f er t he commi t t ee' s posi t i on,
3 pl ease?
4 MS. KI LBY- RI CHARDS: Yes, si r . Mr . Chai r ,
5 l adi es and gent l emen of NFPA, over t he cour se of
6 t he past sever al year s, t he Techni cal Commi t t ee on
7 Publ i c Saf et y Tel ecommuni cat or s Pr of essi onal
8 Qual i f i cat i on has been wor ki ng t o r evi se t he 2007
9 edi t i on of NFPA 1061 St andar d f or Pr of essi onal
10 Qual i f i cat i ons f or Publ i c Saf et y Tel ecommuni cat or
11 t o ensur e t hat per sons ser vi ng as publ i c saf et y
12 t el ecommuni cat i on per sonnel at each l evel or
13 posi t i on wi t hi n t he f i el d have t he oppor t uni t y t o
14 be qual i f i ed t o a nat i onal l y r ecogni zed
15 pr of essi onal qual i f i cat i on st andar d.
16 Thi s i ncl udes t he addi t i on of
17 communi cat i ons t r ai ni ng of f i cer , communi cat i ons
18 super vi sor , qual i t y assur ance, i mpr ovement
19 per sonnel , communi cat i ons t r ai ni ng coor di nat or ,
20 communi cat i ons cent er manager and l ogi st i cs sect i on
21 communi cat i on uni t l eader .
22 The Techni cal Commi t t ee met i n Dal l as on
23 J une 14 t o 15, 2010, f or t he ROP under t he Fal l
24 2011 Revi si on Cycl e. Whi l e no publ i c comment s wer e
Page 24
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9 of 27
29
1 - - pr oposal s wer e r ecei ved, t he Techni cal Commi t t ee
2 r ef i ned t he t hr ee exi st i ng chapt er s and devel oped a
3 br oad r ange of new chapt er s consi st ent wi t h a mor e
4 i ncl usi ve ser i es of posi t i ons cur r ent l y used i n
5 t el ecommuni cat i ons f aci l i t i es.
6 The Techni cal Commi t t ee i ncl uded a
7 r epr esent at i ve f r omt he Associ at i on of Publ i c
8 Saf et y Communi cat i on Of f i ci al s I nt er nat i onal ,
9 commonl y r ef er r ed t o as APCO, whi ch was a pr i nci pal
10 member . The ROP bal l ot r esul t s of bot h t he
11 Techni cal Commi t t ee and t he Techni cal Cor r el at i ng
12 Commi t t ee unani mousl y suppor t ed t hese r evi si ons,
13 but t he APCO r epr esent at i ve di d not r et ur n t he
14 bal l ot . The document r ecei ved sever al publ i c
15 comment s; not one f r omAPCO or i t s pr i nci pal
16 r epr esent at i ve of t he Techni cal Commi t t ee.
17 The Techni cal Commi t t ee met i n Denver on
18 Mar ch 11, 2011, f or t he ROC. The TC made 14
19 r evi si ons based on publ i c commi t t ee comment s. The
20 APCO r epr esent at i ve was pr esent f or t he meet i ng.
21 The APCO r epr esent at i ve t o t he TC vot ed t o accept
22 t he TC' s ROC r evi si ons. Al most t wo mont hs af t er
23 t he ROC bal l ot , NFPA st af f r ecei ved a l et t er f r om
24 APCO r egar di ng NFPA 1061 ci t i ng concer ns f or
30
1 dupl i cat i on of st andar ds, scope, and t i t l e and
Page 25
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10 of 27
2 devel opment pr ocess. St af f sent t he l et t er t o me.
3 At t he J une 2011 meet i ng, I asked t he
4 Techni cal Chai r Commi t t ee t o sl i p - - Cor r el at i ng
5 Commi t t ee t o sl i p- cycl e NFPA 1061 so t hat APCO' s
6 concer ns shoul d be addr essed i n hopes of cont i nui ng
7 har moni zat i on and co- br andi ng of t he st andar d. The
8 TCC was bal l ot ed and agr eed t o sl i p- cycl e t o Fal l
9 2012 Revi si on of t he NFPA 1061 so t hat t he concer ns
10 of APCO coul d be addr essed t hr ough t he submi ssi on
11 of publ i c comment . The St andar ds Counci l appr oved
12 t he sl i p- cycl e NFPA 1 t o t he Fal l 2012 Revi si on.
13 MR. OWEN: Ms. Ri char ds, coul d you compl et e
14 your comment s her e? You' r e done wi t h your t i me.
15 MS. KI LBY- RI CHARDS: On behal f of t he Techni cal
16 Commi t t ee on Publ i c Saf et y Tel ecommuni cat or s
17 Pr of essi onal Qual i f i cat i ons, I woul d ur ge you t o
18 suppor t t he wor k of t he Techni cal Commi t t ee. I ask
19 f or your suppor t on t he Commi t t ee act i ons. Thank
20 you f or your t i me, Mr . Chai r .
21 MR. OWEN: Thank you, Ms. Ki l by- Ri char ds. Now
22 we wi l l open debat e on t he mot i on. Pl ease pr ovi de
23 your name and af f i l i at i on and whet her you' r e
24 speaki ng i n suppor t of or agai nst t he mot i on.
31
1 Do we have any speaker s? Any f ur t her
2 di scussi on? Any di scussi on on Mot i on 1061- 1 t o
3 accept Comment 1061- 2? Ms. Ki l by- Ri char ds, any
4 f i nal comment ar y at al l ? Ther e wasn' t r eal l y
5 anyt hi ng t o r ebut .
Page 26
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11 of 27
6 MS. KI LBY- RI CHARDS: I ask t he member shi p t o
7 pl ease keep i n mi nd t hat t he maj or i t y of t he
8 Techni cal Commi t t ee bel i eves t hat bot h t he
9 chal l enges t o t he scope and pur pose of NFPA 1061
10 ar e a r esul t of t he uni queness of t he document . I f
11 t hi s mot i on i s accept ed, t he document scope wi l l
12 r ever t t o t he cur r ent document scope and t he ent i r e
13 r evi sed document woul d be i n conf l i ct .
14 I woul d ask t he member shi p t o vot e agai nst
15 t he mot i on. Thank you.
16 MR. OWEN: Al l r i ght . Thank you, Ms. Chai r .
17 Bef or e we vot e, l et me r est at e t he mot i on. The
18 mot i on on t he f l oor i s t o accept Comment 1061- 2.
19 Pl ease r ecor d your vot e, 1 i n f avor of t he mot i on,
20 accept , or t wo, opposed t o t he mot i on, r ej ect .
21 Pl ease vot e now. 5 seconds. The bal l ot i ng i s
22 cl osed.
23 The r esul t s of t he vot e ar e 143 t o r ej ect ,
24 29 t o accept . The mot i on has f ai l ed.
32
1 Let ' s now pr oceed wi t h t he di scussi on on
2 Cer t i f i ed Amendi ng Mot i on 1061- 2. Woul d t he maker
3 of t he mot i on pl ease come and make - - r epeat her
4 mot i on. Mi cr ophone 6, pl ease.
5 MS. McDUFFI E: I move t hat 1061- 2 move f or war d
6 t o i ncl ude accept i ng Comment 1061- 3.
7 MR. OWEN: We have a mot i on. Now t hi s i s a
8 gr oup amendi ng mot i on on t he f l oor , t o accept
9 Comment 1061- 3 and accept Comment 1061- 4. I s t her e
10 a second?
Page 27
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12 of 27
12 MR. OWEN: I hear a second. Pl ease pr oceed
13 wi t h your di scussi on on t he mot i on.
14 MS. McDUFFI E: Cr yst al McDuf f i e, APCO
15 I nt er nat i onal , speaki ng i n f avor of t he mot i on.
16 I n addi t i on t o my pr evi ous comment s
17 r egar di ng dupl i cat i on of exi st i ng APCO Amer i can
18 Nat i onal St andar ds, our i nt ent i on i s t o assi st wi t h
19 t he or i gi nal agr eed- upon pat h whi ch was deci ded at
20 t he f i r st j oi nt meet i ng of APCO St andar ds
21 Devel opment , APCO Cal l Cent er St andar ds, and NFPA
22 1061 Leader shi p and St af f whi ch t ook pl ace i n
23 Febr uar y of 2009 i n Or l ando, Fl or i da.
24 The goal f r omt hat meet i ng was t o al i gn
33
1 1061 and publ i c saf et y t el ecommuni cat or mi ni mum
2 t r ai ni ng st andar ds t o compl ement each ot her . I t
3 was agr eed t hat APCO woul d t ake t he l ead on t he
4 t r ai ni ng f or t el ecommuni cat or s and NFPA woul d
5 mai nt ai n t he qual i f i cat i ons pi ece and scope of
6 1061.
7 APCO bel i eves i t i s al so i mpor t ant t o
8 r ecogni ze t hat conf l i ct i ng or dupl i cat i on st andar ds
9 cr eat e conf usi on f or t he publ i c saf et y
10 communi cat i on cent er s t hat bot h of our member shi ps
11 ser ve. APCO r equest s t hat NFPA r et ur n t he scope
12 and pur pose of 1061 t o i t s or i gi nal scope and
13 pur pose and r ef er ence APCO ANS f or posi t i on
14 qual i f i cat i ons out si de t hose f or publ i c saf et y
Page 28
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13 of 27
15 t el ecommuni cat or .
17 woul d you l i ke t o of f er t he commi t t ee' s posi t i on on
18 t hi s?
19 MS. KI LBY- RI CHARDS: I ask t hat t he member shi p
20 under st and t hat t hi s mot i on goes beyond r et ur ni ng
21 t he document t o i t s or i gi nal t ext . I t el i mi nat es
22 exi st i ng t ext t o t he cur r ent document r ef er enced i n
23 Chapt er 4 and cr eat es a new t opi c, Publ i c Saf et y
24 Cal l - Taker . Wi t h no j ob per f or mance r equi r ement s
34
1 or J PRs, t he TC was i nt ent i onal i n i t s endeavor s t o
2 t ake a gl obal or uni ver sal appr oach when addr essi ng
3 Publ i c Saf et y Tel ecommuni cat or I r at her t han a
4 l i mi t i ng t i t l e.
5 The TC st ands by i t s wor k t o est abl i sh a
6 pr of essi onal qual i f i cat i ons st yl e document whi ch i s
7 uni quel y wr i t t en t o J PR f or mat . The changes and
8 del et i ons r equest ed by t he submi t t er woul d r ender
9 t he chapt er unusabl e by t he end user .
10 I woul d ask t he member shi p t o vot e agai nst
11 t he mot i on. Thank you.
12 MR. OWEN: Thank you, Ms. Ki l by- Ri char ds. Wi t h
13 t hat , we wi l l open up debat e on t he mot i on. Pl ease
14 pr ovi de your name and af f i l i at i on and whet her
15 you' r e speaki ng i n suppor t of or agai nst t he
16 mot i on. Mi cr ophone 3, pl ease.
18 GBH I nt er nat i onal . I ' mst andi ng at a mi c t hat says
19 f or t he mot i on, but I don' t know. I mean I t hi nk
Page 29
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14 of 27
20 t hi s i ssue i s an i ssue t hat goes beyond t he
21 member shi p. I t ' s an i ssue of cor r el at i on bet ween
22 st andar ds devel opment or gani zat i ons, and I woul d
23 r ecommend t hat t he St andar ds Counci l deal wi t h t hi s
24 by addr essi ng t he APCO or gani zat i on and get t i ng an
35
1 agr eement on whose j ur i sdi ct i on i t i s.
2 Appar ent l y, t he APCO st andar ds and
3 Amer i can Nat i onal St andar d, I ' massumi ng, ar e al so
4 an Amer i can Nat i onal st andar d. The debat e, whet her
5 t he scope i s r i ght , whet her we ar e encr oachi ng i nt o
6 someone el se' s pur vi ew i s way beyond what t he
7 member shi p her e can di scuss.
8 So I t hi nk t hi s i s somet hi ng t hat needs t o
9 be addr essed by t he Boar d or St andar ds Counci l and
10 i n conj unct i on wi t h t he ot her st andar ds of t he
11 or gani zat i on. Thank you.
12 MR. OWEN: Thank you f or your i nput . I s t her e
13 any di scussi on? Any f ur t her di scussi on on Gr oup
14 Amendi ng Mot i on 1061- 2 t o accept Comment 1061- 3 and
15 1061- 4? Seei ng none, we' l l move t o a vot e.
16 I ' msor r y, Ms. Chai r . Di d you have
17 anyt hi ng f ur t her on t hat ? I apol ogi ze.
18 MS. KI LBY- RI CHARDS: I woul d ask t he member shi p
19 t o vot e agai nst t he mot i on and st and by t he wor k of
20 t he Techni cal Cor r el at i ng - - Techni cal Commi t t ee.
21 Thank you.
22 MR. OWEN: Thank you, Ms. Chai r . Bef or e we
23 vot e, l et me r est at e t he mot i on. The gr oup - -
Page 30
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24 I ' msor r y, si r .
36
1 MR. DUNCAN: J ust a quest i on. You sai d 3 and
2 4. Ar e we vot i ng on t wo mot i ons at one t i me?
3 MR. OWEN: Yes, i t ' s a Gr oup Amendi ng Mot i on.
4 They gr ouped t hose t wo t oget her . I t ' s Comment
5 1061- 3 and 1061- 4. Those ar e gr ouped t oget her .
6 The Gr oup Amendi ng Mot i on on t he f l oor i s t o accept
7 Comment 1061- 3 and accept Comment 1061- 4.
8 Pl ease r ecor d your vot e, 1 i n f avor of t he
9 mot i on t o accept or 2 t o oppose t he mot i on, r ej ect .
10 5 seconds. Okay.
11 Bal l ot i ng i s cl osed. Resul t s ar e on t he
12 scr een. 149 r ej ect , 23 accept . The mot i on has
13 f ai l ed.
14 Let ' s now pr oceed wi t h di scussi on on
16 pl ease. Pl ease i dent i f y your sel f and make your
17 mot i on.
19 I nt er nat i onal . APCO does not wi sh t o pur sue
20 Mot i ons 3 t hr ough 17 and woul d l i ke t o move f or war d
21 wi t h Mot i on 18.
22 MR. OWEN: Al l r i ght . J ust so i t get s on t he
23 r ecor d. You do not want t o pur sue whi ch number s
24 agai n?
37
Page 31
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16 of 27
1 MS. McDUFFI E: Mot i ons Number 3 t hr ough 17.
2 MR. OWEN: Mot i ons 3 t hr ough 17 and pr oceed t o
3 18. Si nce t hey ar e t he maker s of t hese mot i ons,
4 t hi s i s pr oper . Bear wi t h me f or a moment , pl ease.
5 I s ever ybody r eady? That was qui t e a j ump.
6 Let ' s pr oceed wi t h t he di scussi on on
8 agai n, pl ease. I dent i f y your sel f and st at e your
9 mot i on.
11 I nt er nat i onal . APCO makes a mot i on t o r et ur n t he
12 document t o al l ow f or col l abor at i on.
13 MR. OWEN: Al l r i ght . Thank you. Ther e' s a
14 mot i on on t he f l oor t o r et ur n t he ent i r e r epor t .
15 I s t her e a second?
17 MR. OWEN: I hear d a second. Pl ease pr oceed
18 wi t h your di scussi on on t he mot i on.
19 MS. McDUFFI E: Appr ovi ng t he r evi si on of 1061
20 al l ows f or dupl i cat i on and conf l i ct of exi st i ng
21 st andar ds ei t her at t he t i me of wr i t i ng or at t he
22 t i me of f ut ur e r evi si ons. By al l owi ng t hi s, bot h
23 member shi ps wi l l be i mpact ed, not onl y f i r e and EMS
24 agenci es, but l aw enf or cement and emer gency
38
1 management oper at i ons cent er s as wel l .
2 The ver y i nt ent of a nat i onal st andar d i s
3 t hat t he publ i c saf et y communi cat i ons i ndust r y can
4 l ook t o one nat i onal l y accept ed and accr edi t ed
5 document f or gui dance on t he var i ous aspect s of t he
Page 32
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17 of 27
6 cr i t i cal ser vi ces t hey pr ovi de.
7 APCO has agr eed t o wor k col l abor at i vel y
8 wi t h NFPA t o suppor t t he publ i c saf et y
9 communi cat i ons pr ovi der s and user s. I t i s t he goal
10 of APCO t o wor k wi t h NFPA and al l ot her
11 associ at i ons and l i ke or gani zat i ons t o f ashi on
12 st andar ds whi ch pr ovi de al l di sci pl i nes of t he
13 publ i c saf et y communi t y wi t h sol i d and uni ver sal l y
14 accept ed pr act i ces. We must al so consi der any
15 associ at ed t r ai ni ng t hat may need t o be devel oped
16 based upon t hese st andar ds and associ at ed
17 l i abi l i t y.
18 APCO has i nvest ed numer ous hour s of
19 br oad- based r esear ch i nt o our st andar ds. Wi t h
20 di r ect access t o over 15, 000 subj ect mat t er
21 exper t s, our occupat i onal anal ysi s pr ocess i s
22 conduct ed nat i onal l y t o ensur e t hat we ar e not
23 l i mi t ed by geogr aphi cal ar ea.
24 I t shoul d al so be not ed t hat t he APCO
39
1 r epr esent at i ve on t he NFPA Techni cal Commi t t ee
2 expr essed concer ns t hat t he change and scope of
3 1061 was i n di r ect conf l i ct wi t h t he ANSI - appr oved
4 scope of APCO. Thi s r epr esent at i ve cont i nued t o
5 expr ess concer ns of dupl i cat i on and conf l i ct of
6 st andar ds.
7 By r et ur ni ng 1061 t o i t s or i gi nal ver si on,
8 you pr ovi de t i me f or f ur t her col l abor at i on and a
9 cohesi ve ef f or t bet ween our t wo or gani zat i ons t o
Page 33
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18 of 27
10 ensur e t hat al l di sci pl i nes of publ i c saf et y
11 communi cat i ons ar e pr ovi ded wi t h sol i d,
12 nonconf l i ct i ng st andar ds. APCO i s commi t t ed t o
13 suppor t i ng and pr omot i ng publ i c saf et y
14 communi cat i ons.
15 On behal f of APCO I nt er nat i onal and t he
16 APCO St andar ds Devel opment Commi t t ee, I t hank you
17 f or your t i me and consi der at i on of our posi t i on t o
18 br i ng r esol ut i on t o t he al i gnment pr ocess f or 1061.
20 woul d you l i ke t o of f er t he Commi t t ee' s posi t i on on
21 t hi s?
22 MS. KI LBY- RI CHARDS: Yes, si r . I woul d ask t he
23 member shi p t o vot e agai nst t hi s mot i on. To r et ur n
24 t he document woul d not be benef i ci al t o t he end
40
1 user who has wai t ed an ext ended per i od of t i me f or
2 t hi s document t o be i ssued. I f r et ur ned, i t coul d
3 be as much as t hr ee or mor e year s added ont o t he
4 r evi si on Cycl e bef or e t he t el ecommuni cat i ons
5 communi t y sees t hi s document . Coupl ed wi t h t he
6 or i gi nal r evi si on Cycl e and t he sl i p- cycl e, t he
7 document coul d be ei ght t o t en year s i n r evi si on.
8 Wi t h t he pr ocess al r eady, t he Techni cal
9 Commi t t ee has wor ked t o ensur e t hat per sons ser vi ng
10 as publ i c saf et y t el ecommuni cat i ons per sonnel coul d
11 be qual i f i ed t o a nat i onal l y r ecogni zed st andar d
12 t hr ough NFPA. I don' t see a maj or i t y of t he
13 Techni cal Commi t t ee member s wi l l i ng t o r ever t t o
14 t he 2007 t ext .
Page 34
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19 of 27
15 Our goal f r omt he 2011 ROP phase was t o
16 r evi se NFPA 1061 t o a gr ade wher e i t was al r eady
17 par t of a qual i t y document and devel op a br oad
18 r ange of new chapt er s consi st ent wi t h a mor e
19 i ncl usi ve ser i es of posi t i ons and l evel s cur r ent l y
20 used i n communi cat i ons f aci l i t i es. We f eel t hat we
21 have accompl i shed t hat goal .
22 Our si st er st andar ds devel opment
23 or gani zat i on was r epr esent ed at al l phases of t he
24 or i gi nal r evi si on Cycl e f r omROP t o ROC, wor ked on
41
1 many of t hese r evi si ons and bal l ot ed on t hem. I t
2 wasn' t unt i l af t er t he Techni cal Commi t t ee ROC
3 bal l ot was pr ocessed t hat l eader shi p at APCO sent
4 i t s l et t er of concer ns t o t he NFPA st af f . The TC
5 and CC made r ecommendat i ons, whi l e unusual , t o
6 sl i p- cycl e t he pr ocess.
7 Ther e i s a di f f er ence i n how NFPA 1061 and
8 APCO document s ar e used. NFPA 1061 i s a
9 pr of essi onal qual i f i cat i ons document desi gned t o
10 i dent i f y t he mi ni mumj ob per f or mance r equi r ement s
11 of publ i c saf et y t el ecommuni cat i ons per sonnel
12 uni quel y wr i t t en i n J PR f or mat t o di st i ngui sh t asks
13 used t o qual i f y i ndi vi dual s f or l evel s and
14 posi t i ons wi t hi n t he publ i c saf et y
15 t el ecommuni cat i ons communi t y. NFPA 1061 i s not an
16 or gani zat i onal t r ai ni ng or cer t i f i cat i on document .
17 On behal f of t he maj or i t y of t he Techni cal
18 Commi t t ee on Publ i c Saf et y Tel ecommuni cat i ons
Page 35
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20 of 27
19 Pr of essi onal Qual i f i cat i ons, I woul d ask you t o
20 suppor t t he Commi t t ee act i ons. Once agai n, I woul d
21 ask t he member shi p t o vot e agai nst t hi s mot i on. I
22 t hank you f or t he t i me, Mr . Chai r , and t o t he NFPA
23 member s f or l i st eni ng.
24 MR. OWEN: Thank you, Ms. Ki l by- Ri char ds.
42
1 Wi t h t hat , we' l l open up debat e on t he
2 mot i on. Pl ease pr ovi de your name and af f i l i at i on
3 and whet her you' r e speaki ng i n suppor t of or
4 agai nst t he mot i on. Mi cr ophone 4, pl ease.
5 MR. PETERSON: Thank you, Mr . Chai r .
6 Wi l l i amPet er son, Chai r of t he Pr of essi onal
7 Qual i f i cat i ons Cor r el at i ng Commi t t ee speaki ng
9 As Chai r of t he Cor r el at i ng Commi t t ee, we
10 spent many hour s and many mont hs and year s wi t h
11 t hi s i ssue t r yi ng t o wor k wi t h APCO. We do not
12 bel i eve t hat t he wor k of t he Techni cal Commi t t ee
13 dupl i cat es what APCO i s doi ng. We bel i eve i t
14 compl ement s t he t r ai ni ng t hat t hey del i ver t o
15 t el ecommuni cat i ons per sonnel .
16 We al so bel i eve t hat adopt i on of t hi s
17 st andar d wi l l open up an addi t i onal mar ket f or APCO
18 by al l owi ng Depar t ment of Def ense per sonnel t o
19 par t i ci pat e i n APCO t r ai ni ng del i ver y i n t he f i el d
20 as t hey ar e mandat ed t o be cer t i f i ed t o a nat i onal
21 consensus st andar d.
22 So as Chai r of t he Cor r el at i ng Commi t t ee,
23 I woul d ur ge member s pr esent t o suppor t t he
Page 36
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21 of 27
24 Techni cal Commi t t ee and vot e agai nst t hi s mot i on.
43
1 Thank you.
2 MR. OWEN: Thank you. Mi cr ophone 6, pl ease.
4 I nt er nat i onal . I woul d l i ke t o r emi nd t he vot i ng
5 body t hat APCO Amer i can Nat i onal St andar ds
6 cur r ent l y exi st s f or t he posi t i ons bei ng di scussed.
7 MR. OWEN: I ' msor r y. I shoul d have asked you,
8 woul d you st at e your name and whet her you' r e f or
9 agai nst t he mot i on f or t he r ecor d.
10 MS. McDUFFI E: Cr yst al McDuf f i e, APCO
11 I nt er nat i onal , and f or t he mot i on.
12 I j ust want t o r emi nd t he member shi p t hat
13 APCO cur r ent l y hol ds Amer i can Nat i onal St andar ds
14 f or t he posi t i ons t hat we ar e di scussi ng wi t hi n
15 NFPA 1061. APCO st andar ds exi st f or t he posi t i ons
16 of t r ai ni ng coor di nat or , super vi sor , communi cat i ons
17 t r ai ni ng of f i cer , qual i t y assur ance eval uat or , and
18 manager di r ect or .
19 I woul d ask f or your suppor t i n t he mot i on
20 t o r et ur n t hi s document t o i t s or i gi nal ver si on,
21 and whi l e I under st and t hat t hat wi l l t ake some
22 t i me t o accompl i sh, i t wi l l al l ow a mor e qual i t y
23 document t o be pr oduced wi t h col l abor at i ve ef f or t s
24 bet ween APCO and NFPA.
44
Page 37
Attachment 13-8-8-a
22 of 27
1 MR. OWEN: Thank you. I s t her e any f ur t her
2 di scussi on on Mot i on 1061- 18 t o r et ur n t he ent i r e
3 r epor t ? Mi cr ophone 6. Pl ease st at e your name and
4 whet her you ar e f or or agai nst t he mot i on.
5 MR. VANAUKEN: Gor don Vanauken, Vi ce Chai r of
6 t he APCO St andar ds Devel opment Commi t t ee. I ' mi n
8 I j ust want t o cl ar i f y, because one of t he
9 t hi ngs t hat was sai d or seemt o be sai d was t hat
10 t he APCO st andar ds ar e st r i ct l y t r ai ni ng st andar ds.
11 That i s cor r ect f or t he publ i c saf et y
12 t el ecommuni cat or st andar d onl y. The r emai ni ng
13 st andar ds ar e qual i f i cat i ons and t r ai ni ng
14 st andar ds, and t hat ' s why t hey conf l i ct wi t h t he
15 new r ol es t hat ar e bei ng put out t her e.
16 MR. OWEN: Okay. Thank you. I s t her e any
17 f ur t her di scussi on on t he f l oor ? Ms. Chai r , any
18 f i nal br i ef r emar ks?
19 MS. KI LBY- RI CHARDS: I woul d j ust l i ke t o
20 r emi nd t he Commi t t ee t hat we f ol l ow t he J PR f or mat
21 f or st andar ds f or t he NFPA, and I ur ge you t o vot e
23 MR. OWEN: Thank you. Bef or e we vot e, l et me
24 r est at e t he mot i on. The mot i on on t he f l oor i s t o
45
1 r et ur n t he ent i r e r epor t . Pl ease r ecor d your vot e,
2 1 i n f avor of t he mot i on t o accept or 2, oppose t he
3 mot i on t o r ej ect . Fi ve seconds.
4 Bal l ot i ng i s cl osed. The r esul t s of t he
Page 38
Attachment 13-8-8-a
23 of 27
5 vot e ar e 136 t o r ej ect , 37 t o accept . The mot i on
6 has f ai l ed.
7 I s t her e any f ur t her di scussi on on NFPA
8 1061? Seei ng none, we' l l move on t o t he next
9 document . Thank you, MadamChai r , f or your hel p.
10 MS. KI LBY- RI CHARDS: Thank you.
11 MR. OWEN: Next r epor t under consi der at i on i s
12 t hat of t he Techni cal Commi t t ee on St r uct ur al and
13 Pr oxi mi t y Fi r e- Fi ght i ng Pr ot ect i ve Cl ot hi ng and
14 Equi pment . Her e t o pr esent t he Commi t t ee r epor t i s
15 Cor r el at i ng Commi t t ee Chai r Wi l l i amHaskel l of
16 Nat i onal I nst i t ut e f or Occupat i onal Saf et y and
17 Heal t h, Andover , Massachuset t s.
18 The Commi t t ee r epor t can be f ound i n t he
19 whi t e 2012 Fal l Revi si on Cycl e ROP and ROC. The
20 Cer t i f i ed Amendi ng Mot i ons ar e cont ai ned i n t he
21 Mot i ons Commi t t ee r epor t and behi nd me on t he
22 scr een. We' l l pr oceed i n t he or der of t he mot i on
23 number pr esent ed. Mr . Haskel l ?
24 MR. HASKELL: Thank you. Mr . Chai r , l adi es and
46
1 gent l emen, t he r epor t of t he Techni cal Commi t t ee on
2 St r uct ur al and Pr oxi mi t y Fi r e- Fi ght i ng Pr ot ect i ve
3 Cl ot hi ng and Equi pment and t he Cor r el at i ng
4 Commi t t ee on Fi r e and Emer gency Ser vi ces Pr ot ect i ve
5 Cl ot hi ng and Equi pment i s pr esent ed f or adopt i on
6 and can be f ound i n t he Repor t on Pr oposal s and t he
7 Repor t on Comment s f or t he 2012 Fal l Meet i ng
8 Revi si on Cycl e.
9 The Techni cal Commi t t ee and Cor r el at i ng
Page 39
Attachment 13-8-8-a
24 of 27
TABLE A
(Note: The motions are presented in the order of presentation recommended by the Motions Committee)

NFPA 1061, Standard for Professional Qualifications for Public Safety Telecommunicator F2012
Motion
Seq#
NITMAM
Log #
Section/Para Person(s) Authorized to Make the
Motion
Certified Amending
Motion**
Motion Committee Notes and Comments**
1061-1 1057 Title Crystal McDuffie, APCO International Accept Comment 1061-2 If successful the motion seeks to Accept Comment 1061-2
to modify the title of the Standard as follows:

NFPA 1061, Standard for Professional Qualifications for
Public Safety Telecommunicator Telecommunication
Personnel.

1061-2 1058 1.1 Scope Crystal McDuffie, APCO International Accept Comment 1061-3 Group Amending Motion (1061-2): Motions identified by
Logs 1058 and 1059 taken together seek to modify the
scope and purpose of the standard to the previous edition
text as follows:

1.1 This standard identifies the minimum job
performance requirements for personnel working in
public safety telecommunications public safety
telecommunicators.
1.2 The purpose of this standard is to ensure that persons
meeting the requirements of this standard are qualified
to serve as in public safety telecommunicators centers.

These motions have been certified as proper. In addition,
with the agreement of the authorized maker of the motions,
1059 1.2 Purpose Crystal McDuffie, APCO International Accept Comment 1061-4

Attachment 13-8-8-a
25 of 27
TABLE A
(Note: The motions are presented in the order of presentation recommended by the Motions Committee)

NFPA 1061, Standard for Professional Qualifications for Public Safety Telecommunicator F2012 (continued)
Motion
Seq#
NITMAM
Log #
Section/Para Person(s) Authorized to Make the
Motion
Certified Amending
Motion**
Motion Committee Notes and Comments**
these motions are being considered as dependent motions
which will be debated and voted on by the assembly as a
single up or down package. See NFPA Technical Meeting
Convention Rules at 2.3.
Accordingly, the following procedure will be in effect for
these motions at the Technical Session: the two dependent
motions will be grouped into a single Group Amending
Motion identified as Motion 1061-2 which, once made by
the authorized person, will effectively place the dependent
motions on the floor for debate and vote as a single up or
down motion.
1061-18 1078 Entire
Document
Crystal McDuffie, APCO International Return Entire Report

Attachment 13-8-8-a
26 of 27
Attachment 13-8-8-a
27 of 27
J uly 9, 2013

J acklyn Kilby-Richards
Town of Groton Emergency Dispatch
68 Groton Long Point Road
Groton, CT 06340-4806

National Fire Protection Association
Standards Council
1 Batterymarch Park
Quincy, MA 20169-7471

Members of the NFPA Standards Council:

I am responding to the letter from NFPA dated J uly 2, 2013, regarding the appeal from C. McDuffie of
APCO requesting the overturn of the Association Action and accept Comment 1061-2, CAM 1061-1;
overturn of the Association Action and accept Comment 1061-3 and 1061-4, CAM 1061-2; and overturn
of the Association Action and return the entire report, CAM 1061-18.

As Chair of the Technical Committee Public Safety Telecommunications Personnel Professional
Qualifications, the most powerful statement I believe I can make is that there is no conflict or
duplication between NFPA 1061 and any of the related APCO documents. NFPA 1061 Standard
for Professional Qualifications for Public Safety Telecommunicator is a document designed to be
used to qualify individuals for levels and positions within the public safety telecommunications
community. The main intent of the APCO related documents is to address the organization,
resources, training and certification.

The technical committee views the NFPA and APCO documents as complimentary. Together,
the series of documents provide a complete package on professional qualification, certification,
resources, organization and training for the telecommunications industry.

Over the course of the past several years and with revision cycle extensions approved by the Standards
Council, APCO has been provided the opportunity through the NFPA process to submit proposals and
comments to the technical committee. The technical committee and correlating committee relied on
consensus to revise the document. Additionally, the NFPA membership at the technical session voted
overwhelmingly against the motions listed above.

I have attached the Timeline on Events and Actions for NFPA 1061. NFPA staff has also amassed
associated correspondence related to the current NFPA 1061 revision cycle. I would ask that it be released
to Standards Council for its review.

Attachment 13-8-8-a-1
1 of 6
I will be available to speak to the Standards Council, in-person on J uly 30, 2013 at the time established by
the Council for the appeals.

Thank you for the opportunity.

Very Respectfully,

7/9/2013
X J acklyn Kilby Richards
J acklyn Kilby Richards
Signed by: Kilby-Richards, J ackie

J acklyn Kilby-Richards

Attached: Timeline on Events and Actions for NFPA 1061
2 of 6
Revision Cycle F 2011
9-Oct-08 APCO request to replace rep on TC's with Carol Adams
9-J an-09 Call between APCO and NFPA staff and committee leadership. Discussed
options for harmonization
17-Feb-09 In-person Staff from NFPA and APCO met to discuss collaboration and
branding of document. Discussed the Occupational Analysis process and
validation that was being used by APCO and the Roadmap being developed by
APCO to address other roles. Discussed the use of the core competencies
developed for telecommunicator and having NFPA continue with the
Qualifications and APCO the training of these core competencies as in the past.
25-J an-10 NFPA submits 1061 to ANSI PINS
28-May-10 ROP closing date, no proposals from APCO or representative
14-15-J une-
10
ROP TC meeting Dallas TX, APCO representative at meeting via conference
call 2
nd
day
J ul/Aug-10 Emails highlighting independent work and use of other NFPA standards to
development new chapters for NFPA 1061
3-Sep-10 ROP TC ballot APCO representative did not return ballot; no alternate
representation
13-Sep-10 NFPA submits notices Fall 2011 ROP Revision for publication in Federal
Register
27-Oct-10 ROP TCC ballot; approved
7-Nov-10 TCC meeting, Houston , TX
7-Dec-10 NFPA submits 2011 Fall Revision to ANSI
22-Dec-10 ROP posted and published
4-Mar-11 Comment closing date
ROC Comments; none received from APCO
11-Mar-11 ROC Meeting in Denver APCO representative present at meeting.
6-Apr-11 ROC TC ballot
27-Apr-11 TC submits request for scope change to SC
27-Apr-11 Meeting to discuss co-branding with Ken W., Ken H., and Chris Dubay
29-Apr-11 Telephone conversation w/ Amanda Byrd from APCO to NFPA expressing
concern over duplication of scope and material from APCO into NFPA 1061
27-May-11 APCO sent letter to NFPA stating concerns for duplication of standards, scope
and title, and development processes.
28-May-11 Staff reviewed findings from APCO as outlined in matrices
1-J un-11 1061/APCO harmonization meeting, ANSI scope question (Amy's office)
7-J un-11 Telephone conversation with NFPA staff /program manager and APCO
staff/executive director
11-J un-11 ROC TCC Meeting
12-J un-11 In-person meeting with NFPA staff and APCO staff at Annual Conference in
Boston
12-J un-11 TC Chair recommendation to TCC to ask for slip cycle to ROC; approved by
TCC and forwarded to SC (F2012) (7-J uly-11)
7-J ul-11 ROC TCC Ballot
13-J ul-11 Staff email to NFPA Counsel
3 of 6
8-Aug-11 SC approves scope change for 1061 TC and Slip cycle back to ROC and F 2012
18-Aug-11 NFPA submits Fall 2011 ROC to ANSI
26-Aug-11 F2011 ROC Posted and Published
20-Dec-11 F 2012 ROC reposted
2-Mar-12 APCO submitted comments (26) by 3/2/12 closing date on 3/1/12
23-Mar-12 ROC TC initial meeting set for March 15 moved to March 23, 2012 Conference
call/Live Meeting; APCO representative and Program Manager (Guest) present
at meeting
24-Apr-12 ROC TC Ballot, APCO representative voted mostly negative, some affirmative
with comments
9-J un-12 ROC TCC Meeting
2-J ul-12 ROC TCC Ballot
24-Aug-12 1061 TC Chair update to committee
19-Sep-12 Email communication with APCO program manager on next steps in SDP
5-Oct-12 APCO submitted NITMAMs (21)
10-15-Oct-
12
Staff reviewed NITMAMs
25-Oct-12 1061 TC Nonparticipation Report
2-Nov-12 SC certified amending motions
12-J une-13 Technical Session with NFPA Membership, APCO Representative present to
present CAMs, Floor votes against log #s 1057, 1058, 1059 and 1078, no other
CAMs pursued
18-J une-13 Email from APCO requesting names of NFPA members present at Technical
Session
2-J uly-13 APCO appeals request letter for failed CAMs
2-J uly-13 Notification email to TC and CC chairs on appeals request for hearing
9-J uly-13 TC chair response to appeals request including timeline attachment

4 of 6
NFPA Standards Council
1 Batterymarch Park
Quincy, MA 02169-7471

July 8, 2013
Members of the NFPA Standards Council,
As Chair of the Correlating Committee, I ask the Standards Council to support the work of the NFPA 1061
Technical Committee on Public Safety Telecommunications Personnel Professional Qualifications in the
development of the 2014 edition of NFPA 1061.
The Standards Council should be aware that both the NFPA 1061 Technical Committee and the NFPA
Professional Qualifications Correlating Committee have spent countless hours since 2008 with this issue
trying to work with APCO to develop a document that would clearly define the specific Job Performance
Requirements (JPR's) for public safety telecommunications personnel. APCO's own representative on the
technical committee has supported the work of the committee and voted in favor of the document at
each step of the process.
NFPA 1061 is written in the same manner as other NFPA professional qualification documents, and
include minimum Job Performance Requirements (JPR's) for various public safety positions. JPR's
identify the minimum professional qualification standards required for specific public safety positions.
JPR's in the professional qualifications documents are an assembly of three critical components:
(1) The task to be performed,
(2) the tools, equipment, and materials that must be provided to successfully complete the task,
and
(3) the evaluation parameters and/or minimum successful performance outcomes.
JPR's are used by curriculum developers to determine training course content and evaluation criteria;
agencies and organizations to write job descriptions, define hiring practices, and measure successful on-
the-job performance; and by certification organizations to clearly identify certification criteria. Other
applications of specific criteria contained in each of the NFPA Professional Qualifications Standards are
also encouraged.
Previous testimony provided by APCO indicated that NFPA 1061, as adopted by the NFPA membership in
Chicago, duplicates existing APCO training "standards". A review of APCO standards against the
components of the NFPA 1061 JPR's clearly refutes this assertion. While the content of APCO documents
5 of 6
may be consistent with identifying many of the tasks to be performed, there is no mention of the second
and third critical components of a JPR which are critical to determine successful performance of the task
specified.
As such, we do not believe that the work of the Technical Committee duplicates what APCO is doing. We
believe it, in fact, complements the training and certification that they deliver to telecommunications
personnel.
We also believe that adoption of this standard will open up an additional market for APCO by allowing
Department of Defense personnel to participate in APCO training delivery in the field, as they are
mandated to be certified to a national consensus standard.
As Chair of the Correlating Committee, I would urge the Standards Council to support the work of the
Technical Committee and deny the request of APCO to:
Request the document be returned to its original scope and content.
NFPA remove positions other than Telecommunicator from NFPA 1061.
Allow for collaboration between APCO and NFPA for revisions to 1061.

Respectfully submitted,

William Peterson, Chair
NFPA Professional Qualification Correlating Committee
6 of 6
Item 13-8-12
NFPA
37-2010
Standard for the Installation and Use of Stationary Combustion Engines and Gas Turbines
TIA Log No. 1101
Reference: 9.3.3
Comment Closing Date: J une 14, 2013
Submitter: Clifford C. Roberts, American International Group, Inc.

1. Add a new subsection 9.3.3 to read as follows:

9.3.3 The combustion gas turbine starting sequence shall include a purge cycle that will result in a nonignitible
atmosphere in the turbine and its exhaust system prior to the start of the ignition sequence and the introduction of fuel.

Submitters Substantiation: The purpose of this Tentative Interim Amendment (TIA) is to reinstate an important safety
provision of earlier editions of NFPA 37 that was inadvertently deleted in the processing of the current 2010 edition. This
requirement appears in the prior (2006) edition of NFPA 37 as Subsection 9.3.2.

Technical Validity: Proposal 37-20 (Log #CP19) in the Fall 2009 Report on Proposals (ROP) proposed a rewrite of
Chapter 9 of NFPA 37. Proposal 37-20 was accepted by the Technical Committee on Internal Combustion Engines and
the text being proposed for reinstatement by this TIA appears in the proposal as Subsection 9.3.2. Comment 37-7 (Log
#6) proposed amendments to the rewrite of Chapter 9 in the form of a new rewrite of the text beginning with Subsection
9.2.1 and extending to the end of the chapter. This comment also was accepted.

Unfortunately, the text of Subsection 9.3.2 from the 2006 edition was not included in the text of the public comment and,
therefore, does not appear in the text accepted therein. A poll of the Technical Committee members disclosed that it was
never anyones intent to delete this provision and all agreed the text needs to be reinstated.

This TIA reinstates the provision, numbered accordingly.

Emergency Nature: Failure to properly purge the exhaust system of a gas turbine can result in a significant quantity of
fuel remaining in the system. History has shown that this residual fuel can ignite explosively during turbine light off,
resulting in significant damage to the system, including catastrophic rupture of the exhaust system with attendant release
of projectiles that can injure persons in the area and damage other equipment in the area."

Determination of emergency nature meets the conditions stated in Paragraph 5.3(a) of the Regulations Governing the
Development of NFPA Standards: The NFPA Standard contains an error or omission that was overlooked during a
regular revision process.

Attachment 13-8-12-a
1 of 1
TIA 37-2010
NFPA 37, Standard for the Installation and Use of Stationary Combustion Engines and Gas
Turbines
Reference: 9.3.3
(TIA Log 1101)

Comment Closing: 6/14/2013
0 Public Comments Received

TIA TC FINAL BALLOT RESULTS
________________________________________________________________________________________
According to 5.4 in the NFPA (RGCP), the final results show this TIA HAS achieved the necessary votes on
both Question 1 (Technical Merit) and Question 2 (Emergency Nature).
________________________________________________________________________________________
The number of affirmative votes needed to obtain a recommendation to issue the TIA is 10.
[14 (eligible to vote) 1 (not returned) 0 (abstentions) =13 0.75 =9.75]

In all cases, an affirmative vote of at least a simple majority of the total membership eligible to vote is required.
[14 eligible 2 =7 +1 =8 (this is the simple majority)]
________________________________________________________________________________________

14 Eligible to Vote
1 Not Returned (Preston)

TC FINAL Ballot results for Technical Merit are as follows:
13 Agree
0 Disagree
0 Abstentions

FINAL ACTION: PASSED

TC FINAL Ballot results for Emergency Nature are as follows:
13 Agree
0 Disagree
0 Abstentions


Attachment 13-8-12-b
1 of 1
Item 13-8-13
NFPA
37-2010 and Proposed 2014 Edition

Standard for the Installation and Use of Stationary Combustion Engines and Gas Turbines
TIA Log No. 1102
Reference: 6.6.3
Submitter: D. McMenamin,Verizon Wireless Corp.

1. Replace the current text of subsection 6.6.3 of both the 2010 and 2014 editions of NFPA 37 with the following:

6.6.3 Piping for fuel tanks, other than engine-mounted tanks, shall be in accordance with the provisions of 6.6.3.1 through 6.6.3.3,
except as provided for in 6.6.3.4 Chapter 27 of NFPA 30, Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code.

6.6.3.1 Piping for fuel tanks shall meet the applicable requirements of Chapters 21 and 27 of NFPA 30, Flammable and Combustible
Liquids Code. The fill pipe shall terminate outside the building at a point at least 600 mm (24 in.) from any building opening at the
same or lower level.

6.6.3.2 Tanks shall be filled by a closed piping system.

6.6.3.3 The fill pipe for each tank shall be provided on an exterior wall of the room or structure enclosing the tank at a point at least
600 mm (24 in.) from any building opening at the same or lower level.

6.6.3.4 A fill pipe terminating in accordance with 6.6.3.3 shall not be required for tanks that are filled manually at the fill connection
of the tank, provided that the tank and its fill connection are located within the spill containment required by 6.3.2.4, 6.3.5.3, or 6.3.6.3
and the filling operation is constantly attended.

Submitters Substantiation: In sites with indoor engines, authorities having jurisdiction, citing the International Mechanical Code
(IMC), have required carriers to provide exterior containment diesel fuel stations and remote fuel fill alarm panels. The problem is
that on crowded communications sites, insufficient clearances are available to meet NFPA 37 as it is written. Today, installations
include both remote fuel fill stations (mounted on the exterior wall of the shelters) and internal fill connections. In practice, most fuel
providers are unable to meet the requirements for camlock connections (vapor-tight connections), pumps, and associated accessories
necessary to fuel the tanks from the exterior connections. So, in practice, internal connections are the ones most commonly used to fill
the tanks and the exterior fuel station goes unused. Class II fuels are stable, the fuel tanks at such sites are relatively small and the
telephone industry has an impeccable record for fire safety and so this initiative bears more rewards than risk.

Technical Validity: Communications sites, such as cellular telephone tower sites and public safety communications systems, are
arranged on small plots of land where a tower is a virtual hotel for the antennas of numerous communications carriers. Often, the
communications systems are housed in unoccupied industrial occupancies (precast shelter buildings) that have been delivered and
installed on that site. Due to the small size of the shelter, it is not feasible to comply with the current provisions of Subsection 6.6.3 of
NFPA 37, because there is no place to install a remote fuel fill that is far enough away from building openings at the same or lower
level. See the included photos.

Left: A 2-room shelter about to be delivered. Note that there is no place to install a fuel fill that can meet the 24 clearance
requirement as is covered in (current) 6.6.3.1. Right: a group of shelters placed in close proximity to each other.

Due to the limited space that multiple carriers share on a very small property, it is impractical to install the fuel fill at any distance
from the shelter. Because many cell sites are on mountain tops or other off-road areas, the relatively small trucks needed to access
such locations are not equipped with Camlocks, pumps, or other nozzles to achieve liquid/vapor tight connections. The shelters used
for such applications already have concrete containments in the engine areas sufficient to contain spills. There is, to our knowledge,
1 of 2
no history of fires in cell site shelters relative to diesel fuel spills. While refueling spills do occasionally occur, the existing
containment and relatively small quantities involved are easily cleaned up. The majority of existing installations utilize an internal fill
connection, which has worked in practice for many years.

While no U.S. code or other regulation requires standby engine generators at cell sites, many telecommunications carriers provide
them voluntarily. Such generators typically are in the 15 to 60 KW size and provide power to maintain a level of reliability necessary
for public safety and competitive customer service. Although many carriers use outdoor engine modules, these assemblies are not as
reliable as indoor units, because weather and rodent damage problems are inherent to such units.

Cell phones are how most people reach 911 services today and also are the secondary medium for emergency responders
communicating among themselves. Additionally, the primary radio systems for first responders are dependent on repeater or
Trunked Radio systems whose antennas are collocated on towers with cellular or other systems. Emergency planners encourage
citizens to prepare for evacuation emergencies with advice similar to South Carolinas evacuation plan: Motorists are encouraged to
have a full tank of gas when they leave, bringing food items with them and cellular phones. (emphasis added) Coping with disasters
or weather severity is when the cellular and emergency responder systems are needed most and yet are times when commercial power
is least reliable.

The standby diesel engines provided for communications sites employ relatively small, welded steel secondary containment-type belly
tanks complying with ANSI/UL 142, Standard for Steel Aboveground Tanks for Flammable and Combustible Liquids, for Class II fuel
oil (diesel fuel). The shelters used for such purposes are unoccupied except during periodic maintenance activities and are not
considered important buildings as defined in NFPA 30. Further, in NFPA 76, Standard for the Fire Protection of
Telecommunications Facilities, these buildings are considered redundant and replaceable.

Emergency Nature: Given the conditions indicated herein and the contribution of standby generators to the reliability of the
telecommunications system and, therefore by extension, public safety, it is vital that a standard-recognized method of fueling small
diesel generators for communications equipment shelters be established.

Determination of emergency nature meets the conditions stated in Paragraph 5.3(f) of the Regulations Governing the Development of
NFPA Standards: The proposed TIA intends to correct a circumstance in which the revised NFPA Standard has resulted in an
adverse impact on a product or method that was inadvertently overlooked in the total revision process or was without adequate
technical (safety) justification for the action.

2 of 2
TIA 37-2010 and Proposed 2014 Edition
NFPA 37, Standard for the Installation and Use of Stationary Combustion Engines and Gas
Turbines
Reference: 6.6.3
(TIA Log 1102)

1 Public Comment Received

________________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________________________

14 Eligible to Vote
1 Not Returned (Preston)

11 Agree
2 Disagree (Elovitz, Nieman)
0 Abstentions


11 Agree
2 Disagree (Elovitz, Nieman)
0 Abstentions


1 of 4


1 Batterymarch Park, Quincy, MA 02169-7471
Phone: 617-770-3000 Fax: 617-770-0700 www.nfpa.org

MEMORANDUM

TO: NFPA Technical Committee on Internal Combustion Engines

FROM: R. P. Benedetti

DATE: May 29, 2013

SUBJ : NFPA 37 Proposed TIA No. 1102 FINAL TC BALLOT RESULTS
__________________________________________________________________________________
According to 5.4 in the NFPA Regs, the final results show this TIA HAS achieved the majority
vote needed on both Question 1 (Technical Merit) and Question 2 (Emergency Nature).

14 Eligible to Vote
1 Not Returned (O. Preston)

Technical Merit: Emergency Nature:

11 Agree (without comment)
0 Abstentions
2 Disagree (K. Elovitz and D. Nieman)

11 Agree (without comment)
0 Abstentions
2 Disagree (K. Elovitz and D. Nieman)

There are two criteria necessary to pass ballot [(1) affirmative vote and (2) simple majority] with
both questions needing to pass ballot in order to recommend that the Standards Council issues this
TIA.

(1) In all cases, an affirmative vote of at least a simple majority of the total membership eligible to
vote is required.
[14 eligible 2 =7 +1 =8]

(2) The number of affirmative votes needed to satisfy the requirement is 10
(14 eligible to vote - 1 not returned - 0 abstentions =13 0.75 =9.75

An appeal relating to a proposed Tentative Interim Amendment shall be filed no later than 5 days
after the notice of the Technical Committee TIA ballot results are published in accordance with
1.6.2 (c) and 4.2.6. In the case that a Correlating Committee is also being balloted, appeals need to
filed 5 days after the notice of the Correlating Committee TIA ballot results are published.

Final ballot comments are attached for your review. Ballots received from alternate members are not
included, unless the ballot from the principal member was not received.

2 of 4
3 of 4
4 of 4
1 of 1
Item 13-8-14
NFPA
58- Proposed 2014 Edition

TIA Log No. 1095
Reference: 6.12.9
Comment Closing Date: April 1, 2013
Submitter: David Stainbrook, Engineered Controls International

1. Revise 6.12.9 to read:

6.12.9 Where emergency shutoff valves are required to be installed in fixed piping at bulk plants and industrial
plants, accordance with 6.12.2, a means shall be incorporated to actuate the emergency shutoff valves in the
event of a break of the fixed piping resulting from a pull on the hose.

Submitters Substantiation: Since 2001 the installation of Emergency Shutoff Valves has been allowed not
only to protect transfer lines at bulkheads (loading/unloading stations) but also at the liquid outlet of
containers to comply with 5.7.4.2 (D)(2), (H)(2).
The action taken by the Technical Committee during the balloting process on Comment 58-58 would require
all Emergency Shutoff Valves regardless of where they are installed in the fixed piping system to incorporate a
means to actuate in the event of break in the fixed piping resulting from a pull on the hose. This would include
Emergency Shutoff Valves installed 100 feet or more from the transfer hose at the container opening which is
used to only protect the liquid withdrawal opening at the container not the hose at the transfer station. It was the
intent of the Technical Committee to require activation of only the Emergency Shutoff Valve installed within 20
feet of the nearest end of the hose or swivel-type piping connection (see 6.12.2).

Emergency Nature: The intent of the committee was to cover only those emergency shutoff valves that are
installed to protect the loading and unloading stations; the proposed 6.12.9 goes far beyond the intent.
As currently written, Comment 58-58 would create a huge installation problem and in many cases could not
be complied with due to the location of all the Emergency Shutoff Valves installed in the system. The difficulty
in trying to connect all of the valves in the fixed piping system would far outweigh any benefit of having done
so. Only the most critical valve must close and that is the one installed closest to where the hose pull away
occurs, per the requirement in 6.12.2.
The proposed revision to 6.12.9 will clarify the limitation of this new requirement to Emergency Shutoff
Valves installed within 20 ft of lineal pipe from the nearest end of the transfer hose connection to the fixed
piping system (6.12.2), thereby providing the necessary protection for loading and unloading stations.

1 of 1
TIA 58-Proposed 2014 Edition
NFPA 58, Liquid Petroleum Gas Code
Reference: 6.12.9
(TIA Log 1095)


________________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________________

[29 eligible 2 =14.5 =15 (this is the simple majority)]
________________________________________________________________________________________

29 Eligible to Vote
7 Not Returned (Barber, Belke, Garza-Obregon, Kastanas, Meyer, Misel, Zeman)

22 Agree (Dimopoulos w/comment)
0 Disagree
0 Abstentions


22 Agree
0 Disagree
0 Abstentions


1 of 2

TECHNICAL COMMITTEE LETTER BALLOT
PROPOSED TENTATIVE INTERIM AMENDMENT LOG NO. 1095

To Revise 6.12.9 of Proposed 2014 Edition of NFPA 58

Question 1: I agree with the TECHNICAL MERITS of the Proposed TIA to revise 6.12.9.

______X______ AGREE ____________ DISAGREE* ____________ ABSTAIN*

EXPLANATION OF VOTE - Please type or print your comments:

*An explanation must accompany a disagreement or abstaining position.
The current wording of 6.12.9 would require the installation of a means to actuate all
emergency shutoff valves within a piping system in addition emergency shutoff valves
associated with rail transfer systems noted in paragraph 6.12.12. This requirement
would lead to unnecessary complexity and cost while the safety of the facility would not
be measurable enhanced. Actuation of the emergency shutoff valve associated with the
transfer operation adequately addresses this risk__________________________

Question 2: I agree that the subject is of an EMERGENCY NATURE.

______X______ AGREE ____________ DISAGREE* ____________ ABSTAIN*


_____________________________________________________________________

_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________

________________________________
Signature

_ Alexi Dimopoulos _________________
Name (Please Print)

_3 / 13 / 2013 ______________________
Date

Please return the ballot no later than Wednesday, March 13, 2013.

PLEASE RETURN TO:
Kimberly Shea
NFPA
1 Batterymarch Park
Quincy, MA 02169 FAX: (617) 984-7070 E-mail: kshea@nfpa.org
2 of 2
Item 13-8-15
NFPA

TIA Log No. 1079
Reference: 11.1.1, A.11.1.1, and 11.15.2
Comment Closing Date: J anuary 25, 2013
Submitter: Theodore Lemoff, TLemoff Engineering

1. Revise 11.1.1 and A.11.1.1 to read:

11.1.1* This chapter applies to engine fuel systems on vehicles using LP-Gas in internal combustion engines, including
containers, container appurtenances, carburetion equipment, piping, hose and fittings, and their installation.

A.11.1.1 Chapter 11 covers engine fuel systems for engines installed on vehicles for any purpose, as well as fuel systems
for stationary and portable engines.

2. Relocate 11.15.2 and subsequent paragraphs to a new Section 6.26 and renumber Section 11.16 as 11.15 and Section
6.26 as 6.27 and subsequent paragraphs:

11.15.2 6.26 Containers for Stationary Engines.

11.15.2.1 6.26.1 LP-Gas containers for stationary installations shall be located outside of buildings unless the buildings
comply with the requirements of Chapter 10.

11.15.2.2 6.26.2 Containers for stationary engines shall be installed to meet the separation requirements of Section 6.3.

11.15.2.3 6.26.3 Where containers for stationary engines have a fill valve with an integral manual shutoff valve, the
minimum separation distances shall be one-half of the distances specified in Section 6.3.

Submitters Substantiation: The addition of new subsection 11.15.2 placed requirements for containers providing
propane engine fuel for stationary engines. This requires all ASME propane containers to have a maximum allowable
working pressure (MAWP) of 312 psig, if constructed after April 1, 2001 (per 11.3.2.1). It is the intent of the LP-Gas
committee to require vehicle engine fuel containers to have a MAWP of 312 psig due to the possibility of overpressure
and propane release due to heat accumulated from the engine or the vehicles operation. This environment does not exist
for ASME propane containers serving stationary engines (such as emergency generators), and the normal MAWP of 250
psig is adequate. In practice such stationary engine fuel containers exist in the same environment as propane containers
providing fuel to residential heating and cooking.

The problem is ASME containers with a design pressure of 312 psig are currently produced in sizes up to 110 gallons.
Larger 312 psig ASME containers will have to be custom designed and manufactured at a significantly higher cost and
with a lengthy lead time. There is no technical reason to require this for stationary containers serving stationary engines.

It is noted that the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code requires a minimum wall thickness for pressure vessels, with a
design pressure of 250 and 312 psig, up to about 24 diameter. This requirement results in the same design for ASME
containers of about 24 diameter and smaller for pressure of 250 psig and 312 psig. Vehicle fuel containers have a
diameter of about 24 or smaller. This made the requirement for engine fuel containers on vehicles essentially the same,
so there was no hardship. Stationary engines normally use larger containers, for example it is not unusual for a hospital
using a propane engine for standby power to use a 250 gallon or larger ASME container. By relocating the requirement to
Chapter 6, the 250 psig ASME container currently used with no adverse safety implications can continue to be used.

The scope of Chapter 11 is revised to clarify that Chapter 11, in its entirety, is intended only for propane containers on
vehicle, and was never intended to be applicable to containers serving stationary engines.

Emergency Nature: The committee erred when it added requirements for containers for stationary engines in Chapter
11, rather than Chapter 6. The NFPA regulations Governing Committee Projects provide several criteria for the
emergency nature of TIAs. Two of these are applicable to the proposed TIA:
(a) The document contains an error or an omission that was overlooked during a regular revision process.
1 of 2
Formerly SC Item 13-3-6-a
(f) The proposed TIA intends to correct a circumstance in which the revised document has resulted in an adverse
impact on a product or method that was inadvertently overlooked in the total revision process, or was without
adequate technical (safety) justification for the action.
The committee required the use of tanks significantly more expensive and not readily available. (312 psig containers
rather than250 psig containers in sizes larger than 110 gallons) by locating the requirements in Chapter 11, rather than
Chapter 6. No technical substantiation was provided to require a change to the container design pressure; however, by
inadvertently locating the requirement in Chapter 11, a higher design pressure was inadvertently mandated.

2 of 2
Agenda Item: TIA 58-2011 and Proposed 2014 Edition
Document: NFPA 58, Liquid Petroleum Gas Code
Reference: 11.1.1, A.11.1.1, and 11.15.2
(TIA Log 1079)


________________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________________
[29 (eligible to vote) 8 (not returned) 1 (abstention) =20 0.75 =15]

________________________________________________________________________________________

29 Eligible to Vote
8 Not Returned (Belke, Dimopoulos, Fossa, Garza-Obregon, Kastanas, King, Meyer, Wilson)

17 Agree
3 Disagree (Gentry, McTier, Mortimer)
1 Abstention (Barber)


18 Agree
2 Disagree (McTier, Mortimer)
1 Abstention (Barber)


1 of 5
To Revise Section 11.1.1 and A.11.1.1, and Relocate 11.15.2 and subsequent paragraphs to a
new Section 6.26 and renumber Section 11.16 as 11.15 and Section 6.26 as 6.27 and subsequent
paragraphs of the 2011 Edition and Proposed 2014 Edition of
NFPA 58, Liquefied Petroleum Gas Code

Question 1: I agree with the TECHNICAL MERITS of the Proposed TIA to revise Section 11.1.1
and A.11.1.1 and Relocate 11.15.2 and subsequent paragraphs to a new Section 6.26 and
renumber Section 11.16 as 11.15 and Section 6.26 as 6.27 and subsequent paragraphs

_______ _____ AGREE ________X____ DISAGREE* ____________ ABSTAIN*


Just put an exception in Section 11 and I would accept the proposal.
___________________________________________________________________

_____________________________________________________________________


_____X_______ AGREE ____________ DISAGREE* ____________ ABSTAIN*


_____________________________________________________________________

_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________

Steven T. Gentry
Signature

Steven T. Gentry
Name (Please Print)

December 27, 2012
Date

Please return the ballot on or beforeDecember 27, 2012.

PLEASE RETURN TO:
J enny Depew, Administrator, Technical Projects
NFPA
1 Batterymarch Park
Quincy, MA 02169 FAX: (617) 984-7070 E-mail: jdepew@nfpa.org
2 of 5


____________ AGREE _____X_______ DISAGREE* ____________ ABSTAIN*


An additional 11.15.2.4_statement indicating that the pressure relief valve
requirements for ASME containers in stationary service for engine fuel
applications that are not for LP-Gas mobile service or for use on LP-Gas fueled
mobile vehicles shall not be less than a design pressure 250 psig_If the
Committee agrees that the present language is not clear rather than making any
other changes.
__________________________________________________________________

_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________


____________ AGREE _____X_______ DISAGREE* ____________ ABSTAIN*


_____________________________________________________________________

_This is not an emergency
situation.______________________________________________________________
______
_____________________________________________________________________

_Samuel McTier_______________________________
Signature

Samuel E. McTier________________________________
Name (Please Print)

_12/27/2012_______________________________
Date
3 of 5


____________ AGREE ______x______ DISAGREE* ____________ ABSTAIN*


_This does not look like and error, but a new requirement for stationary tanks that
is not impossible to meet.


____________ AGREE ____x________ DISAGREE* ____________ ABSTAIN*


The requirement may cost more, but that does not make it an emergency. Tanks
that meet the requirements are currently on the maket and can be placed into
service.

_______ _

Frank J . Mortimer

_12/20/2012_______
Date

Please return the ballot on or beforeDecember 27, 2012.

PLEASE RETURN TO:
J enny Depew, Administrator, Technical Projects
NFPA
1 Batterymarch Park
Quincy, MA 02169 FAX: (617) 984-7070 E-mail: jdepew@nfpa.org
4 of 5
From: Don Barber
Sent: Thursday, December 27, 2012 12:35 AM
To: Depew, J enny
Subject: NFPA 58 TIA Log No. 1079 TC Ballot

Dear J enny,

I will abstain from voting on this TIA. As an overseas member it is inappropriate for me to
commentor vote on a submission specifically for use in the USA.

Best regards,

Don Barber

On 14 December 2012 at 17:04 "Depew, J enny" <J Depew@nfpa.org>wrote:
To the Technical Committee on Liquefied Petroleum Gases:

Please see the attached pdf file regarding NFPA 58, proposed TIA No. 1079, and the word document of
the ballot form.

Please return the ballot to my attention via e-mail to: jdepew@nfpa.org, or via fax to: 617-984-7070. You
may also mail your ballot to: J enny Depew, NFPA,1 Batterymarch Park, Quincy, MA 02169 to arrive no
later than Thursday, December 27, 2012.

This information has also been posted on the Document Information page, which you may view by going
to www.nfpa.org/58next. Be sure to sign in with your NFPA username/password, and scroll to the
bottom to find the TIA category.

Thank you and have a nice day.

Jenny Depew
Administrator, Technical Projects

5 of 5
1 of 1
Formerly SC Item 13-3-6-c
Item 13-8-16

NFPA 70-Proposed 2014
National Electrical Code
TIA Log No. 1096
Reference: 516.3(A)(1)(a) and 516.10(A)
Comment Closing Date: May 24, 2013
Submitters: Donald Ankele, UL, LLC and Robert J ones, Independent Electrical Contractors, Inc.

1. Remove the indication that 516.3(A)(1)(a) is to be deleted and renumber as needed. This is an error in ROC Comment 14-67 to
read as follows:
(A) Zone Classification of Locations.
(1) For the purposes of this Article, the Zone system of electrical area classification shall be applied as follows:
(a) The inside of open or closed containers or vessels shall be considered a Class I, Zone 0 location.
(b) A Class I, Division 1 location shall be permitted to be alternatively classified as a Class I, Zone 1 location.
(c) A Class I, Division 2 location shall be permitted to be alternatively classified as a Class I, Zone 2 location.
(d) A Class II, Division 1 location shall be permitted to be alternatively classified as a Zone 21 location.
(e) A Class II, Division 2 location shall be permitted to be alternatively classified as a Zone 22 location. [33: 6.2.2]

2. Change the second to last sentence of 516.10(A) and add an informational note as shown in ROC Comment 14-67 to read as
follows:

The installation of electrostatic spraying equipment shall comply with 516.10(A)(1) through (A)(10). Spray equipment shall be listed
except as otherwise permitted. All automatic electrostatic equipment systems shall comply with 516.4(A)(1) through (A)(9).
Informational Note: For more information on listing and approval of electrostatic spray equipment, see NFPA 33-2011, Standard
for Spray Application Using Flammable or Combustible Materials, Section 11.5. NFPA 33 permits certain electrostatic spray
equipment to be approved for use when additional mitigation equipment is employed.

Submitters Substantiation: This TIA was created because the comment 14-67 as accepted by CMP-14 included wording in that did
not comply with the NEC Style Manual in addition to other errors. The TCC directed that the wording be revised to comply with the
style manual. In doing so, the entire rewrite of Article 516 that was accepted by CMP-14 was taken out of the 2014 Code cycle
because the required revision is a technical change to the proposal. A technical change requires an affirmative ballot of CMP-14. This
process is the mechanism to affect that change and simultaneously keep this significant effort in sync with the 2014 NEC.

Emergency Nature: NFPA 70:2011 contains errors that were overlooked during the 2011 revision process and contains major
conflicts with other NFPA standards.

It was identified that the 2011 NEC Article 516 text stated that extracted text was taken from the 2011 editions of NFPA 33 and NFPA
34 while the actual extracted text in Article 516 is from the 2007 editions of NFPA 33 and NFPA 34. The task group formed between
the Finishing Processes Committee and Code Making Panel 14 rewrote Article 516 in its entirety in order to include the correct 2011
extracted text and to reflect major revisions in both of the referenced standards.

1 of 1
TIA 70
-Proposed 2014
NFPA 70, National Electrical Code

Reference: 516.3(A)(1)(a) and 516.10(A)
(TIA Log 1096)


TIA FINAL CC BALLOT RESULTS
________________________________________________________________________________________
both Question 1 (Correlation Issues) and Question 2 (Emergency Nature).
________________________________________________________________________________________
[12 (eligible to vote) 0 (not returned) 1 (abstention) =11 0.75 =8.25]

________________________________________________________________________________________

12 Eligible to Vote
0 Not Returned

CC FINAL Ballot results for Correlation Issues are as follows:
10 Agree
1 Disagree (Hickman)
1 Abstention (Fiske)

________________________________________________________________________________________
[12 (eligible to vote) 0 (not returned) 0 (abstentions) =12 0.75 =9]

________________________________________________________________________________________

CC FINAL Ballot results for Emergency Nature are as follows:
9 Agree
3 Disagree (Fiske, Hickman, Liggett)
0 Abstentions


Final NEC-P14 Ballots are on the next page
1 of 7
TIA FINAL CMP-14 BALLOT RESULTS
________________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________________________

14 Eligible to Vote
3 Not Returned (Fiske, McBride, Jamison)

10 Agree
0 Disagree
1 Abstention (Wechsler)

________________________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________________________

9 Agree
0 Disagree
2 Abstentions (Burns, Wechsler)


2 of 7
CORRELATING COMMITTEE
LETTER BALLOT
To Revise 516.3(A)(1)(a) and 516.10(A) of the Proposed 2014 edition
of NFPA 70, National Electrical Code

Question 1: I agree that there are no correlation issues in accordance with 3.4.2 and 3.4.3 (copy
enclosed) of the NFPA Regs.

____________ AGREE ____________ DISAGREE* _____X______ ABSTAIN*


*An explanation must accompany a disagreement or abstaining position. If disagreeing, cite relevant
section(s)/paragraph(s) of the correlation issue and describe.
As written, 516.3(A)(1) conflicts with both 505.7 and 506.7. Thus, if adopted, Article 516 would permit
something not permitted by Articles 505 and 506; however, the TI A contains all extracted text (taken
from NFPA 33). The intent of CMP-14 was to extract NFPA 33 text, but in so doing, it created a
potential conflict. To lose this text is to revert to the ROC draft version of Article 516 with all its
imperfections. This is an unfortunate situation, to say the
least._____________________________________________________________________

_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________

Question 2: I agree that the subject of this TIA is of an EMERGENCY NATURE.

____________ AGREE ____X______ DISAGREE* ____________ ABSTAIN*


*An explanation must accompany a negative/disagreement or abstaining position.
_I t is not obvious that the NFPA can issue a TI A to a document that has not completed the
consensus process and become a published standard (as is the case with NFPA 70-2014).
Changes to the ROC draft could be made via NI TMAM at the 2013 Technical Session. I t
would seem that everyone understands that TI As are for published codes and standards, but
that is not expressly stated in the Regulations Governing Committee Projects (or in the
Regulations Governing the Development of NFPA Standards). I f NFPA 70-2014 had been
issued as of this ballot date, we would agree that the TI A is of an emergency
nature.____________________________________________________________________

_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________

Signature
William T. Fiske_______________
Name (Please Print)
3 of 7
1
Shea, Kimberly
From: Palmer Hickman [phickman@njatc.org]
Sent: Monday, May 13, 2013 1:56 PM
To: Shea, Kimberly
Cc: Walker, Nancy; jimdollard98@aol.com
Subject: RE: NEC Proposed TIA 1096 Ballot Circulation
Kim,

Mr. Fiske's concerns are persuasive. Accordingly, please record me as voting "Disagree" on Questions 1 and 2. I am not
convinced that the Regs. allow us to vote on a TIA on a Code that is not yet final.

Kind regards,
Palmer
From: Shea, Kimberly [kshea@NFPA.org]
Sent: Wednesday, May 08, 2013 9:13 AM
To: Shea, Kimberly
Cc: Walker, Nancy
Subject: NEC Proposed TIA 1096 Ballot Circulation
NECCorrelatingCommitteeMembers:
AttachedpleasefindthecirculationofballotsonproposedTIA1096.ChangesinvoteareduenolaterthanTuesday,
May14,2013.
KimberlyShea
Administrator,TechnicalProjects
NFPA
1BatterymarchPark
Quincy,MA02169
6179847953
4 of 7
CORRELATING COMMITTEE
LETTER BALLOT
To Revise 516.3(A)(1)(a) and 516.10(A) of the Proposed 2014 edition
of NFPA 70, National Electrical Code

Question 1: I agree that there are no correlation issues in accordance with 3.4.2 and 3.4.3 (copy
enclosed) of the NFPA Regs.

____XX________ AGREE ____________ DISAGREE* ____________ ABSTAIN*


*An explanation must accompany a disagreement or abstaining position. If disagreeing, cite relevant
section(s)/paragraph(s) of the correlation issue and describe.
_____________________________________________________________________

_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________

Question 2: I agree that the subject of this TIA is of an EMERGENCY NATURE.

____________ AGREE ____XX________ DISAGREE* ____________ ABSTAIN*


*An explanation must accompany a negative/disagreement or abstaining position.
I am concerned that this has been a reaction to the CC note and not a thoroughly thought
out approach. I am also concerned that the error of deleting 516.3(A)(1)(a). This portion
could be considered as an true emergency but not the rest of the changes. Perhaps another
TIA could be issued to correct only this oversight.

____Danny Liggett____________________________
Signature
_____Danny Liggett___________________________
Name (Please Print)
____5-7-2013___________________________
Date

Ballots are due no later than Wednesday, May 8, 2013

PLEASE RETURN TO:
Kim Shea, Project Administrator
NFPA
1 Batterymarch Park
Quincy, MA 02169 FAX: (617) 984-7070 E-mail: kshea@nfpa.org
5 of 7
6 of 7
7 of 7
Item 13-8-17
NFPA 70-Proposed 2014
TIA Log No. 1097
Reference: 445.20
Submitters: Joseph Harding, PGMA

1. Revise 445.20 to read as follows:

445.20 Ground-Fault Circuit Interrupter Protection for Receptacles on 15 kW or Smaller, Portable Generators. All 125-volt,
single-phase, 15-and 20 ampere receptacle outlets, that are a part of a 15 kW or smaller, portable generator, either shall have ground-
fault circuit interrupter protection for personnel integral to the generator or receptacle, or shall not be available for use when the
125/250 volt locking-type receptacle is in use. If the generator does not have a 125/250 volt locking-type receptacle or was
manufactured or remanufactured prior to J anuary 1, 2015, this requirement shall not apply.

Submitters Substantiation: On behalf of the Portable Generator Manufacturers' Association, I am proposing a Tentative Interim
Amendment (TIA) for NEC 2014.

This proposed TIA is directed towards a new section for NEC 2014, Section 445.20. This new section originated as Proposal 13-19
during the proposal phase, and was modified by Comment 13-16 during the comment phase.

The new Section 445.20 attempts to address a theoretical electrical shock hazard associated with the use of 15kW or smaller portable
generators. Given the structure and application of the NEC, as Section 445.20 is written, it would apply to the use of any 15 kW or
smaller portable generator -- regardless of its date of manufacture -- under circumstances covered by the NEC. This (presumably
unintended) retroactive application of the NEC effectively would ban the use of millions of portable generators that have been, and
continue to be, used safely. To retroactively apply the NEC in this manner is uncharacteristic, and is an unfair, not to mention
unnecessary, burden on consumers, trades people and society as a whole, particularly given the complete lack of historical electrical
shock incident data to support the requirement in the first instance.
The proposed TIA, if accepted, would not be the first time that a new NEC section has (a) expressly indicated that it should not be
applied retroactively and (b) provided a lead time for design compliance. Rather, a precedent for the proposed TIA was set during the
NEC 2011 code making cycle when Proposal 3-140 for Section 590.6 was accepted in principle by Code-Making Panel 3.
Specifically, Proposal 3-140 (and what eventually became Section 590.6(A)(3)) provided an alternative means of compliance for
generators manufactured prior to the effective date of the 2011 NEC.
1
It is noteworthy that Code-Making Panel 3 recognized the
problem surrounding retroactive applicability and therefore modified the original proposal to add an effectivity date. The last
paragraph of the Panel Statement from Code-Making Panel 3 stated:
"The revisions to the wording also clarified the requirements for GFCI protection on 15 kW or less portable generators, with
information added, that will ensure that this requirement does not apply to manufactured or remanufactured generators prior
to J anuary 1, 2011."
Like Proposal 3-140, the proposed TIA makes clear that the new section should not be retroactively applied. The proposed TIA
suggests a slightly longer lead time than that which Code-Making Panel 3 allowed when Proposal 3-140 was accepted in principle, but
there is good reason for a longer lead time in this instance. The addition of Section 445.20 will require all generators that feature a
125/250 volt locking-type receptacle, regardless of intended use or applicability to have GFCI protection on the 125 volt 15/20 amp
outlets. This will require manufacturers to redesign a wide range of existing product. This broad scale design change merits a longer
lead time (of an additional year) than that provided in Proposal 3-140.

1
Section 590.6(A)(3) states (3) Receptacles on 15 kW or less Portable Generators. All 125-volt and 125/250-volt, single-phase,
15-, 20-, and 30-ampere receptacle outlets that are a part of a 15 kW or smaller portable generator shall have listed ground-fault circuit
interrupter protection for personnel. Listed cord sets or devices incorporating listed ground-fault circuit-interrupter protection for
personnel identified for portable use shall be permitted for use with 15kW or less portable generators manufactured or remanufactured
prior to J anuary 1, 2011.
1 of 2
Emergency Nature: PGMA and its members have determined that this proposed TIA is of an emergency nature requiring prompt
action in accordance with 5.3 of the NFPA Regulations Governing Committee Projects, for the following reasons:
(a) The document contains an error or an omission that was overlooked during
a regular revision process; and
(f) The proposed TIA intends to correct a circumstance in which the revised document has resulted in an adverse impact on a
product or method that was inadvertently overlooked in the total revision process, or was without adequate technical (safety)
justification for the action.
While your organization is reviewing the proposed TIA, we also encourage several grammatical corrections to Section 445.20,
specifically that the three (3) commas identified below be removed. Not only are these commas unnecessary, they may lead to
incorrect interpretations by those who rely on the code.

2 of 2
TIA 70
-Proposed 2014

Reference: 445.20
(TIA Log 1097)


________________________________________________________________________________________
According to 5.4 in the NFPA (RGCP), the final results show this TIA HAS NOT achieved the necessary votes
on both Question 1 (Correlation Issues) and Question 2 (Emergency Nature).
________________________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________________________

12 Eligible to Vote
0 Not Returned

7 Agree
5 Disagree (Brunssen, Bunker, Fiske, Hickman, LaBrake)
0 Abstentions

FINAL ACTION: FAILED

4 Agree (Brunssen, Drake, Hittinger w/comment)
8 Disagree (Bunker, Fiske, J ohnston, Kovacik, Hickman, LaBrake, Liggett, Owen)
0 Abstentions


Final NEC-P13 Ballots are on the next page

1 of 24
TIA FINAL CMP-13 BALLOT RESULTS
________________________________________________________________________________________
According to 5.4 in the NFPA (RGCP), the final results show this TIA HAS NOT achieved the necessary votes
on both Question 1 (Technical Merit) and Question 2 (Emergency Nature).
________________________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________________________

20 Eligible to Vote
1 Not Returned (Keenan)

10 Agree (Paulsen w/comment)
9 Disagree (Adams, Currin, J r., Froemming, Little, Nesser, Ode, Savage, Tobias, J r., White)
0 Abstentions


10 Agree (Paulsen w/comment)
9 Disagree (Adams, Caron, Currin, J r., Little, Nesser, Ode, Savage, Tobias, J r., White)
0 Abstentions


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1 of 1

Secretary/Treasurer:
THOMAS ASSOCIATES, INC.

1300 Sumner Ave. Cleveland, Ohio 44115-2851 216-241-7333 Fax 216-241-0105
URL: www.pgmaonline.com
J une 6, 2013

Ms. Linda Fuller
Manager, Codes and Standards Administration
1 Batterymarch Park
Quincy, MA 02169

Via Email: lfuller@nfpa.org

SUBJ ECT: Proposed Tentative Interim Amendment (Log #1097) on NFPA 70,
, 2014 edition

Dear Ms. Fuller,

In response to your attached letter dated May 22, 2013, the Portable Generator
Manufacturers' Association wishes to file an appeal with the Standards Council regarding
the subject proposed Tentative Interim Amendment. In addition, we would like to
request a hearing with the Standards Council at its J uly 29 August 1, 2013 meeting.

Sincerely,

J OSEPH HARDING
Technical Director

J H/jlb
pgma
Attachment

E-mail: pgma@pgmaonline.com

Attachment 13-8-17-d
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May 22, 2013 EMAIL: jharding@thomasamc.com

Mr. J oseph Harding
Technical Director
Portable Generator Manufacturers Association
1300 Sumner Avenue
Cleveland, OH 44115-2851

Dear Mr. Harding:

This letter is to notify you that the proposed Tentative Interim Amendment (Log #1097) on
, 2012 edition, did not pass ballot of the Technical

Committee on both Technical Merit and the Emergency Nature. As you know, this is deemed to
be a recommendation of the Committee to the Standards Council that this TIA not be issued. A
recommendation for approval of the TIA by the Committee requires a three-fourths affirmative
vote.

In accordance with section 1.6.2 (c) of the Regulations Governing Committee Projects
(enclosed), parties wishing to appear in person before the Council shall notify the Council
Secretary. Although not required, parties wishing to advocate a position are encouraged, to the
extent practicable, to file written submissions in general conformance with 1.6.3 and 1.6.4 in
advance of the meeting at which action will be considered.

The Standards Council will consider the issuance of this TIA at its J uly 29 August 1, 2013
meeting. If you wish to file an appeal with the Standards Council, please let us know what
your intentions are by June 7, 2013. In addition, please let us know if you also wish to be in
attendance to address the Standards Council on this issue.

Very truly yours,

Linda Fuller

LF/nmw

cc: M. Earley, Staff Liaison
(TIA #1097)
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Appeal Documentation for NFPA 70 Appeal Documentation for NFPA 70 Appeal Documentation for NFPA 70 Appeal Documentation for NFPA 70
Tentative Interim Amendment Tentative Interim Amendment
(TIA) Log No. 1097 (TIA) Log No. 1097 (TIA) Log No. 1097 (TIA) Log No. 1097
Supplemental Attachment 13-8-17-d
Page 1 of 12
Appellant Information Appellant Information Appellant Information Appellant Information
J oseph Harding
Technical Director
Portable Generator Manufacturers Portable Generator Manufacturers
Association (PGMA)
1300 Sumner Avenue 1300 Sumner Avenue
Cleveland, OH 44115
Page 2 of 12
Particular Action To Which The Particular Action To Which The
A l R l t A l R l t Appeal Relates Appeal Relates
PGMA requests that the Standards
Council issue the proposed TIA Log p p g
No. 1097, as amended in this
document, in accordance with the ,
NFPA Regulations Governing
Committee Projects section 5.6 b) j )
Page 3 of 12
Grounds For TheAppeal Grounds For TheAppeal Grounds For The Appeal Grounds For The Appeal
The new section 445.20 for NEC 2014 will
i th d i f j it f ll 15 require the redesign of a majority of all 15
KW or smaller portable generators sold in
the United States the United States.
PGMA believes that NEC Code-Making
Panel 13 simply overlooked establishing Panel 13 simply overlooked establishing
an effectivity date for this new
requirement, similar to the effectivity date q y
given for section 590.6 (A) (3) in NEC
2011 for portable generators used in
t i i i t ll ti temporary wiring installations.
Page 4 of 12
Adding an effectivity date to new
Section 445.20 solves two major
issues:
Allows manufacturers sufficient time to
redesign their products in order to
l ith NEC 2014 comply with NEC 2014
Avoids retroactive applicability of this
i t f i t l GFCI new requirement for integral GFCI on
older portable generators and allows a
corded (external) GFCI option corded (external) GFCI option
Page 5 of 12
As currently written, new Section
445.20 would make the vast majority
of 15 kW or smaller portable
generators that use a 125/250V
locking receptacle obsolete.
There are currently millions of units
safely in use. y
No incident data supports making
these units obsolete.
Page 6 of 12
Making these units obsolete would
force portable generator users to
purchase new units that comply with
445.20 as written.
This would be an unnecessary y
burden on consumers, trades people
and society as a whole, especially y p y
given the lack of incident data.
Page 7 of 12
PGMA submitted proposed TIA Log
No. 1097 in order to establish an
effectivity date as follows:
445.20 Ground-Fault Circuit Interrupter Protection for
Receptacles on 15 kW or Smaller, Portable Generators.
All 125-volt, single-phase, 15-and 20 ampere receptacle
outlets, that are a part of a 15 kW or smaller, portable
generator, either shall have ground fault circuit interrupter
protection for personnel integral to the generator or
t l h ll t b il bl f h th receptacle, or shall not be available for use when the
125/250 volt locking-type receptacle is in use. If the
generator does not have a 125/250 volt locking-type
receptacle or was manufactured or remanufactured prior to receptacle or was manufactured or remanufactured prior to
J anuary 1, 2015, this requirement shall not apply.
Page 8 of 12
Grounds For The Appeal Grounds For The Appeal pp pp
The proposed TIA failed ballot at the CMP-
13 level (11 agree, 9 disagree) on both
l i i d correlation issues and emergency nature.
The nine members who disagreed on
correlation issues did so for the same correlation issues did so for the same
reason. All of them felt that for existing
portable generators without integral GFCI,
the use of listed cord sets or devices the use of listed cord sets or devices
incorporating listed ground-fault circuit-
interrupter protection for personnel
identified for portable use should be identified for portable use should be
required.
No members felt that existing portable
t ith t i t l GFCI h ld generators without integral GFCI should
be made obsolete.
Page 9 of 12
The reasons for disagreeing with the The reasons for disagreeing with the
emergency nature of the TIA were
more diverse: more diverse:
Three felt there was no emergency since the TIA was
incorrect.
Two felt there was no emergency since there was no
hazard to society.
Two felt the TIA should have been a NITMAM
One stated the situation does not fit the emergency
nature outlined in NFPA Regulations 5.3 a) through f)
One stated that the new section 445.20 does not impose p
a severe burden on manufacturers
Page 10 of 12
Grounds For The Appeal Grounds For The Appeal pp pp
PGMA believes that the proposed TIA p p
clearly meets the emergency nature
criteria outlined in 5.3 a) and 5.3 f): ) )
5.3 a) The document contains an error or an
omission that was overlooked during a regular
revision process revision process.
5.3 f) The proposed TIA intends to correct a
circumstance in which the revised document
has resulted in an adverse impact on a product
or method that was inadvertently overlooked in
the total revision process or was without the total revision process, or was without
adequate technical (safety) justification for the
action.
Page 11 of 12
Precise Relief Requested Precise Relief Requested Precise Relief Requested Precise Relief Requested
PGMA accepts the view of the CMP-13 members
who disagreed with the TIA on correlation issues. g
We propose to correct this with the following
revised text for 445.20:
445 20 Ground Fault Circuit Interrupter Protection for 445.20 Ground-Fault Circuit Interrupter Protection for
Receptacles on 15 kW or Smaller, Portable Generators. All
125-volt, single-phase, 15-and 20 ampere receptacle outlets
that are a part of a 15 kW or smaller portable generator either
shall have ground-fault circuit interrupter protection for
personnel integral to the generator or receptacle, or shall not be
available for use when the 125/250 volt locking-type receptacle
is in use If the generator was manufactured or remanufactured is in use. If the generator was manufactured or remanufactured
prior to J anuary 1, 2015, listed cord sets or devices
incorporating listed ground-fault circuit-interrupter protection for
personnel identified for portable use shall be permitted. If the
generator does not have a 125/250 volt locking-type receptacle,
this requirement shall not apply.
Page 12 of 12
Item 13-8-18
NFPA

Health Care Facilities Code
TIA Log No. 1104
Reference: 10.2.3.6(5) and A.10.2.3.6(5)
Submitter: Harvey Kostinsky, ECRI Institute

1. Delete entire subsection 10.2.3.6(5) as follows:

(5) *Means are employed to ensure that additional devices or nonmedical equipment cannot be connected to the multiple
outlet extension cord after leakage currents have been verified as safe.

2. Delete corresponding Annex A material A.10.2.3.6(5) as follows:

A.10.2.3.6(5) Power taps used in conjunction with an isolated power system are not subject to this requirement.

Submitters Substantiation: The Technical Committee accepted a public comment (NFPA 99 HEA-MED A11 ROC;
99-307 Log #272 HEA-MED) which would have deleted 10.2.3.6 (5), but another public comment 99-308 Log #64 HEA-
MED on that section was Accepted in Principal and resulted in adding annex material A.10.2.3.6 (5) to that section. (Both
items reported in the NFPA 99 Report on Comments A2011.) NFPA, when compiling the revised version of the
document, did not incorporate the first committee action and implemented the second action, without determining the
position of the committee on this issue.

Technical background: Both of the ROC proposals were based on the recognition that it is impractical to completely
eliminate the use in hospitals of multiple outlet extension cords that allow clinicians and staff to plug and unplug devices
as needed. The situation in the OR was adeptly explained in ROC 99-308 Log #64, It is near impossible to plug all
electrical devices used in an operating room to a wall receptacle. The cord length on equipment are not long enough to
reach the wall and even if it did it would restrict safe movement around the OR table. The problem, however, exists not
just in the OR. For example, it is often necessary to use three or more infusion pumps, in addition to other devices, on one
patient in a patient room. There may not be an adequate number of outlets nearby and running multiple cords, perhaps
with extension cords, can hamper access to the patient and present a trip hazard. Instead, having an appropriate quality
and properly maintained multiple outlet extension cord mounted on an IV pole, allows a safe method of powering
whatever number of IV pumps is needed for a patient.
The Committee action to accept proposal 99-307 Log #272 would have allowed this type of use of multiple outlet
extension cords and eliminated any need for further exceptions or annex material.
Furthermore, the use of isolated power, currently mentioned in the annex material, does not address concerns related to
touch (leakage) current values that are addressed in the main text to which the annex comment is attached. Isolated power
does not limit equipment touch currents to values required within the main document.

Emergency Nature: Uncorrected, the present requirements pose an unreasonable burden on hospitals and clinicians and
restricts safe access to patients not only in the operating room, but also in other patient care areas. Furthermore, as
accrediting bodies, such as The J oint Commission (TJ C) and the U.S. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services
(CMMS) incorporate these requirements into their assessments and survey processes, it becomes increasingly difficult to
reverse these decisions and facilities are forced to implement alternative practices that may be either unnecessarily
expensive (e.g., renovations to increase outlet numbers and accessibility throughout the hospital) or less safe (e.g., use of
more single outlet extension cords running greater distances to access multiple wall outlets). Hospitals have already
approached ECRI Institute regarding this problem, and it is therefore not just a theoretical concern, but one which
facilities are being forced to address now.
This TIA would address at least three of the factors to be considered when assessing the emergency nature of a TIA
proposal (REGULATIONS GOVERNING COMMITTEE PROJ ECTS,
http://www.nfpa.org/assets/files/PDF/CodesStandards/Directory/RegsGovCommProjects_2012.pdf)
(b) The document contains a conflict within the document or with another NFPA document. This factor applies, because,
as discussed in the technical background above, the Annex reference to isolated power is not related to the associated
main document text.
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(d) The proposed TIA intends to offer to the public a benefit that would lessen a recognized (known) hazard or ameliorate
a continuing dangerous condition or situation. Adherence to the requirements may hinder access to the patient and pose a
trip hazard.
(f) The proposed TIA intends to correct a circumstance in which the revised document has resulted in an adverse impact
on a product or method that was inadvertently overlooked in the total revision process, or was without adequate technical
(safety) justification for the action. As discussed above, the current situation is the result of NFPA procedures in place at
the time (and since corrected) that allowed for decisions to be made based on a procedural mishap without addressing
technical considerations.

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TIA 99-2012 and Proposed 2015 Edition
NFPA 99, Health Care Facilities Code
Reference: 10.2.3.6(5) and A.10.2.3.6(5)
(TIA Log 1104)


________________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________________________

19 Eligible to Vote
3 Not Returned (Brannan, Gagnon, Jensen)

16 Agree
0 Disagree
0 Abstentions


16 Agree
0 Disagree
0 Abstentions


Final HEA-MED Ballots are on the next page
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TIA FINAL HEA-MED BALLOT RESULTS
________________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________________________

14 Eligible to Vote
3 Not Returned (Brousseau, King, Silver)

11 Agree
0 Disagree
0 Abstention


11 Agree
0 Disagree
0 Abstention


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Item 13-8-19
March 28, 2013

Harold Levitt William Connell
Port Authority of New York and New Jersey PB Americas, Inc.
PATH Department 75 Arlington Street
One PATH Plaza-8th Floor Boston, MA 02116
Jersey City, NJ 07306

Messrs. Levitt and Connell:

I am transmitting to you herewith the following action of the Standards Council (March 6-7, 2013):

The Council voted to defer action on issuing proposed Tentative Interim Amendments (TIAs) to Sections 5.4.10,
6.3.3.2.10, 7.7.10, A.5.4.10.3, A.6.3.3.2.10.2 and A.7.7.10.2 of the 2010 and proposed 2014 editions of NFPA 130,
Standard for Fixed Guideway Transit and Passenger Rail Systems, (TIA No.1080) and to Sections 12.1.2 and A.12.1.2
of the 2011 and proposed 2014 editions of NFPA 502, Standard for Road Tunnels, Bridges, and Other Limited Access
Highways, (TIA No. 1083). The Council has directed that the Technical Committee on Road Tunnel and Highway
Fire Protection and the Technical Committee on Fixed Guideway Transit and Passenger Rail Systems seek further
input from the National Electrical Code (NEC) Correlating Committee and NEC Code Making Panel 13 on whether
these TIAs, if issued, would cause any correlation issues with documents that report through the National Electrical
Code Project. The Council requests that the NEC Correlating Committee and NEC Code Making Panel 13 responses
be submitted to the Secretary of the Standards Council for dissemination to the technical committees responsible for
NFPA 130 and NFPA 502 for their consideration. Once the Committees have reviewed the responses from the NEC
and develop a course of action, they should report back to the Standards Council at their August, 2013 meeting.
Standards Council Member Kerry Bell recused himself during the deliberations and vote on the issue.

Very truly yours,

Linda Fuller, Manager
Codes and Standards Administration

c: D. Moeller, M. Johnston, R. Bielen, W. Burke, M. Earley, R. Solomon, S. Stanek, G. Harrington, N. Walker
TC Fixed Guideway Transit and Passenger Rail Systems
TC Road Tunnel and Highway Fire Protection
NEC Correlating Committee
Interested Parties

13-3-11
13-3-12
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Formerly SC Item 13-3-11
and SC Item 13-3-12

NFPA

Standard for Fixed Guideway Transit and Passenger Rail Systems
TIA Log No. 1080
Reference: 5.4.10, 6.3.3.2.10, 7.7.10, A.5.4.10.3, A.6.3.3.2.10.2, and A.7.7.10.2
Comment Closing Date: February 13, 2013
Submitter: Harold Levitt, Port Authority of New York & New Jersey

Proposed language to the 2010 edition.

1. Revise 5.4.10 and add a new 5.4.10.1, 5.4.10.2, and 5.4.10.3 to read as follows:

5.4.10 Fire-Resistive Cables. Fire-resistive cables shall be listed and have a minimum 1-hour fire-resistive rating in
accordance with ANSI/UL 2196 and shall be installed per the listing requirements.
5.4.10.1 Fire-resistive cables shall be tested by an approved testing laboratory in a totally enclosed furnace using the
ASTM E 119 time-temperature curve.
5.4.10.2 The cables shall demonstrate functionality for no less than 1 hour, as described in the ANSI/UL 2196 test
standard.
5.4.10.3* The cables and systems shall comply with the following:
(a) Fire-resistive cables intended for installation in a raceway, be tested in the type of raceway in which they are
intended to be installed.
(b) Installation instructions that describe the tested assembly and only the components included in the tested assembly
are acceptable for installation.

2. Revise 6.3.3.2.10 and add a new 6.3.3.2.10.1 and 6.3.3.2.10.2 to read as follows:

6.3.3.2.10 Fire-resistive cables used for emergency lighting and communication shall be listed and have a minimum 1-
hour fire-resistive rating in accordance with ANSI/UL 2196 and shall be installed per the listing requirements. Fire-
resistive cables used for emergency lighting and communication shall be tested by an approved testing laboratory in a
totally enclosed furnace using the ASTM E 119 time-temperature curve.
6.3.3.2.10.1 The cables shall demonstrate functionality for no less than 1 hour, as described in the ANSI/UL 2196 test
standard.
6.3.3.2.10.2* The cables and systems shall comply with the following:

3. Revise 7.7.10 and add a new 7.7.10.1 and 7.7.10.2 to read as follows:

7.7.10 Fire-resistive cables shall be listed and have a minimum 1-hour fire-resistive rating in accordance with
ANSI/UL2196 and shall be installed per the listing requirements. Fire-resistive cables shall be tested by an approved
testing laboratory in a totally enclosed furnace using the ASTM E 119 time-temperature curve.
7.7.10.1 The cables shall demonstrate functionality for no less than 1 hour, as described in the ANSI/UL 2196 test
standard.
7.7.10.2* The cables and systems shall comply with the following:

4. Add a new A.5.4.10.3, A.6.3.3.2.10.2, and A.7.7.10.2 to read as follows:

A.5.4.10.3 When selecting a fire-resistive cable, it is important to understand how it will be installed and if it was tested as
a complete system, including splices. Cables that are exposed (not embedded in concrete) should be protected using either
a raceway or an armor/sheath (see 5.4.2). There are two basic configurations of fire-resistive cables:
Page 1 of 3
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(1) Cables enclosed by a metallic sheath or armor, such as Type MI or Type MC, are installed without raceways.
(2) Cables that are installed in a raceway, such as Type RHW-2, Type TC, or Type CM, are tested as a complete system.

Regardless of the fire test standard used to evaluate fire-resistive cables that will be installed in a raceway, it is important
to consider that the cables are only one part of the system. Other components of the system include but are not limited to
the type of raceway, the size of raceway, raceway support, raceway couplings, boxes, conduit bodies, splices where used,
vertical supports, grounds, and pulling lubricants. Each cable type should be tested to demonstrate compatibility. Only the
specific types of raceways tested should be acceptable for installation. Each cable type that is intended to be installed in
raceway should be tested in both a horizontal configuration and a vertical configuration to demonstrate circuit integrity.

A.6.3.3.2.10.2 When selecting a fire-resistive cable, it is important to understand how it will be installed and if it was
tested as a complete system, including splices. Cables that are exposed (not embedded in concrete) should be protected
using either a raceway or an armor/sheath (see 5.4.2). There are two basic configurations of fire-resistive cables:


A.7.7.10.2 When selecting a fire-resistive cable, it is important to understand how it will be installed and if it was tested as
a complete system, including splices. Cables that are exposed (not embedded in concrete) should be protected using either
a raceway or an armor/sheath (see 5.4.2). There are two basic configurations of fire-resistive cables:


Proposed language to the proposed 2014 edition.

1. Revise Section 12.5 (added via 130-165 Log #CC15 in the Second Draft) to read as follows:

12.5 Fire-Resistive Cables.

12.5.1 Fire-resistive cables shall be be listed and have a minimum 1-hour fire resistance rating tested by an approved
testing laboratory in a totally enclosed furnace using the ASTM E 119 time-temperature curve
12.5.2 The cables shall demonstrate functionality for no less than 1 hour, as described in the ANSI/UL 2196 test standard.
12.5.3 The cables and systems shall comply with the following:
(1)* Fire-resistive cables intended for installation in a raceway shall be tested in the type of raceway in which they
are intended to be installed.
(2) Each fire-resistive cable system have installation instructions that outline the test procedure and only the
components stated in the test report are acceptable for actual installations.

A.12.5.3(1) When selecting a fire-resistive cable, it is important to understand how it will be installed and if it was tested
as a complete system, including splices. Cables that are exposed (not embedded in concrete) should be protected using
either a metallic raceway or an armor/sheath (see 12.4.1). There are two basic configurations of fire-resistive cables.
Page 2 of 3
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raceway should be tested in both a horizontal configuration and avertical configuration to demonstrate circuit integrity.

Submitters Substantiation: This correction addresses the recent action of UL pertaining to their UL 2196, Standard for
Safety for Test for Fire Resistive Cables, 2012. Specifically, as of September 12, 2012, UL has withdrawn all cable
certifications (listings) to this test standard. Recent fire testing has demonstrated that hot-dipped galvanized coatings on
the interior surface of raceways can cause premature failure of copper fire-resistive cable systems.
NFPA 130, 2010 edition currently allows the use of fire-resistive cable listed in accordance with UL 2196, Standard for
Safety for Test for Fire Resistive Cables, 2012. Because NFPA 130 had relied upon the UL listing for compliance, this UL
action has changed the standard.

Emergency Nature: The 2010 edition of the document contains listing requirements that are no longer available for fire-
resistive cables. The proposed revision provides prescriptive requirements for obtaining the equivalent fire resistance
without obtaining UL certification (listing). Several projects currently in the design and construction phase are being
burdened by this UL action and are seeking the direction of this Technical Committee.

Page 3 of 3
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Document: NFPA 130, Standard for Fixed Guideway Transit and Passenger Rail Systems
Reference: 5.4.10, 6.3.3.2.10, 7.7.10, A.5.4.10.3, A.6.3.3.2.10.2, and A.7.7.10.2
(TIA Log 1080)


TIA TC PRELIMINARY BALLOT RESULTS
________________________________________________________________________________________
According to 5.4 in the NFPA (RGCP), the preliminary results show this TIA IS achieving the necessary votes
________________________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________________________

32 Eligible to Vote
9 Not Returned (Grizard, Harrison, Hunt, Mao, Markos, Middlebrook, Peacock, Thomas, & Weng)

TC PRELIMINARY Ballot results for Technical Merit are as follows:
21 Agree
2 Disagree (Devlin, Koffel)
0 Abstentions

PRELIMINARY ACTION: PASSING

20 Agree
3 Disagree (Devlin, Koffel, Nelsen)
0 Abstentions


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Formerly SC Item 13-3-11-b
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To: Standards Council, in care of Mary Maynard
CC: NFPA 130 Committee
From Stephanie Markos, NFPA 130 Committee Principal Member
Re: TIA Log No. 1080
I regret that I was unable to previously submit a vote for the TIA, since I was out of office most of
J anuary. After my return to office in early February, I developed a very bad cold and was out of the
office for several more days, missing the mid-February deadline to change my vote.
However, in reviewing the Committee votes and the UL substantiation in the public comment, I have the
following comments:
I disagree with the technical nature and emergency nature of the TIA for both the 2010 and 2014 editions
of NFPA 130.
Technical Nature:
1. I do not understand why the TIA proposer or Committee members apparently did not consult with UL
as to what alternative approaches would be appropriate/acceptable before submitting a TIA.
2. Since the inclusion of UL 2186 was included only in the 2010 edition, how is it that several projects
currently in the design and construction phase are being burdened by this UL action and are seeking
the direction of this Technical Committee?
3. If a TIA is necessary, why was the alternative of reverting back to the 2007 edition of NFPA 130
which includes citation of UL 1685 and UL 1666, not considered by the Committee as a TIA?
4. Although, the word should is used in the proposed annex text, the text that is included does contain
what should be prescriptive requirements.
5. I believe that the reasons for the Committee negative votes and the public comments provide more
than adequate reasoning for rejecting the TIA.
6. The wire and cable requirements were substantially revised in 2003 and 2010 (with some added
annex text in 2007). While it is a good idea to put all the wire and cable requirements (except for the
vehicle) into one chapter to reduce repetition, careful consideration of the actual requirements by
persons technically familiar with the actual meaning of the requirements is essential to avoid yet
additional revisions that the majority of Committee members may not be really technically
knowledgeable about.
6. The proposed TIA is confusing since it retains listed and listing and thus, if accepted, the TIA
introduces several inconsistencies in the use of listed and listing by its deletion in the specified
sections in both 2010 (see bold italics) and the 2014 edition since several sections still retain listed,
including,for example, reference in 5.4.8 to 5.4.10, although the revised TIA 5.4.10 text deletes
listed. Same issue in Chapters 6 and 7, as noted belowsee next page.
Emergency Nature: As stated in the public comment, since UL has indicated technical reservations with
the UL certification process for UL 2186 alone, that does not necessarily preclude the idea of other
organization listings using other UL or other standards for wire and cable, or, in fact, the listing of the
wire and cable, as permitted according to one of the options contained in the 2007 NFPA 130
requirements (including UL 1685 UL and UL 1666).
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C# 4
Use of Listed and Listing in Chapter s5 and 6 see bold and italics

5.4.5 All wires and cables used shall be listed as being resistant to the spread of fire and shall have reduced smoke
emissions, by complying with 5.4.5.1 or 5.4.5.2.
5.4.8 The emergency lighting and communications circuits shall be protected from physical damage by system
vehicles or other normal system operations and from fires in the system for a period of not less than 1 hour. The
circuits shall be a listed fire-resistive cable system with a minimum 1-hour rating, in accordance with 5.4.10
6.3.3.2.6.1* Conductors in conduits or raceways shall be permitted to be embedded in concrete or run in concrete
electrical duct banks, but shall not be installed, exposed, or surface-mounted in air plenums unless cables are listed
fire-resistive cables in accordance with 5.4.10. (is this correct or should it refer to 6.3.3.2.10 .
6.3.3.2.8 (4) Use of a listed fire-resistive cable system with a minimum 1-hour rating in accordance with
6.3.3.2.10.
6.3.3.2.9 Power Supply for Emergency Ventilation. See Chapter 7.
6.3.3.2.10 Fire-resistive cables used for emergency lighting and communication shall be listed and have a minimum
1-hour fire-resistive rating in accordance with ANSI/UL 2196 and shall be installed per the listing requirements.
7.7.5 All insulations shall conform to NFPA 70 and shall be moisture- and heat-resistant types carrying temperature
ratings corresponding to either of the following conditions:
7.7.6 All wires and cables used in emergency ventilation circuits shall be listed as being resistant to the spread of
fire and shall have reduced smoke emissions, by complying with 7.7.6.1 or 7.7.6.2.
7.7.6.1 All wires and cables shall comply with the FT4/IEEE 1202 exposure requirements for cable char height,
total smoke released, and peak smoke release rate of ANSI/UL 1685.
7.7.6.2 Wires and cables listed as having adequate fire-resistant and low-smoke-producing characteristics, by
having a flame travel distance that does not exceed 1.5 m (5 ft) and generating a maximum peak optical density of
smoke of 0.50 and a maximum average optical density of smoke of 0.15 when tested in accordance with NFPA 262,
shall be permitted for use instead of the wires and cables specified in 7.7.6.1.
7.7.10 Fire-resistive cables shall be listed and have a minimum 1-hour fire-resistive rating in accordance with
ANSI/UL 2196 and shall be installed per the listing requirements.

IN SUMMARY, all of the wire and cable requirements should be VERY carefully reviewed by the
Committee, with assistance by UL and knowledgeable persons on the NEC and other standard
organizations. I believe that is NO technical nature or emergency nature requiring acceptance of the TIA.
VERY Brief History of Wire and Cable Requirements in NFPA 130 for Stations and Trainways.
2000 and Prior: 2-4 (2.4.2 & 2-.4.5), 3.2.3 (3-2.3.2 & 3-2.3.50) & 4-7 (4-7.3 & 4.7.6) NEC. 500
o
for 1
hour and shall not support combustion. Wire and cable for vital train circuits shall pass flame propagating
criteria of IEEE 383. NEC type listed cables suitable for plenums permitted for train signal circuits. Etc.
2003 and 2007. 5.4.2 (6.3.3.2.2), 5.4.5.1) and 6.3.3 (6.3.3.2.5.1) & 7.7 (7.7.3 & 7.7.6.1) 500
o
for 1 hour
and shall not support combustion ADDED: Listed by several methods: UL 1581/ASTM 662;
CSAC22.2 and ASTM 662; listed as low smoke UL 1685; UL 1666 and ASTM 662 travel distance less
thant 4.9 ft and NFPA 262. (2007 a few annex notes)
2010 5.4 (5.4.5, 5.4.8 & 5.4.10) and Deleted the 500
o
and added fire resistive rating: 1 hour rating UL
2196
7 of 7
1 of 3
Formerly SC Item
13-3-11-d/13-3-12-d
2 of 3
Formerly SC Item
13-3-11-d/13-3-12-d
3 of 3
Formerly SC Item
13-3-11-d/13-3-12-d
From: Connell, William [mailto:ConnellW@pbworld.com]

Sent: Tuesday, March 05, 2013 4:47 PM
To: Stanek, Sandra
Cc: 'Levitt, Harold'; Conrad, J ames; David Plotkin; 'English, Gary'; 'Locke, Harold A.'; Alexandre Debs
Subject: UL Appeal of NFPA 130 and NFPA Proposed TIA's
Sandra

The attached has been jointly prepared by the Chairs and certain Technical Committee
Members of both the NFPA 130 and NFPA 502 Technical Committees specifically to address
the appeal letter submitted by UL taking exception to jointly proposed TIAs #1080 and #1083
which amend fire rated cable testing equipments in both NFPA 130 and NFPA 502,
respectively.

This reply is offered to the Standards Council, in addition to the substantiation already provided
in the body of the TIA, for their consideration when acting in regard to the noted appeal.

Regards Bill and Harold

William G. Connell
Parsons Brinckerhoff
75 Arlington Street
Boston, MA. 02116
connellw@pbworld.com
617-960-5007
508-317-9062 mobile

Harold L. Levitt
PATH-WTCC Liaison/Program Manager
Capital Program Management Division-8th Floor
One PATH Plaza, Jersey City, NJ 07306
(t)2012166206/(f)2012166493/(c)2013206390
Chairperson-NFPA 130-Standard for Fixed Guideway Transit
& Passenger Rail Systems
Attachment 13-8-19-d-1
1 of 6
Formerly SC Item 13-3-11-d-1
and SC Item 13-3-12-d-1
March 5, 2013
1 Batterymarch Park
Quincy, MA 02169-7471
Subject: TIA Log 1080 (NFPA 130) and TIA Log 1083 (NFPA 502)
Underwriters La b o r a t o r i e s Appeal Letter dated February 28,
2013
The Technical Committees for NFPA 502 and NFPA 130 provide the following
responses to the points raised in the subject UL appeal of the proposed TIA to each
Standard for the consideration of the Standards Council. The portions of the UL
appeal are reproduced below in italics and responded to in a point by point format.
UL supports third party code promulgators like the National Fire Protection Association and
the open consensus process used. However, we believe if the code development process for
NFPA 130 and 502 is allowed to function without intercession of NFPA's Standards Council,
the minimum level of electrical safety established NFPA 130 (Standard for Fixed Guideway
Transit and Passenger Rail System) and NFPA 502 (Standard for Road Tunnels, Bridges and
Other Limited Access Highways) will be compromised and become inconsistent with other
NFPA codes that include critical safety circuit installation requirements (i.e. critical identified
power services, fire pump power, fire incident communications, etc.). Specifically, those
codes would be NFPA 70, NFPA 72, NFPA 262, NFPA 2010 and NFPA 5000.
The technical committees (TC) for both NFPA 130 and 502 both recognize the
validity of and specifically embrace the work of other NFPA Standards. NFPA 130
and 502 both reference several other NFPA standards. NFPA 70 National Electrical
Code (NEC) does not specifically address the environments covered by NFPA130
for Fixed Guideway Transit and Passenger Rail System or NFPA 502 for Road
Tunnels, Bridges and Other Limited Access Highways. However, the electrical
functionality of wire and cables are required within NFPA 130 and 502 to be listed
and to comply with the NFPA 70 National Electrical Code (NEC) except as modified
within the individual Standard. Tunnels represent a unique environment that is
unlike that of a typical building.. The operational nature and varying fire loads
inherent with these types of tunnels require these two Standards place more stringent
requirements for wire and cable than those found in the NEC.
The NFPA 130 and 502 TCs have in no way suggested any language that has or will
compromise critical circuit safety requirements found in other NFPA Codes or
Standard as suggested by UL. The other Codes and Standards mentioned above call
for the critical circuits to be protected by either a Circuit Integrity (CI) Cable or an
Electrical Circuit Protective System. NFPA 130 and 502 do not use the terms CI
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cable or an Electrical Circuit Protective System for protection of critical circuits,
therefore we are not in conflict with other NFPA Codes or Standards.
The development of the 2014 edition of National Electric Code (NEC) was recently completed
and the critical electrical installation requirements were left intact including references to UL
2196. The NEC is recognized throughout the US and internationally as the preeminent
electrical installation Code. The scope of the NEC does not exclude tunnels and rail stations,
thus the NEC's critical safety circuit installation requirements should align and support the
critical safety circuit requirements established in NFPA 130 and 502.
The NEC requires 2 hour protection for fire pumps and emergency circuits per
Article 700 and 708. One method of providing this protection is called an Electrical
Circuit Protective System. There are two types of Electrical Circuit Protective
System: one of the systems consists of a fire resistive cables per UL 2196 like the
cables we call for in NFPA 130 and 502; and the other systems consist of a fire
protective wrap that envelope the conduit or cable trays and tested to UL 1724.
The wrap type systems are typically used in conditioned spaces and are not
conducive for use in tunnels areas or similar unconditioned and challenging
environments. Since the wrap systems were and still are available, there was no
reason for the NEC to take any action in CMP 13. On September 12, 2012 UL only
suspended their certifications for systems using the fire resistive cables. NFPA 130
and 502 do not recognize an Electrical Circuit Protective System for a method of
protecting critical circuits in tunnel environments.
As mentioned above, NFPA 130 and 502 both follow and insist on the general
requirements of the NEC, and due to the severe conditions found in a tunnel
environment include additional requirements. For example: The NEC only requires
feeders to be protected from fire, but NFPA 130 and 502 require the entire circuit to
survive a fire. This means the entire circuit must be protected from a fire all the way
to the end device and could include feeders as well as branch circuits.
In addition to the above and paraphrasing our previously submitted comments, UL feels the
consequence of the TIAs may decrease the integrity of the critical safety circuits in question.
Specifically:
1. The phrase 'tested by an approved testing laboratory' is not defined by the code and may be
misunderstood or cause confusion in the application of the impacted code sections. This
revision may require enforcers of this code (AHJs) to validate test results themselves or
interpret test results submitted directly to them. AHJs do not have access to testing equipment
and experienced engineers to make their product acceptance decisions.
The phrase approved testing laboratory does not need to be defined. NFPA 130
and 502 use the term approved in several places, which is defined as approved by
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the AHJ. Tunnel projects require the AHJ to be involved at all levels and work
jointly with the owners, designers and engineers from design to completion, and
beyond.
It must also be kept in mind that both NFPA-502 and NFPA-130 are used not only in
the US but are also used extensively around the world. AS such, using wording that
is captive to US practices only affects the wide application of these Standards.
Our tunnel standards are very specific to the road or rail environment, and a
considerable effort has been expended in both Standards to shift from a prescriptive
approach to an integrated performance approach.
ULs argument appears to be that AHJs are not competent to understand or apply
these Standards. We note that AHJs are typically empowered to retain whatever
outside expertise they may require for when they believe additional support is called
for.
We have plenty of other examples (the table that was used as a black box, the passive
protection, the escape routes, etc.). Theres no one recipe that can fit all tunnels, and
I believe that each tunnel is a specific case that should be considered as a specific
case with a guidance document that give latitude for engineers to find alternative
sound protection measures.
2. The use of the NFPA Official Term 'listed' should remain as it appears in the current
version of NFPA 130 and NFPA 502. The use of the term "listed" is appropriate for the
nature of the critical life safety cable in question. The term 'listed' requires products to be
validated by a certification organization, that is acceptable to an AHJ, and capable of making
compliance decisions and subjecting 'listed' product/systems to factory surveillance.
Products/systems that are simply tested as opposed to certified are not subject to routine
factory surveillance and follow-up testing, which creates a scenario where future changes are not
assessed for compliance to the requirements. We believe this can lead to a reduction of the
safety and performance of these life safety products/systems.
The term listed was removed for two reasons:
1. UL suspended all Fire Resistive Cable System tests and rescinded all
certifications in accordance with UL 2196, for both raceway and non-raceway
systems. This action was taken for several reasons but the underlying reason was the
discovery that pervious qualified systems that passed the UL 2196 test in EMT failed
when tested in galvanized rigid steel conduit. To date there are no fire resistive cable
systems listed by UL or any other NRTL that can be installed in a raceway.
2. The TC reviewed the testing requirements in UL 2196 and noticed that the current
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standard does not adequately address testing systems when installed in a raceway.
Since UL 2196 test standard has not been changed or withdrawn, it could be possible
for a manufacturer to test a cable in EMT and at an NTRL and ask for a listing.
With the new wording in the TIA all systems must be tested as a complete system
and in the type of raceway that will be used for that project. The testing must be
done by a NRTL approved by the AHJ. In addition to testing as a complete system,
a complete test report must be submitted to the AHJ describing the how the system
was tested and all components.
The TIA language is required to address the shortfalls of the UL 2196 Standard as it
presently stands, and does so by adding more stringent requirements to increase
assurance that the required life safety goals are achieved for the tunnel environments.
3. Removing the reference to a recognized safety standard, ANSI/UL 2196, removes critical
guidance needed for users and enforcers of NFPA 130 and NFPA 502 and may result in the
misuse of inappropriate test standards. Users and enforcers may not have the necessary
background to determine the appropriateness of a standard(s) or test method(s) to accurately
test fire restive cables or cable systems.
This statement by UL is definitely and demonstrably incorrect. Both NFPA 130 and
502 require the cables to demonstrate functionality for defined minimum time
periods as described in the ANSI/UL 2196 test standard. There is no removal of
reference to the recognized standard, which remains in both NFPA 130 and NFPA
502. The respective TCs didnt use the previous wording in accordance with
because the TCs determined based on ULs own actions that the current standard
does not adequately address testing cables in raceways.
4. The TIA suggests that the cable need only comply with the fire endurance test, and does
not reference the need for additional testing as described in ANSI/UL 2196 including the hose
stream and electrical conductor tensile strength test. The hose stream as referenced in ANSI/UL
2196 is intended to subject the system to the impact and cooling effects of the water hose
stream. Omitting of this test, as well as omitting the electrical conductor tensile strength test
that evaluates the maximum unsupported vertical length of cable in a raceway can result in
systems where the performance of such is compromised.
This statement by UL is definitely and demonstrably incorrect. Neither NFPA 130
nor NFPA 502 give exception to any part of UL 2196, therefore all cables must pass
the entire test including the hose stream and tensile tests.
5. As of December 21, 2012, UL issued the first certification to this modified program, which
takes into consideration variables of the installed product, increases the number of samples to
demonstrate consistency, and includes reference to the manufacturer's installation instructions.
An additional manufacturer has since successfully passed the ANSI/UL 2196 testing under the
current program and several more certification projects are being established for other
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wireways and cable types. UL does have an active certification program with current and
anticipated listings UL certifications can be viewed at ul.com/database under UL Product
Categories FHJR (Fire Resistive Cables) and FHIT (Electrical Circuit Integrity Systems).
ULs position appears to be confusing at best. The ANSI/UL-2196 Standard has not
been changed. UL took the action September 12, 2012 to end their own certification
to the Standard based on discovered shortfalls, which does not bind any other
NRTLs or listing agencies, but has had impact on AHJs and end users.
We note that UL actually presented to the TCs at the ROC meetings that use of the
previously listed cable manufactured before that action date was still OKAY to use
per UL listing, a position that may result in legal actions involving UL given the
shortfalls discovered, however, these legal actions are not within the scope of 502 or
130 to address.
The fact that UL has taken a certain business approach (the de-certification, the
interim listing program) to addressing shortfalls discovered in the UL 2196
Standard should not limit NFPA from adding appropriate requirements within their
own Standards that reflect on the use of that UL Standard to compensate for that
shortfall.
In conclusion, we request the Standards Council to reverse the decisions of NFPA 130 and
502 Technical Committees and require them to refrain from editing existing critical safety
circuit requirements appearing in NFPA 130 and 502.
Action to follow the UL recommendation to invalidate the TIAs will place the
various User agencies, AHJs, and multiple tunnel projects that depend on the NFPA
502 and NFPA 130 Standards in an untenable position. The UL interim testing
protocols are very difficult and expensive to meet, and impose added time
constraints.
The TIAs as written will provide the necessary flexibility to users to select an
approved testing lab while maintaining the same testing regimen as required by t UL
2196. Approval of these TIAs will also allow the international community, which is
highly dependent upon these Standards to utilize their own national and/or regional
testing laboratories.
The technical basis for the TIAs is valid and is necessary to address the shortfalls
Standard created by the actions of UL and that specifically affect application for the
tunnel environments covered by these two NFPA Standards. The TCs urge the
Standards Council to accept the proposed TIAs.
6 of 6
Date:April24,2013
TaskGroup
LarryAyer,BizComElectric,Chairman
MarkOde,UL
JamesConrad,RSCCWire&Cable
StevePasternac,Intertek
RE:TIA1080NFPA130
Report:
ATaskGroupwasformedtoreviewcorrelationissuesbetweenNFPA130andNFPA70(NEC)asaresult
ofaproposedTIA1080submittedbytheNFPA130committee.TheTaskGroupreviewedthisTIA
duringaconferencecallonApril12,2013.
TIA1080wassubmittedtorevisecertaintextinNFPA130thatspecificallydealtwithlistedFire
ResistiveCableSystems.ThisTIAwassubmittedinresponsetoULsactioninSeptember2012to
discontinuecertification(listing)ofFireResistiveCableSystemstoUL2196,StandardforTestsofFire
ResistiveCables.Thesesystemsarealargepartofwiringmethodsusedintrainstations,trainways,and
emergencyventilationsystemsforpassengerrailtypesystems.TheTIAwassubmittedtoprovide
prescriptiverequirementsforobtainingequivalentfireresistanceofCableSystemswithoutobtainingUL
listing.
TheTaskGrouphasreviewedtheTIAandnotesacoupleofitems.
1. First,whileULCertificationwasinitiallydiscontinuedinSeptember2012,aninterimprogram
wasdevelopedinlateSeptember2012andreestablishedcertificationinDecember,2012.To
date,manufacturershaveprovidedtwosystemswhichhaveachievedcertificationunderthis
newprogram:aMICablecertifiedfor2hoursandaMCCablesystemcertifiedfor1hour.
AdditionalFireResistiveCablemanufacturershaveshowninterestinsubmittingtheirproducts.
Theinterimprogram,inthetasksgroupsopinion,eliminatesanyneedtoremovethelisting
requirementsinNFPA130orNFPA70forthatmatter.
2. FireResistiveCableSystemsastheyrelatetotheNECareconsideredasubsetofalargergroup
ofprotectivesystemswhichalsoincludesProtectiveWraps.Thislargergroupiscalled
ElectricalCircuitProtectiveSystems.WhiletheULcertificationwasoriginallydiscontinuedfor
theFireResistiveCableSystemsthecertificationofProtectiveWrapsremained.Thesesystems
areusedthroughoutthecodebutspecificallyinArticles695and700.Duringtherecently
completed2014NECRevisionCycle,severalcommentsweresubmittedtoCodePanel13that
acknowledgedthatcertaincertificationswerediscontinued,howeverPanel13maintainedthe
currentcodetextsinceProtectiveWrapshadmaintainedtheircertification.
3. DuringthesameNFPA70(NEC)revisioncycle,CodePanel3acceptedanewArticle728which
dealsspecificallywithFireResistiveCableSystems.Thisnewarticlemaintainsthelisting
requirementsforthesetypesystemsandclarifiestotheuseroftheNECthateachFireResistive
CableSystemhascertainspecificlistingrequirementsthatmustbemetinorderforthesystem
tofunctionconsistentlyforacertainperiodoftimeduringafire.Thelistingrequirements
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considersystemcomponents,suchasthetypeofwiringmethodorconduit,conduitsupports,
typeofcouplings,verticalsupports,boxesandsplicesthataretobeusedwitheachsystem.
CodePanel3maintainedthatthecertificationprocessforFireResistiveprovidedinnewArticle
728wasimportantandthatanyissuesregardingrecertificationofthesetypesystemswould
likelyberesolvedintheverynearfuture.
AsaresultoftheNECreaffirmingthelistingandcertificationforFireResistiveCablesinCodePanels3,
andreaffirmingthelistingandcertificationofElectricalCircuitProtectiveSystemsinCodePanel13the
changesproposedbyTIA1080wouldcreatecorrelationissueswiththeNFPA70(NEC)document.
2 of 2

TO: Technical Committee on Fixed Guideway Transit and Passenger Rail Systems
(FKT-AAA)

FROM: Sandra Stanek, Staff Liaison

DATE: May 1, 2013

SUBJECT: Informational Ballot Results on Proposed TIA 1080

The NFPA 130 Informational ballot results are as follows:

32 Members Eligible to Vote
9 Ballots Not Returned (M. Chan, W. Koffel, D. McKinney, T. Middlebrook, J . Nelsen,
M. Thomas, L. Weng, S. Wilcheck and J . Zicherman)
2 Members Voted in support of proceeding (S. Gilardi, J r., N. Nott)
21 Members Voted NOT in support of proceeding

Votes from Alternate Members were not included in the results unless their Principal did not
vote.

Attachment 13-8-19-f
1 of 2
INFORMAITONAL BALLOT

TECHNICAL COMMITTEE ON FIXED GUIDWAY TRANSIT AND
PASSENGER RAIL SYSTEMS


With respect to Proposed TIA Log 1080 to revise and add language to
Sections 5.4.10, 6.3.3.2.10, 7.7.10, A.5.4.10.3, A.6.3.3.2.10.2 and A.7.7.10.2
to the 2010 Edition and the Proposed 2014 Edition of NFPA 130, Standard
for Fixed Guideways Transit and Passenger Rail Systems, please record me
as voting:

In support of proceeding with the proposed TIA

NOT in support of proceeding with the proposed TIA.

Name: __________________________________________________

Please return ballots via email to kshea@nfpa.org no later than Friday, April 19, 2013.

Attachment 13-8-19-f
2 of 2
Item 13-8-20
March 28, 2013

Harold Levitt William Connell
Port Authority of New York and New Jersey PB Americas, Inc.
PATH Department 75 Arlington Street
One PATH Plaza-8th Floor Boston, MA 02116
Jersey City, NJ 07306

Messrs. Levitt and Connell:

I am transmitting to you herewith the following action of the Standards Council (March 6-7, 2013):

The Council voted to defer action on issuing proposed Tentative Interim Amendments (TIAs) to Sections 5.4.10,
6.3.3.2.10, 7.7.10, A.5.4.10.3, A.6.3.3.2.10.2 and A.7.7.10.2 of the 2010 and proposed 2014 editions of NFPA 130,
Standard for Fixed Guideway Transit and Passenger Rail Systems, (TIA No.1080) and to Sections 12.1.2 and A.12.1.2
of the 2011 and proposed 2014 editions of NFPA 502, Standard for Road Tunnels, Bridges, and Other Limited Access
Highways, (TIA No. 1083). The Council has directed that the Technical Committee on Road Tunnel and Highway
Fire Protection and the Technical Committee on Fixed Guideway Transit and Passenger Rail Systems seek further
input from the National Electrical Code (NEC) Correlating Committee and NEC Code Making Panel 13 on whether
these TIAs, if issued, would cause any correlation issues with documents that report through the National Electrical
Code Project. The Council requests that the NEC Correlating Committee and NEC Code Making Panel 13 responses
be submitted to the Secretary of the Standards Council for dissemination to the technical committees responsible for
NFPA 130 and NFPA 502 for their consideration. Once the Committees have reviewed the responses from the NEC
and develop a course of action, they should report back to the Standards Council at their August, 2013 meeting.
Standards Council Member Kerry Bell recused himself during the deliberations and vote on the issue.

Very truly yours,

Linda Fuller, Manager
Codes and Standards Administration

c: D. Moeller, M. Johnston, R. Bielen, W. Burke, M. Earley, R. Solomon, S. Stanek, G. Harrington, N. Walker
TC Fixed Guideway Transit and Passenger Rail Systems
TC Road Tunnel and Highway Fire Protection
NEC Correlating Committee
Interested Parties

13-3-11
13-3-12
1 of 3
and SC Item 13-3-12
NFPA 502-2011 and Proposed 2014 Edition

Standard for Road Tunnels, Bridges and Other Limited Access Highways
TIA Log No. 1083
Reference: 12.1.2 and A.12.1.2
Comment Closing Date: February 13, 2013
Submitter: William Connell, PB Americas, Inc.

Proposed language to the 2011 edition.

1. Revise 12.1.2 and 12.1.2*(1) to read as follows:

12.1.2* Emergency circuits installed in a road tunnel and ancillary areas shall remain functional for a period of not less
than 1 hour, for the anticipated fire condition, by meeting one of the following methods:

(1)* A f Fire-resistive cables shall be listed for 2 hours in accordance with ANSI/UL/2196 or other equivalent
internationally recognized standards to 950C (1742F) when approved by the AHJ . tested by an approved testing
laboratory in a totally enclosed furnace using the ASTM E 119 time-temperature curve.
(a) The cables shall demonstrate functionality for no less than 2 hours as described in the ANSI/UL 2196 test standard
(b) Testing shall be performed in the type and configuration of raceway in which they are intended to be installed
(c) Provide documentation to include a full description of the actual test procedure conducted and a list of acceptable
components to be used for installation certifying compliance with the test procedure

12.1.2(2) text remains unchanged.

Proposed language to the proposed 2014 edition.

1. Revise 12.1.2 and 12.1.2(1) (4) to read as follows:

12.1.2* Emergency circuits installed in a road tunnel and ancillary areas shall remain functional for a period of not less
than 1 hour, for the anticipated fire condition, by meeting one of the following methods:

(1)* A f Fire-resistive cables listed for 2 hours in accordance with ANSI/UL/2196 or other equivalent internationally
recognized standards to 950C (1742F) when approved by the AHJ . tested by an approved testing laboratory in a totally
enclosed furnace using the ASTM E 119 time-temperature curve.
(a) The cables shall demonstrate functionality for no less than 2 hours as described in the ANSI/UL 2196 test
standard
(b) Testing shall be performed in the type and configuration of raceway in which they are intended to be installed
(c) Provide documentation to include a full description of the actual test procedure conducted and a list of acceptable
components to be used for installation certifying compliance with the test procedure

(2) Circuits embedded in concrete or protected by a 2-hour fire barrier system in accordance with UL 1724. The insulation
for cables or conductors shall be thermoset and shall be suitable to maintain functionality at the temperature within the
embedded conduit or fire barrier system.
(4) Diversity in system routing as approved (such as separate redundant or multiple circuits separated by a 1-hour fire
barrier) so that a single fire or emergency event will not lead to a failure of the system.

2. Revise A.12.1.2 and A.12.1.2(1) for both the 2011 and proposed 2014 editions to read as follows:

A.12.1.2 The actual duration required for the circuits to be operative will depend upon the duration required for the
circuits to be operative for the emergency evacuation and rescue phase and, in some circumstances, incident
management and structural protection. Factors such as the length of the tunnel, evacuation pathways, the use of fixed
water-based fire suppression systems, and the proximity of emergency services may influence this period of time.
2 of 3

A.12.1.2 (1) When selecting a fire-resistive cable, it is important to know how it will be installed and if it was tested as a
complete system, including splices. Cables that are exposed (not embedded in concrete) should be protected using either a
metallic raceway or an armor/sheath (see 12.3.1). There are two basic configurations of fire-resistive cables:
(1) Armored cables, such as Type MI or Type MC, are installed without raceways.
(2) Cables installed in a raceway, such as Type RHW-2, Type TC, or Type CM, are tested as a complete system.

Regardless of the fire test standard used to evaluate fire-resistive cables installed in a raceway, it is important to consider
that the cables are only one part of the system. Other components of the system include but are not limited to the type of
raceway, the size of raceway, raceway support, raceway couplings, boxes, conduit bodies, splices where used, vertical
supports, grounds, and pulling lubricants. Each cable type should be tested to demonstrate compatibility. Recent fire
testing has demonstrated that hot-dipped galvanized coatings on the interior surface of raceways can cause premature
failure of copper fire-resistive cable systems. Only the specific types of raceways tested should be acceptable for
installation. Each cable type intended to be installed in a raceway should be tested in both a horizontal and a vertical
configuration to demonstrate circuit integrity.

Submitters Substantiation: This correction addresses the recent action of UL pertaining to their UL 2196, Standard for
Safety for Test for Fire Resistive Cables, 2012. Specifically, as of September 12, 2012, UL has withdrawn all cable
certifications (listings) to this test standard. NFPA 502 currently allows the use of 2-hour fire-resistive cable listed in
accordance with UL 2196, Standard for Safety for Test for Fire Resistive Cables, 2012. Because NFPA 502 had relied
upon the UL listing for compliance, this UL action has changed the standard.
Emergency Nature: The 2011 edition of the document contains listing requirements that are no longer available for 2-
hour fire-resistive cables for emergency circuits. The proposed revision provides prescriptive requirements for obtaining
the equivalent fire resistance without obtaining UL certification (listing). Several tunnel projects currently in the design
and construction phase are being burdened by this UL action and are seeking the direction of this Technical Committee.
3 of 3
Document: NFPA 502, Standard for Road Tunnels, Bridges and Other Limited Access Highways
(TIA Log 1083)


________________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________________________

26 Eligible to Vote
2 Not Returned (LeBlanc, Rohena)

23 Agree (Conrad, Sturm w/comment)
1 Disagree (Pillette)
0 Abstentions

________________________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________________________

3 Disagree (Debs, Nelsen, Pilette)
1 Abstention (Kashef)


1 of 10
2 of 10
Document: NFPA 502, Standard for Road Tunnels, Bridges and Other Limited Access Highways
(TIA Log 1083)


TIA TC PRELIMINARY BALLOT RESULTS
________________________________________________________________________________________
According to 5.4 in the NFPA (RGCP), the preliminary results show this TIA IS achieving the necessary votes
________________________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________________________

26 Eligible to Vote
4 Not Returned (LeBlanc, Pilette, Rohena, WahOnn)

TC PRELIMINARY Ballot results for Technical Merit are as follows:
0 Disagree
0 Abstentions

________________________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________________________

TC PRELIMINARY Ballot results for Emergency Nature are as follows:
2 Disagree (Debs, Nelsen)
1 Abstention (Kashef)


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1 of 4
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1 of 3
Formerly SC Item 13-3-11-d
and SC Item13-3-12-d
C#4
2 of 3
3 of 3
From: Connell, William [mailto:ConnellW@pbworld.com]

Sent: Tuesday, March 05, 2013 4:47 PM
To: Stanek, Sandra
Cc: 'Levitt, Harold'; Conrad, J ames; David Plotkin; 'English, Gary'; 'Locke, Harold A.'; Alexandre Debs
Subject: UL Appeal of NFPA 130 and NFPA Proposed TIA's
Sandra

The attached has been jointly prepared by the Chairs and certain Technical Committee
Members of both the NFPA 130 and NFPA 502 Technical Committees specifically to address
the appeal letter submitted by UL taking exception to jointly proposed TIAs #1080 and #1083
which amend fire rated cable testing equipments in both NFPA 130 and NFPA 502,
respectively.

This reply is offered to the Standards Council, in addition to the substantiation already provided
in the body of the TIA, for their consideration when acting in regard to the noted appeal.

Regards Bill and Harold

William G. Connell
Parsons Brinckerhoff
75 Arlington Street
Boston, MA. 02116
connellw@pbworld.com
617-960-5007
508-317-9062 mobile

Harold L. Levitt
PATH-WTCC Liaison/Program Manager
Capital Program Management Division-8th Floor
One PATH Plaza, J ersey City, NJ 07306
(t)2012166206/(f)2012166493/(c)2013206390
Chairperson-NFPA 130-Standard for Fixed Guideway Transit
& Passenger Rail Systems
1 of 6
and SC Item13-3-12-d-1
March 5, 2013
1 Batterymarch Park
Quincy, MA 02169-7471
Subject: TIA Log 1080 (NFPA 130) and TIA Log 1083 (NFPA 502)
Underwriters L aboratori es Appeal Letter dated February 28,
2013
The Technical Committees for NFPA 502 and NFPA 130 provide the following
responses to the points raised in the subject UL appeal of the proposed TIA to each
Standard for the consideration of the Standards Council. The portions of the UL
appeal are reproduced below initalics and responded to in a point by point format.
UL supports third party code promulgators like the National Fire Protection Association and
the open consensus process used. However, we believe if the code development process for
NFPA 130 and 502 is allowed to function without intercession of NFPA's Standards Council,
the minimum level of electrical safety established NFPA 130 (Standard for Fixed Guideway
Transit and Passenger Rail System) and NFPA 502 (Standard for Road Tunnels, Bridges and
Other Limited Access Highways) will be compromised and become inconsistent with other
NFPA codes that include critical safety circuit installation requirements (i.e. critical identified
power services, fire pump power, fire incident communications, etc.). Specifically, those
codes would be NFPA 70, NFPA 72, NFPA 262, NFPA 2010 and NFPA 5000.
The technical committees (TC) for both NFPA 130 and 502 both recognize the
validity of and specifically embrace the work of other NFPA Standards. NFPA 130
and 502 both reference several other NFPA standards. NFPA 70 National Electrical
Code (NEC) does not specifically address the environments covered by NFPA130
for Fixed Guideway Transit and Passenger Rail System or NFPA 502 for Road
Tunnels, Bridges and Other Limited Access Highways. However, the electrical
functionality of wire and cables are required within NFPA 130 and 502 to be listed
and to comply with the NFPA 70 National Electrical Code (NEC) except as modified
within the individual Standard. Tunnels represent a unique environment that is
unlike that of a typical building.. The operational nature and varying fire loads
inherent with these types of tunnels require these two Standards place more stringent
requirements for wire and cable than those found in the NEC.
The NFPA 130 and 502 TCs have in no way suggested any language that has or will
compromise critical circuit safety requirements found in other NFPA Codes or
Standard as suggested by UL. The other Codes and Standards mentioned above call
for the critical circuits to be protected by either a Circuit Integrity (CI) Cable or an
Electrical Circuit Protective System. NFPA 130 and 502 do not use the terms CI
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cable or an Electrical Circuit Protective System for protection of critical circuits,
therefore we are not in conflict with other NFPA Codes or Standards.
The development of the 2014 edition of National Electric Code (NEC) was recently completed
and the critical electrical installation requirements were left intact including references to UL
2196. The NEC is recognized throughout the US and internationally as the preeminent
electrical installation Code. The scope of the NEC does not exclude tunnels and rail stations,
thus the NEC's critical safety circuit installation requirements should align and support the
critical safety circuit requirements established in NFPA 130 and 502.
The NEC requires 2 hour protection for fire pumps and emergency circuits per
Article 700 and 708. One method of providing this protection is called an Electrical
Circuit Protective System. There are two types of Electrical Circuit Protective
System: one of the systems consists of a fire resistive cables per UL 2196 like the
cables we call for in NFPA 130 and 502; and the other systems consist of a fire
protective wrap that envelope the conduit or cable trays and tested to UL 1724.
The wrap type systems are typically used in conditioned spaces and are not
conducive for use in tunnels areas or similar unconditioned and challenging
environments. Since the wrap systems were and still are available, there was no
reason for the NEC to take any action in CMP 13. On September 12, 2012 UL only
suspended their certifications for systems using the fire resistive cables. NFPA 130
and 502 do not recognize an Electrical Circuit Protective System for a method of
protecting critical circuits in tunnel environments.
As mentioned above, NFPA 130 and 502 both follow and insist on the general
requirements of the NEC, and due to the severe conditions found in a tunnel
environment include additional requirements. For example: The NEC only requires
feeders to be protected from fire, but NFPA 130 and 502 require the entire circuit to
survive a fire. This means the entire circuit must be protected from a fire all the way
to the end device and could include feeders as well as branch circuits.
In addition to the above and paraphrasing our previously submitted comments, UL feels the
consequence of the TIAs may decrease the integrity of the critical safety circuits in question.
Specifically:
1. The phrase 'tested by an approved testing laboratory' is not defined by the code and may be
misunderstood or cause confusion in the application of the impacted code sections. This
revision may require enforcers of this code (AHJs) to validate test results themselves or
interpret test results submitted directly to them. AHJs do not have access to testing equipment
and experienced engineers to make their product acceptance decisions.
The phrase approved testing laboratory does not need to be defined. NFPA 130
and 502 use the term approved in several places, which is defined as approved by
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the AHJ . Tunnel projects require the AHJ to be involved at all levels and work
jointly with the owners, designers and engineers from design to completion, and
beyond.
It must also be kept in mind that both NFPA-502 and NFPA-130 are used not only in
the US but are also used extensively around the world. AS such, using wording that
is captive to US practices only affects the wide application of these Standards.
Our tunnel standards are very specific to the road or rail environment, and a
considerable effort has been expended in both Standards to shift from a prescriptive
approach to an integrated performance approach.
ULs argument appears to be that AHJ s are not competent to understand or apply
these Standards. We note that AHJ s are typically empowered to retain whatever
outside expertise they may require for when they believe additional support is called
for.
We have plenty of other examples (the table that was used as a black box, the passive
protection, the escape routes, etc.). Theres no one recipe that can fit all tunnels, and
I believe that each tunnel is a specific case that should be considered as a specific
case with a guidance document that give latitude for engineers to find alternative
sound protection measures.
2. The use of the NFPA Official Term 'listed' should remain as it appears in the current
version of NFPA 130 and NFPA 502. The use of the term "listed" is appropriate for the
nature of the critical life safety cable in question. The term 'listed' requires products to be
validated by a certification organization, that is acceptable to an AHJ, and capable of making
compliance decisions and subjecting 'listed' product/systems to factory surveillance.
Products/systems that are simply tested as opposed to certified are not subject to routine
factory surveillance and follow-up testing, which creates a scenario where future changes are not
assessed for compliance to the requirements. We believe this can lead to a reduction of the
safety and performance of these life safety products/systems.
The term listed was removed for two reasons:
1. UL suspended all Fire Resistive Cable System tests and rescinded all
certifications in accordance with UL 2196, for both raceway and non-raceway
systems. This action was taken for several reasons but the underlying reason was the
discovery that pervious qualified systems that passed the UL 2196 test in EMT failed
when tested in galvanized rigid steel conduit. To date there are no fire resistive cable
systems listed by UL or any other NRTL that can be installed in a raceway.
2. The TC reviewed the testing requirements in UL 2196 and noticed that the current
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standard does not adequately address testing systems when installed in a raceway.
Since UL 2196 test standard has not been changed or withdrawn, it could be possible
for a manufacturer to test a cable in EMT and at an NTRL and ask for a listing.
With the new wording in the TIA all systems must be tested as a complete system
and in the type of raceway that will be used for that project. The testing must be
done by a NRTL approved by the AHJ . In addition to testing as a complete system,
a complete test report must be submitted to the AHJ describing the how the system
was tested and all components.
The TIA language is required to address the shortfalls of the UL 2196 Standard as it
presently stands, and does so by adding more stringent requirements to increase
assurance that the required life safety goals are achieved for the tunnel environments.
3. Removing the reference to a recognized safety standard, ANSI/UL 2196, removes critical
guidance needed for users and enforcers of NFPA 130 and NFPA 502 and may result in the
misuse of inappropriate test standards. Users and enforcers may not have the necessary
background to determine the appropriateness of a standard(s) or test method(s) to accurately
test fire restive cables or cable systems.
This statement by UL is definitely and demonstrably incorrect. Both NFPA 130 and
502 require the cables to demonstrate functionality for defined minimum time
periods as described in the ANSI/UL 2196 test standard. There is no removal of
reference to the recognized standard, which remains in both NFPA 130 and NFPA
502. The respective TCs didnt use the previous wording in accordance with
because the TCs determined based on ULs own actions that the current standard
does not adequately address testing cables in raceways.
4. The TIA suggests that the cable need only comply with the fire endurance test, and does
not reference the need for additional testing as described in ANSI/UL 2196 including the hose
stream and electrical conductor tensile strength test. The hose stream as referenced in ANSI/UL
2196 is intended to subject the system to the impact and cooling effects of the water hose
stream. Omitting of this test, as well as omitting the electrical conductor tensile strength test
that evaluates the maximum unsupported vertical length of cable in a raceway can result in
systems where the performance of such is compromised.
This statement by UL is definitely and demonstrably incorrect. Neither NFPA 130
nor NFPA 502 give exception to any part of UL 2196, therefore all cables must pass
the entire test including the hose stream and tensile tests.
5. As of December 21, 2012, UL issued the first certification to this modified program, which
takes into consideration variables of the installed product, increases the number of samples to
demonstrate consistency, and includes reference to the manufacturer's installation instructions.
An additional manufacturer has since successfully passed the ANSI/UL 2196 testing under the
current program and several more certification projects are being established for other
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wireways and cable types. UL does have an active certification program with current and
anticipated listings UL certifications can be viewed at ul.com/database under UL Product
Categories FHJR (Fire Resistive Cables) and FHIT (Electrical Circuit Integrity Systems).
ULs position appears to be confusing at best. The ANSI/UL-2196 Standard has not
been changed. UL took the action September 12, 2012 to end their own certification
to the Standard based on discovered shortfalls, which does not bind any other
NRTLs or listing agencies, but has had impact on AHJ s and end users.
We note that UL actually presented to the TCs at the ROC meetings that use of the
previously listed cable manufactured before that action date was still OKAY to use
per UL listing, a position that may result in legal actions involving UL given the
shortfalls discovered, however, these legal actions are not within the scope of 502 or
130 to address.
The fact that UL has taken a certain business approach (the de-certification, the
interim listing program) to addressing shortfalls discovered in the UL 2196
Standard should not limit NFPA from adding appropriate requirements within their
own Standards that reflect on the use of that UL Standard to compensate for that
shortfall.
In conclusion, we request the Standards Council to reverse the decisions of NFPA 130 and
502 Technical Committees and require them to refrain from editing existing critical safety
circuit requirements appearing in NFPA 130 and 502.
Action to follow the UL recommendation to invalidate the TIAs will place the
various User agencies, AHJ s, and multiple tunnel projects that depend on the NFPA
502 and NFPA 130 Standards in an untenable position. The UL interim testing
protocols are very difficult and expensive to meet, and impose added time
constraints.
The TIAs as written will provide the necessary flexibility to users to select an
approved testing lab while maintaining the same testing regimen as required by t UL
2196. Approval of these TIAs will also allow the international community, which is
highly dependent upon these Standards to utilize their own national and/or regional
testing laboratories.
The technical basis for the TIAs is valid and is necessary to address the shortfalls
Standard created by the actions of UL and that specifically affect application for the
tunnel environments covered by these two NFPA Standards. The TCs urge the
Standards Council to accept the proposed TIAs.
6 of 6
Date:April24,2013
TaskGroup
LarryAyer,BizComElectric,Chairman
MarkOde,UL
JamesConrad,RSCCWire&Cable
StevePasternac,Intertek
RE:TIA1083NFPA502
Report:
ATaskGroupwasformedtoreviewcorrelationissuesbetweenNFPA502andNFPA70(NEC)asaresult
oftheproposedTIA1083submittedbytheNFPA502committee.TheTaskGroupreviewedthisTIA
duringaconferencecallonApril12,2013.
TIA1083wassubmittedtorevisecertaintextinNFPA502thatspecificallydealtwithlistedFire
ResistiveCableSystems.ThisTIAwassubmittedinresponsetoULsactioninSeptember2012to
discontinuecertification(listing)ofFireResistiveCableSystemstoUL2196,StandardforTestsofFire
ResistiveCables.ThesesystemsarealargepartofwiringmethodsusedinRoadTunnels,Bridgesand
otherareascoveredunderNFPA502.TheTIAwassubmittedtoprovideprescriptiverequirementsfor
obtainingequivalentfireresistanceofCableSystemswithoutobtainingULlisting.
TheTaskGrouphasreviewedtheTIAandnotesacoupleofitems.
1. First,whileULCertificationwasinitiallydiscontinuedinSeptember2012,aninterimprogram
wasdevelopedinlateSeptember2012andreestablishedcertificationinDecember,2012.To
date,manufacturershaveprovidedtwosystemswhichhaveachievedcertificationunderthis
newprogram:aMICablecertifiedfor2hoursandaMCCablesystemcertifiedfor1hour.
AdditionalFireResistiveCablemanufacturershaveshowninterestinsubmittingtheirproducts.
Theinterimprogram,inthetasksgroupsopinion,eliminatesanyneedtoremoveorreplacethe
listingrequirementsinNFPA502orNFPA70forthatmatter.
2. FireResistiveCableSystemsastheyrelatetotheNECareconsideredasubsetofalargergroup
ofprotectivesystemswhichalsoincludesProtectiveWraps.Thislargergroupiscalled
ElectricalCircuitProtectiveSystems.WhiletheULcertificationwasoriginallydiscontinuedfor
theFireResistiveCableSystemsthecertificationofProtectiveWrapsremained.Thesesystems
areusedthroughoutthecodebutspecificallyinArticles695and700.Duringtherecently
completed2014NECRevisionCycle,severalcommentsweresubmittedtoCodePanel13that
acknowledgedthatcertaincertificationswerediscontinued,howeverPanel13maintainedthe
currentcodetextsinceProtectiveWrapshadmaintainedtheircertification.
3. DuringthesameNFPA70(NEC)revisioncycle,CodePanel3acceptedanewArticle728which
dealsspecificallywithFireResistiveCableSystems.Thisnewarticlemaintainsthelisting
requirementsforthesetypesystemsandclarifiestotheuseroftheNECthateachFireResistive
CableSystemhascertainspecificlistingrequirementsthatmustbemetinorderforthesystem
tofunctionconsistentlyforacertainperiodoftimeduringafire.Thelistingrequirements
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considersystemcomponents,suchasthetypeofwiringmethodorconduit,conduitsupports,
typeofcouplings,verticalsupports,boxesandsplicesthataretobeusedwitheachsystem.
CodePanel3maintainedthatthecertificationprocessforFireResistiveprovidedinnewArticle
728wasimportantandthatanyissuesregardingrecertificationofthesetypesystemswould
likelyberesolvedintheverynearfuture.
4. ThereviewoftheTIAandhasalsobroughtconcernsregardingtheproposedwordingin
12.1.2(1)(b).ThepresentwordinginfersthatbothFireResistantMCCableandMICablemust
betestedinaracewayinordertousethesewiringmethods.However,thesesystemshavenot
beentestedforthisspecificapplicationnordotheyrequirearaceway.TheTaskGroupprefers
thewordingforthesamesectionthatwasproposedandacceptedduringtheROCstage.
AsaresultoftheNECreaffirmingthelistingandcertificationforFireResistiveCablesinCodePanels3,
andreaffirmingthelistingandcertificationofElectricalCircuitProtectiveSystemsinCodePanel13the
changesproposedbyTIA1083wouldcreatecorrelationissueswiththeNFPA70(NEC)document.
2 of 2



M E M O R A N D U M

To: NFPA Technical Committee on Road Tunnel and Highway Fire Protection
From: Kelly Carey, Administrator, Technical Projects
Date: July 22, 2013
Subject: NFPA 502 Informational Poll Ballots Final Results

The Final Results of the NFPA 502 Informational Poll Ballots are as follows:
Part 1 2014 Edition
9 Not Returned (I. Barry, J. Dalton, A. Dix, H. Ingason, J. Kroboth, D. LeBlanc, A.
Marino, J. Rohena, D. Sprakel)
4 Recommend the text of TIA No. 1083 be incorporated into the 2014 edition of NFPA 502.
13 Recommend the text of Comment 502-27 as Accepted by the Technical Committee be incorporated
into the 2014 edition of NFPA 502. (2 with comments, C. Both, A. Brinson)
0 Abstain

Part 2 2011 Edition
9 Not Returned (I. Barry, J. Dalton, A. Dix, H. Ingason, J. Kroboth, D. LeBlanc, A.
Marino, J. Rohena, D. Sprakel)
17 Recommend that TIA No. 1083 be Issued on the 2011 edition of NFPA 502.
0 Recommend that TIA No. 1083 Not be Issued on the 2011 edition of NFPA 502.
0 Abstain

According to the final ballot results, both ballot items passed with simply majority.
Supplemental Attachment 13-8-20-f
Page 1 of 8 ADDITION
Item 13-8-21
NFPA 1951
-2013
Standard on Protective Ensembles for Technical Rescue Incidents
TIA Log No. 1098
Reference: Various
Submitters: Dean Cox, Fairfax (VA) County Fire and Rescue Department and J eremy Metz, West Metro (CO) Fire Rescue

1. Revise 2.3.3 to read as follows:

2.3.3 ASTM F 2412, Standard Test Method s for Foot Protection, 2005 2011.

2. Add the two new paragraphs below to follow 6.1.3.3.3. Renumber existing paragraphs 6.1.3.3.4 and 6.1.3.3.5 as 6.1.3.3.6 and
6.1.3.3.7 respectively. Change Annex item A.6.1.3.3.5 to A.6.1.3.3.7. Change Table 6.1.3.3.5 to Table 6.1.3.3.7.

6.1.3.3.4 The location of the wrist crease shall be determined by first placing the glove on a measurement board palm down and
securing (locking) the fingertips down onto the board.

6.1.3.3.5 A 1 lb weight shall be attached to the end of the glove body or gauntlet glove interface component. The weight shall not be
attached to a knitted wristlet glove interface component. The weight shall be applied evenly across the glove.

3. Add the two new paragraphs below to follow 6.2.3.3.3. Renumber existing paragraphs 6.2.3.3.4, 6.2.3.3.5, 6.2.3.3.6, 6.2.3.3.7 and
6.2.3.3.8 as 6.2.3.3.6, 6.2.3.3.7, 6.2.3.3.8, 6.2.3.3.9 and 6.2.3.3.10 respectively. Change Annex item A.6.2.3.3.5 to A.6.2.3.3.7.

6.2.3.3.4 The location of the wrist crease shall be determined by first placing the glove on a measurement board palm down and
securing (locking) the fingertips down onto the board.

6.2.3.3.5 A 1 lb weight shall be attached to the end of the glove body or gauntlet glove interface component. The weight shall not be
attached to a knitted wristlet glove interface component. The weight shall be applied evenly across the glove.

4. Revise 7.1.3.5 to read as follows:

7.1.3.5 Gloves shall be tested for grip as specified in Section 8.29, Grip Test, and shall not have a drop of force of more than 30
percent from the peak pull force value in any 0.2 second interval.


7.1.4.5 Footwear soles and heels shall be tested for abrasion resistance as specified in Section 8.34, Abrasion Resistance Test 3, and
the relative volume loss shall not be greater than 200 250 mm
3
(0.01 0.02 in.
3
).




3
(0.01 0.02 in.
3
).




3
(0.01 0.02 in.
3
).

1 of 7

7.3.5.10 Footwear shall be individually tested for flame resistance as specified in Section 8.32, Flame Resistance Test 4, and shall not
have an afterflame of more than 25seconds, shall not melt or drip, and shall not exhibit any burn-through.


8.1.9.5 The wash cycle procedure in Table 8.1.9.5 (a) through Table 8.1.9.5 (c) shall be followed.

Add two tables 8.1.9.5 (b) and 8.1.9.5 (c) to follow existing Table 8.1.9.5. Renumber Table 8.1.9.5 as Table 8.1.9.5 (a).

Table 8.1.9.5 (b)

Water Level for Whole Garments and CBRN Materials
Operation Wash Cycle Procedure

Low
Water
Level 1
cm (3/8)
in.)
High
Water
Level
1 cm
(3/8 in.)
Number of
Garments cm in. cm in.
1 to 3 15 5.9 25.5 10
4 to 6 17.5 6.9 28 11
7 or more 20 7.9 30.5 12

Table 8.1.9.5 (c)

Water Level for Gloves and Glove Pouches Operation Wash Cycle
Procedure

Low Water
Level
High Water
Level
+1 cm +1 cm
(3/8 in) (3/8 in)
cm in cm in
Gloves 20 7.9 30.5 12
Glove Pouches 20 7.9 30.5 12


8.1.9.14 Gloves and glove pouches shall be tumbled for 60 minutes and shall be removed immediately at the end of the drying cycle.
At the conclusion of the final drying cycle, the gloves or glove pouches shall be permitted to be dried on a forced air nontumble drying
mechanism operated at 10
o
C 2C (50
o
F 3F) above current room temperature until completely dry.


8.2.2.2 Samples shall be conditioned as specified in 8.2.8, 8.2.9, or 8.2.10, except CBRN garment and material samples shall be
conditioned as specified in 8.2.8, 8.2.9, or 8.2.10 8.1.9 followed by 8.1.2.

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8.2.9.1 Samples for conditioning shall be in the form of a pouch as described in 8.2.9.4 8.1.14.


8.4.2.2 Samples shall be conditioned as specified in 8.1.2. Other samples shall be conditioned as specified in 8.1.9 8.1.3 followed by
conditioning as specified in 8.1.2, except CBRN garment and material samples shall be conditioned as specified in 8.1.9 followed by
8.1.2.


8.5.11.4 Sample helmets shall be positioned according to the HPI as described in 8.1.132 on the thermal headform conforming to the
dimensions in Figure 8.5.11.4.


8.5.2.2 Samples shall be conditioned as specified in 8.1.3 followed by conditioning as specified in 8.1.2, except CBRN garment and
material samples and glove samples shall be conditioned as specified in 8.1.9 followed by conditioning as specified in 8.1.2.

18. Revise the following subsections to read as follows:

material samples shall be conditioned as specified in 8.1.9 followed by conditioning as specified in 8.1.2.




8.11.7.1 Specimens shall be representative of the glove body composite construction at the glove areas A-P, B-P, D-P, E-P, F-P, G-P,
H-P, I-P, A-B, B-B, D-B, E-B, F-B, G-B, H-B, I-B as described in 8.1.143 and shall not include seams. Samples and specimens shall
be permitted to be materials representative of those used in the construction of the glove.

20. Revise 8.13.2.2 and 8.16.2.2 to read as follows:


8.16.2.2 Garment materials samples shall be conditioned as specified in 8.1.3 followed by conditioning as specified in 8.1.2, except
CBRN garment and material samples shall be conditioned as specified in 8.1.9 followed by conditioning as specified in 8.1.2.


8.16.8.1 Samples for conditioning shall be in the form of a pouch as described in 8.1.14 8.1.15.


8.17.2.2 Garment materials samples shall be conditioned as specified in 8.1.3 followed by conditioning as specified in 8.1.2, except
CBRN garment and material samples shall be conditioned as specified in 8.1.9 followed by conditioning as specified in 8.1.2.


8.17.8.1 Samples for conditioning shall be in the form of a pouch as described in 8.1.14 8.1.15.

24. Revise 8.19.5.1to read as follows:

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8.19.5.1 Specimen helmets shall be positioned on the headform according to the HPI as described in 8.1.12. Where the crown
clearance of the helmet is adjustable, the helmet shall be mounted with the least amount of clearance. Where an internal faceshield is
an integral part of the structural integrity of the helmet, it shall be deployed as far as possible without interfering with the test
equipment. Helmets shall be subjected to the environmental conditions specified in 8.1.2, 8.1.4, 8.1.5, and 8.1.6 prior to each impact
and within the specified time after being removed from conditioning.


8.20.5.1 The environmentally conditioned helmet shall be positioned according to the HPI as described in 8.1.132 on the test headform
and secured by the helmet retention system or by other means that will not interfere with the test. Where the crown clearance of the
helmet is adjustable, the helmet shall be mounted with the least amount of clearance. The helmet shall be positioned so that the
penetration striker shall impact perpendicular to the helmet. The helmet shall be adjusted to a size sufficient to properly fit on the
headform with the horizontal center plane parallel and within 5 degrees of the reference plane. The front-to-back centerline of the shell
shall be within 13 mm (0.5 in.) of the midsagittal plane of the headform. Where an internal faceshield is an integral part of the
structural integrity of the helmet, it shall be deployed as far as possible without interfering with the test equipment.

26. Revise 8.21.5.1.1 to read as follows:

8.21.5.1.1 The helmet shall be positioned according to the HPI as described in 8.1.132 on the ISO size J headform specified in Figure
8.23.4.1. Where the crown clearance of the helmet is adjustable, the helmet shall be mounted with the most amount of clearance.


8.25.7.2 Specimens shall be representative of glove body composite construction at glove areas A-P, B-P, D-P, E-P, F-P, G-P, H-P, I-
P as described in 8.1.143.


P, A-B, B-B, D-B, E-B, F-B, G-B, H-B, I-B as described in 8.1.143.


P as described in 8.1.143. All variations in composite construction and the order of layering of composite materials shall constitute a
new composite and shall be tested separately.

30. Revise 8.29.3.5, 8.29.4, and 8.29.5.5 to read as follows:

8.29.3.5 Specimen glove pairs shall be tested after being wet conditioned for wet conditions as specified in 8.1.7.

8.29.4 Apparatus. The apparatus shall consist of a pulling device that is a 31.7 mm (1in.) diameter fiberglass pole attached to an
overhead calibrated force measuring device in such a fashion that pulls on the pole will be perpendicular to the ground and downward
in direction. This pole shall be used until surface degradation occurs. The force measuring system shall provide a graphical plot of
force-vs-time.

8.29.5.4 The test subject and the test subjects hand shall be positioned as shown in Figure 8.29.5.4(a) then make three pulls on the
pulling device with gloves, with peak and Figure 8.29.5.4(b), and as described below minimum pull force values measured.

8.29.5.4.1 The test subject shall stand facing the pole with feet shoulder width apart.

8.29.5.4.2 While wearing specimen gloves, the test subject shall grasp the pole with the bottom of the bottom hand at a height equal to
the height of the subject.

8.29.5.4.3 The hands shall be stacked on each other and the thumbs shall not overlap the fingers.

8.29.5.4.4 The body shall be distanced from the pole so that the forearms are approaching vertical and in plane with the pole.

8.29.5.4.5 The elbows shall be shoulder width apart, rotated neither fully in (arms parallel to the pole) nor fully out (arms
perpendicular to the pole).
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Figure 8.29.5.4(a) Position of test subject body, arms and hands with respect to pole. Photo Courtesy Intertek Testing Services,
Used by Permission.

Figure 8.29.5.4(b) Close-up of position of test subject hands on pole. Photo Courtesy Intertek Testing Services, Used by
Permission.

8.29.5.5 The test subject shall pull the pole with as much pulling force as possible in a smooth, steady, swift, and non-jerking action
for 5 +1/-0 seconds. The test subject shall minimize forward or backward movement during the pull as much as possible. The test
subject shall not bend the knees or pull down with body weight during the pull. The test subject shall continue to pull until the test
facilitator instructs the test subject to end the pull at 5 +1/-0 seconds Pulls shall be performed as described in 8.29.5.5.1 through
8.29.5.5.6.

31. Delete existing subsections 8.29.5.5.1 through 8.29.5.5.6 and add a new subsection 8.29.5.6 to read as follows:

8.29.5.5.1 The test subject shall stand with feet together, firmly planted on the ground, and knees slightly bent.

8.29.5.5.2 The stand shall be adjusted such that the cushioned bar is touching the test subjects chest. The stand shall prevent the test
subjects forward movement during the pull.

8.29.5.5.3 The test subject shall extend the arms in front of the body at shoulder height to grab the pulling device for pulling vertically
down from the ceiling. The test subject shall stand in a comfortable pulling position with the arms bent at an angle of approximately
90 degrees, and in any case, the arms shall not be completely extended or touching the body.

8.29.5.5.4 The test subject shall grasp the pulling device with hands next to each other. Thumbs shall not overlap the fingers.

8.29.5.5.5 The test subject shall pull the rope or pole with as much pulling force as possible in a smooth, steady, swift, and non-jerking
action. The test subject shall not bend the knees further or pull down with body weight during the pull.

8.29.5.5.6 The test subject shall continuously pull on the pulling device for a minimum of 5 seconds, +1/0 seconds. The test subject
shall continue to pull until the test facilitator observes a peak pulling force and instructs the test subject to end the pull.

8.29.5.6 The test subject shall repeat the pull described above for a total of three pulls.
5 of 7

32. Revise 8.29.6.1 through 8.29.6.3 to read as follows:

8.29.6.1 The peak pull force value for each individual pull shall be recorded and reported. Any drop in force of greater than 30% in
any 0.2 second interval, as measured in the graphical plot of force versus time, shall be recorded and reported.

8.29.6.2 The minimum pull force value occurring after the peak pull force value shall be recorded and reported.

8.29.6.3 The percentage drop between the peak pull force value and the minimum pull force value shall be calculated, recorded, and
reported.


8.29.7.1 The individual percentage drop between the peak pull force value and the minimum pull force value shall be used to
determine pass or fail performance. Any drop in force of greater than 30% in any 0.2 second interval shall constitute failing
performance.

34. Revise text as follows:

8.45.5.2 While standing, each test subject shall grasp the cylinder so that the elbow is against the side of the body throughout the
duration of the test and the arm bend creates a right angle.

8.45.5.4 Each test subject shall make five successive attempts to twist the cylinder in the appropriate direction exerting as much force
as possible. The range of motion of the subject's armwrist, shall indicate the end of the twisting cycle. The average maximum force
over the five attempts shall be the barehanded control value.

Submitters Substantiation:

1. The ASTM F 2412 standard needs to be updated to the current edition.

2. These added paragraphs clarify the logical sequence of this section.

3. These added paragraphs clarify the logical sequence of this section.
4, 6, 8, 30, 31, 32, 33 As currently written in the 2013 edition, more information is needed to fully explain how the pulls are to be
performed, and also how the graphic results are to be interpreted. After interlaboratory coordination it was determined that the
additional language is necessary to perform consistent testing and to ensure a consistent level of compliant products is available to
users.

The test method as currently written does not provide sufficient detail in order for the test to be consistently applied in the evaluation
of glove grip and requires interpretation of the testing laboratory to determine the appropriate body and hand position, which have a
significant impact on the test results. Specific changes have been proposed in the position of the test subjects body and hands that
alter the original instructions for performing the test. The additional details are intended to ensure that laboratories performing this test
conduct the test in exactly the same way. Photographs of the proper positioning of the test subject body and hands with respect to the
pole are included in the proposed modifications to provide a clear interpretation for running this part of the test.

In addition, it is proposed to base the performance of glove grip on a change in the measured force relative to the time interval in
which that change occurs. Consequently, the criteria in paragraphs 7.1.3.5, 7.2.3.5 and 7.3.4.5 have been modified. This modification
was necessary because the degree of test subject hand slipping on the pole can occur at varying rates (force over time) leading to
widely different application of the test results and potential failure of gloves that are considered to have acceptable performance.

These changes were developed as the result of a meeting between Intertek Testing Services, the North Carolina State University
Textile Protection and Comfort Center, and Underwriters Laboratories, where these organizations worked together to determine how
to consistently run the test method and achieve better precision in test results. The involvement of these organizations and their work
on this test method were pursuant to a recommendation made by the Technical Committee on Structural and Proximity Fire Fighting
Protective Clothing during a committee teleconference held December 2012 where specific problems with the test method and its
application in NFPA 1971 were identified.

5, 7, 9.These changes bring the requirements in line with EN ISO 20345:2011.

10. This change brings all the footwear flame requirements in line together.

6 of 7
11. The water levels for garment, materials and gloves needs to be specified in order to allow for the front load wash machines to be
properly programmed at the testing laboratories.

12. This change is adding a tolerance and provides the temperature conversion.

13, 15, 18, 20, 22. These changes clarify the requirements for CBRN laundering and reference the correct section for pouch
conditioning.

14. This change references the correct section for pouch construction.

16, 19, 26, 27, 28, 29 These changes reference the correct sections in the standard related to glove test areas and the helmet positioning
index.

17. This change references the correct laundry preconditioning for glove samples.

21, 23 These changes reference the correct pouch construction section for moisture barrier with seams.

24, 25.These changes clarify the deployment of the internal faceshield when it is an integral part of the structural integrity of the
helmet.

34. The test apparatus will be maxed out if the test subject uses their arms range of motion to perform this test. In order to achieve
more accurate results it is important the test subject use their wrists range of motion to perform this test.

Emergency Nature: This TIA seeks to correct errors and omissions that were overlooked during the Fall 2013 revision cycle process
of NFPA 1951. Additionally, some parts of this TIA correct circumstances in which the standard could adversely impact a method or
product that was inadvertently overlooked in the total revision process.

7 of 7
TIA 1951
-2013
NFPA 1951, Standard on Protective Ensembles for Technical Rescue Incidents
Reference: Various
(TIA Log 1098)


________________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________________________

27 Eligible to Vote
8 Not Returned (Duffy, Haston, Johnson, Legendre, McKenna, Neilson, Putorti, Reall)

19 Agree
0 Disagree
0 Abstentions


19 Agree
0 Disagree
0 Abstentions


Final FAE-SCE Ballots are on the next page
1 of 2
TIA FINAL FAE-SCE BALLOT RESULTS
________________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________________________

24 Eligible to Vote
8 Not Returned (Byrne, Davis, Geraghty, Howard, Nelson, Paderick, Reall, Stanhope)

16 Agree
0 Disagree
0 Abstentions


16 Agree
0 Disagree
0 Abstentions


2 of 2
Item 13-8-22
NFPA 1951
-2013
Standard on Protective Ensembles for Technical Rescue Incidents
TIA Log No. 1099
Reference: 8.2.5(1)
Submitters: Dean Cox, Fairfax (VA) County Fire and Rescue Department and J eremy Metz, West Metro (CO) Fire Rescue

1. Revise 8.2.5(1) as follows:

8.2.5 Procedure. Thermal protective performance testing shall be performed in accordance with ASTM F 2700, Standard Test
Method for Unsteady-State Heat Transfer Evaluation of Flame Resistant Materials for Clothing with Continuous Heating, with the
following modifications:

(1) The contact spaced configuration shall be used for testing of all material specimens.

(2) The heat transfer performance value calculations using the heat flux in calories/cm
2
/sec shall be reported as the TPP rating.

Submitters Substantiation: In ROP 1951-2 Log #CP7 FAE-SCE, the TPP test was altered to switch from the spaced to the contact
configuration. This change to the test method moved the sensor from 0.25 inches away from the sample to contacting the sample
during the test. This change in test procedure results in a lower heat transfer performance or TPP value due to the location of the
sensor.

In previous editions of NFPA 1951, only the spaced configuration was tested, and from a safety perspective, no justification has been
given for this particular change. The purpose of the original accepted committee proposal was to use ASTM test method F2700 in
order to correct known deficiencies with the previous method. The substantiation for the changes in the committee proposal does not
address switching from the spaced to the contact configuration.

Emergency Nature: The proposed TIA intends to correct a circumstance in which the revised document has resulted in an adverse
impact on a product or method that was inadvertently overlooked in the total revision process, or was without adequate technical
(safety) justification for the action. As stated above, there is no technical justification in the ROP for altering the conduct of the test
from the spaced to the contact configuration. This unintended change has resulted in an adverse impact on products in that currently
compliant products can no longer be certified.

1 of 1
TIA 1951
-2013
NFPA 1951, Standard on Protective Ensembles for Technical Rescue Incidents
Reference: 8.2.5(1)
(TIA Log 1099)


________________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________________________

27 Eligible to Vote
9 Not Returned (Duffy, Fargo, Haston, Johnson, Legendre, McKenna, Neilson, Putorti, Reall)

18 Agree
0 Disagree
0 Abstentions


18 Agree
0 Disagree
0 Abstentions


Final FAE-SCE Ballots are on the next page
1 of 2
TIA FINAL FAE-SCE BALLOT RESULTS
________________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________________________

24 Eligible to Vote
8 Not Returned (Byrne, Davis, Geraghty, Howard, Nelson, Paderick, Reall, Stanhope)

16 Agree
0 Disagree
0 Abstentions


16 Agree
0 Disagree
0 Abstentions


2 of 2
Item 13-8-23
NFPA 1971
-2013
Standard on Protective Ensembles for Structural Fire Fighting and Proximity Fire Fighting
TIA Log No. 1100
Reference: Various
Submitters: Steven Corrado, UL and Pam Kavalesky, Intertek

1. Revise 7.7.22 to read as follows:

7.7.22 Gloves shall be tested for grip as specified in Section 8.38, Grip Test, and shall not have a drop of force of more
than 30 percent from the peak pull force value in any 0.2 second interval.

2. Revise Section 8.38 to read as follows:

8.38.2.1 Samples for conditioning shall be whole gloves pairs.

8.38.3.4 Specimen glove pairs shall be tested after being wet conditioned for wet conditions as specified in 8.1.9.

8.38.4.1 Pulling Device. The pulling device shall be a 3.2 cm (1 in.) diameter fiberglass pole attached to an overhead
calibrated force measuring device in such a fashion that pulls on the pole will be perpendicular to the ground and
downward in direction. This pole shall be used until surface degradation occurs. The force measuring system shall
provide a graphical plot of force-vs-time.

8.38.5.1 Test subjects shall be selected so that their hand dimensions are as close as possible to the middle of the range for
hand length and hand circumference as specified in Table 6.7.6.1 (ab) and Table 6.7.6.1(d) for size small and size large
gloves. At least three test subjects shall be selected for both size small and size large.

8.38.5.4 The test subject and the test subjects hand shall be positioned as shown in Figure 8.38.5.4(a) and Figure
8.38.5.4(b), and as described below: shall then make three pulls on the pulling device with gloves with peak and minimum
pull force values measured. Pulls shall be performed as described 8.38.5.4.1 through 8.38.5.4.6. The test subject shall
extend the arms in front of the body at shoulder height to grab the pulling device for pulling vertically down from the
ceiling.

Figure 8.38.5.4 (a) Position of test subject body, arms, and hands with respect to pole. Photo Courtesy Intertek
Testing Services, Used by Permission.

1 of 3

Figure 8.38.5.4 (b) Close-up of position of test subject hands on pole. Photo Courtesy Intertek Testing Services,
Used by Permission.

8.38.5.4.1 The test subject shall stand facing the pole with feet shoulder width apart. with feet together, firmly planted on
the ground, and knees slightly bent.

8.38.5.4.2 While wearing specimen gloves, the test subject shall grasp the pole with the bottom of the bottom hand at a
height equal to the height of the subject. The stand shall be adjusted such that the cushioned bar is touching the test
subjects chest. The stand shall prevent the test subjects forward movement during the pull.

8.38.5.4.3 The hands shall be stacked on each other and the thumbs shall not overlap the fingers. test subject shall stand in
a comfortable pulling position with the arms bent at an angle of approximately 90 degrees and, in any case, the arms shall
not be completely extended or touching the body.

8.38.5.4.4 The body shall be distanced from the pole so that the forearms are approaching vertical and in plane with the
pole. test subject shall grasp the pulling device with hands next to each other. Thumbs shall not overlap the fingers.

8.38.5.4.5 The elbows shall be shoulder width apart, rotated neither fully in (arms parallel to the pole) nor fully out (arms
perpendicular to the pole). test subject shall pull the rope or pole with as much pulling force as possible in a smooth,
steady, swift, and non-jerking action. The test subject shall not bend the knees further or pull down with body weight
during the pull.

8.38.5.4.6 The test subject shall continuously pull on the pulling device for a minimum of 5 seconds, +1/0 seconds. The
test subject shall continue to pull until the test facilitator observes a peak pulling force and instructs the test subject to end
the pull.

8.38.5.5 The test subject shall pull the pole with as much pulling force as possible in a smooth, steady, swift, and non-
jerking action for 5 +1/-0 seconds. The test subject shall minimize forward or backward movement during the pull as
much as possible. The test subject shall not bend the knees or pull down with body weight during the pull. The test
subject shall continue to pull until the test facilitator instructs the test subject to end the pull at 5 +1/-0 seconds.

8.38.5.6 The test subject shall repeat the pull described above for a total of three pulls.

8.38.6.1 The peak pull force value for each individual pull shall be recorded and reported. Any drop in force of greater
than 30% in any 0.2-second interval, as measured in the graphical plot of force-vs-time, shall be recorded and reported.

8.38.6.2 The minimum pull force value occurring after the peak pull force value shall be recorded and reported.

8.38.6.3 The percentage drop between the peak pull force value and the minimum pull force value shall be calculated,
recorded, and reported.

8.38.7.1 The individual percentage drop between the peak pull force value and the minimum pull force value shall be used
to determine pass or fail performance. Any drop in force of greater than 30% in any 0.2-second interval shall constitute
failing performance.

2 of 3
Submitters Substantiation: As currently written, more information is needed to fully explain how the pulls are to be
performed, and also how the graphic results are to be interpreted. This is necessary to ensure consistent testing is
performed.

The test method as currently written does not provide sufficient detail in order for the test to be consistently applied in the
evaluation of glove grip and requires interpretation of the testing laboratory to determine the appropriate body and hand
position, which have a significant impact on the test results. Specific changes have been proposed in the position of the
test subjects body and hands that alter the original instructions for performing the test. The additional details are intended
to ensure that laboratories performing this test conduct the test in exactly the same way. Photographs of the proper
positioning of the test subject body and hands with respect to the pole are included in the proposed modifications to
provide a clear interpretation for running this part of the test.

In addition, it is proposed to base the performance of glove grip on a change in the measured force relative to the time
interval in which that change occurs. Consequently, the criteria in paragraph 7.7.22 have been modified. This
modification was necessary because the degree of test subject hand slipping on the pole can occur at varying rates (force
over time) leading to widely different application of the test results and potential failure of gloves that are considered to
have acceptable performance.

These changes were developed as the result of a meeting between Intertek Testing Services, the North Carolina State
University Textile Protection and Comfort Center, and Underwriters Laboratories, where these organizations worked
together to determine how to consistently run the test method and achieve better precision in test results. The involvement
of these organizations and their work on this test method were pursuant to a recommendation made by the Technical
Committee on Structural and Proximity Fire Fighting Protective Clothing during a committee teleconference held
December 2012 where specific problems with the test method and its application in NFPA 1971 were identified.

Emergency Nature: The document contains an error or an omission that was overlooked during a regular revision
process. After interlaboratory coordination it was determined that the additional language is necessary to perform
consistent testing and to ensure a consistent level of compliant product available to users.

3 of 3
Agenda Item: TIA 1971-2013
Document: NFPA 1971, Standard on Protective Ensembles for Structural Fire Fighting and Proximity Fire
Fighting
Reference: Various
(TIA Log 1100)


________________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________________
[27 (eligible to vote) 7 (not returned) 0 (abstentions) = 20 0.75 = 15]

[27 eligible 2 = 13.5 = 14 (this is the simple majority)]
________________________________________________________________________________________

27 Eligible to Vote
7 Not Returned (Duffy, Haston, Johnson, Legendre, Neilson, Putorti, Reall)

20 Agree (Matthews, Stull w/comment)
0 Disagree
0 Abstentions


20 Agree
0 Disagree
0 Abstentions


Final FAE-SPF Ballots are on the next page

1 of 5
TIA FINAL FAE-SPF BALLOT RESULTS
________________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________________
[36 (eligible to vote) 2 (not returned) 1 (abstention) = 33 0.75 = 24.75]

[36 eligible 2 = 18 + 1 = 19 (this is the simple majority)]
________________________________________________________________________________________

36 Eligible to Vote
2 Not Returned (David, Doan)

33 Agree
0 Disagree
1 Abstention (Pegg)


33 Agree
0 Disagree
1 Abstention (Pegg)


2 of 5

3 of 5

4 of 5

5 of 5
Item 13-8-24
NFPA 1981
-2013
Standard on Open-Circuit Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) for Emergency Services
TIA Log No. 1111
Reference: 4.1.11 and 4.1.12
Comment Closing Date: August 12, 2013
Submitters: Dan Rossos, Oregon Department of Public Safety Standards &Training; Bill Haskell, NIOSH/NPPTL;
Robert Athanas, FDNY

1. Revise 4.1.11 and 4.1.12 to read as follows:

4.1.11 The certification organization shall not permit any manufacturer to label any SCBA as compliant with the 2007 edition of this
standard on or after 31 August 2013 28 February 2014, except when replacement labels or replacement components that bear the
certification organizations label are required.

4.1.12 The certification organization shall require manufacturers to remove all certification labels and product labels indicating
compliance with the 2007 edition of this standard from all SCBA that are under the control of the manufacturer on 31 August 2013 28
February 2014. The certification organization shall verify that this action is taken.

Submitters Substantiation: The purpose of this TIA is to update on the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
(NIOSH) testing of CBRN SCBAs. Some unanticipated delays have the potential to negatively impact the timeliness of completion of
NIOSH SCBA approvals. These delays could in turn impact approvals and certification of SCBAs by the relevant certification
organization (SEI) to the NFPA 1981 standard, 2013 edition. That standard states in paragraph 4.1.11 that The certification
organizations shall not permit any manufacturer to label any SCBA as compliant with the 2007 edition of this standard on or after 31
August 2013, except when replacement labels or replacement components that bear the certification organizations label are required.
The presumption in the Technical Committee choosing this date was that it would provide sufficient time for manufacturers new
designs to have successfully completed the evaluations for the certification authorities to be able to issue certifications for compliance
to the NIOSH and NFPA standards by that date.

Emergency Nature: NIOSH testing to the Statement of Standard for Self Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) with Chemical,
Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Protection used to Protect Emergency Responders Against CBRN Agents in Terrorist
Attacks in conjunction with the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard 1981 for Open-Circuit Self-Contained
Breathing Apparatus for Fire Fighters contain three interlocked activities. One is NIOSH certification under 42 CFR Part 84, Subpart
H; two is compliance with National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard 1981 for Open-Circuit Self-Contained Breathing
Apparatus for Fire Fighters, current edition; and three is special tests under NIOSH 42 CFR 84.63(c): Chemical Agent Permeation and
Penetration Resistance Against Distilled Sulfur Mustard (HD) and Sarin (GB), performed by The US Army Edgewood Chemical
Biological Center (ECBC) Testing Center and Laboratory Respirator Protection Level (LRPL), performed by NPPTL. To minimize
the total time for CBRN approvals, NIOSH and SEI have a simultaneous test and approval protocol.

The National Personal Protective Technology Laboratory (NPPTL) has allocated its resources provide for the completion of all 9
internally-conducted tests, evaluations and issuance of approvals for SCBA manufacturer applications submitted prior to 1 J une 2013
by September 1
st
. SEI has also allocated resources to provide for completion of the NFPA 1981 compliance testing for apparatus
received by the same date.

However, the availability of ECBC testing resources to complete the HD and GB testing has been negatively impacted by the Federal
Government Budget Sequestration. Consequently, delays are anticipated. Representatives from NPPTL and ECBC are working
closely to develop a projected testing schedule.

A delay past the August 31st date poses a significant impact on fire departments or first responder organizations that planned 4
th

quarter of 2013 purchases or need an emergency purchase of compliant SCBA. These organizations may not have access to the
manufacturer of their current inventory SCBA, posing the dilemma of purchasing another manufacturers product or foregoing
purchase until compliant product is available. Either of these approaches will impact firefighter safety, by requiring additional training
and creating a mixed inventory of SCBA with compromised interoperability of SCBA units. Departments may be faced with either an
inadequate number of compliant SCBAs for operations or sending responders into a hazardous situation with safety equipment that is
no longer compliant with NFPA 1981. Additionally, there is concern that without this compliance date extension, products compliant
to the 2007 edition of NFPA 1981 will no longer be available after August 31, 2013.

1 of 1
TIA 1981-2013
NFPA 1981, Standard on Open-Circuit Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) for Emergency Services
Reference: 4.1.11
(TIA Log 1111)


TIA PRELIMINARY CC BALLOT RESULTS (due on 7/26/13)
________________________________________________________________________________________
According to 5.4 in the NFPA (RGCP), the final results show this TIA HAS/HAS NOT achieved the necessary
votes on both Question 1 (Correlation Issues) and Question 2 (Emergency Nature).
________________________________________________________________________________________
The number of affirmative votes needed to obtain a recommendation to issue the TIA is ___.
[___ (eligible to vote) ___ (not returned) ___ (abstentions) =___ 0.75 =___]

[___ eligible 2 =___ + 1 =14 (this is the simple majority)]
________________________________________________________________________________________

___ Eligible to Vote
___ Not Returned

___ Agree
___ Disagree
___ Abstentions

FINAL ACTION: PASSED/FAILED

___ Agree
___ Disagree
___ Abstentions


Final FAE-RPE Ballots are on the next page
Supplemental Attachment 13-8-24-b
TIA FINAL FAE-RPE BALLOT RESULTS
________________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________________________

31 Eligible to Vote
2 Not Returned (Dickson, Kaller)

28 Agree
1 Disagree (Bull)
0 Abstentions


28 Agree (Putorti w/comment)
1 Disagree (Bull)
0 Abstentions


Supplemental Attachment 13-8-24-c
C#6
Item 13-8-25
NFPA 1982
- 2013
Standard on Personal Alert Safety Systems (PASS)
TIA Log No. 1112
Comment Closing Date: August 12, 2013
Submitter: Dan Rossos, Oregon Department of Public Safety Standards &Training; Bill Haskell, NIOSH/NPPTL;
Robert Athanas, FDNY

1. Revise 4.1.8 and 4.1.9 to read as follows:

4.1.8 The certification organization shall not permit any manufacturer to label any PASS as compliant with the 2007 edition of this
standard on or after August 31, 2013 February 28, 2014.

4.1.9 The certification organization shall require manufacturers to remove all certification labels and product labels indicating
compliance with the 2007 edition of this standard from all PASS that are under the control of the manufacturer on August 31, 2013
February 28, 2014. The certification organization shall verify this action is taken.

Submitters Substantiation: This TIA is related to a similar TIA being submitted to NFPA 1981. The testing and certification of an
integrated PASS device is directly related to the testing and certification of the SCBA. The submitters emphasize the importance of
the two documents continuing to have the same compliance dates.

The purpose of this TIA is to update on the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) testing of CBRN SCBAs.
Some unanticipated delays have the potential to negatively impact the timeliness of completion of NIOSH SCBA approvals. These
delays could in turn impact approvals and certification of SCBAs by the relevant certification organization (SEI) to the NFPA 1981
standard, 2013 edition. That standard states in paragraph 4.1.11 that The certification organizations shall not permit any manufacturer
to label any SCBA as compliant with the 2007 edition of this standard on or after 31 August 2013, except when replacement labels or
replacement components that bear the certification organizations label are required. The presumption in the Technical Committee
choosing this date was that it would provide sufficient time for manufacturers new designs to have successfully completed the
evaluations for the certification authorities to be able to issue certifications for compliance to the NIOSH and NFPA standards by that
date.

Emergency Nature: NIOSH testing to the Statement of Standard for Self Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) with Chemical,
Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Protection used to Protect Emergency Responders Against CBRN Agents in Terrorist
Attacks in conjunction with the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard 1981 for Open-Circuit Self-Contained
Breathing Apparatus for Fire Fighters contain three interlocked activities. One is NIOSH certification under 42 CFR Part 84, Subpart
H; two is compliance with National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard 1981 for Open-Circuit Self-Contained Breathing
Apparatus for Fire Fighters, current edition; and three is special tests under NIOSH 42 CFR 84.63(c): Chemical Agent Permeation and
Penetration Resistance Against Distilled Sulfur Mustard (HD) and Sarin (GB), performed by The US Army Edgewood Chemical
Biological Center (ECBC) Testing Center and Laboratory Respirator Protection Level (LRPL), performed by NPPTL. To minimize
the total time for CBRN approvals, NIOSH and SEI have a simultaneous test and approval protocol.

The National Personal Protective Technology Laboratory (NPPTL) has allocated its resources provide for the completion of all 9
internally-conducted tests, evaluations and issuance of approvals for SCBA manufacturer applications submitted prior to 1 J une 2013
by September 1
st
. SEI has also allocated resources to provide for completion of the NFPA 1981 compliance testing for apparatus
received by the same date.

However, the availability of ECBC testing resources to complete the HD and GB testing has been negatively impacted by the Federal
Government Budget Sequestration. Consequently, delays are anticipated. Representatives from NPPTL and ECBC are working
closely to develop a projected testing schedule.

A delay past the August 31st date poses a significant impact on fire departments or first responder organizations that planned 4
th

quarter of 2013 purchases or need an emergency purchase of compliant SCBA with integrated PASS. These organizations may not
have access to the manufacturer of their current inventory SCBA, posing the dilemma of purchasing another manufacturers product or
foregoing purchase until compliant product is available. Either of these approaches will impact firefighter safety, by requiring
additional training and creating a mixed inventory of SCBA with compromised interoperability of SCBA units. Departments may be
faced with either an inadequate number of compliant SCBAs for operations or sending responders into a hazardous situation with
safety equipment that is no longer compliant with NFPA 1981. Additionally, there is concern that without this compliance date
extension, products compliant to the 2007 edition of NFPA 1981 will no longer be available after August 31, 2013.

1 of 1
TIA 1982-2013
NFPA 1982, Standard on Personal Alert Safety Systems (PASS)
(TIA Log 1112)


TIA PRELIMINARY CC BALLOT RESULTS (due on 7/26/13)
________________________________________________________________________________________
According to 5.4 in the NFPA (RGCP), the final results show this TIA HAS/HAS NOT achieved the necessary
votes on both Question 1 (Correlation Issues) and Question 2 (Emergency Nature).
________________________________________________________________________________________
The number of affirmative votes needed to obtain a recommendation to issue the TIA is ___.
[27 (eligible to vote) ___ (not returned) ___ (abstentions) =___ 0.75 =___]

________________________________________________________________________________________

27 Eligible to Vote
___ Not Returned

___ Agree
___ Disagree
___ Abstentions


20 Agree
0 Disagree
0 Abstentions


Final FAE-ELS Ballots are on the next page
TIA FINAL FAE-ELS BALLOT RESULTS
________________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________________________

29 Eligible to Vote
7 Not Returned (Berger, Busa, Facella, Makky, Roche, Varner, Wolf)

22 Agree
0 Disagree
0 Abstentions


22 Agree (Putorti w/comment)
0 Disagree
0 Abstentions


Item 13-8-26

NFPA 2112
-2012
Standard on Flame-Resistant Garments for Protection of Industrial Personnel Against Flash Fire
TIA Log No. 1105
Reference: Various
Submitter: J effrey O. Stull, International Personnel Protection, Inc.

1. Revise 3.3.6, A.3.3.6, and 3.3.20, and add a new A.3.3.20 to read as follows:

3.3.6* Cold Weather Insulation Material. A fabric that consists of one or more nonseparable layers that is used
for protection in a low-temperature environment. A cold weather insulation material is not an interlining (see
interlining).

A.3.3.6 Cold Weather Insulation Material. Examples of insulation materials are include textile battings(s) alone
or batting(s) that are attached to a face cloth. For example, an insulation material consisting of two layers are
considered nonseparable by the attachment that combines the two layers. The insulation material may or may not
have a face cloth. Cold weather insulation materials generally are provided within the garment such that their area of
coverage coincides with the majority of garment area covering the wearers body.
Cold weather insulation material as defined in this standard does not preclude the use of intermediate layers for
additional protection against thermal hazards.

3.3.20* Interlining. Any textile that is incorporated into any garment as a layer between outer and inner layers that
only covers a small portion of the overall garment. [1975, 2009]

A.3.3.20 Interlining. The outer and inner layers are compliant to the fabric requirements of this standard. Examples
of an interlining are a fabric layer used to stiffen the waist band in a pair of pants or a facing fabric used inside the
closure flap of a coverall. Interlining materials do not come in contact with the wearers skin or underclothing.

2. Revise subsections 5.1.2, 5.1.9(7), and 5.1.12, and add a new 5.1.13 to read as follows:

5.1.2 At least one product label shall be conspicuously located inside each flame-resistant garment. when the item is
properly assembled with all layers and components in place.

5.1.9(7) Fiber content for each primary fabric layer including cold weather insulation materials, but excluding
interlinings and labels.

5.1.12 Garments with multiple layers, including an outer layer and removable cold weather insulation layer, shall
specify the certified wearable configurations on the label configuration and include a warning on the label stating
that all layers must be properly secured and worn in accordance with the manufacturers instructions.

5.1.13 For garments with multiple layers that include an outer layer and a removable cold weather insulation layer, a
label shall be conspicuously attached to the removable insulation layer that states DO NOT WEAR THIS LINER
BY ITSELF. FOR COMPLIANCE WITH THE FLASH FIRE REQUIREMENTS OF NFPA 2112, THE
COMPLETE GARMENT MUST BE WORN. FOR COMPLIANCE INFORMATION, SEE THE PRODUCT
LABEL ON OUTER GARMENT.

3. Add new Section 6.4 and subsections 6.4.1, and A.6.4.1 to read as follows:

6.4 Use of a Liner for Cold Weather Insulation. Garments shall be permitted to include liners in their construction
including cold weather insulation materials where the liner is either integral to the garment or removable.

6.4.1* Where garments incorporate a cold weather insulation material as part of a removable lining system, the
garment shall be designed such that the removable liner consisting of the cold weather insulation material cannot be
independently worn.

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A.6.4.1 Removable liners are permitted to be worn separately if the liner material(s) independently meets the
appropriate fabric requirements in Chapter 7 including 7.1.1 for heat transfer performance and 7.1.5 for overall flash
fire performance. If the liner contains cold weather insulation materials that are not evaluated to 7.1.1 and 7.1.5 and
do not pass the thermal shrinkage resistance requirement in 7.1.3, then the manufacturer must label the liner as
specified in 5.1.13 and provide a design that does not allow separate wearing of the liner without the outer layer.
This may be demonstrated by the absence of a means of closure for the closure area of shirts, pants, and coveralls.

4. Add new subsections 7.1.1.1 and 7.1.1.2 to read as follows:

7.1.1.1 Where the flame-resistant garment consists of multiple and separable layers intended to be worn separately,
the outer layer and the inner layer or layers shall be separately tested.

7.1.1.2 Where the flame-resistant garment consists of multiple layers intended only to be worn together, only the
outer layer shall be tested.

5. Revise subsections 7.1.2 and 7.1.3 to read as follows:

7.1.2 Fabric, cold weather insulation material, and reflective striping utilized in the construction of flame-resistant
garments shall be tested for flame resistance as specified in Section 8.3, and shall have a char length of not more
than 100 mm (4 in.) and an after-flame of not more than 2 seconds, and shall not melt and drip.

7.1.3 Fabric utilized in the construction of flame-resistant garments, excluding manufacturers labels, interlinings,
and cold weather insulation materials, shall be individually tested for thermal shrinkage resistance as specified in
Section 8.4, and shall not shrink more than 10 percent in any direction.

6. Delete existing subsection 7.1.3.1 as follows:

7.1.3.1 Cold weather insulation materials utilized in the construction of flame-resistant garments shall be tested in
accordance with Section 8.4 and shall not shrink more than 20 percent in any direction.

7. Revise subsection 7.1.4 to read as follows:

7.1.4 Fabric, cold weather insulation materials, other textile materials, and reflective striping other than those items
described in 7.1.4.1 and 7.1.4.2, used in the construction of flame-resistant garments shall be individually tested for
heat resistance in their original form as specified in Section 8.4, and shall not melt and drip, separate, or ignite.

8. Add a new subsection 8.3.1.7 to read as follows:

8.3.1.7 Modifications to this test method for testing cold weather insulation materials shall be as specified in 8.3.13.

9. Revise subsections 8.3.3.1, 8.3.3.2, and 8.3.3.3 to read as follows

8.3.3.1 For fabrics and cold weather insulation materials that are designated on the flame-resistant garment label to
be washed, specimens shall be tested before and after 100 cycles of washing and drying as specified in 8.1.3.

be dry-cleaned, specimens shall be tested before and after 100 cycles of dry cleaning as specified in 8.1.4.

be either washed or dry-cleaned, specimens shall be tested before and after 100 cycles of washing and drying as
specified in 8.1.3, or after 100 cycles of dry cleaning as specified in 8.1.4.

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10. Add new subsections to 8.3.13 to read as follows:

8.3.13 Specific Requirements for Testing Cold Weather Insulation Materials.

8.3.13.1 Samples for wash or dry-clean conditioning shall be prepared by cutting a 66-cm 66-cm (26-in. 26-in.)
panel of the cold weather insulation material. A similar-sized piece of 200-g/m
2
to 270-g/m
2
(6.0-oz/yd
2
to 8.0-
oz/yd
2
) flame-resistant fabric meeting all requirements of this standard shall be sewn around the perimeter of the
cold weather insulation material such that the batting side is covered by the fabric.

8.3.13.2 Following wash or dry-clean conditioning, 5 specimens measuring 75 mm 300 mm (3 in. 12 in.) from
each of the warp and filling direction shall be removed from the cold weather insulation material layer of the
conditioned panels.

8.3.13.3 If applicable, all specimens shall be prepared for testing by trimming the scrim material, batting, or other
layer(s) away from the face cloth by 50 mm 3 mm (2.0 in. 1/8 in.) such that the face cloth can be folded back
covering the scrim, batting, or other layer(s) by 50 mm 3 mm (2.0 in. 1/8 in.); the folded specimen shall be
secured in the specimen holder.

8.3.13.4 Testing shall be performed as described in 8.3.2 through 8.3.7.

11. Revise subsection 8.4.1 and add new subsections 8.4.1.1 through 8.4.1.5 to read as follows:

8.4.1 Application. The heat and thermal shrinkage resistance test method shall apply to flame resistant garment
fabrics, components, and hardware.

8.4.1.1 This test method shall apply to flame-resistant garment fabrics, components, hardware, and cold weather
insulation materials.

8.4.1.2 Modifications to this test method for testing flame-resistant garment textile materials shall be as specified in
8.4.8.

8.4.1.3 Modifications to this test method for testing other flame-resistant garment materials, including reflective
striping, shall be as specified in 8.4.9.

8.4.1.4 Modifications to this test method for testing hardware shall be as specified in 8.4.10.

8.4.1.5 Modifications to this test method for testing cold weather insulation materials shall be as specified in 8.4.11.

12. Revise subsections 8.4.2.1 and 8.4.3.1 through 8.4.3.3 to read as follows:

8.4.2.1 Only heat resistance testing shall be conducted on not fewer than three specimens for each hardware item,
label material, and other flame-resistant garment fabrics, and cold weather insulation materials not listed in 8.4.2.2
and 8.4.2.3.

be washed, specimens shall be tested before and after three cycles of washing and drying as specified in 8.1.3.

be dry-cleaned, specimens shall be tested before and after three cycles of dry-cleaning as specified in 8.1.4.

be either washed or dry-cleaned, specimens shall be tested before and after three cycles of washing and drying as
specified in 8.1.3, after three cycles of dry-cleaning as specified in 8.1.4.

13. Delete existing subsection 8.4.8.2 and renumber 8.4.8.3 to 8.4.8.2 to read as follows:

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8.4.8.2 Measurements of cold weather insulation material thermal shrinkage shall be made on the side of the fabric
facing the wearer as used in the construction of the garment.

8.4.8.3 8.4.8.2 Testing shall be performed in accordance with 8.4.2 through 8.4.7.

14. Add new subsection 8.4.11 to read as follows:

8.4.11 Specific Requirements for Testing Cold Weather Insulation Materials.

8.4.11.1 Samples for wash or dry-clean conditioning shall be prepared by cutting a 50-cm 20-cm (20-in. 8-in.)
panel of the cold weather insulation material. A similar-sized cloth piece of 200-g/m
2
to 270-g/m
2
(6.0-oz/yd
2
to
8.0-oz/yd
2
) flame-resistant fabric meeting all requirements of this standard shall be sewn around the perimeter of the
cold weather insulation material such that the batting side is covered by the fabric .

8.4.11.2 Following wash or dry-clean conditioning, 3 specimens measuring 152 mm 152 mm (6 in. 6 in.) shall
be removed from the cold weather insulation material layer of the conditioned panel.

8.4.11.3 Testing shall be performed in accordance with 8.4.2 through 8.4.7, and thermal shrinkage shall not be
measured.

Submitters Substantiation: The current criteria in NFPA 2112-2012 are not workable to support the inclusion of
cold weather insulation materials that provide safe and effective protection of flame resistant garments used for
protection of workers against accident flash fires. Changes were made to the 2012 edition of NFPA 2112 without the
benefit of a full validation effort. An effort intended to meet this purpose has now been completed by a task group
under the direction of the Technical Committee where several prospective cold weather insulation materials were
evaluated using existing and proposed test methods that included both current and modified flame resistance and
heat/thermal shrinkage resistance testing. Additional evaluations were carried out using full scale manikin testing
with garments incorporating the selected cold weather insulation materials in jackets of a simple design to assess
effects of simulated flash fires on the clothing and insulation materials.

This effort produced the following two primary findings:

1. One of the cold weather insulation materials included in the investigation exhibited average afterflame
times in excess of the 2-second requirement using the current flame resistance test procedures. When tested
according to the proposed modified flame resistance test procedures, afterflame times were compliant or
near compliant. In addition, the manikin-based testing for the same fabric exhibiting extended afterflame
times, showed no unusual burning behavior during manikin testing of full garments where the liner
consisted of the cold weather insulation material or showed shrinkage that differed radically from garments
using materials that qualify to current NFPA 2112 performance criteria. Based on these findings, the
modified flame resistance testing can be utilized for the evaluation of cold weather insulation materials.

It was observed that after flame times were observed to be generally shorter when a 50 mm folded edge
was used as compared to a 25 mm folded edge. It was also rationalized that more consistent results would
be provided with the 50 mm folded edge for the modified flame test because the specimen is positioned 19
mm into a 38 mm high flame leaving only a 6 mm space between the top of the flame and the beginning of
the unprotected (by the folded edge) batting. It was therefore reasoned and consistent with the observed test
results that the modified flame resistance test should use a 50 mm folded edge.

Specific changes to NFPA 2112 have been proposed in proposed modifications shown in Section 8.3.

2. Certain cold weather insulation materials exhibited significant distortion in heat/thermal shrinkage
resistance testing and thermal shrinkage. Yet, these same materials when employed in the form of a liner in
a flame resistant jacket utilizing a lightweight shell material did not show significant differences in their
shrinkage (of the liner) with materials that would otherwise pass the NFPA 2112-2013 thermal shrinkage
resistance criteria. This further included testing with the jacket samples inverted (turned inside out)
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representing a worst case exposure and wearing configuration where no adverse safety issues were
observed. From these results, the exemption of cold weather insulation materials from the thermal
shrinkage resistance requirement can be justified. Specific changes to NFPA 2112 implementing these
modifications are provided as in paragraphs 7.1.3, 7.1.3.1 (deletion), 7.1.4, and Section 8.4.

It is important to point out that the cold weather insulation material is required to meet a heat resistance requirement
and is always covered by an outer (shell) material (paragraph 7.1.4). If it is not, it would not qualify as a cold
weather insulation material. It is also important to point out that while these changes were based on testing that did
not show any safety of the protective garment to be compromised when presented to a simulated flash fire,
conditions may exist for which cold weather insulation materials (and other garment materials) will fail to provide
intended levels of protection.

The following substantiations are proposed for the additional changes in this amendment to address cold weather
insulation material definitions, labeling, design criteria, performance criteria, and test methods:

A clarification was added to the definition of cold weather insulation material to indicate that the material is
not an interlining. Additional language was also added to distinguish an interlining that is not tested for
heat resistance or thermal shrinkage resistance from a cold weather insulation material, which is tested for
heat resistance but not thermal shrinkage resistance (paragraphs 3.3.6, 3.3.20, A.3.3.6, and A.3.3.20).

Additional labeling language was added to require the identification of the cold weather insulation material
fiber content, the inclusion of a warning that garments with cold weather insulation materials must be
properly secured and that a separate label must be provided on the liner if detachable, that indicates that the
liner must not be worn by itself. These changes are covered in paragraph 5.1.2, 5.1.9, 5.1.12, and 5.1.13).

Design criteria were added to permit garment with sewn-in or detachable liners that utilize cold weather
insulation materials but that manufacturers must design removable liners so that the liner cannot be worn
without the outer layer (paragraphs 6.4 and A.6.4).

Changes were made in the performance criteria to clarify to which requirements cold weather insulation
materials are tested (paragraphs 7.1.2, 7.1.3, and 7.1.4).

A clarification was provided to specify that the cold weather insulation material is not tested for thermal
protective performance (paragraphs 7.1.1.1 and 7.1.1.2).

Specific procedures were added to address the modified testing of the cold weather insulation material as
specified in U.S. Air Force purchase description NCTRF PD N2-01-3A, Batting, Quilted, Aramid,
involving the removal of 50 mm of batting and folding of the face cloth over the remaining batting, as
supported by the test information provided above (paragraph 8.3.1.7 and Section 8.3.13). Additional
instructions were provided for preparing samples for conditioning by sewing a layer of flame resistant
fabric to the cold weather insulation material prior to laundering with its removal following laundering or
dry cleaning (paragraphs 8.3.13.1 and 8.3.13.2).

Modifications for the heat and thermal shrinkage resistance test method were made to clarify that the cold
weather insulation materials are not evaluated for thermal shrinkage resistance as supported by the test
information above (paragraphs 8.4.1.1 through 8.4.1.5, paragraph 8.4.2.1, and section 8.4.11). Additional
instructions were provided for preparing samples for conditioning by sewing a layer of flame resistant
fabric to the cold weather insulation material prior to laundering with its removal following laundering or
dry cleaning (paragraphs 8.4.3.1 through 8.4.3.3).

For supporting documentation see the doc info pages at www.nfpa.org/2112.

Emergency Nature: The proposed TIA intends to correct a circumstance in which the revised NFPA Standard has
resulted in an adverse impact on a product or method that was inadvertently overlooked in the total revision process
or was without adequate technical (safety) justification for the action. As currently written, NFPA 2112 includes
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criteria that create a bias against cold weather insulation materials that is inconsistent with their use and in consistent
with demonstrated levels of safety.

The OSHA interpretation of March 2010 encouraging employers to provide their employees with garments certified
to a consensus standard like NFPA 2112 has created a need and demand for outerwear garments for cold weather
protection that are certified to the NFPA 2112 standard. The current edition of the NFPA 2112 standard does not
provide clear methods to properly test and certify garments that incorporate insulation for additional protection from
cold weather.

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TIA 2112-2012
NFPA 2112, Standard on Flame-Resistant Garments for Protection of Industrial Personnel
Against Flash Fire
Reference: Various
(TIA Log 1105)


________________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________________________

21 Eligible to Vote
4 Not Returned (Swiss, Wedge, Womble, Wu)

17 Agree (Saner w/comment)
0 Disagree
0 Abstentions


17 Agree (Saner w/comment)
0 Disagree
0 Abstentions


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Report on Proposals November 2014
NFPA 33
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
33- Log #9
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
Gregory J. Cahanin, Cahanin Fire & Code Consulting
4.2.1 Marine Vessel Spray Painting. Marina Repair Facilities subject to OSHA CFR 1915 provisions for shipbuilding or
repairing shall be permitted to paint vessels in temporary membrane enclosures in accordance with Chapter XX.
4.2.1.1 Painting of vessel components or parts removed from vessels or design for installation on vessels shall utilize
spray application operations and processes confined to spray booths, spray rooms, or spray areas as defined in this
standard.
Paint spraying in temporary membrane enclosures shall follow the requirements established in this
Chapter. Only Marina Repair Facilities subject to OSHA CFR 1915 provisions for shipbuilding or repairing shall be
permitted to paint vessels in temporary membrane enclosures in accordance with this chapter.
18.1.1 Painting of vessel components or parts removed from vessels or designed for installation on vessels shall utilize
spray application operations and processes confined to spray booths, spray rooms, or spray areas as defined elsewhere
in this standard.
18.1.2 Small paint stands or booths outside of vessel membrane enclosures are not to be permitted under this chapter.
. Temporary Membrane Enclosures shall be erected for 180 days or less.
Membrane enclosures may be constructed for spray painting in buildings or outdoors at marine facilities
subject to OSHA CFR 1915.
18.4.1 Only personnel required for spray painting shall enter the membrane enclosure during spray painting.
18.4.2 Vessels within membrane enclosures shall not be occupied during spray paint operations.
18.4.3 A ship watch aboard vessels when the vessel is encapsulated shall be permitted except when spray painting is
being performed.
18.4.4 Vessels shall not be occupied for sleeping at any time within a membrane enclosure.
18.3.1 The spray paint area shall consist of the temporary membrane enclosure and a 5-foot zone outside of the
enclosure.
18.3.1.1 No hot work, welding, grinding or cutting shall take place in the spray paint area while it is permitted for spray
painting.
18.3.1.2 No vehicles, ordinary combustibles, portable buildings or container storage shall be located in the 5-foot safety
zone during spray operations.
18.3.1.3 No smoking or open flames shall be allowed in the paint spray area including the membrane enclosure while it
is permitted for spray painting.
18.3.1.4 Membrane enclosures shall be permitted to be used for activities other than spray painting. Other uses of the
membrane enclosure shall comply with applicable codes or standards.
18.3.1.5 Travel distance to an exit from within a membrane structure shall comply with NFPA 101-Table 40.6 for
General Industrial Occupancies.
18.4.1 Membrane shrink wrap material used for membrane enclosures shall have been tested and passed the NFPA
701 Test 2 requirements. Testing shall have been performed by an independent test laboratory.
18.4.2 Contractors installing shrink wrap shall provide documentation of the shrink wrap material they are using on
membrane enclosures to the marina and have such documentation available for review by any AHJ when requested.
Any substitution of any other manufactures material shall require a separate letter and documentation before installation.
18.4.3 Membrane enclosures having shrink wrap that does not have NFPA 701 Test 2 compliant material shall not be
permitted for spray painting.
18.5.1 Electrical wiring and utilization equipment used in membrane enclosures during spray painting shall comply with
Chapter 6.
18.5.2 All lighting, electrical power cords, and any related equipment within the membrane enclosure and five-feet
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NFPA 33
horizontally from the exterior of the membrane enclosure that is energized shall be rated for Class I Division 1 as
defined by NFPA 70 when used during spray paint operations.
18.5.3 Vessels shall be grounded. Grounding by vessel shore power cords neutral ground, independently outside by
attachment of a rod driven into the ground or any other appropriate method consistent with 6.2.1 referenced
requirements.
18.5.4 Scaffolding shall be grounded to the vessel, to an appropriate grounding rod, or other approved method
consistent with 6.2.1 referenced requirements.
18.5.5 Spray paint equipment shall be grounded.
18.5.6 Vessels and membrane enclosures without active spray painting tasks in buildings and outdoors shall have
power cords and lighting rated for outdoor use. Ordinary portable electrical tools and equipment may be used in these
areas.
18.5.7 For building electrical systems more than 18-inches from the floor outlets and switches shall be permitted to be
NEMA 3. (annex note: NEMA 3 is a weathproof classification for outdoor electrical and appropriate due to the water
wash-down of vessels in preparation for painting.
18.5.8 Building electrical systems less than 18-inches from the floor and outside of a membrane enclosure and its 5 foot
safety zone shall be considered Class I Division 2 locations as defined by NFPA 70.
18.6.1 Each membrane enclosure shall be provided with mechanical exhaust ventilation that is capable of confining and
removing vapors and mists to a safe location and is capable of confining and controlling combustible residues, dusts,
and deposits consistent with Chapter 7 requirements as they apply to portable ventilation equipment.
18.6.2 Ventilation equipment shall be installed in accordance with Section 5.6.
18.6.3 Ventilation equipment containing overspray collection filters shall have visible gauges, audible alarms, approved
interlocks, or an effective inspection program to ensure that the required air velocity is being maintained.
18.6.4 Spray Painting and ventilation equipment shall have interlocks between ventilation and all paint spray equipment
via a connection on the ventilation fan or an NFPA 70 compliant junction box such that a shutoff of the ventilation fans
will turn off spray painting equipment.
18.6.4.1 Where interlocks cannot be effectively provided for ventilation equipment that uses plant air, large air storage
tanks, or equipment that cannot be instantly shutoff an audible alarm upon loss of ventilation that will alert all spray paint
operators shall be permitted with AHJ approval.
18.6.5 The concentration of the vapors and mists in the exhaust stream of the ventilation system during spray painting
operations shall not exceed 10 percent of the lower flammable limit under OSHA 1915.35.
18.7.1 Any contractor supplying exhaust equipment for painting and coating work in membrane structures to provide
documentation that equipment complies with NFPA 91 and Chapter 7 requirements. Records shall be made available to
the AHJ or any inspecting authority upon request.
18.7.2 All equipment shall bear a permanent unique number or other designation to identify equipment in use.
18.7.3 Marinas shall keep records on file of approved equipment. Such records may be in the form of a memorandum
stating the equipment number, the owner of the equipment and the leaser of the equipment if any and state that the
marina has accepted the equipment for use at the facility. Records shall be made available to the AHJ or any inspecting
authority upon request.
18.6.1 Coating Material Handling. Flammable and combustible paints, coatings, and cleaning agents for equipment
within the membrane enclosure and its 5-foot safety zone shall not exceed 10 gallons total at any time.
18.6.1.1 All mixing and storage shall be done outside the membrane enclosure area.
18.6.1.2 Mixing rooms and storage rooms shall comply with Chapter 8.
18.6.1.3 Flammable liquid storage cabinets in fixed building locations shall be in accordance with NFPA 30
requirements.
18.6.1.4 Portable containers used for the storage of combustible and flammable liquids shall be in accordance with
Chapter 8 and NFPA 30 requirements.
18.6.1.5 Containers for servicing vessels stored outside shall not be placed within five feet of any membrane enclosure.
18.7.1 Permits for spray painting shall be issued for each spray paint activity on a daily basis. Paint Spray Permit
Records shall be kept for 12 months for review by the AHJ. [Note * for sample form in annex]
18.7.2 Competent Persons, certified as an OSHA Competent Person under OSHA 1915.7, shall perform all Spray Paint
Permitting for membrane structures.
18.7.3 Spray Painting shall not be performed in any membrane enclosure until the Paint Spray Permit Record is signed
by a Competent Person and posted at the entrance to the enclosure.
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18.7.4 The Competent Person shall have the authority to stop the spray painting operation if any equipment
malfunctions, if combustible gas detection readings exceed 10 percent of LFL readings, or if any spray operations are
deemed unsafe by the Competent Person.
18.7.5 No spray paint operations shall take place without permitting by a Competent Person present at all times that
spray painting is in progress.
18.7.6 Combustible Gas Testing in accordance with OSHA 1915.35, Surface Preparation and Preservation shall be
performed by the competent person prior to the start of spray painting and during spray painting operations.
18.7.7 The Competent Person shall inspect all electrical connections within the membrane enclosure as a part of
permitting.
18.7.8 The Competent Person shall insure that any electrical equipment energized within the membrane structure and
the 5-foot safety zone is rated Class I Division 1 per NFPA 70 and the vessel, scaffolding, ventilation equipment, and
spray equipment are grounded.
18.7.9 The Competent Person shall insure that ventilation exhaust equipment and paint spray compressors are
interlocked. For spray painting within membrane enclosures interlocked shall mean that the spray application equipment
cannot be operated unless the exhaust ventilation system is operating and functioning properly and spray application is
automatically stopped if the exhaust ventilation system fails. ( note-taken from NFPA 33-14.3.5.2)
The Competent Person shall have the authority to stop the spray painting operation if any equipment malfunctions, if the
combustible gas detection exceeds 10 percent of LFL readings, or if any spray operations are deemed unsafe by the
Competent Person.
18.8.1 Portable fire extinguishers shall be placed within the membrane enclosure in the vicinity of spray paint
operations.
18.8.1.1 Extinguishers shall be inspected and maintained in accordance with NFPA 10.
18.8.1.2 Extinguishers shall be permitted to be covered in clear plastic bags to protect them from overspray.
18.8.1.3 The minimum size of all extinguishers shall be 4A-20B-C and spaced no more than 30-feet from the spray
painting operator. Where several spray guns are being used at one time, fire extinguishers for each spray gun shall be
provided when separated by more than 30-feet or the width of the vessel.
18.8.2 Fire sprinkler systems in buildings where membrane enclosures are used shall be capable of providing a density
of 0.40 gpm/sq.ft. over the most remote 2,500 sq.ft. with a 500 gpm hose allowance for a duration of 2 hours. Fire
Sprinklers shall be designed and installed in accordance with NFPA 13.
18.8.3 Fire systems on vessels that include engine room fire suppression and fire alarm and detection systems are to
remain active during spray painting.
****Insert Artwork Here****
Annex A Spray Permit Record Form
The marine industry world-wide has developed a method of spray painting in temporary membrane
enclosures that currently exist outside of any nationally published standard. Marinas in the United States have been
using this method for more than a decade with no national standard in place. There has never been a fire during spray
painting in a membrane enclosure recorded in the U.S. or abroad. As this method of painting large boats gained traction
in the industry there is a likelihood of smaller facilities adopting some of the practices with a resulting exposure to fire
loss unless a national standard is established. Local AHJs may lack the expertise to adequately determine that a safe
environment is created for spray painting that a national standard provides.
This proposal is based upon an equivalent method developed for a marina and accepted in full by the local jurisdiction.
The equivalent method was developed by me with equal involvement of Steve Kowkabany, FPE of Neptune Fire
Protection. A third party review by Kenneth Bush, FPE was also performed with a finding that paint spraying could be
performed safely when procedures were followed as found in this new proposed chapter.
The new proposed chapter incorporates methods and procedures now found in NFPA 33 with consideration to the
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membrane enclosure limits and the in-place OSHA requirements for safe spray painting in marine environments that
must be adhered to.
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1 of 1

From: Greg Cahanin [mailto:gcahanin@assuredfiresafety.com]
Sent: Tuesday, May 07, 2013 12:08 PM
To: Cronin, Amy
Cc: Shannon, J im
Subject: NFPA 33 Public Input Letter
Importance: High
Amy-

On April 2
nd
in the email below you stated no request is insignificant. I sent you a letter
on my Public Input on NFPA 33 dated April 5
th
- a month ago.

I am puzzled as to why Rosanne sent me an email stating it had been forwarded to the
appropriate staff for input when the letter was written to you as Standards Secretary- the
appropriate gatekeeper of the standards process. I would be disappointed in anything
but a direct response from you.

The marinas which my public input will effect are a multi-billion dollar industry whose
desire for relevant standards should not brushed aside by partisan ego that has crept
into the process. I am open to having this issue resolved before the Standards Council
in their meeting at the end of J uly if you are having difficulty in making a decision on the
rules they establish. My letter to you is straightforward and should result in nothing less
than it delineates. Naturally, if this course is considered, it would be inappropriate to
ballot and publish the challenged text since it would improperly hinder the Standards
Councils ability to act.

Please feel free to phone me directly to discuss this matter further if need be.

With kindest regards,

Greg Cahanin
Gregory J . Cahanin
Cahanin Fire & Code Consulting
2522 M.L. King St. N.
St. Petersburg, FL 33704
727-896-7719
gcahanin@assuredfiresafety.com
www.assuredfiresafety.com

Page 1 of 1
M E M O R A N D U M

TO: Nancy Pearce NFPA 33 Staff Liaison

FROM: Matt Klaus (NFPA Staff) on Behalf of the NFPA 13 Task Group for
Membrane Structures

DATE: February 12, 2013

SUBJECT: Upcoming Test of Membrane Structure

The NFPA 13 Task Group that was developed to work with the NFPA 33 task group for membrane
structures has reviewed the proposed test plan (and photos of the structures) for the membrane enclosure.
The NFPA 13 task group members do not feel that the test protocol, as currently described, would yield
sufficient information to determine whether or not sprinklers can be omitted from underneath the
membrane structure ceiling. This is not to say that there will be no value in conducting the test (see note
#4 below), only that the test as described will not provide a level of comfort for the task group to make a
determination on the need for sprinklers.

The specific comments and questions that have been posed by the NFPA 13 task group are as follows:

1. Will a fire in the larger enclosures shown in the attached photos react differently than in the one
used for the test?
I would assume it would. The heat plume that is expected to eventually breach the
membrane could do so at any point in the enclosure, but probably at a high point and not
necessarily directly above the fire. If the fire is along a wall of the membrane, then it
could be expected that the hole would be in the wall. What if the fire occurs under the
boat? In any of these cases, the hole may not be directly over the fire, and a sprinkler
discharging at the roof will not directly impinge on the fire. Its possible that the water
discharging from the sprinkler will sufficiently cool the membrane for a period of time to
keep additional holes from forming, and yet allowing heat to continue to spill out,
opening additional sprinklers. If the fuel source is large enough, the fire could burn out of
control, opening additional holes in the membrane, and activating more and more
sprinklers at the roof and eventually over-taxing the system.
2. Will the spray from a single outside sprinkler above the test enclosure provide an adequate
simulation of a sprinkler system discharging in an enclosed building?
I dont see how it can. A sprinkler discharging outside will be subjected to winds which
will affect the discharge spray pattern. In a real fire scenario, additional sprinklers will
activate, especially since its anticipated that the membrane will shield the fire.
3. Will the fire used during the test be of sufficient size to simulate an extra hazard group 2
occupancy?
Based on the description of the fire in the test plan and as described on the conference
call, it doesnt sound like it will. Extra hazard group 2 is one of the severest fires
anticipated in NFPA 13 and the fuel load is expected to include moderate to
substantial amounts of flammable or combustible liquids . A small wood crib or diesel
1 of 18
pan fire with just enough heat to impact the fabric will not simulate the size of the
anticipated fire.

4. No this (test) will not provide enough information to determine if sprinklers would or would not
be needed under the membrane. I would state that I suppose its a starting point of some sort.
With so many other questions that need to be addressed for this type of operation Im not sure
where else to start. Im just guessing that the life safety/egress has already been addressed for
these temp enclosures? Seems like these protected buildings that store these large marine vessels
have a similar situation when the vessel is just stored and the sprinkler protection not reaching the
inside. I completely understand were talking about a specific operation that is taking place under
the shrink wrap, but would this test at least shed some light on how it will react in an actual
flaming fire? Granted I concur with the issues that its not a measurable type of fire (but in real
fires that I deal with not too many meet that measurable criteria anyway).

5. I have read the proposed membrane enclosure testing and the concerns of some of the other Task
Group members and generally agree that the proposed test plan will not be adequate to determine
if sprinklers can be omitted from within the membrane structure, when the membrane structure is
located within a sprinklered building.

In my opinion large scale fire testing would be the most accurate method to determine the answer
to the question. In a large scale test environment (such as the facility at UL) the proposed test
enclosure with the shrink wrapped membrane would be placed within the test building below a
moveable ceiling with a specified sprinkler system installed below the ceiling and over the test
enclosure. Multiple tests could be conducted in a relatively short period of time, the ceiling height
above the test enclosure could be varied, the fire type and size could be varied, etc.

6. Several references and recommendations are made for the use of ESFR sprinklers for the
protection of the paint spray operation. As the provisions of NFPA 33, 9.4.2 requires the use of
Extra Hazard Group 2 design criteria for these operations, the use of ESFR sprinklers is not
allowed by NFPA 13, 12.6.7.1.

7. The desired performance of the membrane material is similar to that of a drop out type ceiling
allowed under the provisions of NFPA 13, 8.15.15. This requires the drop out panels be listed
and has restrictions on the use of QR or Extended Coverage sprinklers above the ceiling. The UL
Standard for the Listing and FM Approval Standard for Approval of such drop out ceiling panels
are UL 723S and FM 4651 respectively. These standards require an exposure to a specific fire
source with and without an operating sprinkler above to ensure the panels will drop out within a
specific time period. See attached FM 4651. Consideration should be given to a similar test in
this case to determine performance of the membrane material in question.

8. As it is anticipated that the membrane enclosure will be provided with a ventilation system, the
impact of such operation must be considered in the displacement of the rising fire plume and
subsequent impingement on the membrane. Additionally, as the provisions of NFPA 33, 9.4.6
would require the protection of the ducts and stacks, how will this protection be addressed by the
testing?

9. What types of obstructions might be created by the scaffolding system used to support the
membrane material? Are there walkways, stairs, etc.?

2 of 18
10. Is there any consideration that must be given to the significant obstruction created by the vessel
itself? Or does the Extra Hazard designation address this issue? NFPA 409 does not require any
specific increase for a paint hanger used to paint large aircraft provided the aircraft is defueled.

11. If a full scale fire test is to be performed then:
What is the appropriate fire size/fuel package to represent the range of anticipated
fire sizes that might be expected? Not sure the reference to UL 711 criteria is
appropriate as this is for portable fire extinguisher testing and would not necessarily
be representative of the hazards here.
Where should be fuel package be located within the enclosure? Should shielding of
the fuel package be considered to represent fire beneath the vessel?
Are sprinklers to be installed above the membrane enclosure? If so at what spacing?
What design density? What clearance? What sprinkler K-Factor, temperature rating,
RTI, etc.? If the effectiveness of the sprinkler protection is to be evaluated the
specific operation of the sprinkler must be defined and maintained.

12. Is there a concern with the reaction of the membrane material causing an obstruction to the means
of egress or draping across the vessel once the tension is released?

13. With ceiling heights of up to 57 ft, I would expect some significant delay in the operation of
overhead sprinklers.

14. Will the application of heat from a fire cause additional shrinkage of the membrane with
undesired stresses on the supporting scaffolding structure?

15. Is there concern about paint overspray deposits on the membrane impacting the performance?

In addition to the comments/questions listed above, NFPA 13 task group members Bill Sheppard and
Chris LaFleur have also marked up a copy of the test plan with their questions and comments. This
review, with the embedded comments, is provided on the subsequent pages of this memo.

3 of 18
M E M O R A N D U M

TO: Nancy Pearce NFPA 33 Staff Liaison

FROM: Matt Klaus (NFPA Staff) on Behalf of the NFPA 13 Task Group for
Membrane Structures

DATE: March 15, 2013

SUBJECT: Membrane Structure Review

The NFPA 13 task group for membrane structures has reviewed the information provided by the NFPA
33 task group and has prepared the following comments for review by the NFPA 33 Technical Committee
at their upcoming First Draft Meeting (March 18-19, 2013):

1. The information garnered from the initial testing on the membrane structure is a good starting
point for learning more about the impact of membrane structures.

2. The membrane structures shown in the photos distributed to the NFPA 13 task group and used in
the testing conducted as part of this project create an obstruction to sprinkler discharge.
Obstructions in excess of 4 feet in width would require sprinkler protection beneath them in
accordance with Chapter 8 of NFPA 13.

3. In addition the obstruction to spray pattern development that is created by the membrane itself,
there are additional obstructions that exist underneath the membrane (the boat itself,
scaffoldingetc) that must also be considered.

4. Identifying the appropriate NFPA 13 hazard classification for NFPA 303 occupancies is
extremely challenging due to the limited information on the commodity and its arrangement.
Adding additional hazards (obstructions such as membrane structures and scaffolding) into these
occupancies without providing complete sprinkler protection in accordance with the rules of the
design and installation standard only serves to complicate an already challenging situation.

5. In order to confirm if it is appropriate to eliminate sprinklers underneath an indoor membrane
structure, additional testing must be conducted in an enclosed, full-scale testing environment. The
full scale testing must consider the variables that will impact the effectiveness of a sprinkler
system that is being obstructed. The variables that should be considered to include, but are not
limited to, the following:

- Ceiling Height
- Sprinkler Height
- Clearance Between Membrane and Sprinkler System
- Delivered Density
- Fire Size
4 of 18
- Ignition Locations
- Obstructions Under the Membrane (boat, fuel, scaffoldingetc)
- Validation or J ustification of Fire Source (boat, crib, burneretc)

6. Based on the information that is available to date, including the information discussed by the
NFPA 33 and NFPA 13 task groups during conference calls, the NFPA 13 task group does not
feel that there is sufficient information available for the NFPA 33 Technical Committee to take an
action that would allow for the omission of sprinklers underneath membrane structures that are
used indoors. Additional information, including the information described in Item #5 above,
would be necessary to make such a determination.
5 of 18
From: Tracey Bellamy
To: Klaus, Matthew
Cc: Bill Sheppard; J . Sheppard (bill.sheppard@att.net); ek@klausbruckner.com; sfranson@vikingcorp.com;
aclafle@sandia.gov; pthomasext@victaulic.com; tvictor@simplexgrinnell.com; lowreyd@bouldercolorado.gov
Subject: NFPA 33 Task Group
Date: Monday, February 11, 2013 9:29:14 PM
After reviewing the proposed test protocol and associated documentation for the Membrane
Enclosed Paint Spray Operation I have the following comments:

Several references and recommendations are made for the use of ESFR sprinklers for the
protection of the paint spray operation. As the provisions of NFPA 33, 9.4.2 requires the
use of Extra Hazard Group 2 design criteria for these operations, the use of ESFR sprinklers
is not allowed by NFPA 13, 12.6.7.1.
The desired performance of the membrane material is similar to that of a drop out type
ceiling allowed under the provisions of NFPA 13, 8.15.15. This requires the drop out panels
be listed and has restrictions on the use of QR or Extended Coverage sprinklers above the
ceiling. The UL Standard for the Listing and FM Approval Standard for Approval of such
drop out ceiling panels are UL 723S and FM 4651 respectively. These standards require an
exposure to a specific fire source with and without an operating sprinkler above to ensure
the panels will drop out within a specific time period. See attached FM 4651.
Consideration should be given to a similar test in this case to determine performance of the
membrane material in question.
As it is anticipated that the membrane enclosure will be provided with a ventilation
system, the impact of such operation must be considered in the displacement of the rising
fire plume and subsequent impingement on the membrane. Additionally, as the provisions
of NFPA 33, 9.4.6 would require the protection of the ducts and stacks, how will this
protection be addressed by the testing?
What types of obstructions might be created by the scaffolding system used to support the
membrane material? Are there walkways, stairs, etc.?
Is there any consideration that must be given to the significant obstruction created by the
vessel itself? Or does the Extra Hazard designation address this issue? NFPA 409 does not
require any specific increase for a paint hanger used to paint large aircraft provided the
aircraft is defueled.
If a full scale fire test is to be performed then:
o What is the appropriate fire size/fuel package to represent the range of anticipated
fire sizes that might be expected? Not sure the reference to UL 711 criteria is
appropriate as this is for portable fire extinguisher testing and would not
necessarily be representative of the hazards here.
o Where should be fuel package be located within the enclosure? Should shielding of
the fuel package be considered to represent fire beneath the vessel?
o Are sprinklers to be installed above the membrane enclosure? If so at what spacing?
What design density? What clearance? What sprinkler K-Factor, temperature
rating, RTI, etc.? If the effectiveness of the sprinkler protection is to be evaluated
the specific operation of the sprinkler must be defined and maintained.
Is there a concern with the reaction of the membrane material causing a obstruction to the
6 of 18
means of egress or draping across the vessel once the tension is released?
With ceiling heights of up to 57 ft, I would expect some significant delay in the operation of
overhead sprinklers.
Will the application of heat from a fire cause additional shrinkage of the membrane with
undesired stresses on the supporting scaffolding structure?
Is there concern about paint overspray deposits on the membrane impacting the
performance?

Tracey

Tracey Bellamy CFPS, PE
Chief Engineer Officer
Telgian Corporation
900 Circle 75 Ste 680
Atlanta, GA 30339
480-292-8063
480-656-3114 (fax)
619-961-8258 (mobile)
tbellamy@telgian.com
www.telgian.com
This email is intended solely for the addressee and may contain privileged, proprietary, or otherwise private
information. If you are not the intended addressee, you must not use, disclose or copy this transmission, and are
asked to notify the sender of its receipt.
Please consider the environment before printing this email.
7 of 18
From: Scott Franson
To: J . Sheppard (bill.sheppard@att.net); lowreyd@bouldercolorado.gov; ek@klausbruckner.com; Klaus, Matthew;
aclafle@sandia.gov; tvictor@simplexgrinnell.com; Tracey Bellamy; pthomasext@victaulic.com;
jw_sheppard@yahoo.com
Subject: Re: NFPA 13 Membrane Structure Task Group
Date: Tuesday, February 12, 2013 1:50:11 PM
Dear Matt,
I have read the proposed membrane enclosure testing and the concerns of some of the other Task
Group members and generally agree that the proposed test plan will not be adequate to determine if
sprinklers can be omitted from within the membrane structure, when the membrane structure is located
within a sprinklered building.
In my opinion large scale fire testing would be the most accurate method to determine the answer to
the question. In a large scale test environment (such as the facility at UL) the proposed test enclosure
with the shrink wrapped membrane would be placed within the test building below a moveable ceiling
with a specified sprinkler system installed below the ceiling and over the test enclosure. Multiple tests
could be conducted in a relatively short period of time, the ceiling height above the test enclosure could
be varied, the fire type and size could be varied, etc.
Thanks,
Scott
Scott Franson
V.P. Research & Development
The Viking Corporation
Office: 269-945-8256
Cell: 616-481-0154
>>> "Klaus, Matthew" <MKlaus@nfpa.org> 2/8/2013 10:11 AM >>>
Dear Task Group Members-
For those of you that were on the call, you should now have an understanding of what the NFPA 33
Task Group is looking at for the testing of the membrane structure in question. I have had
communication with some of you and there is some concern as to whether or not the proposed test
plan provides enough information to determine if sprinklers can be omitted from underneath these
membrane structures.
In order to provide the NFPA 33 Task Group (and eventually the Technical Committee) with some
perspective from the NFPA 13 TCs and CC, I would appreciate it if you could each respond to the
following question so that I can develop a memo to the NFPA 33 Task Group. I have attached the test
plan to this email for your review, along with several photos of the membrane structures we are dealing
with and a third party review of the membrane material. While the majority of the photos I have
attached show the membrane structure protecting a boat outdoors, the concept we are concerned with
is when a membrane structure is protecting a boat within a building/structure. It is also important to
note that NFPA 33 is not limited to boats, but all paint spray applications. The testing being conducted
involves boat paintspraying, however this issue may also apply to other objects.
1)Will a test conducted to the proposed test plan yield enough information to determine if sprinklers can
8 of 18
be omitted from within the membrane structure, when the membrane structure is located within a
sprinklered building?
If you could please respond by the end of the day Tuesday, February 12, I would greatly appreciate it. I
would also ask that you "reply to all" if you have any commentary you would like to add to describe
why you think this test plan will or will not provide sufficient information to make a determination on
the need for sprinklers underneath the membrane structure. Also, keep in mind that this test is not
being conducted by the NFPA 33 TG or TC and is not a "code fund project", but rather is test being
condcuted by a guest of the TC.
As always I greatly appreciate your involvement in this task group. These are the types of task groups
that not only aid in the development of codes and standards, but lead to higher levels of life safety and
property protection in our buildings. Thank you.
Regards,
Matt Klaus
Senior Fire Protection Engineer
NFPA
Important Notice: This correspondence is not a Formal Interpretation issued pursuant to NFPA
Regulations. Any opinion expressed is the personal opinion of the author, and does not necessarily
represent the official position of the NFPA or its Technical Committees. In addition, this correspondence
is neither intended, nor should be relied upon, to provide consultation or services.
[cid:image001.jpg@01CE05E1.8C80B9F0]<http://www.nfpa.org/enforcers>
Interested in making a difference in your community?
Help set the standard for safety and become an NFPA Technical Committee Member.
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9 of 18
From: Lowrey, David
To: Klaus, Matthew; J . Sheppard (bill.sheppard@att.net); jw_sheppard@yahoo.com; ek@klausbruckner.com;
sfranson@vikingcorp.com; aclafle@sandia.gov; pthomasext@victaulic.com; Tracey Bellamy;
tvictor@simplexgrinnell.com
Subject: RE: NFPA 13 Membrane Structure Task Group
Date: Tuesday, February 12, 2013 1:37:17 PM
Attachments: David Lowrey.vcf
The answer is, No this will not provide enough information to answer the question that Matt has
asked. I would state that I suppose its a starting point of some sort. With so many other questions
that need to be addressed for this type of operation Im not sure where else to start. Im just
guessing that the life safety/egress has already been addressed for these temp enclosures?

Seems like these protected buildings that store these large marine vessels have a similar situation
when the vessel is just stored and the sprinkler protection not reaching the inside. I completely
understand were talking about a specific operation that is taking place under the shrink wrap, but
would this test at least shed some light on how it will react in an actual flaming fire? Granted I
concur with the issues that its not a measurable type of fire (but in real fires that I deal with not
too many meet that measurable criteria anyway).

Just my thoughts, I dont disagree with anything anyone else has sent out thus fire.

David L.

From: Klaus, Matthew [mailto:MKlaus@nfpa.org]
Sent: Friday, February 08, 2013 8:12 AM
To: J . Sheppard (bill.sheppard@att.net); jw_sheppard@yahoo.com; ek@klausbruckner.com;
tvictor@simplexgrinnell.com; Lowrey, David
Subject: NFPA 13 Membrane Structure Task Group


For those of you that were on the call, you should now have an understanding of what the NFPA
33 Task Group is looking at for the testing of the membrane structure in question. I have had
communication with some of you and there is some concern as to whether or not the proposed
test plan provides enough information to determine if sprinklers can be omitted from underneath
these membrane structures.

10 of 18
following question so that I can develop a memo to the NFPA 33 Task Group. I have attached the
test plan to this email for your review, along with several photos of the membrane structures we
are dealing with and a third party review of the membrane material. While the majority of the
photos I have attached show the membrane structure protecting a boat outdoors, the concept we
are concerned with is when a membrane structure is protecting a boat within a building/structure.
It is also important to note that NFPA 33 is not limited to boats, but all paint spray applications. The
testing being conducted involves boat paintspraying, however this issue may also apply to other
objects.

1)Will a test conducted to the proposed test plan yield enough information to determine if
sprinklers can be omitted from within the membrane structure, when the membrane structure is
located within a sprinklered building?

If you could please respond by the end of the day Tuesday, February 12, I would greatly appreciate
it. I would also ask that you reply to all if you have any commentary you would like to add to
describe why you think this test plan will or will not provide sufficient information to make a
determination on the need for sprinklers underneath the membrane structure. Also, keep in mind
that this test is not being conducted by the NFPA 33 TG or TC and is not a code fund project, but
rather is test being condcuted by a guest of the TC.

As always I greatly appreciate your involvement in this task group. These are the types of task
groups that not only aid in the development of codes and standards, but lead to higher levels of life
safety and property protection in our buildings. Thank you.

Regards,

Matt Klaus
NFPA
Important Notice: This correspondence is not a Formal Interpretation issued pursuant to NFPA Regulations. Any
opinion expressed is the personal opinion of the author, and does not necessarily represent the official position
of the NFPA or its Technical Committees. In addition, this correspondence is neither intended, nor should be
relied upon, to provide consultation or services.

www.nfpa.org/enforcers

11 of 18
Check out NFPA on social media
www.nfpa.org/socialmedia

12 of 18
From: Bill Sheppard
To: Klaus, Matthew; J . Sheppard (bill.sheppard@att.net); ek@klausbruckner.com; sfranson@vikingcorp.com;
aclafle@sandia.gov; pthomasext@victaulic.com; Tracey Bellamy; tvictor@simplexgrinnell.com;
lowreyd@bouldercolorado.gov
Subject: Re: NFPA 13 Membrane Structure Task Group
Date: Friday, February 08, 2013 12:36:49 PM
Matt:
See my memo and attachment that I sent to you this past
Monday. This test proposal as presented originally by Greg
needs modifications and questions answered before we (NFPA 13
TC and TCC) endorse any test.
Further, having seen the photos, it would be helpful to see
photos inside the membrane in order to get a feel for the
scafolding obstructions that must surely be there that would
impede smoke and heat to the top of the membrane. Depending
upon the layout and where you would start ignition, you may
get different results in the test series. It would surely
take more than one test.
Please forward my Monday memo to all of the above.
Thanks.
Bill

J William Sheppard, FSFPE
Sheppard & Associates, LLC
24756 Tudor Lane
Franklin, MI 48025
Email: jw_sheppard@yahoo.com
313 701 3653
248 757 2739
Fr om: "Klaus, Matthew" <MKlaus@nfpa.org>
To: "J. Sheppard (bill.sheppard@att.net)" <bill.sheppard@att.net>; "jw_sheppard@yahoo.com"
<jw_sheppard@yahoo.com>; "ek@klausbruckner.com" <ek@klausbruckner.com>;
"sfranson@vikingcorp.com" <sfranson@vikingcorp.com>; "aclafle@sandia.gov" <aclafle@sandia.gov>;
"pthomasext@victaulic.com" <pthomasext@victaulic.com>; Tracey Bellamy <tbellamy@telgian.com>;
"tvictor@simplexgrinnell.com" <tvictor@simplexgrinnell.com>; "lowreyd@bouldercolorado.gov"
<lowreyd@bouldercolorado.gov>
Sent : Friday, February 8, 2013 10:11 AM
Subj ec t : NFPA 13 Membrane Structure Task Group


13 of 18
objects.

located within a sprinklered building? (Not as proposed; see my memo to you of this past
Monday--JWS 020813)



Regards,

Matt Klaus
NFPA
Code Enforcer Program

14 of 18


15 of 18
From: Victor, Terry
To: Klaus, Matthew
Cc: J . Sheppard (bill.sheppard@att.net); jw_sheppard@yahoo.com; ek@klausbruckner.com;
lowreyd@bouldercolorado.gov
Subject: RE: NFPA 13 Membrane Structure Task Group
Date: Tuesday, February 12, 2013 6:52:16 AM
Matt,

To answer your question as stated below, I do NOT believe the proposed test plan will yield
sufficient data to determine if sprinklers can be omitted within the membrane structure. Concerns
that I have that will not be addressed using the small scale envelope and undetermined size of the
heat source:
1. Will a fire in the larger enclosures shown in the attached photos react differently than in
the one used for the test?
I would assume it would. The heat plume that is expected to eventually breach the
membrane could do so at any point in the enclosure, but probably at a high point and not
necessarily directly above the fire. If the fire is along a wall of the membrane, then it could
be expected that the hole would be in the wall. What if the fire occurs under the boat? In
any of these cases, the hole may not be directly over the fire, and a sprinkler discharging at
the roof will not directly impinge on the fire. Its possible that the water discharging from
the sprinkler will sufficiently cool the membrane for a period of time to keep additional
holes from forming, and yet allowing heat to continue to spill out, opening additional
sprinklers. If the fuel source is large enough, the fire could burn out of control, opening
additional holes in the membrane, and activating more and more sprinklers at the roof and
eventually over-taxing the system.
2. Will the spray from a single outside sprinkler above the test enclosure provide an
adequate simulation of a sprinkler system discharging in an enclosed building?
I dont see how it can. A sprinkler discharging outside will be subjected to winds which will
affect the discharge spray pattern. In a real fire scenario, additional sprinklers will activate,
especially since its anticipated that the membrane will shield the fire.
3. Will the fire used during the test be of sufficient size to simulate an extra hazard group 2
occupancy?
Based on the description of the fire in the test plan and as described on the conference
call, it doesnt sound like it will. Extra hazard group 2 is one of the severest fires anticipated
in NFPA 13 and the fuel load is expected to include moderate to substantial amounts of
flammable or combustible liquids . A small wood crib or diesel pan fire with just enough
heat to impact the fabric will not simulate the size of the anticipated fire.

There are many what ifs that cant be answered using the test plan proposed. Only a full scale
fire test can adequately address the questions that NFPA technical committees must ask and
consider before allowing an alternative protection scheme.

Ter r y L Vi c t or / National Manager - Sprinkler Business Process / Si mpl ex Gr i nnel l
Tel: 410-401-2245 / Mobile: 443-286-4038
705 Digital Drive, Suite N / Linthicum, MD 21090 / USA
tvictor@simplexgrinnell.com / www.simplexgrinnell.com
16 of 18

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From: Klaus, Matthew [mailto:MKlaus@nfpa.org]
Sent: Friday, February 08, 2013 10:12 AM
To: J . Sheppard (bill.sheppard@att.net); jw_sheppard@yahoo.com; ek@klausbruckner.com;
sfranson@vikingcorp.com; aclafle@sandia.gov; pthomasext@victaulic.com; Tracey Bellamy; Victor,
Terry; lowreyd@bouldercolorado.gov
Subject: NFPA 13 Membrane Structure Task Group



objects.

located within a sprinklered building?


17 of 18

Regards,

Matt Klaus
NFPA



18 of 18
1
Maynard, Mary
From: Thomas G. Euson [TEuson@3s-incorporated.com]
To: Maynard, Mary
Cc: Pearce, Nancy; Barry Thomas (bthomas@beccainc.com)
Subject: RE: Appeal to the NFPA Standards Council regarding a Public Input submitted on NFPA 33
Follow Up Flag: Follow Up
Flag Status: Flagged
Mary,
InconjunctionwiththeappealrequestedbyMr.GregCahanin,IwouldliketocommentasChairoftheNFPACommittee
onFinishingProcesses.PleasepasstotheStandardsCouncil.
Thisappealhasnotbeenformallydiscussedbythecommitteesincewehavenothadafullcommitteemeetingsince
theappealwasrequested.However,Ihavediscussedtheappealletterandtheallegationsmadewithanumberof
committeemembersandspecificallywithMr.BarryThomas,whowaschairoftheTaskGroupdealingwithindoor
membranepaintingenclosures.
ThetaskgroupwasformedduringourJune2012committeemeeting.Cahanin,JimParks,BobArrighetti,RickGalvez
andB.VanDenBreenattendedthismeetingandpresentedtheircasefortheNFPA33committeetoaddresstheissue
ofmembranepainting.Thecommitteetookavoteandagreedtoacceptthetask.Cahanin,ArrighettiandParkswere
namedtotheTaskGroup.
LaterBobArrighettiappliedforandwasgrantedmembershiptoourcommitteeasanEnforcer.(Subsequenttothe
2012elections,achangeincountyofficialsresultedinBoblosinghispositionasFireMarshalandheisnolongeronthe
committee.)
Afterthat,therewereapproximately1012teleconferencemeetingsandmeetingsthattookplaceinconjunctionwith
our2otherregularcommitteemeetings,October,2012andMarch2013.OurJune1012meetingwasheldinFt.
LauderdalesowecouldseefirsthandthemembranepaintingoperationsbeingdoneatLauderdaleMarinaandBroward
Shipyard.
Fromthestart,werecognizedthattherewere2distinctlydifferentissuesonmembranepaintingindoorandoutdoor.
Wechosetoworkonoutdoormembranepaintingbecausethisposedfewerproblemsandthereseemedtobefairly
goodconsensusonwhatwecouldaccomplish.Thiswouldalsoallowustogetsomeexperienceworkingtogetherand
perhapsgenerateaframeworkfromwhichtoworkonindoormembranepainting.
Theworkontheoutdoormembranepaintingchapterwentverysmoothandthecommitteeadaptedthe
recommendationsofthetaskgroupandestablishedaFirstRevisionalongthelinessuggestedbythemembranepainting
interestgroup.
Wethenstartedworkontheindoormembranepaintingissues.
Fromthestart,thetaskgrouprecognizedthatthereweremanyissuesforwhichtherewerenteasyanswers.Thesingle
largestissueforuswastheprotectionissueinsideabuilding.Othercodesappliedandsomewereinconflictwithwhat
themembraneinterestgroupwantedtodo.NFPA303,FireProtectionStandardforMarinasandBoatyards,defines
BuildingsinSection3.3.3asanyroofedstructurewithorwithoutwalls.Thisdoesntgiveusmuchroomfor
1 of 4
2
interpretation.And,fromwhatIunderstand,defineswhatprotectionmustbeprovidedinaccordancewithNFPA13,
StandardfortheinstallationofSprinklerSystem.
Atthispoint,Iwouldliketomakeaneditorial,personalcomment.
Aspartofhissupportforthemarinaspositiononmembranepainting,Cahaninsubmittedathirdpartyreport
fromKennethE.Bush.Inhisreport,BushidentifiedhimselfanaFireProtectionEngineer.Welaterfound
thatBushistheChairofNFPA303.HedidnotidentifyhimselfasbeingaffiliatedwithNFPA303inhisreport.
NordidCahanin.
Myconcernwiththisisthat,inmyopinion,thedefinitionofBuildinginNFPA303ispartoftheindoor
membranepaintingproblem.And,BushispushingthisissuecompletelyofftotheNFPA33committeewithout
havingproperlyidentifiedhimselfandoneofhisprimaryinterestsinthisissue.Assuch,Idonotviewhisreport
asthirdparty.
IfthisissuewasthatimportanttoBush,whydidntheaddressthisinhiscommittee?
WhyhasntCahanin(assuminghehasnt)submittedpubliccommenttoNFPA303addressingtheissuesinthat
documentthathaveimplicationsforwhatheisaskingustodo?
Inhisletter,Cahaninmakesanumberofassertionsthatarefalse.
NoattemptwasmadetohideorkeepsecretfromthecommitteeanymemofromtheNFPA13taskgroup.No
one,specificallyNancyPearce,erredinanywayonthis.Cahaninassertsinoneplacethatthememowaskept
fromthefullcommittee.Later,heassertsthatitshouldnthavebeenprovidedtothefullcommittee.
Howelse,butinapersonalreporttothecommittee,wasthe13TGtopasstheirconcernstous?Perhaps,
CahaninwantedthefullNFPA13committeetoaddressthisissueattheirnextmeetingwhichislaterthis
monthifIrecallcorrectly.Inthatcase,theindoormembraneproposalwouldhavemissedthedeadlinefor
closeofpubliccommentsandwouldbeanonissueuntilnextcycle.
ThelettersummarizingtheNFPA13TGsconcernswasnotexpressingMattKlauspersonalopinions.
Throughoutthe13TGsdiscussions,IwasintouchwithBillSheppard,whomIhaveknownandworkedwithfor
over30years.Inaddition,IknowChrisLaFleurfromthetimeshewaswithGeneralMotors.Ihavetheutmost
professionalrespectforbothBillandChris.BillandItalkedmanytimestryingtofindawaytomakethiswork.
ContrarytoCahaninsassertions,MattKlausmemoreflectedtheopinionofthe13TGasrelayedtomebyBill
Sheppard.
BillSheppardandtheother13TGmembersweretryingtofindawayaroundthesprinklerissueswiththe
membraneenclosures.
Cahanin,tomyknowledge,madenoattempttomeetwiththeNFPA13committeetodiscusstheissues.
Cahanin,tomyknowledge,madenoattempttomeetwiththeNFPA303Committeetodiscusshowchangesin
theirdocumentcouldimpactchangestheywantinotherdocuments.
Theconcernsexpressedbythe13TGmirroredinmanywaysthoseonourMembraneTGwereexpressing.
o Thesinglebiggestconcernissprinklerprotectioninandaroundahugeyacht,surroundedbymulti
layeredscaffoldingandwrappedinaplasticmembrane.AndinabuildingasdefinedbyNFPA303.
2 of 4
3
o ContrarytoCahaninsassertion,thetestconductedbyLauderdaleMarinawasnotconclusivetothe
NFPA33committee.(PleasenotethatweservedlunchinthemeetingroomatourMarch2013meeting
soCahanincouldshowandnarratethetestvideo.)
o Thetestdidnotcomeclosetodemonstratingrealworldconditionsinsideamembraneenclosure
aroundayacht.
o Thelayersofplatformsonthescaffolding,whichwillhaveaseriouseffectontheheatgettingtothe
sprinklersandevenamoreseriouseffectonthewatergettingtothefireinatimelymanner,werenot
partofthetest.
o Onesprinklerheadinsideasmallmembranestructurewithacribfire(thiswascorrect)withoutthe
interferenceoftheplatformswasnotameaningfultest.
ContrarytoCahaninsassertion,Idonotthinkthatthe13TGismiredinarrogance.Cahaninseemstowantto
consideronlythemembraneenclosurearoundtheyacht.Whatabouttheyacht?AnAHJmightconcludethat
theyachtitselfiscreatingsuchaninterferencethattheyachtneedsobstructionprotectionbelowit.
WhenitbecameclearthattheNFPA33MembraneTGwasnotgoingtoachieveanythingnearconsensusonthe
indoormembraneissue,Cahaninbecameincreasinglybelligerentandargumentativeintheirmeetings.Manyof
theTGmemberexpressedtomethatthiswasbecomingcounterproductive.
CahaninandJimParkswereinvitedtojointheTGandweregivenampletimetopresenttheircase,evento
allowingCahanintopresentaminorityreporttothefullcommitteewhichdifferedfromtheTGreport.We
madetimetoviewtheLauderdaletestvideowithCahaninnarratingit.Thecommitteedideverythingpossible
tomakesureCahaninandthemarinainterestgrouphadtheopportunitytopresenttheircase.
Becauseweregardedthisasanimportanttask,weputwhatworkwasdoneontheindoormembraneenclosurework
intoourFirstDraftasacommitteeinputsowecouldcontinueworkingonitthroughthepubliccommentphaseand
after.Itwas(is)myintenttoreconvenetheTGtocontinuediscussions.
However,Ihavedecidednottocontinueanyworkuntilthisissueisresolved.Itispointlesstocontinueuntilweknow
thepathtotake.
IhavetalkedtoJimParks,LauderdaleMarine,andaskedhimifhewishestocontinueontheTG.Hehassaidyesandis
welcometoparticipate.
Mr.CahaninwillnotbeinvitedtocontinueparticipatingontheTG.
Pleaseletmeknowifyouhaveanyquestionswiththeabove.
Thankyouforyourconsideration.
TomEuson
Chair,NFPACommitteeonFinishingProcesses
TOMEUSON,VICEPRESIDENT

5132025070(w)|5135351113(m)|teuson@3sincorporated.com
8686SouthwestParkway|Harrison,OH|45030
SPECI AL HAZARD FI RE SUPPRESSI ON SYSTEMS
3 of 4
4
From: Maynard, Mary [mailto:mmaynard@NFPA.org]
Sent: Monday, J une 17, 2013 3:36 PM
To: Maynard, Mary
Subject: Appeal to the NFPA Standards Council regarding a Public Input submitted on NFPA 33

J une 17, 2013

Gregory J . Cahanin
Cahanin Fire & Code Consulting
2522 M.L. King St. N.
St. Petersburg, FL 33704

Dear Mr. Cahanin:

In accordance with 1.6.5 of the Regulations Governing the Development of NFPA Standards, a determination
has been made that a hearing on your appeal to the NFPA Standards Council regarding a Public Input submitted on
NFPA 33 is unnecessary at this time. Your appeal will be considered by the Council at its J uly 30-31, 2013
meeting solely on the basis of written submissions. Should the Council, at this meeting, determine that a
hearing or other further proceedings are necessary for it to reach a decision, both you and other interested
parties will be notified following the meeting.

If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Very truly yours,

Linda Fuller

c: J . Pauley, M. Brodoff, A. Cronin, R. Bielen, G. Colonna, M. Klaus, N. Pearce, M. Wixted
TC Finishing Processes
Standards Council
4 of 4
Item 13-8-28

Technical Committee on
Cultural Resources

M E M O R A N D U M

TO: Amy Cronin, Secretary, Standards Council

FROM: Don Moeller, Chair, Technical Committee on Cultural Resources

DATE: April 29, 2013

SUBJ: Comment on New Standard Hybrid Gas Fine Water Droplet Systems

At its meeting on April 23, 2013, the Technical Committee on Cultural Resources voted unanimously to
submit the following response to the request for public input on a new standard to address hybrid gas fine
water droplet systems. I am submitting the response on the committees behalf.

The Technical Committee on Cultural Resources supports inclusion of hybrid system technology in NFPA
standards. Hybrid-type systems could potentially be used to control and/or extinguish typical hazards that are
included in and considered by NFPA 909, Code for the Protection of Cultural Resource Properties
Museums, Libraries, and Places of Worship, and NFPA 914, Code for Fire Protection of Historic Structures.
In addition, the committee believes that the technology should be incorporated into the current NFPA 750,
Standard on Water Mist Fire Protection Systems, due to its similarity in technology in regards to both fire
fighting mechanics and system component mechanics.

The Technical Committee on Cultural Resources recognizes that attempts have been made to include hybrid
systems under NFPA 750 and that these attempts have been rejected by the NFPA 750 technical committee. If
it is the decision of the Standards Council to not incorporate hybrid system technology into NFPA 750, then
we recommend and support the development of a new standard for hybrid fire suppression systems.

Although Factory Mutual has approved hybrid systems for use in specific FM insured facilities, the lack of a
national standard covering hybrid systems hampers the use of such systems even when the hybrid system
provides the best option for fire extinguishment in a given hazard area. Also, lack of guidance for use of
hybrid systems leaves authorities who wish to utilize hybrid technology, other than FM, without the type of
definitive guidance provided by a nationally recognized consensus standard.

In summary, the Technical Committee on Cultural Resources supports the inclusion of hybrid fire suppression
systems technology in NFPA standards.
Attachment 13-8-28
1 of 41
C#1
1
Maynard, Mary
From: Ammar Alkotobe [ammar.alkotobe@vipond.ca]
Sent: Thursday, May 23, 2013 4:08 PM
To: Maynard, Mary
Subject: New NFPA Standard for Hybrid Water Mist System
NFAPStandardCouncil,
AsafireprotectionengineerfocussedonSpecialHazardapplication,IwriteinsupportofnewstandardforHybridWater
Mistsystem.
We(Vipond)areseeingtherapidincreaseinthedemandofallkindsofwatermistsystemsincludingtheHybridsystem,
aspecificstandardforthistypeofsystemwillbeveryimportantdocumenttoprovidethebasesfortheDesign,
Installationandtesting.
Thenewstandardwillprovideaguidetothesystemdesigns,AHJs,insurancecompanyandtheendcustomer.
Thanks,
AmmarAlkotobe,P.Eng.
ApplicationEngineer
SpecialHazardVipondFireProtection
Div.ofVipondInc.
T:9055647060
Direct:9055647066x469
F:9055647070
e:ammar.alkotobe@vipond.ca
PleaseconsidertheenvironmentbeforeprintingthisemailHelpsaveourplanet.
VeuillezsongerlenvironnementavantdimprimerleprsentcourrielAideznousprotgernotreplante.
Theinformationinthisemailisconfidentialandmaybelegallyprivileged.Itisintendedsolelyfortheaddressee.Accesstothisemailbyanyone
elseisunauthorized.Ifyouarenottheintendedrecipient,anydisclosure,copying,distributionoranyactiontakenoromittedtobetakenin
relianceonit,isprohibitedandmaybeunlawful.Ifyoubelievethatyouhavereceivedthisemailinerror,pleasecontactthesenderanddeletethis
emailandanyfilestransmittedwithit(withoutmakingcopies).
Thisemailandanyfilestransmittedwithitarepersonalandconfidential,andaresolelyfortheuseoftheindividualorentityaddressed.Therefore,
ifyouarenottheintendedrecipient,pleasedeletethisemailandanyfilestransmittedwithit(withoutmakinganycopies)andadvisetheauthor
immediately.
Attachment 13-8-28
2 of 41
C# 2
1
Maynard, Mary
From: fbarstow@victaulic.com
Sent: Thursday, May 30, 2013 6:25 AM
To: Maynard, Mary
Subject: Hybrid System
ToWhomitMayConcern,
Afterhaveworkedwiththissystemasproductmanagerduringitsdevelopmentandinthefield
withcontractorsinstallingthesystem,Ifeelthistechnologyneedsitsownstandard.I
don'tfeelthattheNFPA750grouphastheresponsibilitynortheexpertisetoevaluatea
gaseoussystemandNFPA2001doesnothavetheresponsibilitynortheexpertisetoevaluatea
waterbasedsystem.Inmyopinionthehybridsystemclearlyfallsoutsidethejurisdictionof
bothcommitteesasboththegaseousagentandthewaterbasedsystemtakeleadsin
extinguishmentindifferentfirescenarios.
FrankBarstow
VortexSalesSpecialists
6102170881Cell
Visit:Victaulicvortex.com
Thismessagecontainsconfidentialinformationandisintendedonlyfortheindividualnamed.
Ifyouarenotthenamedaddresseeyoushouldnotdisseminate,distributeorcopythise
mail.
WrongfuluseofthisinformationforpurposesinconsistentwithVictaulicinterestsmay
resultinlegalactionorprosecution.Pleasenotifythesenderimmediatelybyemailifyou
havereceivedthisemailbymistakeanddeletethisemailfromyoursystem.Email
transmissioncannotbeguaranteedtobesecureorerrorfreeasinformationcouldbe
intercepted,corrupted,lost,destroyed,arrivelateorincomplete,orcontainviruses.The
senderthereforedoesnotacceptliabilityforanyerrorsoromissionsinthecontentsof
thismessage,whichariseasaresultofemailtransmission.
Attachment 13-8-28
3 of 41
C# 3
1
Maynard, Mary
From: Roddy Bieber [Roddy.Bieber@apisystemsgroup.us]
To: Maynard, Mary
Cc: Roddy Bieber
Subject: Proposed new standard for Hybrid, gas and fine water droplet systems
NFPA Standards Council,

I write in support of a new standard for hybrid, gas and fine water droplet systems.

Unfortunately this technology is not recognized by NFPA 750 or NFPA 2001/12 which leaves end users,
installers, AHJ s, insurance companies and 3
rd
party testing agencies very little by way of guidance for the
installation and maintenance of these types of systems. The lack of a standard for these types of systems has
prevented the right fire protection solution from being applied in some cases. This is one of the best fire
protection innovations in years yet a the absence of a standard is preventing its application.

I encourage NFPA to seriously consider the establishment of a separate standard for hybrid, gas and fine
water droplet systems. APi Systems Group would be glad to support this effort in any way we can. Please
contact me directly if you have any questions.
Thankyou,

Roddy Bieber
General Manager
APi Systems Group, Inc.
214.291.1200 Phone
NFPAMembersince1995
FSSABoardofDirectors
NICETIII
Attachment 13-8-28
4 of 41
C# 4
1
Maynard, Mary
From: Gerry Bourne [gerry.bourne@troylfs.com]
Sent: Monday, May 27, 2013 11:22 AM
To: Maynard, Mary
Subject: NFPA Standard for Hybrid, gas and fine water droplet systems
DearMs.Cronin,
IamwritingperthesolicitingrequestoftheStandardsCouncilforpubliccommentsforthejustificationandneedfor
developinganewstandardfortheapplicationofhybrid,gasandfinewaterdropletsystems.
IamaProfessionalEngineerworkingforanationwidefireprotectioninstallerandserviceprovider.InmyroleIam
alwayslookingtobringleadingedgetechnologiestoourconsultantsandcustomersprovidingthemthebestpossible
solutionstotheirfireprotectionneeds.Asanorganizationwestandbehindandusehybridsuppressionsystemsin
manyapplicationsacrossthecountry.PersonallyIhavepresentedthistechnologytomanyfireprotectionengineers,
insuranceriskmanagersandthesocietyoffireprotectionengineersallwithgreatinterestinadoptingthisasan
alternativetotheircurrentsuppressionmethods.Ofteninthesediscussionsthereareinquiresastowherethis
technologyappliestoanNFPAstandardandwehavetodescribehowitcanonlybelookedatusingNFPA2001(Clean
Agent)andNFPA750(WaterMist).Thesecurrentstandardsdonotproperlyapplytoahybridsystemasitisintendedto
beusedsoweareoftenleftwithnothingtofollowfromastandardspointofview.
Iftherecouldbeanewstandardandtechnicalcommitteededicatedtothisitwouldbeofgreatbenefittoourabilityto
providethissolutiontomoreofourcustomersinsuchcaseswherethisisthebestoptionbutisbeingheldback.
IfyouhaveanyquestionsorifIcanbeofanyfurtherhelpregardingthisdonthesitatetocontactme
Regards,
GerryBourne,P.Eng.
BusinessDevelopmentManager
TroyLife&FireSafetyLtd.
4164277360
Gerry.Bourne@troylfs.com
http://www.troylfs.com
Like us on Facebook: www.facebook.com/TroyLFS

NOTICE: The information contained in this email and any document attached hereto is intended only for the named recipient(s). It is the
property of Troy Life & Fire Safety Ltd. and shall not be used, disclosed or reproduced without the express written consent of Troy Life & Fire
Safety Ltd. If you are not the intended recipient (or the employee or agent responsible for delivering this message in confidence to the
intended recipient(s), you are hereby notified that you have received this transmittal in error, and any review, dissemination, distribution or
copying of this transmittal or its attachments is strictly prohibited. If you have received this transmittal and/or attachments in error, please notify
the sender immediately by reply email or telephone and immediately delete this message and all its attachments. Thank you.
RE:
The NFPA Standards Council is considering a proposal by Victaulic for a proposed new standard for Hybrid, gas and fine
water droplet systems. The Council is soliciting public comments on the need for the project, information on resources on
the subject matter, those interested in participating on a technical committee if established, and experience in the
intended application of this technology. The Council is specifically looking for manufacturers that are actively developing
hybrid droplet systems and whether there are enough common installation practices and procedures available to support
a standard, and the intended application for this technology. The Council is also seeking input on whether the subject
matter could be covered by an existing technical committee or possibly through the creation of a new document.
This is an important matter to us and we are soliciting your support for the establishment for a new standard as well as the
Attachment 13-8-28
5 of 41
C# 5
2
creation of a new technical committee to administer the document. Comments are due by May 30th and should be
addressed to Amy Cronin, Standards Council Secretary; and sent to mmaynard@nfpa.org.
Attachment 13-8-28
6 of 41

Fire Suppression Systems Association (FSSA)
3601 East Joppa Road Baltimore, MD 21234 phone 410.931.8100 fax 410.931.8111 www.fssa.net

April 22, 2013

Secretary of the Standards Council via email: stds_admin@nfpa.org
1 Batterymarch Park
Quincy, MA 02169-7471

To whom it may concern:

In response the request published in the April Fire News for public comments on the need for a new
committee project to develop a standard for hybrid systems using a combination of inert gas and
very fine water droplet, the FSSA is submitting the following comment. The FSSA is an
association of manufacturers and installers of special hazards fire extinguishing systems.

The FSSA support the development of a new NFPA standard covering fire extinguishing systems
that use a combination of inert gas and very fine water droplets, known as hybrid systems. A
number of our member companies are involved in either manufacturing such systems or installing
such systems. These systems utilize inert gas to reduce the oxygen concentration in the protected
space below that required to sustain combustion and very fine water droplets which cool the
protected space extracting considerable heat from the fire zone. The two fold attack of oxygen
reduction and cooling is extremely effective for many types of fires.

Attempts have been made to include hybrid systems under NFPA 750, the standard on water mist
systems. These attempts have been rejected by the NFPA 750 technical committee. FSSA agrees
with the opinion that hybrid systems are outside the current scope of NFPA 750 since a primary
extinguishing mechanism of the hybrid technology is oxygen reduction by the inert gas component
not a specific spray (mist) that absorbs heat, displaces oxygen, or blocks radiant heat as required
under NFPA 750.

NFPA 2001 on Clean Agent Fire Extinguishing Systems addresses systems which use inert gas to
extinguish fire. FSSA, however, opines that hybrid systems are outside the scope of NFPA 2001
because the water component of the hybrid system generally leaves some residual water on surfaces
within the protected space. Thus the system does not meet the intent of the definition of a clean
agent in NFPA 2001.

Although Factory Mutual has approved hybrid systems for use in specific FM insured facilities, our
member companies are experiencing difficulties in providing hybrid systems for facilities which are
Attachment 13-8-28
7 of 41
C# 6
April 22, 2013
Page 2

3601 East Joppa Road Baltimore, MD 21234 phone 410.931.8100 fax 410.931.8111 www.fssa.net

not insured by FM because there is no national standard covering such systems. Lack of a national
standard covering hybrid systems hampers the use of such systems even when the hybrid system
provides the best option for fire extinguishment in a given hazard area. Also lack of guidance for
use of hybrid systems leaves the authorities, other than FM, who wish to utilize the hybrid
technology without the type of definitive guidance provided by a national recognized consensus
standard.

For the above reasons, the FSSA requests that the NFPA establish a new committee project to write
a standard covering hybrid systems that use a combination of inert gas and very fine water droplets
to extinguish fire.

FSSA would like to be represented on the Technical Committee developing such a new standard
and thus support the development.

Best regards,

Crista LeGrand, CAE, CMP
Executive Director
Fire Suppression Systems Association

cc: FSSA Board of Directors
FSSA Technical Committee
George Keeley, FSSA legal counsel
Tom Wysocki, Guardian Services Inc., FSSA Technical Director

Attachment 13-8-28
8 of 41
1
Maynard, Mary
From: Anna Gavin [agavin@fireline.com]
To: Maynard, Mary
Subject: hybrid gas and fine water droplet systems proposal
DearNFPAStandardsCouncil,
Ithascometomyattentionthatyouareconsideringaproposednewstandardforhybridgasandfinewaterdroplet
systemsandaresolicitingpubliccommentsatthistime.IwouldliketostatethatFirelineisverymuchinsupportofthis
proposalandwillcontributeifneeded.Wehavebeenastapleinthefireprotectionindustryforover65yearsandwe
feelthatthisformoffiresuppressionhasthepotentialtobeanefficientmethodforspecialhazardapplications.
ThereiscurrentlynoformallanguagepertainingtothesesystemsinNFPA750or2001.Thisleavesmanyquestionsand
hesitationinthedesign,installationandmaintenanceofthesesystems.CompanieslikeFirelinehavegrowntotrustthe
guidanceofNFPAcodesandstandards.Withadefinedsetofstandardsforhybridgasandfinewaterdropletsystems,
muchofthiscanbesolved.
Thankyouforconsideringtheproposalandthepotentialtechnicalcommittees.
Anna Gavin

President
Fireline Corporation
4506 Hollins Ferry Rd.
Baltimore, MD 21227
P 410.247.1422 Ext. 244
F 410.247.4676
C 443.956.3230

Clickalogotolearnmore!
Thisemailandanyattachmentsmaycontainconfidentialinformationintendedsolelyfortheuseofthe
addressee.Ifthereaderofthismessageisnottheintendedrecipient,anydistribution,copying,oruseof
thisemailoritsattachmentsisprohibited.Ifyoureceivedthismessageinerror,pleasenotifythesender
immediatelyanddeletethismessageandanycopies.Thankyou.
Attachment 13-8-28
9 of 41
C# 7
1
Maynard, Mary
From: Gianino, Carl E. [Carl.Gianino@nationalgrid.com]
Sent: Thursday, May 23, 2013 11:14 AM
To: Maynard, Mary
Subject: Develop a new standard for the application of hybrid, gas and fine water droplet systems
Ms. Amy Cronin
Standards Council Secretary
NFPA
Quincy, MA

Re: Develop a new standard for the application of hybrid, gas and fine water droplet systems.

Dear Ms. Cronin,

I am writing per the soliciting request of the Standards Council for public comments for the justification and need for
developing a new standard for the application of hybrid, gas and fine water droplet systems.

As the Lead Fire Protection Engineer for Nationalgrid with over 29 years of experience, I am constantly looking for new
fire protection technologies that will improve our fire protection and reduce our electric generation business interruption
exposure. As a Factory Mutual Insured Property achieving a Highly Protected Risk Status, we have worked closely with
FM approvals, research and engineers on many fire extinguishing systems ranging from clean agent, foam, water, CO2
and most recently Victaulics Vortex Hybrid Water/Nitrogen extinguishing System. Unfortunately without an NFPA
standard that specifically details the requirements of such a unique dual suppression agent system, the design
requirements and AHJ acceptance were left up to agreed upon performance based extinguishment objectives with
respect to fuel and lube oil auto ignition temperatures and O2 monitoring as it applied to our Combustion Turbine
Applications.

By utilizing two suppression agents (water and nitrogen) with one or the other being the primary suppressant depending
on the volume of the space and the fire scenario, one currently has to design, install and test using NFPA 2001 (Clean
Agent) and NFPA 750 (Water Mist) in an ad hoc fashion whether the scope of these standards apply or not being there is
no alternative. For these reasons it is imperative that the Standards Council move to establish an NFPA Standard that
sets forth minimum requirements for this new and very effective technology.

Should you have any further questions, concerns of if I can be of any further assistance, please do not hesitate to contact
me.

Carl E. Gianino, PE
Lead Fire Protection Engineer
Nationalgrid Engineering & Survey, LLC
516-545-6233

******************************************************************************** This e-mail
and any files transmitted with it, are confidential and are intended solely for the use of the individual or entity to
whom they are addressed. If you have received this e-mail in error, please reply to this message and let the
sender know.
Attachment 13-8-28
10 of 41
C# 8
1
Maynard, Mary
From: J eff Hausmann [jeffhausmann@fireequipco.com]
Sent: Friday, May 17, 2013 1:35 PM
To: Maynard, Mary
Subject: Regarding a new NFPA Standard for Hybrid gas/mist systems
To Whom it May Concern,

I will try to present my interest in seeing a standard developed for this technology in as few points and as briefly
as possible. My comments will specifically relate to the Victaulic Vortex system, but some or all of them could
be applied to other present or future systems, as well.

(1) The present standards for water mist systems (750) and clean agent systems (2001) are inadequate for the
hybrid system(s). NFPA 750 requirements address systems with high pressures and pinhole nozzles requiring
much more stringent piping standards than the Vortex system. NFPA 2001 requirements for discharge duration
and system design also ignore the advantages of a hybrid system. Since this type of system is not
accommodated by either standard, a new standard needs to be developed.

(2) A related issue is the type of hazard that can be protected. The Vortex system uses both cooling and
nitrogen to combat fires. This makes it effective in a variety of applications such as flammable liquid fires, IT
rooms, and high voltage switchgear rooms (proven through independent testing).

However, to the extent that the Vortex system is identified as a water mist system, the approval agencies limit
the type of hazards that can be protected to those typically protected by the traditional water mist systems
(machine spaces and turbines).

(3) The hybrid system has other advantages that comparative fire systems do not include. The ability to protect
volumes with un-closeable openings with almost no wetting is only one example. The unique qualities of the
system need to be recognized and codified.

(4) Another related subject is the application of local application systems using Vortex. To date the only special
hazards system with this ability is Carbon Dioxide, and NFPA should consider that use of CO2 may become
more restricted in the future. It would be worthwhile to have an alternate system available.

I hope this proves helpful and informative. Feel free to contact me with any questions or for additional
comments / discussion.

Thank you.

J eff Hausmann SET | Engineered Systems Sales
Fire Systems and Gas / Leak Detection Systems
NICET level IV - fire alarm systems | NICET level IV - special hazards systems | Cert #121209

Fire Equipment Company, Inc | Detroit Michigan USA
phone (313) 891-3164 | fax (313) 369-2533 | mobile (313) 300-2123
http://www.fireequipco.com

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BATTALION ONE FIRE PROTECTION

BATTALION ONE FIRE PROTECTION License #919683 C10/C16 5835 Doyle Street Suite 107 Emeryville, CA 94608
510-653-8075 Phone 510.653-8078 Fax www.battaliononefire.com
1
5/29/2013

Amy Cronin
NFPA
Standards Council Secretary
1 Batterymarch Park
Quincy, MA 02169

RE: Proposed Standard: Hybrid Gas and Fine Water Droplet Systems

Dear Ms. Cronin,

This letter is in reference to the proposed standard for Hybrid, gas and fine water droplet
systems.

Our company is an integrator for the Victaulic Vortex hybrid water/inert gas fire suppression
system. The Vortex system relies on a combination fine water droplet and nitrogen gas which
cools to extinguisher a fire.

We are finding it difficult to obtain approval for the installation of the hybrid systems from the
local AHJ due to the lack of an NFPA standard governing the installation of hybrid water/inert
gas systems.

We are unable to submit plans under the guidance of NFPA 750; Standard on
Water Mist Fire Protection Systems, due to the primary suppressant being the inert gas.

We are unable to submit plans under the guidance of NFPA 2001; Standard on
Clean Agent Fire Extinguishing Systems, because the amount of water in the hybrid system
exceeds the minimum allowed by NFPA 2001.

Battalion One Fire Protections encourages the development of a new standard to govern the
application of hybrid gas and fine water droplet systems.

Sincerely,

Michael Herbert
President

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1
Maynard, Mary
From: Dan Hubert [dan.hubert@janusfiresystems.com]
Sent: Wednesday, May 29, 2013 4:05 PM
To: Maynard, Mary
Subject: Recommendation for a NFPA Standard on hybrid Fire Extinguishing Systems
ToNFPAStandardsCouncil:
Ihaveworkedinthefireprotectionindustryfor30yearswhichincludedinstallation,contractingand
themanufacturingofautomaticsprinklersystems,foam,cleanagents,halon1301andcarbondioxide
gaseousfiresuppressionsystems.Ihavealsobeenresponsibleforthedevelopmentandtesting,for
listingandapproval(byULandFM),ofFM200,IG55,Novec1230andwatermistsystems.
RecentlyTheNFPA750TechnicalCommitteedecidedthathybridsystemsareoutsidethecurrent
scopeofNFPA750eventhoughtheprimaryextinguishingmechanismofthehybridsystems
typicallymeetthesamecriteriaasmanyapprovedwatermistsystems.Lackofanationalstandard
coveringhybridsystems(whichcurrentlymeettheperformancecriteriaestablishedinNFPA750and
maintainFMApproval)bothhamperstheuseofsuchsystemsevenwhenthehybridsystemprovides
thebestoptionforfireextinguishmentinagivenhazardarea.Furtherlackofguidanceforuseof
hybridsystemsleavestheauthoritieswhowishtoutilizethehybridtechnologywithoutthe
definitiveguidanceprovidedbyanationalrecognizedconsensusstandard.
IrequestthattheNFPAStandardsCouncilincludeachapteronhybridsystemsinNFPA750or
recommendthattheStandardsCouncilandNFPAestablishanewcommitteeprojecttocreatea
standardcoveringhybridsystemsthatuseacombinationofinertgasandveryfinewaterdropletsto
extinguishfire.
Thankyouforthisconsideration.
DanielHubert
Director,ProductDevelopment
1102RupcichDrive,MillenniumPark
CrownPoint,IN46307
P:219.310.2214
C:219.765.0777
F:219.663.4562
dhubert@janusfiresystems.com
Thisemailandanyfile(s)transmittedwithitareconfidentialandintendedsolelyfortheuseoftherecipienttowhomtheyareaddressed.Pleasenotify
thesenderimmediatelybyemailifyouhavereceivedthisemailbymistakeanddeletethisemailfromyoursystem.Ifyouarenottheintended
recipientyouarenotifiedthatdisclosing,copying,distributingortakinganyactioninrelianceonthecontentsofthisinformationisstrictlyprohibited.
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2
Wehavetakenprecautionstominimizetheriskoftransmittingsoftwareviruses,butweadviseyoutocarryoutyourownviruschecksonany
attachment(s)tothismessage.Wecannotacceptliabilityforanylossordamagecausedbysoftwareviruses.
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1
Maynard, Mary
From: Kasiski, Robert [robert.kasiski@fmglobal.com]
To: Maynard, Mary
Subject: FW: Comment on New Project - Hybrid, Gas and Fine Water Droplet Systems
DearMs.Maynard,
CouldyoupleasereferencetheemailbelowforoursupportofanewprojectonHybrid,GasandFineWater
DropletSystems.
Thankyouinadvanceforyourassistance.
Robert Kasiski | Senior Engineering Specialist

Engineering Standards - Protection Grp.| P.O. Box 9102 | 1151 Boston-Providence Tpke. | Norwood, MA 02062 USA
T: 781.255.4773 | IT: 8121 4773 | F: 781.551.9775 | E: robert.kasiski@fmglobal.com
www.fmglobal.com

This electronic transmission, including any attachments, is the property of FM Global. It may contain information confidential in nature or subject to legal privilege.
It may also include information developed to reduce the possibility of loss to property. FM Global undertakes no duty to any party by providing such information.
Disclosure, copying, distribution, or use of the contents of this transmission by anyone other than the intended recipient(s) is strictly prohibited If you have
received this message in error, please notify me by reply e-mail and delete the original transmission
From: Kasiski, Robert

To: 'stds_admin@nfpa.org'
Cc: Reilly Bill (wreilly@victaulic.com); zachary.magnone@tycofp.com; Leblanc, J ohn; Fuller, David; MacDonald, Brian
Subject: Comment on New Project - Hybrid, Gas and Fine Water Droplet Systems
Codes and Standards Administration,

This is to advise the Standards Council that FM Global is in support of the NFPA developing a new standard for the
application of hybrid, gas and fine water droplet systems. Our research has indicated the extinguishing mechanism to be
different than that of either an inert gas fire extinguishing system or a water mist fire extinguishing system which is
covered by NFPA 2001 and NFPA 750, respectively. Such that it is outside the purpose and application of those two
standards and development of a new standard is warranted.

FM Global is the process of developing a specific Property Loss Prevention Data Sheet for hybrid fire extinguishing
systems. FM Approvals has developed an in independent Approval Standard, Class 5580, Approval Standard for Hybrid
(Water and Inert Gas) Fire Extinguishing Systems, November 2012 for the listing of this equipment. There are currently
two manufacturers, Victaulic and Tyco which have their Vortex and Aquasonic products currently listed by FM
Approvals.

If you should have any further questions, please do not hesitate to contact me directly.
Very truly yours,
Robert Kasiski
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2
Robert Kasiski | Senior Engineering Specialist
Engineering Standards - Protection Grp. | P.O. Box 9102 | 1151 Boston-Providence Tpke. | Norwood, MA 02062 USA
T: 781.255.4773 | IT: 8121 4773 | F: 781.551.9775 | E: robert.kasiski@fmglobal.com
www.fmglobal.com

This electronic transmission, including any attachments, is the property of FM Global. It may contain information confidential in nature or subject to legal privilege.
It may also include information developed to reduce the possibility of loss to property. FM Global undertakes no duty to any party by providing such information.
Disclosure, copying, distribution, or use of the contents of this transmission by anyone other than the intended recipient(s) is strictly prohibited If you have
received this message in error, please notify me by reply e-mail and delete the original transmission.
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Maynard, Mary
From: Kopp, Ruediger [ruediger.kopp@fogtec.com]
To: stds_admin
Cc: Lakkonen, Max
Subject: Comment on New Project
FOGTECwouldliketocommentonaproposednewstandardfortheapplicationofhybrid,gasandfinewaterdroplet
systems.
AswatermistdeveloperandmanufacturerFOGTEChasevaluatedtherequirementforanadditionalnewstandardfor
hybrid,gasandfirewaterdropletsystems.Wecametotheconclusionthatthesessystemshouldbecoveredeitherby
theexistinggasextinguishingstandardifgasisthedominantextinguishingagentorbytheexistingwatermiststandard
ifthefinewaterdropletsarethemainextinguishingagent.Wedonotseetheneedforanadditionalnewstandard.
BeingamemberoftheNFPA750technicalcommittee,wewouldliketoraisethesubjectinthiscommittee.However,
FOGTECisveryinterestedtobecomeamemberofthenewstandardcommitteeforhybridsystems,incasethisis
initiated.
Bestregards,
ppa.RuedigerKopp,Dipl.Ing.
GeneralManager
FixedSystems

The Smarter Way of Fire Fighting

FOGTEC Brandschutz GmbH & Co.KG
Schanzenstr. 19A, 51063 Kln, Germany
Tel +49 221-96223-18
Mobil +49 172-2969933
Fax +49 221-96223-30
Ruediger.Kopp@FOGTEC.com
http://www.FOGTEC.com

* Registerangaben/Disclaimer: http://www.FOGTEC.com
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Maynard, Mary
From: Matthew M. Euson [MEuson@3s-incorporated.com]
Sent: Thursday, May 23, 2013 2:23 PM
To: Maynard, Mary
Subject: FW: New NFPA Standard Support - Hybrid, gas and fine water droplet systems
NFPA Standards Council,

As a 14 year veteran of the fire suppression industry and as a Board of Directors member of the Fire Suppression Systems
Association, I write in support of a new standard for hybrid, gas and fine water droplet systems.

Unfortunately this technology is not recognized by NFPA 750 or NFPA 2001/12 which leaves end users, installers, AHJ s,
insurance companies and 3
rd
party testing agencies very little by way of guidance for the installation and maintenance of
these types of systems. The lack of a standard for these types of systems has prevented the right fire protection
solution from being applied in some cases. This is one of the best fire protection innovations in years yet a the absence
of a standard is preventing its application.

I encourage NFPA to seriously consider the establishment of a separate standard for hybrid, gas and fine water droplet
systems. 3S would be glad to support this effort in any way we can, including participating as a member of the technical
committee. Please contact me directly if you have any questions.

Best,

Matt Euson
President, 3S Incorporated
Board of Directors, FSSA
Alternate NFPA 33
Technical Committee Member, FSSA
Previous Chairmen Installers Division, FSSA
NICET II Special Hazards

MATTEUSON,President
5132025070(w)|3176962226(m)|MEUSON@3SINCORPORATED.COM
8686SouthwestParkway|HarrisonOH|45030
SPECI AL HAZARD FI RE SUPPRESSI ON SYSTEMS
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3305 104
th
Street Urbandale, Iowa 50322 515-252-9932 515-252-8946 (fax) 800-274-0889 Page 1

Memo
To: National Fire Protection Association
ATTN: Amy Cronin, Standards Council Secretary
From: Shawn Mullen, SET (NPFA Member #125399)
Page: 1 of 1
Date: May 23, 2013
Re: Support for new standard for hybrid, gas and fine water droplet systems
Amy:
As a 28 year veteran of the special hazards fire suppression industry and from my vantage point as
past president of the Fire Suppression Systems Association, I write in support of a new standard for
hybrid, gas and fine water droplet systems.
The innovative technology involved with these hybrid systems is not adequately addressed by any
existing NFPA standard whether it be NFPA 13, NFPA 15, NFPA 750 or NFPA 2001. Because of the
lack of any clear and definitive standard, these new hybrid systems are at a disadvantage in the
marketplace. AHJs, insurance underwriters, owners, engineers and other stakeholders are reluctant to
embrace these systems because of no nationally recognized standard to which they can look for
guidance in the design, installation, testing and maintenance of these systems. Moreover, independent
third party testing agencies are prevented from listing such systems without the existence of a
nationally recognized standard from an organization such as NFPA.
As an installer of special hazards systems including clean agent and water mist systems, I see a clear
need for an independent standard. Too often we see applications that have to settle for a less than
optimum solution because there is no national standard to which they can turn for reference and
support. This is a disservice to a marketplace that is innovating new products and systems, yet is
prevented from the benefits of similar fire suppression innovation because of the lack of a standard.
I encourage NFPA to seriously consider the establishment of a separate standard for hybrid, gas and
fine water droplet systems. If need be, I would be willing to consider submitting my qualifications and
resume for membership on such a new standard committee. Feel free to contact me if I may be of
further assistance to the Standards Council in considering this important request.
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Maynard, Mary
From: Paquet, J oan (J .) [jhiggi37@ford.com]
To: Maynard, Mary
Subject: Hybrid Supression Systems
Amy,

I believe that there needs to be a standard on hybrid fire protection systems. I have installed
a couple of the systems in our manufacturing plants. As usual, I look for an UL and/or FM
approval on the system. In this case, there was only an FM approval. I believe that there
needs to be information available on these systems in the NFPA standards. It is difficult for
me to always make the right decision when all I have to go on is information from the
manufacturer. I like the NFPA standards, because I know that a group of subject matter
experts write it.

For example, I was concerned about the level of oxygen in the room after the hybrid system
activated for a few minutes. It would be nice to know when and when I cant install a hybrid
system. What about installing a hybrid system next to a standard sprinkler system. NFPA
standards have also been a useful tool in helping me make the right decision for Ford.

I am all for NFPA either having a separate standard for hybrids or combining it with another
standard.

J ust my thoughts.

Regards,

Joan Paquet (Higgins)
Fire Protection Engineering Manager
313-323-6916

Fire Bulletins- access only available on Ford network
___

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Maynard, Mary
From: Thierry Carriere [ThierryC@adatech.com]
To: stds_admin
Subject: Comment on New Project -- Hybrid water mist standard
Towhomitmayconcern,
ADATechnologiesisasmallcompanycurrentlydevelopinginnovativehybridwatermistsystemsforgovernment
customers(NASA,DepartmentofDefense,FAA,etc).
Ourmidtolongtermobjectivesaretoreengineerandcommercializetoabroadercustomerbasetheseproducts.We
havereviewedtheNFPA750standardonwatermistsystemsandsubmittedanumberofcommentsinthelastrevision
cycle(2014cycle).Ourapproachtogeneratingwatermistisdifferentfromcurrentlymanufacturedwatermistsystems
andoursystemswillnotfitNFPA750unlesssignificantanddrasticmodificationsareimplemented.Basedonour
experience,thisisveryunlikely.
Wewelcomeandenthusiasticallysupportthecreationofaseparatestandardforhybridwatermistsystems.Hybrid
systemscantakemanyforms,someofthemareyettobedevelopedandcommercializedasmoremanufacturers
discoverwaystoharnessthecombinedcapabilitiesoffinelyatomizedwater(orotherliquids)withcarriergasesto
suppressfires.Thecustomerdemandforhighlyeffectiveandspecializedfiresuppressionsystemswillincreaseandwe
believethathybridwatermistsystemswillofferamorediversearrayofsystemstochoosefrom.Inturn,onceanew
standardisestablished,newsystemswillbemarketedandcustomersneedswillbebetteraddressed.
Pleaseconveyoursupportforthisnewstandardtotheappropriatereviewcommitteemembers.Shouldyouhaveany
questionsordesiretofollowupwithADATechnologies,pleasecontactmeatyourconvenience.Mycontactinformation
isincludedbelowinthesignature.
Bestregards,
Thierry
Thierry Carriere, Ph.D.

Technology Director, Fire Safety Program
ADA Technologies, Inc.
8100 Shaffer Parkway, Suite #130, Littleton, CO 80127
(P) (303) 874-8289
(F) (303) 792-5633
ThierryC@adatech.com
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May 29, 2013

Ms. Amy Cronin
Secretary, Standards Council
1 Batterymarch Park
Quincy, MA 02169-7471

Re: Hybrid Water Mist Systems Support for New Standard

Dear Ms. Cronin:

In conjunction with the Standards Councils request for public comment on the need to establish a new
standard for hybrid water mist systems, we would like to express our opinion on this matter. This would have
the effect of separating these systems from standard water mist systems in the NFPA standards, specifically
NFPA 750.

We are submitting this letter in support of this request for a separate standard.

We are an integrator for two (2) of the water mist manufacturers and have several years experience
engineering and installing these systems. We have found that there is a large market for the hybrid water
mist technology. However, we constantly run into problems with the insurance companies and AHJ s with the
approvals and conformance to NFPA 750.

Summary: NFPA 750, Standard on Water Mist Fire Protection Systems, was originally written to cover single
fluid, high pressure water mist systems. There have been some minor modifications to accommodate other
systems. But, these modifications are totally inadequate to properly reflect the unique operating
characteristics of the newer hybrid systems and to give the approval agencies (primarily FM), end-users,
insurance companies and the AHJ s guidance in their use and application. A new standard is required.

Our primary reasons for supporting this request are as follows:

1. The existing Standard on Water Mist Fire Protection Systems, NFPA 750, does not adequately
represent the differences between the single fluid systems and twin-fluid systems.

a. Specifically, the existing standard does not recognize the use of nitrogen in the
extinguishing mechanism for certain systems. Nitrogen is not even mentioned as far as
we could find. Air is mentioned. (See Item #4 below.) The standard seems to assume
the air (or nitrogen) is merely the atomizing media.

b. For some systems, the nitrogen is an integral part of the extinguishing process and must
be recognized as such.

c. The standard does not address the O
2
depletion in an enclosed space when discharging
some of the hybrid (nitrogen / water) systems. This is a critical safety concern. The
discharge time must be balanced against the O
2
level in the protected space to achieve
the desired O
2
concentration, typically 14 16% - safe to breathe, but inert to fire.

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d. The existing standard does not adequately represent the piping system needed for hybrid
water mist systems that operate at only 1.7 bar (25 psi). (See NFPA 750, 5.4.2.)

2. The wording of the existing standard specifies that the water mist systems must be listed for the
intended application. (See NFPA 750, 8.1.1 and 8.2.4.2.)

a. This is an onerous requirement.

b. The time and costs involved for specific application listing (FM has the only testing
standard) has been a severe restraint on the use of water mist systems in North America.
Insurance companies, AHJ s and end-users look for listed systems in choosing and
approving systems. This has severely limited the use and acceptance of water mist
systems, especially in a time when there is significant environmental pressure on some of
the other agents.

c. Often, test standards dont exist and need to be established before testing can even
begin. This adds significant cost to an already very expensive approval process and can
add a couple years to the process.

d. The test standards are established around the requirements in NFPA 750, few of which
apply to hybrid (nitrogen / water) water mist systems. The result is listed hybrid water
mist systems can rarely be used in accordance with the listing. For this reason, the use
of water mist systems in general, and hybrid water mist systems in particular, have not
gained the wide acceptance that they have in other parts of the world.

e. No other extinguishing or suppression agent in use has this requirement for individual
application listing.

3. The discharge duration time is listed as 30 minutes (See NFPA 750, 10.3.1 (1)), although this is
modified by the following 2 sections.

a. This is modified by 10.2.1 (2), but only for pre-engineered systems. This section
specifies a completely redundant discharge capability or twice the time required to
extinguish the fires. The assumption, as with standard intermediate and high pressure
systems, is that once the discharge stops the capability to extinguish the fires also stops.
This gives no credit for the nitrogen content in an enclosure nor to the very small water
droplet size that remains suspended and continues to both extinguish and inert.

b. Section 10.3.1 (3), allows a specific hazard evaluation. This is meaningless for the vast
majority of the applications as neither the insurance company nor the AHJ can evaluate
the analysis nor has the background or experience to understand it. Thus, they revert to
the code 30 minutes.

c. The discharge duration makes the hybrid systems very expensive and renders them
unsuitable for 99% of the applications without adding any benefit to the capability of the
system.

4. NFPA 750, 10.6 is titled Atomizing Media for Twin-Fluid Systems. This lists Plant Air (10.6.2)
and Air Compressors (10.6.8). This completely ignores the dual role the nitrogen plays as both
the atomizing media and, more importantly, the role it plays in the extinguishing and inerting of
the area.

5. NFPA 750 does not even define a hybrid water mist system correctly. An end-user, insurance
company or AHJ will find no reference in NFPA 750 to a hybrid water mist system.

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a. 3.3.18 defines a Twin-Fluid System as having water and the atomizing media mixed at
the nozzle. No mention is made of the dual extinguishing characteristics of a true
hybrid system using nitrogen and water.

b. 3.3.21.2 defines a Hybrid Water Mist Nozzle as having the capability to operate both by
automatic and nonautomatic means. This may be the only reference in the standard to
hybrid.

6. There are numerous design details in the existing standard that are either not pertinent to hybrid
systems or ignore design details critical to them. A couple of the items are:

a. The piping charts do not list black steel pipe. Why? Unfortunately, an AHJ will interpret
this to exclude the use of black pipe for the nitrogen.

b. Screwed unions cannot be used on pipe larger than 51 mm (2). Why? This may be a
good requirement for intermediate and high pressure systems, but has no meaning for
low pressure systems and for nitrogen pipe.

c. The Figure A.11.1.6 (c) shows a schematic representation of a low pressure twin-fluid
water mist system. However, this isnt even close to a hybrid water mist system. A
hybrid system is not shown.

We support establishing a new standard on hybrid water mist systems. In our opinion, trying to modify the
existing standard to suit the hybrid systems would not be practical and has not yielded results to date.

Should a new standard be approved by the Standards Council, we would be willing to serve on the technical
committee.

Please let me know if you have any questions with the above.

Thank you for your consideration.

Very truly yours,

3S Incorporated

Thomas G. Euson
Vice President

Chair, NFPA Committee on Finishing Processes

cc: Matt Euson, 3S

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1
Maynard, Mary
From: Troutt, Curtis [curtis_troutt@nps.gov]
To: Maynard, Mary
Subject: Hybrid Fire Suppression System Standard
Mrs. Cronin:

I am writing in support of consideration for the development of an NFPA standard for hybrid fire suppression
systems. The back and forth between 750 and 2001 is clumsy and not very surefooted. This technology has
great potential, especially in remote areas with insufficient water infrastructure.

Respectfully,
--

Curtis E. Troutt
National Park Service
Pacific West Region Fire Marshal
333 Bush Street; Suite 500
San Francisco, CA 94104-2828
Ph: 415 623 2182
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1
Maynard, Mary
From: Foran, Rosanne
To: Maynard, Mary
Subject: FW: Comment on New Project
OriginalMessage
From:RobertT.Wickham[mailto:rtwickham@comcast.net]
Sent:Sunday,April14,20139:14AM
To:stds_admin
Subject:CommentonNewProject
Iwouldliketowriteinsupportofanewprojectforgasandwaterhybridsystems.
Further,Iwouldliketosuggestthecreationofanewtechnicalcommitteeforthe
developmentofastandardforthesesystems.Idonotbelievethatthetechnicalcommittees
responsibleforNFPA2001andNFPA750haveshownanyinterestinthissubject.Inthat
regard,IwouldliketopointoutIamamemberoftheTechnicalCommitteeonGaseousFire
ExtinguishingSystems.
AswelearnedwiththedevelopmentofNFPA2010,theStandardforFixedAerosolFire
ExtinguishingSystems,atechnicalcommitteededicatedtothedevelopmentofthatstandard
completeditsassignmentinnearrecordtimewithoutthedistractionoftryingtoaccommodate
competingtechnologiesaswouldbethecaseiftheprojectwereassignedtothetechnical
committeeforNFPA2001orNFPA750.IservedasthefirstchairoftheTechnicalCommittee
onAerosolExtinguishingTechnologyandIampreparedtoapplyformembershiponanew
committeetodevelopanewstandardforgasandwaterhybridsystemsintheSEmember
category.
.
RobertT.Wickham
9WindingBrookDrive
Stratham,NH03885USA
Telephone:6037723229
Mobile:6037701325
mailto:rtwickham@comcast.net
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5024-R Campbell Boulevard Baltimore, MD 21236 phone 410.931.8100 fax 410.931.8111 web www.fssa.net

CE L E B R AT I NG Y E A R S
1982-2012

September 14, 2012

Amy Cronin
Secretary of the Standards Council
1 Batterymarch Park
Quincy, MA 02169-7471

RE: Request for New Committee Project Standard for Hybrid Fire Extinguishing Systems

Ms. Cronin:

I am writing on behalf of the Fire Suppression Systems Association (FSSA). The FSSA is an
association of manufacturers and installers of special hazards fire extinguishing systems.

The FSSA is requesting that the NFPA establish a new committee project to write a standard
covering fire extinguishing systems that use a combination of inert gas and very fine water droplets,
known as hybrid systems. A number of our member companies are involved in either
manufacturing such systems or installing such systems. These systems utilize inert gas to reduce
the oxygen concentration in the protected space below that required to sustain combustion and very
fine water droplets which cool the protected space extracting considerable heat from the fire zone.
The two fold attack of oxygen reduction and cooling is extremely effective for many types of fires.

Attempts have been made to include hybrid systems under NFPA 750, the standard on water mist
systems. These attempts have been rejected by the NFPA 750 technical committee. FSSA agrees
with the opinion that hybrid systems are outside the current scope of NFPA 750 since a primary
extinguishing mechanism of the hybrid technology is oxygen reduction by the inert gas component
not a specific spray (mist) that absorbs heat, displaces oxygen, or blocks radiant heat as required
under NFPA 750.

NFPA 2001 on Clean Agent Fire Extinguishing Systems addresses systems which use inert gas to
extinguish fire. FSSA, however, opines that hybrid systems are outside the scope of NFPA 2001
because the water component of the hybrid system generally leaves some residual water on surfaces
within the protected space. Thus the system does not meet the intent of the definition of a clean
agent in NFPA 2001.
Attachment 13-8-28
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September 14, 2012
Page 2

5024-R Campbell Boulevard Baltimore, MD 21236 phone 410.931.8100 fax 410.931.8111 web www.fssa.net

Although Factory Mutual has approved hybrid systems for use in specific FM insured facilities, our
member companies are experiencing difficulties in providing hybrid systems for facilities which are
not insured by FM because there is no national standard covering such systems. Lack of a national
standard covering hybrid systems hampers the use of such systems even when the hybrid system
provides the best option for fire extinguishment in a given hazard area. Also lack of guidance for
use of hybrid systems leaves the authorities, other than FM, who wish to utilize the hybrid
technology without the type of definitive guidance provided by a national recognized consensus
standard.

For the above reasons, the FSSA requests that the NFPA establish a new committee project to write
a standard covering hybrid systems that use a combination of inert gas and very fine water droplets
to extinguish fire.

Best regards,

Crista LeGrand, CAE, CMP
Executive Director

cc: FSSA Board of Directors

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J anuary 31, 2013

Ms. Linda Fuller
1 Batterymarch Park
Quincy, MA 02169-7471

Re: Hybrid Water Mist Systems Support for New Standard

Dear Ms. Fuller:

It is my understanding that the Standards Council will soon consider a request to establish a new standard for
hybrid water mist systems. This would have the effect of separating these systems from standard water mist
systems in the NFPA standards.

We are submitting this letter in support this request for a separate standard.

Our primary reasons for supporting this request are as follows:

1. The existing Standard on Water Mist Fire Protection Systems, NFPA 750, does not adequately
represent the differences between the single fluid systems and twin-fluid systems.

a. Specifically, the existing standard does not recognize the use of nitrogen in the
extinguishing mechanism for certain systems. Nitrogen is not even mentioned as far as
we could find. Air is mentioned. The standard seems to assume the air (or nitrogen) is
merely the atomizing media.

b. For some systems, the nitrogen is an integral part of the extinguishing process and must
be recognized as such.

c. The standard does not address the O
2
depletion in an enclosed space when discharging
some of the hybrid (nitrogen / water) systems. This is a critical safety concern. The
discharge time must be balanced against the O
2
level in the protected space to achieve
the desired O
2
concentration, typically 14 16% - safe to breathe, but inert to fire.

d. The existing standard does not adequately represent the piping system needed for hybrid
water mist systems that operate at only 1.7 bar (25 psi).

2. The wording of the existing standard specifies that the water mist systems must be listed for the
intended application.

a. This is an onerous requirement.

b. The time and costs involved for specific application listing (FM has the only testing
standard) has been a severe restraint on the use of water mist systems in North America.
Insurance companies, AHJ s and end-users look for listed systems in choosing and
approving systems. This has severely limited the use and acceptance of water mist
Attachment 13-8-28
36 of 41
systems, especially in a time when there is significant environmental pressure on some of
the other agents.

c. Often, test standards dont exist and need to be established before testing can even
begin.

d. The test standards are established around the requirements in NFPA 750, few of which
apply to hybrid (nitrogen / water) water mist systems. The result is listed hybrid water
mist systems can rarely be used in accordance with the listing. For this reason, the use
of water mist systems in general, and hybrid water mist systems in particular, have not
gained the wide acceptance that they have in other parts of the world.

e. No other extinguishing or suppression agent in use has this requirement for individual
application listing.

3. There are numerous design details in the existing standard that are either not pertinent to hybrid
systems or ignore design details critical to them.

We support establishing a new standard on hybrid water mist systems. In our opinion, trying to modify the
existing standard to suit the hybrid systems would not be practical and has not yielded results to date.

Please let me know if you have any questions with the above.

Thank you for your consideration.

Very truly yours,

3S Incorporated

Thomas G. Euson
Vice President

Chair, NFPA Committee on Finishing Processes

cc: Matt Euson, 3S

Attachment 13-8-28
37 of 41
Attachment 13-8-28
38 of 41
Attachment 13-8-28
39 of 41
Attachment 13-8-28
40 of 41
Attachment 13-8-28
41 of 41

May 28, 2013

1 Batterymarch Park
Quincy, MA 02169

Subject: New Installation Standard for Hybrid Systems

Dear NFPA Staff:

As a member of the Technical Committee on Water Mist Fire Suppression Systems, I have the
following input to provide relative to the request for comments on a proposed new installation
standard for hybrid (inert gas and fine water mist) systems as indicated in the April 2013 issue of
NFPA News.
As I understand, one of the key areas of interest relative to the application of these systems is the use
in occupied and unoccupied compartments or spaces. When used in this application, I understand
that the primary fire protection objective is to quickly suppress/extinguish a fire by means of reducing
the oxygen level within the enclosure via the introduction of an inert gas with some potential benefit of
cooling from the water mist. Along with achieving this fire protection objective, there are critical
safeguards that must be considered and implemented as a part of the system design/installation to
ensure that these systems can be safely used in occupied spaces with low oxygen concentrations.
The primary extinguishing mechanism of the hybrid system is similar to a gaseous system covered by
NFPA 2001.

While it is the case that NFPA 750 includes some requirements for twin-fluid systems, these systems
utilize air (rather than nitrogen) as the atomizing media. Water mist systems have the ability to cool
the combustion process and dilute the oxygen concentration with the generation of water vapor near
a fire, but water mist systems are not designed to reduce the oxygen within an entire compartment
space.

The TC on Water Mist Fire Suppression Systems does not have expertise to address the potential
hazards to personnel due to the reduced oxygen content within an occupied area.
In regard to the safeguards to personnel within a protected area with a reduced oxygen
concentration, it would appear that requirements similar to those described in NFPA 2001 would be
needed for hybrid systems. Considering that unique characteristics of these systems, a separate
standard may need to be developed to properly address the installation of these systems.

Supplemental Attachment 13-8-28
Page 1 of 2
C# 22
I trust this information will be helpful in your consideration of this matter.

Very truly yours;

George E. Laverick, FSFPE
Principal Engineer- Fire Extinguishers and Fire Suppression Products
Product Safety

Page 2 of 2
1
Fuller, Linda
Subject: FW: Student Project on Hybrid Water Mist Systems
Attachments: Hybrid Water Mist Fire Protection Systems.pdf; ATT00001.htm
From:"Kimball,Amanda"<AKimball@nfpa.org>
Date:June26,2013,2:59:53PMCDT
To:"robert.kasiski@fmglobal.com"<robert.kasiski@fmglobal.com>,"Stanek,Sandra"
<SStanek@nfpa.org>,PeterThomas<pthomasext@victaulic.com>,"Zachary.Magnone@tycofp.com"
<Zachary.Magnone@tycofp.com>,"george.e.laverick@ul.com"<george.e.laverick@ul.com>,Michael
Gollner<mgollner@umd.edu>
Subject:StudentProjectonHybridWaterMistSystems
PanelMembers,
Inthe2012CodeFundcycle,theattachedinformationgatheringprojectonhybridwatermistsystems
wassubmitted.WewillbeundertakingthisprojectasastudentprojectwiththeUniversityofMaryland
Prof.MichaelGollnerwillbeadvisingtheproject.
ThankyouforagreeingtoserveontheProjectTechnicalPanelforthisproject.ThePaneloverseesthe
technicalaspectsoftheproject(reviewreports,etc).Iwouldexpecttheworkloadtobereviewofa
draftreportandafewconferencecalls.IwouldliketoscheduleaninitialteleconferenceforlateJulyto
discussthescopeoftheprojectsowhenthestudentreturnstoschoolinthefall,theycanhitthe
groundrunningontheproject.Ihavesetupadoodleschedulingpollatthefollowinglink:
https://researchfoundation.doodle.com/wqdakd9f4gkmufxi.PleaseprovideyouravailabilitybyFriday,
July5
th
.
Iwouldbehappytoansweranyquestionsthatyouhave.
Thankyou,
Amanda
AmandaKimball,P.E.
ResearchProjectManager
FireProtectionResearchFoundation
1BatterymarchPark,Quincy,MAUSA021697471
617.984.7295
akimball@nfpa.org
www.nfpa.org/Foundation

This e-mail may contain privileged or confidential information. If you are not the intended recipient: (1) you may not
disclose, use, distribute, copy or rely upon this message or attachment(s); and (2) please notify the sender by reply e-
mail, and then delete this message and its attachment(s). Underwriters Laboratories Inc. and its affiliates disclaim all
liability for any errors, omissions, corruption or virus in this message or any attachments.
HybridWaterMistFireProtectionSystems
Background
TherearenowtwocommerciallyavailablefireextinguishingsystemsthatFMhasclassifiedas"Hybrid"
systems(inApprovalStandard5580),butarenotaddressedintheNFPAstandards.Thesesystemsare
unique because they use an inerting gas such as nitrogen as well as fine droplets of water typical of
watermistsystem.FMhasdeterminedthattheoxygenconcentrationisnotdepletedenoughtoclassify
thisasacleanagent,butitalsodoesnotshowallofthesamecharacteristicsasastandardwatermist
system.Insomecases,manufacturersaremixingandmatchingrequirementsforwatermistsystems
andinertgasestosuittheirneeds.
ProjectDescription
Theobjectiveofthisresearchwouldbetoprovidebackgroundinformationonthesesystemssothatit
canbeultimatelydeterminedwherethesesystemsshouldbestbeaddressedwithinNFPAdocuments.
ThesesystemsmayfitinNFPA750,StandardonWaterMistFireProtectionSystems,NFPA2001,
StandardonCleanAgentFireExtinguishingSystems,ormaybeuniqueenoughtorequiretheirown
independentdocument.
Thisprojectwouldinvolvethefollowingtasks:
Aliteraturereviewofavailableinformationonhybridsystemsincludingtechnicalbackground
informationandtestdata.
Analysisoftheextinguishingproperties/capabilitiesofsuchsystemsandcomparingthemto
traditionalwatermistsystemsandcleanagentsystems.
Meetingwithlisting/approvalbodiessuchasFMorULtogettheirinputonthesesystemsand
informationonhowtheyaretestingthem.
Documentationofthestudyresultsinareport.
HowthisInformationWillbeUsed
The information from this study may be used by the Technical Committees for NFPA 750 and 2001 to
helpdeterminewherehybridwatermistsystemrequirementsshouldbeincludedinthestandards.
Item 13-8-29
Attachment 13-8-29 1 of 3
Item 13-8-30
1
Maynard, Mary
From: Fuller, Linda
Sent: Tuesday, May 07, 2013 11:50 AM
To: Maynard, Mary
Subject: FW: Scope for FAE-NSF

Brian Montgomery, Chair of the Technical Committee on Non-structural Fire Fighting SCBA and William
Haskell, Chair of the Correlating Committee on Fire and Emergency Services Protective Clothing and
Equipment submits for Standards Council approval, a scope for the Non-structural Fire Fighting SCBA
Committee:
ProposedCommitteeScope:ThisCommitteeshallhaveprimaryresponsibilityfordocumentsonrespiratory
equipment,includingbreathingair,foremergencyresponsepersonnelotherthanthoseinvolvedinstructuralfire
fightingoperations,duringincidentsinvolvinghazardousoroxygendeficientatmospheres.Thesetypesof
operationsincludetacticallawenforcement,confinedspace,andhazardousmaterialsresponseoperations.This
Committeeshallalsohaveprimaryresponsibilityfordocumentsontheselection,careandmaintenanceof
respiratoryequipmentandsystemsbyemergencyservicesorganizationsandpersonnel.

DavidG.Trebisacci,CIH,CSP
PublicFireProtectionDivision
NFPA
1BatterymarchPark
Quincy,MA02269
Phone:(617)9847420
Fax:(617)9847056
dtrebisacci@nfpa.org
ImportantNotice:ThiscorrespondenceisnotaFormalInterpretationissuedpursuanttoNFPARegulations.Anyopinionexpressedisthepersonal
opinionoftheauthoranddoesnotnecessarilyrepresenttheofficialpositionoftheNFPAoritsTechnicalCommittees.Inaddition,this
correspondenceisneitherintended,norshoulditbereliedupon,toprovideprofessionalconsultationorservices.
Interestedinmakingadifferenceinyourcommunity?
HelpsetthestandardforsafetyandbecomeanNFPATechnicalCommitteeMember.
CheckoutNFPAonsocialmedia

From: Fuller, Linda
To: Trebisacci, Dave
Subject: FW: Scope for FAE-NSF
Attachment 13-8-30
1 of 3
2
What about this?

Brian Montgomery, Chair of the Committee on Non-structural Fire Fighting SCBA and the William Haskell,
Chair of the Correlating Committee on Fire and Emergency Services Protective Clothing and Equipment
submits for the Standards Council approval, a scope for the Non-structural Fire Fighting SCBA Committee:
ProposedCommitteeScope:ThisCommitteeshallhaveprimaryresponsibilityfordocumentsonrespiratory
equipment,includingbreathingair,foremergencyresponsepersonnelotherthanthoseinvolvedinstructuralfire
fightingoperations,duringincidentsinvolvinghazardousoroxygendeficientatmospheres.Thesetypesof
operationsincludetacticallawenforcement,confinedspace,andhazardousmaterialsresponseoperations.This
Committeeshallalsohaveprimaryresponsibilityfordocumentsontheselection,careandmaintenanceof
respiratoryequipmentandsystemsbyemergencyservicesorganizationsandpersonnel.
LindaFuller
Manager,Codes&StandardsAdministration
NationalFireProtectionAssociation
1BatterymarchPark,Quincy,MA021697471
617.984.7248phone
617.770.3500fax
From: Trebisacci, Dave

To: Fuller, Linda
Cc: Baio, Debbie; Peterson, Cheryl; Montgomery, Brian; whaskell@cdc.gov
Subject: RE: Scope for FAE-NSF
Linda, I discussed the Committee Scope with Chair Brian Montgomery and CC Chair Bill Haskell.

The following is proposed for the Councils approval:

CommitteeScope:ThisCommitteeshallhaveprimaryresponsibilityfordocumentsonrespiratoryequipment,including
breathingair,foremergencyresponsepersonnelotherthanthoseinvolvedinstructuralfirefightingoperations,during
incidentsinvolvinghazardousoroxygendeficientatmospheres.Thesetypesofoperationsincludetacticallaw
enforcement,confinedspace,andhazardousmaterialsresponseoperations.ThisCommitteeshallalsohaveprimary
responsibilityfordocumentsontheselection,careandmaintenanceofrespiratoryequipmentandsystemsbyemergency
servicesorganizationsandpersonnel.

Please let me know if you need anything additional.
Thanks,
Dave

DavidG.Trebisacci,CIH,CSP
PublicFireProtectionDivision
NFPA
1BatterymarchPark
Quincy,MA02269
Phone:(617)9847420
Fax:(617)9847056
dtrebisacci@nfpa.org
Attachment 13-8-30
2 of 3
3
ImportantNotice:ThiscorrespondenceisnotaFormalInterpretationissuedpursuanttoNFPARegulations.Anyopinionexpressedisthepersonal
opinionoftheauthoranddoesnotnecessarilyrepresenttheofficialpositionoftheNFPAoritsTechnicalCommittees.Inaddition,this
correspondenceisneitherintended,norshoulditbereliedupon,toprovideprofessionalconsultationorservices.

From: Fuller, Linda
Sent: Wednesday, March 20, 2013 1:50 PM
To: Trebisacci, Dave
Cc: Baio, Debbie; Peterson, Cheryl
Subject: Scope for FAE-NSF
Dave
IhaveaproposeddocumentscopeforthenewFAENSF,butnotacommitteescope.Couldyou,theCC/TCchairswork
onascopeandbringittotheCouncilforapproval.Hereisacopyoftheproposeddocumentscope.
PROPOSEDDOCUMENTSCOPE:Thisstandardshallspecifytheminimumrequirementsforthedesign,
performance,testing,andcertificationofnewcompressedbreathingairopencircuitselfcontainedbreathing
apparatus(SCBA)andcompressedbreathingaircombinationopencircuitselfcontainedbreathingapparatus
andsuppliedairrespirators(SCBA/SARs)andforreplacementparts,components,andaccessories.Thisstandard
shallnotapplytoSCBAsforstructuralfirefightingapplicationsasaddressedbyNFPA1981.
LindaFuller
Manager,Codes&StandardsAdministration
NationalFireProtectionAssociation
1BatterymarchPark,Quincy,MA021697471
617.984.7248phone
617.770.3500fax
Attachment 13-8-30
3 of 3
MEMORANDUM
TO: AmyCronin,Secretary,NFPAStandardsCouncil
LindaFuller,RecordingSecretary,NFPAStandardsCouncil
FROM: DavidTrebisacci,StaffLiaison
DATE: July16,2013
SUBJECT: FAENSFTechnicalCommitteeNameandScopeChangeRequest
TechnicalCommitteeChairBrianMontgomeryandCorrelatingCommitteeChairWilliamHaskellrequest
thattheStandardsCouncilapprovethefollowingtechnicalcommitteescopechange,technical
committeenamechangeandacronymchange.
1. Change(fromversionsubmitted5/7/2013)theFAENSFTechnicalCommitteeScopeasfollows:
ThisCommitteeshallhaveprimaryresponsibilityfordocumentsonrespiratoryequipment,
includingbreathingair,foremergencyresponsepersonnelotherthanthoseinvolvedinstructural
firefightingoperations,duringincidentsinvolvinghazardousoroxygendeficientatmospheres.
Thesetypesofoperationsincludetacticallawenforcement,confinedspace,andhazardous
materialsresponseoperations.ThisCommitteeshallalsohaveprimaryresponsibilityfor
documentsontheselection,careandmaintenanceofrespiratoryequipmentandsystemsby
emergencyservicesorganizationsandpersonnel.
2. ChangethenameofthecommitteefromTechnicalCommitteeonNonStructuralSCBAto
TechnicalCommitteeonTacticalandSpecialOperationsRespiratoryProtectionEquipment
Thankyouforyourconsideration.
CC: BrianMontgomery,FAENSFTCChair
BillHaskell,CCChair,FAEAACCorrelatingCommitteeonFireandEmergencyServicesProtective
Clothing

Page 1 of 1
Item 13-8-31
1
Fuller, Linda
From: Chase, Barry
Sent: Monday, J une 17, 2013 2:34 PM
To: Fuller, Linda
Cc: Nathaniel Addleman (naddleman@haifire.com)
Subject: NFPA 10 Cycle Change
Linda,
OnbehalfofNatAddleman,ChairoftheTechnicalCommitteeonPortableFireExtinguishers(PFEAAA),Iamrequesting
apermanentcyclechangeforNFPA10.ThedocumentiscurrentlyinathreeyearcycleandisscheduledtoentertheFall
2015cycle.Wewouldliketomoveittoafouryearcycle,beginningwiththeFall2016.
WewouldlikethistobeconsideredattheJuly30August1Councilmeeting.Ifyouneedanythingfurtherfromme,
pleaseletmeknow.
Thankyou.
BarryD.Chase
FireProtectionEngineer
NFPA
1BatterymarchPark
Quincy,MA021697471
Office:(617)9847259
bchase@nfpa.org


Attachment 13-8-31
1 of 4

TECHNICAL COMMITTEE ON
LIQUID FUEL BURNING EQUIPMENT

MEMORANDUM

TO: Linda Fuller


DATE: June 4, 2013

SUBJECT: Request to Change Document Revision Cycle NFPA 31
_________________________________________________________________________________

Linda:

The Technical Committee on Liquid Fuel Burning Equipment requests a change to their scheduled document
revision cycle from the Fall 2014 cycle to the Fall 2015 cycle, to include a reopening of Call for Public Input.

The Technical Committee has been without a Chair for some time, during which no meetings were held.
A new Chair, Roland Riegel, UL LLC has just been appointed.

Mr. Riegel and I have discussed the current workload and two proposed Task Group efforts that need to be
done:

Combustion Venting Tables. This will be a major effort, one that has been in the planning stages
since the last document revision cycle.

Fuel Oil Tank Anchoring. This is a new topic that has arisen because of the impact of Hurricane
Sandy and the many cases of contamination there from, because of dislodged fuel oil tanks.

Initially in my earlier conversation with you, we discussed a rescheduling from Fall 2014 to Annual 2015. In
discussion with Mr. Riegel, we concluded this was not realistic, given the estimated time needed to address
the venting issue. (See Email from Mr. Riegel to me, dated 5/30/2013.)

Please add this request to the Agenda for the July/August Standards Council meeting.

If you have any questions, please call me at extension 7433.

rpb/

cc RRiegel
DMatthews
LPI/CORR
Stds. Cncl. File
Attachment 13-8-31
2 of 4

TECHNICAL COMMITTEE ON
INTERNAL COMBUSTION ENGINES

MEMORANDUM

TO: Linda Fuller


DATE: April 25, 2013

SUBJECT: Revision Cycle for NFPA 37
_________________________________________________________________________________

Linda:

The Technical Committee on Internal Combustion Engines (NFPA 37), at its March 5 & 6, 2013 meeting,
voted unanimously to recommend to the NFPA Standards Council that its revision cycle be changed from a
regular four-year interval to a three-year interval. They also voted to recommend that the next document
revision cycle for this standard be the Fall 2016 cycle.

Please place this item on the Agenda for the next Standards Council meeting (July 2013).

rpb/

cc INT/CORR
SC Folder
Attachment 13-8-31
3 of 4

Phone 617-770-3000 - Fax 617-770-0700 www.nfpa.org

NFPA96(VENAAA)TECHNICALCOMMITTEECOMMERCIAL
COOKINGHOODS
TO:LindaFuller
FROM:SandraStanekStaffLiaison
DATE:April23,2013
SUBJECT:RequesttoChangeDocumentRevisionCycle
FromAnnual2016toFall2016
TheChairmanfortheTechnicalCommitteeonCommercialCookingHoodsrequestsachangeto
thescheduleddocumentrevisioncycleforNFPA96StandardforVentilationControlandFire
ProtectionofCommercialCookingOperationsfromtheAnnual2016totheFall2016cycle.
SandraStanek
StaffLiaison
Attachment 13-8-31
4 of 4
New Project Initiation Form
(To be completed by proponent of new project/document)
Additional pages may be attached if necessary.
a. Explain the Scope of the new project/document:
This document would provide a test method to evaluate fire/ignition resistance of upholstered furniture
subject to a flaming ignition source.
b. Provide an explanation and any evidence of the need for the new project/document:
The State of California publishes Technical Bulletin 117, Requirements, Test Procedure and Apparatus for
Testing the Flame Retardance of Resilient Filling Materials Used in Upholstered Furniture, which
previously included a test method for evaluating fire resistance of upholstered furniture when exposed to an
open flame ignition source. The California Bureau of Home Furnishings and Thermal Insulation has
proposed the removal of the small open flame test requirement. Organizations have argued that requiring
an open flame test will result in the continued use of fire retardant chemicals that can cause health
problems.

NFPA currently publishes two upholstered furniture test methods, NFPA 260, Standard Methods of Tests
and Classification System for Cigarette Ignition Resistance of Components of Upholstered Furniture and
NFPA 261, Standard Method of Test for Determining Resistance of Mock-Up Upholstered Furniture
Material Assemblies to Ignition by Smoldering Cigarettes. Both of these standards use cigarettes as an
ignition source, representing smoldering ignition. NFPAs research proves that smoldering ignition only
represents 45% of the fire deaths associated with upholstered furniture. None of the leading U.S. SDOs for
fire testing currently publish a test method to evaluate upholstered furniture subject to open flame ignition
sources, leaving a gap in the industry.

NFPA conducted an analysis
1
of national statistics regarding upholstered furniture related fire losses. The
analysis found that upholstered furniture is the leading item involved in home fire deaths, accounting for
24% of all home fire deaths in recent years. Of those deaths, 45% is attributed to cigarette ignition, 10% is
attributed to small open flame ignition and 21% can be attributed to flaming ignition from another burning
item. The other 24% are ignitions that are an unknown mix of smoldering and flaming, such as arching or
overheating from operating equipment.

1
WilliamM. Pitts, Summary and Conclusions of a Workshop on Quantifying the Contribution of Flaming Residential Upholstered Furniture to Fire
Losses in the United States, NIST Technical Note 1757, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD, 2012.

c. Identify intended users of the new project/document:
Upholstered furniture manufacturers, testing laboratories
d. Identify individuals, groups and organizations that should review and provide input on the need for the
proposed new project/document; and provide contact information for these groups:

NFPA Fire Test Committee, NFPA 101/NFPA 5000 Residential Occupancies Technical Committee,
NFPA 101/NFPA 5000 Interior Finish Technical Committee, NFPA 1 Fire Code Technical Committee
e. Identify individuals, groups and organizations that will be or could be affected, either directly or indirectly,
by the proposed new project/document, and what benefit they will receive by having this new document
available:
The NFPA 101/NFPA 5000 technical committees on Interior Finish and Residential Occupancies and the
NFPA 1 technical committee could reference this new standard as a requirement for upholstered furniture
in residential occupancies. Both the TCs on Interior Finish and Residential Occupancies have reviewed this
proposal. Neither TC opposed the development of this document.
f. Identify other related documents and projects on the subject both within NFPA and external to NFPA:

NFPA 260, Standard Methods of Tests and Classification System for Cigarette Ignition Resistance of
Components of Upholstered Furniture
NFPA 261, Standard Method of Test for Determining Resistance of Mock-Up Upholstered Furniture
Material Assemblies to Ignition by Smoldering Cigarettes
TB 117, Requirements, Test Procedure and Apparatus for Testing the Flame Retardance of Resilient
Filling Materials Used in Upholstered Furniture
Consumer Product Safety Commission - Furniture Flammability Standards
ASTM Committee E-5, Fire Tests
BS 5852, Methods of Test for Assessment of the Ignitability of Upholstered Seating by Smouldering and
Flaming Ignition Sources
g. Identify the technical expertise and interest necessary to develop the project/document, and if the
committee membership currently contains this expertise and interest:

The committee membership currently contains the expertise to develop this new standard. The technical
committee informally voted during their last committee meeting (April 2013) to support this project.
h. Provide an estimate on the amount of time needed to develop the new project/document:
Two to three years.

i. Comment on the availability of data and other information that exists or would be needed to substantiate
the technical requirements and other provisions of the proposed new project/ document:
The committee could build on the many years of test data gleaned under the California test program.
Manufacturers of upholstered furniture would be asked to share their research or data on use of alternate
methods to pass a flaming ignition test without the use of FR chemicals.

Please send your request to: Signature:
NFPA
Codes and Standards Administration Name: Barry Badders, Chair of the Fire Tests Committee
1 Batterymarch Park (please print)
Quincy, MA 02169
Stds_admin@nfpa.org Affiliation:
Rev. 10/09
To:AmyCronin,SecretarytotheNFPAStandardsCouncil
FROM:NancyPearce,StaffLiaisontoCNSAAA
DATE:July22,2013
SUBJECT:ReleaseofPreliminaryDraftforNFPA350andRequestedRevisionCycle
CC:DonEnglish,GuyR.Colonna,LindaFuller,JoanneGoyette
DearAmy,
OnbehalfoftheTechnicalCommitteeonConfinedSpaceSafeWorkPractices,Iamsubmittingarequest
fortheNFPAStandardsCounciltoreleasethePreliminaryDraftforNFPA350,GuideforSafeConfined
SpaceEntryandWork.Therequestissupportedbytheresultsofthecommitteeballot,attached.The
technicalcommitteerequeststhattheproposedNFPA350beenteredintotheFall2015revisioncycle.
Pleaseletmeknowifyouneedanyfurtherinformation.
Sincerely,
NancyPearce
StaffLiaison

M E M O R A N D U M

TO: NFPA Technical Committee on Confined Space Safe Work Practices
FROM: J oanne Goyette, Administrator, Technical Projects
DATE: J uly 22, 2013
SUBJECT: NFPA 350 TC Final Results on Release of Draft

The Final Results of the NFPA 350 Release of Draft are as follows:
1 Not Returned (R. Stamps)
23 Affirmatives (D. deVries and R. Kraus, w/Comment)
2 Negatives (H. Cohen and J. Norris)
0 Abstentions

According to the final ballot results, the ballot item received the necessary simple majority
affirmative votes required to pass ballot.

Final ballot comments are attached for your review. Ballots received from alternate members are
not included unless ballot from the principal member was not received.
1
BestPracticesGuideforConfinedSpaceEntry
NFPA350
May7,2013
BestPracticesGuideforSafeConfinedSpaceEntryandWork
Chapter1Administration
1.1Scope.
1.1.1Thisguideisintendedtoprotectworkerswhoenterintoconfinedspacesforinspectionortestingorto
performassociatedworkfromdeathandfromlifethreateningandotherinjuriesorillnessesandtoprotect
facilities,equipment,nonconfinedspacepersonnel,andthepublicfrominjuriesassociatedwithconfined
spaceincidents.
1.1.2Thisguideisnotintendedtoreplaceexistingregulationsandstandardsbutrathertosupplementthem
byprovidingadditionalguidanceforsafeconfinedspaceentryandwork.Existingregulationsandstandards
arereferencedthroughouttheguide,andtheannexesdirectthereadertoregulationsandstandardsthat
mightbeapplicable.
1.1.3Thisguideprovidesbothprescriptiveandperformancebasedguidanceonhowtoidentify,evaluate,
assess,eliminate,andcontrolhazardsthatoccurduringentryorworkinandaroundconfinedspaces.
1.1.4Thisguideaddressesthosefire,explosion,safety,andhealthhazardsthatarecommonlyassociated
withconfinedspaceentry.
1.1.5Thisguideaddressestraining,qualifications,andcompetenciesrequiredforpersonnelresponsiblefor
confinedspacehazardidentification,hazardevaluation,andhazardcontrolaswellasforthosewhoare
workinginandaroundconfinedspaces.
1.1.6Thisguideprovidesbestpracticesforconfinedspacerescue.
1.1.7Thisguideaddressesconfinedspacehazardsandsafepracticesthatarecommoninallindustrieswith
confinedspaces.
1.1.8Thisguideaddresseshazardsadjacenttoconfinedspacesthatmightaffectthesafeconditions
necessaryforentryandworkinthespace.
1.1.9Thisguideprovidescriteriaforcontrolsthateliminateorminimizeconfinedspacehazardsinthedesign
phase.
1.2Purpose.
1.2.1Thepurposeofthisguideistoprovidethebestsafeworkpracticesforthoseworkinginandaround
confinedspaces.Theguidegoesbeyondminimumrequirementsthathavebeenestablishedbyregulations
andstandardsandintendstoprovidethosewhostrivetoachieveahigherlevelofsafetywiththebest
practicesforidentifying,evaluating,andcontrollinghazardsinordertomanagetheriskassociatedwith
confinedspaceactivities.Thisguideisalsointendedtoaddressworkpracticesandproceduresnotfully
coveredorexplainedinexistingregulationsandstandardsrelatedtoconfinedspaceentryandwork.
1.2.2Thisguidealsoservestoreferthereadertootherapplicabledocumentsthatrelatetoparticulartypes
ofindustriesortypeofworkbeingdoneinaconfinedspace.
1.3*Application.Thisguideisintendedtoprovideguidanceforentryintoconfinedspacesregardlessof
location.
1.4HEADING.Thisguideisnotintendedtosupersedeorreplaceanyrequirementsinexistingorfuturecodes,
standards,andregulationsapplicabletoconfinedspaceactivities.
Chapter2ReferencedPublications(Reserved)
2
Chapter3Definitions
3.1General.Thedefinitionscontainedinthischaptershallapplytothetermsusedinthisguide.Whereterms
arenotdefinedinthischapterorwithinanotherchapter,theyshallbedefinedusingtheirordinarilyaccepted
meaningswithinthecontextinwhichtheyareused.MerriamWebstersCollegiateDictionary,11thedition,
shallbethesourcefortheordinarilyacceptedmeaning.
3.2NFPAOfficialDefinitions.
3.2.1Guide.Adocumentthatisadvisoryorinformativeinnatureandthatcontainsonly
nonmandatoryprovisions.Aguidemaycontainmandatorystatementssuchaswhenaguidecanbe
used,butthedocumentasawholeisnotsuitableforadoptionintolaw.3.3GeneralDefinitions.
3.3.1Accident.Anunplannedoccurrence,whichresultsinalosssuchasunintendedinjury,illness,death,
propertydamage,ordamagetotheenvironment.[1521,2015]
3.3.2Accidents.Unplannedeventsthatresultininjuriesordamagethatinterruptsroutineoperations.
3.3.3*AcceptableEntryConditions.Conditionsthathavemetallentryrequirementsspecifiedintheconfined
spaceprogramandallentryconditionslistedonthepermit.
3.3.4Adjacentspace.Thosespacesinalldirectionsfromsubjectspace,includingpointsofcontact,internal
andexternal,suchasdecks,sumps,floatingroofs,secondarycontainmentareas,interstitialspaces,under
floors,supports,tanktops,andbulkheads.[326,2015]
3.3.5CompetentPerson.Someonewhoisdesignatedinwritingandwhoiscapableofidentifyingexistingand
predictablehazardsinthesurroundingsorworkingconditionsthatareunsanitary,hazardous,ordangerous
toemployees,andwhohasauthorizationtotakepromptcorrectivemeasurestoeliminatethem.[1006,
2013]
3.3.6*ConfinedSpace.Aspacethat(1)islargeenoughandsoconfiguredthatapersoncanbodilyenterand
performassignedwork;(2)haslimitedorrestrictedmeansforentryorexit;and(3)isnotdesignedfor
continuousemployeeoccupancy.
3.3.7ConfinedSpaceRescueService.TheconfinedspaceRescueTeamdesignatedbytheauthorityhaving
jurisdiction(AHJ)torescuevictimsfromwithinconfinedspaces,includingoperationalandtechnicallevelsof
industrial,municipal,andprivatesectororganizations.
3.3.8ConfinedSpaceRescueTeam.Acombinationofindividualstrained,equipped,andavailabletorespond
toconfinedspaceemergencies.
3.3.9*Explosionproof.Referringtoapparatusenclosedinacasethatiscapableofwithstandinganexplosion
ofaspecifiedgasorvaporthatmightoccurwithinitandofpreventingtheignitionofaspecifiedgasorvapor
surroundingtheenclosurebysparks,flashes,orexplosionofthegasorvaporwithinandthatoperatesat
suchanexternaltemperaturethatasurroundingflammableatmospherewillnotbeignitedthereby.
3.3.10Hazard.Biological,chemical,mechanical,electrical,atmospheric,environmental,orphysicalagentthat
hasorcanhavethepotentialtoresultininjury,illness,propertydamage,orinterruptionofaprocessoran
activityintheabsenceofacontrolmeasure.
3.3.11HazardEvaluation.Atwostepprocessofidentifyinghazardsorpotentialhazardsandthen
determiningtheriskofeachhazardidentified.
3.3.12HazardIdentification.Thedeterminationofpresentandpotentialphysical,chemical,atmospheric,
mechanical,electrical,andbiologicalhazardsinandaroundaconfinedspace.
3.3.13HotWork.Workinvolvingburning,welding,orasimilaroperationthatiscapableofinitiatingfiresor
explosions.[51B,2013]
3
3.3.14IntrinsicallySafe.Typeofprotectionwhereanysparkorthermaleffectisincapableofcausingignition
ofamixtureofflammableorcombustiblematerialinairunderprescribedtestconditions.[70,2014].
3.3.15*JobHazardAnalysis(JHA).Asafetymanagementriskassessment(RA)techniquethatisusedto
defineandcontrolthehazardsassociatedwithaprocess,job,orprocedure.Anyjobthathasactualor
potentialhazardsisacandidateforaJHA.
3.3.16Maintenance.Theroutinerecurringworkrequiredtokeepafacility(plant,building,structure,ground
facility,utilitysystem,orotherrealproperty)orequipmentinsuchconditionthatitcanbecontinuously
utilized,atitsoriginalordesignedcapacityandefficiency,foritsintendedpurpose.
3.3.17Periodic.Occurringorrecurringatregularpredeterminedorspecifiedintervals.
3.3.18*PermitRequiredConfinedSpace(PermitSpace).Aconfinedspacethathasoneormoreofthe
followingcharacteristics:
(1) Containsorhasthepotentialtocontainahazardousatmosphere
(2) Containsamaterialthathasthepotentialforengulfinganentrant
(3) Hasaninternalconfigurationsuchthatanentrantcouldbetrappedorasphyxiatedbyinwardly
convergingwallsorbyafloorthatslopesdownwardandtaperstoasmallercrosssection
(4) Containsanyotherrecognizedserioussafetyorhealthhazard
3.3.19QualifiedPerson.Apersonwho,bypossessionofarecognizeddegree,certificate,professional
standing,orskill,andwho,byknowledge,training,andexperience,hasdemonstratedtheabilitytodealwith
problemsrelatingtoaparticularsubjectmatter,thework,ortheproject.[326,2015]
3.3.20RescueAttendant.Apersonwhoisqualifiedtobestationedoutsideaconfinedspacetomonitor
rescueentrants,summonassistance,andperformnonentryrescues.
3.3.21RescueEntrant.Apersonenteringaconfinedspaceforthespecificpurposeofrescue.
3.3.22RetrievalSystem.Combinationsofrescueequipmentusedfornonentry(external)rescueofpersons
fromconfinedspaces.
3.3.23Risk.Theprobabilitythatasubstanceorsituationwillproduceharmunderspecifiedconditions.Riskis
acombinationoftwofactors:(1)theprobabilitythatanadverseeventwilloccurand(2)theseverityofthe
consequencesoftheadverseevent.
3.3.24RiskAssessment.Aprocessforsystematicallyevaluatingriskthatconsiderstheseverityof
consequencesandthelikelihoodthattheadverseeventwilloccur.
3.3.25Ventilation.Thechangingofairwithinacompartmentbynaturalormechanicalmeans.Ventilation
canbeachievedbyintroductionoffreshairtodilutecontaminatedairorbylocalexhaustofcontaminated
air.[302,2015]

4
Chapter4IdentificationofConfinedSpacesWithinaWorkplace
4.1HEADING.Theowner/operatorortheonsitecontractor/subcontractorperformingworkshouldevaluate
theentirefacility,including,butnotlimitedto,detachedbuildings,structures,sewersanddrainage,trenches;
tanks,vesselsandcontainers,tunnels,andpropertygroundstodetermineifthereareconfinedspaces
presentthatareconfiguredsotheycouldbeenteredbyemployees,contractors,thepublic,orvisitorstothe
facility.
4.2HEADING.Allconstructionsitesshouldbeevaluatedasindicatedinthefacilityorcontractorconfined
spaceprogramtodetermineifconfinedspacescouldbepresentorcreatedatanytimeduringvarious
constructionphases.
4.3HEADING.Spacesthatshouldbeevaluatedtodetermineiftheycouldbeconfinedspacesincludethose
thatapersoncouldenterbodilyandthathavebothofthefollowingcharacteristics
(1) Havelimitedorrestrictedmeansforentryandexit.Anyspacethatrequiresaladdertoaccessorrequires
aworkertocrawlorcontorthis/herbodytoentercouldbeaconfinedspace.Nonstandardstaircases
suchasspiralstairsorshipsladderscouldalsobeconsideredtohavelimitedaccessorrestrictedmeans
egress.Oftenthesespacesarelocatedbelowgradeorrequiredescentintoaspace.Therearealso
confinedspaces,suchaswatertanks,HVACsystems,andwindturbinesthataretypicallylocatedabove
ground.
(2) Arenotdesignedforcontinuoushumanoccupancy.Thesearespaceswhereemployeeswouldnot
normallybeassignedforwork.Theyarespaceswhereadesk,computer,orphonewouldnotbeplaced
butthatmightneedtobeenteredfornonroutineinspection,maintenance,orrepairwork.Utilityvaults,
crawlspaces,tanks,andbelowgradestructuresareexamplesofspacesthattypicallyarenotdesignedfor
continuoushumanoccupancy.Therearealsostructuresthatmightbeconfinedspacesthatneedtobe
workedoninternallyduringconstruction,suchasapipeoratankthatneedstobewelded.
4.4HEADING.Allconfinedspacesshouldbepostedwithsigns,tags,orlabelsdenotingthemasconfined
spacesandprohibitingentrytounauthorizedentrants.Infacilitieswithmultiple,recognizableconfined
spaces,(suchasstoragetankfacilitieswithmultipletanksorworkplaceswithmultiplemanholes),theowner
canidentifysuchspaceswithfacilitysignageandidentifythespacesintheirwrittenconfinedspaceprogram
inlieuofindividualsignsorlabels.Signsshouldhavethefollowing(orsimilar)wording:
DANGERTHISISACONFINEDSPACE.
DONOTENTERWITHOUTPERMIT
FROMCONFINEDSPACEENTRYSUPERVISOR.
4.5HEADING.Allconfinedspacesshouldbelocked,guarded,protected,orbarricadedtoprevent
unauthorizedentrywhenentryoperationsarenotinprogress.
4.6*HEADING.Allemployeeswhoworkoffsiteinafacilityoratalocationwheretheycouldexpecttoworkin
oraroundconfinedspacesshouldbeinformedofthepresence,location,andnatureofsuchspacesand
shouldbeprovidedwithconfinedspaceawarenesstraining(TBD

5
Chapter5General
5.1*HEADING.Thetermsconfinedspace,nonpermitrequiredconfinedspace,andpermitrequiredconfined
spacecancausesomeconfusionamongemployersandworkers.Toeliminatesuchconfusion,thisguideuses
onlythetermconfinedspaceandmakesprovisionsforevaluatingthehazardsofandissuingpermitsforall
confinedspacesentriesregardlessofwhethertheevaluationshowsmultiplehazardsornohazardsatall.*
5.1.1AllconfinedspaceshavethepotentialtobecomeanOSHAdefinedpermitrequiredconfinedspace,
dependingontheworkbeingperformedandtheinherent,potential,orintroducedhazardsinthespaceat
thetimeoftheentry.Whileproceduresrequiredtosafelyenteraconfinedspacevarywidely,thesamebasic
evaluationofthehazardswithinthosespacesshouldbedonepriortoandduringentry.Allconfinedspaces
shouldbeevaluatedinaccordancewiththeguidelinesinChapter6andChapter7,andallhazardsshouldbe
eliminatedorcontrolledtoanacceptablelevelinaccordancewiththeguidelinesinChapter8andChapter9.
5.1.2Table5.1.2showstheterminologyusedinOSHA29CFR1910.146,ANSIZ117.1,API2015/2016,and
thisguide.
Table5.1.2TerminologyforConfinedSpaceEntryinVariousStandardsandDocuments
StandardorDocument TermUsed TermUsedinNFPA350 Comments
29CFR1910.146 Confinedspace Confinedspace NFPA350usesthesame
definitionasOSHAfora
confinedspace.
29CFR1910.146 Permitrequired
confinedspace
Confinedspace NFPA350doesnot
distinguishbetweenpermit
requiredconfinedspaces
andconfinedspaces.All
confinedspacesneed
permitsforentry.
ANSIASSEZ117 Nonpermitconfined
space
Confinedspace Allconfinedspacesneed
permitsforentry.Ifno
hazardsareidentifiedand
nohazardswillbe
introduced,thenno
restrictionswillbelistedon
thepermitforentry.
29CFR1910.146 Reclassification
(downgraded)entry
Confinedspaceentry NotdefinedinNFPA350.A
confinedspacewithhazards
thathavebeencompletely
eliminatedwillhaveno
restrictionsplacedonthe
authorization/permitfor
entry.
29CFR1910.146 Alternateprocedures Confinedspaceentry NotdefinedinNFPA350.A
6
entry confinedspacewhereall
hazardshavebeen
evaluatedandtheonly
hazardisapotentially
hazardousatmospherethat
isbeingcontrolledwith
effectiveventilation.Inthis
casethepermitwouldbe
issuedforentrythat
containsrestrictions
requiringventilationand
continuousmonitoring.
API2015/2016 Nonconfinedspace(a
confinedspacethatis
nolongeraconfined
spacedueto
reconfiguration)
None Ifaspacedoesnotmeetall
thespecificationsfora
confinedspace,thenitisnot
aconfinedspaceandNFPA
350doesnotapply.
NFPA326 Nonconfinedspace
(forpurposesoftank
entry,cleaning,or
repair,aspacethat
previouslywasa
confinedspacebutno
longermeetsanyof
therequirementsfora
confinedspaceora
permitrequired
confinedspace,such
asatankwithalarge
doorsheetcutintothe
side)
None Ifaspacedoesnotmeetall
thespecificationsfora
confinedspace,thenitisnot
aconfinedspaceandNFPA
350doesnotapply.
5.2HEADING.AwrittenconfinedspaceprogramthatmeetstheguidelinesofChapter12shouldbe
developedforeveryfacilitythathasoneormoreconfinedspaces.
5.3HEADING.Apermitshouldbeissuedbythedesignatedentrysupervisorforallconfinedspacesin
accordancewithChapter13.Thepermitcanbebasic,withlimitedguidelinesandrestrictions,oritcanbea
complexpermitwithmultipleguidelinesandrestrictionsestablishedforentryandwork.Areclassified(29
CFR1910.146)confinedspace,inwhichallhazardshavebeeneliminatedandtheworkwillnotcreatenew
hazards,wouldhaveapermitissuedwithoutrestrictions.Analternateprocedures(29CFR1910.146)entry
wouldbeequivalenttoaspaceinwhichtheonlyhazardfoundisahazardousorpotentiallyhazardous
atmosphere.Inthosecases,thepermitwouldindicatethatallothersafetyhazardshavebeenevaluatedor
eliminatedandthattheonlyrestrictionisentrywithcontinuousventilation.(SeeChapter13.)
5.4HEADING.Entrybyemployeesshouldtakeplaceonlyafterthecompetententrysupervisorhasindicated
thatacceptableentryconditionsasindicatedinSection5.5and8.2.1havebeenmetandafterapermithas
beenissued.
5.5HEADING.Priortoentry,thefollowingcriteriashouldbemet:
7
(1) Allinherent,potential,introduced,andadjacenthazardsoftheconfinedspaceshouldbeidentifiedand
evaluatedinaccordancewiththewrittenconfinedspaceentryprogramandguidanceprovidedin
Chapters6and7.
(2) AllhazardsshouldbeeliminatedorcontrolledinaccordancewithChapters8and9.
(3) AnauthorizedentrysupervisorwhoistrainedinaccordancewithChapter11hasbeenassignedto
overseethework.
(4) AnauthorizedentrantwhoistrainedandqualifiedinaccordancewithChapter11hasbeenassignedto
enterthespace
(5) AcompetentattendantwhoistrainedandqualifiedinaccordancewithChapter11hasbeenassigned.
(6) Ifgasmonitoringisnecessaryaccordingtothepermit,aqualifiedgasmonitoringspecialistwhoistrained
inaccordancewithChapter11hasbeenassigned.Thispersoncanbetheattendant,entrysupervisor,or
otherperson,suchasafacilityorcontractoremployeeprovidedthisindividualisqualifiedinaccordance
withChapter11guidelines.
(7) Ifventilationisrequiredaccordingtothepermit,aqualifiedVentilationSpecialistwhoistrainedin
accordancewithChapter11shouldbeassigned.Thispersoncanbetheattendant,theentrysupervisor,
orotherpersonsuchasafacilityorcontractoremployee,providedtheindividualisqualifiedin
accordancewithChapter11guidelines.
(8) Ifenergyorothersourcesexistthatmustbeisolatedorcontrolledaccordingtothepermit,aqualified
isolationspecialisttrainedinaccordancewithChapter11shouldbeassigned.Thispersoncanbethe
attendant,theentrysupervisor,astandbyworker,orentrantifqualifiedinaccordancewithChapter11
guidelines.
(9) Rescueequipmentand/orservicesshouldbeavailableinaccordancewiththepermitandtheguidelines
providedinChapter10.
(10) Otherrequiredpermits,suchashotwork,areissuedbythepermitissuer.
(11) ApermitshouldbeissuedandsignedbythePermitIssuerandentrysupervisorinaccordancewith
Chapter13.
(12) Apreentrymeetingshouldbeheldwithallpersonnelwhowillbeenteringorworkinginoradjacentto
thespacetodiscusstheworktobeperformed,jobrequirementsandassignments,actualandpotential
hazards,andmethodsofeliminatingorcontrollingthehazardsaslistedintheconditionsonthepermit.
(13) Communicationbetweentheentrantandtheattendantshouldbeestablishedinaccordancewith
Chapter8.
(14) Entryshouldnotoccuruntilallconditionsforentryestablishedonthepermitaremet.
5.6RolesandResponsibilities.EveryworkplacethathasoneormoreconfinedspacesasidentifiedinChapter
4thatwillbeenteredshouldhavepersonnelassignedtoperformtheresponsibilitiesoffollowingrolesas
applicable:
(1) Owner/operatorand/orcontractor/subcontractor
(2) Entrant
(3) Attendant
(4) EntrySupervisor
(5) PermitIssuer
(6) GasTester
(7) VentilationSpecialist
(8) Rescuer(couldbeattendantfornonentryrescue)
(9) RescueTeam
(10) StandbyWorker
(11) IsolationSpecialist
5.7TrainingGuidelines.
8
5.7.1Employers(owners/operators)andcontractorsshouldensurethatallemployeesengagedinconfined
spaceactivitieshavethenecessaryunderstanding,knowledge,andskillsandareabletosafelyperformtheir
assignedduties.
5.7.2Employers(owners/operators)andcontractorsshouldensurethatallemployeesengagedinconfined
spaceactivitieswhoareassignedthedutiesoftheroleslistedinSection5.6havebeentrainedasfollows:
(1) Priortobeginningtheinitialassignmenttotheirworkorduties
(2) Beforeachangeinassignmenttoadifferenttypeofworkorduties
(3) Wheneverthereisachangeinoperations,procedures,orguidelinesthathasthepotentialtopresenta
hazardforwhichtheemployeehasnotbeenpreviouslytrainedoreducated
(4) Wheneveranemployer(owner/operator)orcontractorhasreasontobelieveanemployeerequires
retrainingoradditionaleducationduetoinadequaciesintheemployeesperformanceorskillorbecause
theemployeedeviatesfromtheconfinedspaceprogramorestablishedprocedures
5.8TrainingVerification.Employers(owners/operators)andcontractorsshouldverify,inwriting,that
employeeshavebeentrained,asrequired,andtheverificationshouldbeavailableforinspectionby
employeesandtheirdesignatedrepresentatives.Theverificationshouldcontainthenamesoftheemployees
trained;themeansusedtodeterminethattheemployeesunderstandingthetraining;thesignature,name,or
initialsofthetrainer(s);thetrainingsubjectsandcontent;andthedate(s)thetrainingwasconducted,in
accordancewithChapter11.

9
Chapter6IdentificationofHazardsInandAroundConfinedSpaces
6.1General.
6.1.1Workinandaroundconfinedspacesingeneralishazardous,andconditionscanchangesignificantly
withlittleornowarning.Researchandpreplanningarenecessarytoensurethatconfinedspacesare
recognizedandthathazardsareidentifiedandevaluated.Additionally,theanticipationofpotentialhazards
beyondthosecurrentlypresentshouldcontinuethroughouttheworkevolution.
6.1.2Workerscanbecomequitefamiliarwiththespace(s)inwhichtheyoperate.Likewise,workcanbe
routineandrepetitive,andcomplacencycanensuewithcontinualuneventfulentries.Whileknowledgeofthe
spaceandequipmentcanbehelpfulwhenpreplanningwork,itdoesnotlessenthevigilanceneededtoenter,
workin,andexitaconfinedspacesafely.Thespaceshistoryandprioruseshouldbeconsideredin
anticipationofhazards,buteachentryshouldbeconsideredanindividualandunrelatedevent.
6.1.3Identifyinghazardsinaroundaconfinedspaceisathreestageprocess:
(1) Theanticipationorpreplanstagestartswithasizingupofpotentialhazardsandtheidentificationof
resourcesthatmightbeneededtoworkinandaroundconfinedspaces.
(2) Thehazardidentificationstageconfirmsanticipatedhazardsandrecognizesadditionalpotentialhazards.
(3) (3)Thehazardevaluationstagedeterminestheriskofeachhazardidentified.
6.1.4Afterallhazardshavebeenidentifiedandriskshavebeenassessed,controlsshouldbeimplementedin
accordancewithChapter8.
6.2HazardAnticipation/Preplan.Manyhazardscanbeanticipatedbeforeworkbeginsbythepreplanning
process,whichconsistsofathoroughanalysisofthespace,itspurpose,thesystemscontainedwithinit,and
thescopeofworknecessitatingtheentry.Preplanningcanidentifypotentialhazardsandresourcesthat
mightbeneededtoworkinandaroundconfinedspacesandtopreventadverseconsequencesrelatedtothe
work.Therearetwomaincomponentstothepreplanningstage:intelligencegatheringandresource
identification.
6.2.1Hazardpreplanningstartswiththecollectionofinformationthatcouldbeusefulpriortostartingwork.
Thisintelligencegatheringincludes,butisnotlimitedto,usingpreviouslypreparedhazardsurveys,preplans,
schematics,blueprints,workorders,equipmentguides,safetydatasheets,manuals,controlmeasures,and
priorexperiencefrompreviousentriesandknowledgefromworkersfamiliarwiththespace.Likewise,its
operationsandtheprocessareaassociatedwiththeentrymightbehelpfulintheanticipationand
identificationofhazards.
6.2.2Onceintelligencehasbeengathered,potentiallyrequiredresourcescanbeidentified,includingthe
following:
(1) Instrumentation(e.g.,airmonitoringequipment,electricaltesters)
(2) Controls
(a) Engineeringcontrols(e.g.,ventilationhardware,lighting,linebreaking/blanking)
(b) Administrativecontrols[e.g.,additionalpermits,hotwork,lockouttagout(LOTO),personnelneeds]
(3) Personalprotectiveequipment(PPE)(e.g.,hardhats,respirators,chemicalprotectiveclothing,safety
boots)
(4) Outsideresources(e.g.,technicalspecialists,rescueservices,specializedequipment)
6.3HazardIdentification.
6.3.1Hazardidentification,whichisdoneatthesiteoftheconfinedspace,verifiesanticipatedhazardsand
identifiesnewones.Itisdonebyconductingareviewofthespacesdocumentation(e.g.,safetydatasheets
forcargothatthespaceheld),avisualinspection,andatmosphericmonitoring.Thevisualinspectionshould
beconductedaroundtheexteriorofthespaceandtheninallareaswithinthespace.Duringtheinspection,
allpostedwarningsignsandpermitsshouldbenoted,asshouldanymaterialsorconditionsthatcouldposea
hazard,suchaschemicalresidueorthepotentialforachangeintheatmosphericconditions.Atmospheric
10
monitoring(seeChapter7)shouldbeconductedtodeterminetheatmosphericconditionsinsidethespace
andinitsadjacentspaces.
6.3.2Therearethreesourcesofhazardsthatcanbedirectlyorindirectlyassociatedwithworkinginand
aroundconfinedspaces:hazardsdirectlyassociatedwithconfinedspacesandinherentlypresentinoraround
thespace;theresultofproduct(s)storedinoraroundthespace;ortheresultofprocessestakingplacewithin
ornearthespace.Indirecthazardsarehazardsthatarenotintegraltothespacebutcanstillaffectit.
6.3.3Hazardscanbephysical,mechanical,electrical,chemical,biological,orpsychological.Equal
considerationshouldbegiventopotentialhazardsdirectlyandindirectlyassociatedwiththespace.
6.3.4HazardSources.Hazardsthatdirectlyorindirectlyaffectthespacecanbeinherent,introducedor
adjacent.
6.3.4.1InherentHazards.
6.3.4.1.1Inherenthazardsarethosehazardsthatexistasapermanent,essentialcharacteristic,orattributeof
thespace.Thehazardidentificationstageshouldincludewhetherthelocationandconfiguration(including
restrictedaccess,obstructions,orremoteness)couldinhibitorinterferewithmovement,ventilation,escape,
rescue,orfirefighting.
6.3.4.1.2Inherenthazardstobeidentifiedincludethefollowing:
(1) Inaccessibleorlimitedaccessintothespace.Forexample,spaceforwhichladdersorscaffoldingisneeded
toreachtheportal,toenterandexitthespace,ortoperformworktherein.Elevatedspacesrequire
differentconsiderationsforentryandrescuethanthosethatareatgroundlevel,includingfallprotection.
(2) Sizeandshapeoftheportal.Forexample,therestrictivenatureofsomeportalsmakesaccesswith
certaintypesofPPEdifficultorimpossibleorrequiresentrantstocontorttheirbodieswhileenteringor
exiting.Likewise,anopen,unprotectededgeorportalcancreateafallhazard.
(3) Sizeandshapeofthespace/vessel.Forexample,inwardlyconvergingwallsorafunnelshapeddischarge
canentrapandsuffocateanentrant;congestedspacescaninhibitmobilityorcreateslip,trip,andfall
hazards.
(4) Productsorprocessesinthespace.Forexample,chemicals,thermalstress,noise,steam,pressurization,
mechanicalequipment,andotheractivitiesassociatedwiththeuseofthespacecancreatehazards.
Additionally,disturbingproductresidueduringentryorworkcanreleaseacontaminantthatproducesa
hazardnotdetectedduringpreentrytesting.
(5) Fixedequipmentwithinthespace.Forexample,pipingsystems,conduits,ducts,machineryorpressurized
lines,andfiresuppressionsystemsshouldbeevaluatedforpotentialhazardsandlockedout/taggedout,
tested,gasfreed,and/orinertedifneededtoreducetherisk.
6.3.4.2IntroducedHazards
6.3.4.2.1Introducedhazardsarehazardsthatarenotnormallyassociatedwiththespacespurposeor
processesbutarebroughtintothespaceoradjoiningarea(s)deliberatelyorinadvertently.Aspartofthe
hazardevaluationandriskassessment,theactionsofentrantsandthematerials,products,andtechniques
usedtogainaccess,enter,inspect,clean,and/orrepairaconfinedspaceshouldbecarefullyconsideredto
ensuretheydonotintroducehazards.Thisalsoincludesanevaluationofworkbeingperformedinthearea(s)
immediatelysurroundingthespace.
6.3.4.2.2Examplesofintroducedhazardsincludethefollowing:
(1) Atmospherichazards.Ventilatingaspacecanintroducecontaminantsfromanillplacedsupplyairductor
drawcontaminatedairfromengineexhaustoroxygendeficientairfromanotherspaceorsource.
Productoffgassingcanbecapturedbyforcedventilationandcontaminateadjacentareas.
(2) Chemicalhazards.Productsusedincleaning,abating,orcoatingneedtobecheckedforreactivitywith
otherchemicalsthatmightbepresent.Chemicalscanalsoproducehazardousvaporsorgasesand/or
displaceorconsumeoxygenduetotheconfinednatureofthespace.
11
(3) Compressedgases.Compressedgassuchasthoseusedforhotworkorfiresuppressionsystemsposea
hazardduetotheircontents(e.g.,toxicorflammablegases),abilitytodisplaceorenrichtheatmospheric
oxygencontent(e.g.,carbondioxidefireextinguishingsystems),andtheirpotentialtobecomea
projectileifdamaged.Compressedgashoses,valves,andregulatorsshouldbethoroughlyinspected,
evaluated,andleakcheckedpriortobeingbroughtintoaconfinedspace.(Note:Duetotheinherent
risks,compressedgascylindersshouldnotnormallybeintroducedintoconfinedspaces.)
(4) Hotwork.Hazardousatmospheresandflammableconditionscanbecreatedbyhotworksuchaswelding,
cutting,grinding,drilling,andburning,whichcanproducefumes,releasegases,depleteorenrichthe
spacesoxygencontent,orproduceanignitionsource,suchassparksfromtheworkorthetoolitself.
(5) Electricalhazards.Electricalequipment,suchaslighting,powertools,andextensioncords,canproduce
electricalshock,triphazards,andignitionsources;evenmonitoringinstrumentationthatisnot
intrinsicallysafecanintroduceanignitionsource.
(6) Slip,tripandfallhazards.Laddersorscaffoldingusedtoreachtheportal,togainentry,orforaccess
insidethespacecanproduceslip,trip,fall,andentanglementhazards.
6.3.4.3AdjacentHazards.
6.3.4.3.1Adjacenthazardsarehazardsorotherconditionsthatmightexistinthearea(s)surroundingthe
space.Adjacenthazardscanalsoinvolveotherspacesthatareinproximitytotheentrysiteandcanpose
significanthazardsthatneedtobeevaluatedseparatelypriortoentry.
6.3.4.3.2Examplesofadjacenthazardsincludethefollowing:
(1) Adjacentspaces.Spacesandvesselsthatshareacommonwall,contacteachotherinanyway,orsharea
surroundingorcoverneedtobeassessedforpossiblehazardsoroperationthatcouldinfluencethe
subjectspaceorviceversa(e.g.,hotwork,compressedgases,machinery).Thisincludesevaluatingareas
inalldirectionsfromthesubjectspacethosethatshareacommonpoint/wall,contact,corners,
diagonals,decks/floors,tanktops,andbulkheads/walls.
(2) Adjacentworkactivities.Personnelactivitiesorworkthatisbeingperformedinnearbyspacesshouldbe
analyzedforeffectsordangersposedtothesubjectentry.
(3) Externalhazards.Areassurroundingthesubjectspaceshouldbeassessedforotherpossibledangersthat
canaffecttheentry.Pedestrianandvehicletraffic,equipment,smokeandexhaust,contaminate
producingactivities,sparking,heatingorcooling,ortransferofproductcanallproducehazards.
6.3.5TypesofHazards.Apreentryevaluationshouldbeconductedforallconfinedspacestodetermineif
hazardsarepresent.Itshouldbeassumedthataconfinedspaceisnotsafeforentryuntilthehazards
(presentorpotential)areidentified,evaluated,andeliminatedorcontrolled.Hazardsinclude,butarenot
limited,tomechanicalhazards,electricalhazards,physicalhazards,chemicalhazards,biologicalhazards,and
psychologicalhazards.
6.3.5.1MechanicalHazards.Thesehazardsarecreatedbyequipmentwithstoredenergy(mechanical,
electrical,pneumatic,orhydraulic)orequipmentthatis/wasenergizedinandaroundthesubjectspace.
Mechanicalhazardshavethepotentialtocrush,burn,cut,shear,stab,orotherwisestrikeorwoundworkers
andincluderotatingorothermovingequipment.Thisequipmentcanbeassociatedwitheithermechanical
processesthattakeplaceinthespaceorothermachineryinthevicinity.
6.3.5.2ElectricalHazards.Thesehazardsarecreatedbyanelectricalcurrent,charge,orfieldcapableof
causinginjury.Allelectricalsourcesshouldbetreatedasapotentialhazard,includinglowvoltagesources.
Lowvoltagedoesnotmeanlowhazard.Ifelectricalhazardsarepresent,theyshouldbeevaluatedbya
qualifiedelectricianastothepotentialriskandcontrolsinaccordancewithNFPA70E.Voltagealonedoesnot
determinetheseverityofandelectricalshock.Thethreefactorsthatdeterminetheseverityofelectrical
shockareasfollows:
(1) Theactualquantityofcurrent(amperes)flowingthroughthebody
(2) Thepathofcurrentthroughthebody
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(3) Thetimethecurrentflowsthroughthebody
6.3.5.2.1Aselectricitytravelsfromitssourceandreturnstothatsource,eitherthroughanotherwireor
throughtheground,itmakesacompletecircuit.Ifanything,suchasahumanbody,comesincontactwiththe
currentcarryingwiresandhaslowerresistancethanthewire,electricitywillfollowthepathofleast
resistance.Note:Arcflashfromenergizedconductorscanproduceintenseblindinglightcapableofburning
entrantsandexplosivehighpressureshockwavesandmoltenmetalprojectiles.
6.3.5.3PhysicalHazards.Thesehazardsincludehazardsotherthanmechanicalorchemicalthatwouldcause
harmtothebody,including,butnotlimitedto,noise,engulfment,falls,wet/slicksurfaces,slip/triphazards,
lighting,radiation,vibration,andextremesoftemperatureandpressure.Physicalhazardsincludeexplosion
andfirehazardscreatedbyvariouschemicalagentssuchasflammableliquids,paints,solvents,andmethane,
aswellascombustiblesettleddustinexcessof1/32in.,andairborneconcentrationsthatimpairvisibilityto
lessthan5ftareindicatorsofpotentialexplosiveconditions.Concentrationofexplosive/flammablevapors
shouldbelessthan10percentofthelowerflammable/explosivelimit(LFL/LEL)forentryintoaworkarea.
Concentrations10percentormoreoftheLFL/LELposeanexplosionhazard.TheLFL/LELcanbemeasured
withaninstrumentconfiguredtomeasureexplosivegases.Note:LFL/LEListhelowestconcentrationofgasor
vaporinairinwhichburningwilltakeplace.
6.3.5.4ChemicalHazards.Thesehazardscanarisefromexposuretoconcentrationsofgases,vapors,mists,
fumes,liquids,ordusts.Routesofexposurearethroughinhalation,absorptionthroughskinormucous
membrane(nose,throat,eyes),oringestion.Allthreeroutesofentryshouldbeconsideredintheevaluation
ofconfinedspacehazards:
(1) Inhalationisthemostcommonwayforatoxicchemicaltoenterthebody.Inhaledmaterialsareinthe
formofafume,dust,gas,mist,orvapor.
(2) Skinabsorptionoccurswhenachemical(suchasasolvent)passesthroughtheskinandentertheblood
stream.Somedustsandmists,likepesticides,candissolveonmoistskinandthenbeabsorbed.
(3) Ingestionoccurswhenworkersdonotwashtheirhandsbeforeeatingorwhentheydrinkbeveragesor
smokeinanareawherehazardouschemicalsareused.
6.3.5.4.1Chemicalhazardsandoxygenlevelscanbemeasuredusingatmosphericmonitoringdevices,suchas
multigasmeters(configuredforthecompoundsofconcern),singlegasmonitors,andcolorimetrictubes.
(1) Systemicpoisonsarematerialsthatdamagehumanorgansorsystems,suchasthekidneys,liver,orcentral
nervoussystem.Commonpoisonsandtoxicchemicalsfoundinoraroundconfinedspacesincludecarbon
monoxidefromincompletecombustion(e.g.,engines)orfires,hydrogensulfidefromdecayingbiological
material(e.g.,rottingfish,seaweed,grains),cleaningoperations(e.g.,toxicvolatileorganiccompounds,
solvents),andweldingfumes(e.g.,heavymetals).
(2) Corrosives are chemicals that cause visible destruction of living tissue at the site of contact. Some
examplesaremuriaticacid,sulfuricacid,andlye.
(3) Irritants are chemicals that are not corrosive but can cause a reversible inflammatory effect on living
tissues.Irritantsaresimilartocorrosives,buttheyareweakerintheireffects.Theirsitesofactionarethe
skin,eyes,andlungs.
(4) Oxygendeficiencyandenrichmentatmospheresarealsohazardous.Thenormalamountofoxygenis20.8
percentto20.9percentintheair.Whenoxygenislowerthan20.8percent,theremightbeachemicalor
processconsumingtheoxygen;whenitishigher,theremightbeasourceofoxygenbeingintroducedto
thespace.Oxygendeficiencycanleadtoatmospheresthatcannotsustainlifeandthatcanbecome
immediatelydangeroustolifeandhealth.Oxygenenrichedatmospheresgreaterthan22percentcan
createafireorexplosionhazard.Oxygendeficiency(lessthan19.5percent)canbecausedbythe
following:
(a) Displacementofoxygenbyothergasesandvaporssuchasinertgasesorbyevaporatingliquids
(b) Rustingmetals,suchasscrapironortankwallcorrosion
(c) Organicdecay(rottingfruit,molasses,edibleoils)
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(d) Curingpaints
6.3.5.5BiologicalHazards.Thesehazardsarecreatedbyviruses,bacteria,fungi,parasites,orotherliving
organismsthatcancausediseaseinhumans.Commonsourcesofbiologicalhazardsincludebodilyfluidsand
waste,insectbitesorstings,rats,snakes,andmicrobialpathogens.Somebiologicalmaterials,suchas
bacteriaandmolds,canbesampledandthenanalyzedatamicrobiallaboratory.Althoughtheresultscan
taketime,thedatacanassistindetermininganddocumentingpotentialexposures.
6.3.5.6PsychologicalHazards.Confinedspaces,restrictedmovement,excessivenoise,andPPErestriction
cancreatepsychologicalhazards.Someentrantscaneasilybecomeclaustrophobicorstressed,whichcan
causethemtohyperventilateandaltertheirabilitytoreasonandmakesounddecisions.
6.4HazardEvaluation.
6.4.1Oncehazardshavebeenidentified,theirriskstoentrantsshouldbeassessed.Ariskassessmentisa
processinwhichtheexpectedseverityofillness,injury,orpropertydamagethatanidentifiedhazardcan
causeiscoupledwiththeprobabilityofthatlevelofhazardoccurring.Ifthelevelofriskisgreaterthanwhat
isacceptable,controlmeasuresshouldbeintroducedtoreducetherisktoanacceptablelevel.Therisk
assessmentenablesprioritizationofcontrolsandlimitedresourcesorcanindicatethatahazardneedstobe
eliminatedinordertoestablishacceptableentryparameters.
6.4.2Acceptableentryparametersteps,ingeneral,areasfollows:
(1) Identifyhazards(throughmonitoring,visualinspections,documentation,etc.).Usingtheinformationin
thischapter,conductathoroughinvestigationofexistingorpotentialhazardsthatcouldposeadangerto
anentrant.Documentfindingsandensurethatworkersknowwhatthehazardsareandwheretheycan
befound.
(2) Conductahazardevaluationtodeterminetherisks.Develophazardscenariosthatdescribethe
environment,possibleexposures,actionsoreventsthatcouldprecipitatethehazard,andtheoutcome
thatwouldoccurshouldithappen.Inotherwords,determinewhatcangowrong,howitcouldgetthat
way,whattheconsequenceswouldbe,andhowlikelytheeventistohappen.Considerationshouldalso
begiventotheentrantsthemselves,sincetheirleveloftraining,experience,andPPEcancontributetoor
createhazardsinandaroundconfinedspaces(e.g.,wearinganencapsulatedsuittopreventskincontact
cancreateaheatstresshazardoveranextendedperiodofuseinahotenvironment.)
(3) *Assessandevaluatetherisks.Conductariskassessmentofthehazards.Thisassessmentcanbe
quantitative,semiquantitative,orqualitativebasedontheneedsofthesituationandtheidentified
hazards.Therearenumerousmethodsforconductingriskassessments;onesuchmethodisoutlinedin
ANSI/AIHAZ102012,OccupationalHealthandSafetyManagementSystems
(4) Prioritizetherisks.Notewhichofthehazardsposethehighestriskandfocusoncontrollingor
eliminatingthosefirst.
(5) Determinecontrolmeasures.Itisalwaysbesttoeliminatehazardswhenpossibleregardlessofthe
probabilityorseverityofthehazard.Ifthatisnotfeasible,thenextbeststrategyistouseengineering
controlstoreduceentrantsexposures.Engineeringcontrolsincludesuchstrategiesaslocalexhaust
ventilationtoremovecontaminants,generaldilutionventilationtosupplyfreshairtothespace,and
substitutionofmaterialssothatchemicalsarenotintroducedorproducedduringworkinthespace.
OthertypesofcontrolmeasuresincludeadministrativecontrolsandPPE.Administrativecontrolsinclude
suchmeasuresaspostingwarningsignsonconfinedspaces;ensuringthatpersonnelaretrainedhowto
identify,evaluate,andcontrolhazards;andinstitutinganorganizationwideconfinedspacesafety
program.PPEisusedwhenengineeringandadministrativecontrolsarenotsufficienttoreduceor
eliminatethehazardsitisthelastcontrolmeasureinthehierarchyofcontrolsbecauseitdoesnot
reduceorremovethehazard.SeeChapter8forhazardeliminationandcontrols.
(6) Verifycontrolmeasures.Ensurethatthecontrolmeasureschosendonotintroduceanotherhazardthat
hasahigherlevelofrisk.Forexample,ifventilationductsblocktheexitforworkers,itcouldbe
determinedthattheriskofnothavingtheventilationoutweighstheriskposedbytheblockedexit.
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(7) Determineifthelevelofriskisacceptable.Determineiftheriskhasbeenreducedtoanacceptablelevel
(asdeterminedbytheorganizationorthesupervisor)withthecontrolmeasureschosen.Forexample,the
riskassessmentmightconcludethatacomplicated,redundantventilationsystemisrequiredforentry.A
facilityinhouseconfinedspaceentryteammightconcludetheyareuncomfortableandunfamiliarwith
implementingsuchasystemanddeterminethattheywillnotcompletetheentry;instead,theyconclude
theriskistoogreatandopttohireaprofessionalcontractor.
(8) Implementandtrain.Afterthecontrolsareimplemented,ensurethatpersonnelinvolvedintheentry
operationsareinformedofthehazards,riskassessmentdeterminations,andchosencontrolmeasures
(andifthosecontrolmeasuresmightposeahazard).
(9) Instituteongoingassessment.Theidentificationandevaluationofhazardsshouldbeanongoingprocess
asconditionsoftenchangeinaconfinedspaceduetoinherent,introducedandadjacenthazards.There
shouldberegularvisualandatmosphericmonitoringofthespacetoensureconditionsdonotchange.
Changingconditionsmayindicatetheneedtoevacuatethespaceandreevaluateit.
6.5Communications.Avital,reiterativepartofreducinghazardsiscommunication.Itstartsafterthe
identificationofhazardsandcommunicatesthemtoallpersonsinvolvedwiththeentryorworkingarounda
confinedspace.
6.5.1Communicationscanbeaccomplishedverbally,throughtheuseofsignsandplacards,onaJobsafety
analysisform,oronthepermititself.Allverbalnotificationofhazardsshouldbedocumentedinwriting.
6.5.2Theauthorizationforentryproceduresshouldoutlinehowcommunicationduringtheentry,workand
exitstageswillbeconducted,ensuringthatauthorizedentrantsandattendantscanmaintaincontactduring
entryandthroughouttheworkshift.Becausevoicecommunicationscanbehamperedbynoise,PPE,
distance,andsoforth,twoformsofcommunicationshouldbe.
6.5.3Therisksandpotentialexposuresoftheentryaswellasthesignsandsymptomsofexposureneedtobe
communicatedtotheentrantandtheattendant.Thesupervisorshouldensurethattheyarefamiliarwith
equipment,suchasPPE,atmospherictestingequipment,alarmsystems,andtherescueequipmentavailable.
6.5.4Entrantsandattendantsshouldhavetheabilitytowitnessandreviewanytestingresultsconducted;if
thatisnotdone,thentheresultsneedtobecommunicatedtothem.
6.5.5Themeansofrescueorrecoveryaswellasthemeansofegressshouldbecommunicatedtoallentrants
andattendants.
6.5.6Thesupervisorneedstoensurethattheattendant(s)hasthemeanstonotifythedesignatedRescue
Team.
6.5.7Allpersonnelinvolvedneedtobeinformedofotherkeyinformationgiventhecircumstancesofthe
particularconfinedspacetoensureemployeesafety.Thisinformationincludes,butisnotlimitedto,
additionalpermits(e.g.,hotwork,electricalwork,lockout/tagout);otherworkbeingperformedinthe
vicinityoftheconfinedspace;forecastedatmosphericconditions;andpastconcernsorissueswiththespace.
6.6Resources.Theresourcesin6.6.1through6.6.5mightbehelpfulinidentificationofhazardsassociated
withconfinedspaces:
6.6.1SafetyDataSheets(SDS).SafetyDataSheetsshouldbeavailableandreviewedforrecentmaterialsthat
previouslyhavebeenstoredorusedinaconfinedspacebeingentered,havebeenusedtopurgeaconfined
spacebeingentered,orarebeingbroughtintothespacebeingentered.
6.6.1.1SafetyDataSheetsshouldbereviewedorevaluatedtodetermine,ataminimum,theflammability,
combustibility,toxicity,asphyxiationhazard,andreactivityofmaterials.
6.6.1.2AllhazardsidentifiedduringtheSDSevaluationshouldberecordedontheconfinedspacepermitin
accordancewithChapter13andevaluatedandcontrolledinaccordancewithChapters7,8,and9
(atmosphericmonitoring,ventilation,andhazardcontrolsections).
15
6.6.2BlueprintsandSchematics.Blueprintsandschematicscanprovideinformationabouttheconstruction
ofthespace,suchasdimensionsanddistances.Theycanfamiliarizetheentrantwithequipmentlocations,
size,powersources,andsafetyfeatures.
6.6.3PlacardsandMarkings.Warningplacardsandmarkingscanprovideentrantswithspecifichazard
warnings,suchasElectrocutionHazard.Theyalsoprovidewarningoftoxinsandchemicalhazards.The
NFPA704markingsystem,whichprovidesawarningofsignificanthazards,shouldbepresentatmost
facilities.
6.6.4DepartmentofTransportationEmergencyResponseGuide.Thisguideisavailableonlineat
http://phmsa.dot.gov/staticfiles/PHMSA/DownloadableFiles/Files/Hazmat/ERG2012.pdf
6.6.5Documentation.SeeChapter13Permits.

16
Chapter7AtmosphericMonitoring.
7.1ProceduresforAtmosphericTesting.Atmospherictestingshouldbedoneusingthecriteriadescribedin
Chapter7priortoanyconfinedspaceentrytodetermineiftheatmosphereissafeforentry.Further
atmosphericmonitoringmightnotbenecessaryafterinitialentrytestingbasedonthepermitrequirements
ofChapter13.Atmospherictestingisperformedforthreedistinctpurposes:
(1) Evaluationtesting(initialhazardevaluation)
(2) Verificationtesting(preentrytesting)
(3) Continuousmonitoringoftheatmospherewithinthespace(SeeSection7.12.)
7.1.1EvaluationTesting.(Note:Evaluationtestingisperformedforthepurposeofinitialhazardevaluation
andhazardidentification.SeeChapter6.)Theatmosphereofaconfinedspaceshouldbetestedusing
equipmentofsufficientsensitivityandspecificitytoidentifyandevaluateanyatmospherichazardsthatcould
existorarise,sothatappropriatepermitentryprocedurescanbedevelopedandacceptableentryconditions
canbestipulatedforthatspace.Evaluationandinterpretationofthedataanddevelopmentofthe
atmosphericmonitoringproceduresnecessaryforentry,shouldbedonebyorreviewedbyatechnically
qualifiedprofessionalsuchasbutnotlimitedtoaCertifiedIndustrialHygienist,CertifiedSafetyProfessional,
orCertifiedMarineChemistbasedonevaluationofallhazards.
7.1.2VerificationTesting(PreEntryTesting).Theatmosphereofaconfinedspaceshouldbetestedforall
hazardouscontaminantsidentifiedbytheevaluationtestingaboveorbythepermitissuerorentrysupervisor
usingappropriateequipmenttodeterminethattheatmosphericconcentrationsatthetimeofentryare
withintherangeofacceptableentryconditionsasdescribedin8.2.1.Resultsoftesting(actualgas
concentrations,etc.)shouldberecordedalongwiththestipulatedacceptableentryconditionsaccordingto
thepermitrecommendationsinChapter13.Alldetectionequipmentshouldbedesignedforthegasesand
vaporsbeingtestedandcertifiedforuseintheenvironmentwhereitisbeingused.Refertomanufacturers
specificationsandhazardouslocationcertifications.
7.1.3Allportablegasmonitoringequipmentusedforconfinedspaceatmospherictestingshouldbeturnedon
andzeroedaccordingtoSection7.9.
7.1.4Allportablegasmonitoringequipmentusedforconfinedspaceatmospherictestingshouldbebump
testedandcalibratedaccordingtoSections7.6and7.7.
7.1.5Ifatmospherictestingisdonefromoutsidethespace,initialtestingshouldbeperformedwithall
ventilationcontrolsturnedofftoensuretestingofastaticatmosphereandtodeterminethebackgroundgas
concentrationlevelsintheeventthatventilationfailsduringtheentry.However,aftertheinitialtestingis
completed,itisacceptabletotesttheatmospherewiththeventilationcontrolsturnedonifventilationis
necessaryasameanstomitigatethehazard.
7.1.6 Testsforatmospherichazardsshouldbeconductedsimultaneouslyorinthefollowingorder:
(1) Oxygendeficiencyand/oroxygenenrichment.Anoxygendeficientatmosphererepresentsthemost
commonatmospherichazardinconfinedspaces.Mostcombustiblegassensorsareoxygendependentand
mightnotprovidereliablereadingsinoxygendeficientatmospheres.Therefore,oxygenconcentrations
shouldbenotedduringtestingfirsttoensurethatsufficientoxygenispresentforpropersensoroperation
accordingtotheequipmentmanufacturersrecommendations.
(2) 2.Combustibleorflammablemixtures.Combustiblegasesandvaporspresentanimmediatethreatforfire
andexplosionandareacommonatmospherichazardfoundinconfinedspaces.
(3) Toxicgasesandvaporsasnecessaryanddeterminedbyhazardidentification(seeChapter6):
(a) Carbonmonoxide(CO)andhydrogensulfide(H2S)arethetwomostcommontoxicgasesfoundin
confinedspaces.
(b) Carbonmonoxideisabyproductofcombustionandshouldbeasuspectedhazardinandaroundany
spacewherecombustionprocessesoccur.
17
(c) Hydrogensulfideisabyproductofdecompositionoforganicmaterialanddebrisandshouldbe
suspectedwheneverthereisnaturaldecayofanyplantoranimalmaterial.
7.1.7Thequalifiedgastesterperformingatmospherictestingshouldbetrainedandknowledgeablewith
regardtothepotentialatmospherichazardsandthespecificmonitorbeingusedtotesttheconfinedspace
accordingtoSection7.8andChapter11.
7.1.7.1Thequalifiedgastesterperformingatmospherictestingshouldverifythatthemonitorisfunctioning
properly(seeSections7.6and7.7),hastheappropriateaccessories(filters,tubing,probes,etc.)andis
equippedwiththepropersensorsfortheidentifiedatmospherichazardsrelatedtotheconfinedspace.In
addition,thequalifiedgastestershouldhaveanunderstandingoftheequipmentspecifications,including,but
notlimitedto,responsetime,measurementrange,andoperatingtemperature(seeSection7.2).
7.1.8Iftheconfinedspacehasnotbeenopenedortheatmosphereisnotimmediatelyaccessiblefortesting,
thequalifiedGasTestershouldopentheconfinedspacejustenoughtoallowinsertionoftheprobefor
testing.Anypotentialhazardincludingbutnotlimitedtopressureandelectricshockshouldbeeliminated
priortoopeningthespace.Note:Manymanholecovershaveasmallopeningtoallowtheinsertionofa
samplinghose.
7.1.8.1Iftheentrancetotheconfinedspacecouldbeaffectedbywindorambientairflow,thequalifiedgas
testershouldremainontheupwindsideoftheentrance.
7.1.8.2Thepurposeoftestingbeforecompletelyopeningtheconfinedspaceistopreventcreationofan
immediatelyhazardousatmosphereeitherinsideoroutsidetheconfinedspaceandtoprotectthepersonnel
outsidethespace.
7.1.9Asmuchoftheconfinedspaceshorizontalorverticalarea(s)shouldbetestedbyuseofapumpand
remoteprobeorsamplehosefromtheoutsidebeforethespaceisenteredforfurthertesting.
7.1.10Testingshouldincludeallirregularareasoftheconfinedspacewhereatmospherichazardscouldbe
presentorcouldaccumulate.(SeeSection7.11.)
7.1.11Ifentryintotheconfinedspaceisrequiredtotesttheentirearea,theconfinedspaceshouldbe
ventilatedaccordingtoChapter9,andasecondqualifiedgastester,whocanbetheintendedspaceentrant,
equippedwithallappropriatePPE(breathingair,harness,lifeline,etc.)canenterthespacetocompletethe
test,whichwouldincludeirregularareaswherepocketsofgascouldbecometrapped.Anentrypermitandan
attendantarerequiredforthisoperation.Note:Itisnotuncommonforeachentranttobeequippedwitha
multigasmonitorinthissituation.
7.1.12Whentestingforentriesinvolvingaverticaldescentisperformed,theatmosphereshouldbetested
accordingtotheproceduresoutlinedin7.11.2
7.1.13Iftheconfinedspacerequiresahorizontalentry,theatmospherictestingshouldbeperformed
accordingto7.11.3.
7.1.14Thequalifiedgastesterperformingtheatmospherictestingshoulddocumenttheinitialresultsofthe
atmosphericmonitoring,includingallgasreadings,alongwithbutnotlimitedtothetesterssignatureandthe
dateandtimeofthegastest,ontheentrypermit.
7.1.15Whilethepreentrytestdeterminestheinitialairqualitybeforetheconfinedspaceisentered,itis
importanttomonitorforchangesintheatmospherethatcouldoccurduringworkoperationsinsidethespace
toensurethatasafeatmosphereismaintained.Therefore,continuousatmosphericmonitoringaccordingto
7.12shouldbeperformed.
7.1.16IfhazardousatmosphericconditionsasdescribedinSection7.14aredetectedduringpreentrytesting,
entryshouldbeprohibiteduntilcorrectiveactionsaretakenandretestingverifiesacceptableatmospheric
conditions.
18
7.1.17Anychangeinatmosphericmeasurementsshouldbereportedtotheentrantandtheentrysupervisor
immediately.Thetestresultsshouldberecorded,documentingthechangeinconcentrationandtime.
7.1.17.1Ifanyresultsfromatmospherictestingwhileworkingwithintheconfinedspaceexceedthe
acceptablelimitsforentrydescribedinSection7.14,allworkshouldceaseandthespaceshouldbeevacuated
immediately.
7.2SelectionandTypesofMonitors.
7.2.1Agasmonitorshouldbeselectedbasedontheinitialhazardevaluationoftheconfinedspace.The
atmospherichazardsthatcouldbeintheconfinedspacepriortoentryandduringworkinoraroundthe
spaceshouldbedefinedinaccordancewithChapter6.Oncetheatmospherichazardsaredetermined,the
propermonitorcanbeselected.
7.2.2Confinedspacemonitorsshouldbecalibrated,directreading,continuousmonitoringinstruments.The
monitorshoulddetectforoxygen(O2)content,flammablegassesandvapors(LFL),andforpotentialtoxic
gases.Theseareminimumrequirements.Thehazardevaluationwilldetermineifitisnecessarytomonitorfor
specificgases,including,butnotlimitedto,carbonmonoxide(CO),hydrogensulfide(H2S),ammonia(NH3),
orvolatileorganiccompounds(VOCs),likebenzene.Eachofthesehazardousgasescanrequireitsownunique
sensortechnologyinordertobedetectedproperly.Inaddition,monitoringofotherpotentialatmospheric
hazardscouldbenecessaryaccordingtothehazardidentificationandhazardevaluation.
7.2.3Portablegasmonitoringinstrumentsshouldbeusedforconfinedspaceentryatmospherictesting.In
confinedspaceswherefixedgasdetectorsareinstalled,portableinstrumentsshouldbeusedforpreentry
testingandwornbytheentrantinthespace.
7.2.4MonitorAccuracy.
7.2.4.1Directreadinginstrumentsusedforthepurposeofevaluatingorverifyingconfinedspace
atmospheresshouldprovidereadingaccuracyof+/20percentoftheactualgasconcentrationorbetterinall
useconditionsthatarecoveredwithinthemonitorsoperatingspecifications.
7.2.4.2Instrumentsusingcorrelationorresponsefactorstodeterminethelevelofaparticulargasorvapor
concentrationpresentthatisdifferentfromthatforwhichthesensororinstrumentiscalibratedshouldhave
accuracyof+/30percentorbetterwiththecorrelationfactorapplied.Forexample,amonitorequippedwith
aPIDcalibratedtoisobutylenecanbeusedtodetecttheleveloftrichloroethyleneinaconfinedspace.The
monitorreadingshouldbemultipliedbyacorrelationorresponsefactor,specifiedbythemanufacturer,to
determinetherelativeconcentrationoftrichloroethyleneinthespace.Theaccuracyofthevalueafterthe
readinghasbeenmultipliedbythecorrelationfactorshouldbebetterthan+/30percent.
7.2.4.3Inadditiontotheaccuracystatedin7.2.4.1and7.2.4.2,theusershouldbeawareoftheinstruments
capabilitiesintheareasdiscussedin7.2.5through7.2.10.
7.2.5LimitsofDetection.Theminimumdetectionlimit(MDL)(thesmallestlevelofagasthatcanbedetected
withinthespecifiedaccuracyorrepeatabilityofthemonitor)shouldbelessthan2percentforoxygen,2
percentLFLforcombustiblegases,andatleastoneorderofmagnitudelowerthanthepublishedPELorTLV,
whicheverislower,fortoxicgases.Thelevelscanbedeterminedfrommanufacturersspecifications.For
example,thecurrentOSHAPELforchlorine(Cl2)isaceilinglimitof1.0ppm.TheMDLforachlorinemonitor
shouldbelessthanorequalto10percentof1ppm,or0.1ppm.LowerMDLswillprovideforgreaterreading
stabilityandconfidencearoundgasconcentrationactionpointsandreduceoreliminatefalseornuisance
alarmsduetodetectororsensorinstability.
7.2.6MeasuringRange.Theinstrumentmeasuringrangefordetectionofeachofthetargetedgashazards
shouldbeknownandbeverifiedtobeadequateforproperevaluationofallpotentialhazards.Instrument
andsensormeasuringrangesshouldbegreaterthanorequalto25percentforoxygen,100percentLFLfor
combustiblegases,andgreaterthanorequalto50percentoftheIDLHlevelfortoxicgashazards.These
levelscanbedeterminedfrommanufacturersspecifications.Note:Itisdesirabletouseinstrumentswith
19
broadermeasuringrangesinorderthatatmosphereswithcontaminantsthatareoutsidenormallimitvalues
canbeproperlyevaluated,propermitigationprocedurescanbeestablishedandfollowed,andproperPPEcan
beissuedandused.
7.2.7Interferences.
7.2.7.1Instrumentusersshouldbeawareofgasesotherthanthetargetedsensorgasthatcaninterferewith
andcauseerroneoussensorreadings.Forexample,typicalcarbonmonoxidesensorswillproducean
erroneousresponsewhenexposedtohydrogen.Itisimportantthatallknownpotentialatmospheric
contaminantsareidentified,whetherornottheycanbeconsideredtopresentahazardtotheentrantofthe
space,andtheeffectontheparticularcontaminantontheinstrumentssensorsbeverifiedwiththe
instrumentorsensormanufacturer.
7.2.7.2Certaincompoundscanproducepositiveinterferencesthatenhanceormakeinstrumentorsensor
readingsappeargreaterthanactualtargetgasconcentrations.Unlessthepresenceandconcentrationofa
potentialpositiveinterferinggascanbepositivelyidentifiedandconfirmed,theresultingreadingshouldbe
acceptedasthetruerepresentationofthetargetedgasconcentrationandproperactionstepstaken
accordingly.
7.2.7.3Certaincompoundscanproducenegativeinterferencesthatmakeinstrument/sensorreadingsappear
lowerthanactualtargetgasconcentrations.Intheeventthataknownnegativesensorinterferinggasis
encountered,theresultingreadingfromtheconcentrationofthatinterferinggasdeterminedorbelievedto
bepresentshouldbeaddedtotheinstrumentreadingforthetargetgasandthesumofthetwovalues
acceptedastheactualconcentrationofthetargetgaspresentwithproperactionproceduresfollowedasa
result.
7.2.7.4Commonlyknownsensorinterferencesshouldbelistedintheinstrumentusersmanualorotherwise
providedbytheinstrumentsmanufacturer.
7.2.7.5RFI/EMI.Instrument/sensorreadingscanbeaffectedbyradiofrequencyinterference(RFI)orother
electromagneticinterference(EMI).
7.2.7.5.1Instrumentsusedforevaluation/verificationofconfinedspaceatmospheresshouldbecertifiedby
themanufacturertotestedandverifiedtoperforminaccordancewithrelevantguidelinesforRFI/EMI
7.2.7.5.2CareshouldbetakentokeepinstrumentsisolatedfrompotentialsourcesofRFI/EMIasmuchas
possibleduringuse.Asarule,portableelectronicinstrumentsshouldnotbeusedwithin18in.oftheantenna
ofatransmittingmobileorhandheldradio.
7.2.8EnvironmentalFactors(Temperature,Humidity,Pressure/Altitude).Portablegasmonitoring
instrumentscanbeaffectedbyenvironmentalfactors,including,butnotlimitedto,temperature,relative
humidity,andatmosphericpressure.
7.2.8.1Allinstruments/sensorsusedforevaluation/verificationshouldbecompensatedfortheeffectsof
temperatureonthereadingsthroughoutthefullmeasuringrangeofthesensorandthefulloperating
temperaturerangeoftheinstrument.
7.2.8.2Theabsoluteeffectsaswellastheeffectsofchangesinrelativehumidityandpressure/altitudeonthe
monitorreadingsshouldbeidentifiedandunderstoodinaccordancewiththemanufacturersproduct
recommendations.
7.2.9AlarmIndications
7.2.9.1Monitorsshouldhavesimultaneous,multiplealarmindicators,includingaudible,visible,andvibrating
alarmstoindicatetheconditionsin7.2.9.2through7.2.9.6.
7.2.9.2GasAlarmSetPoints.Portablegasmonitorsshouldhavepresetalarmvaluesbutalsoshouldallow
theusertosetthealarmsatparticularlevels.Itiscriticalthataqualifiedhealthandsafetyprofessionalbe
consultedtodeterminethelevelatwhichinstrument/sensoralarmsshouldbesetforaspecificapplication.
20
7.2.9.3Portablegasmonitorsshouldhaveatleasttwolevelsofinstantaneousalarmsforallsensors(oxygen,
LEL,andtoxics).
7.2.9.4PortablegasmonitorsshouldhavealarmstoindicatethattheShortTermExposureLimit(STEL)for
toxicgaseshasbeenexceeded.
7.2.9.5Portablegasmonitorsshouldhavetimeweightedaverage(TWA)(typically8hoursaverage)alarmsfor
toxicgases.
7.2.9.6Gasmonitorsshouldhavealarmstoalerttheusertootherconditions,including,butnotlimitedto,
thefollowing:
(1) Lowbattery
(2) Lowflow(oninstrumentsthatincluderemotesamplingpumps)
(3) Sensorfailure
(4) Calibrationpastdue
(5) Bumptestpastdue
7.3OtherMonitorTypes.
7.3.1Iftheconfinedspacepotentiallycouldhaveatmospherichazardsthatcurrentgasmonitoring
technologycannotdetect,othertypesofdetectionequipmentshouldbeutilizedtoassesstheatmosphere.
Suchpotentialaircontaminantscouldincludeuncommonchemicals,particulates,and,insomecases,
unknownaircontaminants.Colorimetricdetectortubesandindustrialhygienesamplingaretwomethods
thatcanbeutilized.
7.3.2Colorimetricdetectortubesthatareselectedforparticularchemicalscansometimesbeusedfor
screeningpurposes.Thesetubes,whichareusuallymadeofglass,changecolorinaccordancewiththe
concentrationlevelofcontaminantmeasured.Airisdrawnthroughthetubewithabellowormanual
aspirationpump.
7.3.3Detectortubesshouldbeusedasaccordingtothemanufacturersspecifications.Mostdetectortube
manufacturersrequirethatonlytheirbrandofpumpbeused.
7.3.3.1Priortouse,detectortubepumpsshouldbeleakchecked.Thisistypicallydonebycompressingthe
bellowsfully,insertinganunbrokentubeandreleasingthebellowstoseeiftheyexpand.Thebellowswill
remainfullycompressedifnoleaksinthepumpexist.
7.3.3.2Ifmeasurementsaretobemadeinsideaconfinedspace,thedetectortubeshouldbeattachedtothe
endofthesamplinghoseandnotnearthepump.Otherwise,theairinthetubingwillbemeasuredrather
thantheairintheconfinedspace,resultinginerroneousmeasurements.
7.3.3.3*Mostcolorimetrictestmethodsarebestusedforscreeningpurposessincetheyaretypicallyonly
accuratetowithin+/25percent.Toensuresafety,25percentshouldbeaddedtotheresultingreadingto
determinewhattheleveloftoxicgasmightactuallybeintheconfinedspace.
7.3.4*Ifdirectreadinginstrumentsorcolorimetrictubesarenotavailabletoassessthepotentialhazard,
laboratorybasedindustrialhygienemonitoringwithintrinsicallysafebatteryoperatedpumpsandvariousair
contaminantcollectionfilters,tubes,impingers,orotherdevices,suchasvacuumcanisters,shouldbeused.
Theymightbetheonlymeansavailabletomeasureaircontaminants.
7.4IntrinsicSafety.Allmonitorsusedforthepurposeoftestingforatmospherichazardswithinaconfined
spaceshouldbeappropriatelycertifiedbyanationallyrecognizedtestinglaboratory(NRTL)tobeintrinsically
safeforuseinthespaceaccordingtotheclassificationofhazardousatmospheresunderNFPA70,National
ElectricalCode.(SeeChapter8.)
7.5PersonalMonitoringVersusRemoteSampling.Directreadinggasmonitorscanbeusedindifferent
configurations.Diffusionorpassive(personal)monitorsworkonthebasisofthegassensorsbeingexposedto
theambientenvironment,unassisted.Thesensorssensetheimmediateambientenvironmentsurrounding
21
thegasmonitor.Remotesamplingorsampledrawmodeutilizeseitheramanualoranautomaticpump.The
pumpcouldbeanattachmentorinternaltothegasmonitor.Ineitherconfigurationthepumpdrawsair
throughaprobeandtubingintothegasmonitoranddirectlyontothesensors,whichallowsthegasmonitor
tosensetheenvironmentawayfromwherethegasmonitorislocated.
7.5.1*Inallcases,remotesamplingshouldbedonepriortoenteringaconfinedspace.Theinstrumentandits
displayshouldbeinthedirectsightofthequalifiedgastesteratalltimesduringtesting.Apump,defined
lengthoftubing,andaprobewillbeconnectedtothegasmonitorwhilethequalifiedgastesterremains
outsidetheconfinedspacewiththegasmonitorandinsertstheprobeandtubingintotheconfinedspaceto
thefarthestpossiblepointfromtheentry.
7.5.1.1*TubingLengthandResponseTimes.Thequalifiedgastestershouldensurethatadequatetimeis
allowedtocompletelypurgethesampletubingandensurethatafullreadingisobtainedduringremote
samplingoperations.Mostautomaticpumpswilldrawatapproximately2secondsperfootofsampletubing.
Therefore,thequalifiedgastestershouldallow2secondsforeveryfootofsampleprobeandtubingusedplus
thenormalinstrumentresponsetimefortheairfromthesamplingareatobesensedbythesensors.
7.5.1.2Theinstrumentmanufacturershouldbeconsultedtodeterminethepropertypeofsampletubingor
probetobeusedtodetectparticularhazardsbecausetherearesomegasesthatcanbeabsorbedintospecific
typesoftubing,producingerroneousreadings.
7.5.2Gasmonitorsforpersonalmonitoringshouldbeusedinthediffusionmode.
7.5.2.1Confinedspaceentrantsshouldwearagasmonitoratalltimesduringtheentry.Itiscriticalthatthe
monitordoesnotgetcoveredbyclothingorPPEoritwillnolongerbemeasuringtheatmosphere.
7.5.2.2Confinedspaceattendantsalsoshouldwearadirectreading,diffusionmodegasmonitor,orone
shouldbeplacedintheareaoutsidethespace.Thisallowstheattendanttomonitortheenvironmentjust
aroundtheconfinedspacetomakesuretheenvironmentaroundtheconfinedspaceisnotchanging.For
example,ifventilationisexhaustingtoxicmaterialsoutsidethespace,itcouldaffecttheadjacentspaceand
attendanteveniftheinsideoftheconfinedspaceisnotshowingelevatedreadings.Ifthereisatoxicor
combustiblegasreadingoutsidetheconfinedspace,itcouldaffecttheenvironmentintheconfinedspace.
Thesoonertheattendantcanbemadeawareofthis,themoreeffectivedecisionmakingcanbe.
7.6MonitorCalibration
7.6.1Acalibrated,directreadinginstrumentisrequiredforentryintoaconfinedspace.Acalibrated
instrumentisonethathascompletedaspancalibrationfunctionbeforebeingputintoservice.Executinga
spancalibrationisthebestwaytoensuretheunitisreadingconcentrationsasdesigned.Spancalibrationis
theactionofexposingadirectreadinginstrument(orsensors)adefinedconcentrationofcalibrationgas.
Priortocompletionofaspancalibration,thedirectreadinginstrumentshouldhaveazerocalibration
performedinacleanairenvironment,preferablyoutdoorsandupwindfromanysourcesofaircontaminants.
7.6.1.1Thegasmonitorshouldbeprogrammedtosenseasetconcentrationofspecificgasesalignedtothe
configurationoftheinstrumentforthepurposeofcalibration.Forexample,theinstrumentmightbe
programmedtoread20.9percentoxygen(O2),32percentmethane(LFL),25ppmhydrogensulfide(H2S),
and50ppmcarbonmonoxide(CO)duringthecalibrationprocess.Theinstrumentwillthenbeexposedtoa
blendofcalibrationgasesoftheidenticaldefinedconcentrationsofthesamegases.Theinstrumentwillthen
calibratewhatitisprogrammedtoseetowhatitisbeingexposedto.Thisisaspancalibration.Throughthis
process,theinstrumentwilleitherpassorfailthespancalibration.Ifitfails,theunitshouldberemovedfrom
serviceandtaggedformaintenance.Iftheinstrumentpasses,itisacceptabletouseforconfinedspace
monitoring.
7.6.1.2Thegasmonitorinstructionmanualorthemanufacturershouldbeconsultedtodeterminetheproper
gasesandconcentrationstobeusedformonitorcalibration.Calibrationgascanvarydependingonthe
manufacturerofthecalibrationgas.Therearedifferenttypesofcombustiblegasesusedincalibrationgas
blends(pentane,propane,methane,etc).Eachgasmonitormanufacturerhasarationaleonwhichtypeof
22
combustiblegasshouldbeusedtomostaccuratelycalibratethitseircombustiblesensors.Themanufacturers
recommendationsshouldalwaysbefollowed.Ifthemanufacturerofthegasmonitorprovidescalibrationgas,
thecalibrationgasfromthesamemanufactureasthegasmonitorshouldbeused.Thisensuresthatthe
calibrationgascylindershavegonethroughaqualityassuranceprograminalignmentwiththegasmonitors.
7.6.2Calibrationresultsshouldbedocumented.Somedirectreadinggasmonitorshaveadatalogging
featurethatallowsthecalibrationprocesstobedocumentedanddownloadedfromtheinstrument,which
allowselectronicstorageoftheactivity.Otherwise,thefollowingdatarelatedtomonitorcalibrationshould
bedocumentedmanually:
(1) Dateoftest
(2) Serialnumberofinstrumentandsensorstested
(3) Serialnumberofanydocking/calibrationstationusedtoperformthetestornameofindividual
conductingamanualtest
(4) Typeandconcentrationofeachgasusedtoconductthetes
(5) Theresultofthetestforeachsensorintheinstrumenttested.
7.6.3Thepersonperformingcalibrationshouldensurethatthegasmonitorisprogrammedtosensethegas
concentrationslistedonthecylinderlabel.
7.6.4Thepersonperformingthecalibrationshouldensurethatthecalibrationgascylinderhasnotexpired.
Gascylinderstypicallyhaveashelflifeof2yearsorless,dependingonthetypeofgasinthecylinder.
Calibratingwithexpiredgascanresultininaccuratecalibrationandisnotacceptable.
7.6.5Whenamanualspancalibrationisconducted,thepersonperformingthecalibrationshouldensurethat
theregulatorandtubingmeetthegasmonitormanufacturersrecommendationsforthegasesthatarebeing
calibrated.Regulatorscancomeinavarietyofmaterialsandflowrates.Ifthemanufacturerspecifiesa0.5
LPMflowrate,aregulatorwiththatflowrateshouldbeused.Ifthemanufacturerofthegasmonitorsupplies
regulators,aregulatorfromthatmanufacturershouldbeused.Amanufacturerthatownsthequality
assuranceprogramforallcomponentswillensureamoreaccuratecalibrationprocessandlessquestionsfor
troubleshootingiftherearequestionsalongtheway.
7.6.6Gasmonitorspancalibrationcanbeperformedutilizinganautomateddockingorcalibrationstation.A
dockingstationmadebyonemanufacturershouldbeusedtocalibrateaninstrumentmanufacturedby
another.Dockingstationsaredesignedspecificallybyamanufacturertobeusedwithitsgasmonitors.
Dockingstationsshouldensurethatthecalibrationprocessisdocumented.Whenpossible,adockingstation
shouldbeutilizedaspartofthecalibrationprocess.Dockingstationshelpeliminatepotentialerrorsinthe
manualprocessandalsocanbemoreefficientintheuseofcalibrationgas.
7.7Zeroing.Priortoanyatmospherictesting,thegasmonitorshouldbezeroedinaknowncleanair
environmentaccordingtothemanufacturersrecommendationsandinstructions.
7.8BumpTesting
7.8.1Instrumentsusedfortheevaluation/verificationofconfinedspaceatmospheresshouldbebumptested
priortoeachdaysuse.Atypicalbumptestwilltake30to45secondsandisacriticalsteptoensuringthatthe
gasmonitorisfunctioningsinceitwaslastusedorcalibrated.
7.8.1.1Theonlywaytoensurethataportablegasmonitoringinstrumentwillrespondtothetargetedgasis
totestitwithaknownconcentrationofthatgasoranacceptablesurrogategas.
7.8.1.2Abumptestisdefinedasabriefexposureoftheinstrument/sensorstospecifiedtargetgas(es)forthe
purposeofverifyingsensorandalarmfunctionality.Itisnotintendedtobeameasureoftheaccuracyofthe
instrument/sensors.
7.8.1.3Anyinstrumentthatfailstorespondproperlyduringafunctionalbumptestshouldundergoa
successfulfullcalibrationpriortofurtheruse.
23
7.8.2Aninstrumentbumptestshouldbeperformedpriortodailyuseusinganautomateddockingorbump
test/calibrationstationorbymanualapplicationofgastothesensors.
7.8.3Thetestshouldbeperformedbyapplyingaknownconcentrationofeachofthetargetgasestothe
instrument/sensorsindividuallyorincombinationandverifyingthateachsensorrespondsinapositive
mannerandthatallinstrumentalarmsareactivatedaccordingly.
7.8.4Theconcentrationofgasusedforthepurposesofconductingabumptestshouldbegreaterthanthe
lowestalarmsetpointforeachsensor.
7.8.5Surrogategases(agasdifferentfromtheexplicittargetgasforthesensor)canbeusedforthepurpose
ofconductingabumptestofthesensorprovidedthattheconcentrationofgasusedproducesaresponse
equivalenttoorgreaterthantheconcentrationofthetargetgasrequiredtoexceedthelowestalarmset
pointforeachsensor.Thisshouldbedoneinaccordancewithmanufacturersapproval.
7.8.6Bumptestresultsshouldbedocumentedandincludethefollowingdata:
(1) Dateoftest
(2) Serialnumberofinstrumentandsensorstested
(3) Serialnumberofthedocking/bumpstationusedtoperformthetestorthenameofindividualconducting
amanualtest
(4) Typeandconcentrationofeachgasusedtoconductthetest
(5) Theresultofthetest(Pass/Fail)foreachsensorintheinstrumenttested
7.9ClearingPeakValues.Priortoanyatmospherictesting,thegasmonitorsstoredpeakreadingvalues
shouldberesetaccordingtothemanufacturersrecommendationsandspecifications.
7.10TrainingandCompetency.Allpersonnelservingasqualifiedgastestersshouldbetrainedintheproper
useofthegasmonitoraccordingtothemanufacturersrecommendationsandinaccordancewiththe
requirementsgiveninChapter11.
7.11ContinuousAirMonitoring.
7.11.1Itisimperativethattheatmosphereinandaroundaconfinedspaceremainsafeduringongoingentry
operations.Conditionscanchangequicklyorslowlyovertime;withoutcontinuousairmonitoring,air
contaminantscanincreaseoroxygenpercentagecandecrease,creatingdangerousconfinedspace
atmosphericconditions.Entrants,attendants,andotherinvolvedpersonnelespeciallymightbeunawareof
changingconditionsiftheairqualitywasinitiallymonitoredanddeterminedtobeacceptable.
7.11.2Therearemanyreasonsthatairqualitycandeteriorateinandaroundconfinedspaces,includingair
contaminantsbeinggeneratedbyentrantactivities,increasedtemperaturescausingadditionalchemical
vaporization,andexistinghazardsthathavenotbeenadequatelycontrolled.
7.11.3Continuousairmonitoringisthebestmethodtoensurethatairqualityremainsacceptablethroughout
entryoperations.TheOSHAPermitRequiredConfinedSpacesregulationrequiresthatentryconditions
shouldbecontinuouslymonitoredintheareaswhereauthorizedentrantsareworking[29CFR
1910.146(d)(5)(i)].
7.11.4Airqualitymetersforcommonconfinedspaceaircontaminantsandoxygenaredesignedtoperform
continuousairmonitoring.Inaddition,manymetershavefeatures,suchaspeakandSTEL(shortterm
exposurelimit)thatallowfordatareviewofthehighestaircontaminantconcentrationandlowestoxygen
reading.Datatypicallycanbedownloadedandstoredelectronically.
7.11.5Itisadvantageousfortheconfinedspaceattendanttouseandviewthemeteraslongasthe
measurementsaretakeninthevicinityoftheconfinedspaceentrants.Havinganadditionalmeter(s)wornby
oneormoreentrantsprovidesadditionalairmonitoringevaluation.
7.12AcceptableLimitsforEntry.Theatmosphereintheconfinedspaceshouldbeconsideredwithin
acceptablelimitsforentrywheneverthefollowingconditionsaremaintained(seeChapter5):
24
(1) Oxygenconcentrationwithintherangeof19.5percentto22.0percent
(2) Combustiblegasconcentrationlessthan10percentoftheLEL
(3) Toxicgasconcentrationslessthantherecognizedoccupationalexposurelimitsfortherespectivegases
7.13Maintenance.
7.13.1Confinedspacemetersneedtobemaintainedaccordingtothemanufacturersspecificationstoensure
thattheyoperateproperly,tomaximizetheirlongevity,andtomaintaintheirwarranties.Occasional
inspectionfordamage,cleaning,properbatterycharging,andperiodicsensorreplacementisallthatis
typicallyneededtobedonebytheuser.Majorrepairsshouldbeendonebythemanufacturer.
17.13.2Sensorshavelimitedservicelives,evenwhenthemetersareusedinfrequently.Theoxygensensor
typicallyhastheshortestlife,usually2to3years.Themajorityofconfinedspacemetershaverechargeable
batteriesthatprovideyearsofserviceaslongastheyarechargedaccordingtothemanufacturers
procedures.
7.14RecordRetention.
7.14.1Recordspertainingtogasmonitoringinstrumentsandconfinedspaceatmospherictestingshouldbe
retainedaccordingtoallapplicableregulations.
7.14.2Recordsshouldbemaintainedwithregardtocalibrationandbumptesting,personnelexposure,and
gasmonitormaintenance.

25
Chapter8HazardEliminationandControl
8.1General.Inherent,introducedandadjacenthazardsidentifiedinandaroundconfinedspacesshouldbe
completelyeliminatedorcontrolledtotheextentpossiblepriortoentry.TheconfinedspaceEntrySupervisor
and/orPermitIssuershouldensurethatallhazardshavebeeneliminatedorcontrolledandshoulddocument
thecorrectiveactionstakenontheconfinedspacepermit.Hazardsthatareunabletobeadequately
eliminatedorcontrolledshouldbeclearlynotedonthepermitandpersonalprotectionorotherprovisions
shouldbemadeforsafeentry.
8.2ChemicalandAtmosphericHazards.Atmospherichazardsidentifiedduringgasmonitoringshouldbe
eliminatedorcontrolledpriortoentry.Methodstoremovehazardousmaterialsincludecleaning,
displacementorpurgingusingventilation.Wherethiscannotbeinitiallyaccomplished,inertingandpurging,
orothermethodstoprovideasafeatmosphereforentryandworkshouldbeutilized.Suggestedmethodsto
removehazardousatmospheresaregivenin8.2.18.2.3.Atmosphericmonitoringshouldbeperformedin
accordancewithChapter7toconfirmthespaceissafetoenterpriortoentry.
8.2.1AcceptableEntryConditions.Whenlevelsareoutsidethefollowingparameters,entryisallowedonly
aftercontrolmeasuresasindicatedinChapter8areapplied.
(1) <LFL(LEL):10percent
(2) O2:19.5percentto22.0percent
(3) Toxicmaterials:anylevel
8.2.2RemovalofHazardousMaterialsandVaporFreeing.Residualmaterialsinconfinedspacesshouldbe
removedfromthespacepriortoentry.Thiscanbedonebycleaning,ventilatingand/orpurgingwithinert
gas,waterorsteam.
8.2.2.1*Wheneverpossible,theconfinedspaceshouldbecleanedfromtheoutsidewithouttheneedfor
entry.
8.2.2.2*Remainingvaporsandtoxicgasesshouldbeexhaustedtoeliminatehazardswhenentryisrequired
usingventilationblowersandcontrolledexhausteductorsinaccordancewithChapter9.Notethat
intrinsicallysafeblowersandeductorsshouldbeusedforflammableorcombustiblevaporremoval.
8.2.2.3Methodssuchaspurgingwithaninertgas,waterorsteamcanbeusedtoremoveresidualvapors.See
8.2.3and9.5.9.
8.2.2.4RegulationsandStandardsforTankCleaning.
8.2.2.4.1ConfinedspaceentriesofpetroleumstoragetanksshouldbeinaccordancewithAPI2015,
RequirementsforSafeEntryandCleaningofPetroleumStorageTanks,andAPI2016,Guidelinesand
ProceduresforEnteringandCleaningPetroleumStorageTanks.Thesestandardsprovidedetailedsafety
requirementsforabovegroundpetroleumstoragetanks.
8.2.2.4.2CleaningandentryoftanksotherthanpetroleumtanksshouldbeinaccordancewithNFPA326,
SafeguardingofTanksandContainersforEntry,Cleaning,orRepair.Thisstandardprovidesdetailedsafety
requirementsfortanksthatarenotabovegroundpetroleumtanks.
8.2.2.4.3ConfinedspaceentryinmarinevesselsshouldbeinaccordancewithNFPA306Standardforthe
ControlofGasHazardsonVessels.Thisstandardprovidesadviceforentryintoconfinedspacesonmarine
vessels.
8.2.2.5ChemicalResidues.Evenaftercleaninghasbeencompleted,chemicalresiduesmightbepresent.A
reviewoftheSDSshouldbedonetodetermineifthechemicalresiduescouldbecorrosiveorabsorbed
throughtheskin.Methodssuchaswipetesting,testingwithpHpapershouldbedonepriortoentry.Thiswill
helpdetermineifadditionalcleaningandthetypeofpersonalprotectiveequipmentrequired.
8.2.3CombustibleDusts.Combustibledustresidueshouldberemovedusingintrinsicallysafevacuumsor
usingmanualcleaning.Compressedairshouldnotbeusedtomoveorcleancombustibledust.
26
8.2.4Inerting.Entryintoinertatmospheresshouldnotbeallowedexceptinverylimitedcircumstances.Ifhot
workistobeconductedinoradjacenttoaconfinedspacethatcontainsflammableorcombustiblevaporsor
liquids,onemethodofcontrollingtheignitionhazardistodisplacetheoxygenwithinthespacebyinerting.
Inertgascanalsobeusedtodisplaceoxygeninsituationswhereflammablematerialsoratmospherecannot
beremovedpriortoentry.Followingtheuseofinertgas,thespaceshouldeitherbeventilatedwithairin
accordancewithchapter9untilacceptableentryconditionsaremetinaccordancewith8.2priortoentry.
8.2.4.1Containersadjacenttoaconfinedspacewhereandworkistobeconductedshouldalsobeconsidered
aspotentialsourcesofflammablematerialandshouldbemadesafepriortothestartofhotwork.
8.2.4.2Wheneverinertgasesareusedtopurgeaspace,considerthedischargepointfortheevacuated
atmospherefromthespaceinrelationtotheworkersoutsidethespaceandanyrelatedprocessesorwork
adjacenttothespace.Itmightbenecessarytoperformatmospherictestingintheadjacentareasandto
createbarrierswithapproachdistancestoinsurethatlevelsofexhaustedcontaminantsarewithinacceptable
levelsasdefinedin8.2.Hot,warm,andcoldzonescanbeusedtodelineateareasofhazard.
8.2.4.3Wheneverinertingisperformedtheatmospherewithin35feetoftheopeningshouldbetestedas
needed,toassurethatitissafeforbreathing.Inoutsideenvironmentswinddirectionandspeedshouldbe
takenintoconsiderationandareaoftestingextendedifnecessary.
8.2.4.4Theconfinedspaceandthesurroundingareashouldbepostedtoindicatethatthespacehasbeen
inerted.
?CheckNationalSafetyCouncil?
DANGERINERTGASENVIRONMENT
ATMOSPHEREUNSAFEFORWORKERS
INSUFFICIENTOXYGENFORBREATHING
DONOTENTER
8.2.4.5Entryintoinertatmospheresshouldnotoccurexceptinwellcontrolledsituationswherenoother
optionforentryisavailable.Ifaninertatmosphereremains,acombinationfullfacepiecepressuredemand
suppliedairrespirators(SAR)withauxiliarySelfContainedBreathingApparatus(SCBA)escapemechanismor
afullfacepiecepressuredemandSCBAwitha30minutetankshouldbeprovidedtoandusedbyentrants.A
fullrespiratoryprotectionprogramthatincludesfittestingandmedicalscreeningshouldbedevelopedbefore
providinganemployeewitharespirator.
8.2.4.6RegulationsandStandardsforInerting.
8.2.4.6.1InertinginthemaritimeindustryshouldbeinaccordancewithNFPA306StandardfortheControlof
GasHazardsonVessels.Thisstandardincludesasectiononinertingproceduresformarinevessels.
8.2.4.6.2InertinginabovegroundpetroleumstorageshouldbeinaccordancewithAPI2217AGuidelinesfor
SafeWorkinInertConfinedSpacesinthePetroleumandPetrochemicalIndustries.
8.2.4.6.3InertinginotherstoragetanksshouldbeinaccordancewithNFPA326Standardforthe
SafeguardingofTanksandContainersforEntry,Cleaning,orRepair
8.3HotWork.
8.3.1General.Hotworkisanyworkthatmayproduceasourceofignition.Sourcesofignitioninclude,butare
notlimitedtoopenflames,sparksorheatproducingactivityandistypicallyassociatedwithcutting,welding,
grinding,drilling,abrasiveblasting,burning,heatingandbrazingoperationsaspartofmaintenanceor
constructionwork.Italsoincludestheuseofnonapprovedelectricalequipmentinflammableatmospheres,
internalcombustionpoweredequipment,andsoforth.Hotworkinareascontainingflammablevapor/air
mixtureshasbeenthesourceofmanyconfinedspaceaccidentsincludinginjuriesandfatalities.Sometimes,
27
thesefatalaccidentsoccurinspacesadjacenttotheconfinedspaceswhenthesespaceshadnotbeen
consideredasapartoftheconfinedspaceevaluation.
8.3.2HotWorkPermit.Whenhotworkisrequiredinoradjacenttoaconfinedspace,aseparatehotwork
permitshouldbeissuedbythequalifiedhotworkPermitIssuerandshouldbeattachedtotheconfinedspace
permit.Thefacilitywherehotworkistooccur(orthecontractorconductingthehotwork)shouldhaveahot
workprogramandpermitprocedures.Thehotworkpermitshouldcontaininformation,including,butnot
limitedto:
(1) Conditionsunderwhichhotworkpermitauthorizationistostartandstoporbecancelled.
(2) Requirementsforventilation,inertingorotheratmosphericprecautions
(3) Requirementsforcontinuousmonitoringoftheatmospherewithinandoutsideoftheconfinedspace
whilehotworkisbeingconducted.
8.3.3ColdRepairOptions.Wheneverpossiblehotworkshouldnotbeperformedinoraroundconfined
spaces.Alternativemeanssuchasmechanicalcutting,coldcutting,scraping,andhandgrindingorfilingwith
equipmentthatminimizesthepotentialforsparksandheatshouldbeconsidered.Forinstance,cuttingcan
beperformedwithhandsaws,hydraulicshears,pneumaticchiselsorpipecutters.Mechanicaljoining
methodssuchasnutsandbolts,screwedfittings,orcouplingscanbeused.Handfilingisanoptioninsteadof
mechanicalgrinding,andthreadedpipeisanalternativetoweldedorsolderedpipe.Notesparkscanstillbe
generatedusingsomeofthetechniquesrecommendedbuttheriskisgreatlyreduced.
8.3.4Wheneverhotworkmaybeperformed,thequalifiedpersonshouldevaluateallpotentiallocations
whereflammableorcombustiblematerialsmayhaveaccumulatedandtakemeasurestoremoveandclean
thematerialsfromtheselocationsandadjacentspacespriortoissuingthehotworkpermit.Hotworkshould
notbedoneonorintheadjacentareaoflivetanksorlinescontainingflammableorcombustiblematerials
unlessthereisnootheralternativeandahotworkpermitcoveringsuchactivitygasbeenapproved.
8.3.5Tankscontainingflammableorcombustiblematerialsshouldbegasfree,cleanedorinertedpriorto
hotworkbeingperformedinoraroundconfinedspaces.Precautionsshouldbetakentoinsurethatthereare
noignitionsourcesintheareaadjacenttotheconfinedspacebeingcleanedorinertedsincethevapors
exitingthespacewillbeflammableorcombustibleaswell.
8.3.6Hotworkshouldneverbeperformedaboveatank,containerorlinecontainingflammableof
combustiblematerialsunlessprecautionshavebeentakentoshieldtheareabelowfromfallingmaterialsand
assurethatvaporsfromthespacecannotreachtheareaofhotwork.Anexampleofthiswouldbetheuseof
aweldingblankettocoverpipesthatcontainflammableorcombustibleliquids.
8.3.7Atmosphericmonitoringshouldbeconductedinadjacentspaceswithin7.6meters(35feet)horizontally
ofthehotworkbeingperformed.Nohotworkshouldbeperformedunlessatmospherictestingindicatesthat
levelsof02levelsarelessthan22%byvolumeandtheLFLislessthan10%unlessappropriateprecautions
aretakenandtheworkisspecificallyauthorizedbythehotworkpermit.
8.3.8Considerationshouldalsobegivenforadjacentspacesthatareaboveandbelowtheworkbeing
conducted.Notethatwhenweldingtakesplaceonanelevatedsurface,allsurfacesbelowtheelevated
platforminthevicinityoftheweldingarepotentiallyatrisk.
8.3.9Fireprotectionindicatedinthehotworkpermitsuchasappropriateportablefireextinguishersselected
inaccordancewithNFPA10shouldbelocatedwithin10feetofthehotworkarea.Hosesandfoamproducing
equipmentmayalsobeused.
8.3.10Oxygen,flammablegasandinertgastanksshouldremainoutsideaconfinedspacewheneverpossible.
Leakingoxygenlinescancreateandoxygenenrichedenvironmentwhichcanleadtoincreasedfireand
explosionhazardsandleakingacetylenecancreateaflammableatmosphere.
8.3.11Allhosesandtorchesassociatedwithoxygenandgascylindersshouldbedisconnectedandthegasand
oxygensupplyshutoffduringextendedbreakperiodsofmorethan1hour.
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8.3.12Allelectricalweldingequipmentusedinflammableandcombustibleatmospheresshouldbe
intrinsicallysafe,beinspectedandapprovedbyaqualifiedpersonandbeproperlygrounded.
8.3.13Combustiblematerialsshouldnotbelocatedwithinthe35feetofwherehotworkwillbeperformed.
8.3.14RegulationsandStandardsforHotWork.
Allweldingandhotworkshouldbeinaccordancewithapplicableregulations,codesandrecommended
standardsapplicabletotheparticularindustryortypeofoperationbeingperformed.Themostcurrent
regulations,codesandrecommendedpracticesshouldbefollowed.Asummaryofthosestandardsfollows:
8.3.14.1GeneralIndustry.
8.3.14.1.1ThoseworkplacesthatareconsideredgeneralindustryaccordingtoOSHAshouldfollow
requirementsgiveninOSHA1910SubpartQWelding,Cutting,andBrazing(1910.2511910.255)asa
minimum.Thesestandardsprovidebothgeneralrequirementsandspecificrequirementsforoxygenfuelgas
weldingandcutting,arcweldingandcuttingandresistancewelding.InadditiontotheminimumOSHA
generalindustryrequirements,severaladditionalstandardsshouldbeconsidered.
8.3.14.1.2ANSIZ49.1,SafetyinWelding,Cutting,andAlliedProcessesprovidesforthesafesetupanduseof
weldingequipmentandthesafeperformanceofweldingandcuttingoperations.Ithasspecificprovisionsfor
oxyfuelgasandarcweldingandcutting,resistancewelding,electronbeamwelding,laserbeamcuttingand
weldingaswellasbrazingandsoldering.Thestandardisgenerallyapplicabletootherweldingprocessessuch
assubmergedarcweldingandalliedprocesses
8.3.14.1.3NFPA51BStandardforFirePreventionDuringWeldingandOtherHotWorkprovidesguidancefor
persons,includingoutsidecontractorsandpropertymanagers,whomanage,supervise,andperformhot
work.
8.3.14.1.4NFPA326StandardfortheSafeguardingofTanksandContainersforEntry,Cleaning,orRepair
providesminimumproceduresthatpermitrepair,hotwork,orotheroperationsthathavethepotentialto
createafire,anexplosion,oranotherhazardwheneverhotworkwillbeperformedontanksorcontainers
containingflammable,combustibleorotherhazardoussubstancevapors,liquids,orsolidresidues,
TheAmericanWeldingSocietyalsohasinformationregardinghotworkoperations
8.3.14.2ConstructionIndustry.
8.3.14.2.1InconstructionsettingsOSHA1926SubpartJWeldingandCutting(1926.3501926354)provides
informationforgasweldingandcutting,arcweldingandcutting,fireprevention,ventilationinwelding
cuttingandheating,andweldingcuttingandheatinginwayofpreservativecoatings.
8.3.14.2.2NFPA51BStandardforFirePreventionDuringWeldingandOtherHotWorkprovidesguidancefor
persons,includingoutsidecontractorsandpropertymanagers,whomanage,supervise,andperformhot
workintheconstructionindustry.
8.3.14.2.3NFPA326StandardfortheSafeguardingofTanksandContainersforEntry,Cleaning,orRepair
providesminimumproceduresthatpermitrepair,hotwork,orotheroperationsthathavethepotentialto
createafire,anexplosion,oranotherhazardwheneverhotworkwillbeperformedontanksorcontainers
containingflammable,combustibleorotherhazardoussubstancevapors,liquids,orsolidresidues,
8.3.14.3Shipyard/Maritime.Inshipyard/maritimesettingsOSHAregulationsincludedin1915SubpartB
(1915.111910.16)and1915SubpartD(1915.511915.57)andNFPA306(4.3.4),provideinformationcovering
hotworkperformedinthemaritimeindustry.
8.3.14.4PetroleumIndustry.InadditiontoapplicableOSHA,NFPAandANSIregulationslistedabovein
8.3.3.1and8.3.3.2,appropriateAPIstandards,includingbutnotlimitedtothefollowing,provideinformation
relatedtohotworkinthepetroleumindustry
29
8.3.14.4.1API653TankInspection,Repair,Alteration,andReconstruction.Thisdocumentcoversthe
inspection,repair,alteration,andreconstructionofsteelabovegroundstoragetanksusedinthepetroleum
andchemicalindustries.Itprovidestheminimumrequirementsformaintainingtheintegrityofweldedor
riveted,nonrefrigerated,atmosphericpressure,abovegroundstoragetanksaftertheyhavebeenplacedin
service.
8.3.14.4.2APIRP2009SafeWeldingandCuttingPracticesinRefineries,GasolinePlants,andPetrochemicals
Plants.Thisdocumentprovidesguidelinesforsafelyconductingwelding,cuttingorotherhotworkactivitiesin
refineries,gasplants,petrochemicalplantsandotherfacilitiesinthepetroleumandpetrochemicalindustries.
Itprovidesspecificguidanceforevaluatingproceduresforcertaintypesofworkonequipmentinservices.It
doesnotincludeguidanceforcompliancewithregulationsorcodes:hottapping;weldingtechniques,normal,
"safework"practices;orentryorworkininertenvironments.
8.3.14.4.3APIStd2015SafeEntryandCleaningofPetroleumStorageTanks,PlanningandManagingTank
EntryFromDecommissioningThroughRecommissioning.Thisstandardprovidessafetypracticesfor
preparing,emptying,isolating,ventilating,atmospherictesting,cleaning,entry,hotworkand
recommissioningactivitiesin,onandaroundatmosphericandlowpressure(uptoandincluding15psig)
abovegroundstoragetankthathavecontainedflammable,combustibleortoxicmaterials.Thisstandard
directstheuserfromdecommissioning(removalfromservice)throughrecommissioning(returntoservice).
Thisstandardappliestostationarytanksusedinallsectorsofthepetroleumandpetrochemicalplants,and
terminals.
8.3.14.4.4APIRP2016GuidelinesandProceduresforEnteringandCleaningPetroleumStorageTanks.This
RecommendedPracticesupplementstherequirementsofANSI/APIStandard2015,RequirementsforSafe
EntryandCleaningofPetroleumStorageTanks,SixthEdition.ThisRPprovidesguidanceandinformationon
thespecificaspectsoftankcleaning,inordertoassistemployers(owners/operatorsandcontractors)to
conductsafetankcleaningoperationsinaccordancewiththerequirementsofANSI/APIStandard2015.
8.3.14.4.5APIRP2027.IgnitionHazardsInvolvedinAbrasiveBlastingofAtmosphericStorageTanksin
HydrocarbonService.Thisdocumentidentifiestheignitionhazardsinvolvedinabrasiveblastingofthe
exteriorsofhydrocarbonstoragetankscontainingamixturethatisflammableorthatcanbecomeflammable
whenairisadded.Itprovidesoperationalguidelinesforproceduresthatsignificantlyreduceignitionrisks
duringabrasiveblastingofhydrocarbontanksthatmaycontainaflammablevaporspace.
8.3.14.4.6API2202DismantlingandDisposingofSteelfromAbovegroundLeadedGasolineStorageTanks.
Thisdocumentoutlinesprecautionstopreventhazardousexposureofpersonneltoleadantiknock
compoundswhendismantlingtanksthathavecontainedleadedgasolineandwhendisposingofthesteel.
8.3.14.4.7APIRP2207(R2012)PreparingTankBottomsforHotWork,Thispublicationaddressesonlythe
safetyaspectsofhotworkonpetroleumstoragetankbottoms.Itdiscussessafetyprecautionsforpreventing
fires,explosionsandassociatedinjuries.Thetermhotwork,isusedinthispublication,isdefinedasan
operationthatcanproduceasparkorflamehotenoughtoigniteflammablevapors.
8.4EnergySources.Allsourcesofenergy,mechanical,electrical,hydraulic,chemicalorstoredenergyin
confinedspacesthatcouldimpactemployeesafetyshouldbeeliminatedusingalockouttagoutprogram.
OSHA1910.147TheControlofHazardousEnergy(Lockout/Tagout)appliestopreventingtheaccidental
startupofequipmentandmachinery(suchasanagitator)orthereleaseofstoredenergy.OSHA1910.333
Selectionanduseofworkpracticeshasspecificrequirementsfordeenergizingandlockingoutelectrical
equipment.TheOSHAelectricalsafeworkpracticesrequirementswerederivedfromNFPA70EStandardfor
ElectricalSafetyintheWorkplace.Thisstandardprovidescomprehensiveelectricalsafetyinformationto
preventshock,arcandotherelectricalsafetyhazards.
8.4.1Allworkplaceswithconfinedspacesthatcontainenergysourcesrequiringlockout/tagoutshouldhave
anenergycontrolprogram.
30
8.4.2ThequalifiedIsolationSpecialistshouldverifythattheenergysourcesaffectingemployeesinthe
confinedspaceshavebeenlocked/taggedoutorotherwisesafeguardedpriortoworkbeingperformedina
confinedspace.Ifthereisaneedtoenterthespacetoverifythatsourceshavedeenergized,theentryshould
bedoneusingthepermitprocessdefinedinChapter13.
8.4.3Pipesandlinescontainingmaterialsthatcouldenterintotheconfinedspaceshouldbedisconnected
and/orblanked,bled,flushed,purgedorotherwiseisolatedpriortoentry.
8.4.4Pipesandlinesrunningthroughconfinedspacesthatwillbeworkedonfrominsidethespaceneedto
bedisconnectedand/orblanked,bled,flushed,purged,isolatedpriortoworkingonthelines.
8.4.5Pipesandlinescontainingmaterialthatrunthroughthespacebutdoterminatewithinthespacedonot
necessarilyneedtobedisconnectedorisolatedasindicatedin8.4.3solongasEntrySupervisorand/orPermit
Issuerhasdeterminedthatthematerialsintheselinesarenotimpactedbytheworkbeingdoneinthespace
nordoesthematerialcreateahazardtoemployeesworkinginthespace.
8.4.6*WhereequipmentshouldbeoperationalinordertoperformtheworkinthespacethentheEntry
Supervisorand/orPermitIssuershouldinsurethattheworkisperformedusingalternativemeasureswhich
provideeffectiveprotectionofemployeesinthespace.
8.4.7HotTappinginthepetroleumindustryshouldbeinaccordancewithAPI2201SafeHotTappingPractices
inthePetroleum&PetrochemicalIndustries.
8.5PortableElectricalandMechanicalEquipmentUsedinandAdjacenttoConfinedSpaces.Electricaland
mechanicalequipmentusedinconfinedspacesshouldbelisted(andlabeled)foritsintendeduse.All
approvedequipmentshouldbeinspectedbyaqualifiedpersonpriortouse.Equipmenttobeconsidered
includesthefollowing:
(1) Lighting
(2) CommunicationEquipmentincludingcellphones,pagersandtwowayradios
(3) Cordlesstoolsthatutilizeabattery.
(4) Ventilationsystems
(5) Portabletools
(6) Weldingequipment
(7) Mechanicalequipment
(8) Extensioncords
8.5.1WetandDampLocations.Allelectricalequipmentusedinwetordamplocationsshouldbeequipped
withgroundfaultcircuitinterruptersandinspectedbyaqualifiedpersonpriortouse.
8.5.2HazardousLocations.
8.5.2.1Allelectricalandmechanicalequipmentusedinflammableorpotentiallyflammableatmospheres
shouldbeapprovedforClass1Division1locationsandinspectedbyaqualifiedpersonpriortouse.
8.5.2.2Allelectricalequipmentusedinareaswherecombustibledustsmaybepresentshouldbeapproved
forClass2Division1locationsandinspectedbyaqualifiedpersonpriortouse.
8.5.2.3Allelectricalequipmentusedinareaswhereeasilyignitablefibersorflyingsmaybepresentshouldbe
approvedforClass3Division1locationsandinspectedbyaqualifiedpersonpriortouse.
8.5.2.4Equipmentbroughtintoconfinedspacesshouldbeguardedwithnoexposedelectricalcomponentsor
unguardedmovingpartsthatcouldcauseinjury,entanglementoramputation.
8.5.3RegulationsandStandards.
8.5.3.1NFPA497:RecommendedPracticefortheClassificationofFlammableLiquids,Gases,orVaporsandof
Hazardous(Classified)LocationsforElectricalInstallationsinChemicalProcessAreas
31
8.5.3.2NFPA499:RecommendedPracticefortheClassificationofCombustibleDustsandofHazardous
(Classified)LocationsforElectricalInstallationsinChemicalProcessAreas
8.6BondingandGroundingforFlammableandCombustibleMaterials.Staticelectricitymaybegeneratedin
severalways,mosttypicallywhenevertwodissimilarmaterialsrubagainsteachother.Thesematerialsmay
besolids,liquids,orgases.Theaccumulationofachargecreatesapotentialsafetyhazardinthatthecharge
maybequicklydischarged,creatingaspark.Ifthereareflammableorcombustiblegases,vaporsordusts
present,afireorexplosionmayoccur.Thepurposeforgroundingandbondingobjectsistoprovideasafe
pathforstaticelectricitythatmayhaveaccumulatedononeormoreinsulatedobjectstosafelydissipate.The
combinationofgroundingoneobjecttotheearthandthenbondingotherobjectstoitwithaconductive
material,suchascopperwire,isreferredtoasgroundingandbonding.
8.6.1Bonding.Bondingisthejoiningofmetalpartstoformanelectricallyconductivepaththatensures
electricalcontinuityandthecapacitytosafelyconductanycurrentlikelytobegenerated.EntrySupervisors,
attendants,entrantsandallworkersworkinginandadjacenttoconfinedspacesshouldbeinformedthat
metallicpartsofequipment,accessoriesandappurtenancesusedinconfinedspaceentry,ventilationand
cleaningoperations,arecapableofgeneratinganelectrostaticchargeunlesstheyareelectricallybondedto
thespacetoavoidignitionfromsparks.
8.6.1.1Requirements.Beforeuse,aqualifiedperson,suchasanelectrician,shouldthoroughlyinspectall
tankcleaningequipment,nozzles,hoses,couplingsandaccessoriestoensurethattheyareproperlybonded,
including,butnotlimitedto,thefollowing:
(1) Vaporandgasfreeing,degassingandventilationequipmentandappurtenances,suchasblowersand
eductors;inertgaspipingandconnections;water,fueloilandsteampiping,hoses,nozzles,and
connections;flameanddetonationarrestors:andflexiblevaporintakeandexhaustducts.
(2) Vacuumtrucksusedforremovingmaterials,degassingandexhaustingvaporsfromaconfinedspace
shouldbelocatedsuchthatthevaporsaredischargeddownwindofthetruckandawayfortheconfined
spaceandpotentialsourcesofignition.(Note:Regulationsmayrequirethecapture,removaland
treatmentofliquids,vaporsandresidue).Thevacuumtrucksuctionanddischargehosesshouldbe
electricallybondedtoboththetruckandspaceandgrounded.See8.6.3.2.
(3) Hosesandnozzlesusedtoinjectproduct,steam,chemicals,solventsorwaterintothetanktodislodge
andflushresidueandsludgeorwetdownpyrophoricdeposits.
(4) Abrasiveblastinghoses,nozzles,andequipment.
(5) Mechanizedportableandroboticcleaningequipment.
(6) Welding,cutting,grinding,andhottappingequipmentshouldbebondedtotheworktoavoidstray
currents.
8.6.2Grounding(Earthing).Groundingistheprocessofdirectingelectricalcurrenttoearthinordertoreduce
thepossibilityofanelectricalspark(ignitionsource).Careshouldbetakentoensurethatequipmentis
properlygroundedtothepowersource.Withpowerfrompowerlines,theelectricalgroundistiedinatthe
breakerbox.Forportablegeneratorsets,theunitshouldbegroundedlocallytotheframe.Portable
generatorsetscanbestakedtoformanearthgroundingsystemorgroundedtoafacilitygroundsystem.
Groundingshouldbeconsistentwiththeequipmentmanufacturersinstructionsandapplicablenationaland
localelectricalwiringcodes.
8.6.3RegulationsandStandardsforBondingandGrounding.Thefollowingpublicationsaregoodresources
toconsult:
(1) NFPA77,RecommendedPracticeonStaticElectricity,whichprovidesdetailedinformationonhowto
controlstaticelectricity
(2) API2219,SafeOperationsofVacuumTrucksinPetroleumService,whichprovidesrequirementsforsafe
useofvacuumtrucksinpetroleumfacilitiestoremoveflammableorcombustibleliquidsandwhichcan
beusedasareferenceforotherfacilitieswherevacuumtrucksareused
(3) APIRP2003,ProtectionAgainstIgnitionsArisingoutofStatic,Lightning,andStrayCurrents
32
(4) APIRP2027,IgnitionHazardsInvolvedinAbrasiveBlastingofAtmosphericStorageTanksinHydrocarbon
Service
(5) NFPA326,StandardfortheSafeguardingofTanksandContainersforEntry,Cleaning,orRepair
8.7IgnitionSources.Flammableorcombustibleliquidsandvaporsmaybereleasedbothwithinthespaceand
aroundtheoutsideareaofaconfinedspaceduringtheprocessofventilation,inerting,gasfreeingorwhen
removing,agitatingorcleaningresidue.Inadditiontohotwork,whichiscoveredin8.2sourcesofignition
thatshouldbeeliminatedorcontrolledincludethefollowing:
(1) Internalcombustionengines
(2) Nonexplosionproofandequipmentnotratedforthelocation
(3) Nonbondedelectrostaticgeneratingequipmentsuchasweldingmachines,fansandeductors,vacuum
trucks,portablegenerators,pumps,etc.
(4) Lightingequipment
(5) Smoking
(6) Blastcleaning
(7) Grindingandcutting
(8) Unprotectedpyrophoricironsulfidedeposits
(9) Heatingequipment
(10) Vacuumtrucks
(11) Communicationdevicesincludingcellphones,twowayradios,pagers
8.7.1Ignitionsourcesshouldbeeliminatedorremovedfrominsideandadjacenttoconfinedspaces.
8.7.2Ignitionsourcesshouldbeevaluatedregardlessofwhetherornotthereareflammableorcombustible
atmospheres.Ignitionsourcescanalsocreateafirehazardifcombustiblematerialsarepresentinoradjacent
toaconfinedspace.
8.8FallProtection.Fallprotectionshouldbeusedforentriesintoconfinedspaceswherefallsgreaterthan4
ftcouldoccur.Confinedspacefallhazardsshouldbemanagedbytheconfinedspacefallprotectionhierarchy:
(1) Elimination:Removalofthehazardbycoveringallverticalentrypointsuntilentryisrequired
(2) Protection:UseofOSHAapprovedguardrailsystemsthatwillprovideacontrolledaccesszonearoundall
verticalentrypoints
(3) Restriction:Useofpositioningorrestraintdevicesthatwilleliminatethepossibilityofafalltoall
personnellocatedoutsideoftheimmediateverticalentrypoint
(4) Fallarrest:UseofOSHAapprovedfallarrest/belaydevicesthatwilllimitthemaximumarrestingforcesto
below1800lbsintheeventofafallfromaheightgreaterthan4feetabovethelowerlevelofthevertical
entrypointforallpersonnelexposedtoafallhazardduringconfinedspaceoperations.
8.8.1GuardedOpenings.Fallsintoconfinedspacescanoccurwhilepreparingtoenteraconfinedspaceor
whileworkingoutsidetheconfinedspace.Floorandwallopeningsleadingintoconfinedspacesshouldbe
protectedtopreventfallsfromoccurring.Thereareanumberofwaystodothis:
8.8.1.1Controlledaccesszonescanbeusedduringconfinedspaceoperationstolimitexposuretoanyopen
spacesorleadingedgesintowhichpersonscanaccidentallywalk.Thiscanincludetheattendantwarningof
thepotentialfallhazardorprovidingabarricadearoundthespace.
8.8.1.2Restraintsystemscanbeusedduringconfinedspaceoperationswhenaworkerneedstoworknear
theopeningorleadingedge.Thiswouldbeaccomplishedbywearingaproperlyfittedfullbodyharness
attachedashortenedlanyardwhichissecuredtoasuitableanchorpointabletowithstand1000pounds.
8.8.1.3Fallarrestsystemscanbeusedduringconfinedspaceoperationswhentheriskofafallcannotbe
eliminatedthoughtheuseofcontrolledaccessorrestraintsystems.Thiswouldbeaccomplishedbywearinga
properlyfittedfullbodyharnesswithaselfretractingdeviceattachedtoasuitableanchorpointableto
withstand5000poundsorengineeredwitha2:1safetyfactor.
33
8.8.2Access.Allemployeesenteringintoconfinedspacesregardlessofspaceconfigurationorsizeshould
wearaproperlyfittedfullbodyharness.
8.8.2.1Whenutilizingfixedladders,threepointsofcontactshouldbemaintainedatalltimes.Whenthe
ladderextendsbeyond20feetitshouldbeequippedwithladderclimbingsystemorasecondaryformof
protectionsuchasselfretractingdeviceorabelaylineattachedtoasuitableanchorpointabletowithstand
5000poundsorengineeredwitha2:1safetyfactor.
8.8.2.2Whenutilizingpotableladders,threepointsofcontactshouldbemaintainedatalltimes.Asecondary
formofprotectionshouldbeusedsuchasselfretractingdeviceorabelaylineattachedtoasuitableanchor
pointabletowithstand5000poundsorengineeredwitha2:1safetyfactor.
8.8.2.3Whenemployeeneedstobeloweredverticallyintotheconfinedspaceasecondaryformof
protectionshouldbeusedsuchasselfretractingdeviceorabelaylineattachedtoasuitableanchorpoint
abletowithstand5000poundsorengineeredwitha2:1safetyfactor.
8.8.3FallprotectionforverticaldescentsforrescueshouldbeinaccordancewithChapter10.
8.9Slip,Trip,andEntanglementHazards.
8.9.1Floorsshouldbedriedtoeliminatesliphazards.Floorsandsurfacesshouldbedeicedifnecessary.
Wherethiscannotbeinitiallyachieved,entrantsshouldusenonslipfootwear.
8.9.2Cords,lines,andhosesthatarebroughtintothespaceshouldbeplacedandsecuredinsuchamanner
soastominimizetriphazardsinworkareasandpathwaysoftravel.Triphazardsshouldbeclearlyidentified
and/orflaggedormarked.
8.9.3Nonfixedentanglementsnotrequiredfortheentryoperationandworkmayberemovedfromthe
spacetominimizehazards.Fixedentanglementsshouldberecognizedandappropriateprecautions
8.9.4Inspacelightingshouldprovideilluminationsothatallsurfacesandobstructionsareclearlyvisibleto
thoseworkinginthespace.Notethatportablelightingshouldbeapprovedforthelocationinwhichitisused
inaccordancewith8.5.
8.9.5Wheneversurfacesremainslipperyorwetconsidertheinstallationofportablefloormats,orduck
boardstoraisetheworkerabovetheleveloftheliquid.
8.10Lighting.Approved,safelightingshouldbeusedfortheworkbeingperformed.Theselectionoflighting
shouldincludethepresenceofflammableorcombustiblehazardsinaccordancewith8.5.Additionaloptions
forlightingmayincludehelmetlights,portablelighting,etc.Caluminelights(glowsticks)areportableandcan
beutilizedforbackuplightingshouldtheprimarylightingfail.Theycanalsobeusedtoprovidemarkingsasa
visualtrailtoameansofegressinpoorlylitconfinedspaces.
8.11Critters.Confinedspacescanbeidealhideoutsforanimal,snakesandinsects.Iftheconfinedspacetobe
enteredhasbeenvisuallyinspectedandfoundtocontainacritter,measuresshouldbetakentoremovethem
fromthespacepriortoentry.Atrapcouldbeloweredintothespaceforlargeranimalssuchasskunksor
raccoonsorapestcontrolcompanyorlocalanimalcontrolagencycouldbeconsulted.Careshouldbetakenif
anexterminationchemicalisusedtoreassesstheenvironmentandhazardsincludingthehazardofthe
pesticidethathasnowbeenintroducedintothespace.Thespacemayneedtobeventilatedandprotective
clothingandglovesworntopreventskincontactwiththechemicals.
8.12PersonalProtectiveEquipment.Personalprotectiveequipmentshouldbeworninaccordancewiththe
requirementsoftheentrypermitwhenengineeringoradministrativecontrolscannotfullyeliminatethe
hazardtoentrantsandworkers.
8.12.1Personalprotectiveequipmentincluding,butnotlimitedto,eyeprotection,headprotection,foot
protection,handprotection,protectiveclothing,respiratoryprotectionandhearingprotectionshouldbe
wornwheneverthepotentialexistsforaninjurythatcouldbepreventedbytheuseofsuchequipmentas
34
determinedin6.7.OtherPPEtobeconsideredmayincludekneeorelbowpads,ifcrawlingintoaspace,
coolingvestsforhotenvironments,etc.
8.12.2TheEntrySupervisororPermitIssuershouldlisttherequiredPPEonthepermitinaccordancewiththe
facilityand/orcontractorconfinedspaceentryprograms.
8.12.3PPEshouldbeselectedandusedinaccordancewithapplicableregulationsandemployer
requirements.
8.12.3.1GeneralPPErequirementsincludinghazardassessments,maintenance,andtrainingrequirements
shouldfollowtherequirementsgivenin29CFR1910.132.Althoughthatstandardcoversgeneralindustryin
theUnitedStatesonly,itprovidesagoodbasisfordevelopingasolidpersonalprotectiveequipmentprogram.
8.12.3.2Eyeandfaceprotectionshouldbeselectedandusedinaccordancewith29CFR1919.133.
8.12.3.3Respiratoryprotectionrequirementsshouldbeinaccordancewith29CFR1910.134.
8.12.3.4Headprotectionshouldbeselectedandusedinaccordancewith29CFR1910.135.
8.12.3.5Footprotectionshouldbeselectedandusedinaccordancewith29CFR1910.136.
8.12.3.6Handprotectionshouldbeselectedandusedinaccordancewith29CFR1910.138.
8.12.3.7Electricalprotectiveclothingshouldbeselectedandusedinaccordancewith29CFR1910.137and
NFPA70E:StandardforElectricalSafetyintheWorkplace.
8.12.3.8Wheneverskincontactwithchemicalsisofconcern,theappropriateprotectiveclothingshouldbe
worn.Thereisnosinglesourceofinformationforchemicalprotectiveclothing.Manufacturersofchemical
protectiveclothingcanoftenprovideinformationontheappropriateclothingfortheparticularchemicalor
chemicalsofconcern.InadditionthereareseveralNFPAstandardsincludingNFPA1991:StandardonVapor
ProtectiveEnsemblesforHazardousMaterialsEmergenciesandNFPA1992:StandardonLiquidSplash
ProtectiveEnsemblesandClothingforHazardousMaterialsEmergencies.
8.12.3.9Hearingprotectionshouldbeselectedandusedinaccordancewith29CFR1910.95.
8.12.3.10OtherPPEincludingcoolingvestsandflotationdevices,etcshouldbeselectedandwornas
determinedbythehazardevaluation.

35
Chapter9Ventilation
9.1General.
9.1.1Ventilationisusedfortworeasons:first,toremoveorcontrolatmosphericcontaminantsandsecond,to
controltemperatureforpersonalcomfort.Inmostconfinedspaceapplications,theprimaryconcernwillbe
controllingatmosphericcontaminants.Ventilationwillcommonlybeusedtoestablishinitialsafeconditions
(priortoinitialentry)andmayberequiredtomaintainsafeconditionsduringentrywherefactorsexistthat
encouragechangingconditions(e.g.,presenceofresiduesorduringhotwork).
9.1.2Theneedforventilationshouldbedeterminedinitiallythroughtheresultsofahazardevaluationand
riskassessmentconductedinaccordancewithChapter6.
9.1.3Whenconsideringuseofventilation,itisimportanttorecognizethedifferencesbetweenventilation
andpurging.Thesecommonpracticesareoftendescribedinterchangeably,butactuallyapplytodifferent
atmospherichazardcontrolsituations.Ventilationgenerallyintroducesfresh,uncontaminatedairintoaspace
andcontrolscontaminantsinthatspacethroughmixinganddilution.Purgingusesair,steam,orinertgasto
displacetheairwithinthespace.See9.3forguidanceonselectionofmethod.
9.2VentilationTypes.Therearetwotypesofventilationnaturalandmechanical.
9.2.1*NaturalVentilation.Naturalventilationisachievedwhentheclosure(s)onaspaceis(are)removedor
openedsoastoenablethenaturalairflowpresentoutsidethespacetoenterandcirculatewithinthespace.
9.2.1.1Naturalventilationshouldonlybeusedwhenadocumentedhazardevaluationandriskassessment
demonstratesthatitsusewilleffectivelyachievetheremovalorcontrolofatmosphericcontaminantswithin
thespace.
9.2.1.2Whennaturalventilationisused,continuousmonitoringshouldbeperformedtoensurethe
atmosphericconditionsaremaintainedinaccordancewiththepermitforthespace.
9.2.2MechanicalVentilation.Mechanicalventilationusesanairmovingdevice(fan,blower,eductor)to
eitherpushorpullairintoorwithinthespaceandcirculateittoachievetherequiredmixinganddilutionof
airwithinthespace.Therearetwotypesofmechanicalventilationgeneral(sometimesreferredtoas
dilution)andlocalexhaust.
9.2.2.1General(Dilution)Ventilation.Generalventilationcanbeorientedaseithersupplyorexhaust.Itis
referredtoasdilutionventilationbecauseitachievescontrolofcontaminantsthroughmixinganddilutionof
thecontaminatedairusingfresh,uncontaminatedsupplyandmakeupair.
9.2.2.1.1Supplyventilationusesanairmovingdeviceorientedsothatairispushedintothespace.
Dependingonthesizeofthespaceandcapacityoftheairmovingdevice,ductingcanbeusedtodirecttheair
agreaterdistanceintothespace.
9.2.2.1.1.1Thesourceofsupplyairtotheairmovingdeviceshouldbetakenfromalocationknowntobefree
ofcontaminants.
9.2.2.1.1.2Supplyventilationisgenerallylesseffectiveforcontrollinghighlytoxiccontaminantsasittendsto
spreadthecontaminantsbeforedilutionbecomeseffective.Localexhaustventilationshouldbeusedinthese
instances(see9.2.2.2).
9.2.2.1.2Exhaustventilationusesanairmovingdeviceorientedsothatairispulledfromthespace.
9.2.2.1.2.1Theareaorlocationwhereexhaustventilationisdischargedfromthespaceshouldbemonitored
toensurecontaminantsaredissipatingupondischargetotheatmosphere.
36
9.2.2.1.2.2Theareaorlocationwhereexhaustventilationisdischargedfromthespaceshouldbelocatedto
ensurecontaminantsdonotreentertheconfinedspacethroughtheventilationsupplyairsource.(See
Section9.5.)
9.2.2.1.2.3Thesourceforthemakeuporreplacementairshouldalsobefreeofcontaminants.
9.2.2.1.3Supplyandexhaustventilationcanbeusedtogetherwheresufficientopeningsinthespaceenable
thisarrangement.
9.2.2.1.4*Ventilationservesasasourceforthegenerationandaccumulationofstaticelectricalchargesand
allequipmentusedintheventilationsystemshouldbeproperlybondedorgrounded.
9.2.2.2LocalExhaustVentilation.
9.2.2.2.1*Localexhaustventilationshouldbeusedtocaptureandcollectpointsource(localizedorlocally
created)contaminantsgeneratedfromspecificworkactivitiesinordertolimitthereleaseofthe
contaminantstothespaceandthepotentialforfurthercontaminationoftheentirespace.
9.2.2.2.2*Forlocalexhausttobeeffective,itshouldbelocatedandmaintainedasclosetothesourceofthe
contaminantsaspossible.
9.2.3ComfortVentilation.Wherethehazardevaluationandriskassessmentdeterminesthateitherheator
coldstressconditionsexist,ventilationthatprovidesheatingorcoolingshouldbeconsidered.
9.3SelectionandDesignofVentilation.
9.3.1General.
9.3.1.1Theentrysupervisorshouldconsiderthefollowingaspartoftheevaluationontheselectionof
ventilationforcontrollingahazardousatmosphere:
(1) Whethertousepurgingorventilation
(2) Sizeandconfigurationoftheconfinedspaceincludingthenumberandlocationofopeningsthatcanbe
usedforventilationandentrantaccess
(3) Capacityoftheventilationequipment
(4) Prioruseoftheconfinedspaceforthestorageorcontainmentofahazardousmaterial
(5) Currentuseoftheconfinedspacethatmightcontributetotheexistenceofhazardswithinthespace
(6) Whetherassignedworkprocessesinoradjacenttothespacecouldintroduceatmospherichazardsintoa
confinedspace
(7) Typeofventilationequipmentavailable
9.3.1.2*Basedonthesizeoftheconfinedspace(volume)andthecapacityoftheairmovingdevice,theentry
supervisorshoulddeterminethetimeforasingleairchangefortheconfinedspace.Commonpractices
recommendfrom3to5airchangesperhourastypicalventilationrateswithinspacesoncesafeconditions
havebeenestablished.Notethatthisnumberassumesthatsafeconditionswereinitiallyachievedat35ACH
andconditionshavenotchanged.
9.3.2Contaminantcharacterization.Thephysicalandchemicalpropertiesofgases,vapors,dusts,andany
othercontaminantformthatmightbepresentinaconfinedspaceshouldbeconsideredwhenselectingand
designingaventilationsystem.Considerationsshouldinclude,butnotnecessarilybelimitedto:
(1) Characteristicsofair,vapor,gasanddustmovement
(2) Vapordensity(gasesandvapors)
(3) Specificgravity(liquidsorresidues)
(4) Vaporpressure
(5) Effect(s)ofspacetemperatureonaircontaminants
(6) Flammabilitycharacteristics(flammablerangeforgasesandvaporsorMECfordusts)
37
(7) Flashpoint
(8) Boilingpoint
(9) Recommendedexposurelimits(PEL,TLV,orequivalent)
(10) Stabilitycharacteristicsofcontaminants
9.3.3VentilationDesignConsiderations.
9.3.3.1Supplyventilationshouldbeusedwhenventilatingtoreturnatmosphericconditionstonormal
oxygenlevelsortomaintainsafeatmosphericconcentrationswithintheestablishedacceptablerange.
9.3.3.1.1Supplyventilationshouldnotbeusedwheninitiallycontrollinghighlytoxicatmospheric
contaminants.
9.3.3.1.2Supplyventilationshouldbeusedonlywhenacleansourceofmakeuporreturnairisavailable.
9.3.3.1.3*Supplyventilationshouldbeevaluatedtoensurethatsufficientairflowreachesthemostdistant
pointwithinthespace.
9.3.3.2*Exhaustventilationshouldbeusedwhenventilatingatmosphericcontaminantsinlocationswhereit
isnotpermittedtoreleasethosecontaminantstotheatmosphere.
9.3.3.2.1*Exhaustventilationshouldnotuseaxialflowairmovingdeviceswhencontrollingflammable
atmosphericcontaminants.
9.3.3.2.2Exhaustventilationshouldbeusedonlywhenacleansourceofmakeuporreturnairisavailable.
9.3.3.2.3Exhaustventilationshouldbeevaluatedtoensurethattheairmovingdevicecanbelocatedsothat
thereiseffectivecaptureofthecontaminants.
9.3.4*PurgingApplicationsandDesign.Thepurgingmediumshouldbedeterminedbasedonthe
contaminantinthespaceandtheentryorworkconditionobjective.
9.3.4.1*Wherethepurgingobjectiveistogasfreeastoragetankthatpreviouslycontainedaflammable
liquidwhilereducingthepotentialforafireoranexplosion,thenpurgingwithaninertgasshouldbe
implemented.
9.3.4.1.1Whenaninertgaspurgeisusedtodisplacetheflammablevaporsfromaboveorwithinthe
flammablerange,theinertgasshouldbeintroducedintothespaceandmaintaineduntiltheflammablevapor
concentrationhasbeenreducedtoapproximately1percentbyvolume(whichrepresentstheLFLfortypical
petroleumproducts).
9.3.4.1.2Oncetheflammablevaporconcentrationhasbeenloweredto1%byvolume,thenpurgingcannow
resumewithfreshairtodisplacetheremainingflammablevaporsandtoincreasetheoxygencontentto
ambientfreshairlevels.
9.3.4.1.3*Whilemonitoringfortheatmosphericconditionsduringtheinertingprocess,itshouldbenoted
thattheflammablevaporconcentrationsintheinertedatmospherewillnotbedetectableusingacatalytic
beadtypesensorwithouttakingspecialsteps.
9.3.4.2Purgingwithfreshairshouldbeusedtodisplacetoxiccontaminantsortodisplaceoxygendeficientair
(previouslyinerted)andreturntofreshairlevels.
9.3.4.3Purgingwithaninertgasshouldbeusedwheneverhotworkistobeperformedonoradjacenttoa
confinedspacethathasnotbeenthoroughlycleanedandgasfreedofflammablegases,vapors,andresidues.
9.3.4.4Precautionsshouldbetakentoalertallworkersworkingnearspacesthathavebeeninertedasany
ventingoftheinertgasmightdisplacetheoxygeninlocalizedareasnearthespaceandcreateunsafelevelsof
oxygen.

38
9.4VentilationEquipment.
9.4.1AirMovingDevices.Thisincludesventuritypedevicesthatexhaustonly(eductors)andfansystems.
9.4.1.1AxialFlowFans.Inanaxialflowfan,theairflowthroughtheimpellerisparalleltotheshaftonwhich
theimpellerismounted.Withinthiscategoryofequipmenttherearethreetypespropeller,tubeaxial,and
vaneaxial.
9.4.1.2CentrifugalFlowFans.Acentrifugalflowfanincludesawheelorrotormountedonashaftthat
rotateswithinascrollshapedhousing.Airentersthecenteroftherotorandmoveswithcentrifugalforceat
rightanglesthroughtherotorbladesandintothehousing.
9.4.1.3VenturiType(Eductors).Thesedevicesarealsoknownasairejectors,aireductors,orairhorns.They
operateontheventuriprinciplewhereairmovingthroughthehornincreasesinvelocityasitpassesthrough
thesmallercrosssectionalareaandexitsthehorn.Theyarecommonlypoweredbyairorsteam.Whenusing
air,thesedevicesworkassupplyorexhaust,butwhenusingsteamasthesourceofpower,theyshouldonly
beusedforexhaustventilation.
9.4.2DuctWork.Theevaluationconductedaspartoftheselectionandventilationdesigninaccordancewith
9.3.1.1shouldincludeadeterminationonuseofventilationductwork.
9.4.2.1Thesize,shape,orconfigurationofsomeconfinedspacesmightmakeitnecessarytoattachflexible
ductingtotheairmovingdevicethathasbeenselectedinordertodelivertheairmovementtothedesigned
locationwithinthespace.
9.4.2.2Itisrecommendedthattheflexibleductingincludemeansforbondingorgroundingoftheducting
alongwiththeairmovingdeviceinordertocontrolthegenerationandaccumulationofstaticcharge.
9.4.2.3*Thehazardevaluationshouldestablishconditionswherecollapsible,rolled,plastictubingcanbe
usedasventilationductwork.
9.4.2.4Forentryintospaceswithsingleentryaccessportals,thehazardevaluationshouldconsiderusingthe
ductworkandbloweradapter(saddle)tominimizethedegreetowhichthespaceopeningisrestrictedbythe
placementoftheductwork.
9.4.3*ThermalOxidizers.Forventilationrequirementsintanksandotherspaceswithflammable
atmospheres,localenvironmentalregulationsoftenrestrictemissions.Withinthepetroleum,aboveground
storagetankindustrycommonpracticeforgasfreeingorvaporfreeingtanksistouseexhaustventilation
withthedischargeconnectedtoathermaloxidizerunit.
9.4.4*Bonding/Grounding.Staticelectricityiscreatedwheneversurfacesareseparated,whichoccurswhen
movementoccurs,suchasairmovingthroughafanorblowerorducting.Sinceapplicationswhereventilation
isusedinvolveflammablegasorvaporconcentrations,controlofignitionsourcesbecomesessential.
Regulationsandbestpracticesrequirethatallairmovingdevicesbeproperlybondedorgrounded.This
includestheductingwhenattachedtotheairmovingdevice.
9.4.5OtherEquipment.Inadditiontoflexibleducting,theventilationinstallationcanincludeother
equipmentsuchasadapters(saddle)thatattachthroughtheopeningofthespacetotheairmovingdevice
andductingsoasnottocompletelyobstructtheopening.
9.5InstallationofVentilation.
9.5.1Ventilationshouldbeplacedinsuchawaytoreachthefarthestpointwithinthespace,inorderto
maximizetheturbulenceinthespaceandtominimizethecreationofdeadairpockets.
9.5.1.1*Whenevaluatingthespaceconfigurationacompetentpersonshouldconsiderobstructionswithin
thespacethatrestrictorlimitairmovement.

39
FigureA.9.5.1.1TypicalSpaceConfigurations.
9.5.1.2Thelocation,sizeandnumberofportalsoropeningsthatcanbeusedforventilationshouldbe
consideredwhendesigningandinstallingaventilationsystem.
9.5.1.3Locationofopeningscanlimittheabilitytoefficientlyandeffectivelymoveairthroughouttheentire
space.
9.5.1.4*Inplacingtheventilationequipment,openingsforexhaustandsupplyairshouldbeseparatedas
muchaspossibletolimitthepotentialforcreatingshortcircuitingconditions.
FigureA9.5.1.4[thesediagramsareastart;shouldshowsupply,exhaust,localexhaustexamples;should
alsoshowventilationfromtopaswellasfromatgrade(sideentry)configuration]
9.5.2Ventilationductworkshouldbeinstalledsoasnottoblockaccessintoorexitfromthespace.
9.5.3*Stratifiedatmospheres(seeChapter7)shouldbeconsideredaspartoftheselectionanddesign
evaluationtoensurethatventilationductworkispositionedtoachievetheremovalordisplacementof
contaminants.
9.5.4Precautionsshouldbetakentocontrolorremoveallignitionsourcesfromtheareasincegasesand
vaporsmightbepresentintheflammablerangebothinsidetheconfinedspaceandatthepointofventilation
discharge.
9.5.5Allairmovingdevicesandrelatedequipmentshouldbebondedandgrounded.
9.5.6Thedischargepointfromallexhaustventilationprocesses,notconnectedtoscrubbingsystemsorother
contaminantcontrolsystems,shouldbelocatedaminimumof3.7m(12ft)abovegrade.Theselectionofthe
dischargepointshouldensurethatexhaustedcontaminantsaredirectedawayfromareasthatmightcontain
sourcesofignitionandareaswherepersonnelmaybeworking,anddirectedtoalocationthatwillreducethe
likelihoodofreentrainmentofexhaustedcontaminants.
9.5.7Displacementoftheconfinedspaceatmospherewithairshouldbeaccomplishedbyoneofthe
followingmethods:
(1) Anegativepressureorvacuumusedtopulloutsideairintotheconfinedspaceusinganeducatortypeair
movingdeviceorothersimilarequipment.
(2) Apositivepressureordiffusedairblowerusedtopushoutsideairintotheconfinedspace.
(3) Acombinationofoptions(1)and(2)
9.5.7.1Whenthemethoddescribedin9.5.7(1)isused,thefollowingshouldapply:
(1) Theconnectionbetweentheeductorandtheconfinedspaceshouldbeairtight.
(2) Airshouldbedrawnthroughtheconfinedspacetoallowcrossventilationandremovalofvapors.
(3) Allequipmentshouldbebondedorgrounded.
9.5.7.2Whenthemethoddescribedin9.5.7(2)isused,thefollowingshouldapply:
(1) Ifafillopeningthatextendsintotheconfinedspaceisusedasanairsupplypoint,theportionofthefill
pipethatextendsintotheconfinedspaceshouldberemoved.
(2) Theairshouldbesuppliedfromacompressororblowerthathasbeencheckedfordeliveryofcleanair
thatisfreeofflammableortoxicvapors.
(3) Theairdiffusingpipe,ifused,shouldbebondedtotheconfinedspacetocontroltheaccumulationand
dischargeofstaticelectricity.
9.5.8Ventilationforcontrollinghazardsofextremeheatorcold.
9.5.8.1Whenentryandworkinconfinedspacesinvolvespotentialforexposuretotemperatureextremes,
thehazardevaluationandriskassessmentshouldincludeadeterminationoftheneedforcomfortventilation
tobeapplied.
40
9.5.8.2*Basedontheoutcomefromthehazardevaluationandriskassessment,aircanbeconditionedtobe
warmedorcooledasappropriatefortheenvironmentandwork.
9.5.9*Purging.Ahazardevaluationandriskassessmentshouldbecompletedtodeterminethatpurgingcan
besafelyimplemented.
9.5.10AtmosphericMonitoring.
9.5.10.1AtmospherictestingshouldbeconductedbyacompetentpersoninaccordancewithChapter7.
9.5.10.2Ifthehazardevaluationandriskassessmentindicatesthatatmosphericconditionswithinthespace
canchangeadversely,continuousforcedmechanicalventilationshouldbeprovidedforthespaceduringall
entryandwork.
9.5.10.3*Ifthehazardevaluationandriskassessmentindicatesthatatmosphericconditionswillnotbe
maintainedwithinacceptablelevelsatalltimesduringtheentryandwork,flowmonitoring,alarms,
secondarypowersystemsandsimilarbackupsystemsshouldbeutilizedtoensurethesafetyofentrantsand
theintegrityoftheventilationsystemandfreshairsupply.
9.5.10.4Whenventilationcannotordoesnotcompletelyeliminatearecognizedatmospherichazard,other
protectivemeasuresormethodsforcontrollingaircontaminantsandprotectingentrantsshouldbe
determinedbyacompetentpersonpriortoentryauthorization.
9.6LimitationsofVentilation.Thefollowinglimitationsshouldbeconsideredduringthehazardevaluation
andriskassessmentprocess,duringdesignandselection,andduringinstallationanduseofventilation
systemsforconfinedspaces:
(1) Sourceofsupplyandmakeupair
(2) Useofapprovedequipmentwhererequired(electricalareaclassificationforexample)
(3) Bondingandgroundingofallairmovingdevices
(4) Noiselevelsassociatedwithairmovingdevices
(5) Maintainingaccessandegressneedswhileventilatingspaces
(6) Frequentatmosphericmonitoringinsidespaceandoutsidespace
(7) Timerequiredtoachieveinitialsafeconditions
(8) Workerprotectioninadditiontoventilation

41
Chapter10.Rescue.
10.1General.
10.1.1Application.Preventionisrecognizedasthebestmethodtoavoidtheneedforrescue.Ifahazard
evaluationisproperlyperformedandallhazardsarecontrolledinawaythatwilleliminatethechanceof
harmtoentrants,thelikelihoodofaneedforrescueisgreatlyreduced.
Evenincaseswherehazardsmayexist,trainingentrantstounderstandthesepotentialhazardssotheymay
exitthespaceontheirownpowerwhentheyrecognizethethreatisfarbetterthanwaitinguntiltheyare
incapacitatedbyit.Otheroptionsincludetheabilitytoremoveillorinjuredentrantswithoutenteringthe
space(Nonentryrescue)orenteringthespacetoproperlytreat,packageandremovetheseillorinjured
entrants(Entrytyperescue).
Thisguideappliestoallorganizationsthatareresponsibleforselectionorprovisionofaresponsecapability
forrescueemergenciesinorassociatedwithconfinedspaces.Theelementsassociatedwithrescueprogram
needsshouldbeidentifiedinthehazardevaluationandriskassessmentconductedbytheAHJ(person,
personsororganizationhavingresponsibilityforacquiringarescueprovisionforoneormoreconfined
spaces).
10.1.2NonentryRescueAttendantCapabilities.Inaconfinedspaceemergencywherehazardsexistthat
mayaffectotherswhowouldenterthespacetoproviderescue,itisbestpracticetoextracttheincapacitated
patientwithoutenteringthespace.Inmostcases,nonentryrescueprovisions(retrievalsystems)shouldbe
inplacetoallowthisoption.However,itshouldberecognizedthatconditionsmayexistorarisethatwould
prohibittheuseofnonentryrescue.Thissectionisintendedtoaddressnonentryrescue.
10.1.2.1AttendantsShouldBeResponsibleforPerformingCertainNonEntryRescue(Retrieval)Operations.
Attendantsshouldberesponsibleforperformingemergencynotificationandcertainnonentryrescue
(retrieval)operations.Ifproperlyqualified/trainedanAttendantmayperforminthecapacityofaconfined
spacerescueroncerelievedofAttendantduties.
10.1.2.2ConceptandPurposeofRetrievalSystemsforNonEntryRescueRetrievallinesareintended
primarilytoprovideameansforremovalofillorinjuredpersonsfromaspaceinordertolimittheexposure
tootherpersonstaskedwithprovidingrescue.Thisprovidesameansforremovalwithoutenteringthespace
todoso.Thesesystemsshouldalsobeappliedforrescueentrantswheneverpossible,althoughthe
configurationofthesesystemsmaydiffersignificantly.Ifproperlyconfigured,thesesystemsmayalsodouble
asfallprotectioninspaceswherefallhazardsexist.
10.1.2.2.1CompositionofRetrievalSystems.Retrievalsystemsareusuallycomprisedofropeorcablebased
systemswhichareattachedtotheentrantinsuchawayastoprovideaprofile,appropriatetothespaces
configuration,thatwouldallowsuccessfulremovalfromthespace.Theretrievalsystemitselfshould,inmost
cases,provideameansofliftingorotherwisemovingtheentrantsothattheymayberemovedwithout
significantstresstotheoperatorandwithoutdangerofdroppingtheillorinjuredentrantshouldtheoperator
releasethesystemduringretrieval(progresscapture).Thisismuchmoreimportantinverticallyoriented
spaceswhereanillorinjuredpatientcouldbedropped.Inspaceswithaverticaldepthgreaterthan4feet,a
mechanicalmeansofretrieval(oneemployingmechanicaladvantagetoreducetheforcerequired)witha
progresscapturemechanism(topreventdropifthesystemisreleased)shouldbeused.Inhorizontally
orientedspaces,retrievalequipmentmaybeassimpleasarope,webbingorcablesystem;attachedtothe
entrantsharnessorotherappropriatetypeofbodyrigging(wristlets,anklets,wheeledorlowfrictiondrag
devices,etc.)toallowremovalwithoutendangeringtheentrant.Thesesystemsmaynothaveaneedfor
progresscaptureoramechanicalmeansofretrievaliftheentrantisonaperfectlyhorizontal,lowfriction
plane.Inallcases,theretrievalsystemshouldbeappropriatelyanchoredoutsideofthespacetopreventit
frombeingaccidentallypulledintothespaceduringoperations,renderingitineffective.
42
10.1.2.2.2RetrievalSystemsforEntryandFallProtection.Aspreviouslystated,theequipmentutilizedto
createretrievalsystemsmaysometimesserveotherpurposesaswell.Inthecaseofverticallyconfigured
spaceswherenoothermeansofselfassistedentryexists(i.e.laddersorstairs),retrievalsystemshavingthe
capabilityofbothloweringandraisingpersonnelmaybehelpfulastheprincipalmeansofloweringentrants
intothespace.Thisisanonemergencyapplicationofthisequipmentanditishighlyrecommendedthata
redundantlyanchoredandoperatedbackupsystemofsomesortbeinplaceduringtheseoperationsinthe
eventofanyfailureassociatedwiththeprimarysystem.Forinstance,atripodandwinchbeingutilizedto
lowerworkersintoaspaceinapurelyverticalenvironmentshouldalsomaintainsomesortofbackupdevice
whichmayinclude;butarenotlimitedto;fallprotectionblocks,selfretractinglifelinesorbelaysystems.As
mentioned,itishighlyrecommendedthatbackupsystemsberedundantlyanchoredtobecompletely
independentoftheprimarysystemsothatanyfailureoftheprimary(includingtheanchorsystem)wouldbe
sufficientlybackedup.
10.1.2.2.2.1Whenfallhazardsexistwithinaspace,theretrievalsystemmay,insomecases,alsoprovidean
adequatemeansoffallprotectiontokeeptheentrantssafefromfallswhileworkinginthespace.Inorderfor
thistobeeffective,entrantsmustbeindependentlyattachedtoretrievallineswhichareanchoredoutsideof
thespaceandincorporatedevicesthatwillwithstandtheforcesexpectedfromafallwhileproviding
appropriateenergyabsorptiontomakethefalltolerabletotheentrantsbody.Thesesystemsshouldbe
capableofnotonlypreventingand/orarrestingafall,butalsocapableofremovaloftheentrantintheevent
ofafall.Fallprotectionsystemsandrecommendedtolerancesareaddressedindetailwithinchapter8.If
possible,thesesystemsshouldlimittheabilityoftheentrantstoapproachunprotectededges,ineffect,
becomingfallrestraintratherthanfallarrestsystems.
10.1.2.2.3RetrievalSystemConfigurations.Asitappliestotheentrantinatypicalconfinedspaceentry,
unlesswaived,retrievalsystemsshouldmaintainindependentlinesoneachworkerenteringthespacesoas
toallowindependentretrievalwithanyworkershouldanincidentoccur.Thesesystemsshouldalsobe
immediatelyreadytoprovideremovaloftheillorinjuredentrant.Itishighlyrecommendedthatretrieval
systemsbecapableofactuationwithinsecondsofrecognitionoftheemergency.Asitappliestorescue
entrants,configurationsmayvaryfromthetypicalincertaincircumstances.Inanycase,retrievalsystems,
unlesswaived,shouldbeattachedpriortoentryandmaintainedatalltimesuntiltheentrant(s)haveleftthe
space.AretrievallineshouldNEVERbedisconnectedinsideaspace.Thiswouldrenderthesystemineffective
shouldanemergencyoccurrequiringretrieval.
10.1.2.2.3.1RetrievalSystemConfigurationConsiderationsforTypicalEntries.Inentrieswhereportable
anchordevicesandmanufacturedsystemsmaybeemployedwithonlyoneentrant,retrievalsystem
configurationsmaybeverysimplistic.Whentheneedformultipleentrantsoccursorspecificstructural
restrictionsinandaroundthespaceexist,configuringthesesystemsmaybecomecomplicated.
(A)Whileitisoftenthoughtthatasimpletripodandwinchsystemwillsolvemostretrievalproblems,this
maynotbethecase.Atripodandwinchmayofferagoodalternativetoretrievalinmostcasesbut,when
overheadorworkingsurfacesrestricttheabilitytoerectaTripod,othermethodsmustbeutilized.Awinch
deviceorothermanufacturedsystemmaybeanexcellentchoiceinasingleentranttypeofentrywherean
adequateoverheadanchorexists,butwhenmultipleentrantsmustenterthespaceorthedevicecannotbe
positionedabovetheportal,itmaybecomeslightlymorecomplicatedtoconfigurealloftheretrievaldevices
sothattheymaybeeasilymonitoredandeffectivelyutilizedintheeventofanemergency.
(B)Insomecases,retrievalsystemsmayberequiredtoliftillorinjuredentrantsupanddirectlyovertheedge
oftheportal.Significantknowledgeofmanaginghumanbodiesoversuchedgesandtheequipmentand
systemsnecessarytoeffectretrievalwithoutfurtherinjury(toentrantsandoperators)isofparamount
importance.
(C)Appropriateassessmentandtrainingisvitaltoassureproperconfigurationofthesesystemsbasedonthe
circumstancessurroundingtheentry.Itisimportantthattheretrievalsystemutilizedaccomplishtherescue
objectiveeffectivelyandsafelywithinanappropriatetimeframe.
43
10.1.2.2.3.2RetrievalSystemConfigurationConsiderationsforRescueEntrants.Aspreviouslystated,entry
forrescuestillrequirestheneedforretrieval.Unlesswaived,thesesystemsmayoffersignificantassistanceto
personswhoareenteringspacesduringanemergency.Considerthefollowingquestion:Ifitisimportantto
maintainanimmediatemeansofretrievalduringnormalentrieswhennoemergencyyetexists,howmuch
moresoinasituationwhereanemergencyhasalreadyoccurred.Evenwhenretrievalispossible,itis
recommendedthatrescueentrantshavetrainedbackuprescuersimmediatelyavailable(oneforeachrescue
entrantinsidethespace)forentryrescueshouldarescueentrantgetintrouble.Theserepresentsignificant
differencesinrescueentriesvs.typicalconfinedspaceentries.
(A)Otherdifferencesareassociatedwiththeneedforrescuerstohandleemergenciesquicklyandsafelyby
managingrisksandminimizingcomplicationintheirsystems.Whileusingindependentretrievalmightbe
typicalformostentries,rescuersmusttakeotherissuesintoconsideration.Forinstance,whennofallhazards
existwithinthespaceandbreathingairsystemsarenotrequiredforrescueentrants,theymayconsider
placingseveralrescuersonasingleretrievalline,spacingthemoutsoeachmaybeindependentlyretrieved,
oneatatime.Thismakestheriggingoftherescuesystemsnecessarytoliftandlowertheserescuersmore
efficientontheoutsideofthespace.Ofcourse,whilethismaybemoremanageableontheoutsideofthe
space,thereisadditionalropebetweenrescuersthatmustbemanagedinsidethespace.
(B)Inthecaseofrescuersonbreathingairsystems,independentretrievallinesarerecommendedsothatthe
firstrescuerinmaybethefirstrescueroutsincefatigueordepletionofairsupplytypicallyaffectsthefirst
rescuerearlierthanthesubsequentrescueentrants.
(C)Incaseswherefallhazardsexist,rescuersshouldfollowthesameguidelinesastypicalentriesbyproviding
independentattachmenttoappropriatesystemstoactasfallprotection.
(D)Ingeneral,rescuersneedmoreversatilityintheirretrievalsystemswhileprovidingthesamedegree
effectivenessandsafetyassociatedwithtypicalentryretrieval.
10.1.2.2.4EnsuringOperationalReadinessinRetrievalSystems.Retrievalsystemsshouldbereadyatall
times.Toassureoperationalreadiness,thefollowingthreequestionsmaybehelpfulpriortoentry:
(1) Doeseveryoneinvolvedknowtheplanforretrieval?Withoutcommunicationofthisplanofaction,
personnelaroundthesceneoftheemergencymayattempttotrymanydifferentoptions,slowingor
renderingretrievalineffective.Knowtheplan!
(2) Doeseveryoneinvolvedknowtheirpartintheretrievalplan?Whiletypically,thesesystemsareoperated
bytheAttendant,moreadvancedsystemsmaybeutilizedwhichrequiremorethanonepersonsefforts
toeffectretrieval.Again,itisveryimportantthateveryoneinvolvedknowswhodoeswhat.
(3) Willtheretrievalsystemworkthewayitisconfigured?Thismayseemlikeanunreasonablequestion,but
retrievalequipmentisfrequentlysetupwithoutregardforwhetherornotitwillactuallywork.For
instance,slightlyoffsettingawinchdevicefromcenterofaportalinaverticallyorientedspacemay
allowillorinjuredworkerstobetrappedagainsttheundersideoftheportalduringextraction,creating
thesignificantpotentialforsevereinjury.Africtionreducingdeviceorotheredgemanagementmethods
mighthavebeeneffectivelyusedattheportaltopreventthisfromhappening.Inanycase,thesesystems
shouldbetestedpriortousetoassurethateverythingworksthewayitwasintended.
10.1.2.3LimitationsandExceptionsforRetrieval.Itshouldberecognizedthatretrievalisnotalwaysprudent
orevenpossible.Inthecaseofspacesthatcontaininternalconfigurationsthatcouldentangleortrapa
personagainststructure,alineattachedtotheentrantmightnotfunctionatallor,worseyet,mayactually
causefurtherharmtotheentrantduringtheretrievalattempt.
10.1.2.3.1Theconditionswithinaspaceshouldbecarefullyevaluatedtoassurethatsuchdangersare
mitigatedoreliminatedentirely.Inmostcaseswherethesetypesofinternalhazardsexist,thelogicalchoice
maybetoforgoretrievallinesentirelytopreventfurtherrescuecomplications.Considerthefollowing
questionswhendeterminingwhetherornottousearetrievalsystem:
44
(1) Wouldtheretrievalequipmentincreasetheoverallriskofentry?(Iftheanswertothisquestionisyes,
thentheuseofretrievalequipmentcanbewaived.)
(2) Wouldtheretrievalequipmentcontributetotherescueoftheentrant?(Iftheanswertothisquestionis
no,theretrievalequipmentcanbewaived.)
(A)Inthesesituations,itisimportanttoassurethatanentrytyperescueprovisionshouldbeavailableto
respondinatimelymanner.
(B)Itshouldberecognizedthat,regardlessoftheabilitytorigandoperateretrievallineseffectively,itmay
notbeprudenttoutilizethem.Forexample,aworkerwhoispositionedonbuiltupscaffoldingwithinaspace
mightfallandstrikehisheadonanobject.Simplyoperatingtheretrievaltoextractthisperson,without
regardforapotentialspinalinjury,couldcreatepermanentdamagetothepatientsspinewithsignificant
potentialforparalysis.Retrievaloperationsshouldtakeintoaccountthehazardvs.therisktothepatientto
ensuresafety.
10.1.2.4Organizationsshouldimplementproceduresforthefollowingattendantoperations:
(1) Recognizingtheneedforconfinedspacesearchandrescue
(2) Initiatingcontactandestablishingcommunicationswithvictimswherepossible
(3) *Recognizingandidentifyingthehazardsassociatedwithnonentryconfinedspaceemergencies
(4) Advisingtherespondingrescuersofthesituationandpotentialhazards
(5) Recognizingconfinedspaces
(6) *Identifyingtheneedforandperforminganonentryretrieval,basedontheconditionspresent
(7) *Implementingtheemergencyresponsesystemforconfinedspaceemergencies
10.1.3EntryTypeRescue.Governmentorjurisdictionalregulationsoftendelineatebetweenthosespaces
thatcontainactualorpotentialthreats(hazards)thatmaynecessitaterescuevs.thosethatdonothavethat
potential.Confinedspacesthatdonotcontainathreat(orinsomecaseswherethethreatshavebeen
mitigated,controlledoreliminatedentirely)havenorequirementforarescueprovision.
10.1.3.1ExistingNFPAstandardsrelativetoconfinedspacerescue(1670and1006)considerallspacesto
whichtheyrespondtopossiblycontainhazards.Therefore,NFPAtechnicalrescuestandardsmakeno
delineationbetweenconfinedspacesandpermitrequiredconfinedspacessinceanemergencyhasalready
occurred,evokingaresponse.Itassumestheworst;thatahazardmayhavecausedthisemergency;
regardlessofwhetherornotthatisthecase.
10.1.3.2Manyelementsofaconfinedspacerescueprogram,suchastheneedforarescueprovisionandthe
modeofresponseshouldbeaddressedintheplanningphase.Theresponsephaseaddressestheapproachto
emergencieswhentheyhaveoccurred.Allelementsoftherescueoperationshouldbecarefullyconsideredin
theplanningphase.
10.1.3.3Thisguidecontendsthattherequirementforarescueprovisionshouldnotbebasedsolelyonthe
hazardswithinandaroundaspacethatmightcreateemergenciesandmakeitdifficulttoselfrescue,butalso
thecharacteristicsthatmightmakeitdifficultforanillorinjuredworkertoberemovedwhennotunderhis
orherownpower,eveniftherearenoatmospheric,engulfment,entrapmentorotherchemicalorphysical
hazardsintroducedtocausetheemergency.Unlessaspacecanbeproventohavenopotentialforhazards
andnopotentialdifficultyassociatedwithremovalofillorinjuredentrants,arescueprovisionofsome
degreeisrequired.
10.1.3.4RescueResponseMode.Thedegreeandrapidityofresponseshouldbeprincipallydrivenbythe
anticipatedhazards.Thosespacesthatcontainknownhazardsshouldreceivegreaterscrutinyandperhaps
morerapidorcomplexresponsebasedonthesehazards.Considerationsshouldalsoincludethosespaces
wheretechnicalrescuemayberequiredtomoveanillorinjuredentranttoastableenvironmentonce
extractedfromthespace.Rescuecapabilitiesshouldbeevaluatedtoassuretheyareappropriatetothe
response.Manyemergencyresponseagenciesmaynothavethetrainingorequipmenttorespondto
confinedspaceemergencies.Considerationshouldbegiventothreebasicmodesofrescueresponse;
45
(1) Tier1Thosethathavenorecognizedhazardsbutcouldrequiretechnicalrescueforextractionshould
theworkerbecomeincapacitated
(2) Tier2Thosewithnonlifethreateninghazardsrequiringrapidintervention
(3) Tier3Thosewithlifethreateninghazardsrequiringimmediateintervention
10.1.3.4.1*Tier1ResponseMode.Ifahazardevaluationhasbeenperformed(inaccordancewithChaptersix
ofthisguide)andthespacecontainsnopotentialforhazardsbut,duetoitsconfiguration,wouldprohibit
workersfrombeingeasilyremovediftheyweretobecomeincapacitated,eitherduetomedicalillnessor
injury,aTier1responsemodemaybeindicated.Attheminimum,thisshouldincludeanyverticallyoriented
spacegreaterthanfivefeetinverticalheightwhetherornotretrievalequipmentisinplace.ATier1
capabilitysuggeststhatafullytrainedRescueTeammeetingNFPA1670,Chapter7,Technicianlevelis
availabletorespondwithinfiveminutestothesiteandcapableofsetupandrescueentrywithin1215
minutesofarrivalonsite.
10.1.3.4.2*Tier2ResponseMode.IfaspacecontainsnoIDLHorotherpotentiallyimmediatelifethreatening
hazards,butcontainssomeotheractualorpotentialhazardthatcouldincapacitateaworkerorpreventthem
fromexitingthespacewithoutassistance(selfrescue),aTier2responsemodeshouldbeindicated.ATier2
capabilitysuggeststhatafullytrainedRescueTeammeetingNFPA1670,Chapter7,Technicianlevelisonsite
withappropriatecapabilitytomakesafeentryforrescue.Thisteamshouldbeequippedandmobile,capable
ofsetupandrescueentrywithin1215minutesofincidentoccurrence.
10.1.3.4.3*Tier3ResponseMode.IfworkisoccurringinsideaspacethatcontainsanIDLHorother
potentiallyimmediatelifethreateninghazard,eitheractualorpotential,aTier3responsemodeshouldbe
indicated.ATier3capabilitysuggeststhatafullytrainedRescueTeammeetingrequirementsstatedinNFPA
1670,Chapter7,Technicianlevelisstandingbyintheimmediateareawithappropriatecapabilitytomake
safeentryforrescue.Thisteamshouldbecompletelysetupandcapableofrescueentrywithintwominutes
ofincidentoccurrence.TheRescueTeamshouldbededicatedtothissingularentrywithnoother
responsibilities.
46
10.1.3.5*ProtectionofPersonnelDuringRescue.Ingeneral;ifthecauseoftheincidentcannotbeprovento
beunrelatedtotheatmosphere,regardlessoftheatmosphericmonitorreadings,appropriateprotectionin
theformofatmospheresupplyingrespiratorsshouldbewornbyrescuersandprovidedtobreathingvictims.
Ifchemicalprotectiveclothingisindicatedbyconditions,appropriateprotectionshouldbeprovidedfor
rescueentrantsaswell.
Communications:Abilityto
indicatethatanemergencyor
potentialemergencycanoccur
AccountabilityofEntrantsand
Attendants
InventoryofSpacesand
Classifications
ResponseMode:TierI,II,orIII
Time:Evaluateofinternaland
ExternalResources
FrequencyofEntry
ConfigurationandAccessInand
OutoftheSpace
ConfigurationandAccessof
AdjacentSpaces
StructuralStabilityofSpace
PurposeforEntryandOperations
asTheyEffectrescue
IdentifyImmediateHazards
IdentifyconditionandNumberof
Patients
MedicalAssessment
IdentifyNecessaryResources
RescueorRecovery
Mode
47
Figure10.1.3.5PreIncidentActionPlanningandAssessmentFlowChart.
10.1.3.5.1*RescueVs.Recovery.Itisrecognizedthatnotallrescuescanbeperformedsafely.Certain
conditionsmayexistthatwouldcreateanunreasonablerisk(asopposedtocalculatedrisks)torescuers.In
thesecases,thedecisionshouldbemadetodowngradetherescueeffortwhichmayresultinabody
recovery.Thedecisiontochangetheapproachtothisincidentisgenerallytheresponsibilityofthepersonin
chargeoftherescueserviceandmaybelooselybasedonthefollowingguidelines:
(1) ArethereenoughRescueTeammemberstoperformtherescuesafely,
(2) Dorescuershavetheproperequipmenttoperformtherescuesafely,and
(3) Dorescuershavethepropertrainingtoperformtherescuesafely.
(4) Ifanyoneofthesequestionscannotbeansweredintheaffirmative,therescueshouldnotbeperformed.
10.1.3.5.2Communications.Whilecommunicationsequipmentandmethodsarethoroughlyoutlinedin
Chapter8,itisimportanttonotethattheneedforcommunicationsinrescueoperationsshouldbebasedon
thecircumstancesandrescueobjective,whichmeansthechoicesmadebytheRescueTeamarenotonly
aboutthetypeofcommunicationsequipment,butthemethodsemployed.
10.1.3.5.2.1Theprincipleoperationalconcernsregardingcommunicationsforrescueoperationsinvolvenot
onlycommunicationfrominsidetotheoutsideofthespace,butthecommunicationamongrescuersinside
andoutsidethespace.Forexample,teamsutilizingropebasedorotherrescuesystemsforloweringorraising
rescuers/patientsmusthavedefinitivecommunicationssothatthesystemsmaybeoperatedsafely.Systems
remotefromtheportalorpositionedinhighnoiseenvironmentsmayrequiretheuseofhandsignalsin
additiontoverbalorradiocommunicationmethods.Ontheinteriorofthespace,highnoiseenvironmentsor
theuseofbreathingapparatusmayinhibittheabilityofrescuerstospeaktooneanother,eveninclose
proximity.Itwillbeimportanttoutilizeequipmentsuchasvoiceamplifiersorevenmethodssuchashand
signalstoassureadequatecommunicationandefficientoperations.
10.1.3.5.2.2Regardingcommunicationsbetweenteameffortsoutsideofthespacetothoseinsidethespace
andviceversa,methodsutilizedshouldbeaspatentaspossiblewithprovisionsintheeventofa
communicationssystemfailure.Forexample,aRescueTeamutilizingportableradiosystemsastheprimary
meansofcommunicationsbetweentheinsideandoutsideofthespaceshouldhaveasecondarymethodof
communicationsreadilyinplaceintheeventofaradiofailureorinterference.Thismaybeassimpleasthe
utilizationofapredesignatedseriesofhandsignalsbut,inanycase,shouldprovideanappropriate
substitute.Oneofthemostpatentmeansofcommunicationsbetweentheoutsideandinsideofaspaceis
hardlinecommunications.Thistypeofsystemutilizesacommunicationscablethatallowstransmissionof
voicebetweenitsterminalpoints.Whilethismaybeaverygoodmeansofcommunications,circumstances
suchasentanglementhazardswithinthespacemayrenderitineffective.Inanycase,thepreincidentrescue
actionplanandpracticeofthatplanrepresentthebestmeansofdeterminingtheeffectivenessofthe
communicationsmethodschosenbytheRescueTeam.
10.2RescueTeamQualification
10.2.1*Responsibility.TheAHJ(Theperson,persons,ororganization(s)responsibleforthespacesorspaces
atthesite)shouldassurethattherescueservice,regardlessofwhoprovidesit,isqualifiedtoactinthat
capacity.Onsite,contractedorcontractorsuppliedrescueservicesshouldallmeetapplicablerequirements
toassuretheirlevelofcapabilityiscommensuratewiththetaskathand.Assessmentoftherescueservices
qualificationsshouldconsidertheirtraining,standardoperatingprocedures,equipment,availabilityand
abilitytoperformrescue.Anevaluationoftheircapabilitiesshouldincludetheoveralltimelinessofresponse
andademonstrationoftheirabilitytoperformsafeandeffectiverescueinthosetypesofspacestowhichthe
teammustrespond.
48
10.2.2RescueProgramAudits.Confinedspacerescueprogramsshouldbeauditedperiodically.Itis
suggestedthatthisoccuratleastonceayear.Itisalsoagoodpracticetoreviewtherescueprogram
followingeachrescueoperationandmakeadjustmentstotheprogramifneeded.
10.2.2.1ContentofAudit.Rescueprogramauditsshouldbeconductedtoincludeafullevaluationofthe
rescueprogram,regardlessofthesourceoftherescueservicesandtheircapability.Thecomponentsofthe
RescueProgramAuditshouldinclude,butnotbelimitedto:
(1) Evaluationoftherescueresponseplan.
(2) ReviewoftherescueservicesequipmentincludingthesystemutilizedforInspection,Inventory,History
ofuseanddocumentation.
(3) Reviewoftherescueservicesstandardoperatingprocedurestoassuretheycoincidewiththeneedsof
theresponsearea.
(4) Evaluationoftherescueservicesavailabilityandtimelinessofresponsetoassureitisappropriatetothe
responserequired.
(5) Evaluationoftherescueservicecapabilitybymeansofaperformanceevaluation.
(6) Reviewofrescueservicesqualificationsandtrainingrecordsrelativetobothrescueandmedical
provisions.
(7) Reviewofrescueservicespreincidentemergencyactionplansforeachspaceforwhichtheyare
responsible.
(8) Evaluationofthecommunicationsmethodsusedforbothrescueservicenotificationandoperationatan
emergency.
(9) Additionsandcorrectionstotherescueplanbasedonauditresults.
10.2.2.2*AuditorQualifications.Confinedspacerescueprogramauditsshouldbeconductedbyadesignated
personorgroupofpersonstrainedinorfamiliarwithrescueoperationsandmedicalprovisionsatalevel
commensuratewiththerecommendationsofthisguideforRescueTeammembers.
10.2.3PerformanceEvaluations.Performanceevaluationsareaprincipalmeansofdecidingwhoisqualified
amongagroupofperspectiverescueserviceproviders.Performanceevaluationsshouldbeconductedprior
toconsideringarescueserviceandthenperiodicallytoassuretheirperformanceisstillsatisfactory.
Performanceshouldbeevaluatedbymeansofsimulatedrescueoperationsinwhichtherescueservice
removesdummies,mannequins,orpersonsfromactualconfinedspacesorfromrepresentativeconfined
spacesresemblingallthosetowhichtherescueservicecouldberequiredtorespondinanemergencywithin
theirjurisdiction.Representativeconfinedspacesshould;withrespecttoopeningsize,configuration,and
accessibility;simulatethetypesofconfinedspacesfromwhichrescueistobeperformed.
10.2.3.1*TeamCompositionforEvaluations.Evaluationofrescueserviceperformanceshouldincludeall
combinationsofpersonnelexpectedtoparticipateasamemberofthatteam.Thismayrequiremultiple
evaluationstoassureallteammembercompositionswillprovidetheappropriatecapabilityforconfined
spacerescue.AdhocoronetimeRescueTeamsmayonlyneedaqualifyingpreoperationevaluation.
10.2.3.2FrequencyofPerformanceEvaluations.Performanceevaluationsshouldberepeatedannually.
10.2.3.3ComponentsofPerformanceEvaluations.Performanceevaluationsshouldincludeameansof
evaluatingtheteamsabilitytoaddresspatientcare(priortotransferofthepatienttothelocalEMS
provider),rescueoperations,andsafetyandconfinedspaceoperationsandsafety.
10.2.3.3.1PatientCareComponents.Patientcarecomponentsshouldinclude;butarenotlimitedto,the
following:
(1) Assessingandaddressingcriticalimmediatelifethreateningconditions,
(2) Assessingandaddressingconditionsthatarenotimmediatelylifethreatening
(3) Stabilizationandpackagingofthepatientwithregardtoinjuriessoastopreventfurtherharmifpossible,
10.2.3.3.2RescueOperationsandSafetyComponents.Thesecomponentsincludethefollowing:
49
(1) Rescuesystemsafety
(2) Rescuesystemefficiency
(3) Teamoperations(command,controlandcommunications)
10.2.3.3.3ConfinedSpaceOperationsandSafetyComponents.Thesecomponentsincludethefollowing:
(1) Hazardidentification
(2) EntryassessmentGoorNogo?
(3) Hazardmitigation
(4) Regulatorycompliance
10.3HazardEvaluationandRiskAssessments.TheAHJshouldconductahazardevaluationandrisk
assessmentoftheresponseareaandshoulddeterminethefeasibilityandtypeofincidentsthatmayrequire
confinedspacerescueoperations.
10.3.1Components.Theseassessmentsshouldinclude,butnotbelimitedto,thefollowing:
(1) Evaluationoftheenvironmental,physical,social,andculturalfactorsinfluencingthescope,frequency,
andmagnitudeofapotentialincident
(2) TheimpactthesefactorsmayhaveontheabilityoftheAHJtorespondtoandtooperatewhile
minimizingthreatstorescuersatanincidentsite.
(3) Identificationandmaintenanceofalistofthetypeandavailabilityofinternalresourcesneededfor
technicalsearchandrescueincidents.
(4) Identificationofthetypeandavailabilityofexternalresourcesneededtoaugmentexistingcapabilitiesin
confinedspacerescueincidents
(5) Adeterminationofthepotentialtorespondtorescueincidentsthatmightinvolvenuclearorbiological
weapons,chemicalagents,orweaponsofmassdestruction,includingthosewiththepotentialfor
secondarydevices.IftheAHJdeterminesthatahazardevaluationexistsforrescueresponseintoa
nuclear,biological,explosiveand/orchemicalenvironment,appropriatetrainingandequipmentfor
responsepersonnelshouldbeprovided.
10.3.2AcquisitionofResources.Whereanadvancedlevelofsearchandrescuecapabilitymaybeneededina
givenconfinedspace,organizationsshouldhaveasysteminplacetoutilizethemostappropriateresource(s)
available,throughtheuseoflocalexperts,agreementswithspecializedresources,andmutualaid.TheAHJ
shouldestablishproceduresfortheacquisitionofthoseexternalresourcesneededforspecificemergenciesin
andassociatedwithconfinedspaces.Alistoftheseresourcesshouldbemaintainedandupdatedatleast
onceayear,wherenecessary.Ataminimum,thelistshouldbereviewedandupdatedpriortoaplanned
entryrequiringadvancedcapability.
10.3.3Documentation.Thehazardevaluationandriskassessmentshouldbedocumented.
10.3.4ReviewProcess.Thehazardidentificationandriskassessmentshouldbereviewedandupdatedona
scheduledbasisandasoperationalororganizationalchangesoccur.
10.3.5Surveys.AtintervalsdeterminedbytheAHJ;dependingonchangesinequipment,operationsor
materials;theAHJshouldconductsurveysintheorganizationsresponseareaforthepurposeofidentifying
thetypesofrescueincidentsthataremostlikelytooccurinandaroundconfinedspaces.
10.4StandardOperatingProcedures.TheAHJshouldestablishwrittenstandardoperatingprocedures(SOPs)
consistentwithalevelofcapabilitytorespondtoconfinedspacerescueincidents.
10.4.1*RescueProcedures.Rescueproceduresshouldinclude;butnotbelimitedto;identificationof
hazards,useofequipment,andapplicationoftechniquesnecessarytocoordinate,perform,andsupervise
confinedspacerescueincidents.Theperson,personsororganization(s)havingresponsibilityforacquiringa
rescueprovisionandforperformingrescuefortheconfinedspace,shouldworktogethertoestablish
operationalprocedurestoensurethatconfinedspacerescueoperationsareperformedinamannerthat
minimizesthreatstorescuersandothers.
50
10.4.2EvacuationProcedure.TheAHJshouldensurethatthereisastandardoperatingprocedureto
evacuateRescueTeammembersandotherpersonnelfromanareaandtoaccountfortheirsafetywhenan
imminenthazardconditionisdiscovered.Thisprocedureshouldincludeamethodtonotifyallpersonnelin
theaffectedareaimmediatelybyanyeffectivemeans,includingaudiblewarningdevices,visualsignals,
and/orradiosignals.
10.5RegulatoryCompliance.TheAHJshouldcomplywithallapplicablelocal,state,andfederallawsand
regulations.
10.6IncidentResponsePlanning.TheAHJshouldtrainresponsiblepersonnelinproceduresfordeveloping
preincidentemergencyactionplansinordertopreparetherescueserviceforsafepracticesassociatedwith
rescuefromspecificandgenericconfinedspacesforwhichtheyproviderescue.Thisprocessshouldinclude
determining,reviewing,accessing,andusingrelevantcomponentsofapplicablenational,state,industryand
localresponseplans.
10.6.1DocumentationofResponsePlan.Theproceduresforarescueemergencyresponseinandaround
confinedspacesshouldbedocumentedintheconfinedspacerescueincidentresponseplan.
10.6.1.1Theplanshouldbeaformal,writtendocument.
10.6.1.2Whereexternalresourcesarerequiredtoachieveadesiredlevelofoperationalcapability,mutual
aidagreementsshouldbedevelopedwithotherorganizations.
10.6.2ResponsePlanDistribution.Whererequired,copiesoftheconfinedspacerescueincidentresponse
planshouldbedistributedtoagencies,departments,owners/contractorsandemployeeshaving
responsibilitiesdesignatedintheplan.CopiesmayalsobegivenorshowntotheEntrySupervisor,entrants,
attendantsandothersinvolvedintheconfinedspaceentry.
10.6.2.1Arecordshouldbekeptofallholdersoftheconfinedspacerescueincidentresponseplan,anda
systemshouldbeimplementedforissuingallchangesorrevisions.
10.6.2.2TheconfinedspacerescueincidentresponseplanshouldbeapprovedbytheAHJthroughaformal,
documentedapprovalprocessand,whererequired,shouldbecoordinatedwithparticipatingagenciesand
organizations.
10.6.3TypeofResponsePlan.ConfinedspaceResponsePlansareoftwotypes:
10.6.3.1Organizationalresponseplantomanageconfinedspacerescueincidentswithinaspecificareaor
jurisdiction.Thisistheoverallplanformanaginggenericemergenciesofthistype.
10.6.3.2RescueTeampreincidentemergencyactionplanstoaddressspecificorgenericapproachesto
rescuefromconfinedspacesforwhichtheyareresponsible.Thisistheconfinedspacespecificrescueplan
thatshouldfitintotheorganizationalresponseplan.
10.6.4ComponentsofOrganizationalResponsePlan.Theorganizationalresponseplanshouldinclude,but
notbelimitedto,thefollowingcomponents:
(1) CommandStructure
(2) Communications
(3) InternalResources
(4) ExternalResources
(5) SafetyandAccountability
(6) Regulatorycompliance(state,localandFederal)
10.6.5*ComponentsofPreincidentemergencyactionplan.Therescuepreincidentemergencyactionplan
shouldinclude,butnotbelimitedto,thefollowingcomponents(seeFigure10.6.5):
(1) Spaceidentificationandconfiguration(Adjacentareas)
(2) Notification
51
(3) Commandandcontrol
(4) Communications
(5) Worktobeperformed
(6) Hazardidentificationandmitigation(Includeadjacentareas)
(7) Environmentalconcerns
(8) Resourceidentification(Hazmat,Fire,EMS,etc.)
(9) Accessandegressmethods
(10) Retrievalsystems
(11) Rescuesystems
(12) Personalprotectiveequipment(includingatmospheresupplyingrespirators)
(13) Actionplanning
(14) Equipmentrequired(medicalandrescue)
Figure10.6.5SamplePreIncidentEmergencyActionPlanningForm
52
10.7ConfinedSpaceRescueEquipmentandGear.
10.7.1OperationalRescueEquipment.TheAHJshouldensurethatconfinedspacerescueequipmentis
procuredandutilizedcommensuratewithrecognizedstandardsofreferenceandtherespectiveoperational
needsforrescueoperations.Confinedspacerescueequipmentmayinclude,butisnotlimitedto,the
following:
(1) Rescueharnesses(ClassIIorIII)
(2) Rescuerope
(3) Auxiliaryequipmentandropehardware
53
(a) Carabinersandsnaplinks
(b) Ropegrapandascendingdevices
(c) Descentcontrolleddevices
(d) Portableanchors
i. Beamstrapsandclamps
ii. Anchorplates
(e) Pulleys
(f) Loadstraps(endtoendandmultipleconfigurations)
(4) Mechanicalrescue/retrievaldevices(verticalandhorizontal)
(a) Winches
(b) Pulleysystems(i.e.,blockandtackle,prebuilt)
(c) Tripodsanddavitarms
(5) Illumination
(6) Ventilation
(7) EnergyControlDevices
(8) Communicationandtechnologysystems
(a) Hardwire
(b) Mobilecommunicationdevices
(c) Laptopsandtablets
(9) Patientpackagingandcareequipment(BLSandALS)
(a) Medicalfirstresponsekits
(b) Backboards
(c) Basketandflexiblelitters
(d) Stabilizationdevices
(10) Grainrescuetube
10.7.1.1ConfinedSpaceRescueEquipmentStandards.Thefollowingpublicationsshouldbeconsultedas
appropriate:
(1) NFPA1983,StandardonLifeSafetyRopeandEquipmentforEmergencyServices
(2) NFPA1981,StandardonOpenCircuitSelfContainedBreathingApparatus(SCBA)forEmergencyServices
(3) NFPA1951,StandardonProtectiveEnsemblesforTechnicalRescueIncidents
(4) NFPA1855,StandardforSelection,Care,andMaintenanceofProtectiveEnsemblesforTechnicalRescue
Incidents
10.7.1.2Inspection,Care,andMaintenanceofConfinedSpaceRescueEquipmentandGear.Inaccordance
withmanufacturersrequirements/recommendationsandreferencestandards,confinedspacerescue
equipmentshouldbeproperlyinspectedandmaintainedtoensureitwilloperateasdesigned.Allequipment
shouldbeinspectedfordamageordefectbeforeandaftereachuseasappropriateandremovedfromservice
iffounddefective.Inspectionsperformedaccordingtomanufacturersrequirementsshouldbeproperly
documented.
10.7.2*PersonalProtectiveEquipment(PPE).Rescueteamsshouldassesstheneedfor,provideandtrain
personnelintheutilizationofappropriatePPEbasedonguidelineslistedinChapter8.SincesomePPE
requirementsmaybesatisfiedindifferentways,itisimportantthatRescueTeamsnotonlychoosePPE
appropriatetothehazards,butchooseequipmentthatwillmostefficientlyallowthemtomeettherescue
objectives.
10.8IncidentManagementSystem.
10.8.1TheAHJshouldprovideforandutilizetrainingontheimplementationofanincidentmanagement
systemthatmeetstherequirementsofNFPA1561,StandardonEmergencyServicesIncidentManagement
System,withwrittenSOPsapplyingtoallmembersinvolvedinemergencyoperations.Allmembersinvolved
inemergencyoperationsshouldbefamiliarwiththesystem.
54
10.8.2TheAHJshouldprovidefortrainingontheimplementationofanincidentaccountabilitysystemthat
meetstherequirementsofNFPA1561,StandardonEmergencyServicesIncidentManagementSystem.
10.8.3Theincidentcommandershouldensurerotationofpersonneltoreducestressandfatigue.
10.8.4Theincidentcommandershouldensurethatallpersonnelareawareofthepotentialimpactoftheir
operationsonthesafetyandwelfareofrescuersandothers,aswellasonotheractivitiesattheincidentsite.
10.8.5Atallrescueincidents,theorganizationshouldprovidesupervisorswhopossessskillsandknowledge
commensuratewiththeorganizationsrescuecapability.
10.9RescueTeamComposition
10.9.1*ThesizeandcompositionofaconfinedspaceRescueTeamshouldbebasedonpreincidentplanning
andpracticeofthoseplanstoassureeffectiveoperations.TheroleofaConfinedSpaceRescueTeamis
intendedtoincludeentryintothespacetoperformarescueand,asaminimum,shouldbestaffedtoprovide
sufficientmemberswiththefollowingexclusivefunctions:
(1) *Entrant/Entryteamofsufficientsizeandcapabilitytoperformtherescue
(2) *Backupteamofsufficientsizetoprovideimmediateassistanceto,orrescueof,entryteammembers
whobecomeillorinjuredandareunabletoperformselfrescue.
(3) Attendantwhosefunctionisdenyunauthorizedpersonsaccess,monitortheconditionsinthespaceand
thestatusofallentrants
(4) Supervisorwhoshouldmaintaincontroloftheentireoperationandbeknowledgeableinallteam
functions
10.10EntryRescueRescueServiceCapabilities.
10.10.1TheorganizationshouldberesponsibleforthedevelopmentandtrainingofaconfinedspaceRescue
Teamwhoaretrained,equipped,andavailabletorespondtoemergenciesinandaroundconfinedspacesofa
typeandcomplexitythatrequireanythingotherthannonentrytyperescuesfromconfinedspaces.
10.10.2TheRescueServicemayperformbothnonentryandentrytyperescuesfromconfinedspaces.
10.10.3Organizationsshoulddevelopandimplementproceduresforthefollowing:
(1) Determiningandrecognizingexistingandpotentialconditionsatrescueemergencies
(2) Protectingpersonnelfromhazardsinandaroundtheconfinedspace
(3) Ensuringthatpersonnelarecapableofmanagingthephysicalandpsychologicalchallengesthataffect
rescuersperformingtheserescues.
(4) Identifyingthedutiesoftherescueentrant(s)andbackuprescueentrant(s),rescueattendant,andRescue
Teamleaderasdefinedherein
(5) Monitoringcontinuously,oratfrequentintervals,theatmosphereinallpartsofthespacetobeentered
foroxygencontent,flammability[lowerexplosivelimit/lowerflammablelimit(LFL/LFL)],andtoxicity,in
thatorder
(6) Performingentrytyperescuesintoconfinedspaces
(7) Usingvictimpackagingdevicesthatcouldbeemployedinconfinedspacerescue
(8) Selecting,constructing,andusingropeorcablebasedloweringandraisingsystemsinthehighangle
environmentcommensuratewiththeneedsoftheorganization.
(9) Developinghazardisolationandcontrolrequirements
(10) EnsuringthatRescueTeammemberstakepartinamedicalsurveillanceprogram
(11) Planningresponseforentrytypeconfinedspacerescuesinhazardousenvironments
(12) Implementingtheplannedresponse
10.10.4Whereapplicable,organizationsshouldhaveaworkingunderstandingofthemachineryrelated
hazardsinandaroundthespaceasitrelatestotherescue.
55
Chapter11ConfinedSpacePersonnelDuties,ResponsibilitiesandCompetencies
11.1General.Allpersonsengagedinconfinedspaceactivitiesandoperationsshouldbecompetentand/or
qualified.Therearenumerousentitiesthatmaybeinvolved,individuallyorworkingtogether,inconfined
spaceentryandrelatedactivities.Theseinclude,butarenotlimitedtoowners,facilitypersonnel,contractors,
visitors,subcontractorpersonnelandaswellasotherpersonsandoperationsbothwithinandoutsideofthe
confinedspace.Thischaptercoverstheduties,responsibilities,qualificationsandcompetenciesofthese
individualsasrelatedtoconfinedspaceactivities.
11.2Entrants.
11.2.1General.
11.2.1.1Entrantsshouldbecompetent,qualifiedandauthorizedtoenterandworkwithinconfinedspaces.
11.2.1.2*Entryoccurswhenanypartoftheentrantsbodybreakstheplaneofaconfinedspaceopeningthat
providesforentry.
11.2.1.3Entrantsmayalsoperformotheractivitiesandassigneddutiesifqualifiedinaccordancewiththe
applicableConfinedSpaceProgramincluding,butnotlimitedto,selfrescue,monitoringandperformingnon
entrytasks.
11.2.2EntrantDutiesandResponsibilities.
11.2.2.1Entrantsshouldentertheconfinedspaceonlyafterissuanceoftheentrypermit
11.2.2.1.1Entrantsshouldverifythattheirnameislistedontheentrypermit.
11.2.2.1.2Entrantsshouldbeabletoverballyidentifyallconfinedspacehazardsandcontrolsnotedonthe
permittotheEntrySupervisor.
11.2.2.2Entrantsshouldconductassignedworkfollowingapprovedproceduresthatminimizehazards.
11.2.2.3Entrantsshoulddemonstratetheproperuseofapprovedequipment,materials,tools,andpersonal
protectiveequipmentidentifiedinthepermittotheEntrySupervisor.
11.2.2.4Entrantsshouldremainawareofpotentialatmosphericandnonatmospherichazardsthatmightbe
encounteredduringconfinedspaceentry.
11.2.2.4.1Entrantsshouldexittheconfinedspacewhenchangingconditionsresultinhazardsthatcause
unacceptablerisks.
11.2.2.4.2Entrantsshouldimmediatelyexitthespaceiftheentrypermitexpiresoriscancelled.
11.2.2.4.3EntrantsshouldimmediatelyexitthespacewhendirectedbytheattendantorEntrySupervisor,or
duringanemergencyelsewheninthevicinitythatrequiresevacuation.
11.2.2.5Entrantsshouldverballyidentifythehazardsinsideandoutsidetheconfinedspacethatmaybefaced
duringentry,includinginformationonthemode,signsorsymptomsandconsequencesofexposureandacts
accordingly
11.2.2.5.1Entrantsshouldnotifytheattendantofanysymptomsofexposure,emergencyorunacceptable
condition.
11.2.2.5.2Entrantsshouldexittheconfinedspaceimmediatelyifsymptoms,warningsigns,orunacceptable
conditionsoccur.
11.2.2.6Entrantsshouldrespondtoemergenciesastrainedanddirectedincluding,butnotlimitedto,self
rescueorevacuationoftheconfinedspace.

56
11.2.3EntrantQualifications.
11.2.3.1Anentrantshouldverballyidentifythegovernmentalregulationsthatpertaintotheplanned
confinedspaceworktothePermitIssuer.
11.2.3.2Anentrantshouldverballyidentifytheuse,limitationsandhazardsofmaterials,substances,and
equipmentapprovedforusewithinthespecificconfinedspace(i.e.,tools,personalprotectiveequipment,
energyisolationdevices,GasTestersandchemicals)tothePermitIssuerbeforeentry.
11.2.3.3Anentrantshouldverballyidentifytheprimaryandsecondarymeansofcommunicationtobeused
duringemergenciestothePermitIssuerbeforeentry.
11.2.3.4AnentrantshouldverballyexplainhowtointerpretairmonitordisplaysandalarmstothePermit
Issuerbeforeentry.
11.2.3.5Anentrantshouldverballyexplainallsectionsoftheconfinedspaceentrypermitthatareapplicable
totheentrantsdutiestothePermitIssuerbeforeentry.
11.2.3.6AnentrantshouldverballyexplainpersonalwarningsignsandoverexposuresymptomstothePermit
Issuerbeforeentry.
11.2.3.7Anentrantshouldverballyexplainapplicableemergencyprocedureswithinoraroundtheconfined
spacetothePermitIssuerbeforeentry.
11.2.4EntrantDemonstratedCompetencies.
11.2.4.1Anentrantshouldbeabletoreadandunderstandpermitrequirements.
11.2.4.2Anentrantshouldbeabletoproperlydemonstratetheproperuserequiredassignedequipment
including,butnotlimitedto,PPE,respiratoryprotection(ifneeded),nonentryrescuedevices;etc.
11.2.4.3Anentrantshouldbeabletocommunicatewhenevacuationisdesired.
11.2.4.4Anentrantshouldbeabletocompleteassignedtasksinanapprovedmanner.
11.3Attendant.
11.3.1General.
11.3.1.1Attendantsshouldbecompetent,qualifiedandauthorizedtooverseetheentrantsworkinginside
theconfinedspaceandactivitiesoutsidetheconfinedspacethatmightimpactconfinedspaceoperations.
11.3.1.2Attendantsshouldbestationedoutsideofconfinedspaces.
11.3.1.3Attendantsmayalsoperformotherassignedduties,ifcompetent,inaccordancewiththeapplicable
ConfinedSpaceProgramincluding,butnotlimitedto,summoningrescuersandperformingnonentryrescue.
11.3.2AttendantDutiesandResponsibilities.
11.3.2.1Attendantsshouldverballyindentifythehazardsinsideandoutsidethespecificconfinedspacethat
mightoccurduringentry,includinginformationonthemodes,signsorsymptomsandconsequencesof
exposuretoentrants.
11.3.2.1.1Attendantsshouldverifynameislistedontheentrypermit.
11.3.2.1.2Attendantsshouldbeconstantlymonitoringtheconditionsinandaroundtheconfinedspaceto
assurethatrequirementsonthepermit
11.3.2.1.3Attendantsshouldmonitoradjacentareasoutsidetheconfinedspaceforchangingconditionsthat
mightimpactsafeentryworkoractivities.
11.3.2.2Attendantsshouldremainoutsidetheconfinedspaceduringentryoperationsuntilrelievedby
anotherassignedattendant.
57
11.3.2.2.1Attendantsshouldinformthenew(replacement)attendantofcurrentconfinedspaceandentrant
status.
11.3.2.2.2Thereplacementattendantsnameshouldbelistedontheentrypermit.
11.3.2.3Attendantsshouldmonitorentrantsstatusanddirectentrantevacuationasneeded.
11.3.2.4Attendantsshouldcontinuouslymaintainanaccuratecountofentrantsinthepermitspace.
11.3.2.5Attendantsshouldtakethefollowingactionswhenunauthorizedperson(s)approachorentera
permitspacewhileentryisunderway:
11.3.2.5.1Attendantsshouldprevententryofnonauthorizedpersonnelintotheconfinedspace.
11.3.2.5.2Attendantsshouldinformentrantsandsupervisorswhennonauthorizedpersonnelenteror
attempttoentertheconfinedspace.
11.3.2.5.3Attendantsshouldpreventnonauthorizedpersonnelfrominterferingwithattendantduties.
11.3.2.6Attendantsshouldsummonrescueandotheremergencyservicesimmediatelyuponrecognizingan
entrantsdistressinsidetheconfinedspace.
11.3.2.7*Attendantsshouldperformnonentryrescueastrainedandequipped.
11.3.2.8*Attendantsmayperformotherapprovedassigneddutiesthatdonotinterferewiththeprimary
dutytomonitorandprotecttheentrants.
11.3.3AttendantQualifications.
11.3.3.1Anattendantshouldcompetent,qualifiedandauthorizedtheconfinedspaceprogramand
governmentalregulationsthatpertaintotheplannedconfinedspacework.
11.3.3.2Anattendantshouldverballyindentifytheuse,limitationsandhazardsofmaterials,substances,and
equipmentapprovedforuseoutsidethespecificconfinedspace(i.e.,tools,personalprotectiveequipment,
energyisolationdevices,GasTestersandchemicals).
11.3.3.3Anattendantshouldverballyexplainthehazardsinsideandoutsidethespecificconfinedspacethat
mightbefacedduringentryoperations,includinginformationonthemodes,signsorsymptomsand
consequencesofexposuretoentrants.
11.3.4AttendantDemonstratedCompetencies.
11.3.4.1Anattendantshouldbeabletoreadandverballyexplainpermitrequirements.
11.3.4.2Anattendantshouldbeabletoproperlyuserequiredassignedequipmentincluding,butnotlimited
to,PPE,respiratoryprotection,nonentryrescuedevices
11.3.4.3Anattendantshouldbeabletocommunicatewiththeentranttoevacuatewhenconditionsarise
thatmightendangertheentrant.
11.3.4.4Anattendantshouldbeabletoperformassignedtaskssafely
11.3.4.5Anattendantshouldbeabletorecognizeentrantsignsandsymptomsrelatedtohazardousortoxic
chemicalexposuresandoxygendeficiency.
11.4EntrySupervisor.
11.4.1General.
11.4.1.1EntrySupervisorsshouldbecompetenttooverseeanddirectconfinedspaceentryandassociated
operationsinaccordancewithapplicableregulationsandthisdocument
58
11.4.1.2*EntrySupervisorsmayalsobedesignatedasattendants,PermitIssuers,GasTesters,Ventilation
Specialists,IsolationSpecialistsandentrantsinaccordancewiththeapplicableconfinedspaceprogramif
properlytrainedand/orqualifiedinaccordancewiththerespectiverequirementsprovidedinChapter11.
11.4.2*EntrySupervisorDutiesandResponsibilities.
11.411.4.2.1EntrySupervisorsshouldverifythattheappropriateinformationhasbeenrecordedonthe
confinedspaceentrypermitorotherspecifiedpermitandalltestsspecifiedbythepermithavebeen
completedandthatallrequirements,proceduresandequipmentspecifiedbythepermitareinplacebefore
issuingthepermittoauthorizeentry.
11.4.2.1.1EntrySupervisorbeabletoindentify,eliminate,controlormitigatehazards
11.4.2.1.2EntrySupervisorsshouldbeidentifiedanddocumentedonallpermits.
11.4.2.1.3AssignedEntrySupervisorsshouldremainattheconfinedspaceworksitetocontroloperations
unlessrelievedbyanothercompetent,qualifiedandauthorizedEntrySupervisor.
11.4.2.1.4EntrySupervisorsshouldensurethatpersonnelinvolvedwiththeconfinedspaceoperationsare
informedwhenadifferentpersonassumestheEntrySupervisorrole.
11.4.2.1.5TheEntrySupervisorshouldbetrainedasanentrantifdutiesrequireentryintoconfinedspaces.
11.4.2.1.6TheEntrySupervisorshouldbetrainedandqualifiedasaGasTesterifdutiesrequiremaintaining,
testingandoperatingGasTesters.
11.4.2.1.7TheEntrySupervisorshouldbetrainedandqualifiedasaVentilationSpecialistifdutiesrequire
ventilationofthespace.
11.4.2.2EntrySupervisorsshouldconductapreentrysafetymeetingwithallpersonsinvolvedpriortothe
startofconfinedspaceoperationsinaccordancewiththeapplicableConfinedSpaceprogram.(seeSection
5.5)
11.4.2.3EntrySupervisorsshouldcoordinateactivitieswheremultipleemployers(owner/operator,
contractorandsubcontractor)areworkingonthesamejoboronnearbyjobsthatmightimpacttheconfined
spaceoperations.
11.4.2.4*EntrySupervisorsshouldterminatetheentryandcancelthepermitwhenpermitrequirementsare
nolongermet.
11.411.4.2.4.1EntrySupervisorsshouldcancelthepermitwheneverunauthorizedindividualsorequipment
entertheconfinedspace.
11.4.2.4.2EntrySupervisorsshouldcancelthepermitwhenconditionsarisewithinoroutsideoftheconfined
spacethatwerenotanticipatedonthepermitandhavethepotentialtoadverselyaffectoperations.
11.4.2.4.3EntrySupervisorsshouldcancelandreissuethepermitwiththenewentryandcontrol
requirementswhentheconfinedspaceisreclassified.
11.4.2.5EntrySupervisorsshouldidentifymethodsofalertingrescuersandassurerescuersareavailablefora
timelyresponseasrequiredbytheconfinedspaceprogram.
11.4.2.6EntrySupervisorsshoulddetermineacceptableentryconditionsaremetandthattheyremain
consistentwithrequirementsoftheentrypermitincludingwheneverchangesoccurwithinoroutsidethe
confinedspace.
11.4.2.7EntrySupervisorsshouldassurethatallenergysources(including,butnotlimitedto,electrical,
steam,hydraulicandmechanical)andalltankequipmentandappurtenances(including,butnotlimitedto,
tankmixers,heaters,sensors,andotherinstrumentation)havebeencontrolled,disconnectedorisolated
beforethepermitisissued.
59
11.4.2.8EntrySupervisorsshouldassurethattheGasTester,entrants,attendantsandotherconfinedspace
personnelproperlywearanduseapprovedpersonalprotectiveequipmentandappropriaterespiratory
protectionasidentifiedonthepermit.
11.4.2.9EntrySupervisorsshouldverifythatprohibitionofaccesstoconfinedspacesissecurewhenworkis
notinprocessorwhenappropriatetimelyemergencyresponseisnotavailable.
11.4.2.10EntrySupervisorsshouldassurethatareasarebarricaded/cordonedofftopreventexposurewhere
toxicandflammablegases,vapors,orinertgasarevented,orwhereignitionsourcesexist.
11.4.2.11*EntrySupervisorsshouldassurethatallignitionsourcesintheareaareeliminatedorcontrolled
beforepermittingworktobeconductedthatmightinvolvetheactualorpotentialreleaseofflammable
vaporsintotheatmospherearoundorinsidetheconfinedspace.
11.411.4.3EntrySupervisorQualifications.
11.4.3.1*AsupervisorshouldbecertifiedasaConfinedSpaceEntry(Safety)Supervisorwherecertificationis
availableandrequiredorapplicable.
11.411.4.3.2Asupervisorshouldverballyexplainthehazardsthatmightbefacedduringentry,including
informationonthemodes,signsorsymptoms,andconsequencesofexposure.
11.4.3.3Asupervisorshouldverballyexplainandshouldbeabletoapplytheregulatoryandapplicable
confinedspaceprogramrequirements.
11.4.3.4Asupervisorshouldverballyexplaintheproperuseofmonitorsandshouldbeabletointerpret
monitorreadings.
11.4.4DemonstratedCompetencies.
11.4.4.1Asupervisorshouldbeabletoidentify,recognizeandassesshazardsassociatedwiththespecific
confinedspaceandoperationsandthemethodstobeusedforelimination,mitigationorcontrolofsuch
hazardsinaccordancewithchapters6,7,8
11.4.4.2Asupervisorshouldbeableidentifyandevaluateneedforrequiredequipment.
11.4.4.3Asupervisorshouldbeabletoprepareandunderstandpermits.
11.4.4.4Asupervisorshouldbeabletocommunicatewithallpersonnel.
11.4.4.5Asupervisorshouldbeabletoperformassignedtasksinanapprovedmanner.
11.5PermitIssuer.
11.5.1General.
11.5.1.1*PermitIssuersshoulddetermineanddelineatethespecificpermitrequirementsapplicabletothe
hotwork,cold/safeworkand/orconfinedspaceentryoperationstobeperformedandissuetheappropriate
permitsuponassuringthattherequirementshavebeenmetandthatallpersonsinvolvedareawareofthese
requirementsinaccordancewithChapter13.ThePermitIssuercanbeafacilityemployee,EntrySupervisoror
otherdesignatedperson.
11.511.5.2PermitIssuerDutiesandResponsibilities.Priortothestartofwork,thePermitIssuershould
performahazardanalysisandassessmenttoestablishtheconditionsandrequirementsforentryinto
confinedspacesandforconductinghotand/orcold/safeworkinandaroundconfinedspacesinaccordance
withchapter6.
11.5.2.1ThePermitIssuershouldassuretheimplementationoftheserequirementsanddocumentthemon
thepermitpriortoissuingacompletedpermitallowingentryorworkwithinandaroundtheconfinedspace.
11.5.2.2ThePermitIssuershoulddeterminetherequirementsanddesignateappropriateprotectivepersonal
protectiveequipmentandrespiratoryprotectionrequiredforentryintoconfinedspaces.
60
11.5.2.3ThePermitIssuershoulddeterminethattheriskassessmentlevel(seechapter6)iswithinthe
parametersoftheapplicableconfinedspaceprogram.
11.5.2.4ThePermitIssuershouldissueawrittenentrypermitforeveryentryintoaconfinedspaceattesting
thatallrequiredtestingandsafeguardinghasbeencompletedandthattheentryrequirementsonthepermit
havebeensatisfied.
11.5.2.4.1ThePermitIssuershouldassurethatthedurationofthepermitdoesnotexceedthetimerequired
tocompletetheassignedoperationsortasksidentifiedonthepermit.
11.5.2.4.2ThePermitIssuershoulddetermineprohibitedentryandworklimitationsanddocumenttheseon
theentryandworkpermits.
11.5.2.4.3ThePermitIssuershoulddetermineifcontinuousventilationisrequiredtoassureatmospheric
levelsinsidethespaceremainwithinpermitlimits.IfventilationisrequiredthePermitIssuershouldensure
thataVentilationSpecialisthasdeterminedwhatventilationisrequiredandlistthoserequirementsonthe
workpermit.
11.5.2.4.4ThePermitIssuershoulddetermineifperiodicorcontinuoustoxicexposuremonitoringisrequired
duringentry.IfmonitoringisrequiredthePermitIssuershouldensurethataGasTesterhasdeterminedwhat
ventilationisrequiredandlistthoserequirementsonthepermit.
11.5.2.4.5ThePermitIssuershouldenterthenamesofallpersonsandtheirdutiesoneveryentry,safe(cold)
workandhotworkpermitissued.
11.5.2.5ThePermitIssuershouldassurethatEntrySupervisors,entrants,attendantsandotherworkers(or
theirauthorizedrepresentatives)arecapabletoconfirmthatthepreentryrequirementshavebeenmetby
postingthepermitattheentryportalorbyothereffectivemeans.
11.5.2.6Wherethereareanyphysicalconditionsthatmightresultinentrapmentorengulfment,oraffectthe
rapidevacuationofthespacebyentrants,thePermitIssuershoulddetermineifsupplementaryrescue
equipmentandmeasuresarerequired.Therescueequipmentshouldbeidentifiedonthepermit.
11.5.2.7*ThePermitIssuershouldbeawarethattheremightbeaneedtocancelandreissuethepermitif
unforeseenconditionsarise.
11.511.5.2.8ThePermitIssuershouldensurethatallappropriateinformationhasbeenrecordedonthe
permit,thatalltestsspecifiedbythepermithavebeencompletedandareacceptable,andthatallprocedures
andequipmentspecifiedbythepermitareinplacebeforeendorsingandpostingthepermittoallowentry
and/orhotworkorsafeworktooperationscommence.
11.5.2.9ThePermitIssuershouldverifythatrequiredrescueservicesareavailable,thatthemeansfor
summoningthemfortimelyresponseareoperable,andthatpotentialrescueproceduresareplannedto
assureproperequipmentneededforthespecificjobhasbeenidentified,inspectedandstagedsoastobe
availabletoorneartheentrylocationpriortoissuingthepermit.
11.5.3PermitIssuerQualifications.
11.5.3.1APermitIssuershouldbeabletorecognizehazardsassociatedwiththespecificspaceand
operations.
11.5.3.2APermitIssuermaybecertifiedasaConfinedSpaceEntry(Safety)Supervisorwherecertificationis
availableandapplicable.
11.5.3.3APermitIssuershouldverballyindentifythehazardsthatareapplicabletoentry,hotworkandcold
workoperationsandtheequipment,proceduresandcontrolsrequiredtoprotectagainstsuchhazards.
11.5.3.4APermitIssuershouldverballyexplainandbeabletoapplytheapplicableregulatoryandconfined
spaceprogramrequirements.
61
11.5.3.5APermitIssuershouldknowandunderstandtheproperuseofmonitorsandbeabletointerpret
monitorreadings.
11.5.4PermitIssuerDemonstratedCompetencies.
11.5.4.1APermitIssueriscapabletoprepareandissuepermits
11.5.4.2APermitIssuerisabletoidentifyandevaluatethehazardsandtheneedforrequiredequipmentand
controls.
11.5.4.3APermitIssuerisabletocommunicatewithallpersonnel.
11.5.4.4APermitIssuerisabletoperformassignedtasksinanapprovedmanner.
11.6Rescuer.
11.6.1General.Rescuersshouldbecompetent,trained,equipped,designatedandabletorespondto
emergenciesrequiringtherescueofentrantsfromoutsideoforfromwithinconfinedspacesandshouldbe
familiarwithallprovisionsofChapter10.
11.6.2RescuerDutiesandResponsibilities.
11.6.2.1Rescuersshouldevaluatetheinternalandexternalphysical,atmosphericandotherhazards(specific
totheconfinedspace)thatmightbeencounteredduringarescuesituation.
11.6.2.2Rescuersshouldassureallrequiredrescueandpersonalprotectiveequipmentisinspectedandin
goodworkingorderpriortostartofconfinedspaceoperations.
11.6.2.3Rescuersshoulddetermineifanonentryrescueoranentryrequiredrescueisneeded.
11.6.2.3.1Therescuemaybeconductedtotallyfromoutsidetheconfinedspaceandwithouttheneedfor
entry.
11.6.2.3.2Shouldtherescuerequireentryintothespace,therescuersshouldbetrainedsimilartoentrants
andshouldmeetthesameentryrequirementsapplicabletoentrants.
11.6.2.4Rescuersshoulddevelopapreemergencyactionplanwiththeabilitytorespondinanorganized
mannerthatincludes,butisnotlimitedto,thefollowing:
(1) Alarmornotificationmethodspecifictothefacilityoroperation
(2) Assessingtheincidentandidentifyingpotentialrelatedhazards
(3) Determiningifrescueistobeexternalorinternal
(4) DeterminingtheappropriatePPEandrespiratoryprotectionrequiredforentry
(5) Organizingequipmentandpersonnelpriortostartofrescueoperations
(6) Determiningsignalsorcommunicationtobeusedduringrescue
(7) Planningthespecificstepbystepoperationsoftherescue
(8) Respondingtotheincidentandperformingrescue
(9) Conductingapostincidentevaluationandtakingnecessaryactiontocorrectpreemergencyrescueplans
whereneeded.
11.6.2.5Rescuersshouldconsidertherescuerequirementswithrespecttoentrantsselfrescuecapabilityor
physicalandmentalcondition,hazards,equipment,communications,confinedspaceconfigurationandother
rescuerelatedconditionspriortostartingrescueoperations.
11.6.3RescuerQualifications.
11.6.3.1Arescuershouldbefamiliarwiththeconfinedspaceprogramandgovernmentalregulationsthat
pertaintotheplannedrescuework.
62
11.6.3.2Arescuershouldbefamiliarwiththeuse,limitationsandhazardsofmaterials,substances,and
equipmentapprovedforuseoutsidethespecificconfinedspace(i.e.,tools,personalprotectiveequipment,
energyisolationdevices,GasTestersandchemicals).
11.6.3.3Arescuershouldverballyexplainthehazardsinsideandoutsidethespecificconfinedspacethat
mightbefacedduringrescueoperations,includinginformationonthemodes,signsorsymptomsand
consequencesofexposuretorescuersandentrants
11.6.3.4Arescuershouldbeabletoidentifyhazardsandeliminate,controlormitigateexposuresduring
rescueoperations(inaccordancewithchapters6,7,8)
11.6.4RescuerDemonstratedCompetencies.
11.6.4.1Arescuershouldbeabletopreplanrescuesspecifictotheconfinedspace.
11.6.4.2Arescuershouldbeabletoproperlyuserequiredassignedequipmentincluding,butnotlimitedto,
rescueequipment,PPEandrespiratoryprotection.
11.6.4.3Arescuershouldbeabletocommunicatewiththeentrants,attendants,andsupervisors.
11.6.4.4Arescuershouldbeabletoperformassignedtasksinanapprovedmanner.
11.7GasTester.
11.7.1General.GasTestersshouldbequalifiedintheappropriateselection,inspection,calibration,testing,
adjustmentanduseofmonitoringequipmentandapplicablemonitoringandtestingproceduresassociated
withtheassessmentandevaluationofatmospheresinandaroundconfinedspacesinaccordancewith
Chapter7
11.7.2GasTesterDutiesandResponsibilities.
11.7.2.1GasTestershoulddetermineproperselectionofmonitoringequipmentbasedonthehazardsthat
arepresentortobeencounteredduringconfinedspaceoperations.
11.7.2.2GasTestershouldcalibrate,testandadjustequipmentpriortouse.
11.7.2.3Priortoentry,GasTestershouldfirsttest,sampleandmonitortheatmospherearoundtheconfined
space
11.7.2.3.1GasTestershouldverifytheirnameislistedontheentrypermitastester
11.7.2.3.2GasTestershouldbeawareofallconfinedspacehazards,entryrequirementsandcontrolsnoted
onthepermitpriortoentryfortesting.
11.7.2.4GasTestershouldsampleandmonitortheatmosphereinsidetheconfinedspaceinthefollowing
order:
(1) Oxygenlevels
(2) Flammablegasesandvapors
(3) Toxic/hazardousatmosphericcontaminants
11.7.2.5GasTestershouldrecordtestresultsonthepermitandverifybysigningthepermitindicatingthe
time(s)andtheresult(s)ofthetesting.
11.7.2.6GasTestershouldallowPermitIssuers,EntrySupervisors,attendants,entrants,andworkers(ortheir
authorizedrepresentatives)toobservethemonitoringprocessandresults.
11.7.2.7GasTestershouldreevaluateconditionsbytesting,samplingandmonitoringtheatmosphereboth
aroundandinsidetheconfinedspaceasoftenasnecessaryasdeterminedbythePermitIssuerand/orEntry
Supervisor.

63
11.7.3GasTesterQualifications.
11.7.3.1AGasTestershouldbefamiliarwiththeconfinedspaceprogramandgovernmentalregulationsthat
pertaintotheplannedconfinedspacework.
11.7.3.2AGasTestershouldbetrainedandqualifiedintheappropriateselection,inspection,calibration,
adjustmentanduseofmonitoringequipment.
11.7.3.3AGasTestershouldbeabletoverballyexplain,assess,interpretandapplymaterialsafetydata
informationandlimitationspertinenttothehazardsassociatedwiththeconfinedspaceandsurroundingarea
andoperations.
11.7.3.4AGasTestershouldbeabletoverballyexplainandapplytheappropriatetestingprocedures
associatedwiththemonitoringofatmospheresinandaroundconfinedspaces.
11.7.3.5AGasTestershouldmeetthequalificationsforanentrant
11.7.3.6TheGasTestershouldknowhowtodetermine,selectanduserequiredpersonalprotective
equipmentandrespiratoryprotectionbasedonhazardsassociatedwiththeconfinedspaceoperations.
11.7.3.7TheGasTestershouldbeabletoverballyexplainhowtomonitorandinterpretatmospherichazards.
11.7.4GasTesterDemonstratedCompetencies.
11.7.4.1AGasTestershouldbeabletodemonstratethecompetenciesrequiredforanentrantand
understandpermitrequirementsforrecordingmonitoringresults.
11.7.4.2AGasTestershouldbeabletoselect,adjust,calibrate,bumptestandproperlyuserequired
equipment.
11.7.4.3AGasTestershouldbeabletoconductmonitoringandtestinginapprovedmanner.
11.7.4.4AGasTestershouldbeabletocompareresultswithrecognizedOSHA,NIOSHACGIHandother
applicablerecommendedexposurelimitstodetermineifhazardexists.
11.8Owner/Operator.
11.8.1General.Owners/Operatorsshouldhavecontrol,ownershiporauthorityovertheconfinedspaceand
shouldassurethatconfinedspaceoperationsareconductedinaccordancewithregulatoryandindustry
practicesandtheowner/operatorsand/orcontractorsconfinedspaceprogramandchapter12
11.8.2Owner/OperatorDutiesandResponsibilities.
11.8.2.1Theowner/operatorshouldevaluateandreevaluateconfinedspacesandidentifyanddesignate
thosethatshouldbeclassifiedaspermitrequiredconfinedspacesinaccordancewithChapter4.This
responsibilitycanbedelegatedbytheownerwhenthespaceisunderthecontrolofathirdparty(suchas
whenabuildingorportionthereof(aspace)isleasedorcontractedtoathirdparty)andowner/operatorhas
noobligationtothebuilding,spaceoroperationstherein.
11.8.2.2Theowner/operatorshouldobtainrequiredjurisdictionalpermitsandauthorizations.
11.8.2.3Theowner/operatorshouldidentifyanddesignatethoseindividuals(eitherfacilitypersonnelor
contractors)whoareeducated,trained,competentand/orqualifiedtoperformspecificconfinedspace
relatedduties,including,butnotlimitedto,supervisingoperations,issuingpermits,enteringintoconfined
spaces,conductinggastesting,providingforrescue,performingattendantduties,overseeingventilation,and
conductinghotorcoldworkoperations.Theowner/operatorshoulddesignateandidentifytheindividuals
andtheirdutiesinthewrittenconfinedspaceprograminaccordancewithchapter12
11.8.2.4Theowner/operatorshoulddevelopandimplementaconfinedspaceprograminaccordancewith
chapter12whichshouldbeavailableforinspectionbytheemployeesandtheirauthorizedrepresentatives.
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Theconfinedspaceprogramapplicabletotheoperationsmaybethatoftheowner/operatororacontractor
orboth
11.8.2.5Owner/operatorsshouldconductapreentrysafetymeetinginaccordancewithchapter5toassure
thatallPermitIssuers,EntrySupervisors,GasTesters,entrants,attendants,etc.and
contractors/subcontractorsareapprisedofthehazardsassociatedwiththeconfinedspace.
11.8.2.6Whenanowner/operatorarrangesforacontractortoperformworkthatinvolvesconfinedspace
entry,theowner/operatorshouldassurethatthecontractorisawarethatentryintoaconfinedspace
requirescompliancewithanapplicableconfinedspaceprogram.
11.8.2.7Owners/operatorsshouldassurethatcontractors/subcontractorsareawareofanyprecautionsor
proceduresthatthehostemployerhasimplementedfortheprotectionofemployeesinorneartheconfined
spacewherethecontractor/subcontractorpersonnelwillbeworking.
11.8.2.7.1Owners/operatorsshouldcoordinateentryoperationswiththecontractorwhenbothhost
employerpersonnelandcontractorpersonnelwillbeworkinginornearpermitspaces.
11.8.2.7.2Owners/operatorsshoulddebriefcontractorsattheconclusionofentryoperationsregardingthe
permitspaceprogramfollowedandregardinganyhazardsconfrontedorcreatedinpermitspacesduring
entryoperations.
11.8.2.7.3Owner/operatorsshouldcoordinateactivitieswheremultipleemployers(owner/operator,
contractorandsubcontractor)areworkingonthesamejoborothernearbyjobsthatmayimpactuponthe
confinedspaceoperations.
11.8.2.8Owner/operatorsshouldimplementeffectivemeasurestopreventunauthorizedpersonnelfrom
enteringconfinedspaces
11.8.2.9Iftherearechangesintheuseorconfigurationofaconfinedspacethataffectthehazards,
owner/operatorsshouldassurethattheentryiscancelledandtheconfinedspaceisreevaluatedand,as
necessary,reclassified,issuingnewpermitsandestablishingrevisedentrycriteria.
11.8.2.10*Owners/operatorsshouldprovidetherequiredequipmentandassurethatitisproperlyinspected,
tested,maintained,andusedinaccordancewiththeconfinedspaceprogram.
11.811.8.2.11Theowner/operatorshouldevaluate,qualifyandidentifyrescuerservicesanddevelopand
implementproceduresforsummoningrescueandemergencyservices.
11.8.2.12Theowner/operatorshoulddevelopandimplementprocedurestoreviewentryoperationswhen
thereisreasontobelievethatthemeasurestakenundertheconfinedspaceprogrammightnotprotect
employees.Theowner/operatorshouldrevisetheprogramtocorrectidentifieddeficienciesbefore
subsequententriesareauthorized.
11.8.2.13*Theowner/operatorshouldreviewtheconfinedspaceprogramannuallyutilizingcancelled
permitsandotherinformationtoensureprotectionfromhazardsduringentryoperations.
11.811.8.2.14Theowner/operatorshouldconsultwithemployeesandtheirauthorizedrepresentativeson
thedevelopmentandimplementationofallaspectsoftheconfinedspaceprogramandmakeinformation
availabletoallaffectedemployeesandtheirauthorizedrepresentatives.
11.8.2.15Theowner/operatorshouldprovidetrainingregardingexisting,new,andrevisedproceduresand
workpracticessothatallemployeesinvolvedinconfinedspaceoperationsandactivitiesacquirethe
understanding,knowledgeandproficiencynecessaryforthesafeperformanceofassignedduties.Training
shouldbeprovided;
(1) Beforetheemployeeisfirstassignedconfinedspacerelatedduties
(2) Wheneverthereisachangeinassignedduties
(3) Wheneverthereisachangeinconfinedspacerelatedoperationsthatpresentsahazard
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(4) Whenevertheemployerhasreasontobelievethattherearedeviationsfromtheconfinedspaceentry
procedures,operationsorprogramrequirementsorthatthereareinadequaciesintheemployees
knowledgeoftheseproceduresandrequirements.
11.8.2.16Theowner/operatorshouldcertifythatthetraininghasbeenaccomplished.Thecertificationshould
containthetrainingprovided,employeesname,thesignaturesorinitialsofthetrainersandthedatesof
trainingandshouldbeavailableforinspectionbyemployeesortheirauthorizedrepresentatives.
11.8.3Owner/OperatorQualifications.
11.8.3.1Theowner/operatorshouldbeabletoidentifyandclassifyconfinedspaceswithintheirfacility
11.8.3.2Wheretheowner/operatorisanabsentpartythismaybedelegatedtoanotherresponsibleentity
suchas;
(1) SpaceswithinaLeasedfacilitycontrolledbyanotherentity
(2) Entirefacilityiscontrolledbyanotherentity
11.8.3.3Theowner/operatorshouldverballyindentifyandapplytheregulatoryrequirements.
11.8.3.4Theowner/operatorshouldbeabletodevelopandimplementanappropriateconfinedspace
program.
11.8.3.5Theowner/operatorshouldbeabletotrain,qualifyanddesignatepersonnelforconfinedspace
operations.
11.8.3.6Theowner/operatorshouldbeabletoevaluateandselectcontractors,subcontractorsandrescuers.
11.8.4DemonstratedCompetencies
11.8.4.1Theowner/operatorshouldbeabletoverballyexplainandapplyrequirementsandevaluatepermits.
11.8.4.2Theowner/operatorshouldbeabletoidentify,evaluateneedforandprovideforrequired
equipment.
11.8.4.3Theowner/operatorshouldbeabletocommunicateandcoordinateactivitiesassociatedwith
confinedspaceoperations.
11.8.4.4Theowner/operatorshouldbeabletoassigntasksinaccordancewiththeconfinedspaceprogram
andoperationalrequirements.
11.8.4.5Theowner/operatorshouldbeabletorecognize,evaluateandclassifyconfinedspaces
11.9Contractor/Subcontractor.
11.9.1General.Acontractorisanemployerwhoperformsworkundercontracttotheowner/operatoratthe
owner/operatorsconfinedspaceworksite.Contractorsmayemploysubcontractorswhoperformwork
undercontracttotheprimarycontractor.
11.9.2ContractorsandSubContractorsDutiesandResponsibilities.
11.9.2.1Thecontractorshouldidentifyanddesignatethoseindividuals(eithercontractorpersonnelorsub
contractors)whoareeducated,trained,competentand/orqualifiedtoperformspecificconfinedspace
relatedduties,including,butnotlimitedto,supervisingoperations,issuingpermits,enteringintoconfined
spaces,conductinggastesting,providingforrescue,performingattendantduties,overseeingventilation,and
conductinghotorcoldworkoperations..Thecontractorshoulddesignateandidentifytheindividualsand
theirdutiesinthewrittenconfinedspaceprograminaccordancewithchapter12
11.9.2.2Thecontractorshouldattendaprejobsafetymeetingwiththeowner/operatortoestablish
assignmentsandresponsibilitiesassociatedwiththeconfinedspaceentry.Subcontractorsmayattendthis
meetingorthecontractormayconductseparatemeetingsforsubcontractors.
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11.9.2.3Thecontractorshouldreviewtheowner/operatorsconfinedspaceprogramsanddetermineand
establishtherequirementsneededtoconductoperations.Theconfinedspaceprogramapplicabletothe
operationsmaybethatoftheowner/operatororthecontractororboth.
11.9.2.4Ifthecontractordoesnotagreetousetheowner/operatorsconfinedspaceprogram,thecontractor
shoulddevelopandimplementitsownconfinedspaceprograminaccordancewithregulatoryrequirements,
chapter12andcontractorsprocedures.Thisprogramshouldnotconflictwiththefacilityprogramandmay
beusedinlieuofortosupplementtheowner/operatorsprogram.
11.9.2.5Theconfinedspaceprogramtobeusedshouldbeavailableforinspectionbytheemployeesand
theirauthorizedrepresentatives.
11.9.2.6*Thecontractorshouldreviewandevaluatetheconfinedspacetobeenteredtopreplan
operations,identifyhazardsanddeterminenecessarycontrolsandmeasurestobetaken.
11.911.9.2.7*Whencontractors/subcontractorsperformworkthatinvolvesconfinedspaceentry,they
shouldbeawarethatentryintoaconfinedspacerequirescompliancewithanapplicableconfinedspace
program.(Note:Thesamerequirementsapplybetweenacontractorandasubcontractor)
11.911.9.2.8Contractorsshouldassurethattheyareapprisedofthehazardsassociatedwiththeconfined
spaceandthattheyapprisesubcontractorsasnecessary.
11.9.2.9Contractors/subcontractorsshouldbeawareofanyprecautionsorproceduresthatthehost
employerhasimplementedfortheprotectionofemployeesinorneartheconfinedspacewherethe
contractor/subcontractorpersonnelwillbeworking.
11.9.2.10Contractorsandsubcontractorsshouldcoordinateentryoperationswitheachotherandwiththe
owner/operatorwhenbothhostemployerpersonnelandcontractorpersonnelareworkinginornearpermit
spaces.
11.9.2.11Contractors/subcontractorsshouldimplementeffectivemeasurestopreventpersonnelfrom
enteringconfinedspacesunlessdesignatedasentrants.
11.9.2.12Iftherearechangesintheuseorconfigurationofaconfinedspacethataffectthehazards,
contractors/subcontractorsshouldassurethattheentryiscancelledandtheconfinedspaceisreevaluated
and,asnecessary,reclassified,issuingnewpermitsandestablishingrevisedentrycriteria,
11.9.2.13*Contractors/subcontractorsshouldprovidetherequiredequipmentandassurethatitisproperly
inspected,tested,andmaintainedandusedinaccordancewiththeconfinedspaceprogram.
11.9.2.14Ifprovidedbythecontractor/subcontractor,thecontractorshouldevaluate,qualifyandidentify
rescuerservicesanddevelopandimplementproceduresforsummoningrescueandemergencyservices.
11.9.2.15Thecontractor/subcontractorshoulddevelopandimplementprocedurestoreviewentry
operationswhenthereisreasontobelievethatthemeasurestakenundertheconfinedspaceprogrammight
notprotectemployees.andrevisetheprogramtocorrectdeficienciesfoundtoexistbeforesubsequent
entriesareauthorized.Thecontractor/subcontractorshouldrevisetheprogramtocorrectidentified
deficienciesbeforesubsequententriesareauthorized.
11.9.2.16*Thecontractorshouldreviewtheconfinedspaceprogramannuallyutilizingcancelledpermitsand
otherinformationtoensureprotectionformhazardsduringentryoperations.Copiesofpermitsshouldbe
providedtotheowner/operatorfortheirreviewandevaluation.
11.9.2.17*Thecontractorshouldconsultwithsubcontractors,employeesandtheirauthorized
representativesonthedevelopmentandimplementationofallaspectsoftheconfinedspaceprogramand
makeinformationavailabletoallaffectedemployeesandtheirauthorizedrepresentatives.
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11.911.9.2.18Thecontractor/subcontractorshouldprovidingtrainingcoveringexisting,newandrevised
proceduresandworkpracticessothatallemployeesinvolvedinconfinedspaceoperationsandactivities
acquiretheunderstanding,knowledgeandproficiencynecessaryforthesafeperformanceofassignedduties.
11.9.2.18.1Trainingshouldbeprovidedtoeachaffectedemployee:
(1) Beforetheemployeeisfirstassigneddutiesunderthissection.
(2) Wheneverthereisachangeinassignedduties
(3) Wheneverthereisachangeinpermitspaceoperationsthatpresentsahazard
(4) Whenevertheemployerhasreasontobelievethattherearedeviationsfromtheconfinedspaceentry
procedures,operationsorprogramrequirementsorthatthereareinadequaciesintheemployees
knowledgeoftheseproceduresandrequirements
11.9.2.18.2Thecontractor/subcontractorshouldcertifythatthetraininghasbeenaccomplished.The
certificationshouldcontainthetrainingprovided,employeesname,thesignaturesorinitialsofthetrainers
andthedatesoftrainingandshouldbeavailableforinspectionbyowner/operators,
contractor/subcontractoremployeesortheirauthorizedrepresentatives.
11.9.2.19Aftercompletionofthework,thecontractorshouldmeetwiththesubcontractorsandwiththe
Owner/operatortoreviewsafetyissuesthatwereinvolvedonthejob.
11.9.2.19.1Contractorsshoulddebriefowners/operatorsattheconclusionoftheentryoperationsregarding
thepermitspaceprogramfollowedandanyhazardsconfrontedorcreatedinpermitspacesduringentry
operations.
11.9.3Contractor/SubcontractorQualifications.
11.9.3.1Thecontractor/subcontractorshouldbeabletoidentifyandunderstandconfinedspace.
11.9.3.2Thecontractor/subcontractorshouldknowandunderstandthehazardsthatmaybefacedduring
entryintoconfinedspacesandnecessarycontrolsandprotectivemeasures.
11.9.3.3Thecontractor/subcontractorshouldknow,understandandapplytheregulatoryrequirements.
11.9.3.4Thecontractor/subcontractorshouldbeabletodevelopandimplementanappropriateconfined
spaceprogramtocomplywiththeowner/operatorprogram.
11.9.3.5Thecontractor/subcontractorshouldbeabletotrain,qualifyanddesignatepersonnelforconfined
spaceoperations.
11.9.3.6Thecontractor/subcontractorshouldbeabletoevaluateandselectsubcontractorsandrescuers.
11.9.4Contractor/SubcontractorDemonstratedCompetencies.
11.9.4.1Thecontractor/subcontractorshouldbeabletounderstandrequirementsandevaluatepermits.
11.9.4.2Thecontractor/subcontractorshouldbeabletoidentify,evaluateneedforandprovideforrequired
equipment.
11.9.4.3Thecontractor/subcontractorshouldbeabletocommunicateandcoordinateactivitiesassociated
withconfinedspaceoperations.
11.9.4.4Thecontractor/subcontractorshouldbeabletoassigntasksinaccordancewiththeconfinedspace
programandoperationalrequirements.
11.9.4.5Thecontractor/subcontractorshouldbeabletorecognizehazardsassociatedwiththespecificspace
andoperations.
11.9.4.6Thecontractor/subcontractorshouldbeabletoqualifyandselectpersonnelandsubcontractors.
11.10VentilationSpecialist.
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11.10.1*General.VentilationSpecialistsshouldbefamiliarwith,educated,trainedand/orqualifiedinthe
variousmethodsandrequirementsforremovinghazardousand/orcontaminatedatmospheresfromconfined
spaces.VentilationSpecialistsmayalsoperformotheractivitiesifcompetentorqualifiedandassignedin
accordancewiththeapplicableConfinedSpaceProgramandchapter9
11.1011.10.2VentilationSpecialistDutiesandResponsibilities.
11.10.2.1VentilationSpecialistsshouldbefamiliarwithacceptableventilationmethodsandproceduresand
ensurethatthespecificproceduresormethodstobeusedhavebeenreviewedandapprovedinaccordance
withChapter9
11.10.2.2VentilationSpecialistsshouldreviewthepotentialhazardsassociatedwiththeuseofventilation,
purging,etc.duringtheplannedconfinedspaceworkpriortopermitissuanceandentry.
11.10.2.3*VentilationSpecialistsshouldbeawareofthehazardsassociatedwithinfrequentlyused
proceduresandtherisksofusinginertgas,chemicalsorsteamandthatsuchuseshouldbeapproved.
11.1011.10.2.4VentilationSpecialistsshouldensurethatifexhaustedvapors,etc.areormaybeflammable,
ignitionsourcesinandaroundconfinedspaceshavebeeneliminatedorcontrolledpriortoventilation.
11.10.2.5VentilationSpecialistsshouldensurethatadequatelysizedopeningsareprovidedforbothcleanair
replacementandairexhaustandthattheairsupplyandexhaustpointsareseparatedasfarapartaspossible.
11.10.2.6VentilationSpecialistsshouldneverusepureoxygen(oroxygenabovenormalatmosphericlevels)
toventilateaconfinedspace
11.10.2.7VentilationSpecialistsshouldassurethatairintroducedintoanareaisfromaclean
(uncontaminated)source.
11.10.2.8*VentilationSpecialistsshouldassurethathazardousatmosphereisproperlyexhaustedin
accordancewiththeconfinedspaceprogramandregulatoryrequirementsanddoesnotaccumulatein
unapprovedareas.
11.1011.10.2.9VentilationSpecialistsshouldmodifyventilationproceduresoruseappropriatealternativesas
necessarytomaintainacceptableexposuresduringentry,hotworkorcoldwork.
11.10.2.10VentilationSpecialistsshoulddirectventilationflowstowardoccupiedareas,aswellasareasthat
maycompromiseairqualityinoccupiedspaces.
11.10.2.11VentilationSpecialistsshouldbefamiliarwithpotentialcontaminant(liquid,sludge,orvapor)
collectionpointswithinconfinedspaces,includinglessvisibleoraccessibleareaswherecontaminantsareat
riskofremainingfollowingroutinecleaningorotheractivities.
11.10.2.12*VentilationSpecialistsshouldensurethatventilationairstreamsdonotcompromisetheaccuracy
ofcontinuousorperiodicairtestresults.
11.10.2.13VentilationSpecialistsshouldprovideventilationinaccordancewiththeentrypermitandforas
longasdeemednecessarybytheEntrySupervisor,tester,orentrants.
11.10.2.14VentilationSpecialistshouldbeabletocoordinateandcommunicateventilationactivitiesifthe
GasTesterisaseparatepersonwhenrequired
11.10.3VentilationSpecialistQualifications.
11.10.3.1TheVentilationSpecialistshouldbefamiliarwiththeconfinedspaceprogramandindustryand
governmentalregulationsthatpertaintoventilationsincluding,butnotlimitedtooxygenlevels,flammable
andtoxicatmosphericlevelsandrequiredairchangesperhour.
11.10.3.2TheVentilationSpecialistshouldbefamiliarwiththeuse,limitationsandhazardsofmaterials,
substances,andequipmentapprovedforuseoutsidethespecificconfinedspaceincludingfans,eductors,
hoses,personalprotectiveequipment,GasTestersandchemicals.
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11.10.3.3TheVentilationSpecialistshouldknowandunderstandthehazardsinsideandoutsidethespecific
confinedspaceassociatedwithventilationoperations.
11.10.3.4heVentilationSpecialistshouldknowventilationtechniquesappropriatetothespecifichazardsand
confinedspace,includingacceptedindustrystandards,regulatoryrequirements,etc.
11.10.4VentilationSpecialistDemonstratedCompetencies.
11.10.4.1TheVentilationSpecialistshouldbeabletoreadandverballyexplainpermits.
11.10.4.2TheVentilationSpecialistshouldbeabletoappropriatelyinspect,maintain,testanduserequired
equipment.
11.10.4.3TheVentilationSpecialistshouldbeabletoverballyindentify,assess,interpretandapplymonitor
readings.
11.10.4.4TheVentilationSpecialistshouldbeabletocommunicatewhenevacuationisdesired.
11.10.4.5TheVentilationSpecialistshouldbeabletocompleteassignedtasksinanapprovedmanner.
11.10.4.6TheVentilationSpecialistshouldbeabletodeterminerequiredventilationflowrates.
11.11IsolationSpecialist.
11.11.1General.Isolationistheprocessofremovingaconfinedspacefromserviceandcompletelyprotecting
thespacefromtheunwantedreleaseofenergy,hazardousatmosphereandmaterialsintothespaces.These
operationsareperformedbytheIsolationSpecialistwhoshouldbequalified,competentandauthorized.
Isolationmaybepermanentortemporary.
11.1111.11.2*IsolationSpecialistDutiesandResponsibilities.
11.1111.11.2.1IsolationSpecialistsshouldcomplywithapplicablelockouttagoutprogramandbeauthorized
toworkwiththeapplicableenergycontroldevicesorotherisolationequipment,materialsandprocedures.
11.11.2.2IsolationSpecialistsshouldinspectanddeterminethatequipmentordevicestobeusedfor
isolationareapproved,inacceptableconditionandappropriateforthetaskpriortotheiruse.
11.11.2.3IsolationSpecialistsshouldnotifyauthorizedpersonnelwhentheenergycontrolmeasuresare
eitherappliedorremoved.
11.11.2.4IsolationSpecialistsshoulddetermineifstoredenergyisapotentialissue,andifso,eliminateor
controlthehazard.
11.11.2.5IsolationSpecialistsshouldproperlysequenceisolationandenergycontrolprocedures.
11.11.2.6IsolationSpecialistsshouldverifythatrelevantenergysourceshavebeenisolatedpriortothe
issuanceofpermitsforworkinoraroundareasimpactedbyequipmentorspacesthatneedtobeisolated
andnotifythePermitIssuerand/orEntrySupervisor
11.11.2.7IsolationSpecialistsshoulddevelopandmakeavailabletotheowner/operatororcontractorand
EntrySupervisor,anisolationchecklistrelevanttotheconfinedspace.
11.11.2.8IsolationSpecialists,aswellasotherauthorizedindividuals,shouldusemethodsandprocedures
approvedbytheapplicableconfinedspaceorisolationprogramwhentemporarilyremovinglockoutortagout
devices.
11.11.2.9Attheconclusionofthework,IsolationSpecialistsshouldtakeappropriatesafeguardspriorto
releasingthespacefromlockoutortagoutusingtheisolationchecklistforverificationpurposes
11.11.3IsolationSpecialistQualifications.
11.11.3.1AnIsolationSpecialistshouldcomplywiththeconfinedspaceprogramandindustryand
governmentalregulationsthatpertaintoisolation.
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11.11.3.2AnIsolationSpecialistshouldverballyexplaintheuse,limitationsandhazardsofmaterials,
substances,andequipmentapprovedforuseforisolatingthespecificconfinedspace.
11.11.3.3AnIsolationSpecialistshouldverballyidentifythehazardsinsideandoutsidethespecificconfined
spaceassociatedwithisolationoperations.
11.11.3.4AnIsolationSpecialistshouldverballyexplainisolationtechniquesappropriatetothespecific
hazardsandconfinedspaceincludingacceptedindustrystandards,regulatoryrequirements,etc.
11.11.3.5AnIsolationSpecialistshouldbeabletocomplywithandbeauthorizedtoworkwiththeapplicable
energycontroldevicesorotherisolationprocedures.
11.11.4IsolationSpecialistDemonstratedCompetencies.
11.11.4.1AnIsolationSpecialistshouldunderstandallsectionsoftheconfinedspaceentrypermit.
11.11.4.2AnIsolationSpecialistshouldbeabletoidentifyandevaluateneedforrequiredequipment.
11.11.4.3AnIsolationSpecialistshouldbeabletocommunicatewithallpersonnel.
11.11.4.4AnIsolationSpecialistshouldbeabletoperformassignedtasksinanapprovedmanner.
11.11.4.5AnIsolationSpecialistshouldbeabletodetermineisolationdevices,methodsandrequirements.
11.12StandbyWorker.
11.12.1*General.StandbyWorkersareindividualsassignedtostayoutsidetheconfinedspaceandconduct
confinedspacerelatedoperationsasassignedbytheEntrySupervisorwhichdonotinvolvedutiesassigned
specificallytoentrants,GasTester,rescuers,supervisors,PermitIssuers,attendantsandisolationand
ventilationpersons.
11.1211.12.2StandbyWorkersDutiesandResponsibilities.
11.12.2.1StandbyWorkersshouldhaveanunderstandingoftheworkrequiredandtheknowledgeandskills
toperformtheworkinasafemanneraroundthepermitarea.
11.12.2.2StandbyWorkersshouldbefamiliarwiththehazardsinandaroundtheconfinedspaceanduse
appropriateprotectiveclothingandequipmentasappropriateforassigneddutiesandexposuresoras
requiredbyaworkpermit.
11.12.2.3StandbyWorkersshouldreceivedirectionfromtheconfinedspaceEntrySupervisorregardingtasks
tobeperformed.
11.12.2.4StandbyWorkersassignedtomonitorsuppliedairsystemsshouldadheretothefollowing:
11.12.2.4.1Thisshouldbetheonlytaskassignedtooneperson.
11.12.2.4.2TheStandbyWorkersshouldmaintainairsupplycylindersinasecured,uprightposition,properly
switchcylindersasrequiredtoprovideaconstantairsupplyandensurethatthecylindersareprotected
againstdamage.
11.12.2.4.3TheStandbyWorkersshouldensurethatbreathingairsupplylines,hosesandcouplingsare
maintainedandarenotusedforsupplyinganythingotherthanbreathingair.
11.12.2.4.4TheStandbyWorkerspersonshouldassurethattheintakeairsupplyprovidedtocompressors
and/orairpumps(usedinlieuofcylinders)issuitableforbreathingandisfreeofcontaminants.
11.12.2.4.5TheStandbyWorkersshouldimmediatelynotifyentrantstoswitchtoemergencybottledairand
leavethetankintheeventofairsupplyfailure,contaminationordisruption.
11.12.2.5StandbyWorkersshouldhaveanunderstandingoftheemergencyresponseplansestablishedby
theowner/operatororcontractorandknowwhattododuringanemergency.
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11.12.2.6StandbyWorkersconductingcleaning,disposal,hotworkand/orcoldworkoperationsinand
aroundtheconfinedspaceshouldbeabletoperformtheseactivitiesinaccordancewiththeconfinedspace
programandissuedpermitrequirements.
11.12.3StandbyWorkersQualifications(shouldtheyhavetheawarenessleveltrainingtoo).
11.12.3.1StandbyWorkersshouldcomplywithconfinedspaceprogramandindustryandgovernmental
regulationsthatpertaintoworkassignments.
11.12.3.2StandbyWorkersshouldverballyexplaintheuse,limitationsandhazardsofmaterials,substances,
andequipmentapprovedforuseinassignedduties.
11.12.3.3StandbyWorkersshouldverballyindentifythehazardsinsideandoutsidethespecificconfined
spaceassociatedwithassignedoperations.
11.12.3.4StandbyWorkersshouldverballyexplainthesafeworkpracticesappropriatetothespecifichazards
andconfinedspace.
11.12.4StandbyWorkersDemonstratedCompetencies.
11.12.4.1StandbyWorkershouldbeabletoreadrequiredpermitsifassignedtoconducthotorcoldwork.
11.12.4.2StandbyWorkershouldbeabletoproperlyuserequiredequipment.
11.12.4.3StandbyWorkershouldbeabletoverballycommunicatewithallpersonnel.
11.12.4.4StandbyWorkershouldbeabletoperformassignedtasks.
11.13Training.
11.13.1General.Allconfinedspacepersonnelshouldbetrained,educatedand/orqualifiedasrequiredbythe
applicablewrittenconfinedspaceprogramandregulatoryrequirementstoinclude,butnotlimitedto,the
following;
(1) Generalandspecificdutiesandresponsibilitiesforassignedwork.
(2) Equipment,tools,PPE,respiratoryprotectionandmonitoringinstrumentstobeused.
(3) Typeofconfinedspacetobeentered,configurationandstructureandmaterialsorsubstanceswithin,
aroundorintroducedintothespace.
(4) Atmospheric,physicalandchemical(toxic)hazardawarenessincluding,butnotlimitedto,the
identification,elimination,protectionandcontrolmeasuresapplicabletotheproposedentryandwork.
(5) Certification,registrationorlicensingwhenrequired
11.13.1.1SourcesofTraining/Educationinclude,butarenotlimitedto,thefollowing:
11.13.1.1.1OntheJob(apprentice)trainingorexperience
11.13.1.1.2Companysponsoredtraining/educationinternalorexternal
11.13.1.1.3Jobrequiredregulatorytraining/education,including,butnotlimitedto,respiratoryprotection,
hotwork,lockouttagout,etc.asapplicabletodutiesandassignment.
11.13.1.1.4Government,regulatory,privateandlabororganizationtraining/educationprogramssuchas
NFPAEntrySupervisorTrainingProgram,OSHAonlinecoursesorsimilarprograms
11.13.1.2Retraining.
11.13.1.2.1Allconfinedspacepersonnelshouldberetrained,educatedand/orqualifiedasrequiredbythe
confinedspaceprogramorregulations.
11.13.1.2.2Allconfinedspacepersonnelshouldberetrained,educatedand/orqualifiedwhennewduties
andresponsibilitiesareassigned.
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11.13.1.2.3Allconfinedspacepersonnelshouldberetrained,educatedand/orqualifiedwhennew
equipment,typesofspace,ormaterialsareintroduced.
11.13.1.2.4Allconfinedspacepersonnelshouldberetrained,educatedand/orqualifiedwhenwork
deficienciesareobserved.
11.13.1.2.5Allconfinedspacepersonnelshouldberetrained,educatedand/orqualifiedwhencertification
requiresrenewal
11.13.1.2.6Allconfinedspacepersonnelshouldberetrained,educatedand/orqualifiedwhenregulatory
requirementschange
11.13.1.2.7Allconfinedspacepersonnelshouldberetrained,educatedand/orqualifiedintheproperuseof
toolsandequipment,PPE,respiratoryprotectionandmonitoringinstrumentsetcaccordingtothe
manufacturersrecommendationsforchangesinexistingornewtoolsorequipment
11.13.2RescueTraining.TheAHJshouldprovidefortrainingintheresponsibilitiesthatarecommensurate
withtheneedsoftheorganization.
11.13.3RolesandResponsibilities.TheAHJshoulddeterminedistributionofrolesandresponsibilitiesin
ordertofocusrescuetrainingandresourcestomaintainproficiency.
11.13.4ContinuingEducation.TheAHJshouldprovideforthecontinuingeducationnecessarytomaintainall
requirementsoftheorganizationsidentifiedrescueneeds.
11.13.5DocumentationofTraining.TheAHJshouldberesponsibleforthedocumentationofallrequired
rescuerelatedtraining.Thisdocumentationshouldbemaintainedandavailableforinspectionbyindividual
teammembersortheirauthorizedrepresentativesandbytheowner/contractorwhohasarrangedforthe
rescueservice.
11.13.6Fitness.TheAHJshouldensurethatRescueTeammembersarepsychologically,physically,and
medicallycapabletoperformassigneddutiesandfunctionsattechnicalsearchandrescueincidentsandto
performtrainingexercisesinaccordancewithChapter10ofNFPA1500,StandardonFireDepartment
OccupationalSafetyandHealthProgram.
11.13.7IndividualTeamMemberRequirements.Eachmemberoftherescueserviceshouldmeetthe
requirementsdefinedinNFPA1006,Chapter7ConfinedSpaceRescue,Level2.
11.13.7.1Eachmemberoftherescueserviceshouldbeprovidedwith,andtrainedtouseproperly,thePPE
andrescueequipmentnecessaryformakingrescuesfrominandaroundconfinedspacesaccordingtohisor
herdesignatedlevelofcompetency.
11.13.7.2Eachmemberoftherescueserviceshouldbetrainedtoperformtheassignedrescueduties.
11.13.7.3Eachmemberoftherescueserviceshouldbeequipped,trained,andcapableoffunctioningto
performconfinedspacerescueswithintheareaforwhichtheyareresponsible.
11.13.7.4Eachmemberoftherescueserviceshouldalsoreceivethetrainingrequiredofauthorizedrescue
entrants.
11.13.7.5Eachmemberoftherescueserviceshouldpracticemakingconfinedspacerescuesonceevery12
months.
11.13.7.6Eachmemberoftherescueserviceshouldbecertifiedtotheleveloffirstresponderorequivalent
accordingtoU.S.DepartmentofTransportation(DOT)FirstResponderGuidelines.
11.13.7.7Eachmemberoftherescueserviceshouldsuccessfullycompleteacourseincardiopulmonary
resuscitation(CPR)taughtthroughtheAmericanHeartAssociation(AHA)tothelevelofaHealthCare
Provider,throughtheAmericanRedCross(ARC)totheCPRfortheProfessionalRescuerlevel,orthrough
theNationalSafetyCouncilsequivalentcourseofstudy.
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11.13.7.8Eachmemberoftherescueserviceshouldbeawareofthehazardsheorshecouldconfrontwhen
calledontoperformrescueinareasandwithinconfinedspacesforwhichtheserviceisresponsible.
11.13.8RescueTeamRequirements.
11.13.8.1AllconfinedspacerescueservicesshouldmeettherequirementsdefinedinNFPA1670,Chapter7
ConfinedSpaceRescuetotheTechnicianlevel.
11.13.8.2Therescueserviceshouldbecapableofrespondinginatimelymannertorescuesummons.This
shouldtakeintoaccountpossiblebarriers,traffic,logisticsorotherfactorsthatmaycreatedelaysin
response.
11.13.8.3TheAHJshouldprovidetherescueservicewithappropriateinformationonthehazardstowhich
theymaybeexposedwhileperformingrescuefromspecificorgenericspacesforwhichtheyareresponsible.
11.13.8.4TheAHJshouldprovidetherescueservicewithaccesstoallconfinedspacesforwhichtheyare
responsiblesothattheycandeveloprescueplansandpracticerescueoperations.
Chapter12WrittenConfinedSpaceProgram
12.1General.Beforeconfinedspaceoperationsbeginandbeforeworkersenterconfinedspacesforany
reason,employerswhoseemployeeswillbeenteringconfinedspacesshoulddevelopandimplementwritten
confinedspaceprogramsthatinclude,butarenotlimitedto,thefollowingelements:
(1) ProgramResponsibilities
(2) IdentificationofConfinedSpaces
(3) IdentificationofPersonnelwhowillbeinvolvedinconfinedspaceentry
(4) StandardOperatingProceduressuchasatmosphericmonitoringandventilation
(5) EntryPermits
(6) OtherFacilitySafetyPermitsandProcedures
(7) RescueProcedures
(8) Training
(9) Resources
(10) ProgramAuditing
(11) MedicalQualifications
(12) RegulatoryandBestPractices
(13) Employersthatwillonlyhavequalifiedcontractorsentertheirconfinedspacesneedtohaveawritten
confinedspacepolicythatexplainsthefollowing:
(14) Howtheemployerdeterminesifcontractorsarequalified
(15) HowConfinedSpaceHazardsarecommunicatedtocontractors
(16) Howrelevantfacilitysafetyinformationiscommunicatedtocontractors
(17) Howthecontractorisdebriefedafterentryiscompleted
12.2ResponsiblePersonandResponsibilities.ThereshouldbeonepersonassignedtobetheResponsible
Personforthecompanyorfacilitysconfinedspaceentryprogram.Thispersoncanbetheowner/operator
oranothercompetentindividualassignedbythecompanyowner/operator.Thisindividualshouldbeclearly
identifiedinthewrittenprogram.Theconfinedspaceprogramshouldclearlyestablishtherolesand
responsibilitiesofallindividualsinvolvedinconfinedspaceentries.Asaminimum,thenameofthe
responsiblepersonshouldbelistedalongwiththelistofauthorizedentrants,attendantsandEntry
Supervisors.OtherrolessuchastheGasTester,VentilationSpecialist,IsolationSpecialist,standbyperson,
Hot/ColdworkPermitIssuer,etc.shouldbeassignedtootherindividualsifneededorcanbeassignedtothe
attendantorEntrySupervisorifappropriate.Chapter11ofthisguideprovidesalistofrolesandrequired
training.
12.2.1Awrittenconfinedspaceentryprogramshouldbedevelopedbytheresponsiblepersonforevery
workplaceinwhichconfinedpaceentrieswillbeperformedbyemployees.Theprogramshouldmeet,ata
minimum,applicableregulatoryrequirements,andideally,bestpracticesaswell.
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12.2.2EmployeeInvolvement.Employeeswhowillbeinvolvedinconfinedspaceentryoperationsshouldbe
involvedinthedevelopmentandinstitutionofthewrittenprogram.
12.2.3Allemployeesandcontractorsshouldreceiveacopyof,orknowhowtohaveeasyaccessto,the
facilityswrittenconfinedspaceentryprogram.
12.2.4RolesandResponsibilities.Theconfinedspaceprogramshouldclearlyestablishtherolesand
responsibilitiesofallindividualsinvolvedinconfinedspaceentries.Asaminimum,thenameofthe
responsiblepersonshouldbelistedalongwiththelistofauthorizedentrants,attendantsandEntry
Supervisors.OtherrolessuchastheGasTester,VentilationSpecialist,IsolationSpecialist,standbyperson,
Hot/ColdworkPermitIssuer,etc.shouldbeassignedtootherindividualsifneededorcanbeassignedtothe
attendantorEntrySupervisorifappropriate.Chapter11ofthisguideprovidesalistofrolesandrequired
training.
12.3Thewrittenprogramshouldstatethatallemployeesandmanagementarerequiredtofollowall
confinedspaceprogramelementsandrelatedsafetyprocedures.Theprogramandpolicyshouldalsorequire
thatifanyoneinvolvedinconfinedspaceentryoperationsfeelsanunsafeconditionexiststheymust
immediatelyreportthatconditiontotheattendantorEntrySupervisorandentrantsshouldnotenterthe
space,orifentryhasalreadybeenperformed,leavethespaceuntiltheconcernisaddressedbythe
responsiblepersonorEntrySupervisor.
12.4PeriodicReview.Thewrittenprogramandotherprogramelementsshouldbereviewedbytheemployer
andemployeesinvolvedinconfinedspaceoperationsatleastannuallytodetermineiftheprogramis
effectiveinprovidingsafeoperationsforconfinedspaceentries.
12.4.1Ifaconfinedspacerelatednearmiss,accidentorequipmentfailureoccurstheconfinedspaceprogram
shouldbeauditedandmodifiedasnecessarytoaddressanydeficienciesbeforeanyadditionalentriesare
made.
12.4.2Theconfinedspacewrittenprogramshouldbedatedandsignedbytheowner/operator,andapproved
byseniormanagement.
12.5IdentificationofConfinedSpaces.Anauditofthefacilityshouldbedoneandallconfinedspacesshould
beidentifiedinaccordancewithChapter4ofthisdocument.Therecognizedinherentandadjacenthazards
thatexistshouldbedocumented.Inaddition,themostprobableintroducedhazardsbasedontheworklikely
tobeperformedinthespacesshouldbedocumented.NOTEThisdoesnoteliminatetheneedforafull
hazardevaluationriskassessmentofthespaceatthetimeoftheentry.Rather,itistoprovideageneral
understandingofthehazardslikelytobeencounteredsothatproperequipmentcanbepurchasedand
maintained,personneltrainedonthem,androlescanbeassignedasneeded.(SeeFigureA.12.5.)
12.6HEADING.Thewrittenprogramshoulddescribetheproceduresusedtoevaluateconfinedspacehazards
.EntrySupervisorsshouldusethecriterialistedinchapters6and7toidentifyandevaluatethehazards,and
theprocedureslistedinchapters7and8tocontroloreliminatethehazards.
12.7HEADING.Gasmonitoring.Theprogramshouldspecifythegasmonitor(s)andotheratmospherictesting
instrumentationandprocedurestobeusedforconfinedspaceentry,includinginformationabout
maintenanceandrepair,calibration,calibrationfrequency,bumptestingandlimitations.
12.7.1*Theprogramshouldalsospecifytheatmosphericconditionsthatprohibitentry.Theprogramshould
indicatethatifacceptableatmosphericqualitycriteriaarenotmet,orifahazardousatmospheredevelops
duringoccupancy,allentrantsmustexitimmediately.Forexample,noentryshouldbeallowedifanyofthe
followingconditionsexists:
(1) Oxygenislowerthan19.5percentorhigherthan22.0percent.
(2) Hydrogensulfideisgreaterthan10ppm.
(3) LELisgreaterthan10percent.
(4) Carbonmonoxidegreaterthan35ppm.
75
12.7.2Theprogramshouldspecifywhenandhowgasmonitoringisconducted.Forexample,theprogram
shouldspecifyifworkersaretowearmonitoringdevicesduringtheentireentry,oriftheattendantwillbe
performinggasmonitoring,orboth.
12.7.3Theprogramshouldspecifywhoisresponsibleformaintainingandcalibratingmonitoringequipment.
12.7.4Theprogramshouldspecifywheregasmonitorinstructionsandmanualsaremaintainedandwhere
calibrationrecordsaremaintained.
12.8HEADING.Thewrittenprogramshouldprovideinformationaboutthetypesofmechanicalventilation
systemsavailableforconfinedspaceentryincludingwheretheyarelocatedandwhoisresponsiblefor
maintainingthesesystems.
12.8.1Theprogramshouldspecifywhenandhowmechanicalventilationwillbeusedinconfinedspaces.For
example,someconfinedspacesmayrequirecontinuousventilationduringconfinedspaceentryoperations.
12.8.2Theprogramshouldspecifyifadditionalorspecialtypesofmechanicalventilationmayberequiredfor
particulartaskssuchasweldingorusingflammablesolvents.
12.9Rescue.Theprogramshouldexplainhowrescuewillbeperformed.Itshouldstatethatwhenever
possibleallpermitrequiredconfinedspaceentrieswillbedonewithentrantswearingfullbodyharnesses
thatareeitherattachedtoamechanicalretrievaldeviceortoafixedobjectoutsidethespace.Personalfall
arrestmaybenecessarydependingontheconfigurationoftheconfinedspacerelativetoentryoperations.If
attachednonentryrescueisnotpossibleduetotheconfigurationofthespace,thenacomprehensive
emergencyrescuecontingencyplanshouldbedeveloped.
12.9.1Theprogramshoulddesignatewhoisresponsibleformaintainingandinspectingallmechanical
retrieval,personalfallarrest,andrescueequipment.Theprogramshouldstatethatallequipmentwillbe
inspectedpriortouseregardlessofhowfrequentlyitisotherwiseinspected.
12.9.2Theprogramshouldindicatethetypeofpersonalfallarrestequipmentthatwillbeusedforentries.
12.10PersonalProtectiveEquipment(PPE).Theprogramshouldindicatewhoisresponsibleforobtaining
andmaintainingpersonalprotectiveequipmentandshouldcrossreferenceotherPPEprogramssuchasthe
respiratoryprotectionprogramandthefacilitysPPEwrittenpoliciesorprocedures.
12.11EnergyControlProgram(Lockout/Tagout).Ifthereisanyenergysource(s)thatcancreateahazardin
oraroundtheconfinedspaceduringentryoperationsthentheprogramshouldcrossreference
lockout/tagoutorotherenergycontrolprogramsinthefacility.
12.12Hot/ColdWork.Theprogramshouldcrossreferencefacilityhot/coldworkwrittenpoliciesand
procedures.Ifhot/coldworkisperformedinoraroundconfinedspacesahot/coldworkPermitIssuershould
beassignedinaccordancewithchapter11.
12.13Permits.Thewrittenprogramshouldincludethefacilitysconfinedspaceentrypermit.Seechapter13
forpermits.
12.14Training.Thewrittenprogramshouldincludeinformationaboutthetypesoftrainingrequiredandwho
willberesponsibleforensuringthatallemployeesaretrainedtothelevelofcompetencyrequiredbytheir
jobassignment.
12.14.1Theprogrammayindicatethatgenerictrainingmaterialsmaybeusedforinitialtraining,howeverthe
programshouldalsoindicatethatallemployeesMUSTBETRAINEDonthefacilitysspecificconfinedspace
hazards,proceduresandequipmentbeforebeingauthorizedtoperformanyconfinedspaceprogram
function.
12.14.2Theprogramshouldindicatewhoisresponsibleformaintainingrecordsoftraining.
12.14.3*Theprogramshouldindicatehowoftenretrainingwilloccur.
76
12.15Recordkeeping.Theprogramshouldindicatewhowillmaintainconfinedspaceprogramrecords,
includingcancelledpermits.Allpermitsshouldbemaintainedforaperiodofatleastoneyear.
12.16Contractors.Theprogramshouldindicatethatcontractorswillbeexpectedtofollowtheprocedures
establishedbythewrittenprogram.Itshouldindicatethatallcontractorswillbeinformedofthehazardsand
potentialhazardsintheconfinedspacestheywillbeentering.Ifjointentriesareperformed,theprogram
shouldexplainhowtheseentriesaremanaged.Forexample,willtherebeoneortwoattendants,whose
permit(s)willbeused,andhowairmonitoringisconducted.Attheconclusionofacontractorentry,the
programshouldexplainhowthecontractorisdebriefedconcerningtheentry,andhowthedebriefingis
documented.Theprogramshouldalsoindicatethatifproceduresarenotbeingfollowed,thecontractormay
bedisciplined,includingremovalfromthefacility.
12.17ReportingofAccidentsorNearMisses.Theprogramshouldindicatethatallaccidentsornearmisses,
includingfailuresofretrievalsystems,ventilationsystems,gasmonitoralarmssounding,etc.aretobe
reportedtotheresponsibleperson.Thefacilitysincidentinvestigationprocedureshouldbecrossreferenced
andfollowed.
12.18*GeneralFitnessforDutyEvaluation.Thewrittenprogramshouldincludeprocedurestobeusedto
evaluatethephysicalandmentalcapabilitiesofpersonnelworkinginoradjacenttoconfinedspaces.The
programshouldconsiderthehazardsandtheworkassignmentandmaycrossreferenceotherprogram
medicalevaluationprocedures,suchasforrespiratoryprotectionandhazardousmaterialresponse.
Additionalmedicalevaluationsmaybenecessarytoaddressphysiologicalandpsychologicalstressesthatmay
bepresentduringconfinedspaceentries,suchasclimbingladders,heatstressandclaustrophobia.*
CHAPTER13PERMITS
13.1General.
13.1.1PermitUse.PermitshouldbeusedforallentriesintoConfinedSpaces,reclassification,oralternate
procedure.PermitshallbeconspicuouslyvisibleattheConfinedSpacelocation.Permitsshouldbemarkedas
cancelledwhenworkhasbeencompletedorconditionshavechangedrequiringanewpermit.Canceled
Permitsshallbemaintainedfordurationnotlessthan2yearsandshallbemadeavailabletoEntry
SupervisorsorPermitIssuerforreviewpriortoenteringConfinedSpace.Permitaretobelimitedto1shift,if
workactivityexceeds1shiftthepermitshouldbereissued.Additionally,permitshouldbeconsidered
cancelledifpersonnelchange.
13.2PermitElements.APermitshouldbedevelopedoradoptedthatmeetstheneedsoftheworkactivities
oftheowner/operator.Theelementsbelowdescribeindetailtheexpectationoftheelements,howthey
shouldbeusedandwhytheyareimportant.Eachelementmaybeexpandedorminimizedonthepermitto
meetthejobtaskrequirementand/ortheresponsiblepartiesprogrammanagementrequirements.Each
elementofthepermitidentifiedhasanindepthsectionwithinthisstandardthattheProgramManager,
EntrantSupervisor,Attendant,andEntrantshouldbefamiliarwithandaddressedasmandatoryrequirements
underthetrainingprogram.Ataminimum,12ofthe14elementslistedbelowshouldbeaddressedonany
owner/operatorspermit.Twooftheelementsarediscretionary;4.AlternateProcedureand5.
Reclassificationshouldonlybeusedifowner/operatorswrittenprogramallowsthem.Itshouldbenoted
thatthese2discretionarysectionshaveahistoryofmisuseinindustry.Thisguidelinecautionstheuseof
thesesections,programsthathaveclearwrittenproceduresincludingmanagementofchangethesesections
mayutilizethesesections.Figure13.2isanexampleofatypicalpermit.
***INSERTFIGURE13.2HERE***
13.2.1ConfinedSpaceIdentification.Theconfinedspaceshouldbeclearlyidentifiedonthepermit.Thismay
bedonebyusingitsname,locationanddescription.
77
(1) Location:Thelocationoftheconfinedspaceshouldbeaspreciseaspossible.Waystodothisinclude:
addressoflocation,streetorcrossroadsnearsite,buildinglocationand/ornumber,roomorspace
number,andGlobalPositioningSystem(GPS)coordinates.Ifthereisaspacesimilartotheoneonthe
permit,thereshouldbeadditionalinformationaddedtothepermittoensurethecorrectspaceis
identifiedbyallpersonnel.
(2) Description:Inadditiontothelocation,adetaileddescriptionofthespacemayassistpersonnelin
correctlyidentifyingtheconfinedspace.Forexample,adescriptionmayincludewhattypeofspaceitis
(e.g.,tank,silo,vault),whatitsfunctionis(e.g.,fueloilwaste,grainhopper),and/oritsphysicalattributes
(typeofmaterial,color,size,shape,etc.).
13.2.2WorkActivities.
(1) Time:Thepermitshouldoutlinetheperiodoftimethepermitisvalidand,ifpossible,thetimeswhen
workersareexpectedtobepresentinthespace.Permitsbecomevoidoncethetime/dateofthepermit
hasexpired.
(2) Work:Thepermitshouldoutlinewhatworkisscheduledtobedoneinthespace.Permitsareissuedfor
specificworkandifthereisachangeinthescopeofworkoritslocation,anewpermitmayneedtobe
issued.WorkthatisnotidentifiedonthepermitmaynotbedonewithouttheapprovaloftheEntry
Supervisor.
13.2.3InitialConfinedSpaceSAFEWORKEvaluation.AllConfinedSpacesshallhaveanInitialSAFEWORK
evaluation.Theintentofthisevaluationistoensurethereviewofconfinedspacesbeforeanyworkactivity
begins,toensurehazardousconditionsdonotexistinherently,areintroduced,orareadjacenttoconfined
space.EvaluationneedstobesignedoffbyEntrySupervisororissuer.Ifnohazardousconditionsexistwork
mayproceed.IfanyhazardsexisttheEntrySupervisororPermitIssuerneedstocompletethepermit
appropriatelytoensuresafeentry.
13.2.4Alternateprocedure.(DISCRETIONARYSECTION)
Caution:Alternateprocedureneedstobemanagedunderextremecontrol.Historyofconfinedspace
entryincidentsindicatemisuseofthisprocedureandhasresultedindeath.Manyowner/operators
havechosennottoallowtheuseofthisprocedure.
13.2.4.1Whenalternateprocedureisused,itmayonlybeusedifthereisnopotentialforanyotherhazard
besidesatmosphere.Awrittenprocedureisneededfortheconfinedspace,includinghazardevaluation,
hazardidentification,andriskassessment.Theuseofthisprocedureonlyprovidesrelieffromthe
requirementofaconfinedspaceattendant,andstandbyrescue.
13.2.4.2Allhazardsmustbeeliminatedbeforeentry,excepthazardousatmospherepotential.TheEntry
Supervisorneedstosignoffonpermitifalternateprocedureistobeusedandreviewwithentrantwhat
conditionswouldcancelsaidpermitapproval.
13.2.4.3Whenthisprocedureisbeingusedpositivepressureventilationandcontinuousairmonitoringare
required.Hazardousatmospheremaynotexistpriortoventilation.
13.2.44,Note:EmergencyServicesRescuenotificationshouldstillbearranged,andincidentactionplan
documented.
13.2.5Reclassification.(DISCRETIONARYSECTION).
Caution:Reclassificationproceduresneedtobemanagedunderextremecontrol.Historyofconfined
spaceentryincidentsindicatemisuseofthisprocedurehasresultedindeath.Manyowner/operators
havechosennottoallowtheuseofthisprocedure.
WhenReclassificationprocedureisuseditmayonlybeusedifthereisnopotentialforhazardbeforeentry.A
writtenprocedureisneededfortheconfinedspaceincludinghazardevaluation,hazardidentificationandrisk
assessment.Includingwrittendetaileddescriptiononhoweachhazardhasbeeneliminated.Theuseofthis
procedureonlyprovidesrelieffromtherequirementofaconfinedspaceattendant,andstandbyrescue.
78
TheEntrySupervisorneedstosignoffonpermitifreclassificationprocedureconfirmingreclassificationwas
conductedproperly,andreviewwithentrantwhatconditionswouldcancelsaidpermitapproval.
Reclassificationisonlyallowedbyformalriskassessmentandidentificationofproperhazardelimination
proceduresbyindependentcompetentperson.
Note:EmergencyServicesRescuenotificationshouldstillbearranged,andincidentactionplandocumented.
13.2.6HazardIdentification.Allrecognizedandpotentialhazardsshouldbeoutlinedonthepermitoronthe
permitsdocumentation.Thesehazardsshouldthenbeeliminatedorcontrolledtoreducetherisktothe
workerstoanacceptablelevel.Givingworkersinformationaboutthehazardswillassistthemintheirown
hazardrecognitionandwillhelptoalertthemtochangesinthespacescondition.Typesofhazardsinclude
inherenthazards,introducedhazards,andadjacenthazards.13.2.6.1InherentHazards.Asdescribedin
Chapter6,theremaybehazardsinherenttotheconfinedspace.Thesehazardsexistasapermanentor
characteristicattributesuchasthespacesdesign,configuration,size,orfixedequipmentwithinthespace.
Thesehazardsmaynotbeabletobeeliminatedorcontrolled,butmeasurescanbetakentoassesstheirrisks
andtakeprecautions.Anexampleofthisisasteepladderintoafueltank.Theladdersconfigurationisnot
changeable,butthewayinwhichsuppliesarebroughtintothespacecanbealtered.Theworkerdoesnot
havetocarrythemdown;instead,theycanbeloweredtohim/her.
13.2.6.2IntroducedHazards.Thesetypesofhazardsaretypicallybroughtintothespacebyworkersorwork
processes.Theintroductionofmaterials,personnelandworkprocessesshouldbeevaluatedcarefullyto
ensurethattheydonotcreateahazardousconditionforpersonnel.Thesearehazardsthatcanbecontrolled
oreliminated,makingthemakeyelementinariskassessment.Anexampleofintroducedhazardsincludesthe
materialsbroughtintoaspacetocleanit.Ifthematerials,suchassolventsusedtocleanafueltank,create
hazardouslevelsofvapors,theconditionofthespacemaybealteredbytheprocess.Anotherexampleof
introducedhazardsiswhenworkersdisturbsettledmaterials,suchasfishprocessingorotherbiologicalwaste.
Thedisruptionofthematerialsmayallowtrappedlevelsofhydrogensulfidegastobereleasedcreatinga
hazardousatmosphere.
13.2.6.3AdjacentHazards.Adjacenthazardsarethosehazardsthatarenotinthespacebutareinclose
proximity.Thesehazardsmayimpactaconfinedspacethroughanopeningorhatch(e.g.,smokefromanearby
fireorhotwork),commonwallorconduit(e.g.,leakfromanadjacenttank),orthroughphysicalchanges(e.g.,
heatingofanadjacentwallduringhotwork).Whenconductinganinspectiontodevelopaconfinedspace
permit,adjacenthazardsthatexistorcanpotentiallyexistshouldbeconsideredandtakenintoaccount.
13.2.7HazardControl.(SeealsoChapter8.)Identifiedhazardsshouldbeeliminatedorcontrolled.Whenthe
hazardsareinherent,theyshouldberecognizedandmeasuresshouldbedevelopedtoreducetherisktothe
workers.Controlsshouldbeclearlyoutlinedonthepermit,andincludesuchmeasuresas:
13.2.7.1AirMonitoring.Airmonitoringisoftenrequiredtomonitortheconditionsintermittentlyor
continuously.Thefrequencyofmonitoringdependsontheworkbeingperformedandotherpotential
introducedoradjacenthazardsthatcouldaltertheatmosphericconditionsofthespace.Thesecaninclude
OxygenDeficient,OxygenEnriched,FlammableorExplosive,Toxics,Irritant/CorrosivesorAsphyxiating
atmospheres.Thepermitshoulddetailwhatairmonitoringshouldbedone,bywhom,andatwhatlevels
personnelarerequiredtoexitthespace.
13.2.7.2Ventilation.Ifpossible,ventilatingaspacewithfreshairbeforeandduringconfinedspaceworkmay
reduceorremoveatmosphericcontaminants.Ventilation,especiallyduringthewarmermonths,mayalso
providereliefforthermalstress.Thepermitshouldoutlinewhatventilationisrequiredpriortoentryand
duringentry.Iftheventilationwillblockaccessinoroutofthespace,thepermitshouldoutlinewhatthe
procedureswillbeneededtoensureworkersafetyduringoperations.
13.2.7.3PersonalProtectiveEquipment.ThepermitshouldaddressentrantandattendantPPE
requirements.Likewise,ifpersonnelneedtocarryescapedevicesoradditionalPPEforspecificwork,suchas
cleaningorpainting,thatshouldalsobeincluded.
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13.2.7.4OtherPermits.Allotherpermitsthatareneededforthespaceshouldbedelineatedonthepermit
(e.g.,HotWork,Linebreak,Electricalwork,etc.).
13.2.7.5GroundingandBonding.Ifthespaceortheventilation/equipmentbroughtintothespaceneedtobe
groundedorbonded,thatinformationshouldbeonthepermit.
13.2.8Communications.Communicationsshouldbedocumentedastohowtheywillbemaintained,as
follows:
(1) Verbal:Acceptableiflineofsightismaintained
(2) Radio:Permittoindicatetestintervals
(3) Rescuerequest:PermittoindicatehowRescueTeamwillbenotified
13.2.9Rescue.WhenpreparingforentryintoaConfinedSpaceRescueneedstobeunderstood.Thereare2
typesofrescuebothneedtobeunderstoodastowhentheyareusedandthelimitationsofeach.Regardless
ofwhetheraconfinedspacehashazardsornot,theowner/operatorshallensurerescueisavailableand
appropriate.AllConfinedSpacesshouldhavearescueincidentactionplan,whichdescribeshowrescuewill
beachieved.ThisincidentactionplanneedstobeavailabletoEntrySupervisors,Attendants,andEntrants.
Theincidentactionplanshouldbeattachedtothepermitbeingissued.EmergencyResponseTeamshouldbe
notifiedwhenallconfinedspacesareentered.
(1) SelfRescue,permitshallindicatewhatequipmentwillbeusedandwhowillassist.Individualsshouldbe
trainedonwhenandhowtousetheequipmentandthelimitationsofsaidequipment.
(2) EmergencyResponseRescueshouldbenotifiedofthelocationofentry,hazards,andduration.
13.2.10Entrants.[Introductorytext]:
(1) Nameshallbeprinted
(2) Entrantshallsignpermit,indicatingthattheyhavebeentrainedinConfinedSpaceentryandhavefully
reviewedallthehazardsassociatedwiththespecificentrytheyareabouttomakeincludingwhich
conditionchangesrequiretheirimmediateevacuation.
13.2.11Attendant.[Introductorytext]:
(1) Nameshallbeprintedonthepermit
(2) Attendantshallsignpermit,indicatingthattheyhavebeentrainedinConfinedSpaceentryandhavefully
reviewedallthehazardsassociatedwiththespecificentry.TheAttendantmustbeawareofthepotential
hazardsintheconfinedspace.Thiswouldincludepossiblebehavioraleffectsrelatedtoexposuretothese
hazards.AnAttendantmustremaininconstantcontactwiththeentrant,unlessrelievedbyanother
attendant.Maintainscommunicationwithentrant,monitorsactivitiesandordersevacuations,when
needed.PerformsNONENTRYRESCUEorsummonsRescueTeamifneeded.Maynotperformanyother
dutythatmayinterferewiththeprimarydutiesofattendingtothesafetyoftheentrant.
13.2.12EntrySupervisor.TheEntrySupervisorhastotalresponsibilityfortheentry.TheEntrySupervisor
shallsignpermit,indicatingthattheyhavebeentrainedinConfinedSpaceentryandhavefullyreviewedall
thehazardsassociatedwiththespecificentry.Theymustbeawareofthepotentialhazardsineachspaceand
standardoperatingproceduresandequipmentrequiredforeachentry.Ensuresthattheworkremains
consistentwiththepermitiftheworkorhazardschange,thespaceisreevaluatedandanewpermitis
issued.
13.2.13CancelPermit.Eachpermitshallhavealocationonthepermittobeidentifiedascanceled.Apermit
canbecanceledattheendoftheworkactivitybyattendantorentrantoratanytimebyattendant,entrant,
supervisor,orsafetyprofessionalbecauseofhazards.
13.2.14RescueandEmergencyContact.Permitshouldconspicuouslyindicatewhoandhowemergency
rescueandcontactarecontacted.

80
CONFINEDSPACEENTRYPERMIT
**COMPLETEBOTHSIDESOFPERMITANDPOSTAT
JOBSITE.**
1
LOCATIONOFCONFINEDSPACE
ADDITIONALDESCRIPTOR(Ex;LOCATION#,Risk
Assessment#,etc)
DESCRIPTIONOFCONFINEDSPACE(TANK#,MANHOLE,ETC.)
2
DATEISSUED
TIMEOFENTRY/ISSUED
TIMEPERMITEXPIRES(MAX
DURATION=10HRS.)
DESCRIPTIONOFWORKTOBEDONE
3
InitialConfinedSpaceSafeWorkevaluation.IfYES,isindictedforanyofthequestions.
ENTRYNOTPERMITTEDUNTILhazardsareindentifiedandmitigatedbyuseofthepermitand
authorizedEntrySupervisor.
IfNOisindicatedforeveryquestionworkmayproceed.EntrySupervisor
Signature________________________________________
Ifanyconditionschangeworkshallstopandsupervisorcontacted
HAZARDIDENTIFICATION
HAZARDSPRESENTORPOTENTIALLYPRESENT
(indicateYESorNOineverybox)
INHERENT
HAZARDS
INTRODUCED
HAZARDS
ADJACENT
HAZARDS
ADJACENT
HAZARDS
MECHANICAL/ELECTRICAL
(springs,elevatedparts,electricover
50volts.)

Physical
Engulfmentbymaterial

PNEUMATIC/HYDRAULIC/
FLUIDS/GASES
(lifts,agitators,etc.)

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL/
ATMOSHERIC

4
AlternateProcedure:
AreAlternateProceduresallowed yes noIfalternateprocedureisallowedthereshallbeaformal
hazardassessmentbyqualifiedpersonincludingwrittenformalprocedure.
IfYESandbeingused,EntrySupervisormustsignanddate______________________
81
5
ReclassificationProcedure:
AreReclassificationProceduresallowed yes noIfreclassificationproceduresareallowedthere
shallbeaformalhazardassessmentbyqualifiedpersonincludingwrittenformalprocedure.
IfYESandbeingused,EntrySupervisormustsignanddate______________________
6
7
ENERGYSOURCES
(examples)
HAZARDSPRESENTORPOTENTIALLY
(CHECKALLTHATAPPLY)
HAZARDCONTROLLEDBY
Ifadditionalpermitsareusedindicate
here
inadditiontoothercontrols.
INHERENT
HAZARDS
INTRODUCED
HAZARDS
ADJACENT
HAZARDS
MECHANICAL
(springs,elevated
parts,etc.)

ELECTRICAL
(motors,agitators,
etc.)

PNEUMATIC/
HYDRAULIC
(lifts,agitators,etc.)

FLUID/GASES
(CIPlines,nitrogen,
steam,etc.)

OTHER
HAZARDS

UNAUTHORIZED
ENTRY
OFPERSONNEL

NOISE>85dB

EXCESSIVEHEATOR
COLD

FALLINGOBJECTS

OtherPermits:Hot
Work,LineBreak,
LOTO,LiveElect
Work

ATMOSPHERICHAZARDS:(recordpreentryanddocument
continuousatleasteverytwohoursuntilexit)BumpTest
requiredandcompletedyes
GasTester:TypeModel_________________Serial#
_______________________
PRE
ENTRY
REQUIRED
AM/PM:
Time
AM/
PM:
Time
AM/
PM:
Time
AM/
PM:
Time
AM/
PM:
82
CONTINUOUS
MONITORING
REQUIRED
YES NO

PERCENTOF
OXYGEN
19.5%to22.5%

LOWEREXPLOSIVE
LIMIT
<10%ofLFL

CARBONMONOXIDE
<35ppm

HYDROGENSULFIDE
<10ppm

OTHER
TESTERINITIALS:
PERSONALPROTECTIVEEQUIPMENTREQUIRED:(FORALL,EITHERCHECKTHEBOXORCIRCLEN/A)
N/A RespiratorN/A SafetyGlassesw/SideShieldsN/A HardHat
Type:_________________________N/A GogglesN/A FaceShield
Model:________________________N/A EarPlugs/MuffsN/A Boots
Cartridge/Filter:_________________N/A Gloves(Type:_______________)N/A DisposalCoveralls
Other
(specify:______________________________________________________________________________
________________)
8
COMMUNICATIONS:
ENTRANT VERBAL(ONLYALLOWEDFORLINEOFSIGHT) RADIO
EMERGENCYRESCUEWILLBEREQUESTEDBY:
9
RESCUE:(FORALL,EITHERCHECKTHEBOXORCIRCLEN/A)
N/A FullBodyHarnessw/DRingN/A Tripod/RetrievalSystemN/A FallArrestingEquipment
N/A LifelinesandSafetyorWristHarnessN/A EmergencyEscapeRetrievalEquipment
EmergencyResponseTeamhasbeennotifiedofentry,hazards,andduration(Stilluseforalternate
procedure,orreclassification)
IncidentActionPlanhasbeencompletedandavailable
1
0
ENTRANT(S):Iamawareofthehazardsandtheireffects,andwilltaketheprecautionsrequired.
__________________________________________________________________
_________________________________
83
FIGURE13.2Exampleofatypicalconfinedspaceentrypermit.
Chapter14Recordkeeping
14.1General.Allrecordsforaconfinedspaceprogramshouldbemaintainedbytheowner/operatorfora
minimumofonecalendaryeartoallowforanannualreviewoftheprogram
14.2EmployerSiteRecords.
14.2.1Documentedevaluationandclassificationforeachconfinedspacepresentshouldbemaintainedfor
thedurationofoccupancyoruntilpermanentlyeliminated
14.2.2Recordsofallreclassificationandpermits,includingallsupportingairmonitoringresults,shouldbe
maintainedforaperiodoftwoyearfromthedateofentry.
14.2.3Documentationofannualreviewstodeterminecontinuedprogrameffectivenessshouldbe
maintainedforaperiodoftwoyearsfromthedateofthereview.
14.2.4Documentationofconfinedspacemonitoring,personalprotectionequipment,rescueequipment
monthlyinspectionsandmaintenanceshouldbemaintainedforaminimumoftwoyears.
14.2.5Documentationofconfinedspacemonitoring,personalprotectionequipment,andrescueequipment
inspectionsforandduringentryshouldbemaintainedforaminimumoftwoyears
14.3EmployeeRecords.
14.3.1Employeetrainingrecords,certifications,competencies,shouldbemaintainedforthedurationof
employmentifrequiredforentry.
14.3.2Arosterofemployeestrained,educated,qualifiedandauthorizedtoparticipateinconfinedspace
entries
14.3.3Anymedicalevaluationprogramdocumentsshouldbemaintainedforthirtyyearspastthelast
employmentdateofanyemployee
PrintNameInitialPrintNameInitialPrintNameInitial
1
1
ATTENDANT(S):Iamawareofthehazardsandtheireffects.Iwillarrangeforrescuefromoutsidethe
space,ifrequired.
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________
PrintNameInitialPrintNameInitialPrintNameInitial
1
2
ENTRYSUPERVISOR:Iauthorizeentryintothisconfinedspaceandverifythatthehazardshavebeen
evaluated,controlmeasureshavebeeninstituted,andtheconditionsareasindicatedonthispermit.
_______________________________________________________________________
___________________________
PrintedName(s)DepartmentPhoneSignature(s)
1
3
CANCELPERMITThispermitshallbecancelledatthecompletionoftheentryorifhazardschangeby
placingalargeXacross
bothsidesofthepermit.
1
4
RESCUE&EMERGENCYCONTACT
____________:(555)5555555
84
14.4Contractor.Contractorpermits,supportingairmonitoringresultsandqualificationsshouldberetained
foraminimumofoneyear.
Chapter15ManagementofChange(MOC)
15.1Purpose.Toestablishtheprocedurestomanagechangestoequipment,workScopeandApplication
OwnersofconfinedspacesshouldcompleteaMOCreviewforanytemporaryorpermanentchangeaffecting
confinedspacedesign,equipment,orworkpractices.Changeisdefinedasallmodificationstoconfinedspace
configuration,equipment,workprocesses,materials,procedures,andcontents/chemicals.
15.2ResponsibilitiesandCommunication.ForaMOCsystemtofunctioneffectively,confinedspaceowners,
entrants,attendants,supervisors,andrescuersshouldknowhowtorecognizewhichdeviationsandchanges
aresignificantenoughtotriggeraMOCreview.Onceadeviationorchangeaffectingaconfinedspaceis
identifiedthattriggerstheMOCsystem,facilityownersassignqualifiedpersonnelandprovidetheresources
toconductanMOCprocesstodeterminewhatchanges,ifany,areneededintheconfinedspaceprogramand
hazardcontrolmeasures.
15.3MOCProcessandActivation.AMOCprocessshouldbeformallydeveloped,implemented,
communicated,anddocumentedtoensurethechangesanddeviationsaffectingconfinedspaceshavebeen
reviewedandauthorized.ThestepsforexecutingaMOCprocessinclude,butarenotlimitedtoprocesses,
procedures,orthefacilityfordesignatedconfinedspaces.ThepurposeoftheManagementofChange(MOC)
procedureistoensurethatworkplacechangestoequipment,processes,personnel,procedures,ormaterials
affectingconfinedspacesareproperlyreviewedagainstoriginalconfinedspacehazardassessmentdata.MOC
isaconceptthatifwellimplementedcouldlikelypreventconfinedspaceaccidentsassociatedwithchanges
ormodificationswithconfinedspaces.
15.3.1AnMOCformshouldbeoriginated,submitted,andauthorizedpriortoimplementingachange
affectingaconfinedspace.ThepersonoriginatingthechangeordeviationshouldcompletePartIoftheMOC
form.
15.3.2TheMOCFormshouldthenbesubmittedforreviewandapprovalbyqualifiedpersonnelfamiliarwith
theprocesswhoshouldthoroughlyidentifypotentialissues,developprotectivemeasures,andproposea
courseofactionforproceedingsafelywiththeconfinedspaceprogramchangesordeviations.
15.3.3Aftertheconfinedspaceprogramchangeshavebeenimplementedbutpriortoentryintoconfined
spaces,theMOCformshouldbereviewedandauthorizedtoensureallconfinedspaceprogramrequirements
anddocumentationhavebeenfullyaddressedorupdatedandthatthechangewasimplementedand
consistentwithoriginalorupdatedconfinedspaceclassificationandhazardassessmentdocumentationprior
toprovidingauthorizationforconfinedspaceentry.
15.4MOCWarrantedConfinedSpaceChanges:
15.4.1EquipmentChangesAffectingConfinedSpace.Theaddition,modification,orremovalofequipment
suchthatnewprocesses,procedures,documentationortrainingforconfinedspaceworkisrequired.
Examplesofchangesinconfinedspacesinclude,butarenotlimitedtothefollowing:
(1) Physicalconfiguration(e.g.;externalorinternaldimensionsofspace,materialsofconstruction,physical
condition)ofthespace
(2) Entryorinternalaccessportalsandpaths(e.g.,number,size,configurationthatwillmodifyoraffect
egressroutes,etc.)
(3) Internalequipment(e.g.,agitators,dampers,piping,obstructions,safetycriticalequipment,systemparts,
etc.)
(4) Instrumentationandmonitoring(e.g.,monitors,electricalcontrols,program/controllogicorset/alarm
points,etc.)
(5) Electrical,hydraulic,pneumaticormechanicalequipment,orchangeofelectricalclassification
(6) Reclassificationofthespacesoastonolongerbeaconfinedspace
85
15.4.2ConfinedSpaceProcessChanges.Anychangestoconfinedspaceoradjacentprocesses,work
practices,orprocedureswhichcouldimpactpreviouslyestablishedconfinedspaceprograms,classification
andhazardassessmentdataincluding:
(1) Plannedconfinedspaceoradjacentworkactivities(welding,cleaning,maintenance,repairs,testing,
monitoring,etc.)
(2) Hazardousatmosphericconditions(oxygen,combustiblegases,toxicgases,etc.)insideoroutsidethe
space
(3) Physicalfactors(temperature,humidity,noise,radiation,etc.)
(4) Safeupperandloweroperatinglimits(temperature,pressure,flow,composition,etc.)
(5) Changesinventilationthatcouldaffectdisplacement,dilution,orremovalofaircontaminantswithinthe
space
(6) PreventativeMaintenance,isolationorLockoutTagoutProcedures(additionsorchangesinthese
proceduresorprocesses)
15.4.3ConfinedSpaceContent/ChemicalChanges.Anychangesincontentsand/orchemicalsusedin
confinedspaceswhichcouldimpactpreviouslyestablishedconfinedspaceclassificationandhazard
assessmentdataincluding:
(1) Thetype,amount,orcompositionofcontents/chemicalsstoredinconfinedspacesthatmayaffect
electricalhazardousareaclassifications,hazardousatmosphereconsiderations,airmonitoringprovisions,
ventilationrequirements,PPErequirementsforentrants,rescuepreparedness,etc.)
(2) Introductionoruseofneworchangedhazardouschemicalsorothermaterialsinsideconfinedspacesthat
maypresentorproducepotentialchemicalorphysicalhazardexposureconcernstoentrants.
(3) Theuseofnewordifferentmaterialsorchemicalsoutsideoftheconfinedspacewhosereleasecould
affecttheconfinedspace.
15.5MOCCompletionandVerification.AMOCverificationprocessshouldbefollowedtoaffirmthatthe
potentialsafetyimpactsandconsequencesfromtheproposedchangesordeviationhavebeenproperly
addressed.TheMOCFormshouldverifyallrequiredMOCactionitemsarecomplete,theconfinedspace
classification/hazardassessmenthavebeenupdated,theconfinedspaceprogram,entryprocedureand
rescueplanhavebeenrevisedaccordingly,andtheconfinedspaceissafetoenter.AMOCcompletionand
verificationprocessshouldconfirm,butnotbelimitedtothefollowingitems:
(1) Constructionandequipmentinaccordancewithdesignspecifications
(2) Confinedspacesafety,operating,maintenance,andemergencyproceduresareinplaceandare
appropriatefortheplannedactivity.
(3) Anupdatedconfinedspaceclassificationandhazardassessmenthasbeenperformedand
recommendationshavebeenimplementedbeforestartup
(4) RequirementsandauthorizationsinMOChavebeenmet
(5) Trainingofeachaffectedemployeeonchangeshasbeencompleted
Chapter16PreventionthroughDesign(PtD)
16.1*Purpose.APreventionthroughDesign(PtD)conceptseekstoinitiateadesignprocesstoreduceor
eliminateinherentrisksandhazardsassociatedwiththedesignoffacilities,equipment,andproducts.PtDcan
minimizethecostofretrofittinganduseoflaborintensiveadministrativehazardcontrolmeasures.Thegoal
ofPtDistoeliminatehazardsandreducerisksbystudyingthesafetyimpactsduringtheinitialstagesof
designratherthanrelyingonreactivehazardisolationandcontrolapproaches.
16.2ScopeandApplication.TherootPtDconceptsandapproachhaveaverystronganddirectrelationship
andbenefittohazardandriskreductioneffortsassociatedwithconfinedspaceentryandrescueoperations.
Specifically,theapplicationofPtDconceptstoconfinedspacestargetstwotypesofinteractions;construction
and/orinstallationofnewconfinedspaces,andredesigningandrenovationofconfinedspacestoeliminateor
minimizehazards.
86
16.3Responsibilities.PtDisfacilitatedwhenHSEprofessionalsandengineerseffectivelycollaborateduring
theearlystagesofacapitalprojectprocess.ForaPtDprocesstofunctioneffectively,confinedspaceowners
mustunderstandthehierarchyofhazardcontrolsandrecognizewhichconfinedspacehazardsandriskscan
bereducedthroughimproveddesignorredesign.Onceanopportunityforreducedrisksthroughan
employmentofaPtDprocessisidentified,facilityownersshouldgathertheappropriatequalifiedpeopleand
resourcestoperformaPtDreview.
16.4PtDProcessandActivation.PtDiswidelyrecognizedandevenformalizedbyOSHA,NIOSH,other
consensussafetyorganizationsandseveralnonmandatoryPtDstandardsandguidelineshavebeen
developed,published,anddisseminatedtothepublic.Thereisnotacurrentregulatorystandard,consensus
standard,orguidelinethatspecificallyaddressesaformalprocessforactivatingaPtDconceptspecificallyfor
confinedspaces.ConfinedspaceownersshouldconsiderthefollowingtoolsandprocessestomoveaPtD
conceptforwardtowardsreductionandeliminationofconfinedspacerisksandhazards:
(1) IntegratePtDconceptsintoyourManagementofChange(MOC)processwhenevaluatingpotential
hazards,risks,andcontrolmeasuresfornewconfinedspacesorwhenmakingchangesorrenovations
withexistingconfinedspaces;
(2) Useriskassessmentandcoincidinghierarchyofcontrolstoachieveatolerablelevelofriskwhen
performingconfinedspaceriskassessments,andduringdevelopmentofconfinedspaceentry
procedures/permits,andrescueplans;
(3) InvestigateconfinedspaceincidentsandnearmissesthatevaluatethebenefitofPtDconceptsintothe
rootcauseanalysisandcorrectiveactionprocess;and
(4) TrainandcommunicatePtDconcepts,practices,andbenefitstofacilitymanagers,supervisors,engineers,
andEHSprofessionals.
16.5PtDWarrantedConfinedSpaceChanges.ThefollowingprovidesexamplesofhowPtDconceptscanbe
utilizedtoreduceoreliminatethehazardsandrisksassociatedwithconfinedspaceentryandrescue
operations.
16.5.1PtDtoEliminateConfinedSpacebyDefinition.[Introductorytext]:
(1) Eliminatetheabilityorneedtoenterandperformwork(e.g.,remotelyoperatedtools,fixedmonitoring
devices,viewingwindowsorcameras,remotegreasejoints,redesignofworkormaintenancetasks,
relocatecriticalvalves/equipmentoutsidespace,etc.);
(2) Eliminaterestrictedmeansofentryandexit(e.g.,replaceladderswithsteps/stairs,enlarge
openings/accesspaths,usestandarddoorwayopenings,addaccesspoints,etc.);
(3) Designspaceforcontinuousemployeeoccupancy(e.g.,improvesventilation,illuminatespace,alterspace
configuration,etc.);
16.5.2PtDtoEliminatePRCSDefinitionClassification.[Introductorytext]:
(1) Substituteoreliminatehazardouschemicalsthatpresentpotentialhazardousatmospheres(e.g.,use
combustibleliquidswithreducedflashpoints,usecorrosivesandtoxicswhichpresentalessenedworker
exposureconcern,etc.)
(2) Protectfromexposuretoserioussafetyhazards(e.g.,installfixedguards/coversonmechanicaland
electricalequipmenthazards,installrailingsand/orfallprotectionpointsintospace,installenergy
isolationlockoutpointsoutsideofspace,eliminateorguardexposuretosharp/heated/slipperysurfaces)
(3) Preventfromexposuretoengulfmentorentrapmenthazards(e.g.,designpipes,valves,andlinebreaks
toallowblockingandbleedingoflinesoutsideofspace,designspaceopeningtoallowforeasyemptying
ofcontents,alterconfigurationofspacetoprevententrapment,etc.)
16.5.3PtDtoFacilitateRescueofEntrants.[Introductorytext]:
(1) Designorredesignspacetoallowfortwoopeningsforrescue
(2) Designorredesignopeningstoallowunobstructedaccessofrescue/retrievalequipment
(3) Permanentlymountdavitarm,receiver,orotherfixedanchorpointsatspaceaccessopening
87
(4) Worktowardsthegoalthebeingabletoperformexternalrescueofentrantswhendesigningspaces.
16.5.4PtDReferenceStandardsandGuidelines.Severalagencieshavedevelopedstandardsandguidelinesin
referencetodiscussionandimplementationofaPtDprocess.ThefollowingisasummarizedlistofPtD
references,sites,andstandardsforfurtherreference:
(1) ANSI/ASSEZ590.3,PreventionThroughDesign:GuidelinesforAddressingOccupationHazards&Risksin
theDesign&RedesignProcesses
(2) NIOSHPreventionthroughDesign:PlanfortheNationalInitiative
(3) ANSI/AIHA/ASSEZ102012,OccupationalHealthandSafetyManagementSystem(providesspecific
referencetouseofPtDprocess)
(4) ASSETechBriefonPtDStandard
AnnexA
A.1.3ForconfinedspaceactivitieswithintheUnitedStates,thisguideisintendedtoincorporatethe
requirementsincludedinOSHAstandardsforgeneralindustry,construction,agriculture,andmaritime.
A.3.3.3AcceptableEntryConditions.SeeSection8.2.
A.3.3.6ConfinedSpace.Forexample,tanks,vessels,silos,storagebins,hoppers,vaults,andpitsarespaces
thatoftenhavelimitedmeansofentry.)
A.3.3.9ExplosionProof.SeeNFPA70.
A.3.3.15JobHazardAnalysis(JHA).ForaJHA,thejobfirstisbrokenintoasequenceofsteps.Eachstep
shouldaccompanysomemajortask,whichwillconsistofaseriesofmovements.Theanalystthenlooksat
eachseriesofmovementswithinthatbasictask.
Next,allthehazardsorpotentialhazardsassociatedwitheachstepareidentified.Itisimportantthatthe
entireenvironmentbeconsideredinordertodetermineeveryconceivablehazardthatmightexist.
Finally,basedonthebasicjobstepsandthepotentialhazards,itcanbedeterminedwhatactionsare
necessarytoeliminate,control,orminimizehazardsthatcouldleadtoaccidents,injuries,damagetothe
environment,orpossibleoccupationalillness.Eachsafejobprocedureoractionmustcorrespondtothejob
stepsandidentifiedhazards.
A.3.3.18PermitRequiredConfinedSpace(PermitSpace).Thedefinitionin3.3.18isbasedon29CFR
1910.146.
A.4.6.Anexampleofthistypeofjobwouldbeacontractorwhoissenttovarioussitestodocontractrepair
workinconfinedspacesorapestcontrolapplicatorwhomightentercrawlspacestoapplypesticides.
A.5.1Althoughapermitshouldbeissuedforallconfinedspaceentriesaccordingtothisguide,thisisnotto
implythatallconfinedspacesarepermitrequiredconfinedspaces(PRCSs)asdefinedbyOSHA.Thereisa
differencebetweenaPRCSunderOSHAandaconfinedspacethathasbeenissuedapermit.
Thisguideusesthetermsconfinedspaceandconfinedspaceentryforallspacesthatmeetthedefinitionof
confinedspace,regardlessofhazard.Thepurposeisnottosupplantotherdefinitionsorregulatory
requirementsbuttoclarifyandsimplifytheterminologysothattherecommendationscontainedwithinthis
guidecanbemoreeasilyappliedtoallindustriesandsituationsitisintendedtoreach.
A.6.4.2(3)Training,competencies,andPPEareaddressedinChapters11and12;theguidancegiventhere
shouldbeusedtoanalyzethehazardsandassesstherisk.
A.7.3.3.3Colorimetricdetectortubesvisiblychangecolorwhenchemicalreactionsoccurbetweentheair
contaminantandthesubstanceinthedetectortube.Becausetheamountofcolorchangeisproportionalto
88
theconcentrationoftheaircontaminant,aquantitativemeasurementcanbeobtained.Thereare
approximately500differentaircontaminantsthatcanbemeasuredwithdetectortubes.Althoughgas
monitorshavereplaceddetectortubesforcommonaircontaminants,detectortubesfillavoidforspecific
chemicalsinwhichalternativedirectreadingmonitoringdonotexist.Examplesarechemicalssuchas
hydrogenchloride,ozone,andphosgene.
A.7.3.4Theobviousshortcomingtothismethodisthatlaboratoryanalysisofthecollectedsampleneedsto
bedone,whichevenunderthemostidealconditions(i.e.,havingaqualifiedlaboratoryonsiteornearby)can
takeseveralhoursbeforetheresultsareknown.ThistypeofIndustrialhygienemonitoringisofvaluefor
determiningaircontaminantconcentrationsforentriesthatdonotneedtotakeplaceimmediatelyorto
assistindeterminingtheexposurelevelsthatwouldbeexpectedforaparticulartypeoftask.
Forexample,stainlesssteelweldinginaconfinedspacecreatesvarioussafetyandhealthhazards,oneof
whichisgeneratinghexavalentchromium,aknowncarcinogenandachemicalwithanOSHAexpandedhealth
standard.Industrialhygieneairmonitoringcandetermineifthecontrolsutilized,suchaslocalexhaust
ventilation,areeffectiveinreducinghexavalentchromiumconcentrationstobelowtheOSHAActionLevel
andPermissibleExposureLimit,oriftheappropriaterespiratoryprotectioncontinuestobeneededforfuture
entries.
A.7.5.1Forexampleiftheconfinedspaceis12ftdeepandis4ftby4ftsquareandtheentryisinthecenter
ofthespace,theprobeshouldbeloweredtowithin36in.fromthebottomofthespacetomonitortheairat
thatlocationfor2to3minutes,andthereadingsdocumented.Thenthespaceatapproximately10ftdeep
shouldbemonitoredforapproximately2to3minutes.Thisroutineincontinueduntilalllevelsofthespace
havebeenmonitoredbeforetheconfinedspaceisentered.
A.7.5.1.1Forexample,ifa12ftprobeandtubeconfigurationisused,aminimumof24secondsshouldbe
allowedplusthenormalresponsetimeoftheinstrument,typically2minutes,beforethereadingfromthe
sensorsisaccepted.Abestpracticewouldbetomonitorthatenvironmentat12ftfor2minutesand30
secondsbeforemovingtothenextsamplingpoint.
Mostremotesamplingpumpswillhavealimitfromhowfartheycansample.Diaphragmorrotaryvanepumps
usedinportablegasdetectiontypicallyhavealimitofupto100ftprobeandtubelengthbeforetheyareno
longereffective.
A.8.2.2.1Dependingonthematerialtoberemoved,cleaningdevicesthatutilizewaterorsteammaybe
preferred.Cautionmaybeneededwhenusingsteamtoavoidoverheating.Approvedcleaningchemicalsor
combustible(nonflammable)liquidsmayalsobeused.
A.8.2.2.2Whereflammablevaporsmaybepresent,fans,blowersandeductorsareusuallyairorsteam
powered.Ifelectricallydrivenequipmentisuseditshouldbeinspectedandcertifiedsafeforusebya
qualifiedperson.
A.8.4.6Anexampleofthisisasweepaugerinagrainbinthatmustbeenergizedtomoveresidualmaterial
fromthebin.Alternativemeasurestoprovideemployeeprotectionshouldbetolimitthespeedoftheauger
andprovideadministrativeandengineeringcontrolssuchasaportableguardrailorkillswitchtostopthe
augerinanemergency.
A.9.2.1Cautionisrecommendedwhenrelyingonnaturalventilationasthesolemeansforimplementing
ventilationofaconfinedspace.Twoprimaryreasonssupportacautiousapproachwhenconsideringuseof
naturalventilation.First,ifthespaceisconstructedwithinternalstructure,thatstructureorotherelements
ofinternalconfigurationcaninterfere,impede,ordiverttheaircirculationwithinthespace;and,second,
dependingonthephysicalpropertiesoftheaircontaminants,suchasvapordensity,theaircirculationfrom
naturalventilationmightnoteffectivelyreachtheallpointsinthespaceandeffectivecontaminantcontrol
wouldnotbeaccomplished.Incidentdataillustraterelianceonnaturalventilationbecauseitisreadily
availableandrequiresnoadditionalequipment;however,thosedataalsoillustratethatafalsesenseof
securityexistsbecausethespacehasbeenventilated.Asabestpractice,theonlycertainmeansfor
89
achievingeffectiveventilationiswithmechanicalventilationusingwellmaintainedequipment,approvedfor
theapplications,installedaccordingtobestpractices,andsupportedbyfrequentatmosphericmonitoringto
confirmtheconditions.
A.9.2.2.1.4Ventilationsystembondingandgroundingisofparticularimportancewhenacontaminantisa
flammablevapor,gas,solidoracombustibledust.Seesection9.4foradditionalinformationonbondingand
groundingofventilationequipment.
A.9.2.2.2.1Examplesofpointsourcecontaminantscaninclude,butnotbelimitedto,fumesfromweldingor
otherhotworkactivities;vaporsfromsolventcleaningordegreasing;orvaporsfrompaintingorcoating
activities.
A.9.2.2.2Section9.3describestherelationshipbetweensupplyandexhaustforeffectivelymovingairand
indicatesthattheratioofsupplyingorblowingairascomparedtoexhaustingorcapturingtheairis
approximately30to1.Forlocalexhaustventilationtobeeffective,thisperformancefactormeansitis
importantthatthelocalexhaustventilationapplicationbelocatedasclosetothesourceaspossible
typicallywithinoneductdiameter.Thismightrequireanassistantwithinthespacetobeassignedtomove
theexhaustairmovingdeviceoritsattachedflexibleductingastheworkermoves(forexample,asthe
weldermoveswithinthespaceduringweldingoperationthedistancefromtheventilationdevicecould
increasetogreaterthanthecapturedistancerecommended).
A.9.3.1.2Thetimerequiredforasingleairchangecanbecalculatedbyknowingthevolumeofthespaceand
thecapacityoftheairmovingdevice,asshownbytheequationbelow:

where:
T=time(minutes)
V=volume(ft
3)
Q=volumetricflowrate(ft
3
/min)
A.9.3.3.1.3Whenselectinganddesigningventilation,itisimportanttorecognizethattheorientation(supply
orexhaust)forthemechanicalventilationmakesadifference.Theeffectivenessofbothorientationsis
limitedbytheabilityoftheairmovingdevicetoeitherpushtheairintothespaceortopulltheairfrom
withinthespace.Theratioforsupplyingversusexhaustingisapproximately30:1.FigureA.9.3.3.1.3illustrates
theimpactofsuchlimitationsforbothsupplyandexhaustventilation.Wheretheairmovingdevicecapacity
isinadequatetosupplyairuniformlythroughoutthespace,aconditionknownasshortcircuitingislikely.
Shortcircuitingisalsopossiblewithexhaustventilation.SeeA.9.5forexamples.
***INSERTFIGUREA.9.3.3.1.3HERE***
90
FigureA.9.3.3.1.3Supplyandexhaustventilationdesignconsiderations.
A.9.3.3.2Anexampleofthisconditionwouldbeforanabovegroundpetroleumorchemicalstoragetank
previouslycontainingflammableand/ortoxicliquidswherelocalenvironmentalregulationscontrol
emissions.Inthisexample,exhaustventilationwouldbepreferredtosupply,andthecontaminantscaptured
bytheexhaustventilationwouldneedtobecontrolledduringdischarge,sothatthecontaminantswerenot
freelyreleasedtotheoutsideair.Forthepetroleumapplication,itiscommonthatthedischargewouldbe
connectedtoathermaloxidizerorsimilardevicetorendertheflammablevaporsnonhazardous.
A.9.3.3.2.1Axialflowfandesignincludesanimpellerorpropellerthatcanactassourceforignitionifthe
impellergetsoutofalignmentandcontactsthefanhousing.So,itisadvisablewhenventilatingflammable
vaporstoeitherusesupplyventilationortonotuseanaxialflowfandesign.
A.9.3.4Asnotedin9.1.3,purgingusesair,steam,oraninertgasinthepurgingprocess.Themostcommonly
usedinertgasesarenonflammablegasessuchasnitrogen,carbondioxide,orargon.
A.9.3.4.1Foradditionalguidanceonuseofinertgasestogasfreespacespreviouslycontainingflammable
liquids,seeNFPA306,StandardontheControlofGasHazardsonVessels,orNFPA326,Standardforthe
SafeguardingofTanksandContainersforEntry,Cleaning,orRepair.
A.9.3.4.1.3Aminimumoxygenconcentrationisrequiredduetotheoperationofthecatalyticbeadtype
sensorwhichrequiresoxygentobeatleastapproximately16%byvolumeinairsothatthesensorcanburn
thesample.Lowoxygeninthesample,suchaswouldbeexperiencedduringinerting,willyieldinaccurate
resultsfortheflammablevaporconcentrations.Thereareothersuitablesensortypesthatdonotrequire
oxygeninthesamplewhendetectingflammablegasesorvaporsorothermethodsfordetectingflammable
30 d FT
FAN VELOCITY 4,000 FPM
VELOCITY
HERE ONLY
400 FPM
d
AT A DISTANCE OF 30 DIAMETERS AWAY FROM A SUPPLIED
AIR FAN, THE EFFECTIVE VELOCITY IS REDUCED 90%!
1 d FT
FAN VELOCITY 4,000 FPM
d
AT A DISTANCE OF ONLY 1 DIAMETER AWAY FROM AN
EXHAUST FAN, THE EFFECTIVE VELOCITY IS REDUCED 90%!
91
vaporconcentrationsinlowoxygenatmospheres.SeeA.9.5.9regardingexamplesofspecificinerting
conditionsforflammablegasesorvapors.
A.9.4.2.3Rolled,plastictubingcannotbeproperlybondedorgroundedduetothenonconductive
constructionandisconsideredlesssafethantypicalrigid,flexibleductingifinvolvedinafireduetothe
tendencyfortheplastictubingstyleductingtomelt.Thismaterialisalsonoteffectivewhenusedasducting
forexhaustventilationasitwillcollapseonitselfduetolackofstructuralintegrity.Becauseofeaseof
installationandcost,itisquitecommoninmanyapplications.Itcanalsobeflattenedduringentrysothatthe
entrypathisnotcompletelyblockedbytheductwork.Inspiteoftheseadvantages,thehazardevaluationis
importantwhendeterminingwhethertheplastictubingcanbeusedforductwork.
A.9.4.3Forexamplesofsuchinstallations,refertoANSI/APIStandard2015,RequirementsforSafeEntryand
CleaningofPetroleumStorageTanksandANSI/APIRecommendedPractice2016,GuidelinesandProcedures
forEnteringandCleaningPetroleumStorageTanks.
A.9.4.4Foradditionalguidanceonsafepracticestocontrolstaticelectricitygeneration,accumulation,and
dischargerefertoNFPA77,RecommendedPracticeonStaticElectricity,andAPI2003,RecommendedPractice
onProtectionAgainstIgnitionsArisingOutofStatic,LightningandStrayCurrents.
A.9.5.1.1Obstructionconcernsinclude,butarenotnecessarilylimitedtobaffles,pipingandequipment,
gratesandscreens,internalconfiguration(likeinternalstructuralmembers),sumps,slopingoruneven
surfaces,andsimilarspacecharacteristics.ExamplesoftypicalspaceconfigurationsareshowninFigure
A.9.5.1.1.
***INSERTFIGUREA.9.5.1.1HERE***
FigureA.9.5.1.1TypicalSpaceConfigurations.
A.9.5.1.4Shortcircuitingoccurswheninadequatethroworprojectionofthesupplyairoccurs,andthe
supplyairisexhaustedbeforeitreachesthedesiredlocationwithinthetanktogeneratethemostturbulence
92
whichpromotesthemixinganddilutionofthecontaminatedair.Shortcircuitingisalsopossiblewhenusing
exhaustventilation.BothconditionsareimpactedbythelimitationsillustratedinA.9.3.3.1.3.Examplesofthis
conditionareshowninFigureA.9.5.1.4.
SHORTCIRCUITING INSUFFICIENTFANCAPACITY
SHORTCIRCUITINGEXHAUST
DuctingSupply
INSUFFICIENT FAN CAPACITY
EXHAUST VENTILATION
HEAVIER THAN AIR VAPORS TEND TO REMAIN HERE
93

Ducting - Exhaust
EXHAUST VENTILATION
HEAVIER THAN AIR VAPORS ARE VENTED OUT
TO SAFE LOCATION

94
Local Exhaust
FigureA9.5.1.4[thesediagramsareastart;shouldshowsupply,exhaust,localexhaustexamples;should
alsoshowventilationfromtopaswellasfromatgrade(sideentry)configuration]
A.9.5.3Addcasestudy(illustrative)exampleofhowstratifiedatmospherescanimpactventilation
effectiveness
A.9.5.8.2Guidanceonwhenventilationforthermalprotectionofworkersmightbenecessarycanbe
obtainedfromtheACGIH,ThresholdLimitValuesforChemicalSubstancesandPhysicalAgents.
A.9.5.9Purgingcanbeusedtodisplacehighconcentrationsofflammablevaporsfromaspaceduringthe
cleaningandgasfreeingstageoftheprocess.Theobjectiveistointroducetheinertgassothatitdisplaces
theflammablevaporstoapproximatelytheLFLforthematerialbeforeintroducingfreshairintothespaceto
bringtheoxygenleveluptofreshairlevels.Typically,theinertgasisusedtodisplacetheflammablevapor
concentrationtoabout1%byvolumeinair.Atthispoint,whenairisintroducedtoremovetheremaining
vaporconcentrationandraisetheoxygenconcentrationlevel,theflammablevaporandairmixturewillnot
bewithintheflammablerange(itwillbeataconcentrationbelowtheLFL)sotherewillbenodangerofafire
orexplosion.Typicalinertgasesusedarecarbondioxide,nitrogen,andargon.Properapplicationforthis
processrequiresknowledgeofthespaceconfigurationandopeningsandthegasselection.Carbondioxide
andargonarebothheavierthanairgases,whilenitrogenisslightlylighterthanair.Selectionoftheinertgas
mightdependonwhatopeningsareusedforintroducingtheinertgasandhowtheflammablevaporsare
ventedfromthespace(orcapturedandtreatedifenvironmentalrequirementsprohibitemissions).The
sourceoftheinertgascanalsoimpacttheimplementationofthepurgingprocess.Asalsonotedin9.3.4.3,
purgingcanbeusedtoprepareanareawithinaconfinedspace(likepipingorotherhollowstructure)ora
confinedspaceforhotworkwherecleaningcannotbeeffectivelyaccomplished.Inthisapplication,theinert
gasisusedtodisplacetheoxygenconcentrationtoalevelbelowthatwhichwillsupportcombustion.Itis
necessarytoreducetheoxygenleveltobelowthelimitingoxidantconcentration(LOC),whichformany
petroleumbasedmaterialsisapproximately1416%byvolume.NFPA306,StandardontheControlofGas
HazardsonVessels,orNFPA326,StandardfortheSafeguardingofTanksandContainersforEntry,Cleaning,
orRepairestablishafactorofsafetybelowtheLOCbyrequiringthattheoxygenconcentrationbebelow8%
byvolumeor50%oftheLOC,whicheverisleast.
95
A.9.5.10.3Examplesofthisconditioncouldbe:adecisiontoconductentryintoaninertedatmosphere;entry
intoaspaceduringemergency/rescueconditionswhereventilationsupplyairorpowersourcemaybe
compromisedand/orunreliable.
A.10.1.2.4(3)Thisshouldincludefallprotectionwhereapplicablewhenoperatingaroundunprotectededges
suchasaportal.Itmaybeveryeasyfortheattendanttofallintoaverticallyorientedspacewhileattempting
tomakecontactwithanentrantorevenmorelikelyintheeventofanemergencywhiletryingtoaffect
retrievalefforts.Theattendantshouldtakewhatevermeasuresnecessarytoavoidthehazardsassociated
withand/orcreatedbytheemergency.
A.10.1.2.4(6)Theimportanceoftrainingattendantstorecognizewhetherornotretrievalshouldbe
implementedcannotbeoverstated.Thereisagreatneedtoassureattendantsunderstandtheimplicationsof
retrievalincertainsituations.Forexample,ifasignificantfalltakesplaceduetoainteriorcollapseof
scaffoldingnotrelatedtotheatmospherichazardandthepatientiscomplainingofnumbnessofthelower
extremities,itmaynotbeprudenttoextractthispersonwiththeretrievalsystemasthiscouldcreate
permanentspinalinjuryandparalysis.Theattendantshouldbetaughttoassesseachemergencyquicklyto
assurethehazardsand/orpatientconditionnecessitatesrapidremovalornot.Someoftheconsiderations
mayinclude;butarenotlimitedto;thefollowingparameters:
(1) Whatisthemechanismofinjury(atmospheric,mechanical,etc.)?
(2) Whatisthepatientschiefcomplaint(whatistheinjury/illness)?
(3) Whatisthepatientslevelofconsciousness(talkingcoherently,disorientedornonresponsive)?
(4) Whatarethecurrenthazards(Immediatelifethreatening,lowhazardornohazardsrelatedtothe
emergency)?
Questionssuchasthesecanbeusedtorapidlyperformariskvs.benefitmatrixtomaketheproperdecisions
onwhetherornottoretrieveinaconfinedspaceemergencywhereretrievalequipmentisanoption.Ifthe
conditionsareimmediatelylifethreateningandtheonlychoiceistoactuatetheretrievalsystemorthe
patientislikelytodie,theretrievalisthecorrectresponse.Ifthepatientsconditionandthehazardsarenot
immediatelylifethreatening,yetthepatientsconditioncouldbeworsenedbyretreival,thentherescue
serviceshouldbenotifiedtorespondandentryrescuemaybetheappropriateoption.
A.10.1.2.4(7)Implementingtheemergencyresponsesystemreferstomakingtheappropriatecontactsto
assurerescuesummonsaswellasthoseotheragencieswhichmaybeappropriate.Thismaybeassimpleas
utilizinganassignedradiotodirectlynotifytherescueserviceandotherappropriateemergencyresponse
agenciesorascomplexashavingtwoattendantssothatonecanphysicallyleavethesceneduringan
emergencytoinitiatecontactwiththeappropriateagencies.Regardlessofthemethod,itshouldbewell
plannedinadvancesoitcanbeorchestratedasquickly,safely,andefficientlyaspossibleintheeventofan
emergency.Simplycalling911doesnotassureanappropriateresponsetoconfinedspaceemergenciesina
timelymanner.Theattendantshouldbereadytosummonhelpintheeventofanemergencyregardlessof
whetherornotnonentryrescue(retrieval)isappropriate.
A.10.1.3.4.1Tier1responsesusuallyinvolvethosespacesnotcommonlyaddressedbyFederalstandards.
Whiletheseentriesmaynotrequirerescuecapabilityofanysort,itisrecognizedthatmedicalemergencies
occurringwithinthesespacesmaycreateadifficultrescue.Itisimportantthatorganizationsrecognizethis
potentialthroughanassessmentofeachplannedworkactivitytodeterminetheneedforarescuecapability.
Iftheneedexists,theorganizationshouldfurtherassessresourcesforaqualifiedrescuecapability
appropriatetotheanticipatedemergency.Allrescueresponseshouldbeavailableandcapableofresponding
inatimelymanner.ThisshouldbeassuredpriortomakingentryintospacesrequiringTier1response.
A.10.1.3.4.2Tier2responsegenerallyallowsasingularRescueTeamtoaddressmultipleentries,assuming
responsetimesareappropriatetotheanticipatedemergencies.Preincidentplanningshoulddictatewhether
ornotaRescueTeamcanprovideserviceformultiplespaces.Inanycase,adequatecommunicationsshould
existbetweenentry/egresspointsandtherescueservicetoassurethatanemergencyinonespacewill
facilitateimmediatesuspensionofallotherentriesandexitofallworkersfromthosespaces.
96
A.10.1.3.4.3Withimmediatelylifethreateninghazards,thegoalforpatientaccessshouldbecommensurate
withtheneedforlifesavingmeasuresassociatedwithcardiorespiratoryarrest.Itisgenerallyconsidered
that,withoutintervention,cessationofheartfunctioninnormalconditionswillyieldatleastsome
irreversiblebraindeathwithinfourtosixminutes.Thisisthereasoningbehindtherecommendations
associatedwithTier3response,especiallywherenonentryrescue(retrieval)isnotpossible.
Preincidentemergencyactionplanningshouldalwaysserveasthebasisforresponsemodelogistics.While
Tier3responsegenerallysuggestsasingulardedicatedRescueTeamforasingularspace,entriesmayexist
thatwouldallowasingularRescueTeamtoaddressmultipleentriesinthesameimmediatearea.The
followingcriteriashouldexistbeforedecisionsofthistypearemade:
(1) Awalkingtransitiontimebetweenthemostremotetwoentry/egresspointsiswithinoneminute,
(2) Theteamisabletodivideitsforcessothatatleastonerescuerislocatedateachentry/egresspointwith
patentcommunicationstoallowimmediatenotificationofotherteammembersintheeventofan
emergency,orwheretherearemultipleentrysitesincloseproximity,therescuerisabletomonitora
numberofsites.
(3) Allrescueequipmentneededtoperformentryrescueissetupwithinasuitabledistanceateach
entry/egresspointormultiplepointsandeveryteammemberpossessestheappropriatePersonal
ProtectiveEquipmenttomakeimmediateentry,
(4) Intheeventofanemergencyatoneentry/egresspoint,operationsattheremainingentry/egresspoints
maybeterminatedimmediatelysothattheentrantsexitthespaceandtheRescueTeammember
attendingthatentry/egresspointcanrespondtotheemergencyatanotherpointwithinoneminuteto
beginorassistinrescueoperations.
ThisisnotusuallypossiblewithmultiplesimultaneousentriesmonitoredbyonlyoneteamsinceTier3entries
areassociatedwithimmediatelifethreateningemergenciesthatwouldrequireextremelyrapidintervention.
A.10.1.3.5Notallcontaminantsarereadilymeasuredonallatmosphericmonitorconfigurations.Gas
monitorsusedforconfinedspaceentrytypicallymonitoronlytwoorthreetoxicgases.Ifanatmosphereis
unknownitshouldbeassumedtobeIDLHandappropriateprecautionstakenpriortoentry.
Ifrescueresponseisrequired,rescuersshouldassumetheworstandprovidemaximumprotectionfor
rescuersbasedonsuspectedhazards.Appearancesmaybedeceptive.Forexample;Scale(thismayberust,a
hardmineralcoatingthatformsontheinsideofboilers,kettlesandothercontainersinwhichwateris
heated,orotherencapsulatingbuildup)mayentrapresidualproductsthatareinatank.Aworkeriscleaning
thetankinteriorand,intheprocess,scrapesascalebubblecontainingacontaminantthatcreatesa
temporaryIDLHenvironment.Theworkerisincapacitatedasaresult.Rescuepersonnelrespondandmonitor
thespacetofindtheatmosphereclear.Thedecisionismadetoenterthespacewithoutatmosphere
supplyingrespirators.Thefirstrescueentrantstepsonascalebubbleandreleasesthesamecontaminant
thatincapacitatedthefirstvictim.Thisisamistakethatrescuerscannotaffordtomake.(SeeFigure
A.10.1.3.5.)
97
FIGUREA.10.1.3.5[FIGURECAPTION]
MitigateRisk/HazardPriorto
Entry
MitigateRisk/HazardPriorto
Entry
EnergyIsolation
RetrievalSystem
AssociatedRescueTools
orDevicestoFree
Rescuer
FreeSpace
TeatherRescuer
CofferDam/Rescue
Tube
AtmosphericMonitoring
Ventilation:
dilution/exhaust
RespiratoryProtection
EnergyIsolation
CommunicationDevices
Lighting,HeatorCooling
Space
RetrievalSystems
FallProtection
ControlledDescent
AnchorPoints
EnergyIsolation
Purge/Block/Bleed
DetermineandSelect
AppropriatePPE
DetermineandSelect
AppropriatePatientCare
InitiateTactical
Worksheet
98
Identifyand
AssesstheNeed
forAnchor
Points
AssesstheEntry
Point
DetermineRescuer
Assignmentsand
Responsibilities
MakeEntry
PatientPackingand
Extricationfrom
Space
TransferPatientto
AdvancedMedical
Care
Removalofall
RescuersfromSpace
Terminate
Rescue
Operations
Critique
A.10.1.3.5.1Adisregardforrescuersafetycannotonlyinhibitrescueoftheillorinjuredpersonstowhich
theyoriginallyresponded,butmayplacefellowrescuersatriskbycompellingthemtogoafter
theirincapacitatedfellowrescuer.Rescuersshouldobservethiscardinalrule:Dontbecomeavictim!
A.10.2.1ThetermAuthorityHavingJurisdiction,inthiscase,ismeanttoapplytowhomevermaybe
responsibleforthespacestowhichtherescueserviceresponds.Itgenerallyimpliestheperson,persons,or
organizationwhoacquiredtherescueservicetoactasresponsefortheentryorentriestakingplace.Thisis
independentofwheretherescueserviceisfromsincetheremaybemanyoptionsincludinginplantteams,
outsidemunicipalresponseservicesandprivatelyownedcontractedservices.
99
A.10.2.2.2ThereviewteammayincludetheconfinedspaceEntrySupervisor.
A.10.2.3.1Theperformanceevaluationsshouldserveasabasisfordeterminingwhetherthecurrenttraining
haspreparedtherescueservicetofunctionattheestablishedlevelofcapabilityunderabnormalweather
conditions,extremelyhazardousoperationalconditions,andotherdifficultsituations.
A.10.4.1Itshouldberecognizedthateachrescueresponseshouldbebasedonthecircumstances
surroundingtheincident.StandardOperatingProceduresshouldprovideatypicalapproachwhileallowing
latitudeforindependentjudgment.Whiletheincidentmanagershouldbeheldaccountabletojustifyany
divergence,thisabilitytovaryallowsadjustmenttoplanstomeetchangingneeds.
A.10.6.5Analyzingcriticalareasrelatedtotheincidentmaybethesinglemostimportantpartofany
emergency.EmergencyresponseagenciesgenerallyrefertothisprocessasSizeUp. Havingasolid,well
thoughtoutactionplancanpositivelyaidindeterminingifanincidentcanhaveapreforecastedresult,
minimizeharmtolifeanddamagestoproperty,ortoexpeditetheprocessofrescuingtrappedvictims.
Determining,evaluatingandassessingofallofthecircumstanceshelpsassurethesuccessoftherescue
mission.
InformationAcquisitionandManagement.Analysisofthepotentialemergencybeginswithmanaging
informationfromthefacilityorspacelocationpriortoanyincident.Thebasicsofdefiningwhattakesplacein
theconfinedspaceisalogicalplacetobeginthisanalysis.
Recordallfindingsonapreplansurveyordocumentthatcanbemadereadilyavailableonamoments
notice.Todaystechnologicalequipmentmakesinformationreadilyavailableandportabletotheincident
location.Theuseoftablets,smartphonesandlaptopcomputersaidtofacilitateandimplementanaction
plan.Diagrams,plans,blueprintsandothermeansofdrawingscanbecreatedonpaperorcomputer
programsandsoftwaremaybeutilizedtoaidinmanagingandinputtingeverchanginginformation.Oncethe
informationistabulated,itshouldbereviewedforaccuracyandputonascheduletobeappropriately
reviewedsoitmaybekeptcurrentandprecise.Technologicalequipmentthatisnotapprovedforusein
classifiedareasmaypresentsourcesofignitioninsituationswhereflammablevaporsmaybepresent.
Asolidbaseofwrittenortexttypeinformationcanbeobtainedfromthefacilityorownerofthespacesuch
aschemicalandmanufacturingdata,MaterialSafetyDataSheets,thetypeofprocessesthespacemaybe
usedfor,datesandtimesthespacemaybeoccupied,sizeandlocationofvesselsandconfinedspaces,facility
floorplansorsitesurveys,priorincidents,previouspermitentries,andthenumberofworkersinandaround
thespace,ortypeofworkbeingperformedroutinelyinandaroundthespace.
HazardandRiskAnalysis.Manyfactorsshouldbetakenintoconsiderationwhenperformingananalysisona
confinedspace.Anindepthhazardandriskanalysismayinclude;butnotlimitedto;whattypeofprocess
takesplaceinthespaceandor,whattypeofworkwillbedonewithinthespacethatisnotcustomarytoits
originalprocess?Howdoesthesurroundingenvironmenthaveaneffectonthespaceandor,arethere
constantchangesintheexternalenvironmentoverperiodsoftimethataddlayersofcomplexitythatrequire
specialattention?Whattypeofworkisnormally,andpotentiallyperformedthatmayrequiretheentrant/sto
evaluatetheinternalenvironmentofthespaceonatimedbasisincludingtemperatureexposureand
temperaturechanges,existingorchangingatmosphericconditions,orlengthofworkbeingperformed?Will
atmosphericmonitoringdevicesberequiredorwillchemicalspecificmonitoringdevicesberequired?Willthe
requirementofspecializedbreathingapparatusbeneededtoworkwithinthespace?Aretherebiological
concernsorradioactiveconcernswhileworkinginsidethespace?
Willtheworkbeingperformedinthespacechangetheinternalenvironmentandorwillithaveaneffecton
thespacesimmediateexternalsurroundingareasoradjacentprocesses?Arethereconcernswithequipment,
tools,andmachinesworkinginthespaceeitherrepairingorcleaning?Willequipmentbeingusedinthespace
effectthecurrentatmosphere?Whattypeofventilationisneededtosustainanonhazardousatmospheric
condition?Willthephysicaldimensionsofthespacehaveaneffectontheentrants,andwillthephysicaland
100
mentalhealthconditionoftheentrant/sposeapotentialhazardtoworksafelyinsidethespace?Theseand
otherconsiderationsarecoveredmorethoroughlyinchaptersixofthisguide.
EnvironmentalConsiderations.Arelowfloorlevelliquidsaconcern,arethereoverheadobstructionsorutility
pipingorcablesaconcern?WillPersonalProtectiveEquipment(PPE)berequiredtoworkwithinthespace?
Doesthespacespanovermanylevelsorfloors?Isthereapotentialforweathertoeffecttheoutcomeofan
incidentwithinthespace?Isuncontrollableambientnoiseafactor?Isthereapotentialforvibrationswithin
andadjacenttothespace?Doesvehicletrafficorheavyequipment,orotherprocesseseffectthespace?
Doesthepotentialforanimalandinsectinteractionposeaconcerntotheentrant/swithinthespace?
EnergyIsolationConsiderations.Wherearethecontroldeviceslocatedforpowerandpotentialsourcesof
energyfortheinternalandexternalareasofthespace?Howlongwillittaketoverifythatthesesourcescan
belockedandtagged?Canallsourcesbemechanicallycontrolled,blockedorblankedordoesthespace
requirepersonneltobecommittedtoalocationtophysicallycontroladevice?
Willittakeaspecialtypersonorspecialgroupofindividualsormaintenanceworkerstosecureenergy
sources?Howlongwillittaketoassembleagrouptosecureenergysourceswithinthefacilityorlocationof
thespace?Dotheseindividualsworkonpremisesoroffsiteofthespacelocation?Isthereaconsiderable
timefactorassociatedwiththisspecifictaskofsecuringenergysources?Whatisthemeansofdeliveringa
messagethatanincidenthasoccurredinaconfinedspacetopersonnelthatwillberequiredtorespond?
CommunicationsConsiderations.Canentrants,attendantsorrescuerscommunicateeffectivelythroughout
thespaceoristhereaneedforamorecomplexsystemrequiringradiosorcommunicationsystems?Will
thesecommunicationdevicesworkbelowgradeandspantheworkinglengthandlevelsofthespace?
WorkHistoryandPhysicalAttributesoftheSpace.Howoftenhasthespacebeenenteredinto,andisthere
priordocumentationtopreviousentries?Wherearepreviousentrydocumentsorpermitentrieslocatedand
aretheyrelevanttopotentialemergencies?Doestheconfiguration,length,ordesignofthespaceput
limitationsontheuseofrescueequipmentorrequirespecifictypeofequipment?Doesthesize,location,or
heightoftheentrypointposechallengesforentrants/rescuepersonnelandrescuetypeequipment?
CapabilityofNonrescuers(Entrants,Attendants,EntrySupervisors).Whatistheleveloftrainingofthe
individualsworkingwithinthespace?Howoftenisanemergencyplanreviewedandwhenwasthelasttimea
trainingsessionwasperformed?Isthereasafetyplaninplaceforthespace?
RescueCapabilitiesOnsiteandOutsideResources.Arethereemergencytrainedprofessionalsonlocationof
thespaceorisanoutsideagencyorlocalfire/rescuedepartmenttaskedasaresource?Whatisthetime
frameforaRescueTeamofonsiteemployeestoassemble?Whatisthetimeframeforanoutsideresource
toarriveonlocationofthespace?Whatistheleveloftrainingoftheoutsideresource?Istheoutside
resourcetrainedtotheALSmedicallevel?WhereistheclosestMedicalFacilitythatcanfacilitateapatient
thathassufferedapotentialconfinedspaceemergencyorhazardousmaterialsexposure?
Doestheownerofthespacehaveanemergencyplanorrequirenotificationorcontactwithspecialized
agenciessuchastheFBI,CIA,ATF,Military,localandstatepolice,orlocalsecurityduetorestrictedareas,
processesoraccessrestrictions?
Doesthespacerequiredifferentlevelsofemergencyresponsedependingonthetypeofprocessorwork
beingperformedinthespace?Doesthetimeofdayordayofweekrequiredifferentlevelsofemergency
response?
A.10.7.2PersonalProtectiveEquipment(PPE).Asanexample,rescuersmaychooseeitherClassCAirline
respirators(SuppliedAirRespiratorsorSAR)orSelfcontainBreathingApparatus(SCBA)tosatisfythe
requirementsofrescuerstoutilizeAtmosphereSupplyingRespiratorsforrespiratoryprotectioninpotentially
hazardousatmospheres.However,theyshouldalsoconsidertheadvantagesanddisadvantagesofeach
relativetotherescueobjective.
101
Inthiscase,thelimiteddurationofairsupplyinextendedrescueoperationsrequiringspinalimmobilization
ordifficultextractionmightprecludetheuseofSCBA.However,significantentanglementhazardswithina
spacemightmaketheuseofSARimpossible.TheportalshapeandsizemightberestrictivetotheuseofSAR
sothatentrymaybemadewhilewearingtheapparatusinthemannerintendedbythemanufacturervs.
attemptingtoremovebulkierSCBAthatwontotherwisefitthroughtheportalandexposingtherescuerto
thepotentialofdroppingtheapparatus,potentialpullingthefacepieceoffandexposingtherescuerto
contaminants.
Themosteffectivemeansofmakingtheseandotherdecisionsisthroughtheuseofpreincidentrescue
actionplanningandpracticeofthoseplansonrepresentativeoractualspaces.Onlythroughcareful
considerationofthecircumstancesandtestingoftheplanmayPPEchoicesmadebytheRescueTeambe
validated.
A.10.9.1IngeneralconfinedspaceRescueTeamsarecomposedofnolessthansixmembersinorderto
performalltherequiredfunctionslisted.However,thesizeandcapabilityofateamrequiredtoperforma
specificrescuewilldependonmanyfactorsincluding;theconditionofthepatient,thesizeandshapeofthe
space,sizeoftheaccessopeningandthehazardspresent.Thepositionsdescribedin(1)(4)ofthisparagraph
describetheminimumnumberofexclusiverolesthatshouldbefilledtoperformanentrytyperescue.Many
rescueswillrequireadditionalfunctionssuchasventilation,roperescuesupportorcommunicationthatwill
requireadditionaltrainedresources.Preincidentplanningofrepresentativespacesisakeyelementto
determiningthesizeandcapabilitiesoftheteam.TableA.10.9.1canbeofassistanceinunderstandingthe
correlationofteamsizerelativetotheconditionsofthespaceandanticipatedrescuemethods;
TableA.10.9.1ConfinedSpaceRescueTeamStaffingDecisionTable
IF THEN
ThepermittedconfinedspacehasNOobstructionsOR
entanglementhazardsANDtheentrantISproperlyattachedto
aretrievalsystem.
Onerescuerisneededtoperformanonentry
assistedrescuefromtheoutside
ThepermittedconfinedspacehasobstructionsOR
entanglementhazards,theentrantISNOTattachedtoa
retrievalsystem,NOpotentialatmospherichazardsexistAND
verticalroperescueISNOTrequired.
Threerescuersareneededtoperforman
emergencyentrytoperformrescue
1edgemanager
2personentryteam
retrievalsystem,NOpotentialatmospherichazardsexistAND
verticalroperescueISrequired.
Fiverescuersareneededtoperforman
1EdgeManager
2RescueSystemOperators(withassistance
fromplantpersonnel)
2PersonEntryTeam
retrievalsystem,potentialatmospherichazardsexist,SAR
CANNOTbeused(requiringSCBA)ANDverticalroperescueIS
NOTrequired.
Fiverescuersareneededtoperforman
1EdgeManager
2PersonEntryTeam
2PersonBackUpTeam
retrievalsystem,potentialatmospherichazardsexist
Sixrescuersareneededtoperforman
102
(requiringSAR)ANDverticalroperescueISNOTrequired. 1EdgeManager
2PersonEntryTeam
2PersonBackUpTeam
1AirSupplyOperator
retrievalsystem,potentialatmospherichazardsexist,SAR
CANNOTbeused(requiringSCBA)ANDverticalroperescueIS
required.
Sevenrescuersareneededtoperformand
1EdgeManager
fromplantpersonnel)
2PersonEntryTeam
2PersonBackUpTeam
retrievalsystem,potentialatmospherichazardsexist
(requiringSAR)ANDverticalroperescueISrequired.
Eightrescuersareneededtoperformand
1EdgeManager
fromplantpersonnel)
2PersonEntryTeam
2PersonBackUpTeam
1AirSupplyOperator
Anemployeeactivatesafallprotectionsystemandis
suspendedinaharnessrequiringroperescue.
Fourrescuersareneededtoperformapickoff
rescue
1EdgeManager
fromplantpersonnel)
1Rescueronrope
A.10.9.1(1)Entryteamsizewillbedrivenbythesizeofthespaceanddegreeofdifficultyoftherescue
operation.Whileattheoperationsleveltheentryteamsizeshouldbenolessthantwomembers,some
spacesrequiringtechnicianlevelresourcesmaybeonlylargeenoughtoaccommodateasinglerescuer.Some
incidentsmayinvolvelargespacesorcomplexrescueoperationsthatwillrequireseveralrescuerstoenter
thespace.
A.10.9.1(2)Theintentofthebackupteamistoquicklyandeffectivelyremoveanincapacitatedrescuerwhois
unabletoperformselfrescue.Ingeneralthisrequiresnolessthantwomembersimmediatelyavailableto
enterthespaceequippedwiththesameorgreaterlevelofPPEastheentryteam.Thesizeandcapabilityof
theteamshouldbedrivenbythespecificconditionsencounteredandthescopeoftherescueoperation.
A.11.2.1.2Itshouldbeunderstoodthatreachingintoaconfinedspacewithamonitorprobetomeasurethe
atmosphere(orothersimilaractivitysuchastakingasampleofresiduethroughasmallopening)shouldnot
beconsideredasentryintothespace.
A.11.3.2.7Whentheemployer'sconfinedspaceprogramallowsattendantentryforrescue,attendantswho
havebeentrainedandproperlyequippedforentryrescueoperationsmaydoso,onlyafterbeingrelievedby
anotherqualifiedattendant.Rescuebytheprimaryattendantshouldbethelastsolution,asinformationthey
103
havewillbecriticallyvaluableinassistingthedesignatedRescueTeamwhenassessingwhatmightbethe
conditioninthespacethatcontributedtotheemergency.
A.11.3.2.8Approvedassigneddutiesmayinclude,butarenotlimitedto,checkinggastestinginstrumentsto
assuretheyarepositionedandworkingasintended;watchingforoutsideactivitythatmightaffectentry
operations,assistinginreplacingblowersandductworkforventilationifmovedduringentrantentry/exit,
monitoringairsupply,etc
Dutiesthatarenotallowedinclude,butarenotlimitedto,anytaskwheredirectcontactwithentrantscould
belost,likegoingtogetatoolfromtruck,performingunauthorizedactivities,takingasmokingbreak,etc.as
wellasanytaskforwhichtheattendantisnotassignedorqualified.Undersomecircumstancestwo
attendantsmaybeplacedoutsidethespaceinsteadofasingleattendanttoensurethatifthereisaneedfor
oneattendanttotakeabreak,thatthereisatleastoneattendantstilldedicatedtothespace.Thiswould
allowsomeoftheabovelisteddutiestobeaccomplished.
A.11.4.1.2Confinedspacerelatedworkpracticesandactivitiesaretypicallyconductedincompliancewith
legalregulationsand/orindustryandfacilityrequirements.Forexample,intheUnitedStates,OSHArequires
theemployertodesignateanEntrySupervisortosuperviseworkthatinvolvesenteringPermitRequired
ConfinedSpaces,includingthosewithinertatmospheres.Industrypracticesandfacilityprogramsare
generallyconsistentwiththeselegalrequirements.
A.11.4.2ItiscommonpracticeinindustrythatthePermitIssuerandtheEntrySupervisorareoftendifferent
personsespeciallywhencontractorsaredoingtheentryworkinamannedfacility.Insuchcases,thePermit
Issuermaybeafacilityemployeewhoinitiatesthepermitaccordingtofacilityconfinedspaceprogram
requirements.Oncethepermitrequirementsaremet,theissuerandtheEntrySupervisor(andtester)then
signoffonthepermit.TheEntrySupervisorcontrolstheentryandoperationsinaccordancewiththepermit
requirementsandcancancelthepermitiftheconditionschangesothatthepermitrequirementsareno
longermet.Whereasingleentityhastotalresponsibilityfortheentryandwork,thePermitIssuerandEntry
Supervisormaybethesameperson.
A.11.4.2.4Ifunacceptablerisksdevelopwithinoroutsidethespaceexceedingthoseauthorizedbythe
permit,theEntrySupervisorshouldcancelthepermitandhaveentrantsvacatethespace.TheEntry
Supervisorshouldnotallowentrantstoreenterthespaceuntilthehazardsareabatedandriskisreducedto
anacceptablelevel.Atmospherictestingwithinthespaceshouldbecompletedbeforeanentrypermitmay
bereissued.
A.11.4.2.11Beforeimplementingentryorworkpermits,EntrySupervisorsshouldrequirethatinternal
combustionandnonapprovedelectricalpoweredequipment(including,butnotlimitedto,automobiles,
trucks,vacuumtrucks,forklifts,fans,educators,pumps,weldingmachines,andcompressors)arerestrictedto
designatedsafeareas(suchasoutsidethetankdikearea)awayfromsourcesofflammablevapors,by
notationonthepermitsand,ifnecessary,bypostingsignsand/orbarricadingaccesstothearea.
EntrySupervisorsshouldbeawarethatapproveddieselpoweredinternalcombustionequipmentispreferred
tousinggasolineorgaspoweredequipment.
EntrySupervisorsshouldbeawarethattheuseofsteamorairoperatedequipmentispreferredtousing
electricorinternalcombustionpoweredequipment.
EntrySupervisorsshouldassurethatallelectricalequipmentandappurtenanceshavebeeninspectedand
approvedbyaqualifiedpersontodeterminethattheyareexplosionprooforprotectedsoastonotcreate
and/orreleasesufficientenergytobeasourceofignition.
Electricalequipmentattachedtoandaroundtheconfinedspace,shouldbedisconnectedandlockedor
taggedoutbeforeissuinganentrypermit.Suchequipmentandappurtenancesinclude,butarenotlimitedto,
meteringandsignalingdevices,alarms,sensors,overflowprotectionsystems,cathodicprotectionsystems,
andelectricalheatingcoils.
104
Dependingonthepotentialexposures,EntrySupervisorsshouldassurethatallelectricallypoweredcleaning
andrelatedequipment,includingbutnotlimitedto,electricalpoweredtools,communicationdevices,lights
andmotors,usedthroughoutcleaningoperations,meetstheminimumrequirementsofNFPA70forClassI,
Division1,GroupD(orhigher)(orClass1,Zone0orZone1)locations.Theuseofanytypeofnonexplosion
proofelectricalequipmentshallbeprohibitedunlessspecificallypermittedunderanauthorizedjobsite
procedureorbyissuanceofanentry,hotworkorsafe(cold)workpermitpermittingsuchuse.
EntrySupervisorsshouldassurethatbondingandgroundingcablesandclampsareinspectedbyaqualified
persontoassuregoodcondition,adequacyandintegritypriortothestartofworkandperiodically,as
necessary,duringthework.
EntrySupervisorsandqualifiedpersonsshouldensurethatequipmentcapableofcreatinganignitablespark
upondisconnectionisproperlybondedandgrounded(earthed)beforeissuingpermits(seeAPI2003,API
2219andNFPA77foradditionalinformation).
A.11.4.3.1NFPAandothertrainingentitiesoffertrainingtopreparefortheAmericanPetroleumInstitute
EntrySupervisorcertificationexam.TheMarineChemistprogramrunthroughNFPAalsocertifiesindividuals
whoareworkingonmarinevessels.
A.11.5.1.1ItiscommonpracticeinindustrythatthePermitIssuerandtheEntrySupervisorareusually
differentpersons(especiallywhencontractorsaredoingtheentryworkinalocationwithfacilitypersonnel).
Insuchcases,thePermitIssuermaybeafacilityemployeewhoinitiatesthepermitaccordingtofacility
confinedspaceprogramrequirements.Oncethepermitrequirementsaremet,theissuerandtheEntry
Supervisor(andtester)thensignoffonthepermit.TheEntrySupervisorcontrolstheentryandoperationsin
accordancewiththepermitrequirementsandcancancelthepermitiftheconditionschangesothat
thepermitrequirementsarenolongermet.Whereasingleentityhastotalresponsibilityfortheentryand
work,thePermitIssuerandEntrySupervisormaybethesameperson.
A.11.5.2.7Suchchangesmightincludetheowner/operatorsreclassificationoftheconfinedspace,othernon
confinedspacerelatedactivitiesaffectingtheconfinedspaceoperations,emergencieswithinandoutsidethe
space,changesinweatheraffectingthework,unauthorizedpersonsorequipmententeringtheworkareaor
confinedspace,etc.
A.11.82.10Equipmentmayinclude,butisnotlimitedtothefollowing:
(1) Testingandmonitoringequipmentandcalibrationmaterials.
(2) Ventilatingequipment.
(3) Communicationsequipment.
(4) Personalprotectiveequipmentandrespiratoryprotection.
(5) Lightingequipment.
(6) Barriers,guards,warningsignsandshields.
(7) Equipment,suchasladders,neededforingressandegress.
(8) Rescueandemergencyequipmentneededtocomplywiththeconfinedspaceprogramrequirements
(excepttotheextentthattheequipmentisprovidedbyrescueservices).
(9) Anyotherequipmentnecessaryforauthorizedworkinandaroundtheconfinedspace.
A.11.82.13Theowner/operatorshoulddevelopshouldretaineachcancelledentrypermitforatleastone
yeartofacilitatethereviewoftheconfinedspaceprogram.Anyproblemsencounteredduringanentry
operationshallbenotedonthepertinentpermitsothatappropriaterevisionstotheprogramcanbemade.
A.11.9.2.6Thecontractorshouldobtaincopiesoftheowner/operatorsevaluationoftheconfinedspace(s)
involvedincluding,butnotlimitedtotheMSDSscoveringhazardousmaterialsandchemicalsintheconfined
spaceandintheareaofthejob,theisolation(Lockout/Tagout)procedures,requiredandavailablefire
protectionequipment,etc.
105
A.11.9.2.7ThecontractorshouldprovidethefollowingdocumentationtotheOwner/operator(andthe
subcontractorshouldprovidethesametothecontractor):
(1) Generalsafetypoliciesandprocedures
(2) ConfinedSpaceEntryProgram
(3) Permitrequirementsforentry,hotandcoldwork
(4) Qualificationsortrainingcertificationforallinvolvedpersonnel.
(5) HotWorkandcoldworkprocedureswhereflammablesmaybepresent
(6) Pastworkinvolvingconfinedspaces
(7) PPEandotherequipment,materialsandchemicaltobeprovidedforuseonthejob
(8) Emergencyproceduresorrescueservicestobeavailable
(9) Astatementindicatingthattheyhaveneverbeencitedbystateorfederalsafetycomplianceagenciesfor
anyconfinedspacesafetyinfraction.Iftheyhavebeencitedpreviously,acopyofthecitationanda
statementfromthemdescribingthecorrectiveactiontheyhaveinstitutedshallbeprovided.(Reference29
CFR1910.146(C)(9):
(10) Inadditiontocomplyingwiththepermitspacerequirementsthatapplytoallemployers,eachcontractor
whoisretainedtoperformpermitspaceentryoperationsshould
(a) Obtainanyavailableinformationregardingpermitspacehazardsandentryoperationsfromthe
owner/operator;
(b) Informtheowner/operatorofthepermitspaceprogramthatthecontractorwillfollowandofany
hazardsconfrontedorcreatedinoraroundtheconfinedspace.
A.11.9.2.13Equipmentmayinclude,butisnotlimitedtothefollowing:
(1) Testingandmonitoringequipmentandcalibrationmaterials.
(2) Ventilatingequipment.
(3) Communicationsequipment.
(4) Personalprotectiveequipmentandrespiratoryprotection.
(5) Lightingequipment.
(6) Barriers,guards,warningsignsandshields.
(7) Equipment,suchasladders,neededforingressandegress.
(8) Rescueandemergencyequipmentneededtocomplywiththeconfinedspaceprogramrequirements
(excepttotheextentthattheequipmentisprovidedbyrescueservices).
(9) Anyotherequipmentnecessaryforauthorizedworkinandaroundtheconfinedspace.
A.11.9.2.16Contractorsshouldretaincancelledentrypermitsforatleastoneyeartofacilitatethereviewof
theconfinedspaceprogram.Anyproblemsencounteredduringanentryoperationshouldbenotedonthe
pertinentpermitsothatappropriaterevisionstotheprogramcanbemade.
A.11.9.2.17Whenacontractorarrangestohaveasubcontractorperformworkthatinvolvesconfinedspace
entry,thecontractorshould
(1) Informthesubcontractorthattheworkplacecontainsconfinedspacesandthatentryisallowedonly
throughcompliancewithanapprovedconfinedspaceprogram
(2) Appraisethesubcontractorofthehazardsandtheowner/operatorsexperiencewiththespace.
(3) Apprisethesubcontractorofanyprecautionsorproceduresthathavebeenimplementedforthe
protectionofemployeesinornearpermitspaceswherecontractorpersonnelwillbeworking;
(4) Coordinateentryoperationswiththecontractorandowner/operatorwhenowner/operatorand
contractorpersonnelwillbeworkinginorneartheconfinedspace.
(5) Thesubcontractorshoulddebriefthecontractorattheconclusionoftheentryoperationsregardingthe
permitspaceprogramfollowedandregardinganyhazardsconfrontedorcreatedinpermitspacesduring
entryoperations.
106
A.11.10.1Ventilationmethodsmayinclude,butarenotlimitedto,displacement.dilution,flushing;inerting,
purgingorotherappropriatemethodsofremovingorcontrollingahazardatmosphere.Note:Itisnot
advisabletousesteamtoremoveaflammableatmosphereduetothepotentialforastaticdischarge.
A.11.10.2.3PermitIssuersshouldassurethatappropriaterequirementsforsafeventilationoperationsand
personalprotectiveequipmentaredocumentedontheentrypermitandimplemented.
PermitIssuersshouldensurethatacceptableatmosphericlevelsaredocumentedbeforeventilatedspaces
areentered
PermitIssuersshouldprovideforandEntrySupervisorsshouldassurethatcontinuousforcedairventilationis
providedwhileconfinedspacesareoccupied(evenifinitialandsubsequentatmospherictestresultsare
acceptable)whererequiredbytheconfinedspaceprogram.
EntrySupervisorsshouldassurethatairqualityismonitoredasoftenasfeasible,andifnecessaryuse
appropriateadditionalmeasurestomaintainexposureswithinacceptablelevels
A.11.10.2.8Whererequired,exhaustedatmosphereshouldbecaptured,disbursedandtreated,as
appropriate.
A.11.10.2.12Forexample,GasTestershouldtakereadingsawayfromtheincomingairflowandinareas
wherethesampleisrepresentativeoftheairwherepersonnelarelocated.
A.11.11.1Isolationshouldbeachievedbyapprovedmethods,includingbutnotlimitedto,blanking,blinding,
doubleblockandbleeding,misaligningorremovingsectionsoflines,pipes,orducts,lockoutortagoutofall
sourcesofenergy;orblockingordisconnectingallmechanical,hydraulic,electrical,vapor,gas,engulfment,
chemicalorsteamlinkagesandconnectionsthatcouldcreatehazards.
A.11.11.2Authorizedpersonneltobenotifiedmayinclude,butarenotlimitedtoowner/operators,
contractors/subcontractors,PermitIssuersandEntrySupervisors.
A.11.12.1Workeroperationsanddutiesmayinclude,butarenotlimitedto,movingandstagingequipment
andmaterialsforusewithinoroutsidethespace;conductingnonentryrequiredhotand/orcoldwork;
assistingGasTester,attendants,ventilationandisolationpersonnelwithactivitiesoutsideoftheconfined
space;manningbarrierstopreventunauthorizedentryintothesurroundingarea;actingasafirewatch
duringhotworkoperationsorwhenignitionsourcesarepresentinthearea.
A.12.5TableA.12.5isanexampleofaidentificationtemplate.
TableA.12.5IdentificationofConfinedSpacesat(Facility/Company)
Name
and
Location
Size/Configuration
Normal
Contents
or
Process
Typical
Reasons
for
entry
Safety
Hazards
Health
Hazard/Potentially
Hazardous
Atmosphere
Adjacent
Hazards Notes

A.12.7.1Thereisnohardandfastruleaboutwhatlevelsshouldbeallowedforentryintoconfinedspaces
wheretoxiccontaminantsmaybepresent.OSHAPermissibleExposureLimitsexistforseveralhundredair
contaminantsandtheselevelsmustnotbeexceeded.TheNationalInstituteforOccupationalSafetyand
107
Health(NIOSH)andtheAmericanConferenceofGovernmentalIndustrialHygienists(ACGIH)alsohave
establishedoccupationalexposurelimitsformanycontaminants.Whenworkinginconfinedspaces,itisoften
standardpracticetosetmeteralarmlevelsatonehalforlessoftheallowableorrecommendedexposure
limits(calledtheactionlevel).Gasmetermanufacturersmayalsorecommendalarmlimitsbasedonthe
contaminantpropertiesandbasedontheaccuracyofthemeasurement.
A.12.14.3AsampletrainingcertificationformandalternatetrackingareprovidedinFigureA.12.14.3.
FigureA.12.14.3ConfinedSpaceEntryTrainingCertificationandAlternateTrackingOption
EmployeeName__________________________________________________
JobTitle_________________________________________________________
Datetrained________________TrainerSignature________________________
Thisemployeewastrainedas(entrant,attendant,EntrySupervisor,etc).___________
Trainingsource(ifoutsidetrainer)*______________________________________
DateofInhouseTrainingonPoliciesandEquipment_______________________
InHouseTrainerSignature____________________________________________
(Recommendattachsyllabusorotherrelevanttrainingmaterials)
AlternateOptionforTrackingTraining
Employee
Name
TrainingCompetency
(Entrant/Attendant/Entry
Supervisor,GasTester
etc
DateTrainedand
byWhomGeneric
orOutside
source*
DateTrainedon
InHousePolicy
andEquipment
SignatureofInHouse
Trainer

Contentsoftraining(attachifpossible):
*NoteIfanoutsidetrainingsourceisused,thetrainingmustincludethefacilitysequipmentandpolicies.
A.12.18Itemstobeconsideredaspartofthefitnessfordutymayinclude:
(1) Hotandcoldtemperaturechanges
(2) Unstablesurfaces
(3) Areaswhichrequireclimbingupordown
(4) Audiblealertsandcommunication
(5) Tightworkspaces
(6) CapableofwearingrequiredPPE
A.16.1Theoptimalmethodofpreventingoccupationillnesses,injuriesandfatalitiesistodesignoutthe
hazardsandrisk;thereby,eliminatingtheneedtocontrolthemduringworkoperations.Thisapproach
involvesthedesignoftools,equipment,systems,workprocessesandfacilitiesinordertoreduceor
eliminate,hazardsassociatedwithwork.(YoungCorbett,2011)
A.16.5.4RiskAssessmentProcessExample(toaccompanyChapter6).Revieweachidentifiedhazardand
determinewhattheprobabilityofanincidentoccurringandtheseverityoftheincidentifitdoesoccur.The
assessmentmaybequalitativeorquantitative(numerical).Explanationsofeachlevelofwithintheprobability
andseverityscalesaregiveninTableA.16.5.4(a),TableA.16.5.4(b),andTableA.16.5.4(c).
108
TableA.16.5.4(a)RiskAssessmentMatrix
Probability
S
e
v
e
r
i
t
y
1 2 3 4 5
Unlikely Seldom Occasional Likely Frequent
1 Negligible 2 3 4 5 6
2 Minor 3 4 5 6 7
3 Moderate 4 5 6 7 8
4 Critical 5 6 7 8 9
5 Catastrophic 6 7 8 9 10
TableA.16.5.4(b)Severity
Severity
Negligible 1 Firstaidorminormedicaltreatment
Minor 2 Minorinjury,lostworkday
Moderate 3 Moderateinjuryresultinginlostworkdays
Critical 4 Permanentorpartialdisability
Catastrophic 5 Deathorpermanenttotaldisability
TableA.16.5.4(c)1ProbabilityofOccurrence
Probability Description
Frequent 5
Expectedtooccurinmost
circumstances.
Likely 4
Willprobablyoccurinmost
circumstances.
Occasional 3 Occurssporadically,notregularly.
Seldom 2 Unlikelybutcouldoccuratsometime.
Unlikely 1
Mayoccuronlyinexceptional
circumstances.
Oncetheprobabilityandseverityaredetermined,usethematrixtofindthelevelofrisk.Theabovematrixis
anexamplewherethedifferentcolorsindicatethelevelsofrisk.Belowisanexplanationofeachcolorforthis
matrix.
Red:Activitiesinthisareaareconsideredunacceptablelevelsofrisk,includingcatastrophicandcritical
injuriesthatarehighlylikelytooccur.Supervisorsshouldconsiderwhethertheyshouldeliminateormodify
activitiesthatstillhavethisratingafterapplyingallreasonableriskmanagementstrategies.
Yellow:Activitiesinthisareaareconsideredcriticalandmaycausesevereinjury,majorpropertydamage,
significant,financialloss,and/orresultinnegativepublicityfortheorganizationand/orinstitution.
109
Green:Activitiesinthisareaareconsideredminorornegligiblehazardsthatpresentaminimalthreattothe
safety,healthandwellbeingofparticipants.Theycontainminimalriskandareunlikelytooccur.
Organizationscanproceedwiththeseactivitiesasplannedandhandlethroughroutineprocedures.


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(TIA No. 1096).

From: Ramirez, Alfredo M. [mailto:Alfredo.M.Ramirez@ul.com]

From: Ramirez, Alfredo M. [mailto:Alfredo.M.Ramirez@ul.com]

37-2010 and Proposed 2014 Edition

58- Proposed 2014 Edition

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99-2012 and Proposed 2015 Edition

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130-2010 and Proposed 2014 Edition

From: Connell, William [mailto:ConnellW@pbworld.com]

March 28, 2013

NFPA 502-2011 and Proposed 2014 Edition

From: Connell, William [mailto:ConnellW@pbworld.com]

Supplemental Attachment 13-8-27-b

Robert Kasiski | Senior Engineering Specialist

From: Kasiski, Robert

Codes and Standards Administration,

Thierry Carriere, Ph.D.

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