G.R. No.

101538 June 23, 1992

AUGUSTO BENEDICTO SANTOS III, represented by his father and legal guardian, Augusto Benedicto Santos vs. NORTHWEST ORIENT AIRLINES and CA

FACTS: The petitioner is a minor and a resident of the Philippines. Private respondent Northwest Orient Airlines (NOA) is a foreign corporation with principal office in Minnesota, U.S.A. and licensed to do business and maintain a branch office in the Philippines. On October 21, 1986, the petitioner purchased from NOA a round-trip ticket in San Francisco. U.S.A., for his flight from San Francisco to Manila via Tokyo and back. The scheduled departure date from Tokyo was December 20, 1986. No date was specified for his return to San Francisco. On December 19, 1986, the petitioner checked in at the NOA counter in the San Francisco airport for his scheduled departure to Manila. Despite a previous confirmation and re-confirmation, he was informed that he had no reservation for his flight from Tokyo to Manila. He therefore had to be wait-listed.

On March 12, 1987, the petitioner sued NOA for damages in the RTC of Makati. On April 13, 1987, NOA moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, citing Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention, reading as follows:

Art. 28. (1) An action for damage must be brought at the option of the plaintiff, in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, either before the court of the domicile of the carrier or of his principal place of business, or where he has a place of business through which the contract has been made, or before the court at the place of destination.

The private respondent contended that the Philippines was not its domicile nor was this its principal place of business. Neither was the petitioners ticket issued in this country nor was his destination Manila but San Francisco in the United States. Lower court granted the dismissal, CA affirmed. ISSUE: WON the Philippines has jurisdiction over the case. (Issue raised by the party is WON the provision of the Warsaw convention was constitutional) HELD: No jurisdiction (the provision is constitutional) The Convention is a treaty commitment voluntarily assumed by the Philippine government and, as such, has the force and effect of law in this country. The petitioners allegations are not convincing enough to overcome this presumption. Apparently, the Convention considered the four places designated in Article 28 the most convenient forums for the litigation of any claim that may arise between the airline and its passenger, as distinguished from all other places. CADALIN VS POEA 238 SCRA 721 Facts: On June 6, 1984, Bienvenido M. Cadalin, Rolando M. Amul and Donato B. Evangelista, in theirown behalf and on behalf of 728 other overseas contract workers (OCWs) instituted a class suit by filingan "Amended Complaint" with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) for moneyclaims arising from their recruitment by AIBC and employment by BRII . BRII is a foreign corporation with headquarters in Houston, Texas, and is engaged inconstruction; while AIBC is a domestic corporation licensed as a service contractor to recruit, mobilizeand deploy Filipino workers for overseas employment on behalf of its foreign principals. The amended complaint principally sought the payment of the unexpired portion of theemployment contracts, which was terminated prematurely, and secondarily, the payment of the interest ofthe earnings of the Travel and Reserved Fund, interest on all the unpaid benefits; area wage and salarydifferential pay; fringe benefits; refund of SSS and premium not remitted to the SSS; refund ofwithholding tax not remitted to the BIR; penalties for committing prohibited practices; as well as thesuspension of the license of AIBC and the accreditation of B Issue: Whether or not the proceedings conducted by the POEA, as well as the decision that is the subject of these appeals, conformed with the requirements of due process. Whether or not what is the prevalent law to be applied in this case, Art. 291 of Labor Code or Art. 1144 of Civil Code. Ruling: Wherefore, all the three petitions are dismissed. The three petitions were filed under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court on the grounds thatNLRC had committed grave

abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing thequestioned orders. We find no such abuse of discretion. NLRC believed money claims-all money claims arising from employer-employee relationsaccruing during the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three (3) years from the time the cause ofaction accrued, otherwise they shall be forever barred. This is embodied in the Article 291 of Labor Codewhich the petitioners failed to comply. It applied the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976, which provides forgreater benefits than those stipulated in the overseas-employment contracts of the claimants. It was of thebelief that "where the laws of the host country are more favorable and beneficial to the workers, then thelaws of the host country shall form part of the overseas employment contract." Its interpretation is applicable to contracts of adhesion where there is already a prepared formcontaining the stipulations of the employment contract and the employees merely "take it or leave it." Thepresumption is that there was an imposition by one party against the other and that the employees signedthe contracts out of necessity that reduced their bargaining power.

NORSE MANAGEMENT CO. (PTE) and PACIFIC SEAMEN SERVICES, INC., petitioners, vs. NATIONAL SEAMEN BOARD, HON. CRESCENCIO M. SIDDAYAO, OSCAR M. TORRES, REBENE C. CARRERA and RESTITUTA C. ABORDO, respondents. Facts: Napoleon B. Abordo, the deceased husband of private respondent Restituta C. Abordo, was the Second Engineer of M.T. "Cherry Earl" when he died from an apoplectic stroke in the course of his employment with petitioner NORSE MANAGEMENT COMPANY (PTE). The M.T. "Cherry Earl" is a vessel of Singaporean Registry. In her complaint for compensation benefits filed before the National Seamen Board, private respondent alleged that the amount of compensation due her from petitioners should be based on the law where the vessel is registered. Petitioners contend that the law of Singapore should not be applied in this case because the National Seamen Board cannot take judicial notice of the Workmen's Insuran ce Law of Singapore instead must be based on Boards Memeorandum Circular No. 25. Ministry of Labor and Employment ordered the petitioner to pay jointly and severally the private respondent. Petitioner appealed to the Ministry of Labor but same decision. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not the law of Singapore ought to be applied in this case. Held: The SC denied the petition. It has always been the policy of this Board, as enunciated in a long line of cases, that in cases of valid claims for benefits on account of injury or death while in the course of employment, the law of the country in which the vessel is registered shall be considered. In Section 5(B) of the Employment Agreement between petitioner and respondents husband state s that In the event of illness or injury to Employee arising out of and in the course of his employment and not due to his own willful misconduct, EMPLOYER will provide employee with free medical attention. If such illness or injury incapacitates the EMPLOYEE to the extent the EMPLOYEE's services must be terminated as determined by a qualified physician designated by the EMPLOYER and provided such illness or injury was not due in part or whole to his willful act, neglect or misconduct compensation shall be paid to employee in accordance with and subject to the limitations of the Workmen's Compensation Act of the Republic of the Philippines or the Workmen's Insurance Law of registry of the vessel whichever is greater. Finally, Article IV of the Labor Code provides that "all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this code, including its implementing rules and resolved in favor of labor.

G.R. No. L-66006 February 28, 1985 BAGONG FILIPINAS OVERSEAS CORPORATION and GOLDEN STAR SHIPPING, LTD., petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION, DIRECTOR PATRICIA SANTO TOMAS and PROSERFINA PANCHO respondents. Elizer A. Odulios for petitioners. Pedro L. Linsangan for respondent P. Pancho.

AQUINO, J.: The issue in this case is whether the shipboard employment contract or Hongkong law should govern the amount of death compensation due to the wife of Guillermo Pancho who was employed by Golden Star Shipping, Ltd., a Hongkong based firm. The shipboard employment contract dated June 1, 1978 was executed in this country between Pancho and Bagong Filipinas Overseas Corporation, the local agent of Golden Star Shipping. It was approved by the defunct National Seamen Board. Pancho was hired as an oiler in the M/V Olivine for 12 months with a gross monthly wage of US $195.

In October, 1978, he had a cerebral stroke. He was rushed to the hospital while the vessel was docked at Gothenberg, Sweden. He was repatriated to the Philippines and confined at the San Juan de Dios Hospital. He died on December 13, 1979.

The National Seamen Board awarded his widow, Proserfina, P20,000 as disability compensation benefits pursuant to the above-mentioned employment contract plus P2,000 as attorney's fees. Proserfina appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission which awarded her $621 times 36 months or its equivalent in Philippine currency plus 10% of the benefits as attorney's fees. Golden Star Shipping assailed that decision by certiorari.

We hold that the shipboard employment contract is controlling in this case. The contract provides that the beneficiaries of the seaman are entitled to P20,000 "over and above the benefits" for which the Philippine Government is liable under Philippine law.

Hongkong law on workmen's compensation is not the applicable law. The case of Norse Management Co. vs. National Seamen Board, G. R. No. 54204, September 30, 1982, 117 SCRA 486 cannot be a precedent because it was expressly stipulated in the employment contract in that case that the workmen's compensation payable to the employee should be in accordance with Philippine Law or the Workmen's Insurance Law of the country where the vessel is registered "whichever is greater".

The Solicitor General opines that the employment contract should be applied. For that reason, he refused to uphold the decision of the NLRC.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the National Labor Relations Commission is reversed and set aside. The decision of the National Seamen Board dated February 26, 1981 is affirmed. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

PIA VS OPLE Leave a comment

PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES (PIA) CORPORATION vs HON. BLAS F. OPLE, in his capacity as Minister of Labor; HON. VICENTE LEOGARDO, JR., in his capacity as Deputy Minister; ETHELYNNE B. FARRALES and MARIA MOONYEEN MAMASIG G.R. No. 61594 September 28, 1990 FACTS: On 2 December 1978, petitioner Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (PIA), a foreign corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines, executed in Manila 2 separate contracts of employment, one with private respondent Farrales and the other with private respondent Mamasig. 1 The contracts, which became effective on 9 January 1979, provided in pertinent portion as follows: 5. DURATION OF EMPLOYMENT AND PENALTY This agreement is for a period of 3 years, but can be extended by the mutual consent of the parties. xxx xxx xxx 6. TERMINATION xxx xxx xxx Notwithstanding anything to contrary as herein provided, PIA reserves the right to terminate this agreement at any time by giving the EMPLOYEE notice in writing in advance one month before the intended termination or in lieu thereof, by paying the EMPLOYEE wages equivalent t o one months salary. xxx xxx xxx 10. APPLICABLE LAW: This agreement shall be construed and governed under and by the laws of Pakistan, and only the Courts of Karachi, Pakistan shall have the jurisdiction to consider any matter arising out of or under this agreement. Farrales & Mamasig (employees) were hired as flight attendants after undergoing training. Base station was in Manila and flying assignments to different parts of the Middle East and Europe. roughly 1 year and 4 months prior to the expiration of the contracts of employment, PIA through Mr. Oscar Benares, counsel for and official of the local branch of PIA, sent separate letters, informing them that they will be terminated effective September 1, 1980. Farrales and Mamasig jointly instituted a complaint, for illegal dismissal and non-payment of company benefits and bonuses, against PIA with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE). PIAs Contention: The PIA submitted its position paper, but no evidence, and there claimed that both private respondents were habitual absentees; that both were in the habit of bringing in from abroad sizeable quantities of personal effects; and that PIA personnel at the Ma nila International Airport had been discreetly warned by customs officials to advise private respondents to discontinue that practice. PIA further claimed that the services of both private respondents were terminated pursuant to the provisions of the employment contract. Favorable decision for the respondents. The Order stated that private respondents had attained the status of regular employees after they had rendered more than a year of continued service; that the stipulation limiting the period of the employment contract to 3 years

was null and void as violative of the provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing rules and regulations on regular and casual employment; and that the dismissal, having been carried out without the requisite clearance from the MOLE, was illegal and entitled private respondents to reinstatement with full backwages. Decision sustained on appeal. Hence, this petition for certiorari ISSUE: (Relative to the subject) Which law should govern over the case? Which court has jurisdiction? HELD: Philippine Law and Philippine courts Petitioner PIA cannot take refuge in paragraph 10 of its employment agreement which specifies, firstly, the law of Pakistan as the applicable law of the agreement and, secondly, lays the venue for settlement of any dispute arising out of or in connection with the agreement onl y [in] courts of Karachi Pakistan. We have already pointed out that the relationship is much affected with public interest and that the otherwise applicable Philippine laws and regulations cannot be rendered illusory by the parties agreeing upon some other law to govern their relationship. the contract was not only executed in the Philippines, it was also performed here, at least partially; private respondents are Philippine citizens and respondents, while petitioner, although a foreign corporation, is licensed to do business (and actually doing business) and hence resident in the Philippines; lastly, private respondents were based in the Philippines in between their assigned flights to the Middle East and Europe. All the above contacts point to the Philippine courts and administrative agencies as a proper forum for the resolution of contractual disputes between the parties. Under these circumstances, paragraph 10 of the employment agreement cannot be given effect so as to oust Philippine agencies and courts of the jurisdiction vested upon them by Philippine law. Finally, and in any event, the petitioner PIA did not undertake to plead and prove the contents of Pakistan law on the matter; it must therefore be presumed that the applicable provisions of the law of Pakistan are the same as the applicable provisions of Philippine law. [DOCTRINE OF PROCESSUAL PRESUMPTION, eh?] Petition denied.

SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 297 SCRA 469 1998

FACTS:

Herein private respondent Milagros P. Morada is a flight attendant for petitioner SAUDIA airlines, where the former was tried to be raped by Thamer and Allah AlGazzawi, both Sauidi nationals and fellow crew member, after a night of dancing in their hotel while in Jakarta, Indonesia. She was rescued. After two weeks of detention the accused were both deported to Saudi and they were reinstated by Saudia. She was pressured by police officers to make a statement and to drop the case against the accused; in return she will then be allowed to return to Manila and retrieved her passport. For the second time, she was asked by her superiors to again appear before the Saudi court. Without her knowledge, she was already tried by Saudi court together with the accused and was sentenced to five months imprisonment and to 286 lashes in connection with Jakarta rape incident. The court found her guilty of (1) adultery; (2) going to a disco, dancing and listening to the music in violation of Islamic laws; and (3) socializing with the male crew, in contravention of Islamic tradition.

ISSUE/S: WHETHER OR NOT the QC Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to hear and try the civil case based on Article 21 of the New Civil Code or the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia court though there is the existence of foreign element.

RULING:

The forms in which a foreign element may appear are many, such as the fact that one party is a resident Philippine national, and that the other is a resident foreign corporation. The forms in which this foreign element may appear are many. The foreign element may simply consist in the fact that one of the parties to a contract is an alien or has a foreign domicile, or that a contract between nationals of one State involves properties situated in another State. In other cases, the foreign element may assume a complex form. In the instant case, the foreign element consisted in the fact that private respondent Morada is a resident Philippine national, and that petitioner SAUDIA is a resident foreign corporation. Also, by virtue of the employment of Morada with the petitioner SAUDIA as a flight stewardess, events did transpire during her many occasions of travel across national borders, particularly from Manila, Philippines to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and vice versa, that caused a conflicts situation to arise.

The forms in which a foreign element may appear are many, such as the fact that one party is a resident Philippine national, and that the other is a resident foreign corporation. The forms in which this foreign element may appear are many. The foreign element may simply consist in the fact that one of the parties to a contract is an alien or has a foreign domicile, or that a contract between nationals of one State involves properties situated in another State. In other cases, the foreign element may assume a complex form. In the instant case, the foreign element consisted in the fact that private respondent Morada is a resident Philippine national, and that petitioner SAUDIA is a resident foreign corporation. Also, by virtue of the employment of Morada with the petitioner SAUDIA as a flight stewardess, events did transpire during her many occasions of travel across national borders, particularly from Manila, Philippines to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and vice versa, that caused a conflicts situation to arise.

Where the factual antecedents satisfactorily establish the existence of a foreign element, the problem could present a conflicts case. Where the factual antecedents satisfactorily establish the existence of a foreign element, we agree with petitioner that the problem herein could present a conflicts case. A factual situation that cuts across territorial lines and is affected by the diverse laws of two or more states is said to contain a foreign element. The presence of a foreign element is inevitable since social and economic affairs of individuals and associations are rarely confined to the geographic limits of their birth or conception.