E.

I.

Concept of Torts

Civil liability in Quasi-Delict vs. Civil liability in Delict Art 2176 NCC vs. Art 365/100 RPC

Essentially, tort consists in the violation of a right given or the omission of a duty imposed by law. Simply stated, tort is a breach of a legal duty. (Naguiat v. NLRC, G.R. No. 116123, March 3, 1997) The act that breaks the contract may also be a tort (Air France v. Carrascoso, L-21438, September 28, 1996) A. Elements of Torts or Quasi-Delict

Laws
Civil Code Article 20 Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same. Article 21 Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy, shall compensate the latter for the damage. Article 2176 Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. Article 2177 Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover the damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. Article 2178 The provisions of Articles 1172 to 1174 are also applicable to a quasi-delict. Article 1173 The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time, and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of Articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.

Article 2176 provides the elements of a tort or quasi-delict: 1) that there is an act or omission; 2) presence of fault or negligence (lack of due care); 3) damage to another; 4) causal connection between the fault or negligence and the damage; 5) there are no pre-existing contractual relations

B.

Negligence

It is the omission of that degree of diligence, which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponding to the circumstances of the persons, time and place (Art 1173, NCC)

C.

Kinds of Negligence

Culpa Aquiliana (quasi-delict; Article 2176) Culpa Criminal Culpa Contractual D. Quasi-Delict distinguished sources of obligation from other

Article 1178: Sources of obligations: 1) Law 2) Contracts 3) Quasi-contracts 4) Acts or Omissions punished by law 5) Quasi-Delicts

Article 2201, paragraph 2: In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for all damages, which may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation. Articles 1170 to 1174 Article 1170 Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages. Article 1171 Responsibility arising from fraud is demandable in all obligations. Any waiver of an action for future fraud is void. Article 1172 Responsibility arising from negligence in the performance of every kind of obligation is also demandable, but such liability may be regulated by the courts, according to the circumstances. Article 1174 Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which, could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable. Revised Penal Code Article 365 Art. 365. Imprudence and negligence. Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed. Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a

less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed. When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said damages to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less than twenty-five pesos. A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously, would have constituted a light felony. In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their sound discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed in Article sixtyfour. The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable: 1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those provided in the first two paragraphs of this article, in which case the court shall impose the penalty next lower in degree than that which should be imposed in the period which they may deem proper to apply. 2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the Automobile Law, to death of a person shall be caused, in which case the defendant shall be punished by prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods. Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or falling to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing of failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place. Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which the damage impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest. The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article shall be imposed

upon the offender who fails to lend on the spot to the injured parties such help as may be in this hand to give. (As amended by R.A. 1790, approved June 21, 1957).

1903 (now Article 2180) of the Civil Code as an employer of Pedro Fontanilla? H: Yes. Judgment AFFIRMED R: Authorities support the proposition that a quasidelict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code, with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime. The Court underlined the differences between crimes under the Penal Code and the culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito under the Civil Code: 1. That crimes affect public interest, while cuasi-delitos are only of private concern; 2. That, consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act, while the Civil Code by means of indemnification, merely repairs the damage; 3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because the former are punished only if there is a penal law clearly covering them, while the latter, cuasi-delitos, include all acts in which any kind of fault or negligence intervenes. First, the Court examined cases it has previously decided: Rakes v. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil. 359, 362-365, [1907]): that the civil liability was not intended to be merged in the criminal nor even to be suspended thereby, except as expressly provided in the law. Where an individual is civilly liable for a negligent act or omission, it is not required that the injured party should seek out a third person criminally liable whose prosecution must be a condition precedent to the enforcement of the civil right. [The employers] liability to his employee would arise out of the contract of employment, that to the passengers out of the contract for passage, while that to the injured bystander would originate in the negligent act itself. Manzanares v. Moreta, 38 Phil., 821 1918: The contributory negligence of the child and her mother, if any, does not operate as a bar to recovery, but in its strictest sense could only result in reduction of the damages

QUASI-DELICT
Barredo v. Garcia G.R. No. 48006, July 8, 1942 F: There was a head-on collision between the taxi driven by Pedro Fontanilla (FONTANILLA) and a carretela. GARCIA was a 16 year-old boy who was one of the passengers of the carretela, who suffered injuries and died two days later. It is undisputed that FONTANILLAS negligence was the cause of the mishap, as he was driving on the wrong side of the road, and at high speed. A criminal action was filed against FONTANILLA and he was convicted. The court in the criminal case granted the petition that the right to bring a separate civil action be reserved. The parents of Faustino Garcia (THE PARENTS) brought an action against BARREDO, herein petitioner, as the sole proprietor of the Malate Taxicab and employer of FONTANILLA. The Court of First Instance of Manila awarded damages in favor of THE PARENTS. As to BARREDOS responsibility, the COURT OF APPEALS found that FONTANILLA, who had been caught several times for violation of the Automobile Law and speeding, which appears in the records of the Bureau of Public Works, should indemnify THE PARENTS. The DEFENSE contends that the liability of BARREDO is governed by the RPC; hence his liability is only subsidiary and as there has been no civil action against FONTANILLA, the person criminally liable, BARREDO cannot be held responsible in this case. The COURT OF APPEALS disagreed with the contention of the defense, rationing that the liability sought to be imposed upon BARREDO is not a civil obligation arising from a felony or a misdemeanor, but an obligation imposed in Article 1903 of the Civil Code by reason of his negligence in the selection or supervision of his servant or employee. I: Whether or not SPS Garcia may bring this separate civil action against Barredo, thus making him primarily and directly responsible under article

Bahia v. Litonjua and Leynes (30 Phil, 624 [1915]): this theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately on his own negligence and not on that of his servant. Cuison v. Norton & Harrison Co., (55 Phil., 18 [1930]): The basis of civil law liability is not respondent superior but the relationship of pater familias. This theory bases the liability of the master ultimately on his own negligence and not on that of his servant. Walter A. Smith & Co. v. Cadwallader Gibson Lumber Co., 55 Phil., 517 [1930]) we are of the opinion that the presumption of liability against the defendant has been overcome by the exercise of the care and diligence of a good father of a familythe defendant is therefore absolved from all liability. The Court held, therefore, that the defendants theory about his secondary liability in the present case is negative by the six cases above set forth. He is, on the authority of these cases, primarily and directly responsible in damages under article 1903, in relation to article 1902 of the Civil Code (now 2180 and 2176, respectively). Secondly, the Court also took up the Philippine decisions relied upon by the defendant: City of Manila v. Manila Electric Co. (52 Phil, 586 [1928]): Our deduction, therefore is that the case relates to the Penal Code and not to the Civil Code. Indeed, as pointed out by the trial judge, any different ruling would permit the master to escape scot-free by simply alleging and proving that the master had exercised all diligence in the selection and training of its servants to prevent the damage. Arambulo v. Manila Electric Co. (55 Phil., 75): In view of the foregoing considerations, we are of opinion and so hold, (1) that the exemption from civil liability established in article 1903 of the Civil Code for all who have acted with the diligence of a good father of a family, is not applicable to the subsidiary civil liability provided in article 20 of the Penal Code. This case destroys the defendants contention in the present case because it illustrates the principle that the employers primary responsibility under article 1903 of the Civil Code is different in character from his subsidiary liability under the Penal Code.

Third, and Lastly, the Court indicated the foundations of the previously cited legal provisions, authors, and cases: Firstly, the RPC in article 365 punishes not only reckless but also simple negligence. If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not punished by law, according to the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and application in actual life. Death or injury to persons and damage to property through any degree of negligence even the slightest would have to be indemnified only through the principle of civil liability arising from a crime. Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. There are numerous cases of criminal negligence, which can not be shown beyond reasonable doubt but can be proved by a preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the defendant can and should be made responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, there would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. Ubi jus ibi remedium. Thirdly, to hold that there is only one way to make defendants liability effective, and that is, to sue the diver and exhaust his (the latters) property first, would be tantamount to compelling the plaintiff to follow a devious and cumbersome method of obtaining relief. In construing the laws, courts have endeavored to shorten and facilitate the pathways of right and justice. Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and the Civil Code on this subject, which has given rise to the overlapping or concurrence of spheres already discussed, and for lack of understanding of the character and efficacy of the action for culpa aquiliana, there has grown up a common practice to seek damages only by virtue of the civil responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that there is another remedy, which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. The Court believes it is high time they pointed out to the harm done by such practice and to restore the principle of responsibility and fault or negligence under Article 1902 et seq of the Civil Code to its full rigor.

Elcano v. Hill G.R. No. L-24803, May 26, 1977 F: Petitioner (ELCANO, et.al), filed a complaint for recovery of damages against Reginald Hill (REGINALD), a minor, who was married, living and getting subsistence from his father Marvin Hill (ATTY. HILL) at the time, for the killing of their son Agapito Elcano. REGINALD was acquitted in the criminal case that was instituted beforehand, on the ground that his act was not criminal, because of lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake. REGINALD and ATTY. HILL filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the civil action for damages is barred by the acquittal of REGINALD and that Article 2180 of the Civil Code cannot apply because at the time of the occurrence complained of, REGINALD, though a minor, was already legally married. I: Whether or not the present civil action for damages is barred by the acquittal of REGINALD in the criminal case wherein the action for civil liability was not reversed? Whether or not Article 2180 is applicable against ATTY. HILL, notwithstanding the undisputed fact that at the time of the occurrence complained of, REGINALD, though a minor, living with and getting subsistence from his father, was already legally married? H: No, it is not barred. Yes, it is applicable. Trial Court may proceed. R: The Court relied heavily on its decision in BARREDO v. GARCIA, which discussed the foundation of the legal provisions, doctrines, and cases, which embody the separate and distinct nature of civil liability, which may arise either from the Penal Code or the Civil Code. The Court also indicated that it is important to note that the New Civil Code, which was drafted after BARREDO v. GARCIA, no longer uses the term not punishable by law thereby making it clear that the concept of culpa aquiliana includes acts which are criminal in character or in violation of the penal law, whether voluntary or negligent. More precisely, the Court referred to the new provision: Article 2177, Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff

cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. According to the Report of the Code Commission, p.162, then, under the proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana The Court also cited the decision in Rakes v. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. 7 Phil 359, Article 2176, where it refers to fault or negligence, covers not only acts not punishable by law but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. The Court thus held, in reiteration of Garcia that culpa acquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts, which may be punishable by law. Thus, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the victim does not recover damages on both scores. It results therefore that the acquittal of Reginald Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict. Hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him. As to the vicarious liability of the parents on account of a delict committed by their minor child, the same is not extinguished by the fact that said child who is living with and dependent upon said parents is married. Pursuant to Article 399, which provides that a minor emancipated by marriage may not, nevertheless, sue or be sued without the assistance of the parents, indicates that such emancipation does not carry with it freedom to enter into transactions or do any act that can give rise to judicial litigation (See Manresa, i.d., Vol. II, pp. 766-767, 776). Killing someone else invites judicial action. Thus, the marriage of a minor child does not relieve the parents of the duty to see to it that the child, while still a minor, does not give cause to any litigation, in the same manner that the parents are answerable for the borrowings of money and alienation or encumbering of real property which cannot be done by their minor married child without their consent (Article 399; Manresa; supra). However, the Court did acknowledge that inasmuch as it is evident that REGINALD, now of age, as a matter of equity, the liability of ATTY.

HILL has become merely subsidiary to that of his son. Cinco vs. Canonoy, et.al. G.R. No. L-33171, May 31, 1979 F: Porfirio P. Cinco (CINCO) filed a complaint in the City Court of Mandaue City, Cebu, for the recovery of damages on account of a vehicular accident involving his automobile and a jeepney driven by Romeo Hilot and operated by Valeriana Pepito and Carlos Pepito (THE PEPITOS), the last three being the private respondents in this suit. Subsequent thereto, a criminal case was filed against the driver, Romeo Hilot. At the pre-trial in the civil case, counsel for THE PEPITOS moved to suspend the civil action pending the final determination of the criminal suit, invoking Rule 111, Section 3(b) of the Rules of Court which provides (b) After a criminal action has been commenced, no civil action arising from the same offense can be prosecuted and the same shall be suspended, in whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered. CINCOs contentions are as follows: 1) That it was the fault or negligence of the driver, Romeo Hilot, in the operation of the jeepney owned by the Pepitos which caused the collision between his automobile and his jeepney; 2) That damages were sustained by CINCO because of the collision; 3) that there was a direct causal connection between the damages he suffered and the fault and negligence of PEPITO, et.al. PEPITO, et.al., in their answer, claim that they observed due diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees. The City Court of Mandaue City ordered the suspension of the civil case. The Court of First Instance Judge dismissed the petition for certiorari. Hence, the petition to this tribunal. I: Whether or not there can be an independent civil action for damage to property during the pendency of the criminal action? H: Yes; City Court is Ordered to Proceed

R: Liability being predicated on quasi-delict, the civil case may proceed as a separate and independent civil action, as specifically provided in Article 2177 of the Civil Code. The separate and independent civil action for a quasi-delict is clearly recognized in Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court: - In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34, and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct form the criminal action may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of the evidence. The civil action referred to in Secs. 3(a) and 3(b) of Rule 111 which was cited by respondent court refers to the civil action that arises from the criminal offense and not the civil action based on the quasi-delict, which is allowed by Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court previously mentioned. The Court pointed to the relevance in the case at bar of Article 31 of the Civil Code, which provides that when the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings regardless of the result of the latter. The jural concept of quasi-delict is that of an independent source of obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony. Article 1157 of the Civil Code bolsters this conclusion when it specifically recognizes that Obligations arise from: (1) Law; (2) Contracts; (3) Quasi-contracts; (4) Acts or omissions punished by law; and (4) Quasi-delicts. CINCOs cause of action is based on quasi-delict, which is enunciated in Article 2176 of the Civil Code and is so broad that it includes not only injuries to persons but also damage to property (Barredo vs. Garcia 73 Phil 607, at 620, supra). It makes no distinctions between damage to persons and damage to property. The Court clarified the word damage which is used in two

concepts: the harm done and reparation for the harm done. And with respect to harm it is plain that it includes both injuries to person and property since harm is not limited to personal but also to property injuries. In fact, examples of quasi-delict in the law itself include damage to property. Article 2191(2) of the Civil Code holds proprietors responsible for damages caused by excessive smoke, which may be harmful to persons or property.

Baksh v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 97336, February 19, 1993 F: Private respondent, Marilou T. Gonzales (MARILOU) filed a complaint against petitioner (BAKSH) for the alleged violation of their agreement to get married. MARILOU was 22 years old, single, a Filipina, and alleged that she was of good moral character and with a reputation duly respected in her community. BAKSH on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen, an exchange student residing in the Philippines. BAKSH allegedly courted MARILOU and proposed to marry her. The two of them allegedly went to MARILOUs parents where BAKSH secured their approval to the marriage. From that point on, MARILOUs parents began preparations for the marriage. MARILOUs parents also allowed the two to live together before their marriage, which led to the alleged maltreatment of MARILOU at the hands of BAKSH. BAKSH eventually repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore. The trial court, applying Article 21 of the Civil Code ruled in favor of MARILOU. I: Whether or not damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines? H: Yes; Petition Denied R: The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. This notwithstanding, the Civil Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is designed to expand the concept of torts of quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books.

The Court referred to the Report of the Code Commission to illustrate their intention to vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs, which it is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes. The Court distinguished the difference between quasi-delict and tort. Tort is much broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes not only negligence but intentional criminal acts as well such as assault and battery, false imprisonment and deceit. In the general scheme of the Philippine legal system envisioned by the Commission responsible for drafting the New Civil Code, intentional and malicious acts, with certain exceptions, are to be governed by the Revised Penal Code while negligent acts which in the absence of Article 21, would have been beyond redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is even postulated together with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly broadened the scope of the law on civil wrongs; it has become much more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts. In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioners fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him. In short, the private respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every single Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral seduction. It is not the promise to marry but the fraud and deceit behind it and willful injury to her honor and reputation, which followed thereafter which justifies the award of damages. The Court cited Tanjanco v. Court of Appeals, The essential feature is seduction, that in law is more than mere sexual intercourse or a breach of a promise of marriage, it connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded (U.S. vs. Buenaventura 27 Phil 121; U.S. vs. Ariante 9 Phil 595) The Court cited Domalagon vs. Bolifer, 33 Phil 471, moral damages together with actual damages, should there be any, such as the expense for the wedding preparations, may be recovered. The Court found that BAKSH, from the very beginning, was not at all moved by good faith and an honest motive. BAKSH clearly violated the Filipinos concept of morality and so brazenly

defied the traditional respect Filipinos have for their women. It can even be said that BAKSH committed such deplorable acts in blatant disrespect of Article 19 of the Civil Code which directs every person to act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his obligations. No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs and traditions. Dulay v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 108017, April 5, 1995 F: On December 7, 1988 an altercation between Benigno Torzuela (TORZUELA) and Atty. Napoleon Dulay (ATTY. DULAY) occurred at the Big Bang sa Alabang, Alabang Village, Muntinlupa as a result of which TORZUELA, the security guard on duty at the said carnival shot and killed ATTY. DULAY. Petitioner is the widow of ATTY DULAY, who filed an action for damages against TORZUELA and Safeguard Investigation and Security, Inc., (SAFEGUARD) and/or Superguard Security Corp. (SUPERGUARD), alleged employers of TORZUELA. TORZUELA is an employee of SAFEGUARD and SUPERGUARD and at the time of the incident complained of, was under their control and supervision. The petitioner insists that TORZUELAs act of shooting ATTY DULAY constitutes a quasidelict actionable under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Petitioner also contends that SUPERGUARD AND SAFEGUARD are primarily liable for their negligence either in the selection or supervision of their employees, and that this liability is independent of the employees own liability for fault or negligence and is distinct from the subsidiary civil liability under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. The petitioner also invokes Article 33 of the civil Code. SUPERGUARD and SAFEGUARD claim that Article 2176 is inapplicable in the case at bar, contending that the provision is limited to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. I: Whether or not Article 2176 of the Civil Code covers not only acts committed with negligence but also acts which are voluntary and intentional? H: Yes; Order REVERSED and SET ASIDE; REMANDED to RTC for trial on the merits.

R: Well-entrenched is the doctrine that Article 2176 of the Civil Code covers not only acts committed with negligence, but also acts which are voluntary and intentional. The Court cited its previous rulings in Elcano v. Hill and Andamo v. Intermediate Appellate Court. Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, when an injury is caused by the negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after selection or both (Laguyan v. IAC, 167 SCRA 792 [1988]). The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such employee (Kapalaran Bus Lines v. Coronado, 176 SCRA 792 [1989]). In applying the abovementioned doctrines then, the Court rationed that it is enough that the complaint alleged that TORZUELA shot ATTY DULAY resulting in the latters death; that the shooting occurred while TORZUELA was on duty; and that either SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD was TORZUELAs employer and responsible for his acts. Since the petitioners clearly sustained an injury to their rights under the law, it would be more just to allow them to present evidence of such injury. Castillo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 48541, August 21, 1989 F: CASTILLO, et.al. and ROSARIO, et.al. figured into a vehicular accident on May 2, 1965 at Bagac, Villasis, Pangasinan, which caused injuries to their persons and damage to their respective vehicles. A civil case for the recovery of damages for the injuries sustained by CASTILLO, et.al., and for the damage to their vehicle as a result of the collision, was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila. An Information was filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan, against Juanito Rosario, for double physical injuries; double less serious physical injuries; and damage to property through reckless imprudence, in the Court of First Instance of Urdaneta. Juanito Rosario was convicted by the trial court, but acquitted by the Court of Appeals.

On the basis of the testimonies and evidence submitted by CASTILLO, et.al., as well as the records of the criminal case attached in the Request for Admission of ROSARIO, et.al., the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissed the complaint of CASTILLO, et.al. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. I: Whether or not a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may bar a civil action for damages based on quasi-delict? H: It depends, there is an exception to the general rule. Petition DENIED. R: There is no dispute that the subject action for damages, being civil in nature, is separate and distinct from the criminal aspect, necessitating only a preponderance of evidence. The general rule is found in the case of Azucena v. Potenciano, G.R. No. L-14028, June 30, 1962, the Court held whether it be conviction or acquittal would render meaningless the independent character of the civil action and the clear injunction of Article 31, that his action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter. However, this rule is not without exception. Thus Section 2 (c) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court provides: Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration from a final judgment that the fact from which the civil action might arise did not exist. Negligence, being the source and foundation of actions of quasi-delict, is the basis for the recovery of damages. In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals found that no negligence was committed by Juanito Rosario to warrant an award of damages to CASTILLO, et.al. It was the Court of Appeals findings that the collision was not due to the negligence of Juanito Rosario but rather it was CASTILLOs own act of driving the jeep to the shoulder of the road where the car was, which was actually the proximate cause of the collision. With these findings, the Court of Appeals exonerated Juantio Rosario from civil liability on the ground that the alleged negligence did not exist. ELEMENTS OF QUASI-DELICT

Garcia, et.al., v. Florido G.R. No. L-35095, August 31, 1973 F: A collision occurred, which resulted in various physical injuries sustained by Garcia, et.al., and necessitated their medical treatment and hospitalization. Garcia, et.al. filed an action for damages against respondents, owners and drivers, of the PU car and the passenger bus that figured in the collision. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss on three grounds: 1) that Garcia et.al., had no cause of action; ) that the complaint carries with it a prayer for attachment but without the requisite verification, hence defective; and 3) that they, the respondents, had operated said passenger bus with maximum care and prudence. Garcia et.al., filed an opposition to said motion to dismiss alleging that the aforesaid action for damages was instituted not to enforce the civil liability of respondents under Article 100 of the RPC but for their civil liability on quasi-delicts pursuant to Articles 2176-2194, as the same negligent act causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the RPC or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extracontractual under the Civil Code, and the party seeking recovery is free to choose which remedy to enforce. The trial court dismissed the complaint for damages, on the grounds that the allegations of the complaint in culpa aquiliana must not be tainted by any assertion of violation of law or traffic rules or regulations and because of the prayer in the complaint asking the Court to declare the defendants jointly and severally liable for moral, compensatory and exemplary damages, the court is of the opinion that the action was not based on culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict. I: Whether or not the complaint filed by GARCIA et.al. is based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana and not under Art 100 of the RPC? H: Quasi-delict; Decision appealed from REVERSED; Trial Court ordered to proceed on the merits. R: The Court declared that there is no question that from a careful consideration of the allegations contained in the complaint, the essential averments

for a quasi-delictual action under Articles 21762194 of the New Civil Code are present, namely: a) act or omission of the private respondents; b) presence of fault or negligence or lack of due care in the operation of passenger bus No. 25 by respondent Pedro Tumala resulting in the collision of the bus with the passenger car; c) physical injuries and other damages sustained by petitioners as a result of the collision; d) existence of direct causal connection between the damage or prejudice and the fault or negligence of private respondents; and e) the absence of pre-existing contractual relations between the parties. The circumstance that the complaint alleged that respondents violated traffic rules in that the driver drove the vehicle at a fast clip in a reckless, grossly negligent and imprudent manner in violation of traffic rules and without due regard to the safety of the passengers aboard the PU car does not detract from the nature and character of the action, as one based on culpa aquiliana. The violation of traffic rules is merely descriptive of the failure of said driver to observe for the protection of the interests of others, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance, which the circumstances justly demand, which failure resulted in the injury on petitioners. Certainly, excessive speed in violation of traffic rules is a clear indication of negligence. It should be emphasized that the same negligent act causing damages may produce a civil liability arising from a crime under Article 100 of the RPC or create an action for quasidelict or cula extra-contractual under Arts. 21762194 of the New Civil Code. In the case at bar, there is no question that petitioners never intervened in the criminal action instituted by the Chief of Police against respondent Pedro Tumala, much less has the said criminal action been terminated either by conviction or acquittal of said accused. It is therefore evident that by the institution of the present civil action for damages, petitioners have in effect abandoned their right to press recovery for damages in the criminal case and have opted instead to recover them in the present civil case. Undoubtedly an offended party loses his right to intervene in the prosecution of a criminal case, not only when he has waived the civil action or expressly reserved his right to institute, but also when he has actually instituted the civil action. For by either of such actions his interest in the criminal case has disappeared.

In whatever way we view the institution of the civil action for recovery of damages under quasi-delict by petitioners, whether as one that should be governed by the provisions of Section 2 of Rule 111 of the Rules of court which require reservation by the injured party consideration that by the institution of the civil action even before the commencement of the trial of the criminal case, petitioners have thereby foreclosed their right to intervene therein, or one where reservation to file the civil action need not be made, for the reason that the law itself (Article 33 of the Civil Code) already makes the reservation and the failure of the offended party to do so does not bar him from bringing the action, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, We find no legal justification for respondent courts order of dismissal. Andamo, et.al., v. IAC G.R. No. 74761, November 6, 1990 F: SPS ANDAMO are owners of a parcel of land, which is adjacent to that of a religious corporation. Within the land of the religious corporation, waterpaths and contrivances, including an artificial lake, were constructed, which allegedly inundated and eroded SPS ANDAMOs land, caused a young man to drown, damaged SPS ANDAMOs crops and plants, washed away costly fences, endangered the lives of SPS ANDAMO and their laborers during rainy and stormy seasons and exposed plants and other improvements to destruction. SPS ANDAMO instituted a criminal action. SPS ANDAMO also filed a civil action against the religious corporation, which was suspended by the same court until after judgment in the related Criminal Case, based on the motion to dismiss which was grounded in Sec 3 (a) of Rule 111 of the Rules, filed by the religious corporation. I: Whether or not the dismissal of the Civil Case in accordance with Sec 3 (a) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court was proper? H: No; Petition Granted; Trial Court ordered to proceed on the civil action R: It is axiomatic that the nature of the action filed in court is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint as constituting the cause of action. The nature of an action is not necessarily determined or

controlled by its title or heading but by the body of the pleading or complaint itself. A careful examination of the complaint filed by petitioners shows that the civil action is one under Article 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff (Taylor v. Manila Electric Co.). Clearly from the petitioners complaint the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation are alleged to have inundated the land of petitioners. There is therefore an assertion of a causal connection between the act of building these waterpaths and the damage sustained by the petitioners. Such action if proven constitutes fault or negligence which may be the basis for the recovery of damages. Taylor v. Manila Electric Co. & Light Co. G.R. No. L-4977, March 22, 1910 F: This is an action to recover damages for the loss of an eye and other injuries, instituted by David Taylor, (TAYLOR) a minor, by his father, his nearest relative. TAYLOR was 15 at the time he received the injuries complained of, the son of a mechanical engineer, more mature than the average boy of his age, and having considerable aptitude and training in mechanics. On the day of the incident, he and a friend wandered about the Manila Electric Co & Light Cos (MANILA ELECTRIC) premises. They found some twenty or thirty brass fulminating caps scattered on the ground. The boys took the caps home and made a series of experiments with them. One of which was opening one of the caps with a knife and finding that it was filled with a yellowish substance they got matches. TAYLOR held the cap while his friend applied a lighted match to the contents. An explosion followed, causing more or less serious injuries to all three. Hence the institution of this complaint for damages by TAYLOR against MANILA ELECTRIC. TAYLOR contends that MANILA ELECTRIC was negligent in leaving the caps or detonators willfully or through an oversight, knowing or ought to have known that young boys

were likely to roam about in pastime or in play. TAYLOR bases his case on the provisions in the Civil Code which pertain to quasi-delict. TAYLOR also claims the inapplicability of contributory negligence on his part, being a minor at the time of the incident. MANILA ELECTRIC endeavors to weaken or destroy the probative value of the facts on which these conclusions are based by intimating or rather assuming that the blasting work on the companys well and on its McKinley extension was done by contractors. I: Whether or not it was Manila Electric Co & Light Cos negligence that was the proximate cause for the injuries sustained by TAYLOR? H: No; Petition Denied R: The owners failure to take reasonable precautions to prevent the child from entering his premises at a place where he knows or ought to know that children are accustomed to roam about or to which their childish instincts and impulses are likely to attract them is at least equivalent to an IMPLIED LICENSE TO ENTER, and where the child against injury from unknown or unseen dangers, placed upon such premises by the owner, is clearly a breach of duty, a negligent omission, for which he may and should be held responsible, if the child is actually injured, without other fault on its part than that it had entered on the premises of a stranger without his express invitation or permission. But while the Court held that the entry of TAYLOR upon MANILA ELECTRICs property without defendants express invitation or permission would not have relieved MANILA ELECTRIC from responsibility for injuries incurred there by plaintiff, without other fault on his part, if such injury were attributable to the negligence of the defendant, we are of opinion that under all the circumstances of this case the negligence of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises was NOT the proximate cause of the injury received by TAYLOR, which therefore was not, properly speaking, attributable to the negligence of the defendant, and on the other hand, we are satisfied that TAYLORs action in cutting open the detonating cap and putting a match to its contents was the proximate cause of the explosion and of the resultant injuries inflicted upon TAYLOR, and that MANILA ELECTRIC,

therefore, is not civilly responsible for the injuries thus incurred. The care and caution required of a child is according to his maturity and capacity only, and this is to be determined in each case by the circumstances of the case. The Court was satisfied that TAYLOR had sufficient capacity and understanding to be sensible of the danger to which he exposed himself when he put the match to the contents of the cap; that he was sui juris in the sense that his age and his experience qualified him to understand and appreciate the necessity for the exercise of that degree of caution which would have avoided the injury which resulted from his own deliberate act. Negligence is not presumed, but must be proven by him who alleges it (Scaevola, Jurisprudencia del Codigo Civil, vol. 6, pp. 551, 552). The test is simple. Distinction must be made between the accident and the injury, between the event itself, without which there could have been no accident, and those acts of the victim not entering into it, independent of it, but contributing to his own proper hurt.

I: Whether or not the respondent Judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the civil case? H: Yes. The case is remanded to the lower court. R: Article 31 of the Civil Code provides as follows: When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the later. Evidently, the above-quoted provision of the Civil Code refers to a civil action based, not on the act or omission charged as a felony in a criminal case, but one based on an obligation arising from other sources, like quasi-delict. In the case at bar, the allegations of the complaint clearly show that the cause of action of the HEIRS OF TAYAG was based upon quasidelict. All the essential averments for a quasi delictual action are present, namely: 1) an act or omission constituting fault or negligence on the part of private respondent; 2) damage caused by the said act or omission; 3) direct causal relation between the damage and the act or omission; and 4) no preexisting contractual relation between the parties. The cause of action of the HEIRS OF TAYAG being based on quasi-delict, the acquittal of the driver, VILLA is not a bar to the prosecution of the civil case for damages.

Heirs of Tayag vs. Alcantara, et.al., G.R. No. 50959, July 23, 1980 F: Pedro Tayag, Sr. was bumped and hit by a Philippine Rabbit Bus, being driven by Romeo Villa y Cunanan, as a result of which, he sustained physical injuries which caused his instantaneous death and the bicycle he was riding on was damaged and destroyed. A complaint for damages was filed by the HEIRS OF TAYAG against Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc and Romeo Villa Y Cunanan. A criminal case was pending in the trial court. Respondent judge suspended the hearing of the Civil Case until the criminal action is terminated. Respondent Judge acquitted Romeo Villa of the crime of homicide on the ground of reasonable doubt. Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc and Villa filed a motion to dismiss the civil case on the ground that the HEIRS OF TAYAG did not have a cause of action because of the acquittal of VILLA in the criminal action. The HEIRS OF TAYA opposed said motion, alleging that their cause of action is based on quasi-delict.

NEGLIGENCE
Picart v. Smith G.R. No. L-12219, March 15, 1918 F: PICART was riding his pony over the Carlatan Bridge. Before he had gotten halfway across, SMITH approached from the opposite direction in an automobile, going at a rate of about ten or twelve miles per hour. As SMITH neared the bridge, he saw a horseman on it and blew his horn to give warning of his approach. SMITH continued his course and after he had taken the bridge he gave two more successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the man on horseback before him was not observing the road. PICART, it appears, saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals. There being the no possibility of the horse getting across to the other side, however, SMITH quickly

turned his car sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse alongside of the railing where it was then standing; but in so doing the automobile passed in such close proximity to the animal that it became frightened and turned its body across the bridge with its head toward the railing. The horse fell and its rider was thrown off. As a result of its injuries, the horse died. PICART received contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and required medical attention for several days. I: Whether or not SMITH in maneuvering his car in the manner described was guilty of negligence such as gives rise to a civil obligation to repair the damage done? H: Yes; Petition GRANTED R: The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet pater familias of the Roman law. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the action in the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that. The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in a particular case. Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing the conduct or guarding against its consequences. The Court, in applying this test to the conduct of SMITH in the present case, declared that negligence is clearly established. A prudent man, placed in the position of SMITH, would, in the Courts opinion, have recognized that the course which he was pursuing was fraught with risk, and would therefore have foreseen harm to the horse and rider as a reasonable consequence of that

course. Under these circumstances the law imposed on SMITH the duty to guard against the threatened harm. It goes without saying that PICART himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But as we have already stated SMITH was also negligent; and in such case the problem always is to discover which agent is immediately and directly responsible. Under these circumstances, the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences without reference to the prior negligence of the other party. In Rakes v. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil. Rep, 359), this Court held that while contributory negligence on the part of the person injured did not constitute a bar to recovery, it could be received in evidence to reduce the damages which would otherwise have been assessed wholly against the other party. Ong v. Metropolitan Water District G.R. No. L-7664, August 29, 1958 F: SPS ONG seek to recover damages from Metropolitan Water District (METROPOLITAN), a government-owned corporation, for the death of their son, Dominador Ong in one of the swimming pools operated by METROPOLITAN. On the day of the incident, Dominador Ong was found under water in one of the pools. The lifeguard immediately jumped into the pool and retrieved the lifeless body. Manual artificial respiration was supplied. The male nurse came to render assistance, followed by the sanitary inspector. Afterward, one of the security guards carried Dominador Ong to the resuscitator and medicine kit and upon arriving, injected the boy with camphorated oil. Dr. Ayuyao was fetched from the University of the Philippines. The doctor declared the boy dead upon his arrival. METROPOLITAN admits the fact that Dominador Ong drowned in of its swimming pools but avers that his death was caused by his own negligence or by unavoidable accident. METROPOLITAN also alleges that it had exercised due diligence in the selection of, and supervision over, its employees and that it had observed the diligence required by law under the circumstances. SPS ONG contend that METROPOLITAN failed to take the necessary precautions to protect

the lives of its patrons by not placing at the swimming pools efficient and competent employees who may render help at a moments notice and they ascribed such negligence to METROPOLITAN because the lifeguard it had on the occasion minor Ong was drowning was not available or was attending to something else with the result that his help came late. SPS ONG also contend that even if be assumed that the deceased is partly to be blamed for the unfortunate incident, still METROPOLITAN may be held liable under the doctrine of last clear chance for the reason that, having the last opportunity to save the victim it failed to do so. The trial court dismissed the petition. H: No; Petition DISMISSED R: The Court found sufficient evidence to show that METROPOLITAN has taken all necessary precautions to avoid danger to the lives of its patrons or prevent accident, which may cause their death. The Court also did not find applicability of the last clear chance, considering that the record does not show how minor Ong came into the big swimming pool. The doctrine of last clear chance simply means that the negligence of a claimant does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it appears that the latter, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to claimant notwithstanding his negligence. The last clear chance doctrine can never apply where the party charged is required to act instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have been discovered; at least in cases in which any previous negligence of the party charged cannot be said to have contributed to the injury (OMally vs. Eagan, 77 ALR 582) The Court reiterated the decision of the trial court: There is also a strong suggestion coming from the expert evidence presented by both parties that Dominador Ong might have dived where the water was only 5.5 feet deep, and in so doing he might have hit or bumped his forehead against the bottom of the pool, as a consequence of which he was stunned, and which eventually led to his drowning. As a boy scout he must have received instructions in swimming. He knew, or must have known that it was dangerous for him to dive in that part of the pool.

Civil Aeronautics Administration v. CA, G.R. No. L-51806, November 8, 1988 F: SIMKE is a naturalized Filipino citizen and at the time of the incident was the Honorary Consul General of Israel in the Philippines. While walking on a terrace at Manila International Airport, SIMKE slipped over an elevation about four inches high at the far end of the terrace. As a result, SIMKE fell on his back and broke his thighbone. SIMKE filed an action for damages based on quasi-delict against CAA. The CFI of Rizal decided in favor of SIMKE. The CA affirmed the CFI. The appeal of CA is grounded in the following contentions: 1) that the suit against the CAA cannot stand because it is really a suit against the Republic of the Philippines; 2) that there is no evidence to support the finding that the injuries sustained by SIMKE was due to CAAs negligence, and 3) there was no substantial and competent proof to support awards for damages. I: Whether or not the construction of the elevation was done in a negligent manner? H: Yes; Petition DENIED R: The Court referred to Article 1173 of the Civil Code, which states that The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the person, of the time and of the place. Here, the obligation of the CAA in maintaining the viewing deck, a facility oepen to the public, requires that CAA insure the safety of the viewers using it. The legal foundation of CAAs liability for quasi-delict can be found in Article 2176 of the Civil Code which provides that whoever b y act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done As the CAA knew of the existence of the dangerous elevation which it claims though, was made precisely in accordance with the plans and specifications of the building for proper drainage of the open terrace, its failure to have it repaired or altered in order to eliminate the existing hazard constitutes such negligence as to warrant a finding of liability based on quasi-delict upon CAAA.

The Court finds the contention that SIMKE was, at the very least, guilty of contributory negligence, thus reducing the damages that SIMKE may recover, unmeritorious. Contributory negligence under Article 2179 of the Civil Code contemplates a negligent act or omission on the part of the plaintiff, which although not the proximate cause of his injury, contributed to his own damage, the proximate cause of the plaintiffs own injury being the defendants lack of due care. The court applied the test formulated in Picart v. Smith: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent man would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. Reasonable men govern their conduct by the circumstances which are before them or known to them. They are not, and are not supposed to be omniscient of the future. Hence they can be expected to take care only when there is something before them to suggest or warn of danger. Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of the course actually pursued? If so, it was the duty of the actor to take precautions to guard against the harm. Even if SIMKE had been looking where he as going, the step in question could not easily be noticed because of its construction.

Pater Familias
Corliss v. The Manila Railroad Co. No. L-21291, March 28, 1969 F: CORLISS is the widowed spouse of Ralph W. Corliss, whose jeep collided with a locomotive of Manila Railroad Co., leading to his untimely death. CORLISS filed a complaint for recovery of damages against the Manila Railroad Co. The lower court dismissed the complaint. I: Whether or not negligence may be imputed on the Manila Railroad Company, which may justify the recovery of damages by CORLISS for the death of her husband? H: No; Petition DISMISSED

R: Judge Cooley in his work on Torts (3d ed.), Sec 1324, defines negligence to be: the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. Ahern v. Oregon Telephone Co. 35 Pac 549 (1894), Negligence is want of the care required by the circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not an absolute, term and its application depends upon the situation of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances reasonably require. Where the danger is great, a high degree of care is necessary, and the failure to observe it is a want of ordinary care under the circumstances. The lower court relied on the following cases: Mestres v. Manila Electric Railroad & Light Co., and U.S. v. Manabat & Pasibi. In the Manabat case, the Court announced the following doctrine: A person in control of an automobile who crosses a railroad, even at a regular crossing, and who does not exercise that precaution and that control over it as to be able to stop the same almost immediately upon the appearance of a train, is guilty of criminal negligence, providing a collision occurs and injury results. Considering the purposes and the general methods adopted for the management of railroads and railroad trains, we think it is incumbent upon one approaching a railroad crossing to use all of his faculties of seeing and hearing. He should approach a railroad crossing cautiously and carefully. He should look and listen and do everything that a reasonably prudent man would do before he attempts to cross the track. There can be no hard and fast rule. There must be that observance of that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the situation demands. Thus defendant-appellee acted. It is undeniable then that no negligence can be rightfully imputed to it. What commends itself for acceptance is this conclusion arrived by the lower court: Predicated on the testimonies of the plaintiffs witnesses, on the knowledge of the deceased and his familiarity with the setup of the checkpoint, the existence of the tracks; and on the further fact that the locomotive had blown its siren or whistle, which was heard by said witnesses, it is clear that CORLISS, Jr. was so sufficiently warned in advance of the oncoming train that it was incumbent upon him to avoid a possible accident and this

consisted simply in stopping his vehicle before crossing and allowing the train to move on. A prudent man under similar circumstances would have acted in this manner. This, unfortunately, CORLISS Jr. did not do.

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.

II. Special Rules

Laws:
Civil Code Article 1173 The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time, and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of Articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply. Article 2180 The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father, and in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in their company. The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions. Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable. Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students to apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.

Article 2182 If a minor or insane person causing damage has no parents or guardians, the minor or insane person shall be answerable with his own property in an action against him where a guardian ad litem shall be appointed. Article 2185 Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. Article 2187 Manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs, drinks, toilet articles and similar goods shall be liable for death or injuries

Family Code
Article 221 Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company and under their parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law. Revised Penal Code Article 12 Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. the following are exempt from criminal liability: 1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval. When the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the law defines as a felony (delito), the court shall order his confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums established for persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to leave without first obtaining the permission of the same court. 2. A person under nine years of age. 3. A person over nine years of age and under fifteen, unless he has acted with discernment, in which case, such minor shall be proceeded against in accordance with the provisions of Art. 80 of this Code. When such minor is adjudged to be criminally irresponsible, the court, in conformably with the provisions of this and the preceding paragraph, shall commit him to the care and custody of his family who shall be charged with his surveillance and education otherwise, he shall be committed to the care of some institution or person mentioned in said Art. 80.

4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere accident without fault or intention of causing it. 5. Any person who acts under the compulsion of irresistible force. 6. Any person who acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury. 7. Any person who fails to perform an act required by law, when prevented by some lawful insuperable cause. Article 100 Civil Liability of a person guilty of felony. Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.

something out of the ordinary, and the mere fact that the deceased ignored the caution of a companion of the age of 8 years does not, in our opinion alter the case. But even supposing that contributory negligence could in some measure be properly imputed to the deceased, - a proposition upon which the members of the court do not all agree, - yet such negligence would not be wholly fatal to the right of action in this case, not having been the determining cause of the accident (Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil 359).
Taylor v. Manila Electric Railroad & Light Co.,

G.R. No. L-4977, March 22, 1910 F: This case stems from an action to recover damages for the loss of an eye and other injuries, instituted by David Taylor, a minor, by his father, his nearest relative. I: Whether or not Manila Electric Railroad & Light Co., leaving the caps in its premises was the proximate cause of the injuries suffered by David Taylor? H: No. Judgment AFFIRMED R: But while we hold that the entry of the plaintiff upon defendant's property without defendant's express invitation or permission would not have relieved defendant from responsibility for injuries incurred there by plaintiff, without other fault on his part, if such injury were attributable to the negligence of the defendant, we are of opinion that under all the circumstances of this case the negligence of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises was not the proximate cause of the injury received by the plaintiff, which therefore was not, properly speaking, "attributable to the negligence of the defendant," and, on the other hand, we are satisfied that plaintiffs action in cutting open the detonating cap and putting match to its contents was the proximate cause of the explosion and of the resultant injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff, and that the defendant, therefore is not civilly responsible for the injuries thus incurred. Federico Ylarde v. Edgardo Aquino, No. L-33722, July 29, 1988 F: In 1963, private respondent Mariano Soriano (PRINCIPAL SORIANO) was the principal of the Gabaldon Primary School, a public educational institution located in Tayug, Pangasinan. Private respondent Edgardo Aquino (AQUINO) was a teacher therein. At that time, Gabaldon Primary School was littered with several concrete blocks, which were acknowledged as serious hazards to the schoolchildren by another teacher by the name of Sergio Banez (BANEZ). In 1962, BANEZ started burying the huge

Cases: GOOD FATHER OF A FAMILY

Julian del Rosario v. Manila Electric Co., No. 35283, November 5, 1932 F: The charged end of a wire fell to the ground in shrubbery close to a walkway in the City of Manila. The lighting company received a phone call about this incident at 2:25p.m. and promised to send an inspector. At 4p.m. the neighboring school turned out and as children went home, one of the boys, 9 years old, touched the wire with his hand and received a shock, which resulted in death. Petitioner, Julian del Rosario (DEL ROSARIO) is the father of Alberto del Rosario, the 9-year old boy who died from the incident. DEL ROSARIO filed an action for the purpose of recovering damages. The trial court absolved Manila Electric Co. Hence, petitioners appeal. I: Whether or not the Manila Electric Co. overcame the presumption of negligence from the breakage of the wire? Whether or not Alberto del Rosario is guilty of contributory negligence, absolving Manila Electric Co. from paying damages? H: No, Manila Electric Co. did not overcome the presumption of negligence; Alberto del Rosario cannot be guilty of contributory negligence; Judgment of lower court REVERSED R: The Court is of the opinion that the presumption of negligence on the part of the company from the breakage of this wire ahs not been overcome, and the defendant is responsible for the accident. More than an hour and a half passed before anyone representing the company appeared on the scene, which resulted in Alberto del Rosarios death. Further, owing to his immature years and the natural curiosity which a child would feel to do

stones one by one. Thereafter, AQUINO, gathered eighteen of his male pupils, aged ten to eleven, after class dismissal, ordering them to dig beside a one-ton concrete block in order to make a hole wherein the stone can be buried. The work was left unfinished. The following day, also after classes, Aquino called four of the original eighteen pupils to continue digging, one of them was Novelito Ylarde. At one point, AQUINO left the children, allegedly to get some rope. Before he left, he told them not to touch the stone. Minutes after AQUINO left, the children began to playfully jump into the pit, which resulted in a concrete block falling into the hole they had dug, trapping NOVELITO inside, pinned to the wall in a standing position. Three days later, after sustaining severe injuries, NOVELITO died. Petitioners are SPS YLARDE, and parents of NOVELITO. They filed a suit for damages against AQUINO and PRINCIPAL SORIANO. The lower court dismissed the complaint by SPS YLARDE on the following grounds: 1) that the digging done by the pupils is in line with their course called Work Education; 2) that Aquino exercised the utmost diligence of a very cautious person; 3) that the demise of NOVELITO was due to his own reckless imprudence. SPS YLARDE base their action against AQUINO on Article 2176 of the Civil Code, while the complaint against PRINCIPAL SORIANO is founded on Article 2180 of the same Code. I: Whether or not under the cited provisions, both PRINCIPAL SORIANO and AQUINO can be held liable for damages? Whether or not there were acts and omissions on the part of AQUINO amounting to fault or negligence which have direct causal relation to the death of NOVELITO? H: Only AQUINO may be held liable for damages; Yes; Petition GRANTED R: The Court held that PRINCIPAL SORIANO cannot be made responsible for the death of NOVELITO. PRINCIPAL SORIANO was the head of an academic school and not a school of arts and trades. The Court cited its ruling in Amadora vs. Court of Appeals, wherein the Court thoroughly discussed the doctrine that under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, as a general rule, it is only the teacher and not the head of an academic school who should be answerable for torts committed by their students. The exception is in the case of establishments of arts and trades, it is only the head of a school, who can be held liable. Applying said doctrine, PRINCIPAL SORIANO, cannot be held liable for the reason that the school he heads is an academic school and not a school of arts and trades. Besides,

PRINCIPAL SORIANO did not give any instruction regarding the digging. From the foregoing, it can be easily seen that AQUINO can be held liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code as the teacher-in-charge of the children for being negligence in his supervision over them and his failure to take the necessary precautions to prevent any injury on their persons. From a review of the record of the case, it is very clear that AQUINO acted with fault and gross negligence when he (1) failed to avail himself of services of adult manual laborers and instead utilized his pupils aged ten to eleven to make an excavation near the oneton concrete stone which he knew to be a very hazardous task; (2) required the children to remain inside the pit even after they had finished digging, knowing that the huge block was lying nearby and could easily be pushed or kicked aside by any pupil who by chance may go to the perilous area; (3) ordered them to level the soil around the excavation when it was so apparent that the huge stone was at the brink of falling; (4) went to a place where he would not be able to check on the childrens safety; and (5) left the children close to the excavation, an obviously attractive nuisance. In ruling that the child NOVELITO was imprudent, it is evident that the lower court did not consider his age and maturity. This should not be the case. The degree of care required to be exercised must vary with the capacity of the person endangered to care for him. The standard of conduct to which a child must conform for his own protection is that degree of care ordinarily exercised by children of the same age, capacity, discretion, knowledge and experience under the same or similar circumstances. A truly careful and cautious person would have acted in all contrast to the way AQUINO did. Were it not for his gross negligence, the unfortunate incident would not have occurred and NOVELITO would have been a grown-man of thirty-five. Jarco Marketing v. CA, GR No. 129792, December 21, 1999 F: CRISELDA and ZHIENETH were at the 2nd floor of Syvels Department Store, in Makati City. CRISELDA was signing her credit card slip at the payment and verification counter when she felt a sudden gust of wind and heard a loud thud. She looked behind her and found her daughter ZHIENETH crying and screaming on the floor, pinned by the bulk of the stores gift wrapping counter/structure. ZHIENETH was rushed to Makati Medical Center. Fourteen days after the incident, on 22 May 1983, she died. She was six years old. Private respondents are the parents of ZHIENETH (THE PARENTS). Petitioner Jarco Marketing Corporation is the owner of Syvels

Department store. The stores branch manager, operations manager, and supervisor are also petitioners in this case. Petitioners will hereinafter be referred to as JARCO, et.al. THE PARENTS filed a complaint for damages against JARCO et.al.. In their answer with counterclaim, JARCO et.al, denied any liability of the injuries and consequent death of ZHIENETH. They claim that ZHIENETHs mother, CRISELDA was negligent in exercising care and diligence over her daughter. They also claim that ZHIENETH was guilty of contributory negligence, alleging that she climbed the counter, triggering its eventual collapse. JARCO et.al., also claims that the counter was made of sturdy wood with a strong support; it never fell nor collapsed for the past fifteen years since its construction. The RTC dismissed the complaint filed by the PARENTS, ruling that 1) the proximate cause of the fall of the counter on ZHIENETH was her own misbehavior; 2) CRISELDA was negligent in her care of ZHIENETH; 3) JARCO, et.al., was not negligent in the maintenance of the counter; and 4) JARCO et.al, are not liable for the death of ZHIENETH. The PARENTS appealed, asserting that ZHIENETH should be entitled to the conclusive presumption that a child below nine years old is incapable of contributory negligence. And even if ZHIENETH was already capable of contributory negligence, it was physically impossible for her to have propped herself on the counter. In addition, the PARENTS highlighted the testimony of GERARDO GONZALES, who claimed that ZHIENETH told the doctor the counter had merely fallen on her. Moreover, the parents asserted that negligence could not be imputed to CRISELDA for it was reasonable for her to have let go of ZHIENETH at the precise moment she was signing the credit card slip. The CA decided in favor of the PARENTS, it found that JARCO et.al., were negligent in maintain a structurally dangerous counter. The CA faulted JARCO et.al. for omitting their knowledge of the dangerous counter which was brought to their attention by two former employees. The CA concluded that the incident that befell ZHIENETH could have been avoided had JARCO et.al repaired the defective counter. In addition, the CA declared that ZHIENETH, who was below seven years old at the time, was absolutely incapable of negligence or other tort. I: Whether or not the death of ZHIENETH was accidental or attributable to negligence? H: Yes; Attributable to negligence of JARCO et.al.; Petition DENIED

R: The Court distinguished the difference between accident and negligence. Accident is a fortuitous circumstance, event or happening; an event happening without any human agency, or if happening wholly or partly through human agency, an event which under the circumstances is unusual or unexpected by the person to whom it happens. Negligence is the failure to observe, for the protection of the interest of another person, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury (U.S. v. Barias, 23 Phil 434, 437 [1912] citing Judge Cooleys work on Torts, 3rd ed., 1324). The test in determining the existence of negligence is enunciated in the case of Picart v. Smith, Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The Court applied the test from Picart v. Smith, and concluded that without doubt, JARCO et.al., were personally informed of the danger posed by the unstable counter. Yet, neither initiated any concrete action to remedy the situation nor ensure the safety of the stores employees and patrons as a reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have done. Thus, as confronted by the situation JARCO et.al miserably failed to discharge the due diligence required of a good father of a family. Anent the negligence imputed to ZHIENETH, the Court cited Judge Cezar S. Sangco, and applied the conclusive presumption that favors children below nine years old in that they are incapable of contributory negligence.

Experts and Professionals

Culion Ice, Fish and Electric v. PHL Motors Corp.,

G.R. No. 32611, November 3, 1930 F: The plaintiff and defendant are domestic corporations. The Philippine Motors Corporation was at this time engaged in business as an automobile agency, but, under its charter, it had authority to deal in all sorts of machinery engines and motors, as well as to build, operate, buy and sell the same and the equipment thereof. C.E. Quest, (QUEST) was at the time, the manager of Philippine Motors Corporation (PHIL MOTORS) who agreed to change the engine on the motor schooner Gwendoline, owned by Culion Ice, Fish & Electric (CULION). In the course of the preliminary work upon the carburetor and its connections, it was observed that the carburetor was flooding, and that the gasoline, or other fuel was trickling freely from the lower part of the carburetor to the floor. This fact was called to QUESTs attention, but he appeared to think lightly of the matter. During a trial run, a backfire occurred on the boat, which

caused a flame to shoot back into the carburetor and instantly the carburetor and adjacent parts were covered with a mass of flames. The wreck of the Gwendoline was sold for only P150. The value of the boat before the incident occurred was P10,000. I: Whether or not Quest is free from blame? H: No; Judgment AFFIRMED R: A study of the testimony led the Court to the conclusion that the loss of this boat was chargeable to the negligence and lack of skill of Quest. Ordinarily a backfire from an engine would not be followed by any disaster, but in this case the leak along the pipeline and the flooding of the carburetor had created a dangerous situation, which a prudent mechanic, versed in repairs of this nature, would have taken precautions to avoid. The Court reiterated that it must be remembered when a person hold himself out as being competent to do things requiring professional skill, he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular work which he attempts to do. The proof shows that QUEST had had ample experience in fixing the engines of automobiles and tractors but it does not appear that he was experienced in doing similar works on boats. QUEST did not use the skill that would have been exhibited by one ordinarily expert in repairing gasoline engines on boats. Such a person would have been sufficiently warned from the circumstances on the boat to cause him to take greater and adequate precautions against danger. The Gwendoline may be said to have resulted from accident, but this accident was in no sense an unavoidable accident. It would not have occurred but for Quests carelessness or lack of skill. As a rule, workmen who make repairs on a ship in its owners yard, or a mechanic who repairs a coach without taking it to his shop, are not bailees, and their rights and liabilities are determined by the general rules of law, under their contract. Though defendant cannot be held liable on the supposition that the burden of proof has not been sustained by it in disproving the negligence of its manager, the Court was nevertheless of the opinion that the proof shows by a clear preponderance that the accident to the Gwendoline and the damages resulting therefrom are chargeable to the negligence of lack of skill of Quest. US v. Pineda, No. 12858, January 22, 1918 F: Santiago Pineda (PINEDA) is a registered pharmacist of long standing and the owner of a drug store in the City of Manila. Feliciano Santos,

(SANTOS) having some sick horses, presented a copy of a prescription to PINEDA for potassium chlorate. Under the supervision of PINEDA, the prescription was prepared and returned to SANTOS, who gave the doses to his sick horses. The sick horses died shortly afterwards. SANTOS submitted the remaining packages from PINEDAs pharmacy to the Bureau of Science for examination. An analysis found that the packages contained not potassium chlorate but barium chlorate. Barium chlorate is a poison; potassium chlorate is not. An autopsy revealed that the death of the horses was the result of poisoning. Thereafter, two chemists from the Bureau of Science went to the PINEDAs drugstore and bought potassium chlorate, which when analyzed was also found to be barium chlorate. The lower court found in favor of SANTOS. Hence this appeal, which required a construction and an application for the first time, of the penal provisions of the Pharmacy Law. I: Whether or not accident or mistake is a defense for pharmacists? H: No; Judgment AFFIRMED R: Responsibility for the quality of drugs is fixed by section 17 of the Pharmacy Law, as mended (now Administrative Code [1917], section 751): it shall be unlawful for any persontosellany prescription, drug, chemical, medicine, or position under any fraudulent name As a pharmacist, he is made responsible for the quality of all drugs and poisons which he sells. And finally it is provided that it shall be unlawful for him to sell any drug or poison under any fraudulent name. A literal construction of fraudulent name would strip the law of at least much of its force. It would leave the innocent purchaser of drugs, who must blindly trust in the good faith and vigilance of a pharmacist, at the mercy of any unscrupulous vendor. As to the care required of a pharmacist, it is a well-settled rule that the care required must be commensurate with the danger involved, and the skill employed must correspond with the superior knowledge of that business which the law demands. The responsibility of the druggist to use care has been variously qualified as ordinary care, care of a specially high degree, the highest degree of care known to practical men. In Fleet vs. Hollenkemp, the Supreme Court of Kentucky held that for owners of drug stores, or persons engaged in vending of drugs and medicines by retail, the legal maxim applicable is caveat venditor that is to say, let him be certain that he does not sell to a purchaser or send to a patient one drug for another. If he does these things, he cannot escape civil responsibility, upon the alleged pretexts that it was

accidental or an innocent mistake. Such excuses will not avail him. Thus, in reality, for the druggist, mistake is negligence and care is no defense. The law penalizes any druggist who shall sell one drug for another whether it be through negligence of mistake. NOTE: There is no better evidence of negligence than the frequency of accidents. Fernando v. CA, G.R. No. 92087 G.R. No. 92087, May 8, 1992 F: On November 7, 1975, Bibiano Morta, market master of the Agdao Public Market filed a request with the Chief of Property of the City Treasurers Office for the re-emptying of the septic tank in Agdao. An invitation to bid was issued. Feliciano Bascon won the bid. However, on November 22, 1975, BERTULANO, who had lost the bid, was found dead with four other companions in the subject septic tank. They died due to asphyxia caused by the diminution of oxygen supply in the body working below normal conditions. The petitioners claim that Davao City is guilty of negligence for the following reasons: 1) that it has failed to clean a septic tank for the period of 19 years resulting to an accumulation of hydrogen sulfide gas which killed the laborers; 2) that a any ventilation pipe in the toilet is lacking in the septic tank; and 3) that there was a failure by the market master to supervise the area where the septic tank is located. The trial court rendered a decision, dismissing the complaint filed by parents, guardians, and spouses of those deceased. They appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the trial courts decision, granting damages to the petitioners. However, the Court of Appeals rendered an Amended Decision following the filing of separate motions for reconsideration, reversing its earlier decision. I: Whether or not Davao City is guilty of negligence in the case at bar and if so, whether or not such negligence is the immediate and proximate cause of deaths of the victims hereof? H: No; No; Judgment AFFIRMED R: The Supreme Court defined negligence as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance, which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury (Corliss v. Manila Railroad Company). The Court also defined proximate cause as that cause, which, in intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred (Vda. De. Bataclan, et.al., v. Medina, 102 Phil. 181, 186)

The Court also cited its decision in Picart v. Smith, wherein it identified the proper criterion for determining the existence of negligence: Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing the conduct or guarding against its consequences. To be entitled to damages for an injury resulting from the negligence of another, a claimant must establish the relation between the omission and the damage. He must prove under Article 2179 of the Civil Code that the defendants negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury. Further, the septic tank was constructed in 1956, since then, no accident has befallen any who have passed by or used subject septic tank, reaffirming the compliance by Davao City with the sanitary and plumbing specifications in constructing the toilet and the septic tank. The accident in the case at bar occurred because the victims on their own and without authority from Davao City opened the septic tank. An ordinarily prudent person should undoubtedly be aware of the risks. The victims are no exception; more so Mr. BERTULANO, an old hand in this kind of service, who is presumed to know the hazards of the job. In Culion Ice, Fish, and Elect. Co vs. Philippine Motors Corporation, the Court held that when a person holds himself out as being competent to do things requiring professional skill, he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular work which he attempts to do. The fatal accident in this case would not have happened but for the victims negligence.

INTOXICATION
Wright v. Manila Electric, No. 7760, October 1, 1914 F: Manila Electric R. R. & Light Co. (MANILA ELECTRIC) is a domestic corporation operating an electric street railway in Manila. Mr. WRIGHT drove home in a calesa one night and in crossing the tracks to enter his premises the horse stumbled, leaped forward, and fell, causing the vehicle to strike one of the rails with great force. The fall of the horse and the collision of the vehicle with the rails, resulting in a sudden stop, threw Mr. WRIGHT from the vehicle and caused the injuries complained of. It is undisputed that at the point where Mr. WRIGHT crossed the tracks on the night in question not only the rails were above-ground, but that the ties upon which the rails rested projected from one-third to onehalf of their depth out of the ground, thus making the

tops of the rails some 5 or 6 inches or more above the level of the street. It is admitted that MANILA ELECTRIC is negligent in maintaining its tracks as described, but it is contended by MANILA ELECTRIC that MR. WRIGHT was also negligent in that he was intoxicated to such an extent at the time of the accident that he was unable to take care of himself properly and that such intoxication was the primary cause of the accident. The trial court held that both parties were negligent but that Mr. WRIGHTs negligence was not as great as MANILA ELECTRICs. I: Whether or not Mr. WRIGHT was negligent by being intoxicated on the night in question? H: No; JUDGMENT AFFIRMED R: The Court held that mere intoxication is not negligence, nor does the mere fact of intoxication establish a want of ordinary care. It is but a circumstance to be considered with the other evidence tending to prove negligence. It is the general rule that it is immaterial whether a man is drunk or sober if no want of ordinary care or prudence can be imputed to him, and no greater degree of care is required to be exercised by an intoxicated man for his own protection than by a sober one. If ones conduct is characterized by a proper degree of care and prudence, it is immaterial whether he is drunk or sober. It is impossible to say that a sober man would not have fallen from the vehicle under the conditions described. A horse crossing the railroad tracks with not only the rails but a portion of the ties themselves aboveground, stumbling by reason of the unsure footing and falling, the vehicle crashing against the rails with such force as to break a wheel, this might be sufficient to throw a person from the vehicle no matter what his condition.

incurred civil liability, with obligation to indemnify the heirs of the murdered woman and to pay costs? H: Yes; JUDGMENT AFFIRMED R: Civil liability generally accompanies criminal liability, because every person liable criminally is also liable for reparation of damage and for indemnification for harm done; but by express provision of the penal laws there may be civil liability even when the perpetrator is held to be exempt from criminal liability. Such is the case of a lunatic or demented person who in spite of his deranged mind, is still reasonably and justly liable with his property for the consequences of his acts, even though they be performed unwittingly.

CALCULATION OF RISK
Valenzuela v. CA, GR No. 115024, February 7, 1996 F: Ma. Lourdes Valenzeula (VALENZUELA) was driving with a companion when she noticed something wrong with her tires. She thus pulled over to the side of the road, alighted from the car, and went to the rear to open the trunk. As she was standing outside of the car pointing to the tools to a man who was about to help her fix the tire, she was suddenly bumped by a 1987 Mitsubishi Lancer driven by Richard Li, (LI) the defendant in this case. VALENZUELA suffered a traumatic amputation and was confined in the hospital for twenty days and was eventually fitted with an artificial leg. LI denies that he was negligent, and claims that it was VALENZUELA who was negligent in the instant case. The trial court found LI guilty of gross negligence and liable for damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. The trial court also found Alexander Commercial Inc (ALEXANDER INC.) jointly and severally liable for damages pursuant to Article 2180. The Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the trial court, but absolved ALEXANDER INC of any liability. I: Whether or not VALENZUELA was likewise guilty of contributory negligence in parking her car alongside Aurora Blvd, which is a no parking zone? H: No; REINSTATEMENT of the JUDGMENT of the RTC R: The Court agreed with the respondent court that VALENZUELA was not guilty of contributory negligence. Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard

INSANITY
US v. Baggay 20 Phil 142 No. 6659, September 1, 1911 F: Baggay, a non-Christian, without provocation suddenly attacked Bil-liingan, with a bolo, inflicting a serious wound on her head from which she expired immediately. With the same bolo he likewise inflicted various wounds on other women, including his own mother. A complaint was filed in the court of Ilocos Sur. The same court found that Baggay was suffering from mental aberration. I: Whether or not Baggay, jr. notwithstanding that he was held exempt from criminal liability, has nevertheless

to which he is required to conform for his own protection. Courts have traditionally been compelled to recognize that an actor who is confronted with an emergency is not to be held up to the standard of conduct normally applied to an individual who is in no such situation. Under the emergency rule adopted by this Court in Gan v. Court of Appeals, an individual who suddenly find himself in a situation of danger and is required to act without much time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence. As to the liability of LIs employer, ALEXANDER INC, the Court held that the same is jointly and severally liable for damages caused. The relationship in question is based on the principle of pater familias. The primaruy liability under the concept of pater familias embodied by Art 2180 (in relation to Art 2176) of the Civil Code is quasi-delictual or tortious in character. It is customary for large companies to provide certain classes of their employees with courtesy vehicles. In other words, like a good father of a family, they entrust the company vehicle only after they are satisfied that the employee to whom the car has been given full use of the said company are for company or private purposes will not be a threat or menace to himself, the company, or to others. In the instant case, LI was assigned a service car by ALEXANDER INC. And the Court determined that ALEXANDER INC did not demonstrate to their satisfaction that it exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in entrusting its company car to LI. The Court agreed with the respondent court that the relationship in question is based not on the principle of respondeat superior, which holds the master liable for acts of the servant, but that of pater familias, in which the liability ultimately falls upon the employer, for his failure to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of his employees. It is only up that point however, that the agreement with the respondent court ends. Utilizing the bonus pater familias standard expressed in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the Court is of the opinion that ALEXANDER INC is jointly and solidarily liable for the damage caused by the accident. The employers liability under the concept of pater familias embodied by Article 2180 (in relation to Art. 2176) of the Civil Code is quasi-delictual or tortious in character. His liability is relieved on a showing that he exercised the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of its employees. Once evidence is introduced showing that the employer exercised the required amount of care in selecting its employees, half of the employers burden is overcome.

The question of diligent supervision however depends on the circumstances of employment. Ordinarily, evidence demonstrating that the employer has exercised diligent supervision of its employee during the performance of the latters assigned tasks would be enough to relieve him of the liability imposed by Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code. The employer is not expected to exercise supervision over either the employees private activities or during the performance of other tasks either unsanctioned by the former or unrelated to the employees tasks. The case at bench presents a situation of a different character, involving a practice utilized by large companies with either their employees of managerial rank or their representatives. It is customary for large companies to provide certain classes of their employees with courtesy vehicles. In other words, like a good father of a family, they entrust the company vehicle only after they are satisfied that the employee to whom the car has been given full use of the said company car for company or private purposes will not be a threat or menace to himself, the company, or to others. When a company gives full use and enjoyment of a company car to its employee, it in effect guarantees that it is, like every good father, satisfied that its employee will use the privilege reasonably and responsively. Since most important business transactions and decisions may occur at all hours in all sorts of situations and under all kinds of guises, the provision for unlimited use of a company car therefore principally serves the business and goodwill of a company and only incidentally the private purposes of the individual who actually uses the car, the managerial employee or company sales agent. A company owes a responsibility then to the public to see to it that the managerial or other employees to whom it entrusts virtually unlimited use of a company issued car are able to use the company issue capably and responsibly. The service car enabled Li to perform work outside the office. ALEXANDER INC has not demonstrated to the Courts satisfaction, that it exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in entrusting its company car to Li.

III. Degrees of Negligence

Civil Code Article 2231. In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence.

Marinduque v. Workmens Compensation No. L-8110, June 30, 1956 F: Marinduque Iron Mines Agents, Inc (MARINDUQUE) questions the order of the Workmens Compensation Commissioner confirming the award of compensation to the heirs of Pedro Mamador (MAMADOR) for his accidental death. MAMADOR was a laborer of MARINDUQUE, who boarded one of its trucks, driven by Procopio Macunat, (MACUNAT) with other laborers. While trying to overtake another truck on the company road, it turned over and hit a coconut tree, resulting the death of MAMADOR and injury to others. MACUNAT was prosecuted, convicted and sentenced to indemnify the heirs of the deceased. MARINDUQUE challenges the validity of the order on two grounds: 1) that it had not been given the opportunity to cross-examine the opposing witnesses; and 2) that the claim is barred by Section 6 of the Workmens Compensation Law, because (a) Macunat was prosecution and required to indemnify the heirs of the deceased and (b) an amicable settlement was concluded between said heirs and Macunat. MARINDUQUE also claims that it was the laborers notorious negligence that led to his untimely death with precludes his heirs from recovery of damages. MARINDUQUE claims that the criminal case and its outcome constituted an election by the employee (or his heirs) to sue the third person, such election having the effect of releasing the employer. I: Whether or not the outcome of the criminal case released the employer from liability? H: No; Petition Dismissed R: The criminal case was not a suit for damages against the third person, it being alleged, without contradiction that the heirs did not intervene therein and have not so far received the indemnity ordered by the court. The Court reiterated its previous decision in Nava v. Inchausti Co. 57 Phil 751, that the indemnity granted the heirs in a criminal prosecution of the other person does not affect the liability of the employer to pay compensation (Balajadia v. Province of Iloilo, G.R. No. 41979, October 1934).

As to the amicable settlement the court finds that the widow did not promise to waive the civil action for damages, nor could she bind the other heirs of the deceased. The Commission has not declared that the employers prohibition against laborers riding haulage trucks was known to MAMADOR. The employer does not point out evidence to that effect. There is no doubt that mere riding a haulage truck or stealing a ride thereon is not negligence, ordinarily. Nevertheless, even granting there was negligence, it surely was not notorious negligence, which we have interpreted to mean the same thing as gross negligence implying conscious indifference to consequences pursuing a course of conduct which would naturally and probably result in injury utter disregard of consequences (38 Am. Jur., 691). Getting or accepting a free ride on the companys haulage truck couldnt be gross negligence, because as the referee found, no danger or risk was apparent. Benguet Electric Cooperative Inc. v. CA G.R. No. 127326, December 23, 1999 F: Jose Bernardo (J BERNARDO), a meat vendor, went out of his stall to meet a jeepney loaded with slaughtered pigs in order to select the meat to sell for the day. J BERNARDO was the first to reach the jeep, and grasping the handlebars, he suddenly stiffened and trembled. The other vendors rushed to J BERNARDO, discovering that the antenna of the jeepney had gotten entangled with an open electric wire at the top of the roof of a meat stall. J BERNARDO died shortly in the hospital. The HEIRS OF BERNARDO filed a complaint against BENECO before the RTC. BENECO filed a third-party complaint against the jeepney owner, Guillerma Canave, Jr. (CANAVE). The trial court found in favor of the HEIRS OF BERNARDO. BENECO contends that the electrocution and death of J BERNARDO were directly attributed to the fault and negligence of CANAVE. BENECO also claims that the amount of damages awarded by the respondent court is improper. Finally, BENECO alleges that exemplary damages should not be awarded because the amount was not specified in the body nor the complaint, in contravention of Rule 11 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines implementing B.P. 129.

I: Whether or not exemplary damages were properly awarded to the HEIRS OF BENECO? H: Yes; JUDGMENT MODIFICATION AFFIRMED with

R: There is no question that as an electric cooperative holding the exclusive franchise in supplying electric power to the towns of Benguet province, its primordial concern is not only to distribute electricity to its subscribers but also to ensure the safety of the public by the proper maintenance and upkeep of its facilities. It is clear to the Court that BENECO was grossly negligent in leaving unprotected and uninsulated the splicing point between the service drop line and the service entrance conductor, which connection was in violation of the Philippine Electrical Code. By leaving an open live wire unattended for years, BENECO demonstrated its utter disregard for the safety of the public. Indeed, J BERNARDOs death was an accident that was bound to happen in view of the gross negligence of BENECO. CANAVE was well within his right to park the vehicle in said area where there was no showing that any municipal law or ordinance was violated nor that there was any foreseeable danger posed by his act. As to the award for net loss income, the Court followed the ruling in Villa Rey Transit v. Court of Appeals and Davila v. PAL. Accordingly, in determining the indemnity for the loss of earning capacity, the Court multiplied the life expectancy of the deceased as reduced to 25 years by the annual net income of P27,000 which gives us P675,000. (Net Earning Capacity = Life Expectancy x Gross Annual Income Necessary Living Expenses). Lastly, as to BENECOs contention that exemplary damages should not be awarded, the same deserves no merit. The amount of exemplary damages need not be pleaded in the complaint because the same cannot be predetermined. One can merely ask that it be fixed by the court as the evidence may warrant and be awarded at its own discretion. In fact, the amount of exemplary damages need not be proved because it is contingent upon or incidental to the amount of compensatory damages that may be awarded to the claimant. The Court declared that it was not aware of the principle laid down in Tacay v. RTC Tagum, where the trial court was ordered to either expunge the unspecified claim for exemplary damages or

allow the private respondent to amend the complaint within a reasonable time and specify the amount thereof and then pay the corresponding docket fees. However, the Court preferred not to expunge the claim for exemplary damages and pursue the Tacay lead, for to delete the claim for exemplary damages would be to give premium to BENECOs gross nelgience while to order the amendment of the complaint would be to unjustly delay the proceedings and prolong further the almost fifteen-year agony of the intended beneficiaries. Exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. It is awarded as a deterrent to socially deleterious actions. In quasi-delict, exemplary damages are awarded when the act or omission, which caused injury is attended by gross negligence. Gross negligence has been defined as negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to consequences in so far as other persons may be affected. In this case, there is a clear showing of BENECOs gross negligence. The Court finds no reason to disturb the finding of the respondent court awarding exemplary damages to the HEIRS OF BERNARDO in the amount of P20,000.

IV. Proof of Negligence

Burden of Proof
Rules of Court RULE 131 Section 1. Burden of proof. Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law.

Res Ipsa Loquitur

Perla Compania De Seguros, Inc, et.al. v. Sarangaya III,

G.R. No. 147746, October 25, 2005 F: SPS Sarangaya lease out a commercial building in front of their residential home. One of the tenants

in the commercial building is Perla Compania De Seguros, Inc (PERLA INC). Bienvenido Pascual, (PASCUAL), the branch manager of PERLA INC entered into a contract of lease with SPS SARANGAYA. The right side of office was used by PASCUAL as a garage for a 1981 model 4 door Ford Cortina, a company-provided vehicle he used in covering the different towns within his area of supervision. On July 7, 1988, PASCUAL decided to warm up the car, which eventually led to a small flame coming out of the engine and ultimately destroyed the garage, the residential home of SPS SARANGAYA, and the furniture therein. A criminal complaint was filed against PASCUAL, which was eventually withdrawn. SPS SARANGAYA filed a civil complaint based on quasi-delict against PERLA INC, alleging that PASCUAL had acted with gross negligence while PERLA INC lacked the required diligence in the selection and supervision of PASCUAL as its employee. PASCUAL insists that the fire was accidental, or caso fortuito, hence he is not liable for damages. PERLA INC claims it exercised due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of PASCUAL as its branch manager. The trial court ordered in favor of SPS SARANGAYA and declared PERLA INC jointly and solidarily liable with PASCUAL. The trial court insisted that although SPS SARANGAYA failed to prove the precise cause of the fire that engulfed the garage, PASCUAL was nevertheless negligent based on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts decision with modification of the amount of damages. Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally mans the thing or transaction speaks for itself. It relates to the fact of an injury that sets out an inference to the cause thereof or establishes the plaintiffs prima facie case. The facts of the occurrence warrant the supposition of negligence and they furnish circumstantial evidence of negligence when direct evidence is lacking. The doctrine is based on the theory that the defendant either knows the cause of the accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it and the plaintiff, having no knowledge thereof, is compelled to allege negligence in general terms. In such instance, the plaintiff relies on proof of the happening of the accident alone to establish negligence. The doctrine provides a means by which a plaintiff can pin

liability on a defendant who, if innocent, should be able to explain the care he exercised to prevent the incident complained of. Thus, it is the defendants responsibility to show that there was no negligence on his part. To sustain the allegation of negligence based on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the following requisites must concur: 1) the accident is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; 2) the cause of the injury was under the exclusive control of the person in charge and 3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured Under the first requisite, ordinary refers to the usual course of events. Flames spewing out of a car engine when it is switched on is obviously not a normal event. The test in determining the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: did the defendant in committing the alleged negligent act use reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person in the same situation would have employed? If not, then he is guilty of negligence (Picart v. Smith). A prudent man should have known that a 14 year old car, constantly used in provincial trips, was definitely prone to damage and other defects. For failing to prove care and diligent in the maintenance of the vehicle, the necessary inference was that PASCUAL has been negligent in the upkeep of the car. As to the second requisite, being its caretaker, PASCUAL alone had the responsibility to maintain it and ensure its proper functioning. Where the circumstances which caused the accident are shown to have been under the management or control of a certain person, and in the normal course of events, the incident would not have happened had that person used proper care, the inference is that it occurred because of lack of such care. Finally, as to the third requisite, there is nothing in the records to show that SPS SARANGAYA contributed to the incident. They had no access to the car, and had no responsibility regarding its maintenance even if it was parked in a building they owned.

Macalinao v. Ong G.R. No. 146635, December 14, 2005 F: MACALINAO and ONG were employed at GENETRON, owned and operated by respondent SEBASTIAN. SEBASTIAN instructed MACALINAO and ONG to deliver a heavy piece of machinery to a manufacturing plant in Bulacan. While on the way, the vehicle, driven by ONG, bumped the front portion of a jeepney. The collision resulted in physical injuries of the passengers, and eventually led to the death of MACALINAO. Before his death, however, MACALINAO filed an action for damages against ONG and SEBASTIAN before the RTC. After his death, his parents substituted him in the action. The RTC declared ONG negligent and SEBASTIAN jointly liable. The appellate court reversed the findings of the trial court. I: Whether or not there is a sufficiency of evidence presented to support a finding of negligence against Ong? H: Yes; Petition GRANTED R: Contrary to the conclusion of the Court of Appeals, the evidence on record, coupled with the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur sufficiently establishes ONGs negligence. Photographs of the accident coupled with the information provided in the police blotter are admissible and considered in the absence of competent evidence to refute the facts stated therein. While not constituting direct proof of ONGs negligence, the foregoing pieces of evidence justify the application of res ipsa loquitur, a Latin phrase which literally means the thing or the transaction speaks for itself. The doctrine can be invoked only when under the circumstances, direct evidence is absent and not readily available. The inference which the doctrine permits is grounded upon the fact that the chief evidence of the true cause, whether culpable or innocent is practically accessible to the defendant but inaccessible to the injured person. The following are the requisites for the application of res ipsa loquitur: 1) the accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someones negligence;

2) it is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or defendants; and 3) The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated The Court is convinced that all the above requisites are present in the case at bar. No two motor vehicles traversing opposite lanes will collide as a matter of course unless someone is negligent, thus the first requisite is present. Driving the Isuzu truck gave Ong exclusive management and control over it, a fact which shows that the second requisite is also present. No contributory negligence could be attributed to MACALINAO relative to the happening of the accident since he was merely a passenger in the truck. The last requisite is therefore, also present. There exists a fourth requisite under American jurisprudence, that is, that the defendant fails to offer any explanation tending to show that the injury was caused by his or her want of due care. No evidence was proffered to substantiate that ONG drove cautiously and prudently at the time of the incident. Thus, even this requisite is fulfilled. With all the requisites of the applicability of res ipsa loquitur present, the burden of proving due care at the time in question shifts to ONG and SEBASTIAN. This burden, ONG and SEBASTIAN failed to meet. As a consequence, the prima facie finding of negligence against ONG remaining unexplained/uncontradicted is deemed established. ONG is liable to MACALINAO, and SEBASTIAN is jointly liable. Capili v. Cardaa G.R. No. 157906, November 2, 2006 F: Jasmin Cardaa was walking along the perimeter fence of the San Roque Elementary School when a branch of a tree located within the schools premises fell on her, causing her instantaneous death. Her parents, (THE PARENTS) filed a case for damages before the RTC. A year before, a resident of the barangay had reported on the possible danger the tree posed to passersby. THE PARENTS aver that CAPILIs gross negligence and lack of foresight caused the death of their daughter. CAPILI denied knowing that the tree was dead and rotting.

The trial court dismissed the complaint for failure of the PARENTS to establish the negligence of CAPILI. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision and found CAPILI liable for JASMINs death. I: Whether or not CAPILI is negligent and liable for the death of JASMIN? H: Yes; Petition DENIED R: A negligent act is one from which an ordinary prudent person in the actors position, in the same or similar circumstances, would foresee such an appreciable risk of harm to others as to cause him not to do the act or to do it in a more careful manner. The probability that the branches of a dead and rotting tree could fall and harm someone is clearly a danger that is foreseeable. As the school principal, CAPILI was tasked to see that the maintenance of the school grounds and safety of the children within the school and its premises. That she was unaware of the rotten state of the tree whose falling branch had caused the death of a child speaks ill of her discharge of the responsibility of her position. In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, plaintiff has to prove by the preponderance of the evidence: 1) the damages suffered by the plaintiff; 2) the fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person for whose act he must respond; and 3) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence and the damages incurred. The fact however, that JASMIN died as a result of the dead and rotting tree within the schools premises shows that the tree was indeed an obvious danger to anyone passing by and calls for application of the principle of res ipsa loquitur. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies where (1) the accident was of such a character as to warrant a presumption or inference that it would not have happened except for the defendants negligence; (2) the accident must have been caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive management or control of the person charged with the negligence complained of; and (3) the accident must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured. The effect of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, is to warrant a presumption or inference that the mere falling of the branch of the dead and

rotting tree which caused the death of JASMIN was a result of CAPILIs negligence, being in charge of the school. The Court cited D.M. Consunji, Inc v. Court of Appeals, wherein it held As a rule of evidence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. The procedural effect of the doctrine is that petitioners negligence is presumed once respondents established the requisites for the doctrine to apply. Once respondents made out a prima facie case of all the requisites, the burden shifts to the petitioner to explain. The presumption or inference may be rebutted or overcome by other evidence and, under appropriate circumstances a disputable presumption such as that of due care or innocence may outweigh the inference. CAPILI fails to outweigh the inference of negligence in this case. Professional Services, Inc v. Agana G.R. No. 126297, January 31, 2007 F: Natividad Agana was rushed to the Medical City Hospital. Dr. Ampil performed an anterior resection surgery. Dr. Ampil called on Dr. Fuentes to perform a hysterectomy, after which Dr. Ampil completed the operation and closed the incision. However, the operation was flawed two pieces of gauze were left in her body, which eventually led to her death. Natividad Agana had filed a complaint for damages and was substituted by her children after her death. The trial court ruled in favor of Agana. The Court of Appeals however, modified the decision by releasing Dr. Fuentes from liability. HEIRS of AGANA maintain that the Court of Appeals erred in finding that Dr. Fuentes is not guilty of negligence or medical malpractice, invoking the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. They contend that the pieces of gauze are prima facie proof that the operating surgeons have been negligent. I: Whether or not Dr. Fuentes is liable through the application of res ipsa loquitur? H: Yes; Petition DENIED

R: The requisites for the applicability of res ipsa loquitur are: 1) the occurrence of an injury; 2) the thing which caused the injury was under the control and management of the defendant, 3) the occurrence was such that in the ordinary course of things, would not have happened if those who had control or management used proper care; and 4) the absence of explanation by the defendant. Of the foregoing requites, the most instrumental is the control and management of the thing which caused the injury. The Court found the element of control and management of the thing which caused the injury to be wanting. Hence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur will not lie. It was duly established that Dr. Ampil was the lead surgeon during the operation of Natividad Agana. Dr. Ampil examined the work of Dr. Fuentes, and finding everything to be in order, allowed Dr. Fuentes to leave the operating room. Dr. Ampil then directed the incision to be closed. Under the Captain of the Ship rule, the operating surgeon is the person in complete charge of the surgery room and all personnel connected with the operation. Their duty is to obey his orders. To our mind, it was this act of the closure of the incision notwithstanding that two pieces of gauze remained unaccounted for, that caused injury to Natividads body. Clearly, the control and management of the thing which caused the injury was in the hands of Dr. Ampil, not Dr. Fuentes. In this jurisdiction, res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of substantive law, hence, does not per se create or constitute an independent or separate ground of liability, being a mere evidentiary rule. IN other words, mere invocation and application of the doctrine does not dispense with the requirement of proof of negligence. Here, the negligence was proven to have been committed by Dr. Ampil and not by Dr. Fuentes.

of the front tires burst and the vehicle began to zigzag until it fell into a canal or ditch on the right side of the road and turned turtle. The vehicle was speeding at the time. After half an hour, about ten men, one of them carrying a lighted torch made of bamboo with a wick on one end, evidently fueled with petroleum approached the overturned bus, and almost immediately a fierce fire started. Juan Bataclan was one of the four passengers who died in the fire. Vda De Bataclan instituted the present suit to recover damages from Mariano Medina. The trial court was of the opinion that the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was the fire and not the overturning of the bus. Damages were not awarded for his death but for his injuries. I: Whether or not the proximate cause of Juan Bataclans death was the negligence of Mariano Medina and Conrado Saylon? H: Yes; Petition Granted; Award Increased R: The proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom (Vol 38, pages 695-696, of American Jurisprudence). In the present case and under the circumstances, the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was the overturning of the bus, this for the reason that when the vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help, made not only by the passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the conductor themselves and that because it was very dark, the rescuers had to carry a light with them; and coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not available, they had to use a torch, the most handy and available; and what was

V. Causation
1) Definition of Proximate Cause Vda De Bataclan, et al. v. Medina G.R. No. L-10126, October 22, 1957 F: Conrado Saylon is a driver of a bus owned and operated by Mariano Medina. One night, as SAYLON was driving towards Pasay City with eighteen passengers, including Juan Bataclan, one

more natural than that said rescuers should innocently approach the overturned vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from them. In other words, the coming of the men with the torch was to be expected and was a natural sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the call for outside help. Urbano v. IAC No. L-72964, January 7, 1988 F: On October 23, a quarrel ensued between Urbano and Marcelo Javier. Urbano unsheathed his bolo and hacked Javier hitting him on the right palm of his hand, which was used in parrying the bolo hack. Javier was brought and treated by Dr. Guillerma Padilla who conducted a medico-legal examination. Upon the intercession of Councilman Solis, Urbano and Javier agreed to settle their differences. On November 14, Javier was rushed to the hospital in a very serious condition. The Doctor there found that he was suffering from tetanus toxin. The presence of a healing wound in Javiers palm could have been infected by tetanus. On November 15, Javier died. I: Whether or not the proximate cause of Javiers death was Urbanos hacking of Javiers palm? H: No; Petition Granted R: The Court applied the definition of proximate cause as supplied in Vda. De Bataclan v. Medina, which is that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. The Court looked into the nature of tetanus. In the case at bar, Javier suffered a 2 inch incised wound on his right palm when he parried the bolo which Urbano used in hacking him. This incident took place on October 23, 1980. After 22 days, or on November 14, 1980 he suffered the symptoms of tetanus, like lockjaw and muscle spasms. The following day, November 15, 1980, he died. If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by Urbano was already infected by tetanus germs at the time, ti is more medically probable that Javier should have been infected with only a mild cause of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the

22nd day after the hacking incident or more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset time should have been more than six days. Javier, however, died on the second day from the onset time. The more credible conclusion is at the time Javiers wound was inflicted, the severe form of tetanus was not yet present. Considering the circumstances of Javiers death, his wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died. The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused (People v. Cardenas). The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or btween the time Javier was wounded to the time of this death. The infection was therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime (People v. Rellin, 77 Phil 1038). There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may hve been the proximate cause of Javiers death with which URBANO had nothing to do. The Court stresses, however, that its discussion of proximate cause and remote cause is limited to the criminal aspects of this rather unusual case. It does not necessarily follow that URBANO is also free from civil liability. Phoenix Construction, Inc. v. IAC G.R. No. L-65295, March 10, 1987 F: Private respondent, DIONISIO was driving his car home. A collision occurred between his car and a dump truck, which he had not seen because his headlights were off, and because the dump truck, driven by CARBONEL and owned by Phoenix Construction Inc. (PHOENIX) was parked askew in such a manner as to stick out onto the street. DIONISIO commenced an action for damages in the Court of First Instance, claiming that the legal and proximate cause of his injuries was the negligent manner in which CARBONEL had parked the dump truck entrusted to him by his employer, PHOENIX. PHOENIX and CARBONEL counter that the proximate cause of DIONISIOs injuries was his own recklessness in driving fast at the time of the accident, while under the influence of liquor, without his headlights on and without a curfew pass. PHOENIX also sought to establish that

it had exercised due care in the selection and supervision of the dump truck driver. The trial court decided in favor of DIONISIO. The IAC affirmed the decision of the trial court but modified the award of damages. I: Whether or not the proximate cause of DIONISIOs injuries was the negligence of the dump truck driver and his employer? H: Yes; Decision AFFIRMED and MODIFIED R: The Court agreed with the lower courts that the legal and proximate cause of the accident and of DIONISIOs injuries was the wrongful and negligent manner in which the dump truck was parked in other words, the negligence of CARBONEL. The collision of DIONISIOs car with the dump truck was natural and foreseeable consequence of the truck drivers negligence. The petitioners urge that the truck drivers negligence was merely a passive and static condition and that DIONISIOs negligence was an efficient intervening cause. However, the Court struck down this argument by establishing that first, even in the U.S., the distinctions between cause and condition have almost entirely been discredited. Secondly, the truck drivers negligence far from being a passive and static condition was rather an indispensable and efficient cause. The improper parking of the dump truck created an unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down General Lacuna Street and for having so created this risk, the truck driver must be held responsible. DIONISIOs actions were no more than a foreseeable consequence of the risk created by the negligent manner in which the truck driver had parked the dump truck. In other words, CARBONEL owed a duty to DIONISIO and others similarly situated not to impose upon them the very risk the truck driver had created. According to Prosser and Keeton: Foreseeable Intervening Causes: If the intervening cause is one which in ordinary human experience is reasonably to be anticipated or one which the defendant has reason to anticipate under the particular circumstances, the defendant may be negligent, among other reasons because of failure to guard against it; or the defendant may be negligent only for that reason. In all of these cases there is an intervening cause combining with the defendants conduct to produce the result, and in each case the

defendants negligence consists in failure to protect the plaintiff against that very risk. Obviously, the defendant cannot be relieved from liability by the fact that the risk or a substantial and important part of the risk, to which the defendant has subjected the plaintiff has indeed come to pass. Foreseeable intervening forces are within the scope of the original risk, and hence of the defendants negligence. As to DIONISIOs negligence, the Court held the same to be only contributory and that consequently respondent DIONISIO may recover damages though the same are subject to mitigation by the Courts (Article 2179, Civil Code of the Philippines). Quezon City Government v. Dacara G.R. No. 150304, June 15, 2005 F: DACARA, while driving his car, rammed into a pile of earth/street diggings found at Matahimik St., Quezon City, which was then being repaired by the Quezon City government. As a result, DACARA allegedly sustained bodily injuries and the vehicle suffered extensive damage for it turned turtle when it hit the pile of earth. DACARA sought indemnification from the city government, which yielded negative results. Thereafter, through his father, he filed a complaint for damages. The RTC found in favor of DACARA. The CA affirmed the RTCs decision. I: Whether or not negligence of the Quezon City government was the proximate cause of the incident? H: Yes; Petition PARTLY GRANTED R: Proximate cause is defined as any cause that produces injury in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, such that the result would not have occurred otherwise. Proximate cause is determined from the facts of each case, upon a combined consideration of logic, common sense, policy, and precedent. The RTC and the CA are in unanimity that the proximate cause was the Quezon City governments negligence. The Quezon City government has not sufficiently demonstrated any special circumstances to justify a factual review of the case. The lower courts findings are quoted thus: nary a lighting device or a reflectorized

barricade or sign perhaps which could have served as an adequate warning to motorist especially during the thick of the night where darkness is pervasive none was ever presented to stress the point that sufficient and adequate precautionary signs were placed at Matahimik Street. None was found at the scene of the accident. The provisions of Article 2189 of the Civil Code capsulizes the responsibility of the city government relative to the maintenance of roads and bridges since it exercises the control and supervision over the same. 2) DISTINGUISHED FROM OTHER KINDS

of the first two would not have produced this result without the negligence of Sabido and Lagunda. The rule is that according to the great weight of authority, where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omission of two or more persons, although acting independently of each other, are in combination, the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, and it is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury, either is responsible for the whole injury, even though his act alone might not have caused the entire injury, or the same damage might have resulted from the acts of the other tortfeasor. (38 Am Jr 946, 947). SEE ANNOTATION ON PROXIMATE CAUSE

a) REMOTE 3) LAST CLEAR CHANCE SEE Urbano v. IAC b) CONCURRENT Sabido and Lagunda v. Custodio, et.al. G.R. No. L-21512, August 31, 1966 F: Two trucks, one driven by Nicasio Mudales and belonging to Laguna-Tayabs Bus Company, and the other driven by Aser Lagunda and owned by Prospero Sabido, going in opposite directions met each other in a road curve. Both drivers must have driven their trucks not in the proper lane and are, therefore, both reckless and negligent. The Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeals concluded that Laguna-Tayabas Bus Co and its driver Mudales, had violated the contract of carriage with Agripino Custudio, who died as a result of the trucks side-swiping each other. Whereas Sabido and Lagunda are guilty of a quasidelict, by reason of which all of them were held solidarily liable. I: Whether or not the proximate cause was the concurrent negligence of Laguna-Tayabas Bus Co and its driver and Sabido and Lagunda? H: Yes; Petition R: Although the negligence of the carrier and its driver is independent, in its execution, of the negligence of the truck driver and its owner, both acts of negligence are the proximate cause of the death of Agripino Custodio. In fact, the negligence Anuran v. Buno G.R. Nos. L-21353, May 20, 1966 F: A motor truck speeding alone, negligently bumped a parked jeepney from behind, with such violence that three of its passengers died, even as two others suffered injuries. Representatives of the dead and injured filed actions for damages against the driver and the owners of the truck and also against the driver and the owners of the jeepney. The CFI absolved the driver of the jeepney and its owners but required the truck drivers and owners to make compensation. The Appellate Court considered the truck driver guilty of greater negligence, even though the jeepney was overloaded and parked in such a way that one-half of its width was on the pavement of the road and the other half on the right shoulder. The Appellate Court applied the doctrine of last clear chance I: Whether or not the last clear chance doctrine is applicable in the case at bar? H: No. An error of law was committed in releasing the jeepney from liability. Decision MODIFIED R: Application of principle of last clear chance applies in a suit between the owners and drivers of two colliding vehicles. It does not apply where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligation. It would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver and his

employer on the ground that the other driver was also negligent. The last clear chance rule is tied up with the rule on contributory negligence (Art. 2179 of the New Civil Code). Where both parties are guilty of negligence, but the negligent act of one succeeds that of the other by an appreciable interval of time, the one who has the last reasonable opportunity to avoid the impending harm and fails to do is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party (Picart v. Smith). In other words, the negligence of the claimant does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of the defendant, where it appears that the latter, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to the claimant, notwithstanding his negligence (Ong v. Metropolitan Water District). The Anuran case applies the general rule on contributory negligence, not the last clear chance rule. Pantranco North Express, Inc v. Baesa G.R. Nos. 79050-51, November 14, 1989 I: Whether or not doctrine of last clear chance is applicable in the case at bar? H: No; Petition is DENIED R: The doctrine of the last clear chance was defined by this Court in Ong v. Metropolitan Water District: The doctrine of the last clear chance simply, means that the negligence of a claimant does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it appears that the latter, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to claimant notwithstanding his negligence. The doctrine applies only in a situation where the plaintiff was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence but the defendant who had the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is made liable for all the consequences of the accident notwithstanding the prior negligence of the plaintiff (Picart v. Smith). The subsequent negligence of the defendant in failing to exercise ordinary care to avoid injury to plaintiff becomes the immediate or proximate cause of the accident which intervenes between the accident and the

remote negligence of the plaintiff, thus making the defendant liable to the plaintiff (Picart v. Smith). Generally, the last clear chance doctrine is invoked for the purpose of making a defendant liable to a plaintiff who was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence, although it may also be raised as a defense to defeat a claim for damages. The doctrine of last clear chance finds no application in this case. For the doctrine to be applicable, it is necessary to show that the person who allegedly had the last opportunity to avert the accident was aware of the existence of the peril or should, with exercise of due care, have been aware of it. One cannot be expected to avoid an accident or injury if he does not know or could not have known the existence of the peril. There is nothing to show that the jeepney driver knew of the impending danger. This Court has held that the last clear chance doctrine can never apply where the party charged is required to act instantaneously and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have been discovered (Ong v. Metropolitan Water District). The Court finds that the negligence of PANTRANCOs driver in encroaching into the lane of the incoming jeepney and in failing to return the bus to its own lane immediately upon seeing the jeepney coming from the opposite direction as the sole and proximate cause of the accident without which the collision would not have occurred. Bustamante v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 89880, February 6, 1991 F: I: Whether or not the last clear chance doctrine is applicable in this case? H: No. The liability of the two drivers for their negligence must be solidary. Decision of Trial Court REINSTATED R: The last clear chance doctrine broadly states that the negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it appears that the defendant, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiffs negligence. In other

words, even though a persons own acts placed him in a position of peril, and an injury results, the injured person is entitled to recovery. As the doctrine is usually stated, a person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent or that of a third person imputed to the opponent is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident. The doctrine does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence. It cannot be extended into the field of joint tortfeasors as a test of whether only one of them should be held liable to the injured person by reason of his discovery of the latters peril and it cannot be involved as between defendants concurrently negligent. As against third persons, a negligent actor cannot defend by pleading that another had negligently failed to take action, which could have avoided injury. Respondent Court committed an error of law in applying the last clear chance doctrine as between the defendants, since the case at bar is not a suit between the owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles but a suit brought by the heirs of the deceased passengers against both owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles. Therefore, the respondent court erred in absolving the owner and driver of the cargo truck from liability. Philippine Bank of Commerce v. CA G.R. No. 97626, March 14, 1997 F: I: H: Decision MODIFIED; reducing the amount of actual damages, private respondent is entitled to by 40%. R: Under the doctrine of Last Clear Chance (also referred to as supervening negligence or as discovered peril), petitioner bank was indeed the culpable party. This doctrine, in essence, states that where both parties are negligent, but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in time than that of the other, or when it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence should be attributed to the

incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is chargeable with the consequences thereof. Stated differently, the rule would also mean that an antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude the recovery of damages for the supervening negligence of or bar a defense against liability sought by another, if the latter, who had the last fair chance, could have avoided the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence. Here, assuming that the private respondent RMC was negligent in entrusting cash to a dishonest employee, thus providing the latter with the opportunity to defraud the company, as advanced by the petitioner, yet it cannot be denied that the petitioner bank, thru its teller, had the last clear opportunity to avert the injury incurred by its client simply by faithfully observing their self-imposed validation procedure. Canlas v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 112160, February 28, 2000 F: I: H: Petition GRANTED R: The rule is that the antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude the recovery of damages caused by the supervening negligence of the latter, who had the last fair chance to prevent the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence. Under the doctrine of last clear chance, which is applicable here, the respondent bank must suffer the resulting loss. Assuming that Osmundo Canlas was negligent in giving Vicente Manosca the opportunity to perpetrate the fraud, by entrusting to latter the owners copy of the transfer certificates of title of subject parcels of land, it cannot be denied that the bank had the last clear chance to prevent the fraud by the simple expedient of faithfully complying with the requirements for banks to ascertain the identify of the persons transacting with them. For not observing the degree of diligence required of banking institutions, whose business is impressed with public interest, respondent has to bear the loss sued upon. Engada v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 140698, June 20, 2003

F: I: H: Petition DENIED R: The doctrine of last clear chance states that a person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident. But as already stated on this point, no convincing evidence was adduced by ENGADA to support his invocation of the above-cited doctrine. Instead, what has been shown is the presence of an emergency and the proper application of the emergency rule. ENGADAs act of swerving to the Tamaraws lane at distance of 30 metters from it and driving the Isuzu pick-up at a fast speed as it approached the Tamaraw denied IRAN time and opportunity to ponder the situation at all. There was no clear chance to speak of. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals did not err in holding ENGADA responsible for the vehiclur collision and the resulting damages.

I: Whether or not the proximate cause of Magnos death was out of his own negligence? H: Yes; Complaint DISMISSED R: The Court was inclined to agree that the death of Magno was primarily caused by his own negligence and in some measure by the too close proximity of the media agua or rather its edge to the electric wire of the company by reason of the violation of the original permit given by the city and the subsequent approval of said illegal construction of the media agua. The company cannot be expected to always be on the lookout for any illegal construction which reduces the distance between its wires and said construction and after finding that said distance of 3 feet had been reduced to change the stringing or installation of its wires so as to preserve said distance. Teh Le Kim v. Philippine Aerial Taxi Co. G.R. No. 39309, November 24, 1933 F: KIM bought a ticket for a flight to Iloilo. When the plane landed, KIM unfastened the straps around him and not even waiting to put on his hat, climbed over the door to the lower wing, went down the ladder to the pontoon and walked along the pontoon toward the revolving propeller. He was caught by the revolving blades, which resulted in his arm needing to be amputated. I: Whether or not Philippine Aerial Taxi Co. complied with its contractual obligations? H: Yes; JUDGMENT AFFIRMED R: By sheer common sense, KIM ought to have known that a propeller, be it that of a ship or of an aeroplane is dangerous while in motion and that to approach is to run the risk of being caught and injured thereby. KIMs negligence alone was the direct cause of the accident. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. v. CA G.R. No. 57079, September 29, 1989 F: I: H: Trial Courts decision REINSTATED

VI. Defenses
1. Plaintiffs Negligence as the Proximate Cause Article 2179. When the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendants lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. Manila Electric Co. v. Remoquillo, et.al. G.R. No. L-8328, May 18, 1956 F: The deceased turned around and swinging the galvanized iron sheet with his hands, which came into contact with the electric wire of the Manila Electric Co., strung parallel to the edge of the media agua and 2 from it, causing his death by electrocution.

R: Private respondents negligence was not merely contributory but goes to the very cause of the accident, hence, he has no right to recover damages for the injuries which he and his wife suffered. The perils of the road were known to, hence appreciated and assumed by, private respondents. By exercising reasonable care and prudence, ESTEBAN could have avoided the injurious consequences of his act, even assuming arguendo that there was some alleged negligence on the part of petitioner. It was not the lack of knowledge of these excavations which caused the jeep of ESTEBAN to fall into the excavation but the unexplained sudden swerving of the jeep from the inside lane towards the accident mound. As a resident of Lacson street, ESTEBAN passed on that street almost everyday and had knowledge of the presence and location of the excavations there. It was his negligence that exposed him and his wife to danger, hence he is solely responsible for the consequences of his imprudence. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE Article 2179. When the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendants lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. Article 2214. In quasi-delicts, the contributory negligence of the plaintiff shall reduce the damages that he may recover.

R: The alleged contributory negligence of the victim, if any, does not exonerate the accused. The defense of contributory negligence does not apply in criminal cases committed through reckless imprudence, since one cannot allege the negligence of another to evade the effects of his own negligence. 3) Fortuitous Event Article 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be held responsible for those events which, could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable. Juntilla v. Fontanar G.R. No. L-45637, May 31, 1985 F: The records show that the passenger jeepney turned turtle and jumped into a ditch immediately after its right rear tire exploded. The evidence shows that the passenger jeepney was running at a very fast speed before the accident. The passenger jeepney was overloaded at the time of the accident. I: H: R: Tire blow-out of a jeep is not a fortuitous event, where there exists specific acts of negligence by the carrier consisting of the fact that the jeepney was overloaded and speeding at the time of the accident. In the case at bar, there are specific acts of negligence on the part of the respondents. The sudden blowing up, therefore, could have been caused by too much air pressure injected into the tire coupled by the fact that the jeepney was overloaded and speeding at the time of the accident. Characteristics of a fortuitous event: In Lasam v. Smith: 1) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or of the failure of the debtor to comply with his obligation, must be independent of the human will, 2) it must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the caso fortuito or if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid, 3) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner, and 4) the obligor

Genobiagon v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 40452, October 12, 1989 F: Genobiagon driving a rig, bumped an old woman who was crossing the street. Old woman died three hours later. I: Whether or not contributory negligence is a defense in a criminal case? H: No; DECISION AFFIRMED

(debtor) must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor. In the case at bar, the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence was not independent of the human will. The accident was caused either through the negligence of the driver or because of the mechanical defects of the tire. Common carriers should teach their drivers not to overload their vehicles, not to exceed safe and legal speed limits, and to know the correct measures to take when a tire blows up thus insuring the safety of passengers at all times. Hernandez v. Chairman, Commission on Audit G.R. No. 71871, November 6, 1981 F: I: H: Petition GRANTED R: Hernandez is entitled to be relieved from the accountability for the money forcibly taken from him in the afternoon of July 1, 1983. To impose such liability upon him would be to read the law too sternly when it should be softened by the proven facts. One could easily agree that Hernandezs choice was the safer destination, being nearer, and in view of the comparative hazards in the trips to two places. It is true that Hernandez miscalculated, but the Court feels he should not be blamed for that. The decision he made seemed logical at the time and was one that could be expected of a reasonable and prudent person. And if, as it happened, the two robbers attacked him in broad daylight in the jeep while it was on a busy highway, and in the presence of other passengers, it cannot be said that all this was the result of imprudence and negligence. This was undoubtedly a fortuitous event covered by the said provisions something that could not have been reasonably foreseen although it could have happened, and did. Servando v. Philippine Steam Navigation Co. G.R. Nos. L-36481-2, October 23, 1982 F: I:

H: R: Fortuitous event or force majeure, concept and nature of; Obligor exempt from liability of nonperformance of obligation due to a fortuitous event; Burning of a customs warehouse; fortuitous event. Thus where the fortuitous event or force majeure is the immediate and proximate cause of the loss, the obligor is exempt from liability for nonperformance. A caso fortuito presents the following essential characteristics: 1) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or of the failure of the debtor to comply with his obligation must be independent of the human will; 2) it may be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the caso fortuito or if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid; 3) the occurence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; 4) the obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor. In the case at bar, the burning of the customs warehouse was an extraordinary event which happened independently of the will of the appellant. The latter could not have foreseen the event. National Power Corporation et.al. v. CA G.R. Nos. 103442-45, May 21, 1993 F: I: Whether or not the written notices of warning issued by NPC were sufficient? H: Not sufficient; Petition DISMISSED R: Act of God doctrine, requisites to exempt the obligor from liability on the claim of force majeure. In any event, we reiterate our pronouncement in the latter case that Juan F. Nakpil & Sons v. Court of Appeals is still good law as far as the concurrent liability of an obligor in the case of force majeure is concerned. In the Nakpil case, We held To exempt the obligor from liability under Article 1174 of the Civil Code for a breach of an obligation due to an act of God the following must concur: (a) the cause of the breach of the obligation must be independent of the will of the debtor; (b) the event must be either unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; and (d) the debtor must be free from any

participation in, or aggravation of the injury to the creditor. Intervention of a human factor removed the occurrence from the rules applicable to acts of God. Accordingly, petitioners cannot be heard to invoke the act of God or force majeure doctrine to escape liability for the loss or damage sustained by the private respondents since they, the petitioners were guilty of negligence. The event then was not occasioned exclusively by an act of God or force majeure; a human factor negligence or imprudence had intervened. The effect then of the force majeure in question may be deemed to have, even if only partly, resulted from the participation of man. Thus, the whole occurrence was thereby humanized, as it were, and removed from the rules applicable to acts of God. 4. ASSUMPTION OF RISK Afialda v. Hisole G.R. No. L-2075, November 29, 1949 F: Injury caused by an animal. Afialda was employed by the defendant spouses as caretaker of their carabaos for a fixed compensation. While tending the animals he was gored by one of them and later died as a consequence of his injuries. The mishap was due neither to his fault nor to force majeure. Lower court took the view that under the abovequoted provision of the Civil Code the owner of an animal is answerable only for damages caused to a stranger, and that for damage caused to the caretaker of the animal the owner would be liable only if he had been negligent or at fault under Article 1902 of the same code. I: Whether the owner of the animal is liable when the damage is caused to its caretaker? H: Order AFFIRMED

Ilocos Norte Electric Company v. CA, G.R. No. 53401, November 6, 1989 F: PLDT wire electrocuted Nana Belen while she was on her way to her property to look after merchandise therein that might have been damaged. I: H: Decision AFFIRMED R: Petitioner was negligent in seeing to it that no harm is done to the general public. It is imperative to note the surrounding circumstances which impelled the deceased to leave the comforts of a roof and brave the subsiding typhoon. As such, shall we punish her for exercising the right to protect her property from the floods by imputing upon her the unfavorable presumption that she assumed the risk of personal injury? Definitely not. For it has been held that a person is excused from the force of the rule, that when he voluntarily assents to a known danger he must abide by the consequences, if an emergency is found to exist or if the life or property of another is in peril or when he seeks to rescue his own endangered property. Clearly an emergency was at hand as the deceaseds property, a source of her livelihood was faced with an impending loss. Furthermore, the deceased, at the time the fatal incident occurred, was at the place where she had a right to be without regard to petitioners consent as she was on her way to protect her merchandise. Hence, private respondents, as heirs, may not be barred rom recovering damages as a result of the death caused by petitioners negligence. 5) Due Diligence Ramos, et.al. v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. PHL No. L-22533, February 9, 1967 F:

R: The animal was in the custody and under the control of the caretaker who was paid for his work as such. Obviously it was the caretakers business to try to prevent the animal from causing injury or damage to anyone, including himself. And being injured by the animal under those circumstances, was one of the risks of the occupation which he had voluntarily assumed and for which he must take the consequences.

I: Whether or not PEPSI-COLA exercised the required due diligence in the selection of its driver? H: Yes; Decision AFFIRMED R: When employer proved that it exercised due diligence in the selection of its driver where it was proven that the employer had carefully examined

the erring driver as to his qualifications, experience and record of service, such evidence is sufficient to show that the employer exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of the driver and rebuts the juris tantum presumption that the employer was negligent in selecting said driver. Metro Manila Transit Corp v. CA G.R. No. 104408, June 21, 1993 F: I: H: Decision AFFIRMED R: Defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees; the mere formulation of various company policies on safety without showing that they were being complied with is not sufficient to exempt petitioner from liability arising from negligence of its employees. As the negligence of the employee gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of the employer, the latter has the burden of proving that it has been diligent not only in the selection of employees but also in the actual supervision of their work. It is incumbent upon petitioner to show that in recruiting and employing the erring driver the recruitment procedures and company policies on efficiency and safety were followed. Paying lip-service to these injunctions or merely going through the motions of compliance therewith shall warrant stern sanctions from the Court. It is not felt by the Court that there is enough evidence on record as would overturn the presumption of negligence and for failure to submit all evidence within its control, assuming the putative existence thereof, petitioner MMTC must suffer the consequences of its own inaction and indifference. The basis of the employers vicarious liability is applicable only where there is an employer-employee relationship, although it is not necessary that the employer be engaged in a business or industry. The plaintiff must show, to hold the employer liable, that the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed. It is only then that the defendant, as employer, may find it necessary to interpose the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees.

6) Prescription Kramer, Jr. v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 83524, October 13, 1989 F: Lower court dismissed complaint on the grounds that the action has already prescribed. I: Whether or not the action for damages has already prescribed? H: Yes; Petition Dismissed. R: An action based on quasi-delict must be instituted within 4 years from the day the quasidelict was committed. The prescriptive period begins from the day the quasi-delict is committed. The occurrence of the last element is the time when the cause of action arises. Elements of a cause of action: 1) A right in favor the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; 2) An obligation on the part of defendant to respect such right; 3) An act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff The aggrieved party need not wait for a determination by an administrative body like a Board of Marine Inquiry, that the collision was caused by the fault or negligence of the other party before he can file an action for damages. Allied Banking Corporation v. CA G.R. 85868, October 13, 1989 F: I: H: R: An action for damages arising from quasi-delict or alleged tortious interference should be filed within 4 years from the day the cause of action accrued. There can be no question that in this case that the action for damages instituted by private respondent arising from the quasi-delict or alleged

tortious interference should be filed within 4 years from the day the cause of action accrued. Since the cause of action accrued on March 25, 1980 while the third-party complaint was filed only on June 17, 1987, the action has prescribed. The third party complaint should not be admitted.