DISTRICT 07 COLOMBIA COORT 07 APPEALS

Nos. 92-CF-670 & 96-CO-694

DEMETRIUS

N. MCLEAN,
APPEllANT ,

v.
UNITED STATES,

F3760-91

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MAR'2 S

~98 'E

APPEll..EE

Appeals from the Superior Court of the District of Columbia Criminal Division (Hon. Harriett R. Taylor, Trial Judge) (Argued March 4, 1998 Before Judges.
WAGNER,

Decided

March 26, 1998)

ChiefJudge, and STEADMAN and SCHWELB, Associate

1mK0RAND'QH OPINION

um

JODGHBH'l'

On February 28, 1992, Demetrius McLean was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder and related offenses. McLean filed a post-trial motion to vacate his convictions pursuant to D.C. Code 23-110 (1996), alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The trial judge held a hearing on McLean's motion. On April 4, 1996, the judge denied the motion in a twelve-page written order. These consolidated appeals are from McLean's convictions and from the order denying his post-trial motion. W~ affirm in both appeals.
I. TBB DIREC'J.' APPEAL

In his direct appeal, McLean presents. a nll:!n."''E'r of c""d:.eiltions, 110ne of which persuades us that the trial judge committed reversible error. Specifically, we are satisfied that 1. the trial judge did not commit plain error by failing, sua sponte, to suppress certain identification evidence; see, e.g., United States v. Hunter, 692 A.2d 1370, 1374-77 (D.C. 1997); 2. the judge did not abuse her discretion by denying McLean's request for a suspension of the trial following the prosecutor's belated disclosure of a government witness' J~ statement, where defense counsel was permitted to, and did, re-call the witness

for further cross-examination; see, e.g., Moore v. United States, 657 A.2d 1148, 1150 (D. C. 1995); Edelen v. United States, 627 A.2d 968, 972 (D. C. 1993); 3. McLean was not prejudiced by, and is not entitled to reversal for, the judge's failure to instruct the jurors, sua sponte, that they could consider prior convictions of prosecution witnesses only in relation to those witnesses' credibility; see Gilliam v. United States, _ A.2d _, No. 95-CF-537 (D.C. Feb. 19, 1998) (en banc) ; 4. having failed to file a pretrial motion to suppress a state:u..entt.hat he wade wllil.:: ih i-iulice custOQj, and having failed to this date to proffer any facts from which a finding that the statement was involuntary could reasonably be inferred, McLean was not prejudiced by the judge's refusal to hold a mid-trial suppression hearing when the prosecution introduced the statement in its rebuttal case. See Duddles v. United States, 399 A.2d 59, 64 (D.C. 1979);1 and the trial judge correctly denied as time-barred, see Super ct. Crim. R. 33, and on the merits, seeJobnson v. United States, 537 A.2d 555, 562 (D.C. 1988), McLean's motion for a new trial based on a claim of newlydiscovered evidence.
II.
THE COLLATERAL ATTACK

5.

In her comprehensive order denying McLean's 23-110 motion, the trial judge found that McLean had failed to satisfy the requisites of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695 (1984). Substantially for the reasons set forth by. the judgp.; we c~~cluc~ t.ha t U.le actions and decisions by trial counsel of which McLean complains were reasonable rather than "egregious and prejudicial," and that, in any event, they did not "so undermine the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the [proceeding] cannot be relied upon as having produced an unjust result." Stratmon v. United States, 631 A.2d 1177, 1182-83 (D.C. 1993) (quoting Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 686.
Affirmed.

It is undisputed that McLean signed a rights card waiving his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

FOy;r;;PCCi
Garland Pinkston, Jr. Clerk of the Court

Copies to: Honorable Harriett R. Taylor Clerk, Superior Court Richard Todd Hunter, Esquire 801 North Pitt St. Suite 209 Alexandria, VA 22314 John R. Fisher, Esquire Assistant United States Attorney