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NSA surveillance program reaches into the past to retrieve, replay phone calls

Object 1

Soltani, Published:

By Barton Gellman and Ashkan arch !" E-mail the writers

#he National Security Agency has built a surveillance system capable o$ recording %!&& percent' o$ a $oreign countrys telephone calls, enabling the agency to re(ind and revie( conversations as long as a month a$ter they take place, according to people (ith direct kno(ledge o$ the e$$ort and documents supplied by $ormer contractor )d(ard Sno(den* A senior manager $or the program compares it to a time machine + one that can replay the voices $rom any call (ithout re,uiring that a person be identi$ied in advance $or surveillance* #he voice interception program, called -S#./, began in 0&&1* .ts 2)#23 tool, short $or %retrospective retrieval,' and related pro4ects reached $ull capacity against the $irst target nation in 0&!!* Planning documents t(o years later anticipated similar operations else(here*

.n the initial deployment, collection systems are recording %every single' conversation nation(ide, storing billions o$ them in a 5&6day rolling bu$$er that clears the oldest calls as ne( ones arrive, according to a classi$ied summary* #he call bu$$er opens a door %into the past,' the summary says, enabling users to %retrieve audio o$ interest that (as not tasked at the time o$ the original call*' Analysts listen to only a $raction o$ ! percent o$ the calls, but the absolute numbers are high* )ach month, they send millions o$ voice clippings, or %cuts,' $or processing and long6 term storage* At the re,uest o$ 7*S* o$$icials, #he 8ashington Post is (ithholding details that could be used to identi$y the country (here the system is being employed or other countries (here its use (as envisioned* No other NSA program disclosed to date has s(allo(ed a nations telephone net(ork (hole* 3utside e9perts have sometimes described that prospect as dis,uieting but remote, (ith notable implications $or a gro(ing debate over the NSAs practice o$ %bulk collection' abroad* Bulk methods capture massive data $lo(s %(ithout the use o$ discriminants,' asPresident 3bama put it in :anuary* By design, they vacuum up all the data they touch + meaning that most o$ the conversations collected by 2)#23 (ould be irrelevant to 7*S* national security interests* .n the vie( o$ 7*S* o$$icials, ho(ever, the capability is highly valuable* .n a statement, /aitlin ;ayden, spokes(oman $or the National Security /ouncil, declined to comment on %speci$ic alleged intelligence activities*' Speaking generally, she said that %ne( or emerging threats' are %o$ten hidden (ithin the large and comple9 system o$ modern global communications, and the 7nited States must conse,uently collect signals intelligence in bulk in certain circumstances in order to identi$y these threats*' NSA spokes(oman <anee <ines, in an e6mailed statement, said that %continuous and selective reporting o$ speci$ic techni,ues and tools used $or legitimate 7*S* $oreign intelligence activities is highly detrimental to the national security o$ the 7nited States and o$ our allies, and places at risk those (e are s(orn to protect*' Some o$ the documents provided by Sno(den suggest that high6volume eavesdropping may soon be e9tended to other countries, i$ it has not been already* #he 2)#23 tool (as built three years ago as a %uni,ue one6o$$ capability,' but last years secret intelligence budgetnamed $ive more countries $or (hich the -S#./ program provides %comprehensive metadata access and content,' (ith a si9th e9pected to be in place by last 3ctober*

#he budget did not say (hether the NSA no( records calls in ,uantity in those countries or e9pects to do so* A separate document placed a high priority on planning %$or -S#./ accesses against pro4ected ne( mission re,uirements,' including %voice*' 7bi,uitous voice surveillance, even overseas, pulls in a great deal o$ content $rom Americans (ho telephone, visit and (ork in the target country* .t may also be seen as inconsistent (ith 3bamas :an* != pledge %that the 7nited States is not spying on ordinary people (ho dont threaten our national security,' regardless o$ nationality, %and that (e take their privacy concerns into account*' .n a presidential policy directive, 3bama instructed the NSA and other agencies that bulk ac,uisition may be used only to gather intelligence related to one o$ si9 speci$ied threats, including nuclear proli$eration and terrorism* #he directive, ho(ever, also noted that limits on bulk collection %do not apply to signals intelligence data that is temporarily ac,uired to $acilitate targeted collection*' #he emblem o$ the -S#./ program depicts a cartoon (i>ard (ith a telephone6 headed sta$$* Among the agencys bulk collection programs disclosed over the past year, its $ocus on the spoken (ord is uni,ue* ost o$ the programs have involved the bulk collection o$metadata + (hich does not include call content + or te9t, such as e6 mail address books* #elephone calls are o$ten thought to be more ephemeral and less suited than te9t $or processing, storage and search* And there are indications that the call6recording program has been hindered by the NSAs limited capacity to store and transmit bulky voice $iles* .n the $irst year o$ its deployment, a program o$$icer (rote that the pro4ect %has long since reached the point (here it (as collecting and sending home $ar more than the band(idth could handle*' Because o$ similar capacity limits across a range o$ collection programs, the NSA is leaping $or(ard (ith cloud6based collection systems and a gargantuan ne( %mission data repository' in 7tah* According to its overvie( brie$ing, the 7tah $acility is designed %to cope (ith the vast increases in digital data that have accompanied the rise o$ the global net(ork*' /hristopher Soghoian, the principal technologist $or the American /ivil ?iberties 7nion, said history suggests that %over the ne9t couple o$ years they (ill e9pand to more countries, retain data longer and e9pand the secondary uses*' Spokesmen $or the NSA and the o$$ice o$ @irector o$ National .ntelligence :ames 2* /lapper :r* declined to con$irm or deny e9pansion plans or discuss the criteria $or any change*

Based on 2)#23s internal revie(s, the NSA has a strong motive to deploy it else(here* .n the documents and in intervie(s, 7*S* o$$icials said 2)#23 is uni,uely valuable (hen an analyst uncovers a ne( name or telephone number o$ interest* 8ith up to 5& days o$ recorded conversations in hand, the NSA can pull an instant history o$ the sub4ects movements, associates and plans* Some other 7*S* intelligence agencies also have access to 2)#23* ;ighly classi$ied brie$ings cite e9amples in (hich the tool o$$ered high6stakes intelligence that (ould not have e9isted under traditional surveillance programs in (hich sub4ects are identi$ied $or targeting in advance* .n contrast (ith most o$ the governments public claims about the value o$ controversial programs, the brie$ings supply names, dates, locations and $ragments o$ intercepted calls in convincing detail* Present and $ormer 7*S* o$$icials, speaking on the condition o$ anonymity to provide conte9t $or a classi$ied program, ackno(ledged that large numbers o$ conversations involving Americans (ould be gathered $rom the country (here 2)#23 operates* #he NSA does not attempt to $ilter out their calls, de$ining them as communications %ac,uired incidentally as a result o$ collection directed against appropriate $oreign intelligence targets*' 7ntil about 0& years ago, such incidental collection (as unusual unless an American (as communicating directly (ith a $oreign intelligence target* .n bulk collection systems, (hich are e9ponentially more capable than the ones in use throughout the /old 8ar, calls and other data $rom 7*S* citi>ens and permanent residents are regularly ingested by the millions* 7nder the NSAs internal %minimi>ation rules,' those intercepted communications %may be retained and processed' and included in intelligence reports* #he agency generally removes the names o$ 7*S* callers, but there are several broadly (orded e9ceptions* An independent group tasked by the 8hite ;ouse to revie( 7*S* surveillance policiesrecommended that incidentally collected 7*S* calls and e6mails + including those obtained overseas + should nearly al(ays %be purged upon detection*' 3bama did not accept that recommendation* <ines, in her statement, said the NSAs (ork is %strictly conducted under the rule o$ la(*' 2)#23 and -S#./ are carried out under )9ecutive 3rder !0555, the traditional grant o$ presidential authority to intelligence agencies $or operations outside the 7nited States*

Since August, Sen* @ianne Aeinstein B@6/ali$*C, the chairman o$ the Senate .ntelligence /ommittee, and others on that panel have been (orking on plans to assert a greater oversight role $or intelligence6gathering abroad* Some legislators are considering (hether /ongress should also dra$t ne( la(s to govern those operations* )9perts say there is not much legislation that governs overseas intelligence (ork* uch o$ the 7*S* governments intelligence collection is not regulated by any statute passed by /ongress,' said #imothy ;* )dgar, the $ormer director o$ privacy and civil liberties on 3bamas national security sta$$* %#heres a lot o$ $ocus on the Aoreign .ntelligence Surveillance Act, (hich is understandable, but thats only a slice o$ (hat the intelligence community does*' All surveillance must be properly authori>ed $or a legitimate intelligence purpose, he said, but that %still leaves a gap $or activities that other(ise basically arent regulated by la(, because theyre not covered by A.SA*' Beginning in 0&&=, /ongress loosened D&6year6old restrictions on domestic surveillance because so much $oreign data crossed 7*S* territory* #here (ere no comparable changes to protect the privacy o$ 7*S* citi>ens and residents (hose calls and e6mails no( routinely cross international borders* <ines noted that the NSAs 4ob is to %identi$y threats (ithin the large and comple9 system o$ modern global communications,' in (hich ordinary people share $iber6optic cables (ith legitimate intelligence targets* Aor Peter S(ire, a member o$ the presidents revie( group, the $act that Americans and $oreigners use the same devices, so$t(are and net(orks calls $or greater care to sa$eguard Americans privacy* .ts important to have institutional protections so that advanced capabilities used overseas dont get turned against our democracy at home,' he said* Soltani is an independent security researcher and consultant* :ulie #ate contributed to this report*

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