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BIMAL

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SABDAB~DHA

AND

THE PROBLEM

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Sabdabodha has been accepted by the Naiyayikas as a separate type of prami (= Knowledge). Accordingly, the most efficient causal factor (xidhakutama) that generates such a prama (the heard sentence in this case) is a pram@a. In this regard kibdabodha in Nyaya is on a par with perception and inference although it must also be distinguished from them. The idea is that the knowledge episode that is arrived at through speech, i.e., Sabdu, has a unique status distinct from a perceptual episode or an episode of knowledge through inference based on evidence. What is presupposed here is a causal mechanism (causal in an extended sense, for we are talking about a mental episode of a subject as its end-product). &bdu stands for human speech and hence for linguistic utterances. Such utterances are usually made by a speaker, a person who is a participant in a linguistic community. The mechanism can be understood on the basis of the following considerations. 1. The speaker emits sounds which are identifiable as a linguistic utterance. 2. This is done to communicate some knowledge or information to a hearer. 3. The hearer is a participant in the same linguistic community (i.e., he has linguistic competence). 4. The utterance must be that of a sentence which consists of words, sometimes a word and a suffix. (It can consist of a single word in English but that word would be a one-word sentence). 5. The hearer has auditory perception of each word in the utterance. 6. The hearer, as a consequence of 3 and 5, is reminded of the meanings/objects/things associated with each word. 7. The hearer then acquires knowledge of the connected meaning communicated by the utterance. (The hearer thus comes to know what the speaker wants him to be informed of by the utterance.) 8. Several auxiliary factors or episodes of knowledge are worth mentioning to explain how the final knowledge is reached as the end-product.
Journal of Indian Philosophy 16 (1988) 107-122. 0 1988 by Kluwer Academic Publishers.

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8a. The words must be mutually related (syntactically) to constitute a linguistic sentence. Call it syntactic expectancy, for one word or one element expects another word to form together an independent linguistic utterance. This ensures indirectly the grammatical acceptability of the sentence uttered. Words are expected to be grammatically tied; an analytic list of necessary words and suffixes will not do. 8b. The meanings of the word-elements must fit, or be compatible with, each other and the hearer must have some awareness of such compatibility or at least, he must not be aware of any incompatibility or lack of fitness. Call this the fitness condition. Fire and dampness are not compatible, neither are pigs and fly. Another way of putting the same point is to say that if the hearer knows that pigs (the meting of pigs) and fly (the meaning of fly) do not fit he would not have any kibdubodha, any language-generated knowledge from the utterance pigs fly. 8c. Word elements must be spatio-temporarily proximate to each other so that the hearer will be able to discern the togetherness of the two or more word-elements. Call this tisutti, physical proximity. 8d. If some word in the sentence is ambiguous (usually has two or more meanings) the hearer should be able to make an intelligent guess about the speakers intention from the context, the situation of utterance, etc. Thus, ambiguities can sometimes be resolved as in Please, bring me saindhava uttered during a meal by a speaker. Saindhava can either mean a horse or some salt. Obviously the latter meaning is intended by the speaker, as the context no doubt indicates.l
II

In the above analysis of the causal mechanism, the utterance triggers off the process. The knowledge of the word in the hearer (derived from hearing) is the efficient causal factor (instrument) for the final (hearers) knowledge of the meaning of the uttered sentence. The final piece of knowledge (called a pram& also a &Sdabodha) is produced through another intermediate factor called vykptira function or operation, which is in this case the resulting remembrance of the meaning of the individual words from the auditory perception of the words. The theory is that an efficient causal factor (an instrument =

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kura~a) needs an intermediate factor (called vy@tira) to produce the end-product @Mu, in this case a prama).* The following skeletal causal model is pre-supposed. We write with a pen. The pen is an instrument (the most efficient causal factor) for the end-product, writing on the paper. But besides the agent (the writer, who is not considered in this skeletal account), the pen needs to be in physical contact with the paper to produce writing. Such contact with the paper is its vytiphru operation or function or intermediate causal factor. This intermediate causal factor owes its origin to (is caused by) the pen and at the same time causes the writing (the final result) to come about. Hence here is the skeletal causal model:

where I stands for the instrumental cause, V for the intermediate vytiptiru, and R for the end-product. The above model is applied to explain the origin of any mental event, especially the cognitive events we call knowledge-episodes. In the case of perception, the sensory faculty is the instrument. What is instrumental to generate an episode of knowledge (a pramaL) is called an epistemic means (prumtig). Thus the sense-faculty is called prum&zu in the case of perception and the sense-object connection is the intermediate vytiptiru. The end product (R) is the perceptual knowledge. In the case of inference, the knowledge of concomitance or pervasion between the evidence or reason and the inferable feature (stidhyu) is called the pram&u (I), and the combined knowledge (technically called a partimurh, a judgement having a special structure) that the particular evidence in question is such an evidence as is pervaded by the inferable feature is called the intermediate factor or vytiptiru (V). The knowledge of concomitance is usually derived from memory. It is usually a knowledge of the connection between universal features or sortals. But the final premise which gives, i.e., produces, the inferential conclusion - the final episode of knowledge derived from an immediately preceding knowledge-episode - must be of the form: The particular case (P) contains this particular evidence, i.e., instantiation of the same evidence which is pervaded by (concomitant with) the feature we

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intend to infer. Thus the instantiation of the model I + V -+ R in the case of perception is (The sense-organ + the sense-object connection) + Perceptual Knowledge and in the case of inference (Knowledge of concomitance + PartimarSa) -, inference. The same applied to Stibdubodha is given as follows: (Knowledge of the word-elements i- Knowledge of their meanings) -, (hearers) knowledge-episode from &bdu. The above account is based mainly on Gangesa and MathurSnatha. To avoid unnecessary complications, I have omitted references to many minor details as well as the difference of opinion among the Naiyayikas regarding such details. For example, some would argue that the most immediate factor (e.g. the sense-object contact in the case of perception) should be called the most efficient factor, i.e., the instrument (and hence the prum@zu). We need not go into such details here.

III

In the case of the production of the hearers knowledge from the hearing of the utterance (i.e., &&Azbodhu) several other factors demand attention. The hearers knowledge of the word-meanings from the utterances of the words is generated according to the following psychological rule of association and memory. The hearer is a competent language user, and he is acquainted with the connection between word and meaning. This acquaintance or cognition may be called hkti-jhinu or ytti-jritinu. The said connection is called vpti, and an awareness of it would be called vrtti-j&Gzu. The general nomological rule is that whenever such cognition of the connection between the two items is present, a cognition of one will generate remembrance of the other. Hence if words are cognized, meanings are presented to the hearer. This is therefore noted as an auxiliary factor. It is easy to see why this factor is necessary. If the hearer hears a

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word, say a pot and comprehends its meaning, and then remembers through association, another item, say the space (since he recalls that the pot is always in that space), he may then have an awareness where the two items are computed as a pot in a space. But this would not be a knowledge derived from any linguistic expression or iubda, for the second item, the space, was presented in a different way, and not as the meaning of the word (the) space by the utterance of the word(s) (the) space. The above factor is noted so as to ensure that the resulting knowledge is solely generated from linguistic expressions through our cognition of their meanings. Some further considerations enter in the account of the origin of speech-generated knowledge. Naiyayikas note four further auxiliaries, which are also necessary. Even if the bits of knowledge of the wordmeanings are presented by the knowledge of the words in the relevant manner, there must exist syntactic expectancy between the words uttered in sequence. In other words, words must be related to each other in the way they are made to relate in a given linguistic practice. There is syntactic expectancy between Word A and Word B, if the utterance of A cannot contribute to the knowledge of the sentencemeaning without being in combination with Word B. It follows that the utterances of words must follow an established linguistic practice, i.e., the grammar and syntax of a particular language. Some have said that syntactic expectancy is in fact the sequential order in which words and suffixes are arranged in a particular language following its rules of grammar and syntax (Znupiirvi = cikSik@). A sequence of word utterances that violates these established rules will not be potent enough to set the mechanism in action and produce the relevant hearers knowledge. With such input, there is no output such as an episode of word-generated knowledge. The words and inflections may be juxtaposed following the rules of grammar and syntax, but if they are juxtaposed at random in this way, the result may still be at times a nonsensical utterance such as Pigs fly or Drink bananas. These utterances lack semantic fitness or compatibility (yogyatti). Again, such utterances cannot be proper inputs for the &.ibdabodha mechanism. Thus the hearers awareness of fitness, or more generally, his lack of awareness that the items do not fit, is a necessary factor, another auxiliary for language-generated knowledge iibdabodha.

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The hearer should also have clear indication as to the spatiotemporal togetherness of the relevant words. This is ensured by the physical proximity of such words. If the two words, drink and milk, are set apart spatio-temporally, or such words as eat and rice intervene, as in Drink Eat Milk Rice, the hearer will fail to get the message.The hearers awareness of the meaning of this uninterrupted sequence of words is another auxiliary. This seeks to avoid to some extent the structural or constructional ambiguities of sentences. Sometimes in a natural language, we have words with double or multiple meaning, the homonyms or hornphones. In such cases,the context of utterances helps the hearer to resolve ambiguities and get at the meaning intended by the original speaker. An awareness of this is necessary. This is called ttitparya-jfitina, awareness of the speakers intention. If somebody asks for a pen while writing, it may be assumed that he intends (to get) a writing pen, not a play-pen or oxpen. Although it is not often obvious, an awareness of the speakers intention can be a very general condition for Gbdabodha, a key to interpreting any utterance made. Otherwise, a parrots utterance may prompt us to action. Recorded messagesdo prompt us to action but that is because we hear them as spoken by the original speaker, not by the tape-recorder.
IV

So far, I have delineated the maintstream view in the Navya-Nyaya tradition ignoring any difference of opinion and controversies within the Nyaya tradition or even between the Nyaya schools and others. My concern here has been to give a causal account of the origin of the mental episode called itibdabodha, i.e., the hearers knowledge from the linguistic utterance, underlining the usual nomological connection between mental events. &bdabodha is also used, by extension, to refer to the description of the content of the hearers relevant knowledge. Given a sentence-utterance, one may ask: What is its jtibdabodha? The answer is presumably given by describing the knowledge-episode which is produced in the hearer by the utterance. In this way, an instance of Stibdabodha is given by the description of exactly the message contained in and communicated through the

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utterance of the sentence. This description corresponds very roughly to what we sometimes call a paraphrase, provided such paraphrasing is done following a definite set of translational rules. The idea is to represent the meaning of each word along with its semantic connection with others in the cluster. Implicit relations are thereby made explicit and the meaning intended by the speaker of the original sentences is supposed to be rendered unambiguous. This process is variously called Gbdabodha, anvayabodha or vcikytirtha-bodha (knowledge of the meaning of the sentence).3 I have used the word meaning here with some trepidation. It is clear from the above that the Naiyayikas along with many others in India were trying to articulate the hearers meaning. Meaning, as the modern adage goes, is not in the heads of the speakers, nor is it in the heads of the hearers. In actuality the hearers at times may hear but not fully comprehend what is said. What goes on in the inner world of the individual hearer is not presumably accessible to us. We therefore conceive here an ideal hearer who is also a competent language-user. The idea is that the structured awareness or knowledgeepisode that is supposed to arise (being caused in the above manner) in the ideal hearer is what is shared by all language-users and hence inter-subjectively available. The knowledge-episodes arising in all individual hearers are distinct events, but on this theory all such events share the same structured content, provided the original causal mechanism is triggered off by the utterance of the same sentence in the same or similar situations (by the same speaker). In fact, the ideal hearer is like a computing machine, where the input would be the utterance and the output would be a corresponding uniquely structured knowledge-episode. In conceiving such an ideal hearer we have to exclude obviously a number of other variable factors that may inhibit the functioning of the said machine, The Naiyayikas have claimed in this way that an account or analysis (or structural description) of the object-complex grasped by the knowledge-episode would be an account of the meaning of the sentence. Hence the equation: Gbdabodha = vtikytirthabodha. The meaning is the object-complex related in a given manner that has been grasped by the knowledge of the hearer when he heard the sentence uttered. The said knowledge-episode is qualificative in character. Its struc-

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ture is assumed to be attributive-substantive in form (that is, it is in qualifier-qualificand model), and hence the structural description seeks to identify what qualifies what. If x is qualified by y then x can be called the qualificand, the substantive, and y the qualifier, the attribute. The lexical items along with the grammatico-syntactic elements of the uttered sentence are mapped onto the object-complex of the said knowledge-episode following some conventional rules of mapping. There is however difference of opinion among philosophers as to which word in the sentence would contribute its meaningelement as the chief qualificand, the chief substantive. The chief qualificand is the nucleus around which the other elements would gather as qualifier, qualifier of the qualifier, the bonding agent between a qualifier and a qualificand and so on. The Grammarians and the Mimamsakas believe that the principal element in a sentence is the verb itself and hence the part of the meaning-complex of the verbal expression should be the chief qualificand. In Sanskrit, the verbal expression has two main parts, the verbal stem and the verbal suffix. E.g. pacati (cooks) = (a)ti, According to the Vaiyakaranas (Grammarians), the meaning of the verbal stem (e.g. pat) is dominant, and therefore this should be selected as the prinis in cipal qualificand while a structural description of the &b&b&ha order.4 Ramah annam pacati (= Rama cooks rice). It should first be analysed into the constituent lexical and grammatical elements (altogether six such elements here) as Rrlma + s/amra + am/pat + (a)ti,,/ Here ti which is technically called Gkhyda here, means agency which qualifies the meaning of the verbal stem pat, i.e., the cooking or the action conducive to cooking. In fact the verbal stem is said.to have both meanings, the result (phala = cooking) and the activity conducive to such result. The meaning of the second inflection, am, in the nominal stem, anna, is karma, the accusative, i.e., the substratum of accusativeness, and this is connected with the meaning of the stem itself by the relation of identity. I.e., the substratum denoted by am is identical with rice (the meaning of amra). This complex is then

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connected (being the accusative) with the meaning of the verbal stem, cooking = softening of the rice grain as well as the operation or activity conducive to such softening. The &hy~2u, i.e., ti, has three meanings apart from meaning agency: a substratum, a number (singular), and a particular time (present time). The one with the first inflection, Rama, is connected with the substratum of agency by the relation of identity, the number also goes along with it, and the present time qualifies the operation or activity, one of the meanings of the verbal stem. Besides, I have already noted that the meaning of ti qualifies the meaning of pad. Hence the description of the content of the Sabdabodha, according to the VaiyZkarana, is as follows:
I. It is the activity, which is presently taking place, which is tied to the substratum which is identical with one (single) Rama, and which is conducive to the softening located in the substratum which is identical with rice.5

In the above presentation, I have followed the old Vaiyakaranas. The New Vaiyakaranas would have a slightly different structural description. Roughly the New School would say:
Ia. The activity of cooking occurring in present time has an agent (qualified by Rama as its agent) which is identical with R$ima and qualified by rice which is connected with it by way of being its object.

According to the Mim?irnsaka, the meaning of the verbal suffix or Bkhyata, not of the stem, should be the principal qualificand. This meaning is identified by the Mim+sakas as bhtivunti making something to be, to become or to happen. Apadeva has defined bhtivunti as bhtivitur bhtivaminukzilo bhtivaka-vytiptiraviSesah.6 It is argued that in each sentence there is a verb, and in each verb there is an implicit verb bhti, to be, to become. When something becomes, that which happens or becomes is called bhavitr become-er and it presupposes something else that makes it become, and the second item is called bh&aka or bhtivayitr maker of becoming. Bhtivanti is the operation or function of the maker conducive to his making whatever he makes. Bhavana is therefore the making function. This is expressed by the akhyata, ti in pacati , and according to the Mimarnsakas, this meaning is the chief qualificand which the action of cooking qualifies as a qualifier. In fact, the action of cooking becomes the object

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(karma) or the instrument (karana) of the making function @h&ma)). Pacati (cooks) is paraphrased as p&ur;n kuroti (makes cooking), and annap pacati (cooks rice) is paraphrased as plEkena anna~ karoti (makes rice by cooking). Here the meaning of the verbal stem takes the role of a ktiraka, a maker, an auxiliary to making, just as the meanings of the nominal stems are (and hence they take ktiraka inflections explicitly). Consider the sentence: Ramah kasfhena annam pacati (Rama cooks rice with fire-wood) The initiul paraphrase on this view would be: Ramah kasfhena pakena am-ramkaroti (R5ma makes rice by cooking by firewood). The final structural description of the knowledge would be
II. It is a making function, which is happening at present, which is done through the instrumentality of cooking (i.e. qualified by cooking). which (cooking) has rice as its object-goal (karma) and is done through the instrumentality of firewood, and it is the making function qualified by Rama as its agent.

To avoid complications I have omitted the mention of singularity or singleness (expressed by the singular suffixes) in such items as the karma (rice), and the agent (Rama). I have also avoided complications inthe English presentation by not giving the detailed analysis of the connection between such items as makiirg function and cooking, cooking and rice, cooking and firewood. The Naiyayikas however give a different analysis, for they believe that the word with the first ending (pruthamti vibhakti) should be given primacy in a sentence and hence its meaning should be selected as the chief qualificand. All the other meaning elements including that of the verbal stem or verbal suffix should be connected with this element as its qualifiers. To use an imagery, according to the Vaiyakaranas, the meaning of the verbal stem, and according to the MimSrnsakas, the meaning of the final verb suffix, should be at the centre around which all the other meaning-elements should cluster. According to the Naiyayikas, the meaning of the word with the first

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ending, (usually the nominative or the subject) should be at the centre around which other elements should rotate. The meaning of ti in pacati on this view is the effort, a property, which can be located in the agent who cooks. Udayana in Nytiyakusu_ _ mtirijali gives the initial paraphrase of pacati (cook) as pakanukdavartamana-yatna-vtin (possesseseffort at present conducive to cookJ8 The Naiyiyikas in this regard have sometimes been followed by the &ck%ikas and Vedtitins. Consider the sentence: Ram+ mahtiase k&.hana armg pacati (In the kitchen Rama cooks rice with firewood.) The structural description of the relevant hearers knowledge (generated in the above manner by the utterance) would be:
III. It is Rrima who is qualified by the effort that is conducive to cooking, which cooking has rice as its object-goal (i.e. qualified by the object-hood in rice), which is qualified by instrumentality in firewood, and it is the same Rtia who is qualified by being located in the kitchen.

The last clause can also be written as


IIIa. . . . which cooking is qualified by being located in the kitchen.9

In fact IIIa. would be more in accordance @h the grammatical convention according to which the locative is a ktiraka which provides the location of the action. (See definition of the location in Pm.) lo The above way of representing the knowledge-content is admittedly very cumbersome and tenuous especially in its English version. In Sanskrit however, part of the complexity is resolved by natural nominalizations, compound-formation, etc., which are very common features of the Sanskrit language. To represent clearly the structure or formation of this rather artificial description of the knowledge-content, we may use a device which I had suggested in 1968 (The Navya-nytiya Doctrine of Negation). l1 Use Q for qualification-connector and read Q(ab) as a (is) qualified by b. Allow the following formulas: (9 (ii)

Q (ab) Q (bc)

Q (ab) Q (4 = Q (a(bc)).
=

Q (a Q (lx)).

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Read (i) as a (is) qualified by both b and c and (ii) as a (is) qualified by b which is qualified by c. Using this convention we may represent IIIa. as IIIa. Q (a

Q (e Q WW>

Where a = Rama, e = effort, c = cooking, Y = rice, f = firewood and k = kitchen. The above structural representation both reveals and conceals. We have used a simple connector-function, a two-place predicate Q. But in each case the specific nature of this connector is different and hence it needs to be spelled out in each case to reveal the structure in full. In the fully explicit Sanskrit representation, each connector is articulated in language. For example, the connector between cooking and rice is the objecthood that is resident (ni@za) in rice and conditioned (nirzi@ta) by cooking. When a deeper analysis is required, it would be represented by saying that cooking is connected with objecthood and objecthood is connected with rice. Writing 0 for objecthood we can write: Q (c r, Ro). and read it as Rice qualifies cooking through objecthood connector. These connectors or mixers between the meaning-elements are usually of two types: non-identity and identity. Non-identity has various sub-categories, owner-owned (represented usually by the genitive), location-locatable (represented by locative suffixes), objecthood, goalhood, contenthood (all represented by the accusative suffix in comrection with various verbs, cooking, going and knowing), etc. In fact the connectors are regarded as the semantic counterpart of various syntactic-grammatical elements represented in the surface structure of the sentence. Identity is usually the connector between the meaningelements where two or more words are appositional (same endings or
vibhakti).

In the above analysis, the following correlation between the linguistic elements and the corresponding components of the knowledgecontent of the hearer has been made;
Linguistic elements Components of knowledge

The word RGna(4-s)

Rama

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The verbal suffix ti The stem pat + Mahanasa + The affix (locative) -e
ktigha +

The instrumental suffix -ena Anna + The accusative am The affix s in Ramah

The Effort (= krti) The action of cooking kitchen location or occurrenthood firewood instrumentality rice objecthood The meaning of the stem itself
(Prtitipadiktirtha).
V

Both the Naiyayikas and the Vaiyakaranas (also the Mim5rpsakas) have given arguments to support their respective positions. The details of these arguments I shall omit here. Only one argument may be mentioned. This is based upon the supposed relationship between a sentence with a sub-sentence. Consider: Look, the deer runs = Pasya mrgo dhavati The VaiyGkaranas argue that since this is to be treated as a single sentence with one principal qualificand in the content of the verbal knowledge, their own analysis with the meaning of the verbal stem as the principal element provides a better structural description. A. It is the seeing (by you) which is the object of command, and which has the running as its object, which running belongs to the deer as its agent.12

Here since the object (karman) is expressed by a verbal stem (dhtivana = run), and not by a nominal stem, one would not expect a second ending am (those endings are specifically meant for nominal stems). The proto-analysis of the Naiyayikas would have been A.* The deer is qualified by the effort conducive to running, and your being the location of seeing is the object of command.

Here clearly we have two sentences joined by and, and the two components are independent of each other. But this is counter-

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intuitive. For intuitively this sentence is to be treated as a single sentence with a subordinate clause or subsentence. If however the first part is made dependent upon the latter part, the deer would undoubtedly be the object (of seeing) and hence and word for deer would have to be inflected with the second (accusative) ending. The Naiyayikas do not think this to be a serious argument. For the above sentence can also be explained on their theory as one single sentence with one subordinate clause. B. You are the locus of a commanded seeing, which seeing has such deer as its object, as is qualified by the effort conducive to running.13

Here the entire sentence (sub-sentence) the deer runs conveys the object of seeing, not simply the expression for the deer, and therefore there is no scope for the second (accusative) ending to appear as an inflection for the sub-sentence. Such inflection to be sure appears in the case of nominal stems only.
VI

I shall conclude by noting a few arguments of the Naiyayikas in support of language-generated knowledge as a separate knowledge, distinct from perception or inference. In other words, a question generally arises: Why should the hearers relevant knowledge from the utterance not be a special case of inference or even a case of perception? Why should it be regarded as another category of knowledgeepisodes, called verbal knowledge? Both the Vaisesikas and the Buddhists have settled for inference. That is, for them this so-called verbal knowledge or speech-generated knowledge is only a special case of inference. But the Naiyayikas find it important to distinguish verbal knowledge from both perception and inference. I shall note only two arguments here which will be based on JagadiSa.14 Jagadisa says that the verbal knowledge or A3~&bodha or the knowledge-episode arising in the hearer from the utterance of a sentence has always a determinate structure that constitutes it (niyuntrittirtha). This determination is a causal determination, the structure of the object-complex being uniquely determined by the

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particular sentence that is uttered. In the case of perceptual knowledge such unique determination is absent. For example, consider a perceptual situation where a cat is sitting on the mat. The object-complex which produces the perceptual awareness has a neutral structure, a cat, a mat and a connection. The resulting perceptual knowledge may have either of the two forms: The cat is ON the mat or The mat is UNDER the cat. The verbal expressions of the perceptual knowledge reveal different structures. But the utterance of The cat is ON the mat would produce in the hearer a knowledge-episode with a determinate structure. It is the cat qualified by the occurrence-in-the-mat. From the utterance of The mat is UNDER the cat there will be a different knowledge-episode in the hearer. The same feature, that of having a structure uniquely determined by the particular utterance, distinguishes language-generated knowledge from inference also. In inference, the final knowledge-episode is produced by what is called a pmimarSa, a combined judgement based upon an awareness of the presence of evidence or Zirigu or hetu, and another awareness (knowledge) of its concomitance with the inferable feature, the sdhyu. The combined judgement may take either of the two forms (revealing two different structures of the object-complexes of the knowledge): The hill ,has smoke which is concomitant with fire or There is such smoke on the hill as is concomitant with fire. These judgements lead to knowledge-episodes having two different structures (hence they are distinguishable). The hill has fire or There is fire on the hill. Although the verbal expressions of these two knowledge-episodes imply each other, the knowledge-episodes themselves are different as episodes. Hence the structural content of the inferential knowledgeepisode is not uniquely determined by the evidence or the inferential

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mark, Zitiga. From the evidence adduced, we may infer either The hill has fire or There is fire on the hill. But from the uttered sentence The hill has fire there will arise a verbal knowledge-episode with a uniquely determined structure. Thus, arguably, a Sabdabodha, the hearers knowledge, has a distinct feature and it is distinguished from perception and inference. But of course, if we wish to put little importance on this feature of having a uniquely determined structural content, the distinction between inference and Gbdabodha may be eliminated.
NOTES * This was presented at a Conference in Bangalore, December 1986. I wish to thank Dr. A. Chakrabarti, who read an earlier draft, for criticisms and suggestions. All these terms have been explained by modern writers in various ways. See B. K. Matilal, Logic, Language and Reality, Delhi, 1985, chapter 5. 2 This was first discussed in Matilals The Doctrine of Karana in Grammar and Logic, Ganganath Jha Research Journal, 1961; the main points are incorporated in Matilal, 1985. 3 GarigeSa, Tattvacintama~i, &bda-kha@a, Calcutta. 4 See also Matilal, The Indian Theorists on the Nature of the Sentence (vtikya), Foundations of Language, 1967. 5 Vartamanakalina-R;imabhinnakaytmistha-alavyaparah. 6 Apadeva, Mimri~s&ny~yaprak~a, ed. F. Edgerton. Rama-nisfha-vartamana-k~~a-kasfha-kara~aka-~na-karmaka-p~k~nuk~la-bh~v~~. 8 Udayana, Nytiyakusumaiijali, Chapter 3. 9 Mahanasadhikaranaka-anna-karmaka-kasfhnin R?imalJ. lo adharo dhikaranam - is explained as katr-karma-vyavahitah kriyay+ adharal$. I1 B. K. Matilal, The Navya-nyciya Doctrine of Negation, Cambridge (Mass), 1968, Part 1. r2 Vartamana-k~~a-mrga-nistha-dhavana-karm~a-dar~~~uk~a-vy~p~r~ (tvan.. @ha). I3 dhavananuk~la-vyap8ra-van-mrga-karmaka-aavyapka-van tvam. I4 Jagadisa, $abdaSaktiprakZikci (ed. M. Nyayacharya, Calcutta, 1984).