Torcal Mainwaring

B.J.Pol.S. 33, 5584 Copyright 2003 Cambridge University Press DOI: 10.
1017/S000712340300003 Printed in the United Kingdom
The Political Recrafting of Social Bases of Party Competition: Chile, 197395

MARIANO TORCAL
AND
SCOTT MAINWARING*
This article examines social cleavages and the impact of political legacies on Chiles post-authoritarian party system. In contrast to society-oriented approaches to party system formation, we argue that cleavage appearance in a party system depends on political agency, which can even (re)create social identities and social conicts. The Chilean case illustrates this point; the structure of the party system is deeply inuenced by distinctive political legacies of the authoritarian period. The cleavage between those who supported authoritarian rule and those who opposed it has powerfully shaped the party system during the new democratic period. In post-authoritarian Chile (19902001), a societal approach does not adequately explain the formation of cleavages or the contours of the party system. A class cleavage has appeared between the governing coalition and the conservative opposition, but this cleavage is politically constructed and maintained. The Chilean case also shows that it is important to examine the ways in which political elites craft party systems from above during the transition period. Political agency from the supply side played a decisive role in emphasizing or diminishing some of the political and cultural conicts existing after the authoritarian experience and, therefore, an essential role in party system formation in post-authoritarian Chile.
We have undertaken this enterprise of examining social cleavages and the impact of political legacies on Chiles post-authoritarian party system as a way of exploring how post-authoritarian party systems in general are structured. Because a party system is formed and/or re-established when democracy is restored, new democracies provide an ideal context in which to discuss theoretically important aspects of cleavages and the formation of party systems. According to the original formulation of the social cleavage theory of party systems, links between cleavages and party systems arose as a consequence of political mobilization and the organization of the sectors of society affected by four conicts that emerged during the formation of the nationstate and the industrial revolution in Western Europe: centreperiphery, religion, class and the ruralurban divide.1 These four conicts do not necessarily nd expression in the party system, but once a cleavage has made its political appearance, according to Lipset and Rokkan, it tends to remain stable over time even when the original conict has subsided. This is the well-known freezing hypothesis. The theory produced by this seminal work has been a leading approach to the study of the formation of citizens preferences and the study of party systems in Western Europe. According to
*Department of Political and Social Science, Pompeu Fabra University, Barcelona; and Kellogg Institute, University of Notre Dame, Indiana, respectively. Although we have not followed the standard practice of alphabetizing by last name, we were equal partners in producing this article. We thank Felipe Agu ero, Pradeep Chhibber, Michael Coppedge, Henar Criado, Scott Desposato, Edward Gibson, Samuel Eldersveld, John Goldthrope, Iva n Jaksic, Juan Esteban Montes, Marcelo Lasagna, Jose Ramo n Montero, Ana Rico, Andrew Stein, Eric Stromberg and J. Samuel Valenzuela for helpful suggestions on earlier drafts. We are grateful to Manuel Alca ntara for sharing the Elites Parlamentarias Iberoamericanas data and to Marta Lagos for granting us permission to use the 1995 Latinobarometro data. 1 Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction, in Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, eds, Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives (New York: Free Press, 1967), pp. 164.
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TORCAL AND MAINWARING
the dominant interpretation of Lipset and Rokkan, divisions rooted in society such as class, religion, ethnicity, region and urban or rural location are the only driving forces behind the appearance of a cleavage. This sociological interpretation of cleavage theory sees party systems primarily as expressions of different social divisions. Lipset and Rokkan paid some attention to strictly political explanations about cleavage and party system formation, but they treated these explanations as secondary. For them, the fundamental engine of cleavage formation and change is sociological. In contrast to this approach, we argue that the appearance of a cleavage in a party system depends more on political agency. Politics, we maintain, can (re)create socio-political identities, polarizing or diffusing potential social conicts, and can even alter the nature of social conicts through the policies adopted by the government. There is, of course, a complex interaction between political factors and the social context, but we maintain that politics is the main engine in the formation and evolution of politically relevant social cleavages. We thus agree with other scholars who have emphasized that political factors are the main shapers of party systems and social and political conicts.2 Latin American party systems constitute fertile cases for examining and challenging propositions about how cleavages form and evolve, and Chile is a particularly interesting case. In contrast to the rest of Latin America, it has often been considered a paradigmatic case of strong class or religious cleavages in party competition.3 Most explanations of this class cleavage have been formulated from a sociological perspective, leaving politics aside. Apparently Chile would be a most likely case for supporting the social cleavages approach to party system formation and change. This article suggests four important points with broader theoretical and comparative applicability. First, it shows that although cleavages have a social component, they are politically constructed. The Chilean party system has undergone a realignment because of the experience of authoritarian rule (197390). Chilean society remains politically polarized about the military dictatorship of 197390, and the party system still has a powerful democratic/authoritarian cleavage that resulted from the previous authoritarian period. Secondly, the Chilean case poses doubts about the dominant arguments given for the freezing and thawing of social cleavages. Most of the literature emphasizes social, economic and cultural factors as the main source of class cleavage formation and erosion. The Chilean case demonstrates that politics can be the driving force behind the freezing
2 Pradeep Chhibber and Mariano Torcal, Elite Strategy, Social Cleavages, and Party Systems in a New Democracy: Spain, Comparative Political Studies, 30 (1997), 2754; Pradeep Chhibber, Democracy without Associations: Transformation of the Party System and Social Cleavages in India (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999); Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Rise of Christian Democracy in Europe (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996); Herbert Kitschelt, The Transformation of European Social Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Hanspeter Kriesi, The Transformation of Cleavage Politics: The 1997 Stein Rokkan Lecture, European Journal of Political Science, 33 (1998), 16585; Jan Pakulski and Malcolm Waters, The Reshaping and Dissolution of Social Class in Advanced Society, Theory and Society, 25 (1996), 66791; Adam Przeworski and John Sprague, Paper Stones: A History of Electoral Socialism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986); Giovanni Sartori, From the Sociology of Politics to Political Sociology, in Seymour Martin Lipset, eds, Politics and the Social Sciences (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 65100. 3 Robert H. Dix, Cleavage Structures and Party Systems in Latin America, Comparative Politics, 22 (1989), 2337; Timothy R. Scully, Rethinking the Center: Cleavages, Critical Junctures, and Party Evolution in Chile (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1992); Timothy R. Scully, Reconstituting Party Politics in Chile, in Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully, eds, Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1995), pp. 10037.
Recrafting Social Bases of Party Competition
57
or erosion of cleavages. It is impossible to understand cleavage formation and erosion in Chile without focusing on political factors. Thirdly, the Chilean case reinforces the evidence that the social cleavage model was geographically and historically bounded. In post-authoritarian Chile (19902001), a societal approach does not adequately explain the formation of cleavages or the contours of the party system. A modest class cleavage has appeared between the governing coalition and the conservative opposition, but this cleavage was politically constructed through political and economic decisions taken by political authorities. Fourthly, the Chilean case shows that it is important to examine the ways in which political elites craft party systems from above during the transition period. Political agency from the supply side played a decisive role in emphasizing or downplaying some of the socio-political and cultural conicts existing after the authoritarian experience and, therefore, an essential role in party system formation in post-authoritarian Chile. Political elites enjoyed considerable autonomy in reshaping the party system from above in continuous interaction with existing social differences and potential conicts. This phenomenon draws attention to the general theoretical importance of political agency in party system formation.
CLEAVAGES AND PARTY SYSTEM FORMATION: THE THEORETICAL DEBATE
Lipset and Rokkan formulated a theory to explain the divisions and forces that shaped Western European party systems.4 The cleavage concept is at the core of their analysis and of much subsequent work. Most analysts see cleavages as lasting divisions between social and political groups that may give rise to open conict, but beyond that, interpretations diverge. In this debate about cleavages and party systems, there are three modal positions. First, there is a sociological in the sense of objective social relations interpretation.5 This approach argues that parties represent societal interests, and societal interests fundamentally reect the sociological position of actors. This is the so-called class causal linkage proposition.6 Notwithstanding some caveats about the political mechanisms that translate social cleavages into partisan divides, these scholars assume that individuals political orientations reect their objective position in society.7 To use Heaths expression, classes are real groups with distinct political interests.8 Therefore, class serves not only to categorize peoples objective societal position (class in itself), but also, and more
Lipset and Rokkan, Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments. For prominent examples, see Anthony Heath, Roger Jowell and John Curtice, How Britain Votes (London: Pergamon, 1985); Jonathan Kelley, Ian McAllister and Anthony Mughan, The Decline of Class Revisited: Class and Party in England, American Journal of Political Science, 79 (1985), 71937; Richard Rose, Class and Party Divisions: Britain as a Test Case, Sociology, 2 (1968), 12962; Richard Rose, Electoral Behavior: A Comparative Handbook (New York: Free Press, 1974); Richard Rose and Derek Urwin, Social Cohesion, Political Parties and Strains in Regimes, Comparative Political Studies, 2 (1969), 767; David L. Weakliem and Anthony F. Heath, Rational Choice and Class Voting, Rationality and Society, 6 (1994), 24370; Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (London: Doubleday, 1960), pp. 23078. 6 Pakulski and Waters, The Reshaping and Dissolution of Social Class in Advanced Society, p. 670. 7 We put objective in inverted commas because all identities including class are ultimately constructed rather than objectively given. To us, objective means merely that a national census could classify individuals according to certain more or less clearly dened demographic categories without asking questions about personal opinions. 8 Anthony Heath, Social Mobility (London: Fontana, 1981), p. 51.
5 4
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importantly, to predict the formation of mobilized groups as collective political actors (class for itself).9 A second position in this debate understands cleavage differently and places greater emphasis on the autonomy of party systems vis-a ` -vis the sociological explicandum. While also building on Lipset and Rokkans contribution, it is less structural and more political. For example, Bartolini and Mair, Knutsen and Scarbrough, and Kriesi argue that a cleavage has three elements: a structural base, the political values of the groups involved, and a political articulation.10 They also emphasize the relative autonomy of political values compared with objective sociological factors. Other scholars emphasize the autonomy of political values from structural factors and understand cleavages as political divides based on new issues or ideological conicts rooted in cultural divisions that have more autonomy with respect to previously existing societal conicts.11 For example, Franklin et al. maintain that cleavages refer to issues, policy differences or political identications related to certain longstanding conicts in a particular society.12 In this literature, cultural or ideological conicts are key to the logic of cleavage formation. The preceding theoretical approaches emphasize the political elements of a cleavage more than the traditional sociological approach; they underscore the autonomy of politics to explain the limited effects of these new value conicts on most party systems. For example, old parties such as the social democrats, they maintain, are assimilating the conicts in their electoral platforms, creating new cleavages that overlap with old ones and producing new spaces of party competition but without altering the main structure of their party systems.13 Nevertheless, these interpretations are tilted towards a cultural/sociological view since the engine that forms cultural cleavages and structures party systems lies in transformations in society. Traditional cleavages (especially class) are declining because of the successful resolution of the social conicts they had embodied,14 or because of the improvement of economic and social conditions since the Second World War, giving way to the appearance of new cultural cleavages.15 In this perspective, the new emerging value
9 Herbert Kitschelt, Class Structure and Social Democratic Party Strategy, British Journal of Political Science, 23 (1993), 299337, at p. 300. 10 Bartolini and Mair, Identity, Competition, and Electoral Availability; Oddbjorn Knutsen and Elinor Scarbrough, Cleavage Politics, in Jan van Deth and Elinor Scarbrough, eds, The Impact of Values (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 492523; Kriesi, The Transformation of Cleavage Politics. 11 Bartolini and Mair, Identity, Competition, and Electoral Availability; Russell J. Dalton, Citizen Politics in Western Democracies (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1988); Ronald Inglehart, The Changing Structure of Political Cleavages in Western Society, in Russell J. Dalton, Scott C. Flanagan and Paul Allen Beck, eds, Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies: Realignment or Dealignment? (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 2569; Ronald Inglehart, Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990); Oddbjorn Knutsen, The Impact of Structural and Ideological Party Cleavages in Western European Democracies: A Comparative Empirical Analysis, British Journal of Political Science, 18 (1988), 32352; Oddbjorn Knutsen, Cleavage Dimensions in Ten West European Countries, Comparative Political Studies, 21 (1989), 495534. 12 Mark Franklin, Thomas Mackie and Henry Valen, Introduction, in Mark Franklin, Thomas T. Mackie, Henry Valen et al., Electoral Change: Responses to Evolving Social and Attitudinal Structures in Western Countries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 357, at p. 4. 13 Inglehart, The Changing Structure of Political Cleavages in Western Society; Inglehart, Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society; Kitschelt, The Transformation of European Social Democracy; Kitschelt, European Party Systems. 14 Mark N. Franklin, The Decline of Cleavage Politics, in Franklin, Mackie, Valen et al., Electoral Change, pp. 383405, at pp. 4035. 15 Inglehart, The Changing Structure of Political Cleavages in Western Society; and Inglehart, Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society.
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cleavages may have weak structural foundations,16 but they acquired the autonomy as a result of social and economic transformations. These perspectives differ from Lipset and Rokkans classical sociological interpretation, but they, too, understate political factors in the evolution of cleavages. Most explanations of cleavage decline focus on these social, cultural and economic transformations, not on political processes. The third approach pays more attention to the ways in which political factors in general and political elites in particular shape cleavages and party systems from above. Przeworski and Spragues analysis of the electoral fortunes of social democratic parties in Western Europe is an excellent example.17 They argue that class emerges as a major cleavage in party systems to the extent that parties of the left emphasize class issues. Some scholars who work on the creation of ethnic and national identities have also emphasized the political creation of cleavages; they have emphasized that ethnicity and national identities are constructed and that political elites play a major role in building them.18 Although all three approaches that we have sketched here often focus on the same concept (cleavage), they differ in how they understand the relationship between social cleavages and party system formation. The rst sees party systems as fundamentally being shaped from below, i.e., by society, whereas the third sees party systems as fundamentally being shaped by political processes. The second approach falls between these two poles. It gives more autonomy to the three elements but prioritizes the sociocultural conditions in the formation of cleavages. We draw mainly on the third approach to the study of cleavage formation and party systems. We agree with Przeworski and Spragues and Sartoris emphasis on political agency in party system formation.19 The interaction of competing political parties, their political discourses, electoral platforms and policy making can change voters political and cultural preferences. These factors are primarily responsible for the creation or disappearance of social identities that can reect or defuse existing social differences. Politics is responsible for creating, transforming, deepening or diffusing specic social and economic conicts. The difference between the approach we advocate and the second approach discussed above is more than one of degree. The second approach recognizes, as we do, that actors politicize some issues rather than others, but it still sees the conicts that form the fault lines in party systems as originating in society. We emphasize that political actors acting in the context of specic legacies politicize social conicts, alter which social conicts have partisan relevance and even create important fault lines.
MEASUREMENT AND METHOD
The dependent variable of our analysis is the competition between pairs of the ve electorally most important parties in contemporary Chile: the two conservative parties, Renovacio n Nacional (RN) and Unio n Democra tica Independiente (UDI), which together have formed the core of the opposition since 1990; and the most important parties of
16 Clem Brooks and Jeff Manza, Social Cleavages and Political Alignments: U.S. Presidential Elections, 1960 to 1992, American Sociological Review, 62 (1997), 93746; Knutsen and Scarbrough, Cleavage Politics; Kriesi, The Transformation of Cleavage Politics. 17 Przeworski and Sprague, Paper Stones. See also Sartori, From the Sociology of Politics to Political Sociology. 18 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore, Md: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), pp. 357. 19 Przeworski and Sprague, Paper Stones; Sartori, From the Sociology of Politics to Political Sociology.
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the governing centre-left coalition since 1989, the centrist Partido Demo crata Cristiano (PDC), the centre-left Partido Socialista (PS), and the centre-left Partido por la Democracia (PPD). We do not examine the social bases of specic parties but rather the competition between parties, so the dependent variable is always a dichotomy of party preferences such as PDC versus PS. We build broader dichotomies such as PDC versus the left by aggregating individual party preferences or, where possible, by using direct survey questions about coalition preference in order to circumvent the problematic right/left category.20 In two of the surveys used here, party preference rather than vote is the dependent variable. Theoretically, we prefer the information about party identication because party realignment should be measured by stable elements of party preference such as PID (party identication) instead of vote, which depends more on short-term changes in public opinion. Furthermore, non party-identiers in Chile were comparatively low (around 38 per cent in our 1995 surveys, though the percentage has increased since then), and the class distribution of non-identiers was similar to that of identiers. As a result, the distribution of party preferences using both measures (vote intention and party identication) is similar. To verify consistency of results, we use both measures when data are available. Class is a central independent variable in this study. Our class categories build loosely on those developed by Erikson and Goldthorpe,21 and also employed frequently in the literature on voting.22 We use their class schema as a beginning point because their conceptual and operational thinking about class is sophisticated and has been widely used in Western Europe. Their class categories differentiate positions within labour markets and production units in terms of the employment relations that they entail.23 They begin with a basic threefold division of class positions into employers, self-employed and employees. They also take into account distinctions within each of these three categories and classify individuals according to both employment status and occupation. They work predominantly with seven class categories. In Table 1 we present a ve-category version of their class scheme.24 They classify employees according to the kind of labour contract and the conditions of employment. Unfortunately, Chilean surveys from the 1990s do not allow for more than a loose approximation to the EriksonGoldthorpe scheme; the occupation categories are not ne-grained enough for an exact replication. More generally, few Latin American surveys have provided the kind of detailed occupational coding needed to replicate Erikson and
20 Geoffrey Evans, Class Voting: From Premature Obituary to Reasoned Appraisal, in Geoffrey Evans, eds, The End of Class Politics? Class Voting in Comparative Context (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 120, at pp. 1112. Paul Nieuwbeerta and Nan Dirk De Graaf also advocate circumventing the left/right dichotomy and propose an empirical way to do so; see Traditional Class Voting in Twenty Postwar Societies, in Geoffrey Evans, eds, The End of Class Politics? Class Voting in Comparative Context (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 2356. 21 Robert Erikson and John H. Goldthorpe, The Constant Flux: A Study of Class Mobility in Industrial Societies (Oxford: Clarendon, 1992). 22 Heath, Jowell and Curtice, How Britain Votes; David L. Weakliem, Class and Party in Britain, 19641983, Sociology, 23 (1989), 28597; David L. Weakliem, Two Models of Class Voting, British Journal of Political Science, 25 (1995), 25470; Weakliem and Heath, Rational Choice and Class Voting; Geoffrey Evans and Clive Payne, Modeling Trends in the Class/Party Relationship, 196487, Electoral Studies, 10 (1991), 99117; Geoffrey Evans, Putting Men and Women into Classes: An Assessment of the Cross-Sex Validity of the Goldthorpe Class Schema, Sociology, 30 (1996), 20934; Evans, Class Voting; Paul Nieuwbeerta, The Democratic Class Struggle in Twenty Countries, 19561990 (Amsterdam: Thesis Publishers, 1995). 23 Erikson and Goldthorpe, The Constant Flux, p. 37. 24 Erikson and Goldthorpe, The Constant Flux, pp. 389.

TABLE
61
Erikson and Goldthorpes Class Schema

Description Large employers; professionals, administrators and managers; high level technicians; supervisors of non-manual workers. Routine non-manual employees in administration and commerce; sales personnel; other rank-and-le service workers. Small owners with or without employees. Farmers, smallholders and other self-employed workers in primary production. Lower-level technicians; supervisors of manual workers; skilled manual workers. Semi- and unskilled manual workers; agricultural and other workers in primary production.
Title Service class (Classes I and II) Routine non-manual (Class III) Petty bourgeoisie and farmers (Classes IVa, b and c) Skilled workers (Classes V and VI) Unskilled workers (Classes VIIa and b)
Goldthorpe. We strongly prefer an approximation to Erikson and Goldthorpe to the alternatives: forgoing the analysis of social cleavages, doing it on the (shaky) basis of ecological data, or generating sui generis class categories that would lack the theoretical and operational sophistication of Erikson and Goldthorpe and would lack even loose comparability with the analyses based on their classication. Moreover, drawing upon the EriksonGoldthorpe scheme makes it possible to compare across the various surveys we used. Although it is not possible to replicate EriksonGoldthorpe for the 1990s, we attempt to achieve as close an approximation as is possible with the original survey data. We primarily used four surveys: 1994 and 1995 Centro de Estudios Pu blicos national surveys, the 1995 Latinobaro metro, and a 1973 survey from greater Santiago. Fortunately, the 1973 survey provides detailed employment status and occupational information that makes a close approximation to EriksonGoldthorpe possible. An appendix provides detailed information on the creation of our class categories. With the three surveys from the 1990s, we created a sixth class category that is not included in the original EriksonGoldthorpe scheme: poor (or marginalized) self-employed. In the EriksonGoldthorpe scheme, the self-employed typically belong in the petty bourgeoisie category (or in the case of independent professionals, in the service class). But in Latin America, much of the self-employed category consists of poor individuals in the informal sector. They have different employment relations not only from workers, but also from the kind of petty bourgeoisie that exists in the advanced industrial democracies. Their relations with both suppliers and customers/clients are typically more ephemeral than those of the petty bourgeoisie.25 To treat all the self-employed in Latin America as petty bourgeoisie or service class would distort the intention of Erikson and Goldthorpe. Both the 1995 Latinobaro metro and the 1994 and 1995 Centro de Estudios Pu blicos surveys have information that enables us to differentiate between the marginalized self-employed and the petty bourgeoisie or service class. To test whether class inuences individuals party preferences, we use odds ratios. We focus on relative instead of absolute class voting, which we measure by odds ratios. Indices
25 We are grateful to John Goldthorpe for his observations on this issue. Personal communication, 14 November 2000.
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TABLE
2
Inter-bloc competition RN/PDC RN/PPD UDI/PPD UDI/PS RN/PS PDC/PPD PDC/PS PPD/PS Intra-Concertacio n competition
Party and Coalition Competition (PID) by Class: Chile, 1995 (odds ratios)
Intraconservative bloc
UDI/RN
UDI/PDC
Class categories 0.68 0.22* 1.15 1.88 3.59** 0.80 1.56 0.68 1.12 0.64 1.19 1.93 0.67 0.66 0.48 1.93 0.96 0.63 1.24 2.61*** 0.63 1.56 1.14 1.53 0.43 0.32*** 3.08** 2.61*** 0.44** 1.64 2.18 2.80 3.45 2.68 2.71 6.69*** 4.35 1.75 1.44 0.61 1.43 0.76 2.85* 0.60*** 1.03 1.84*** 0.83 0.60 1.32 1.61*** 0.33*** 0.57 0.18 0.11** 1.49 0.47 1.15 0.98 0.75 0.40 1.97*** 3.85* 0.40* 2.57*** 0.45 0.55 1.07 0.88 0.67 1.29 1.93 0.32 0.72 0.64 1.23 0.28** 2.59*** 1.35 0.66 2.48
Democracia y PDC/left Progreso (0)/ Concertacio n (1) 0.96 1.02 1.35 1.24 0.73 1.00 1.22 2.95* 0.55* 1.48 0.59** 0.35* 0.72*** 1.69 2.01** 1.80** 1.04 1.17 1.03 1.66
1.22
0.83
1.71
0.38***
0.45***
0.52**
2.48
4.64***
Employed Petty bourgeoisie Service class Routine nonmanual Skilled workers Unskilled workers Marginalized self-employed
1.29
4.58**
1.34
1.07
Non-employed Retired Students Home Unemployed
0.40 1.00 1.42 0.94
0.63 0.68 1.58*** 0.61
Source: 1995 National Public Opinion Survey, Centro de Estudios Pu blicos (Roper Center Archive, CHCEP 95236/237). *Signicant at p 0.01. **Signicant at p 0.05. ***Signicant at p 0.10.
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of relative class voting that are based on odds ratios measure the strength of the relationship between class and party preference independently of the general popularity of political parties or changes in the size of classes.26 In this article, the odds ratios measure the proclivity of one class compared to other classes to prefer one party or coalition rather than another.27 Odds ratios are a non-symmetrical association measure; a negative association goes from 0 to 1; 1 represents a neutral association; and a positive association ranges from 1 to innity. Because of this non-symmetry, we sometimes present the log odds ratios of the regression models (the natural logarithm of the odds ratios), although they are more difcult to interpret intuitively.
SOCIAL BASES OF PARTY COMPETITION IN POST-AUTHORITARIAN CHILE
Table 2 shows the bivariate odds ratios calculated for each class category and all pairs of party competition among the ve major parties using party identication from a 1995 national survey. Class categories have a modest but statistically signicant inuence in the competition between the parties of the two competing ideological blocs. More than other classes, the service class, the petty bourgeoisie, and the routine non-manual identify with parties of the conservative bloc. Unskilled workers, the marginalized self-employed, and to a lesser degree skilled workers disproportionately prefer the pro-government bloc. This pattern is reproduced when the odds ratios are computed for coalition preference (conservative coalition Democracia y Progreso/centre left coalition Concertacio n de los Partidos see the last columns of Table 2).28 Class has a discernible but modest effect in party competition. Class has a minor effect in competition within the Concertacio n and within the conservative coalition. The limited effect of class in the competition between traditional adversaries, the PDC and the PS, is noteworthy. They now form part of the same electoral coalition and have governed together since the re-instauration of democracy. So far we have focused on class as the sole independent variable. We are also interested in the effects of religion, the rural/urban cleavage and gender on party choice. These cleavages were historically important in the Chilean party system,29 and in many democracies, religion is the most powerful social cleavage in shaping party preferences.30 We regressed these demographic variables on coalition preference (Democracia y Progreso 0; Concertacio n 1). We used the already discussed ve dummy class
Evans, Class Voting; Evans and Payne, Modeling Trends in the Class/Party Relationship, 196487; Heath, Jowell and Curtice, How Britain Votes, pp. 305. 27 For example, in the 1995 Centro de Estudios Pu blicos survey, skilled workers were 8.78 times more likely to identify with the PDC than with the PS (79 to 9 identiers), and all other categories were 6.10 times more likely to choose the PDC over the PS (415 to 68 identiers). The odds ratio for the service class cell in Table 2 for PDC/PS is therefore 6.10 divided by 8.78, or 0.69, indicating the higher relative likelihood that, compared to the average party identier of other occupations, skilled workers were more inclined to identify with the PDC. If we reversed the dependent variables, with the PDC 0 and PS 1, the ratio would be 8.78 divided by 6.10, or 1.44. 28 In the Latinobaro meter, we constructed coalition preference with vote intention, whereas the 1995 National Opinion Survey directly asked respondents about coalition preference. 29 Scully, Rethinking the Center; Scully, Reconstituting Party Politics in Chile; J. Samuel Valenzuela, Or genes y transformaciones del sistema de partidos en Chile, Estudios Pu blicos, 58 (1995). 30 Arend Lijphart, Religious vs. Linguistic vs. Class Voting: The Crucial Experiment of Comparing Belgium, Canada, South Africa, and Switzerland, American Political Science Review, 73 (1979), 15982; Rose and Urwin, Social Cohesion, Political Parties and Strains in Regimes.
26
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TABLE
3
Model 1 Democracia y Progreso (0)/Concertacio n (1) PDC (0)/PS (1) Regression coefcients Odds ratio 1.08 0.00 1.36 0.67 0.24 1.73 0.97 0.95 0.87 3.28 0.07 5.28 0.31 Ref. cat. 0.40 1.44** 0.55 0.03 0.05 0.14 1.19* 2.25* 784.5 29.93** 0.04 670 Regresssion coefcients 0.18 0.28 0.20 0.22 0.58 Ref. cat. 0.23 0.20 0.06 0.22* 0.76* 1.16 Regression coefcients Odds ratio 0.60 0.39 0.80 1.61 2.00 1.09 0.36 0.96 1.18 0.97 381.8 21.46** 0.04 543 Model 2 Model 3 PDC (0)/Left (1)
Party Competition by Social Cleavages in Chile, 1995
Odds ratio 0.83 0.76 1.22 1.24 0.56 1.26 1.22 1.07 0.80 2.13
Petty bourgeoisie Service class Routine non-manual Skilled workers Unskilled workers Marginalized self-employed Non-employed Rural/Urban Religiosity Age Gender 1.83* 945.3 47.3* 0.05 910
0.51*** 0.94* 0.23 0.48 0.70** 0.09 Ref. cat. 1.01* 0.04 0.16** 0.03
Constant 2 Log likelihood 2 (d.f. 10) Pseudo R2 (N)
Source: 1995 National Public Opinion Survey, Centro de Estudios Pu blicos (Roper Center Archive, CHCEP 95236/237). *Signicant at p 0.01. **Signicant at p 0.05. ***Signicant at p 0.10. Note: The table shows the coefcients and odds ratios generated by logistic regression in models with different dependent variables.
65
variables and the four non-employed groups as a reference category.31 We assess religiosity through the question, How frequently do you attend church or practice your faith?32 The other independent variables are urban/rural residence (rural 0/urban 1), age (to assess whether generation affects party preference), and gender (female 0/male 1).33 The results (Table 3, Model 1) demonstrate a modest direct impact of class on coalition preference when other cleavages are controlled for. The petty bourgeoisie and the service class are more likely than others to prefer the conservative coalition. Skilled and unskilled workers were more likely than other classes to favour the centre-left coalition. The average probability that a respondent supports the governing coalition decreases 0.22 (from 0.77 to 0.55) if he/she belongs to the service class and by 0.11 (from 0.77 to 0.66) for the petty bourgeoisie, whereas the probability increases 0.11 (from 0.75 to 0.86) for unskilled workers. Model 1 also demonstrates the relative importance of the traditional social cleavages. It shows the importance of an urban/rural cleavage in choosing between coalitions. Chileans living in rural areas tend to prefer the conservative coalition. This nding is consistent with the historical record; the rural regions have been more favourable to conservative parties.34 Surprisingly in view its importance before 1973, religion was nowhere close to achieving statistical signicance in 1995. In Santiago, religion was a highly signicant predictor of coalition preference in the 1960s.35 The religious cleavage weakened between the mid-1960s and 1973, but it continued to exist.36 This nding is also notable in light of the fact that the rights members of congress are much more religious than the centre-lefts.37 Although three class variables, the rural/urban cleavage and age are statistically signicant, Model 1 ts badly and the pseudo R2 is very low. This means that social cleavages have limited capacity to explain coalition preference. The regression in Model 2 uses the same independent variables to examine the inuence of social cleavages in the competition between the Socialist and Christian Democratic parties. We changed the model slightly, using skilled workers, which is the most neutral, as the reference category.38 Only the marginalized self-employed class was signicant
31 We collapsed the four non-employed categories from Table 2 into one category. The heterogeneous character of these four categories made them less useful for purposes of detecting class cleavages. We used this non-employed category as the reference class because it the most neutral one; the odds ratio is 1.37. 32 The values for this independent variable range from 1 (goes to church at least once a week) to 5 (never or almost never goes to church). 33 These are important intervening variables between class conict and party preference. See Franklin, The Decline of Cleavage Politics and Szonja Szele nyi and Jacqueline Olvera, The Declining Signicance of Class: Does Gender Complicate the Story? Comments, Theory and Society, 25 (1996), 72530. 34 Enzo Faletto and Eduardo Ruiz, Conicto pol tico y estructura hoy, in An bal Pinto et al., Chile Hoy (Santiago: Centro de Estudios Socio-Econo micos, Universidad de Chile, 1970), pp. 21354. 35 Kenneth P. Langton and Ronald Rapoport, Religion and Leftist Mobilization in Chile, Comparative Political Studies, 9 (1976), 277308. 36 Brian H. Smith, The Church and Politics in Chile: Challenges to Modern Catholicism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982), pp. 12661; 21423; Brian H. Smith and Jose Luis Rodr guez, Comparative Working-Class Political Behavior: Chile, France, and Italy, American Behavioral Scientist, 18 (1974), 5996. 37 A project of the Universidad de Salamanca asked members of the Chilean congress to respond to the question, How religious do you consider yourself, from 1 (indifference to religion) to 10 (very religious)? The means were 3.4 for the Socialist Party (n 13), 4.8 for the PPD (n 11), 7.0 for the PDC (n 31), 6.4 for RN (n 23), and 7.5 for UDI (n 12) (Centro de Investigaciones Sociolo gicas, Universidad de Salamanca, Elites Parlamentarias Iberoamericanos, Vol. 2, Chile, 1997), p. 37. 38 The odds ratio is 0.93, the closest to 1.
66
between the PDC and the PS in 1995. Gender is the only other statistically signicant demographic variable; as was true in the past, women continue to disproportionately favour the PDC over the PS. Although the model as a whole is statistically signicant, the pseudo R2 is again very low (0.04), which means that this model fails to include the variables inuencing the competition between these two parties. Sociological cleavages have little impact in explaining the preference in contemporary Chile for two historical adversaries, the PS and PDC. Model 3 assesses the inuence of traditional social cleavages on the competition between the Christian Democrats and the left, which were adversaries from 1958 until 1973. The left/centre-left category includes both offspring of the pre-1973 PS (the PS and the PPD) as well as the Communist party.39 Age and gender are the only statistically signicant predictors of party preference; younger respondents and men are comparatively more likely to identify with a left-leaning party. In contrast to the ongoing existence of a modest class cleavage between the governing coalition and the opposition, virtually no class pattern can be observed in the competition between PDC/PS and PDC/Left (Models 2 and 3). Also noteworthy is the fact that religiosity does not help predict party preference between the PDC and the left. The sociological differences between the centre-left and the PDC have withered.
SOCIAL CLEAVAGES IN THE 1973 PARTY SYSTEM IN GREATER SANTIAGO
Were class and other social cleavages more salient in the pre-coup party system? The conventional wisdom is that class was an important determinant of party preferences in pre-1973 Chile. Previous ecological (i.e., based on aggregate voting data) evidence suggested that in the pre-1973 party system, the left, centre and right had very distinctive class bases, and that the Socialists and Christian Democrats also had different class bases.40 Moreover, some excellent work on the pre-coup Chilean party system has presented it as based on well-differentiated class and religious cleavages.41 Some careful empirical work based on survey data showed that Chilean parties had interclass bases of support and that the class cleavage was not as deep as studies based on ecological data had afrmed; nonetheless, these analyses also conrmed the existence of a class cleavage.42 The lack of available national surveys before 1973 made it impossible to compare the pre-1973 and post-1989 social bases of parties at the national level on the basis of individual data. Pre-coup surveys of greater Santiago, however, can be compared with the Santiago subset of the 1995 survey to examine patterns of change and continuity. A 1973 survey indicated the existence of a class cleavage between the PDC and the PS/left in metropolitan Santiago (Table 4).43 In 1973, the left drew a higher proportion than
39 The reference category in Model 3 is the marginalized self-employed, which is the most neutral category (the odds ratio 1.00). 40 Maurice Zeitlin and James Petras, The Working-Class Vote in Chile: Christian Democracy versus Marxism, British Journal of Sociology, 21 (1970), 1629; Robert Ayres, Unidad Popular and the Chilean Electoral Process, in Arturo Valenzuela and J. Samuel Valenzuela, eds, Chile: Politics and Society (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1976), pp. 3066. 41 Scully, Rethinking the Center; Scully, Reconstituting Party Politics in Chile; Valenzuela, Or genes y transformaciones del sistema de partidos en Chile. 42 Smith, The Church and Politics in Chile, pp. 12633; 21423; Smith and Rodri guez, Comparative Working-Class Political Behavior. 43 The Political Situation before the Parliamentary Elections, sample size 754, Roper Center archive number CHCEDOP7345. Although this survey was limited to one city, in 1973 metropolitan Santiago accounted for 30

TABLE
67
PDC/Centre-Left Competition by Social Cleavages, Metropolitan Santiago, 1973

Model 4: PDC (0)/PS (1) Model 5: PDC (0)/Left (1) 1.17 0.81 Ref. cat. 1.86** 2.26* Model 6: Opposi. (0)/UP (1) 0.91 0.69 Ref. cat. 2.14* 2.30*
Petty bourgeoisie Service class Routine non-manual Skilled workers Unskilled workers Marginalized self-employed Non-employed Religiosity Age Gender
2 (d.f. 7) Pseudo R2 (N)
0.98 0.62 Ref. cat. 1.79*** 1.98**
0.83* 1.01 1.03 20.42* 0.05 382
0.81* 1.01 0.91 25.14* 0.05 435
0.80* 0.99 1.03 42.09* 0.07 535
Source: February 1973 Metropolitan Santiago Survey (CHCEDOP 7345). *Signicant at p 0.01. **Signicant at p 0.05. ***Signicant at p 0.1. Note: The table shows the odds ratios generated by logistical regression in models with different dependent variables.
the PDC of its votes from among skilled and unskilled workers, whereas the PDC won a higher share than the left of its votes from among the petty bourgeoisie and the service class. Unskilled workers were more likely than other categories to vote for the Socialists and the left. Controlling for the other variables in the equation, in 1973 the probability of voting for the Socialists increased on average 0.10 (0.36 to 0.46) for skilled workers and 0.13 (0.36 to 0.49) for unskilled workers. This probability increased by 0.09 (0.43 to 0.52) for skilled workers and 0.15 (0.42 to 0.57) for unskilled workers in the competition between the Christian Democrats and the left (PS and Chilean Communist Party [PCCh]). In the competition between the Unidad Popular (UP) and the opposition, the direct impact of class again appears. Skilled and unskilled workers were more likely than other categories to vote for the Unidad Popular (Model 6). This is a contrast to the situation in metropolitan Santiago in 1995 (Table 5). For the 1995 data, we created a dummy variable representing the citizens from other parts of the country (0) and those residing in metropolitan Santiago (1) and six interactive variables containing the class information of Santiago residents by multiplying this dummy variable by class. The coefcients of these new variables represent the distinct effect of the class categories for metropolitan Santiago. If the coefcients are not signicant, there are no statistical differences of the effect of this class category with respect to the national effect
(Fnote continued)
per cent of Chiles population. To create our ve class categories, we included the non-employed by using the information provided by the survey about the occupation of the head of the household. The information in this survey about party preference is vote intention, not party identication as was the case in 1995. In 1973 we included Socialists and Communists as respondents on the left; in 1995 we counted PS, PPD and Communist identiers. As expected, the results for PDC/left competition are consistent with those obtained for PDC/PS competition. We could not include the rural/urban cleavage because the sample is limited to metropolitan Santiago.
68
TABLE
PDC/Centre-Left Competition by Social Cleavages in Metropolitan Santiago, 1995

Model 7: PDC (0)/PS (1) Model 8: PDC (0)/Left (1) 0.58 0.00 0.55*** 0.51 0.31* Ref. cat. 0.67 0.65 Ref. cat. 2.41 2.74 1.48 0.69 0.50 1.07 0.79* 2.37* 49.11* 0.07 640
Petty bourgeoisie Service class Routine non-manual Skilled workers Unskilled workers Non-employed Marginalized self-employed Metropolitan Santiago Petty bourgeoisie in Santiago Service class in Santiago Routine non-manual in Santiago Skilled workers in Santiago Unskilled workers in Santiago Non-employed in Santiago Marginalized self-employed in Santiago Religiosity Age Gender
2 (d.f. 16) Pseudo R2 (N)
0.88 0.01 Ref. cat. 0.59 0.74 2.28 0.18** 1.29 1.06 0.87 1.41 Ref. cat. 0.46 0.28 2.69 0.93 0.85 3.32* 29.29** 0.05 543
Source: 1995 National Public Opinion Survey, Centro de Estudios Pu blicos (Roper Center Archive, CHCEP 95236/237). *Signicant at p 0.01. **Signicant at p 0.05. ***Signicant at p 0.10. Note: The table shows odds ratios generated by logistic regression in models with different dependent variables.
discussed above. None of the interactive class categories in metropolitan Santiago is statistically signicant in the competition between the PDC and the PS or between the PDC and the left in 1995 (Table 5, Models 7 and 8). The t of both models is poor. If one eliminates the interactive terms, the dummy variable for metropolitan Santiago becomes signicant; residents of Greater Santiago tend to vote disproportionately for the left. But there is no statistically signicant class base to this difference between Santiago and the rest of the country.44 The change in the inuence of religion is also striking. In 1973 religious citizens voted disproportionately for the Christian Democrats; the probability of choosing the PDC instead of the Socialists increased on average 0.26 from the most to the least religious individuals. The religious cleavage was signicant substantively and statistically. Among voters this historic conict has apparently disappeared in Chile today.45
44 We also took the 1995 metropolitan subsample and ran the same analysis with it that we did in Table 4 for 1973. The coefcients showed that the left fared better in Greater Santiago than elsewhere, but none of the class categories was statistically signicant, nor was religion. 45 It is possible that other questions about religion (for example, Catholics versus Protestants) would detect a religious cleavage. Nevertheless, it is revealing that the important question about frequency of religious practice failed to do so.
69
The data for Santiago suggest that the post-authoritarian Chilean party system has experienced a realignment since 1973 and that parties social bases have changed. The left in general and the PS in particular enjoyed disproportionate support from skilled and unskilled workers before the coup de tat. Since 1989, class has mattered mainly in the competition between the pro-government and conservative electoral coalitions: the service class, the petty bourgeoisie and the routine non-manual are more likely than others to vote for the conservatives. This realignment is also suggested by the declining impact of religion on voting. Alongside this important change is an element of continuity: the odds ratios indicate that class voting before 1973 was not as intense in Chile as some authors have indicated,46 and it remained modest in the 1990s. Although the survey evidence directly comparing the 1973 and post-1989 social bases of parties is limited to greater Santiago, it seems highly likely that some realignment has occurred on the national level. Greater Santiago respondents accounted for 40 per cent of the 1995 sample, a percentage high enough to affect results for the entire sample. Equally important, the literature on the pre-1973 party system presents ecological evidence of a class cleavage between each of the three political blocs (right, centre and left) and a religious one. In the post-1989 period, the class cleavage between the left/centre-left and the centre has weakened, as has the religious cleavage. This evidence has implications for the debate on change and continuity in the Chilean party system. Peter Siavelis, Arturo Valenzuela, and Samuel Valenzuela and Timothy Scully, among others, have argued that there are powerful continuities from the pre-1973 party system to the post-1989 system.47 John Carey has argued the opposite, namely, that the party system has changed in fundamental respects.48 The evidence on social bases of Chilean party competition points in the direction of some change.
POLITICAL LEGACIES IN THE RESHAPING OF MODERN CHILEAN PARTY COMPETITION
So far we have included only class and other demographic and sociological variables in the model. Now we add some political variables to complete our two-stage model of party preference. The reason for this two-stage model (rst the demographic/sociological variables, then the political variables) is that a one-stage model with all the demographic and the political/attitudinal variables implicitly assumes that all the explanatory variables are spatially and temporally co-ordinate. This assumption is awed and can lead to misleading conclusions.49 Sociological and demographic variables are at a different level
Zeitlin and Petras, The Working-Class Vote in Chile: Christian Democracy versus Marxism. Peter Siavelis, Continuity and Change in the Chilean Party System: On the Transformational Effects of Electoral Reform, Comparative Political Studies, 30 (1997), 65174; Arturo Valenzuela, Party Politics and the Crisis of Presidentialism in Chile: A Proposal for a Parliamentary Form of Government, in Juan J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela, eds, The Failure of Presidential Democracy (Baltimore, Md: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), pp. 91150; J. Samuel Valenzuela and Timothy Scully, Electoral Choices and the Party System in Chile: Continuities and Changes at the Recovery of Democracy, Comparative Politics, 29 (1997), 51127. 48 John M. Carey, Parties and Coalitions in Chile in the 1990s, in Scott Morgenstern and Benito Nacif, eds, Legislative Politics in Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). See also Juan Esteban Montes, Scott Mainwaring and Eugenio Ortega, Rethinking the Chilean Party Systems, Journal of Latin American Studies, 32 (2000), 795824. 49 Douglas Rivers, Heterogeneity in Models of Electoral Choice, American Journal of Political Science, 35 (1991), 73757; Christopher H. Achen, Social Psychology, Demographic Variables, and Linear Regression: Breaking the Iron Triangle in Voting Research, Political Behavior, 14 (1992), 195211. For example, if religion
47 46
70
of causation from the political attitudinal ones; the former are more distant from the dependent variable than the latter. Therefore, for methodological reasons we began by examining class and other demographic variables and now add the political ones. The political attitudinal variables are closer to the dependent variables in the chain of causation.50 This analysis also allows us to disentangle the direct effects of the sociological variables before we include some intervening variables (for example, the inclusion of ideology might affect the direct impact of religiosity on party identication or voting behaviour). Including the political variables constitutes the required second step in our two-stage causal analysis aimed at estimating the direct effects of social cleavages on party preference controlled by other explanatory variables. We also have theoretical reasons to include the political variables. If our earlier theoretical discussion about the importance of political factors in forming party systems is correct, these variables should help us understand and predict coalition and partisan preference. To examine the impact of political variables on party choice, we added six specically political independent variables to the previous multivariate logistic regression model. The rst asks respondents to evaluate the countrys economic situation. The answers range from 1 (very bad) to 5 (very good). The second political variable is a retrospective economic evaluation. The rst two political variables assess how respondents past and present evaluations of the economy shaped their coalition and party preference, i.e., economic voting.51 The third scores respondents evaluation of the Frei government. This variable measures retrospective voting, i.e., voting on the basis of government performance.52 The answers range from 1 (bad) to 7 (excellent). Two variables measure whether respondents opinions of well-known leaders help determine party and coalition preference. In a regression on coalition preference (Table 6, Model 9), we included the respondents personal evaluation of the president at the time of the administration of the survey, Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei, and of Arturo Alessandri, the conservative who ran for the presidency against Frei in 1993. Later models that analyse PS versus PDC competition and left versus PDC competition use respondents opinions of Eduardo Frei and Ricardo Lagos, the PPD/PS
(Fnote continued)
(or class, gender, age, etc.) strongly inuences political values, once political values were included in the equation, religion might appear to have no impact on party identication or voting behaviour. But it would be fatuous to conclude that religion has no impact on party identication merely because its impact is mediated. 50 Merrill J. Shanks and Warren E. Miller, Policy Direction and Performance Evaluations: Complementary Explanations of the Reagan Elections, British Journal of Political Science, 20 (1990), 143235; John Bartle, LeftRight Position Matters, but Does Social Class? Causal Models of the 1992 British General Election, British Journal of Political Science, 28 (1998), 50129. 51 Economic voting can occur along four dimensions: personalcollective, retrospectiveprospective, affectivecognitive, and simplemediated. For the sake of simplicity and given the lack of relevant questions in the 1995 national survey, we used only this question, which measures collective (sociotropic) economic voting. On different kinds of economic voting, see Donald R. Kinder and D. Roderick Kiewiet, Economic Discontent and Political Behavior: The Role of Personal Grievances and Collective Economic Judgments in Congressional Voting, American Journal of Political Science, 23 (1979), 495527. However, the inclusion in the model of government performance evaluation also indirectly measures retrospective and mediated economic voting. See Michael S. Lewis-Beck, Economics and Elections: The Major Western Democracies (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1990), pp. 3442. 52 On retrospective voting, see V. O. Key Jr, The Responsible Electorate (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966); Morris P. Fiorina, Retrospective Voting in American National Elections (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1981).

TABLE
71
Coalition Preference by Social Cleavages and Political Variables Chile, 1995

Model 9 PID Model 10 Vote 0.56 0.33** 1.87 0.49 1.09 Ref. cat. 1.07 1.00 1.18 1.32 0.92 1.72* 1.46* 337.2 157.4* (d.f. 11) 0.26 450
Petty bourgeoisie Service class Routine non-manual Skilled workers Unskilled workers Non-employed Marginalized self-employed Rural/Urban Religiosity Age Gender Economic situation Retrospective econ. evaluation Freis government assessment Frei evaluation Alessandri evaluation Leftright Constant (coefcient) 2 Log likelihood
2
0.94 0.24* 0.80 1.75 2.46 Ref. cat. 2.94* 0.53*** 1.00 1.16 0.90 0.99 1.22 1.89* 1.98* 0.56* 1.23* 3.59* 587.5 173.5* (d.f. 16) 0.21 641
Pseudo R2 (N)
Source: 1995 National Public Opinion Survey, Centro de Estudios Pu blicos (Roper Center Archive, CHCEP 95236/237), and 1995 Latinobaro metro. *Signicant at p 0.01. **Signicant at p 0.05. ***Signicant at p 0.10. Note: The table shows the odds ratios generated by multivariate logistic regression in models that both have the dependent variable Democracia y Progreso (0)/Concertacio n (1), for respectively PID and Vote.
leader and recently inaugurated president of the Republic.53 For the regression on vote preference (Table 6, Model 10), Freis government assessment and leadership evaluation were not included in the survey. Finally, we have included ideological self-location on the leftright scale (right coded 1 and left coded 5). Leftright identication is an important attitudinal variable to predict party preference that is conceptually and empirically separable from it.54
53 Conceptually, respondents opinions of political leaders are distinct from party identication, and empirically the two factors are usually separable. According to the classic Michigan model, party identication is clearly different from leadership evaluation. Leadership is considered a short-term effect in the funnel of voting causality, whereas party identication is a long-term effect. The theory holds that they tend to evolve in opposite directions; leadership becomes more important in voting when party identication gets weaker. See Angus Campbell et al., The American Voter (New York: Wiley, 1960). Later revisions of the model pointed out the importance of leadership and other variables in forming party identication, making the model non-recursive, but the two variables are still very distinct. In cases of pronounced personalism, the two might be inextricably connected such that they were measuring the same phenomenon, but statistical analysis of party identication and leader evaluation with these data revealed that they are distinct in Chile. 54 Ronald Inglehart and Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Party Identication, Ideological Preference and the LeftRight Dimension among Western Mass Publics, in Ian Budge, Ivor Crewe and Dennis Farlie, eds, Party
72
Table 6 presents the results of two multivariate logistic regression models for coalition preference (Model 9 for PID and Model 10 for vote). The results are largely consistent with those obtained in Model 1 (Table 3), which has the same dependent variable but without the political independent variables. The service class has an impact in both models, and the rural/urban cleavage does in the CEP survey (urban/rural residency was not included in the vote intention survey). But the sociological variables are overwhelmed substantively and in statistical signicance by some of the political variables. The 2 and the pseudo R2 increased considerably relative to the sociological models. Sociological variables do not predict respondents coalition preference nearly as well as political variables. In Model 9, four of the six political variables are signicant at a 0.01 level, whereas only three of the nine sociological variables are signicant at 0.10. Respondents leftright self-classication, their evaluation of the Frei government, and their evaluations of Frei and Alessandri were powerful determinants of coalition preference for PID preference.55 The evaluation of the economic situation has no impact in either model. Table 6 thus shows the importance of political variables in predicting coalition preference. There is a new dominant competition between the coalitions driven by political factors and, to a secondary degree, by class and rural/urban residency. Table 7 presents the ndings of a similar analysis using virtually the same independent variables but comparing PDC (0) and PS (1) with PDC (0) and left/centre-left (1) competition. PDC/left competition dominated Chilean politics between 1964 and 1973. Consistent with the results in Table 3 (Models 2 and 3), few of the sociological variables are statistically signicant. Controlling for the other variables in the equation, PDC and PS identiers and voters differ little in terms of class, rural/urban residence and religiosity. The only statistically signicant sociological variables in Table 7 are age and gender in Model 11 (PID); men were more likely than women to prefer the PS over the PDC. Models 13 (PID) and 14 (vote) also display the lack of any clear class pattern in the competition between PDC identiers/voters and the left. In contrast, several political variables in these models are highly signicant in the competition between the PDC/PS and PDC/left. Controlling for the other independent variables, individuals who located themselves further to the left, those who had a worse evaluation of Frei, and those who had a better opinion of Lagos were more likely to identify with and vote for the PS or the left in general. In the CEP surveys, political variables do a much better job than the sociological ones of explaining partisan preferences between the PDC/PS and the left/centre-left. In Models 11 and 13, the pseudo R2 is substantially higher than it was in the earlier sociological models that were based on the same CEP surveys (Models 2 and 3). PDC and PS identiers do not differ markedly in their evaluations of the government or the economic situation. This result probably reects the fact that the two parties have
(Fnote continued)
Identication and Beyond: Representations of Voting and Party Competition (London: Wiley, 1976), pp. 24373; Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Measuring Ideological Conceptualizations, in Samuel Barnes, Max Kaase et al., Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1979), pp. 21554. 55 We checked correlations among the independent variables to detect possible multicollinearity problems. In theory, it seemed plausible that the evaluation of the Frei government and the evaluation of Frei personally could be highly correlated. Although the actual correlation of 0.51 is moderately high, many respondents evaluated the government and Frei personally differently. This correlation does not affect the signicance test since both are statistically signicant. Unless there is a perfect correlation between independent variables, multicollinearity mostly affects the signicance test leading to a type II error. This is not the case with this model.

TABLE
73
PDC/PS and PDC/Centre-Left Competition by Social Cleavages and Political Variables, Chile, 1995
Dependent Var.: PDC (0)/PS (1) Model 11: PID Model 12: Vote 0.80 1.05 Ref. cat. 0.75 1.05 0.70 1.23 0.99 1.34 0.68** 0.64*** 1.13** 0.27 301.2 22.4** 0.07 289 Dependent Var.: PDC (0)/Left (1) Model 13: PID 0.60 0.72 0.78 1.26 0.55 Ref. cat. 0.71 0.86 1.05 0.80** 1.59*** 0.73** 1.10 0.93 1.69* 0.61* 1.71* 1.23 559.7 104.8* 0.17 526 Model 14: Vote Ref. cat. 1.51 1.55 0.82 0.96 0.92 1.11 0.99 1.27 0.80 0.75 1.22* 0.75 427.7 28.7* 0.01 346
Petty bourgeoisie Service class Routine non-manual Skilled workers Unskilled workers Non-employed Marginalized selfemployed Rural/Urban Religiosity Age Gender Economic situation Retrospective economic evaluation Freis government assessment Leftright location Frei evaluation Lagos evaluation Constant (coefcients) 2 Log likelihood
2
1.44 0.00 Ref. cat. 1.01 1.19 1.98 0.26*** 0.71 0.99 0.94 2.43* 0.85 1.07 0.76 2.78* 0.52* 1.65** 3.80* 249.9 98.6* 0.19 419
Pseudo R2 (N)
Source: 1995 National Public Opinion Survey, Centro de Estudios Pu blicos (Roper Center Archive CHCEP 95236/237) and 1995 Latinobaro metro. *Signicant at p 0.01. **Signicant at p 0.05. ***Signicant at p 0.10. D.f. 16 D.f. 11 Note: The table shows the odds ratios generated by logistic regression.
been governing together since 1990, fostering converging evaluations of the government and the economy notwithstanding somewhat different opinions of Frei. In sum, although modest class and rural/urban cleavages underpin the divide between the governing centre/centre-left coalition and the conservative opposition, these sociological variables provide little predictive leverage in shaping whether a particular party identier prefers the left/centre-left or PDC. Political variables, in contrast, provide powerful explanations of both coalition preference and PDC/PS party identication in the post-1989 period. Respondents location on the leftright scale and their assessment of political leaders and government performance are decisive factors in their coalition preference and in the choice between the PDC and PS. Although the class cleavage between the PDC and the left has withered, ideological and political differences between the PDC and the left persist notwithstanding the widely documented shift of the PS and PPD away from revolutionary positions. Ideological
74
differences between the members of each coalition are resilient; they are the dominant factors in party preference. This fact makes the creation of an enduring electoral coalition unlikely, although a reshaping of party competition has occurred, and an important new conict has emerged between the two electoral coalitions.
MILITARY RULE AND THE RESHAPING OF THE PARTY SYSTEM
Between 1973 and 1995, the class cleavage in Chile changed and possibly weakened somewhat, and the religious cleavage faded. These important changes in the Chilean party systems result from the nature of the authoritarian period and the democratic transition.56 Authoritarian regimes, especially long-lived ones, can provoke profound changes in party systems. In Chile, four legacies of military rule and the transition to democracy reshaped the party system. First, the military regime imposed a new electoral system with two-member districts. This decision was taken by presidential advisers who anticipated that two-member districts in which the largest party needed to outpoll the second by at least two to one in order to capture both seats would favour the right. In conjunction with the other processes detailed in this section, this electoral system has, as Carey has skilfully demonstrated, changed party system dynamics from tripartite (leftcentreright) to bipartite (right versus the Concertacio n, the left/centre-left/centre coalition).57 The change in the electoral system has fostered co-operation and policy convergence between the PPD, PDS and PDC. Secondly, the military regime and its political allies reshaped the party system through economic and labour policies that diminished the size of the unionized working class in industrial areas and the political articulation of the working class in the rural areas. The industrial labour force declined by 30 per cent between 1973 and 1983.58 This has had an impact on party competition since, as Przeworski and Sprague have argued, without powerful unions there is no organization to unite workers as a class in relation to other classes, which reduces their chances of becoming a politically organized group.59 Unions in Chile, as in most democracies, have historically been one of the primary political actors to emphasize class, social justice and redistributive questions. Their partial dismantling through repression and neoliberal economic policies that led to reductions in the size of the industrial labour force weakened the organizational inuence of actors with a class discourse. In the rural sector, these neoliberal economic policies dismantled the articulation of political interests of rural workers.60 Weaker unions and a less salient class discourse in the urban and rural areas have weakened the class cleavage between what was the left and the PDC. Although it had important structural consequences, this is initially a political more than a structural/sociological explanation for the reshaping of the Chilean party system. The reduced size of the unionized Chilean working class, which was a key actor in forming a powerful class identity between the 1930s and 1970s, was not an inevitable product of
Eugenio Tironi and Felipe Agu ero, Sobrevivira el Actual Paisaje Pol tico Chileno? Estudios Pu blicos, 74 (1999), 15168. 57 Carey, Parties and Coalitions in Chile in the 1990s. 58 Hector E. Schamis, Reconceptualizing Latin American Authoritarianism in the 1970s: From Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism to Neoconservatism, Comparative Politics, 23 (1991), 20120, at p. 208. 59 Przeworski and Sprague, Paper Stones. See also Kitschelt, The Transformation of European Social Democracy; Kitschelt, Class Structure and Social Democratic Party Strategy. 60 Marcus J. Kurtz, Free Markets and Democratic Consolidation in Chile: The National Politics of Rural Transformation, Politics and Society, 27 (1999), 275301.
56
75
economic modernization or globalization. Rather, these profound transformations were mainly effected by policies of the military dictatorship, which suppressed unions, radically altered labour legislation, and pursued policies that shrank the industrial working class.61 Thus, while structural changes in the Chilean working class have affected party politics, these changes were primarily induced from above and constitute an important political legacy of authoritarian rule that has contributed to the changes in the Chilean party system. In this respect, structural and political explanations go together: political processes (policies adopted by the authoritarian regime) had structural effects (deunionization, increased intraclass fragmentation) that in turn had further political ramications (weakening actors with a class discourse). Thirdly, the neoconservative economic policies adopted by the authoritarian regime favoured specic sectors of the society and punished others. Chile reduced tariffs from a historical high of 94 per cent in 1973 to an average of 10 per cent in 1979.62 Trade liberalization had a severe impact on some industries, increasing bankruptcies and adversely affecting industrialists and the labour force in those sectors. But market opening also dramatically favoured the export-oriented sectors of the economy. This could explain the greater support given to the conservative coalition by the service class, which includes executives and managers of export-oriented corporations. Furthermore, after 1983 policy makers and technocrats formed a coalition with some sectors of the economy for designing and implementing neoconservative economic policies. This coalition of capitalists and landowners, led by producers for the international markets, helped design and implement a gradual neoconservative reform programme after 1983. In part because of political negotiations during the democratic transition, the democratic government has maintained most of these market-oriented policies. However, the beneciaries of market-oriented policies have credited their implementation to the preceding military regime. This fact could help explain the greater support given by the petty bourgeoisie and the service classes to the conservative coalition. Finally, the military regime polarized Chilean society between supporters and critics. In the evocative expression of Constable and Valenzuela, Chile became a nation of enemies.63 The political conict between supporters and critics of military rule has profoundly shaped the post-1989 party system. Whereas the pre-1973 system had a tripartite character, with the left, centre and right all representing competitive poles, post-1989 competition has so far been fundamentally bipolar,64 expressing the divide between those who previously supported and those who opposed the dictatorship. This political cleavage has endured for more than a decade as the most powerful fault line in the party system. The presence of Pinochet as commander-in-chief until 1997 and still as a lifetime senator, inquiries into human rights abuses committed under Pinochet, recent public disputes about the legal process opened in Spain against the dictator and his incarceration in England, and occasional highly publicized rifts between the civilian
61 Alan Angell, Unions and Workers in Chile during the 1980s, in Paul W. Drake and Iva n Jaksic, eds, The Struggle for Democracy in Chile, 19821990 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1991), pp. 188210; Manuel Barrera and J. Samuel Valenzuela, The Development of Labor Movement Opposition to the Military Regime, in J. Samuel Valenzuela and Arturo Valenzuela, eds, Military Rule in Chile: Dictatorship and Opposition (Baltimore, Md: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 23069. 62 Schamis, Reconceptualizing Latin American Authoritarianism in the 1970s, p. 208. 63 Pamela Constable and Arturo Valenzuela, A Nation of Enemies: Chile under Pinochet (New York: W. W. Norton, 1991). 64 Carey, Parties and Coalitions in Chile in the 1990s; Tironi and Agu ero, Sobrevivira el Actual Paisaje Pol tico Chileno?
76
governments and some members of the military have served as ongoing reminders of what brought about this profound divide.65 The political cleavage between supporters and opponents of military rule has remained powerful. Seven years after the 1988 plebiscite and six years after the rst democratic elections, attitudes towards democracy profoundly divided voters of the Concertacio n and the conservative coalition. The 1995 Latinobaro metro asked respondents about their preferred political regime.66 The percentage of voters who always preferred democracy, by party, was UDI, 17 per cent; RN, 36 per cent; PDC, 75 per cent; PPD, 75 per cent and PS, 72 per cent. The very low percentage of UDI and RN identiers who stated that they always favour democracy would have been less striking in the late 1980s given conservative fears about what might transpire under democracy, but it is remarkable how powerful it remained in 1995. Another question that also tapped this divide between democrats and individuals whose commitment to democracy was more equivocal was Which of the following actors would you like to have more power? Thirty-nine per cent of UDI respondents, 28 per cent of RN respondents, 6 per cent of PDC respondents, 9 per cent of PPD respondents, and only 3 per cent of PS respondents answered the military. The divide between those who supported authoritarian rule and those who opposed it on such issues has powerfully structured the post-1989 party system. Redistributive questions were also a source of division between the two coalitions but, compared to the differences on regime preference, the differences were less stark.67 The regime preference question is the most powerful attitudinal difference between supporters of the two coalitions. With the 1995 Latinobaro metro data, we regressed the regime preference question and the distributional question on coalition vote (Table 8, Model 15). The odds ratio for the regime preference is 7.42, and the probability of voting for the centre-left coalition increases 0.34 (from 0.56 to 0.90) when the voter favours democracy. Although the income distribution question also does well in predicting the dependent variable with an odds ratio of 2.11 (the probability of supporting the Concertacio n increases by 0.13, from 0.66 to 0.79), the regime question is easily the most powerful predictor of any variable examined so far. The depth of this conict over regime preference underscores the importance of this legacy in structuring party competition in post-authoritarian Chile. This legacy is the most powerful limitation elites have faced in choosing electoral strategies and recreating political cleavages. This can be observed by the fact that in the competition between PDC and PS (Table 8, Model 16), regime preference is not statistically signicant whereas the income distribution answer is a powerful predictor of voting preferences. The odds ratio is 2.97, which is higher than in the competition between coalitions. The contrasting preferences regarding income differences indicate that questions related to distribution, class and social justice could become a cleavage between the PDC and the PS, but these differences have not powerfully emerged in the political arena.
65 Alexander Wilde, Irruptions of Memory: Expressive Politics in Chiles Transition to Democracy (Authoritarian Legacies Working Group, Institute for Latin American and Iberian Studies: Columbia University, 1998). 66 Respondents were asked which of the following statements they most agreed with: 1. Under some circumstances, an authoritarian regime might be preferable to a democracy. 2. Democracy is always preferable to other political regimes. 3. For people like us, it doesnt matter whether the regime is democratic. 67 In response to a 1995 Latinobaro metro question about whether the current distribution of income was very or fairly unjust, there was agreement among 44 per cent of UDI sympathizers, 47 per cent of RN sympathizers, 59 per cent of PDC sympathizers, 66 per cent of PPD sympathizers, and 81 per cent of PS sympathizers.

TABLE
77
Coalition Vote and PDC/PS Vote by Regime and Distributional Preferences, 1995 (Logistic Regression)
Model 15 Democracia y Progreso (0)/ Concertacio n (1) Regression coefcients Odds ratio 7.42 2.11
Model 16 PDC (0)/PS (1) Regression coefcients 0.15 1.09* 1.83* 329.7 12.8* 0.04 302 Odds ratio 0.85 2.97
Regime preference Distributional perception Constant 2 Log likelihood 2 (d.f. 2) Pseudo R2 (N)
Source: 1995 Latinobaro metro. *Signicant at p 0.01.
2.00* 0.75* 0.22* 421.1 84.1* 0.20 466
A NEW AUTHORITARIAN/DEMOCRATIC CLEAVAGE?
Authoritarian rule in Chile provoked far-reaching changes in political identities. But why have these changes endured after nine years of democratic governments? Is it possible to talk about the existence of an authoritarian/democratic cleavage, as Tironi and Agu ero have suggested?68 To answer this question, clarity about what constitutes a cleavage is essential, and here we need to go beyond the understanding of a social cleavage that we have used so far. Following Bartolini and Mair, a cleavage should be manifested in three distinctive elements: its structural base, the political values of the groups involved, and their political articulation.69 We have already seen that there are structural differences between the two coalitions. The conservative coalition Democracia y Progreso obtains relatively more support from the petty bourgeoisie and the service classes. What about the cultural dimension of the conict? Based on the 1995 Latinobaro metro, Table 9 displays the ordinary least square regression coefcients with the leftright scale as the dependent variable,70 which constitutes the best predictor of coalition preference in previous models. The table depicts the structure of three cultural-ideological divisions that could potentially give rise to political conicts among parties: the authoritarian/democratic cultural division, the perception of social inequality and religious differences. The best predictor of voters ideological identication after controlling for class, age and gender is support for a democratic regime, followed by perceptions of income distribution and religiosity. However, only some of these potential political conicts have inuenced electoral competition. Their inuence on party competition depends on being politicized by parties.
Tironi and Agu ero, Sobrevivira el Actual Paisaje Pol tico Chileno? Bartolini and Mair, Identity, Competition, and Electoral Availability. See also Franklin, The Decline of Cleavage Politics; Kriesi, The Transformation of Cleavage Politics. 70 This scale goes from 0 (left) to 10 (right).
69 68
78

TABLE
Determinants of Ideological Self-Location in Chile, 1995

Model 17: LeftRight Scale (010) Regression coefcients Standard coefcients 0.07 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.01 0.27 0.12 0.10 0.06 0.04
Petty bourgeoisie Service class Routine non-manual Skilled workers Unskilled workers Marginalized self-employed Regime preference Distributional perception Religiosity Age Gender Constant R2 n
0.47** Ref. cat. 0.19 0.48** 0.15 0.04 1.30* 0.61* 0.23* 0.01** 0.19 6.25* 0.12 931
Source: Latinobaro metro 1995. *Signicant at p 0.01. **Signicant at p 0.05. Note: The table shows the regression and standard coefcients of a model based on ordinary least squares regression.
Table 10 contains the coefcients and odds ratio of two voting regression models and two PID regression models (two for coalition preference and two for PDC/PS competition).71 In Model 18 (PID as the dependent variable), one of the best predictors of coalition preference is the respondents evaluations of Pinochet; the probability of supporting the progressive coalition plummets an amazing 0.51 (from 0.88 to 0.37) for respondents who scored Pinochet 7 compared to those who gave him a 1. This is an important factor driving the competition between the two blocs. Model 19 (vote as the dependent variable) reinforces this perception: the authoritarian/democratic conict is the best predictor (odds ratio 6.90) of coalition preference. Ideology also matters in both models. Religiosity and the perception of social inequalities are not statistically signicant, and except for the service class in Model 19, the direct effect of class disappears when all these variables are included. In contrast, the authoritarian/democratic conict does not affect the competition between the PDC and PS (Model 21). Preferences between PS and PDC identiers regarding income distribution are substantively important and statistically signicant at p 0.01 (Models 20 and 21). But as can be seen from the weakness of the class categories in Models 20 and 21, this distribution question is not reected in different class bases between the PDC and PS; i.e., it does not provoke any kind of class political identity (class for itself). Equally interesting, the evaluation of Allende (Model 20) is a substantively important and statistically signicant factor. The probability of supporting the PS instead of the PDC increases 0.36 (from 0.02 to 0.38) with the most compared to the least
These models contain all the independent variables already discussed plus two new ones that measure economic voting: satisfaction with respondents assessments of their personal and the national economic situations (from 1, very good to 5, very bad).
71
TABLE
10
Democracia y Progreso (0)/ Concertacio n de Partidos (1) PDC (0)/PS (1) Model 20: PID (1994) Model 21: Vote (1995) Model 18: PID (1994) Model 19: Vote (1995)
Coalition Support and PDC/PS Competition by Cleavages, Regime Preference and Distributional Perceptions, Chile, 1994 and 1995
Petty bourgeoisie Salariat (service class) Routine non-manual Skilled workers Unskilled workers Non-employed Marginalized self-employed Religiosity Gender Age Urban/rural Regime preference Evaluation of Pinochet Evaluation of Allende Distributional perception Leftright location National economic evaluation Retrospective economic evaluation Government evaluation Constant 2 Log likelihood
Pseudo R2 (N)
1.01 0.57 1.00 0.97 0.70 Ref. cat. 1.28 0.66*** 1.09 0.99 0.74* 1.05 1.12 1.77* 1.39* 0.92 1.63* 2.78 670.3 241.2* 0.24 745
0.45 0.27* 1.97 0.34** 0.83 Ref. cat. 1.17 1.10 0.99 6.90* 1.60 1.66* 1.16 0.83 1.78 286.3 198.5* 0.31 437
0.88 1.23 Ref. cat. 4.32 2.11 0.65 4.40** 2.31** 1.29** 3.78** 0.91 1.47* 3.79* 2.69* 0.88 1.39 0.98 10.72 238.7 138.1* 0.26 399
0.79 1.31 Ref. categ. 0.70 1.08 0.68 1.21 1.27 0.99 0.92 2.54* 1.14** 0.70*** 0.70 1.14 273.6 30.2* 0.10 279
Source: 1994 National Public Opinion Survey, Centro de Estudios Pu blicos (Roper Center Archive CHCEP94227); Latinobaro metro 1995. *Signicant at p 0.01. **Signicant at p 0.05. ***Signicant at p 0.10. 16 d.f. 13 d.f. In 1994 the question was whether the respondent thought economic development or equality of opportunity and social justice were more important social objectives. Note: The table shows the odds ratios generated by logistic regressions for different dependent variables.
79
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favourable evaluation of Allende (7 compared to 1). The diverging evaluations of Allende show that the political legacies of the past are a driving force in the competition between these two parties. These results suggest three conclusions. First, an authoritarian/democratic cleavage is present at all three levels: structural bases, political values and party differences. Secondly, attitudinal differences emerging after the authoritarian experience have not tightly conditioned choices of party leaders in Chile during the democratic transition. Voters in the centre-left camp believe that income distribution is unjust and would prefer greater emphasis on redistribution. In order to maintain intact the governing coalition and consolidate democracy, however, PS and PPD leaders have largely followed a centrist line and have not politicized class and redistributive issues. This helps account for why the class cleavage between the PDC and the left has eroded. PDC, PS and PPD elites have given priority to restoring and consolidating democracy. Neither social class nor religion has been relevant in structuring party competition between the PDC and the centre-left despite the potential for such a conict. Religion helps shape leftright location (Table 9), but it has not crystallized as an important cleavage in the party system. Finally, the legacies of past political conicts, reected in the evaluation of Allende, are an ongoing limitation on the unity of the centre-left coalition despite the strength of the authoritarian/democratic cleavage. The authoritarian/democratic cleavage will probably diminish over time as the memories of the 197390 dictatorship soften, as a new generation of voters comes on the scene, and as the right seeks to distance itself with respect to Pinochet and the dictatorship.72 Nonetheless, this cleavage has persisted for considerable time as the dominant one in democratic Chile. Moreover, if our argument is correct, the authoritarian/democratic cleavage will recede not primarily because of structural or cultural changes, but rather because new political issues will come to the fore and this one will gradually lose its ability to mobilize and differentiate between voters.
ELITE RECRAFTING OF PARTY COMPETITION DURING THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY
The nature of the Chilean transition to democracy fostered elite reshaping of the party system primarily from above in the 198789 period. Chilean civil society mobilized against the dictatorship in 198384, but social mobilization proved incapable of toppling the regime. Pinochet used the fear of mobilization and polarization to bolster his legitimacy and crush the popular protests. From then on, the struggle for democratization was elite led. The fundamental dynamics of the political system revolved around the regime and opposition party leaders. Opposition leaders functioned with considerable autonomy with respect to civil society and traditional party organizations, which had been crushed during the rst dozen years of military dictatorship. The construction of the new conservative parties, RN and UDI, was also engineered from above, with relatively weak constraints from below. Given the dynamics of the Chilean transition to democracy, the process of reorganizing the parties and deciding what line they should adopt was primarily elite led. Small groups of elites got together to determine party strategy and to form the opposition coalition. These
Alejandro Moreno, Political Cleavages: Issues, Parties, and the Consolidation of Democracy (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1999), argues that the authoritarian/democratic cleavage characterizes the party systems of many new democracies, but that it tends to recede over time.
72
81
elites had almost no need to be responsive to demands from within the party organizations because the organizations were still disarticulated. Nor did party leaders need to be attentive to the electoral connection,73 because elections had not been observed. Party leaders in the period of reorganizing the Chilean party system (198789) deliberately de-emphasized class issues, whereas in the 1960s and 1970s they politicized class. During the 1960s and 1970s, the PSs discourse focused on class, dependency and revolution. The party formally embraced MarxismLeninism in 1966, and it regarded itself as a vanguard that would further working-class interests. It explicitly rejected the possibility of class compromise, ofcially embraced revolutionary violence and criticized liberal bourgeois democracy. PS leaders viewed the Christian Democrats as class enemies.74 When they reorganized the Chilean parties in the second half of the 1980s and especially beginning with the preparation for the 1988 plebiscite, party leaders were aware of how disastrous the extreme politicization of class issues had been between the late 1960s and 1973. In response to this and also to the difcult challenge of engineering a transition to democracy in the face of a crafty, well-entrenched military dictatorship that enjoyed considerable popular support, party elites of the democratic opposition deliberately depoliticized class and redistributive issues. Instead, they focused on the importance of reconquering democracy. This was a quintessential pacted transition, and one of the prices of the pact was that major redistributive issues were taken off the agenda. This focus on distinctively political issues reinforced the authoritarian/democratic cleavage and may have diminished the saliency of class cleavages in the party system. After years of bitter rivalries among the opposition parties, as the 1988 plebiscite approached, opposition leaders became determined to exploit that event in order to try to effect a transition to democracy. Believing that a confrontational, mobilizational and polarizing approach would imperil prospects for a democratic transition, they pursued a cautious path. To maintain a united front, which they deemed essential to defeat Pinochet in the 1988 plebiscite, they smoothed over historical enmities. They excluded the Communist Party from their coalition because the PCCh insisted on pursuing a more radical, confrontational, classist strategy. The coalition played down class and redistributive themes and underscored the desirability of restoring democracy. Eschewing class confrontation, it also emphasized the importance of maintaining stability and order and of continuity in economic policy.75 This discourse resonated in Chilean public opinion, which generally rejected the confrontational tactics of the 197073 and 197387 periods. The change in party discourse was especially pronounced in the Socialist Party. By February 1988, when the alliance for the 1988 plebiscite was formed, class discourse was marginal among most Socialist Party leaders. Instead, party leaders focused on democracy
David Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1974). Ignacio Walker, Socialismo y Democracia: Chile y Europa en Perspectiva Comparada (Santiago: CIEPLAN-Hachette, 1990), pp. 13671. 75 Manuel Antonio Garreto n, La Oposicio n Pol tica Partidaria en el Re gimen Militar Chileno: Un Proceso de Aprendizaje para la Transicio n, in Marcelo Cavarozzi and Manuel Antonio Garreto n, eds, Muerte y Resurreccio n: Los Partidos Pol ticos en el Autoritarismo y las Transiciones del Cono Sur (Santiago: FLASCO, 1989), pp. 395465; Eduardo Silva, Capitalist Regime Loyalties and Redemocratization in Chile, The State and Capital in Chile: Business Elites, Technocrats and Market Economics (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1996); Vero nica Montecinos, Economic Policy Elites and Democratization, Studies in Comparative International Development, 28 (1993), 2553; Timothy R. Scully, Chile: The Political Underpinnings of Economic Liberalization, in Jorge I. Dom nguez and Abraham F. Lowenthal, eds, Constructing Democratic Governance: South America in the 1990s (Baltimore, Md: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), pp. 99117.
74 73
82
and the need for compromise in order to achieve it.76 The two competing socialist organizations, product of a 1979 schism, strove to achieve unity and downplay differences. Without signicant changes in the economic model, it would be impossible to radically address redistributive and class issues in the short term. Rather, the coalition leaders emphasized that they would rely on rapid growth to improve everyones standard of living. They argued that the greatest priority needed to be growth and that a successful growth strategy precluded dramatic economic changes intended to suddenly redress class inequalities. Compared to the transitions to democracy in Argentina and Brazil, the Chilean transition was marked by a discourse in which themes of social justice, class and redistributive issues were muted. In Argentina and Brazil, democratic leaders promised to redress social justices and made redistribution a central part of their discourse. Chiles opposition leaders not only faced a recent past (197073) characterized by a particularly painful episode of class confrontation and ideological conict, they also had witnessed the dramatic failures of Argentine and Brazilian democratic presidents (not to mention the even more spectacular failures of democratic presidents in neighbouring Bolivia and Peru) to deliver on their promises of quickly improving living standards for the poor majorities. As a result, the leaders of the Chilean democratic opposition downplayed these themes. Many groups in civil society still favoured a confrontational class discourse and perspective, but they did not have the power to shape the discourse and decisions of party leaders. Opposition party leaders marginalized these more progressive voices, fearing that they could disrupt the transition and, after March 1990, that they could threaten the economic successes of the new governing coalition.77 From 1987 to 1989, political elites had signicant autonomy to reshape the party system from above. A conspicuous example of this autonomy is that in 1987 opposition leaders of PS lineage created a new party, the PPD, Party for Democracy. This partys very name underscores the move from a confrontational class discourse to one that focused on democracy. It would be difcult to construe the creation of the PPD as a response to demands from below. The virtual non-existence of a class or religious cleavage between the left/centre-left and Christian Democrats has been reinforced by the fact that the Socialists and Christian Democrats have been members of the same governing coalition since 1989. PS, PPD and PDC elites have emphasized what brings their coalition together rather than harping on differences. The effort to nd common ground has been a part not only of bargaining about coalition candidates but also of legislative voting; the legislative voting of the PDC members of congress has been close to that of PS and PPD members.78 The mufing of policy differences within the coalition is partly responsible for the changing nature of cleavages in the party system. But ongoing differences among the members of this coalition still exist. As some scholars have argued, class does not appear spontaneously as an important cleavage in party systems.79 Rather, it surfaces as a major cleavage only if parties of the
Garreto n, La Oposicio n Pol tica Partidaria en el Re gimen Militar Chileno; Kenneth Roberts, Deepening Democracy? The Modern Left and Social Movements in Chile and Peru (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1999); Walker, Socialismo y Democracia, pp. 174219. 77 Philip D. Oxhorn, Organizing Civil Society: The Popular Sectors and the Struggle for Democracy in Chile (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995). pp. 21720, 24383. 78 Carey, Parties and Coalitions in Chile in the 1990s. 79 Pakulski and Waters, The Death of Class; Pakulski and Waters, The Reshaping and Dissolution of Social Class in Advanced Society; Przeworski and Sprague, Paper Stones; Sartori, From the Sociology of Politics to Political Sociology.
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left emphasize it. In Chile, the electorally most important parties to the left of centre, the PS and PPD, have downplayed class issues. Following the logic of Przeworski and Sprague, it is no wonder that when the left-of-centre parties eschewed class and redistributive issues, class has not surfaced as a major cleavage in the competition among the PCD and the parties of the left despite attitudinal differences on distributive issues. Whereas Przeworski and Sprague emphasized that socialist and social democratic parties are mainly responsible for politicizing class issues, the Chilean case shows that conservative parties can also activate class cleavages.80 In Chile, the activation of the cleavage between the governing coalition and the conservative opposition was a result of the interaction between different parties, including the conservative ones. Just as class surfaces as a major cleavage in a party system only if parties politicize class issues, the same is true of religion. Religion was an important cleavage at some points in Chiles past, although its salience declined during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Religion became irrelevant as a predictor of party preference in contemporary Chile in part because religious leaders no longer support any particular political ideology or party as a coherent bloc.
CONCLUSION
The post-1989 Chilean party system has been fundamentally structured by specically political variables resulting from the authoritarian regime and the democratic transition. The cleavage between those who supported military rule and those who opposed it stands out above all else. Although a modest class cleavage persists between the governing coalition and the conservative opposition, the main key to understanding the bases of the Chilean party system in the 1990s is political. The military dictatorships in the southern cone and Brazil created opportunities for destroying party loyalties and for creating new ones. In Chile, the military dictatorship led to a persistent realignment in the party system. A deep political cleavage has remained between those who supported military rule and those who opposed it. Military rule profoundly divided Chile politically. It represented a salvation for elite groups threatened by the Allende government, it restored political and economic order based on a different economic policy strategy, and it ultimately (198589) fostered economic growth. With these achievements, it won the deep support of a signicant part of the electorate. But at the same time it persecuted scores of thousands of people, destroyed Chiles lengthy democratic heritage, induced a terrible recession (198183) that led to massive unemployment, exacerbated income inequalities, hurt the non-competitive national sectors of the economy, and reduced the labour force working in them. These results provoked the enmity of another important part of Chilean society. Writing shortly after the transition to democracy, Scully speculated that a political divide between authoritarians and democrats might surface as a new cleavage in the party system alongside the traditional social cleavages (class, religion and rural/urban).81 As Tironi and Agu ero have argued, the democratic/authoritarian cleavage has so far eclipsed the traditional cleavages.82 The political salience of the divide between those who supported and those who opposed the dictatorship has fostered weaker linkages between social groups and parties, thus diminishing the utility of the traditional social cleavage approach.
80 81 82
For a similar argument on the Spanish case, see Chhibber and Torcal, Elite Strategy. Scully, Rethinking the Center, pp. 190202. Tironi and Agu ero, Sobrevivira el Actual Paisaje Pol tico Chileno?
84
Political identities, including party preferences, are mainly formed through political processes. No particular kind of cleavage necessarily dominates a party system. Rather, the cleavages that dominate are themselves the result of a political struggle. Because of political conicts, the authoritarian/democratic cleavage has eclipsed others as the dominant one in post-authoritarian Chile. The main restrictions to reshaping the party system have been political and not societal. Political legacies of authoritarian rule together with political agency since the transition have created new cleavages and reshaped the party system. More than the rst two approaches to the study of party systems discussed in the rst section of this article, we bring politics back into the logic of cleavage and party system formation. The autonomy of the political element of a cleavage goes beyond what the rst two approaches have recognized. It also implies the capacity of political actors through their discourse and policy-making to forge political identities and party preferences. Political identities and party preferences may form along fault lines that are not determined or predicted well by actors sociological locations, but rather are shaped by distinctive political legacies and experiences. Voters may form party preferences not because a party ghts for social groups material and cultural interests, but because a political experience forges collective memories and identities.83 Party competition, the electoral strategies adopted by elites, and electoral platforms and policy making help form these memories and identities once democracy is established. Our article also has implications for the debate about the freezing and thawing of social cleavages. The Western European literature has generally seen social and cultural transformations as the cause of the thawing of social cleavages.84 Without denying that social and cultural transformations affect party systems, we have emphasized the impact of political factors in changing cleavage structures. To understand how Latin American party systems are structured, it is important to look at the supply side of parties, that is, at what political elites create and do.85 The demand side, i.e., the ways in which societal interests shape party systems from below, is important, but an analysis of cleavages from a sociological approach does not satisfactorily explain Latin American party systems. We must also turn our attention to the ways in which political agency and politics shape party systems from above.
83 For a related argument on Central Europe, see Herbert Kitschelt et al., Post-Communist Party Systems: Competition, Representation, and Inter-Party Collaboration (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 84 Inglehart, The Changing Structure of Political Cleavages in Western Society; Inglehart, Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society. 85 A converging approach is Edward Gibson, The Populist Road to Market Reform: Policy and Electoral Coalitions in Mexico and Argentina, World Politics, 49 (1997), 33970. He contends that electoral politics along with policy making have been the main factors explaining the successful rebuilding in Mexico and Argentina of the electoral majorities of populist parties in their road to market reforms.

APPENDIX: THE CLASS VARIABLE
84a
Any assessment of the class bases of parties that rests on survey data must be able to identify the class of survey respondents properly. In this appendix, we address this issue, focusing on how we operationalized survey categories into class categories. Centro de Estudios Pu blicos (CEP) surveys. The 1994 and 1995 Centro de Estudios Pu blicos National Public Opinion Surveys (Roper Center Archive nos. 227/1994 and 236237/1995) asked two questions about employment relations and occupation. The rst is Regarding your activity and occupation, what is your main activity? The answers are (1) managers/executives; (2) armed forces; (3) employees (empleados); (4) workers; (5) others with contracts; (6) unemployed; (7) housework; (8) retired; (9) student; and (10) independent worker. This rst question differentiates the self-employed and owners from all kinds of employees. A follow up question for independent workers is What kind of independent worker are you? The answers are (10) independent worker; (11) independent professional; (12) industrialist, entrepreneur; (13) craftperson; (14) does occasional odd jobs; (15) farm worker; and (16) other. We eliminated category (16), for which the survey provides insufcient information to determine class. The CEP surveys did not include data on the occupation of the head of the household, so we could not use this information (as we do for the 1995 Latinobaro metro and the 1973 CEDOP survey) to determine the class of the non-employed categories. Five of the eleven remaining categories t obviously into the ve classes derived from EriksonGoldthorpe or our marginalized self-employed category and require no further elaboration, but it is essential to explain our decisions about other categories. The classication of the military would vary by rank, but the CEP surveys do not provide this information. The number of cases is very low (0.4 per cent of the respondents in 1994 and 0.5 per cent in 1995), and the socioeconomic prole suggested that it would be best to place them in the service class. In the EriksonGoldthorpe scheme, large employers are part of the service class, but the CEP surveys did not distinguish between large and small entrepreneurs.86 Because small employers vastly outnumber large ones, we placed this category in the petty bourgeoisie category. The inclusion of a few large owners in the petty bourgeoisie category would not affect our results. Empleado frequently has a more specic meaning in Spanish than employee in English and refers mainly to the routine non-manual category. The socioeconomic prole of the empleado category is consistent with this common usage. Obreros in Chile generally refers to unskilled workers, and the data on education, socioeconomic status, and personal and household belongings support this classication. The obreros category is substantially less educated and afuent and has a lower socioeconomic status than independent skilled workers.
TABLE
A1
Construction of the Class Categories with the 1994 and 1995 Centro de Estudios Publicos Surveys
Class category Service class Service class Service class Petty bourgeoisie Petty bourgeoisie Petty bourgeoisie Routine non-manual Skilled workers Unskilled workers Marginalized self-employed Marginalized self-employed
Survey occupation and employment status category Executives Military Independent professionals Industrialists, small or large entrepreneur Independent workers Independent craftsperson Employees Others with a contract Workers (employees) Independent agricultural worker Does occasional odd jobs (independent)
Note: The 1994 Centro de Estudios Pu blicos survey has the Roper Center Archive No. CHCEP94227. It is a national adult survey of 1,495 individuals. The 1995 survey has the Roper Center Archive No. CHCEP95236/237. Also a national adult survey, it had 1,503 respondents.
86
Erikson and Goldthorpe, The Constant Flux, p. 40.
84b
Two survey categories were underspecied for our purposes, and we used socioeconomic data to check the validity of our classications. First is the independent workers subcategory, which accounts for only 0.2 per cent of the 1994 survey and 0.8 per cent of the 1995 survey. We included it in the petty bourgeoisie category because in terms of education, socioeconomic status, and family and personal goods, it was considerably better off than the marginalized independents, worse off than the independent professionals and managers and executives (service class), and close to the industrialists and entrepreneurs. The others with a contract category is also underspecied for our purposes, but it unequivocally refers to an employee rather than an owner or independent worker. We eliminated the possibility that this category could be high-level professional employees (service class) because the data indicate markedly lower socioeconomic status and education and signicantly less afuence than that of the service class. The data also indicate markedly higher education and socioeconomic status and greater afuence than unskilled workers. This left skilled workers (employees) and routine non-manual as the only possibilities. After consultation with Carla Lehmann,87 who oversees the Centro de Estudios Pu blicos surveys, we decided that skilled workers was the best t. Latinobaro metro. The 1995 Latinobaro metro had three overarching employment statuses that correspond exactly to the starting point for Erikson and Goldthorpes scheme: employers, employees and self-employed. It then broke these three broad categories into eight main occupation categories, one of which (other employees) was usefully further subdivided into three subcategories. Eight of the ten resulting original categories can be easily classied into our class categories. The remaining two need to be subdivided. The other employee who does not work in an ofce and is not engaged in writing or working with numbers survey category is insufciently specied to distinguish between skilled and unskilled workers. Lacking a better way to subdivide this category, we did so by education (see Table A2) and classied the more educated as skilled workers and the less educated as unskilled. Although this procedure marks a deviation from Erikson and Goldthorpe, in Chile skilled workers are generally more educated than unskilled workers and, conversely, workers with higher education levels are generally more skilled. In the absence of more precise information in the original survey, there is no better means of distinguishing between skilled and unskilled workers for this survey category. Because the survey category unequivocally belongs to the working class, our assumption (and the resulting operationalization) does not affect the most important conclusions regarding class cleavages. We also subdivided the ambulatory self-employed category as shown in Table A2. The highly educated ambulatory self-employed typically are engaged in production relations characteristic of the petty bourgeoisie; this is not true for the less educated ambulatory self-employed. The ambulatory self-employed with no college education have slightly lower than average socio-economic status than the sample mean and are substantially less likely than the mean respondent to have modern conveniences such as water heaters, refrigerators and cars. The 1995 Latinobaro metro distinguished between owners with 0 to 5 employees and those with 6 or more, but there were only three cases in the latter category. We put these three cases in the petty bourgeoisie because an enterprise with six workers hardly qualies as large. The number of cases is so small that it could not affect substantive results. We classied individuals who were retired or unemployed on the basis of their previous job, and the non-employed with no previous work experience and students on the basis of the occupation of the head of the household. 1973 CEDOP survey of metropolitan Santiago. With approximately eighty occupations that funnel into eight primary occupation categories (V83), this survey provided the most detailed occupational coding of the four we used and made for the best approximation to EriksonGoldthorpe. The rst ve categories (under V83 in Table A3) neatly t one class in the EriksonGoldthorpe scheme. We subdivided the three next categories in V83 (from Agricultural workers, etc. through to Artisan workers, etc.) according to additional information in a subsequent occupation question (V84). Because of spatial constraints, we provide only a sampling of the original survey categories. We classied the non-employed according to the class position of the head of the household (V84). This survey did not provide enough information for enough cases to create a separate poor self-employed category. In all four surveys, information regarding socio-economic status and education was useful in checking the validity of how we grouped different occupational categories. Information about household and personal belongings was also useful in this regard for the three surveys from 1994 and 1995. Details are available from the authors.
87
Telephone conversation with our research assistant, Juan Esteban Montes, 12 April 2001.

TABLE
84c
A2
Construction of the Class Categories with the 1995 Latinobaro metro

Employment status employee self-employed employee employee employer employer self-employed Some college education Up to 12 years education Subdivided by education
Survey occupation category High level executives Independent professionals Professional employees Middle level executives Business owners Small farmers Self-employed (street salespersons)
Class category Service Service Service Service Petty bourgeoisie Petty bourgeoisie Petty bourgeoisie Marginalized self-employed Routine non-manual
Comments
Only well-educated self-employed street salespersons should be classied as petty bourgeoisie.
Other employees who work in an ofce Other employees who do not work in an ofce but spend time writing or working with numbers Other employees who do not work in an ofce and do not spend much time writing or working with numbers
employee
employee
Routine non-manual
employee
10 or more years education Up to 9 years education
Skilled workers
Unskilled workers
Survey does not provide sufcient information to distinguish between skilled and unskilled workers.
Note: Data come from 1995 Latinobaro metro. For Chile, there were 1,240 respondents.
84d

TABLE
A3
Construction of the Class Categories with the 1973 CEDOP Survey

Subdivided by V84 Class category Service class
Survey occupation category (V83) employed categories Professionals and technical people. Engineers and professionals. Researchers, scientists. Lawyers and judges. Doctors. Writers. Executives and employees with leadership responsibilities. Owners (commerce, industry, agriculture) Ofce workers. Typists, operators of ofce machinery. Accountants. Telegraph operators. Shop owners, street salespeople. Agricultural workers, shermen, hunters, miners, wood industry workers. Bus drivers, train engineers, and other transportation workers. Artisan workers in factories, manual workers, mechanics, metal workers, carpenters, electricians, weavers and textile workers, factory workers, construction workers, dock workers, food and tobacco workers.
Service class Petty bourgeoisie Routine non-manual
Petty bourgeoisie Domestic work Workers in general Skilled workers Artisans, self-employed entrepreneurs without workers, independent salespeople (comerciantes) Employees (salespeople, drivers, etc.) Unskilled workers Unskilled workers Skilled workers Petty bourgeoisie
Routine non-manual
Head of households occupation (for non-employed respondents only) (V84) Domestic work Workers in general Skilled workers Artisans, businesspeople without dependents, shop owners (comerciantes) Employees Professionals, technical people Executives, managers Unskilled workers Unskilled workers Skilled workers Petty bourgeoisie Routine non-manual Service class Service class
Source: Roper Center Archive No. CHCEDOPO7345, February 1973, survey of metropolitan Santiago, N 754.

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B.J.Pol.S. 33, 5584 Copyright 2003 Cambridge University Press DOI: 10.

1017/S000712340300003 Printed in the United Kingdom

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