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CHINESE COMMUNITY 40 Phil 349 31 Oct 1919 FACTS The City of Manila, plaintiff herein, prayed for the expropriation of a portion private cemetery for the conversion into an extension of Rizal Avenue. Plaintiff claims that it is necessary that such public improvement be made in the said portion of the private cemetery and that the said lands are within their jurisdiction. Defendants herein answered that the said expropriation was not necessary because other routes were available. They further claimed that the expropriation of the cemetery would create irreparable loss and injury to them and to all those persons owing and interested in the graves and monuments that would have to be destroyed. The lower court ruled that the said public improvement was not necessary on the particular-strip of land in question. Plaintiff herein assailed that they have the right to exercise the power of eminent domain and that the courts have no right to inquire and determine the necessity of the expropriation. Thus, the same filed an appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not the courts may inquire into, and hear proof of the necessity of the expropriation. HELD: The courts have the power of restricting the exercise of eminent domain to the actual reasonable necessities of the case and for the purposes designated by the law. The moment the municipal corporation or entity attempts to exercise the authority conferred, it must comply with the conditions accompanying the authority. The necessity for conferring the authority upon a municipal corporation to exercise the right of eminent domain is admittedly within the power of the legislature. But whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a particular case under the conditions imposed by the general authority, is a question that the courts have the right to inquire to.

REPUBLIC VS. PLDT 26 SCRA 320 27 Jan 1969 FACTS: The plaintiff Republic of the Philippines is a political entity exercising government powers through one of its branches, the Bureau of Telecommunication. Herein defendant, PLDT is a public service corporation holding a franchise to install operates and maintains a telephone system. After its creation, the BOT set up its own government telephone system by utilizing its own appropriations and other equipment and by renting trunk lines of the PLDT to enable the govt offices to call privately. BOT entered into an agreement with the RCA communications for joint overseas telephone service whereby BOT would convey overseas calls received by RCA to local residents. PLDT complained to the BOT that it was a violation of the condition of their agreement since the BOT had used trunk lines only for the use of government offices but even to serve private persons or the general public in competition with the business of PLDT. Subsequently, the plaintiff commenced suit against PLDT asking the court judgment be rendered ordering the PLDT to execute a contract with the plaintiff, through the BOT for the use of the facilities of PLDT's telephone system throughout the country under such conditions as the court may consider reasonable. The CFI rendered judgment stating that it could not compel PLDT to enter into such agreement. Hence this petition. ISSUE: Whether or Not PLDT may be compelled to enter into such agreement. HELD: Yes, the state, may, in the interest of national welfare transfer utilities to public ownership upon payment of just compensation, there is no reason why the state ma not require a public utility to render services in the general interest provided just compensation is paid.

PEOPLE VS. FAJARDO 104 Phil 443 29 Aug 1958 FACTS: The municipal council of Baao, Camarines Sur stating among others that construction of a building, which will destroy the view of the plaza, shall not be allowed and therefore be destroyed at the expense of the owner, enacted an ordinance. Herein appellant filed a written request with the incumbent municipal mayor for a permit to construct a building adjacent to their gasoline station on a parcel of land registered in Fajardo's name, located along the national highway and separated from the public plaza by a creek. The request was denied, for the reason among others that the proposed building would destroy the view or beauty of the public plaza. Defendants reiterated their request for a building permit, but again the mayor turned down the request. Whereupon, appellants proceeded with the construction of the building without a permit, because they needed a place of residence very badly, their former house having been destroyed by a typhoon and hitherto they had been living on leased property. Thereafter, defendants were charged in violation of the ordinance and subsequently convicted. Hence this appeal. ISSUE: Whether or Not the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power. HELD: No. It is not a valid exercise of police power. The ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates to permanently deprive appellants of the right to use their own property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to a taking of appellants property without just compensation. We do not overlook that the modern tendency is to regard the beautification of neighborhoods as conducive to the comfort and happiness of residents. As the case now stands, every structure that may be erected on appellants' land, regardless of its own beauty, stands condemned under the ordinance in question, because it would interfere with the view of the public plaza from the highway. The appellants would, in effect, be constrained to let their land remain idle and unused for the obvious purpose for which it is best suited, being urban in character. To legally achieve that result, the municipality must give appellants just compensation and an opportunity to be heard.

CITY OF BAGUIO V. NAWASA 106 Phil 31 Aug 1959 FACTS: Plaintiff a municipal corporation filed a complaint against defendant a public corporation, created under Act.1383. It contends that the said act does not include within its purview the Baguio Water Works system, assuming that it does, is unconstitutional because it deprives the plaintiff ownership, control and operation of said water works without just compensation and due process of law. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss ion the ground that it is not a proper exercise of police power and eminent domain. The court denied the motion and ordered the defendants to file an answer. The court holds that the water works system of Baguio belongs to private property and cannot be expropriated without just compensation. Sec. 8 of R.A.1383 provides for the exchange of the NAWASA assets for the value of the water works system of Baguio is unconstitutional for this is not just compensation. Defendants motion for reconsideration was denied hence this appeal. ISSUE: Whether or Not there is a valid exercise of police power of eminent domain HELD: R.A. 1383 does not constitute a valid exercise of police power. The act does not confiscate, destroy or appropriate property belonging to a municipal corporation. It merely directs that all water works belonging to cities, municipalities and municipal districts in the Philippines to be transferred to the NAWASA. The purpose is placing them under the control and supervision of an agency with a view to promoting their efficient management, but in so doing does not confiscate them because it directs that they be paid with equal value of the assets of NAWASA. The Baguio water works system is not like a public road, the park, street other public property HELD in trust by a municipal corporation for the benefit of the public. But it is a property of a municipal corporation, water works cannot be taken away except for public use and upon payment of just compensation. Judgment affirmed.

NATIONAL POWER CORP. VS. GUTIERREZ G.R. No. 60077 18 Jan 1991 FACTS: Petitioner filed an action to acquire a right of way over the land of Respondents for the construction of transmission lines. Petitioner was adjudged to pay the full market value of land traversed by the transmission lines. Petitioner argued that it was only asking for a right of way. ISSUE: Whether or Not the acquisition of the right of way constitutes "taking" and such the case will be entitled just compensation. HELD: The acquisition of the right of way constitutes taking. It perpetually deprives Respondents of their proprietary rights. No plant higher than three meters is allowed below the transmission lines. Because of high tension current conveyed through the transmission lines, danger to life and limbs cannot be discounted. The owner of the property is entitled to just compensation.

REPUBLIC VS. CASTELVI 58 SCRA 336 15 Aug 1974 FACTS: In 1947, the republic, through the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), entered into a lease agreement with Castelvi on a year-to-year basis. When Castelvi gave notice to terminate the lease in 1956, the AFP refused. She then instituted an ejectment proceeding against the AFP. In 1959, however, the republic commenced the expropriation proceedings for the land in question. ISSUE: Whether or Not the compensation should be determined as of 1947 or 1959. HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that the taking should not be reckoned as of 1947, and that just compensation should not be determined on the basis of the value of the property as of that year. The requisites for taking are: 1) the expropriator must enter a private property, 2) the entry must be for more than a momentary period, 3) it must be under warrant or color of authorities, 4) the property must be devoted for public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected, and 5) the utilization of the property for public use must be such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property. Under Sec. 4 Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, just compensation is to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. The Supreme Court has ruled that when the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. In the instant case, it is undisputed that the Republic was placed in possession of the Castelvi property, by authority of court, on August 10, 1959. The taking of the Castelvi property for the purposes of determining the just compensation to be paid must, therefore, be reckoned as of June 26, 1959 when the complaint for eminent domain was filed.

EPZA VS. DULAY 148 SCRA 305 29 Apr 1987 FACTS: The four parcels of land which are the subject of this case is where the Mactan Export Processing Zone Authority in Cebu (EPZA) is to be constructed. Private respondent San Antonio Development Corp., in which these lands are registered under, claimed that the lands were expropriated to the government without them reaching the agreement as to the compensation. Respondent Judge Dulay then issued an order for the appointment of the commissioners to determine the just compensation. It was later found out that the payment of the government to San Antonio would be P15/sqm, which was objected to by the latter contending that under PD 1533, the basis of just compensation shall be fair and according to the fair market value declared by the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, or by the assessor, whichever is lower. Such objection and the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration were denied and hearing was set for the reception of the commissioners report. EPZA then filed this petition for certiorari and mandamus enjoining the respondent from further hearing the case. ISSUE: Whether or not the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just compensation in PD 1533 is unconstitutional. HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that the mode of determination of just compensation in PD 1533 is unconstitutional. The method of ascertaining just compensation constitutes impermissible encroachment to judicial prerogatives. It tends to render the courts inutile in a matter in which under the Constitution is reserved to it for financial determination. The valuation in the decree may only serve as guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation, but it may not substitute the courts own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount. The determination of just compensation is a judicial function. The executive department or the legislature may make the initial determination but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that the private party may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the courts findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the justness of the decreed compensation.

AMIGABLE VS. CUENCA 43 SCRA 360 29 Feb. 1972 FACTS: Victoria Amigable is the registered owner of a particular lot. At the back of her Transfer Certificate of Title (1924), there was no annotation in favor of the government of any right or interest in the property. Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used a portion of the lot for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues. On 1958, Amigables counsel wrote the President of the Philippines, requesting payment of the portion of the said lot. It was disallowed by the Auditor General in his 9th Endorsement. Petitioner then filed in the court a quo a complaint against the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca, in his capacity as Commissioner of Public Highways for the recovery of ownership and possession of the lot. According to the defendants, the action was premature because it was not filed first at the Office of the Auditor General. According to them, the right of action for the recovery of any amount had already prescribed, that the Government had not given its consent to be sued, and that plaintiff had no cause of action against the defendants.

ISSUE: Whether or not appellant may properly sue the government. HELD: When the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without going through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the government without violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without its consent. In the case at bar, since no annotation in favor of the government appears at the back of the certificate of title and plaintiff has not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of the lot to the government, then she remains the owner of the lot. She could then bring an action to recover possession of the land anytime, because possession is one of the attributes of ownership. However, since such action is not feasible at this time since the lot has been used for other purposes, the only relief left is for the government to make due compensationprice or value of the lot at the time of the taking.