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G.R. No. L-39047 April 30, 1985 / Pascua v. Florendo

This is a petition for review on certiorari, seeking to annul the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cagayan which dismissed the petitioners' action for reconveyance with damages on the ground that the period within which to file the same had already prescribed. Petitioners, as plaintiffs, filed a complaint for reconveyance with damages against the private respondents, spouses Clemente and Juliana Castro. The latter, as defendants, in lieu of filing an answer, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the complaint states no cause of action and that the same is already barred by the statute of limitations. The trial court denied the respondents' motion after finding that the grounds relied upon by them did not appear on the face of the complaint. The court subsequently declared the respondents in default for their having failed to file an answer within the reglementary period. Thus, the petitioners proceeded to present their evidence exparte After receiving the petitioners' evidence, the trial court made the following findings: From the evidence adduced during the presentation of evidence by plaintiffs, it was shown that Alberto Pascua is one of the plaintiffs in this case; that he knows his coplaintiffs Crispina, Sotera, surnamed Pascua, and Eduardo Molina, the first two being his sisters while the last is his nephew being the son of his sister Alejandra; that his father is Jordan Pascua while his mother is Magdalena Dumadag; that both his parents are already dead (Exhibits A, B, and C); that Alejandra Pascua is also dead; that during the lifetime of Jordan and Magdalena Dumadag, they begot five children, namely Alberto, Alejandra, Crispina, Martin and Sotera; that Jordan Pascua and Magdalena Dumadag acquired a parcel of land located at Dacalafugo, Camalaniugan, Cagayan, consisting of 1.02.20 hectares and described in paragraph 3 of the complaint; that lately they came to know that their brother Martin Pascua sold the property to Clemente Castro, a resident of Camalaniugan, Cagayan; that when they went to complain to the Agrarian office in Tuguegarao Clemente Castro showed them the deed of sale which they xerox copied (Exhibit D); that the signature Alberto Pascua appearing in Exhibit D is not his signature; that the genuine signature of Alberto Pascua appears in Exhibit E; that he and this coplaintiffs did not give consent to the sale of the land subject matter of this case; that the signature Sotera Pascua, appearing in Exhibit D is not also the signature of Sotera Pascua; that he and his co-plaintiffs did not appear before the Notary Public; that the land subject matter of this case was never given to Martin Pascua by their deceased father; that Martin Pascua is already dead; that the land is now titled in the name of the defendant Juliana O. Castro (Exhibits F and F-1) while the deed of sale was executed in favor of Clemente Castro (Exhibit D); that the land is declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 157 (Exhibit G) in the name of Juliana Castro; that plaintiffs and the defendants have been neighbors since before the war and defendants know that the land sold to them and subject matter of this suit was inherited by the plaintiffs from their deceased father; that they (plaintiffs) have been deprived of the fruits of the land for more than 20 years; that the land yields from thirty to forty sacks of palay valued at P 30.00 each; and that plaintiffs agreed to pay their counsel the amount of P 1,200.00 out of which they have already paid P 200.00. From Exhibit D of the plaintiffs, it appears that the deed of sale was executed in favor the defendant Clemente Castro married to Juliana Orteza by Martin Pascua on May 8, 1951. Alberto Pascua and Sotera Pascua testified that lately they came to know that this land was conveyed by Martin Pascua to the defendants and that said defendants have been in possession of the land in question for more than 20 years. They testified further, however, that they have been deprived of the fruits of the land for more than twenty years. If such is the case, it is clear that the defendants have entered and occupied the property for more than twenty years and it is inconceivable that the plaintiffs did not come to know that the defendants bought the property from their brother Martin Pascua when they admitted that they have suffered damages by virtue of the dispossession for more than twenty years. The conclusion is obvious that the plaintiffs had knowledge of the transaction made by their brother about twenty years ago. From the evidence of the plaintiffs, the Court finds that there was really fraud committed by Martin Pascua in selling the entire property which said Martin Pascua and plaintiffs inherited from their parents thus excluding the shares of the plaintiffs. Certainly, Martin Pascua could only sell one-fifth of the property and that the four-fifths were fraudulently conveyed by him. It is clear that there was fraud on the part of Martin Pascua in selling the shares of his brother and sisters. The action for relief on the ground of fraud, however, may be brought only within four years from the discovery of the fraud. (Article 1391, New Civil Code; Section 43 (c) Act 190). xxx xxx xxx

In view of the fact that the deed of sale was executed on May 8, 1951, or over twenty years before the filing of the complaint on May 31, 1973, it is hard to believe that plaintiffs did not come to know of this deed of sale executed by their brother. The Court, therefore, comes to the inevitable conclusion that this action, having been filed 22 years after the execution of the deed of sale, has long prescribed. Not satisfied with the trial court's decision, petitioners elevated the case to this Court through this petition. The petitioners ask us to examine the following alleged errors of the respondent court: 1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE ON GROUND OF PRESCRIPTION ALTHOUGH IT HAS PREVIOUSLY DENIED A MOTION TO DISMISS BASED ON THE SAME GROUND. 2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING RELIEF TO PLAINTIFFS ALTHOUGH THE DEFENDANTS WERE DECLARED IN DEFAULT.

The petitioners contend that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion when, after hearing their evidence presented ex-parte, the respondents having been declared in default, it dismissed the case on the ground that the action had already prescribed. When the same ground was earlier raised, the court denied the motion to

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dismiss filed by the respondents. The petitioners argue that because of its denying the motion to dismiss, the trial court is estopped from dismissing the case on the same ground. Petitioners further contend that the court's conclusion that they had knowledge of the sale executed by their deceased brother, Martin Pascua about twenty years ago is based merely on surmises and conjectures because, in reality, it was only in 1973 when they came to learn of the deed of sale executed by their deceased brother in 1951. In 1973, the deed was shown to them by respondent Clemente Castro at the Agrarian office. Therefore, the period of prescription should be counted from the knowledge of the petitioners of the deed of sale and not from the date it was executed. Petitioners' contention are without merit. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss because the grounds relied upon by the respondents for their motion did not appear on the face of the complaint. There was no finding that the allegation of prescription had no merit. It cannot be said, therefore, that the trial court was already estopped from passing upon the issue of prescription. The issue was not adjudicated on its merits and the doctrine of res judicata had not set in yet. We likewise find the petitioners' contention, that they came to know of the deed of sale by Martin Pascua in favor of the respondents only in 1973, highly improbable. As the trial court correctly observed, it is inconceivable that the petitioners did not come to know about the purchase by the respondents of property from Martin Pascua. They admitted that they have been neighbors of the respondents since before the war or period of about 30 years and that the latter had deprived them of the fruits of the land in question for more than 20 years. Alberto Pascua, one of the petitioners testified that his parents from whom they inherited the property died more than 25 years ago yet the children never exerted any effort to have the property partitioned. This fact indicates that petitioners had knowledge of the sale, which explains why they had no interest at all in any project of partition. More important is the fact that after the respondents purchased the land they worked to secure an Original Certificate of Title on the basis of a free patent application. This was way back in 1958, 15 years before the petitioners decided to file the action below. Clearly, the petitioners' action is now barred by the statute of limitations. In the case of Iglesia ni Cristo v. Hon. Judge, Court of First instance of Nueva Ecija, Br. I (123 SCRA 523), quoting the case of Labora v. Dayang-hirang (37 SCRA 346), we ruled: The rule in this jurisdiction, regarding public patents and the character of the certificate of title that may be issued by virtue thereof, is that where land is granted by the government to a private individual, the corresponding patent therefore, is recorded, and the certificate of title is issued to the grantee; thereafter, the land is automatically brought within the operation of the Land Registration Act, the title issued to the grantee becoming entitled to all the safeguards provided in Section 38 of said Act. In other words, upon the expiration of one year from its issuance, the certificate of title becomes irrevocable and indefeasible like a certificate issued in a registration proceeding. It is quite obvious, therefore, that the respondents' title has already become indefeasible and irrevocable, the one-year period provided by law having expired in 1959. Moreover, even if we add the lower court's finding that there was fraud on the part of Martin Pascua when he effected the sale of the disputed lot in favor of the respondents, the petitioners are still barred from recovering the lot because their action should have been filed within four (4) years from their discovery of the fraud, which in turn, is deemed at the latest to have taken place in 1958, when the respondents were issued an original certificate of title. This was our ruling in the case of Balbin v. Medalla (108 SCRA 666) where we stated: An action for reconveyance of real property resulting from fraud may be barred by the statute of limitations, which requires that the action shall be filed within four (4) years from the discovery of the fraud. Such discovery is deemed to have taken place when the petitioners herein were issued original certificates of title through either homestead or free patent grants, for the registration of said patents constitutes constructive notice to the whole world. (Gerona v. de Guzman, 11 SCRA 153, and cited cases thereof ). In the case at bar, the latest patent was issued on October 14, 1959. There is, therefore, merit in petitioners' contention that if any action for reconveyance should be commenced, the same should be filed on or before October 14, 1963. But private respondents' complaint for reconveyance and annulment of titles with damages was filed only on August 30, 1973 or more than 14 years had already elapsed from the date of the issuance of the respective titles of the defendants. Consequently, the action for reconveyance of land titled in the names of defendants (petitioners herein) had already prescribed. The petitioners raise as a second issue that the respondent court had no alternative but to grant the relief prayed for in their complaint as this was evident in the tenor of the summons issued by said court which in part stated: ... if you fail to appear within the time aforesaid, the plaintiff will take judgment against you by default and demand from this Court the relief applied for in said complaint. ... Petitioners also anchor their contention on Rule 18, Section 1 of the Rules of Court which provides: Judgment by default.If the defendant fails to answer within the time specified in these rules, the court shall, upon motion of the plaintiff and proof of such failure, declare the defendant in default. Thereupon the court shall proceed to receive the plaintiff's evidence and render judgment granting him such relief as the complaint and the facts proven may warrant. This provision applies where no answer is made to a counter-claim, cross-claim or third-party complaint within the period provided in this Rule. Nowhere in the aforequoted provision nor in the summons issued by the respondent court is it stated that the petitioners are automatically entitled to the relief prayed for, once the respondents are declared in default. Favorable relief can be granted only after the court has ascertained that the evidence offered and the facts proven by the presenting party, petitioners in this case, warrant the grant of the same. Otherwise, it would be meaningless to require presentation of evidence if everytime the other party is declared in default, a decision

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would automatically be rendered in favor of the non-defaulting party and exactly according to the tenor of his prayer. This is not contemplated by the Rules nor is it sanctioned by the due process clause. In the case of Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete (66 SCRA 452-453), we had occasion to elaborate on this point. We ruled: The Rules of Court contain a separate rule on the subject of default, Rule 18. But said rule is concerned solely with default resulting from failure of the defendant or defendants to answer within the reglementary period. Referring to the simplest form of default, that is, where there is only one defendant in the action and he fails to answer on time, Section I of the rule provides that upon 'proof of such failure, (the court shall) declare the defendant in default. Thereupon the court shall proceed to receive the plaintiff's evidence and render judgment granting him such relief as the complaint and the facts proven may warrant.' This last clause is clarified by Section 5 which says that 'a judgment entered against a party in default shall not exceed the amount or be different in kind from that prayed for'. Unequivocal, in the literal sense, as these provisions are, they do not readily convey the full import of what they contemplate. To begin with, contrary to the immediate notion that can be drawn from their language, these provisions are not to be understood as meaning that default or the failure of the defendant to answer should be 'interpreted as an admission by the said defendant that the plaintiff's cause of action find support in the law or that plaintiff is entitled to the relief prayed for.' (Moran, supra, p. 535 citing Macondray & Co. v. Eustaquio, 64 Phil. 466, citing with approval Chaffin v. McFadden, 41 Ark 42; Johnson v. Pierce, 12 Ark. 599; Mayden v. Johnson, 59 Ga. 105; People v. Rust, 292 Ill. 328; Ken v. Leopold, 21 Ill. A. 163; Chicago, etc. Electric R. Co. v. Krempel, 116 Ill. A. 253.) xxx xxx xxx

In other words, a defaulted defendant is not actually thrown out of court. While in a sense it may be said that by defaulting he leaves himself at the mercy of the court, the rules see to it that any judgment against him must be in accordance with law. The evidence to support the plaintiff's cause is, of course, presented in his absence, but the court is not supposed to admit that which is basically incompetent. Although the defendant would not be in a position to object, elementary justice requires that only legal evidence should be considered against him. If the evidence presented should not be sufficient to justify a judgment for the plaintiff, the complaint must be dismissed. And if an unfavorable judgment should be justifiable, it cannot exceed in amount or be different in kind from what is prayed for in the complaint. In the instant case, from the evidence presented ex-parte by the petitioners and from their very own allegations, the only judgment that is warranted is the dismissal of the complaint. It is barred by the statute of limitations. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. No costs. G.R. No. 151098 March 21, 2006 / Gajudo v. Traders Royal Bank

The mere fact that a defendant is declared in default does not automatically result in the grant of the prayers of the plaintiff. To win, the latter must still present the same quantum of evidence that would be required if the defendant were still present. A party that defaults is not deprived of its rights, except the right to be heard and to present evidence to the trial court. If the evidence presented does not support a judgment for the plaintiff, the complaint should be dismissed, even if the defendant may not have been heard or allowed to present any countervailing evidence. The Case Before us is a Petition for Review2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the June 29, 2001 Decision3 and December 6, 2001 Resolution4 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 43889. The CA disposed as follows: "UPON THE VIEW WE TAKE OF THIS CASE, THUS, the partial judgment appealed from, must be, as it hereby is, VACATED and SET ASIDE, and another one entered DISMISSING the complaint at bench. Without costs."5 The assailed Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration6 for lack of merit. The Facts The CA narrated the facts as follows: "[Petitioners] filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 90, against [respondent] Traders Royal Bank, the City Sheriff of Quezon City and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. Docketed thereat as Civil Case No. Q-41203, the complaint sought the annulment of the extra-judicial foreclosure and auction sale made by [the] city sheriff of Quezon City of a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 16711 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, the conventional redemption thereof, and prayed for damages and the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. "The complaint alleged that in mid 1977[, Petitioner] Danilo Chua obtained a loan from [respondent] bank in the amount of P75,000.00 secured by a real estate mortgage over a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 16711, and owned in common by the [petitioners]; that when the loan was not paid, [respondent] bank commenced extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings on the property; that the auction sale of the property was set on 10 June 1981, but was reset to 31 August 1981, on [Petitioner Chuas] request, which, however, was made without the knowledge and conformity of the other [petitioners]; tha t on the re-scheduled auction sale, [the] Sheriff of Quezon City sold the property to the [respondent] bank, the highest bidder therein, for the sum of P24,911.30; that the auction sale was tainted with irregularity because, amongst others, the bid price was shockingly or unconscionably, low; that the other [petitioners] failed to redeem the property due to their lack of knowledge of their right of redemption, and want of sufficient education; that, although the period of redemption had long expired, [Petitioner] Chua offered to buy back, and [respondent] bank also agreed to sell back, the foreclosed property, on the understanding that Chua would pay [respondent] bank the amount of P40,135.53, representing the sum that the bank paid at the auction sale, plus interest; that [Petitioner] Chua made an initial payment thereon in the amount of P4,000.00, covered by Interbank Check No.

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09173938, dated 16 February 1984, duly receipted by [respondent] bank; that, in a sudden change of position, [respondent] bank wrote Chua, on 20 February 1984, asking that he could repurchase the property, but based on the current market value thereof; and that sometime later, or on 22 March 1984, [respondent] bank wrote Chua anew, requiring him to tender a new offer to counter the offer made thereon by another buyer. "Traversing [petitioners] complaint, [respondent] bank, upon 05 July 1984, filed its answer with counterclaim, thereunder as serting that the foreclosure sale of the mortgaged property was done in accordance with law; and that the bid price was neither unconscionable, nor shockingly low; that [petitioners] slept on their rights when they failed to redeem the property within the one year statutory period; and that [respondent] bank, in offering to sell the property to [Petitioner] Chua on the basis of its current market price, was acting conformably with law, and with legitimate banking practice and regulations. "Pre-trial having been concluded, the parties entered upon trial, which dragged/lengthened to several months due to postponements. Upon 11 June 1988, however, a big conflagration hit the City Hall of Quezon City, which destroyed, amongst other things, the records of the case. After the records were reconstituted, [petitioners] discovered that the foreclosed property was sold by [respondent] bank to the Ceroferr Realty Corporation, and that the notice of lis pendens annotated on the certificate of title of the foreclosed property, had already been cancelled. Accordingly, [petitioners], with leave of court, amended their complaint, but the Trial Court dismissed the case without prejudice due to [petitioners] failure to pay additional filing fees. "So, upon 11 June 1990, [petitioners] re-filed the complaint with the same Court, whereat it was docketed as Civil Case No. 90-5749, and assigned to Branch 98: the amended complaint substantially reproduced the allegations of the original complaint. But [petitioners] this time impleaded as additional defendants the Ceroferr Realty Corporation and/or Cesar Roque, and Lorna Roque, and included an additional cause of action, to wit: that said new defendants conspired with [respondent] bank in [canceling] the notice of lis pendens by falsifying a letter sent to and filed with the office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, purportedly for the cancellation of said notice. "Summons was served on [respondent] bank on 26 September 1990, per Sheriffs Return dated 08 October 1990. Supposing that all the defendants had filed their answer, [petitioners] filed, on 23 October 1991, a motion to set case for pre-trial, which motion was, however, denied by the Trial Court in its Order of 25 October 1991, on the ground that [respondent] bank has not yet filed its answer. On 13 November 1991[, petitioners] filed a motion for reconsideration, thereunder alleging that they received by registered mail, on 19 October 1990, a copy of [respondent] banks answer with counterclaim, dated 04 Octobe r 1990, which copy was attached to the motion. In its Order of 14 November 1991, the trial Court denied for lack of merit, the motion for reconsideration, therein holding that the answer with counterclaim filed by [respondent] bank referred to another civil case pending before Branch 90 of the same Court. "For this reason, [petitioners] filed on 02 December 1991 a motion to declare [respondent] bank in default, thereunder alleging that no answer has been filed despite the service of summons on it on 26 September 1990. "On 13 December 1991, the Trial Court declared the motion submitted for resolution upon submission by [petitioners] of proof of service of the motion on [respondent] bank. "Thus, on 16 January 1992, upon proof that [petitioners] had indeed served [respondent] bank with a copy of said motion, the Trial Court issued an Order of default against [respondent] bank. "Upon 01 December 1992, on [petitioners] motion, they were by the Court allowed to present evidence ex parte on 07 January 1 993, insofar as [respondent] bank was concerned. "Thereafter, or on 08 February 1993, the Trial Court rendered the new questioned partial decision.7 "Aggrieved, [respondent] bank filed a motion to set aside [the] partial decision by default against Traders Royal Bank and ad mit [respondent] Traders Royal Banks x x x Answer with counterclaim: thereunder it averred, amongst others, that the erroneous filing of said answer was due to an honest mistake of the typist and inadvertence of its counsel. "The [trial court] thumbed down the motion in its Order of 26 July 1993."8 Respondent bank appealed the Partial Decision9 to the CA. During the pendency of that appeal, Ceroferr Realty Corporation and/or Cesar and/or Lorna Roque filed a Manifestation with Motion10 asking the CA to discharge them as parties, because the case against them had already been dismissed on the basis of their Compromise Agreement11 with petitioners. On May 14, 1996, the CA issued a Resolution12 granting Ceroferr et al.s Manifestation with Mot ion to discharge movants as parties to the appeal. The Court, though, deferred resolution of the matters raised in the Comment13 of respondent bank. The latter contended that the Partial Decision had been novated by the Compromise Agreement, whose effect of res judicata had rendered that Decision functus officio. Ruling of the Court of Appeals The CA ruled in favor of respondent bank. Deemed, however, to have rested on shaky ground was the latters "Motion to Set Aside Partial Dec ision by Default Against Traders Royal Bank and Admit Defendant Traders Royal Banks Answer."14 The reasons offered by the bank for failing to file an answer were considered by the appellate court to be "at once specious, shallow and sophistical and can hardly be dignified as a mistake or excusable negligence, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against."15 In particular, the CA ruled that the erroneous docket number placed on the Answer filed before the trial court was not an excusable negl igence by the banks counsel. The latter had a bounden duty to be scrupulously careful in reviewing pleadings. Also, there were several opportunities to discover and rectify the mistake, but these were not taken. Moreover, the banks Motion to Set Aside the Partial Decision and to Admit [the] Answer was not accompanied b y an affidavit of merit. These mistakes and the inexcusable negligence committed by respondents lawyer were binding on the bank.

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On the issue of whether petitioners had convincingly established their right to relief, the appellate court held that there was no ground to invalidate the foreclosure sale of the mortgaged property. First, under Section 3 of Act No. 3135, an extrajudicial foreclosure sale did not require personal notice to the mortgagor. Second, there was no allegation or proof of noncompliance with the publication requirement and the public posting of the notice of sale, provided under Act No. 3135, as amended. Third, there was no showing of inadequacy of price as no competent evidence was presented to show the real market value of the land sold or the readiness of another buyer to offer a price higher than that at which the property had been sold. Moreover, petitioners failed to prove that the bank had agreed to sell the property back to them. After pointing out that the redemption period had long expired, respondents written communications to Petitioner Chua only showed, at most, that the former had made a proposal for the latter to buy back the property at the current market price; and that Petitioner Chua was requested to make an offer to repurchase the property, because another buyer had already made an offer to buy it. On the other hand, respondent noted that the Interbank check for P4,000 was for "deposit only." Thus, there was no showing that the check had been issued to cover part of the repurchase price. The appellate court also held that the Compromise Agreement had not resulted in the novation of the Partial Decision, because the two were not incompatible. In fact, the bank was not even a party to the Agreement. Petitioners recognition of Ceroferrs title to the mortgaged property was in tended to preclude future litigation against it. Hence this Petition.16 Issues In their Memorandum, petitioners raise the following issues: "1. Whether or not the Respondent Court of Appeals erred in failing to apply the provisions of Section 3, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure [and in applying instead] the rule on preponderance of evidence under Section 1, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court. "2. Whether or not the respondent appellate court failed to apply the conventional redemption rule provided for under Article 1601 of the New Civil Code. "3. Whether or not this Honorable Court can exercise its judicial prerogative to evaluate the findings of facts."17 The first issue is one of law and may be taken up by the Court without hindrance, pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.18 The second and the third issues, however, would entail an evaluation of the factual findings of the appellate court, a function ordinarily not assumed by this Court, unless in some excepted cases. The Court will thus rule on the first issue before addressing the second and the third issues jointly. The Courts Ruling The Petition has no merit. First Issue: Quantum of Proof Petitioners challenge the CA Decision for applying Section 3 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, rather than Section 1 of Rule 133 of the same Rules. In essence, petitioners argue that the quantum of evidence for judgments flowing from a default order under Section 3 of Rule 9 is not the same as that provided for in Section 1 of Rule 133. For ease of discussion, these two rules will be reproduced below, starting with Section 3 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court: "Sec. 3. Default; declaration of. If the defending party fails to answer within the time allowed therefor, the court shall, upon motion of the claiming party with notice to the defending party, and proof of such failure, declare the defending party in default. Thereupon, the court shall proceed to render judgment granting the claimant such relief as his pleading may warrant, unless the court in its discretion requires the claimant to submit evidence. Such reception of evidence may be delegated to the clerk of court. "(a) Effect of order of default. A party in default shall be entitled to notice of subsequent proceedings but not to take part in the trial. "(b) Relief from order of default. A party declared in default may at any time after notice thereof and before judgment file a motion under oath to set aside the order of default upon proper showing that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence and that he has a meritorious defense. In such case, the order of default may be set aside on such terms and conditions as the judge may impose in the interest of justice. "(c) Effect of partial default. When a pleading asserting a claim states a common cause of action against several defending parties, some of whom answer and the others fail to do so, the court shall try the case against all upon the answers thus filed and render judgment upon the evidence presented. "(d) Extent of relief to be awarded. A judgment rendered against a party in default shall not exceed the amount or be different in kind from that prayed for nor award unliquidated damages.

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"(e) Where no defaults allowed. If the defending party in an action for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or nor a collusion between the parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated." We now quote Section 1 of Rule 133: "SECTION 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. In determining where the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, the witnesses manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may also consider the number of witnesses, though the preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number." Between the two rules, there is no incompatibility that would preclude the application of either one of them. To begin with, Section 3 of Rule 9 governs the procedure which the trial court is directed to take when a defendant fails to file an answer. According to this provision, the court "shall proceed to render judgment granting the claimant such relief as his pleading may warrant," subject to the courts discretion on whether to require the presentation o f evidence ex parte. The same provision also sets down guidelines on the nature and extent of the relief that may be granted. In particular, the courts judgment "shall not exceed the amount or be different in kind from that prayed for nor award unliquidated damages." As in other civil cases, basic is the rule that the party making allegations has the burden of proving them by a preponderance of evidence.19 Moreover, parties must rely on the strength of their own evidence, not upon the weakness of the defense offered by their opponent.20 This principle holds true, especially when the latter has had no opportunity to present evidence because of a default order. Needless to say, the extent of the relief that may be granted can only be as much as has been alleged and proved21 with preponderant evidence required under Section 1 of Rule 133. Regarding judgments by default, it was explained in Pascua v. Florendo22 that complainants are not automatically entitled to the relief prayed for, once the defendants are declared in default. Favorable relief can be granted only after the court has ascertained that the relief is warranted by the evidence offered and the facts proven by the presenting party. In Pascua, this Court ruled that "x x x it would be meaningless to require presentation of evidence if every time the other party is declared in default, a decision would automatically be rendered in favor of the non-defaulting party and exactly according to the tenor of his prayer. This is not contemplated by the Rules nor is it sanctioned by the due process clause."23 The import of a judgment by default was further clarified in Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete.24 The following disquisition is most instructive: "Unequivocal, in the literal sense, as these provisions [referring to the subject of default then under Rule 18 of the old Rules of Civil Procedure] are, they do not readily convey the full import of what they contemplate. To begin with, contrary to the immediate notion that can be drawn from their language, these provisions are not to be understood as meaning that default or the failure of the defendant to answer should be interpreted as an admission by the said defendant that the plaintiffs cause of action find support in the law or that plaintiff is entitled to the relief prayed for. x x x. xxxxxxxxx "Being declared in default does not constitute a waiver of rights except that of being heard and of presenting evidence in the trial court. x x x. "In other words, a defaulted defendant is not actually thrown out of court. While in a sense it may be said that by defaulting he leaves himself at the mercy of the court, the rules see to it that any judgment against him must be in accordance with law. The evidence to support the plaintiffs cause i s, of course, presented in his absence, but the court is not supposed to admit that which is basically incompetent. Although the defendant would not be in a position to object, elementary justice requires that only legal evidence should be considered against him. If the evidence presented should not be sufficient to justify a judgment for the plaintiff, the complaint must be dismissed. And if an unfavorable judgment should be justifiable, it cannot exceed in amount or be different in kind from what is prayed for in the complaint."25 In sum, while petitioners were allowed to present evidence ex parte under Section 3 of Rule 9, they were not excused from establishing their claims for damages by the required quantum of proof under Section 1 of Rule 133. Stated differently, any advantage they may have gained from the ex parte presentation of evidence does not lower the degree of proof required. Clearly then, there is no incompatibility between the two rules. Second and Third Issues: Review of the Evidence Petitioners urge this Court to depart from the general rule that the lower courts findings of fact are not reviewable in a p etition for review.26 In support of their plea, they cite the conflicting findings of the trial and the appellate courts, as well as the alleged conjectures and surmises made by the CA in arriving at its Decision. Indeed, the differences between the findings of the two courts a quo, leading to entirely disparate dispositions, is reason enough for this Court to review the evidence in this case.27 Whether the CA indulged in surmises and conjectures when it issued the assailed Decision will thus be determined. At the outset, it behooves this Court to clarify the CAs impression that no evidence was presented in the case which might have contributed to petitioners challenge to its Decision. The appellate courts observation was based on the notation by the lower courts clerk of court that there were no separate folders for exhibits and transcripts, because "there was no actual hearing conducted in this case."28 True, there was no hearing conducted between petitioners and respondent, precisely because the latter had been declared in default, and petitioners had therefore been ordered to present their evidence ex parte. But the absence of a hearing did not mean that no evidence was presented. The Partial Decision dated February 8, 1993, in

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fact clearly enumerated the pieces of evidence adduced by petitioners during the ex parte presentation on January 7, 1993. The documentary evidence they presented consisted of the following: 1. A copy of respondent banks Petition for the extrajudicial foreclosure and auction sale o f the mortgaged parcel of land29 2. The Certificate of Sale that was a consequence of the foreclosure sale30 3. A Statement of Account dated February 15, 1984, showing Petitioner Chuas outstanding debt in the amount of P40,135.5331 4. A copy of the Interbank check dated February 16, 1984, in the amount of P4,00032 5. The Official Receipt issued by the bank acknowledging the check33 6. The banks letter dated February 20, 1984, advising Petitioner Chua of the sale of the property at an extrajudicial pu blic auction; the lapse of the period of redemption; and an invitation to purchase the property at its current market price34 7. Another letter from the bank dated March 22, 1984, inviting Petitioner Chua to submit, within five days, an offer to buy the same property, which another buyer had offered to buy35 8. A copy of the Notice of Lis Pendens, the filing of which was done after that of the Amended Complaint36 9. A copy of the title showing the inscription of the Notice of Lis Pendens37 10. A copy of the Absolute Deed of Sale to Cerrofer38 11. A copy of a letter dated August 29, 1986, made and signed by petitioners counsel, requesting the cancellation of the Not ice of Lis Pendens39 12. A copy of a page of the Memorandum of Encumbrance from TCT No. (314341) 7778/T-3940 Having clarified this matter, we proceed to review the facts. Petitioners do not deny that the one-year period for legal redemption had already lapsed when respondent bank supposedly offered to sell the property in question. The records clearly show that the Certificate of Sale following the extrajudicial public auction of the property was registered on June 21, 1982, the date from which the legal redemption period was to be reckoned.41 Petitioners insist, though, that they had the right to repurchase the property through conventional redemption, as provided under Article 1601 of the Civil Code, worded as follows: "ART. 1601. Conventional redemption shall take place when the vendor reserves the right to repurchase the thing sold, with the obligation to comply with the provisions of Article 1616 and other stipulations which may have been agreed upon." It is true that the one-year period of redemption provided in Act No. 3135, as amended -- the law under which the property here was sold in a foreclosure sale -- is only directory and, as such can be extended by agreement of the parties.42 However, it has also been held that for legal redemption to be converted into conventional redemption, two requisites must be established: 1) voluntary agreement of the parties to extend the redemption period; and 2) the debtors commitment to pay the redemption price on a fixed date.43 Thus, assuming that an offer was made to Petitioner Chua to buy back the property after the lapse of the period of legal redemption, petitioners needed to show that the parties had agreed to extend the period, and that Petitioner Chua had committed to pay the redemption price on a fixed date. The letters sent by the bank to Petitioner Chua on February 20 and March 22, 1984, do not convincingly show that the parties arrived at a firm agreement for the repurchase of the property. What can be gleaned from the February 20 letter is that Petitioner Chua proposed to pay the redemption price for the property, but that the bank refused to accede to his request, because the one-year redemption period had already lapsed.44 The bank, though, had offered to sell back the property to him at the current market value. Indeed, an examination of his earlier letter of February 17, 1984, readily reveals that he expressed willingness to settle his account with the bank, but that his "present financial situation precludes [him] from effecting an immediate settlement x x x."45 On the other hand, the letter dated March 22, 1984, clearly states that "x x x the Bank rejected [his] request to redeem said property due to [the] lapse of [the] one (1) year legal redemption period."46 Nonetheless, he was "[invited] to submit an offer to buy the same property in five (5) days from receipt [of the letter]."47 Petitioner Chua was also informed that the bank had received an offer to purchase the foreclosed property. As to the P4,000 check enclosed in his proposal dated February 17, 1984, as a token of his good faith, he was advised that the amount was still outstanding in the books of the bank and could be claimed by him if he thought the invitation was not feasible. More important, there was no showing that petitioners had committed to pay the redemption price on a fixed date. True, Petitioner Chua had attempted to establish a previous agreement to repurchase the property for less than its fair market value. He had submitted in evidence a Statement of Account48 dated February 15, 1984, showing a balance of P40,135.53; the Interbank check dated February 16, 1984 , for P4,000, which was deposited to the account of respondent bank;49 and the Official Receipt for the check.50 Granting that these documents evinced an agreement, petitioners were still unable to establish a firm commitment on their part to pay the redemption price on a fixed date. On the contrary, the February 17 letter of Petitioner Chua to the bank clearly manifested that he was not capable of paying the account immediately. For this

8
reason, he proposed to pay in "three or four installments" without a specification of dates for the payments, but with a plea for a reduction of the interest charges. That proposal was rejected. Indeed, other than the Interbank check marked "for deposit" by respondent bank, no other evidence was presented to establish that petitioners had offered to pay the alleged redemption price of P40,135.53 on a fixed date. For that matter, petitioners have not shown that they tendered payment of the balance and/or consigned the payment to the court, in order to fulfill their part of the purported agreement. These remedies are available to an aggrieved debtor under Article 1256 of the Civil Code,51 when the creditor unjustly refuses to accept the payment of an obligation. The next question that presents itself for resolution is the propriety of the CAs ruling vacating the Partial Decision of the regional trial court (RTC) and dismissing the case. To recall, the RTC had resolved to withhold a ruling on petitioners right to redeem conventionally and/or order the re conveyance of the property in question, pending a determination of the validity of the sale to Cerrofer Realty Corporation and Spouses Cesar and Lorna Roque. The trial court, however, granted the prayer for damages against respondent bank. The RTC ruled as follows: "The evidence presented by [petitioners] in so far as the cause of action against [respondent] Traders Royal Bank is concerned are preponderant to support the claims of the [petitioners]. However, in view of the fact that the property subject matter of this case has already been conveyed to defendant Cerrofer Realty Corporation thus the issue as to whether or not the said conveyance or sale is valid is sill pending between the [petitioners] and [respondents] Cerrofer Realty Corporation and Cesar Roque and Lorna Roque. Hence, this Court resolves to grant the prayer for damages against Traders Royal Bank. "The claims of the [petitioners] as against [respondent] Traders Royal Bank having been established and proved by evidence, judgment is hereby rendered ordering [respondent] Traders Royal Bank to pay [petitioners] actual damage or the market value of the land in question in the sum of P500,000.00; the sum of P70,000.00 as compensatory damages; the sum of P200,000.00 to the heirs of [petitioner] Danilo Chua; and attorneys fees in the sum of P30,000.00."52 In the light of the pending issue as to the validity of the sale of the property to the third parties (Cerrofer Realty Corporation and Spouses Roque), the trial court properly withheld judgment on the matter and thus left the prayer for damages as the sole issue for resolution. To adjudge damages, paragraph (d) of Section 3 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court provides that a judgment against a party in default "shall not exceed the amount or be different in kind from that prayed for nor award unliquidated damages." The proscription against the award of unliquidated damages is significant, because it means that the damages to be awarded must be proved convincingly, in accordance with the quantum of evidence required in civil cases. Unfortunately for petitioners, the grant of damages was not sufficiently supported by the evidence for the following reasons. First, petitioners were not deprived of their property without cause. As correctly pointed out by the CA, Act No. 3135, as amended, does not require personal notice to the mortgagor.53 In the present case, there has been no allegation -- much less, proof -- of noncompliance with the requirement of publication and public posting of the notice of sale, as required by ct No. 3135. Neither has there been competent evidence to show that the price paid at the foreclosure sale was inadequate.54 To be sure, there was no ground to invalidate the sale. Second, as previously stated, petitioners have not convincingly established their right to damages on the basis of the purported agreement to repurchase. Without reiterating our prior discussion on this point, we stress that entitlement to actual and compensatory damages must be proved even under Section 3 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court. The same is true with regard to awards for moral damages and attorneys fees, which were also granted by the trial court. In sum, petitioners have failed to convince this Court of the cogency of their position, notwithstanding the advantage they enjoyed in presenting their evidence ex parte. Not in every case of default by the defendant is the complainant entitled to win automatically. WHEREFORE, this Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. G.R. No. L-63397 April 9, 1985 / Lina v. CA

Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the then Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 14943-SP, dated November 29, 1982, affirming (a) the order of default issued by respondent judge in a collection suit instituted by private respondent Northern Motors, Inc. against petitioner; and, (b) the judgment of default in the same case. On March 31, 1982, private respondent Northern Motors, Inc. filed with the then Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig) a case for sum of money with damages; docketed as Civil Case No. 4520. On April 22, 1982, petitioner Alex Lina was served with summons together with a copy of the complaint. On May 8, 1982, when no answer or motion to dismiss was filed by petitioner, private respondent Northern Motors, Inc. filed a motion to declare him in default. The motion was set for hearing on May 21, 1982. On May 19, 1982, petitioner filed his opposition to the aforesaid motion inviting attention to the fact that he had filed a motion for extension of time to file responsive pleading within the reglementary period. On May 26, 1982, respondent judge issued an order declaring defendant (herein petitioner) in default and allowing plaintiff (herein private respondent) to adduce its evidence ex parte. On May 27, 1982, defendant (petitioner) filed his answer to the complaint. On July 28, 1982, respondent court rendered its decision in favor of plaintiff (herein private respondent).

9
On August 11, 1982, petitioner filed a motion to set aside decision dated July 28, 1982. On August 25, 1982, respondent judge issued an order denying petitioner's motion to set aside decision. On October 6, 1982, petitioner filed with the then Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari/prohibition, which was denied in its decision dated November 29, 1982 on the ground that ... when the private respondent filed on May 8, 1982, its motion to declare defendant in default because the last day for him to file an answer under the summons was May 7, 1982, the petitioner has not filed an answer. So, there was actually a valid ground for the motion, and the respondent court could have validly declared the defendant in default, especially because, at that time it was still unaware of the fact that on May 5, 1982, the herein petitioner had sent to it, by registered mail, a motion for extension of twenty days from May 7, 1982, within which to file an answer, and which motion was received by the respondent court only on May 19, 1982. But, then the respondent court did not immediately act on the motion to declare defendant in default, so that by May 19, 1982, the herein petitioner was still able to file an opposition to the motion asking him to be declared in default. The principal ground of the opposition of the petitioner was the fact that he had sent, by registered mail, a motion for extension of time to file responsive pleading, and he even attached to his opposition a copy of the motion for extension. On May 26, 1982, the respondent court resolved the motion to declare defendant in default by granting the motion. Now since on May 26, 1982, the motion for extension of time to file responsive pleading was already before the court, as it received the same on May 19, 1982, and aside from this, a copy thereof was attached to the petitioner's opposition to the private respondent's motion to declare defendant in default, it is conclusively assumed that the respondent court, in resolving the motion to declare defendant in default, had taken into consideration the motion for extension, especially because the ground of petitioner's opposition to the motion to declare defendant in default is the fact that he had asked for extension of time to file responsive pleading. Now, then, when the respondent court declared the defendant in default, it is a clear and inevitable implication, without the need of an express statement to that effect, although it would have been more desirable, that the motion for extension of nine to file responsive pleading was denied. In other words, the Order of May 26, 1982 had the necessary and logical implication that the petitioner's opposition to the motion to declare defendant in default, based upon the ground that he had asked for extension of time to file responsive pleading, was disapproved or denied by the court.(pp. 22-23, Rollo) Coming to this Court on a petition for certiorari/prohibition, petitioner raised the following issues, to wit: 1. Whether or not the order of default was issued in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

2. Whether or not certiorari is proper in a case where judgment by default was rendered without an order of default being furnished petitioner and where meritorious defenses exist, which are for the trial court to evaluate and which evaluation was not done in this case. We are in agreement with respondent appellate court's affirmance of the questioned order of the trial court. The granting of additional time within which to file an answer to a complaint is a matter largely addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. "While trial courts are persuaded, as a matter of policy, to adopt a basically flexible attitude in favor of the defendant in this area of our adjective law, the defense should never be lulled into the belief that whenever trial courts refuse a second request for extension to file an answer, the appellate courts will grant relief (Naga Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 41 SCRA 105)." In the case at bar, it was on May 5, 1982 or two (2) days before the expiration of the fifteen-day reglementary period given to defendant to file his responsive pleading when petitioner moved for an extension of twenty (20) days from May 7 within which to file his answer. Upon motion of private respondent and over the objection of petitioner, respondent judge issued an order declaring petitioner in default. Under the Rules of Court, the remedies available to a defendant in the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) are: a) The defendant in default may, at any time after discovery thereof and before judgment, file a motion, under oath, to set aside the order of default on the ground that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect, and that he has a meritorious defense; (Sec. 3, Rule 18) b) If the judgment has already been rendered when the defendant discovered the default, but before the same has become final and executory, he may file a motion for new trial under Section 1 (a) of Rule 37; c) If the defendant discovered the default after the judgment has become final and executory, he may file a petition for relief under Section 2 of Rule 38; and

d) He may also appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or to the law, even if no petition to set aside the order of default has been presented by him. (Sec. 2, Rule 41) Petitioner in this case did not avail himself of any of the above remedies. Instead, he went to the appellate court on certiorari/prohibition. On this point, respondent appellate court aptly said: ... where the judgment rendered by the respondent court is the one sought to be annulled, a petition for relief, under Rule 38 of the Revised Rules of Court, which is a remedy in the ordinary course of law, could have been just as plain, adequate and speedy as certiorari. Such a remedy could have been granted by the respondent court. And if the respondent court still denies the petition, then petitioner can take an appeal on the order denying the petition, and in the course of such appeal petitioner can also assail the judgment an the merits upon the ground that it is supported by the evidence, or it is contrary to law. (p. 25, Rollo) ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED. Without costs.

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Arquero v. CA, G.R. No. 168053, September 21, 2011 This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner Rebecca T. Arquero against public respondents Edilberto C. De Jesus (De Jesus), in his capacity as Secretary of Education, Dr. Paraluman Giron (Dr. Giron), Department of Education (DepEd) Director, Regional Office IV-MIMAROPA, Dr. Eduardo Lopez (Lopez), Schools Division Superintendent, Puerto Princesa City, and private respondent Norma Brillantes. Petitioner assails the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision[1] dated December 15, 2004 and Resolution[2] dated May 3, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 85899. The assailed decision reversed and set aside the Judgment by Default[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 95, Puerto Princesa City, while the assailed resolution denied petitioner s motion for reconsideration. The facts of the case are as follows: On October 13, 1989, Congress approved Republic Act (RA) No. 6765, or An Act Integrating Certain High Schools in the City of Puerto Princesa and in the Province of Palawan with the Palawan National School and Appropriating Funds Therefor. Under the law, the following schools were converted into national schools and integrated with the Palawan National School (PNS) in the City of Puerto Princesa, Province of Palawan, as branches thereof: (1) Puerto Princesa School of Philippine Craftsmen; (2) San Jose Barangay High School; (3) Inagawan Barangay High School; (4) Puerto Princesa Rural High School; all in the City of Puerto Princesa and (5) Plaridel Barangay High School in the Municipality of Aborlan; (6) Narra Barangay High School in the Municipality of Narra; (7) Quezon Municipal High School in the Municipality of Quezon; (8) Pulot Barangay High School in the Municipality of Brookes Point; (9) Bataraza Barangay High School in the Municipality Bataraza; and (10) Balabac Barangay High School in the Municipality of Balabac; all in the Province of Palawan.[4] Section 2 of the law provides that the PNS shall, in addition to general secondary education program, offer post-secondary technical-vocational and other relevant courses to carry out its objectives. The PNS shall thus be considered the mother unit and the integrated schools should benefit from a centralized curriculum planning to eliminate duplication of functions and efforts relative to human resource development for the province.[5] The law also provides that the Palawan Integrated National Schools (PINS) shall be headed by a Vocational School Superintendent (VSS) who shall be chosen and appointed by the Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture, and Sports (now the DepEd).[6] Except for Puerto Princesa School of Philippine Craftsmen, which shall be headed by the Home Industries Training Supervisor, the PNS and each of its units or branches shall be headed either by a Principal or Secondary School Head Teacher to be chosen in accordance with the DepEd Rules and Regulations.[7] However, no VSS was appointed. Instead, then DECS Region IV Office designated then PNS Principal Eugenio J. dela Cuesta in a concurrent capacity as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the PINS. After the retirement of Dela Cuesta, petitioner took over as Secondary School Principal of the PNS.[8] On March 18, 1993, then DECS-Region IV Director IV Desideria Rex (Director Rex) designated petitioner as OIC of the PINS.[9] On December 1, 1994, Director Rexs successor, Pedro B. Trinidad placed all satellite schools of the PINS under the direct su pervision of the Schools Division Superintendent for Palawan effective January 1, 1995.[10] This directive was later approved by the DepEd in September 1996. Petitioner was instructed to turn over the administration and supervision of the PINS branches or units.[11] In another memorandum, Schools Division Superintendent Portia Gesilva was designated as OIC of the PINS. These events prompted different parties to institute various actions restraining the enforcement of the DepEd orders. Pursuant to RA 8204, separate City Schools Division Offices were established for the City of Puerto Princesa and the Province of Palawan. [12] On March 14, 2000, Regional Director Belen H. Magsino issued an Order addressed to the Schools Division Superintendent of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City, and petitioner stating that the PINS satellite schools shall be under the supervision of the division schools superintendents concerned, while petitioner should concentrate on the supervision and administration of the PNS.[13] Again, this prompted the filing of various court actions. On May 14, 2002, then DECS Undersecretary Jaime D. Jacob issued an Order[14] addressed to Dr. Giron, OIC, DepEd Regional Office No. 4, stating that there being no more legal impediment to the integration, he ordered that the secondary schools integrated with the PNS be under the direct administrative management and supervision of the schools division superintendents of the divisions of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City, as the case may be, according to their geographical and political boundaries. Consequently, Dr. Giron instructed the secondary schools principals concerned of the assumption of jurisdiction by the superintendent of the schools division offices of the city and province, and that their fiscal and financial transaction as turned over will be effected in July 1, 2002. However, then DepEd Undersecretary Ramon C. Bacani (Bacani) ordered that the status quo be maintained and that no turn over of schools be made.[15] In the meantime, petitioner remained as the OIC of the PINS. On September 19, 2002, Dr. Giron withdrew the designation of petitioner as OIC of the PINS, enjoining her from submitting to the Regional Office all appointments and personnel movement involving the PNS and the satellite schools. On November 7, 2002, petitioner appealed to the Civil Service Commission assailing the withdrawal of her designation as OIC of the PINS.[16]

On March 28, 2003, then DepEd Secretary Edilberto C. De Jesus designated Assistant Schools Division Superintendent Norma B. Brillantes (hereafter referred to as private respondent) in concurrent capacity as OIC of the PINS entitled to representation and transportation allowance, except the salary of the position.[17] Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or Clarification[18] before the Office of the DepEd Secretary as to the designation of private respondent. On September 18, 2003, Dr. Giron filed a formal charge[19] against petitioner who continued to defy the orders issued by the Regional Office relative to the exercise of her functions as OIC of the PINS despite the designation of private respondent as such. The administrative complaint charged petitioner with grave misconduct, gross insubordination and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Petitioner was also preventively suspended for ninety (90) days.[20] On October 2, 2003, petitioner filed the Petition for Quo Warranto with Prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Injunctive Writ[21] before the RTC of Palawan[22] against public and private respondents. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 3854. Petitioner argued that the designation of private respondent deprived her of her right to exercise her function and perform her duties in violation of her right to security of tenure. Considering that petitioner was

11
appointed in a permanent capacity, she insisted that private respondents designation as OIC of the PNS is null and void ther e being no vacancy to the position. Petitioner thus prayed that the RTC issue an order granting the writ of quo warranto enjoining private respondent from assuming the position of OIC of the PNS, declaring the questioned designation null and void and without operative effect, and declaring petitioner to be entitled to the office of the principal of the PNS.[23] On October 6, 2003, the Executive Judge issued a 72-Hour TRO[24] enjoining and restraining private respondent from assuming the position of OIC and performing the functions of the Office of the Principal of the PNS; and restraining public respondents from giving due course or recognizing the assailed designation of private respondent. The RTC later issued the writ of preliminary injunction.[25] Respondents failed to file their Answer. Hence, on motion[26] of petitioner, the Court declared respondents in default in an Order[27] dated December 15, 2003. In the same order, petitioner was allowed to present her evidence ex parte. On June 14, 2004, the RTC rendered a Judgment by Default,[28] the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered and by preponderance of evidence, judgment is hereby rendered: 1. Declaring petitioner Rebecca T. Arquero as the lawful Principal and Head of the Palawan Integrated National High School who is lawfully entitled to manage the operation and finances of the school subject to existing laws; 2. Declaring the formal charge against petitioner, the preventive suspension, the investigating committee, the proceedings therein and any orders, rulings, judgments and decisions that would arise therefrom as null, void and of no effect; 3. Ordering respondent Norma Brillantes, or any person acting in her behalf, to cease and desist from assuming and exercising the functions of the Office of the Principal of Palawan Integrated National High School, and respondents Edilberto C. De Jesus, Paraluman R. Giron and Eduardo V. Lopez, or any person acting in their behalf, from giving due course or recognizing the same; and 4. Making the writ of preliminary injunction issued in this case permanent.

IT IS SO ORDERED.[29]

The RTC held that considering that the integrated school failed to offer post-secondary technical-vocational courses, the VSS position became functus officio. The PNS, therefore, remains to be a general secondary school under the jurisdiction of the DepEd.[30] Consequently, supervision of the integrated school was automatically vested with the principal of the PNS without the necessity of appointment or designation. As to the administrative case filed against petitioner, the RTC opined that the formal charge and preventive suspension are illegal for lack of due process.[31] On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby GRANTED. The appealed decision of the court a quo in Civil Case No. 3854 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new judgment is hereby entered DISMISSING the petition for quo warranto filed by appellee Rebecca T. Arquero. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.[32] Applying the rules on statutory construction, the appellate court emphasized the need to harmonize the laws. The CA held that the PINS and its satellite schools remain under the complete administrative jurisdiction of the DepEd and not transferred to the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA). It also explained that by providing for a distinct position of VSS with a higher qualification, specifically chosen and appointed by the DepEd Secretary that is separate from the school head of the PNS offering general secondary education program, RA 6765 intended that the functions of a VSS and School Principal of PNS be discharged by two separate persons.[33] The CA added that if we follow the RTC conclusion, petitioner would assume the responsibilities and exercise the functions of a division schools superintendent without appointment and compliance with the qualifications required by law.[34] The appellate court likewise held that petitioner failed to establish her clear legal right to the position of OIC of the PINS as she was not appointed but merely designated to the position in addition to her functions as incumbent school principal of the PNS.[35] Clearly, there was no violation of her right to due process and security of tenure when private respondent replaced her. As to the validity of filing the administrative charge against her and the subsequent imposition of preventive suspension, the CA refused to rule on the matter due to the pendency of the administrative case which is within the jurisdiction of the DepEd. Hence, this petition raising the following issues: A. THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED THE 15TH DECEMBER 2004, AND THE RESOLUTION OF 3RD MAY 2005, HAVE DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE, NOT THERETOFORE DETERMINED BY THE SUPREME COURT, OR THE APPELLATE COURT HAS DECIDED IT IN A WAY PROBABLY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE HIGHEST COURT; OR THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS HAS SO FAR DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS AS TO CALL FOR AN EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF SUPERVISION.

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B. THE CHALLENGED DECISION WAS RENDERED ON THE BASIS OF MERE UNSUBSTANTIATED ARGUMENTATIONS OF THE INDIVIDUAL RESPONDENTS. NO IOTA OF EVIDENCE, TESTIMONIAL OR DOCUMENTARY, WERE PRESENTED AND OFFERED FOR A SPECIFIC PURPOSE BY THE RESPONDENTS (WHO WERE DECLARED IN DEFAULT). THEREFORE, THE CONCLUSION OF THE IMPUGNED DECISION IS NOT SUPPORTED BY RECORDED EVIDENCE.[36]

The petition is without merit. Petitioner insists that respondents could not have appealed the RTC decision having been declared in default. She explains that the only issue that could have been raised is a purely legal question, therefore, the appeal should have been filed with the Court and not with the CA. In Martinez v. Republic,[37] the Court has clearly discussed the remedies of a party declared in default in light of the 1964 and 1997 Rules of Court and a number of jurisprudence applying and interpreting said rules. Citing Lina v. Court of Appeals,[38] the Court enumerated the above-mentioned remedies, to wit: a) The defendant in default may, at any time after discovery thereof and before judgment, file a motion, under oath, to set aside the order of default on the ground that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect, and that he has meritorious defenses; (Sec. 3, Rule 18) b) If the judgment has already been rendered when the defendant discovered the default, but before the same has become final and executory, he may file a motion for new trial under Section 1 (a) of Rule 37; c) If the defendant discovered the default after the judgment has become final and executory, he may file a petition for relief under Section 2 of Rule 38; and d) He may also appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or to the law, even if no petition to set aside the order of default has been presented by him. (Sec. 2, Rule 41)[39]

The Court explained in Martinez that the fourth remedy, that of appeal, is anchored on Section 2, Rule 41 of the 1964 Rules. Even after the deletion of that provision under the 1997 Rules, the Court did not hesitate to expressly rely on the Lina doctrine, including the pronouncement that a defaulted defendant may appeal from the judgment rendered against him. Moreover, in Rural Bank of Sta. Catalina v. Land Bank of the Philippines,[40] the Court provided a comprehensive restatement of the remedies of the defending party declared in default: It bears stressing that a defending party declared in default loses his standing in court and his right to adduce evidence and to present his defense. He, however, has the right to appeal from the judgment by default and assail said judgment on the ground, inter alia, that the amount of the judgment is excessive or is different in kind from that prayed for, or that the plaintiff failed to prove the material allegations of his complaint, or that the decision is contrary to law. Such party declared in default is proscribed from seeking a modification or reversal of the assailed decision on the basis of the evidence submitted by him in the Court of Appeals, for if it were otherwise, he would thereby be allowed to regain his right to adduce evidence, a right which he lost in the trial court when he was declared in default, and which he failed to have vacated. In this case, the petitioner sought the modification of the decision of the trial court based on the evidence submitted by it only in the Court of Appeals.[41]

Undoubtedly, a defendant declared in default retains the right to appeal from the judgment by default on the ground that the plaintiff failed to prove the material allegations of the complaint, or that the decision is contrary to law, even without need of the prior filing of a motion to set aside the order of default except that he does not regain his right to adduce evidence.[42] The appellate court, in turn, can review the assailed decision and is not precluded from reversing the same based solely on the evidence submitted by the plaintiff. The next question to be resolved is whether petitioner has the right to the contested public office and to oust private respondent from its enjoyment. We answer in the negative. A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine the right or title to the contested public office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment.[43] It is brought against the person who is alleged to have usurped, intruded into, or unlawfully held or exercised the public office.[44] It may be brought by the Republic of the Philippines or by the person claiming to be entitled to such office.[45] In quo warranto, the petitioner who files the action in his name must prove that he is entitled to the subject public office. In other words, the private person suing must show a clear right to the contested position.[46] Otherwise, the person who holds the same has a right to undisturbed possession and the action for quo warranto may be dismissed.[47] It is not even necessary to pass upon the right of the defendant who, by virtue of his appointment, continues in the undisturbed possession of his office.[48] On the basis of the evidence presented solely by petitioner and without considering the arguments and attachments made by res pondents to rebut petitioners claims, we find that petitioner failed to prove that she is entitled to the contested position. It is undisputed that petitioner was appointed as the principal of the PNS. In addition, she was designated as the OIC of the PINS. Said designation was, however, withdrawn. Private respondent was, thereafter, designated as the new OIC. This prompted petitioner to file the quo warranto petition before the court a quo. The contested position was created by RA 6765. Section 3 of the law provides:

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Section 3. The school shall be headed by a Vocational School Superintendent. He shall be chosen and appointed by the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports [now Secretary of Education].

Moreover, Section 4 thereof states: Section 4. The Home Industries Training Supervisor of the Puerto Princesa School of Philippine Craftsmen shall continue to serve as such. The main school and each of its units or branches shall be headed either by a Principal or Secondary School Head Teacher to be chosen in accordance with the rules and regulations of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports [now the Department of Education].

As aptly observed by the CA, the law created two positions the VSS and the principal or secondary school head teacher of each of the units or branches of the integrated school. The legislators clearly intended that the integrated schools shall be headed by a superintendent. Admittedly, petitioner did not possess the qualifications to hold the position and she was merely designated by the DepEd as the OIC of the PINS. At that time, she held in a concurrent capacity, the permanent position of principal of the PNS. Having been appointed as OIC without the necessary qualifications, petitioner held the position only in a temporary capacity. The purpose of an acting or temporary appointment is to prevent a hiatus in the discharge of official functions by authorizing a person to discharge those functions pending the selection of a permanent or another appointee. An acting appointee accepts the position on the condition that he shall surrender the office once he is called to do so by the appointing authority. Therefore, his term of office is not fixed, but endures at the pleasure of the appointing authority.[49] The essence of an acting appointment is its temporariness and its consequent revocability at any time by the appointing authority.[50] Thus, under RA 6765, petitioner can only insist on her security of tenure as principal of the PNS but not as OIC of the integrated school. Upon the withdrawal of her designation, her right to the contested position ceased to exist. Petitioner also bases her right to the contested position on the enactment of RA 7796, or An Act Creating the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority, Providing for its Powers, Structure and for Other Purposes, and RA 9155, or An Act Instituting a Framework of Governance for Basic Education, Establishing Authority and Accountability, Renaming the Department of Education Culture and Sports as the Department of Education, and for Other Purposes. She contends that under RA 7796, the position of VSS could no longer be filled up by the DepEd having been absorbed by TESDA. As such, the right to manage the operation and finances of the integrated schools is automatically vested with petitioner being the principal of the PNS without further appointment or designation. Again, we do not agree. As found by the RTC and affirmed by the CA, the PINS failed to implement its technical-vocational education program. Consequently, the PNS and the other satellite schools never came under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Technical and Vocational Education of the DepEd nor the technical-vocational education in DepEds regional offices. Thus, except for the Puerto Princesa School of Philippine Craftsmen, which is now within the jurisdiction of the TESDA, the PNS and the other units remained under the complete administrative jurisdiction of the DepEd. Although the technical-vocational education program was not implemented, it does not alter the laws intent that the main school, which is the PNS and the other units integrated with it, shall be headed either by a principal or secondary school head teacher; while the PINS or the integrated school shall be headed by another. We cannot subscribe to petitioners insistence that the princi pal automatically heads the PINS without appointment or designation. As clearly explained by the CA, by providing for a distinct position with a higher qualification (that of a superintendent), specifically chosen and appointed by the DepEd Secretary, separate from the school head of the PNS offering general secondary education program, the law clearly intended the functions of a VSS and school principal of the PNS to be discharged and performed by two different individuals.[51] Neither can petitioner rely on the enactment of RA 9155. The law, in fact, weakens petitioners claim. RA 9155 provides the framework for the governance of basic education. It also emphasizes the principle of shared governance which recognizes that every unit (which includes the national, regional, division, school district, and school levels) in the education bureaucracy has a particular role, task and responsibility. The school shall be headed by a [principal] or school head; a school district by a schools district supervisor; a division by a schools division superintendent; a region by a director; and the national level by the Secretary of Education. It must be recalled that the integration under RA 6765 involved certain high schools in different municipalities of the Province of Palawan and the City of Puerto Princesa. We also note that RA 6765 intended that the integrated school shall be headed by a superintendent. Nowhere in the above laws ca n we find justification for petitioners insistence that she, and not private respondent, has a better right to hold the contested position. Clearly, petitioner failed to establish her right to the contested position. Therefore, the dismissal of her quo warranto petition is in order. It must be emphasized, however, that this declaration only involves the position of petitioner as OIC of the PINS. It does not in any way affect her position as principal of the PNS which she holds in a permanent capacity. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals Decision dated December 15, 2004 and Resolution dated May 3, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 85899, are AFFIRMED. G.R. No. 194122 October 11, 2012 / Hernandez v. Agoncillo

Assailed in the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the April 29, 2010 Decision1 and October 12, 2010 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 108801. The instant petition arose from a Complaint for Damages filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Parafiaque City against herein petitioner and one Freddie Apawan Verwin by herein respondent, alleging as follows:

14
xxxx 2. x x x Defendant Hector Hernandez is x x x the owner of the delivery van which is the subject matter of the above-entitled case. He is doing business under the name of Cargo Solution Innovation and is the employer of Defendant Fredie Apawan Verwin; 3. That on October 5, 2006 at around 12:15 in the afternoon, Defendant Fredie Apawan Verwin was driving a delivery van belonging to a certain Hector Hernandez, bearing plate number RBB-510, along Buendia Avenue Flyover, South Super-Highway (Osmea Avenue), and negligently backed against a Honda City model with plate number XMF-496, owned and driven by the Plaintiff at the time of the incident; 4. That at the time of the incident, the traffic condition at the Buendia Avenue Flyover was bumper-to-bumper and that Plaintiff's and Defendant's vehicles were in an ascending position; 5. That Defendant driver alighted from his van and so did the Plaintiff to assess the damage done. Plaintiff observed that the pedestal of the van totally engaged and hooked the front bumper of her Honda car; 6. That after a brief discussion of the incident, Defendant driver went back to his van and stepped on the gas which caused the van to move abruptly forward and resulted to the disengagement of the bumper of Plaintiff's car and damage to the car radiator, and as a consequence, the Plaintiff's car was towed. Plaintiff paid P1,700 as towing fee. x x x 7. Right after the incident, Plaintiff made various demands from Defendants, thru the secretary of the Cargo Solution Innovation or C.S.I., the company which the driver of the van was working for, to pay the actual damages sustained, but to Plaintiff's dismay her demands were unheeded; 8. That defendant Hector Hernandez never talked nor appeared to the Plaintiff despite several requests made by the latter. Instead, he made a person appear having the name of Mr. De Ocampo before the Plaintiff in her clinic at Medical Center Manila, sometime on October 11, 2006 and acted in representation of Hector Hernandez and made a number of inquiries regarding the accident that transpired; 9. That sometime after, Plaintiff contacted Mr. De Ocampo for feedback regarding Defendant's position about the incident, and Mr. De Ocampo spoke that the Defendants are still waiting for the police report and ever since that conversation, no communication transpired between the parties regarding any agreement or settlement about the accident; 10. That as a direct consequence of the foregoing, Plaintiff's vehicle sustained heavy damage and the repair of which amounted to P130,602.53. A copy of the official receipt given by Honda Makati is hereby attached as Annex "D"; 11. Plaintiff was unable to use her vehicle in going to work for five (5) weeks and led her to commute by means of a taxi every time her duty called her in Medical Center Manila in United Nations Avenue, Manila costing her P500-1000/day; 12. Considering the character of Defendant driver's negligence, together with the malicious refusal to pay actual damages of both Defendants and Plaintiff's experience of sleepless nights and anxiety because of the incident, Defendants should be held liable for moral damages in an amount of not less than P50,000.00; 13. Forced to litigate, Plaintiff engaged the services of a lawyer and have agreed to pay attorney's fees in the amount of P30,000.00 plus P2,500.00 per appearance.3 On May 31, 2007, the MeTC issued a Summons Under Summary Procedure4 which was served upon and received by petitioner on June 18, 2007. However, the summons was not served on the other defendant. The case then proceeded only against petitioner. On July 6, 2007, petitioner filed an Ex Parte Motion for Extension of Time to File His Answer claiming that he just engaged the services of his counsel. He prayed that he be granted an additional period of fifteen (15) days or until July 21, 2007 within which to file his responsive pleading.5 On July 18, 2007, the MeTC issued an Order6 denying petitioner's Ex Parte Motion for Extension of Time holding that the said Motion was filed beyond the reglementary period provided for by the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure and that it is likewise a prohibited pleading under the said Rule. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration7 on August 17, 2007. Meanwhile, petitioner, nonetheless, filed his Answer with Affirmative and Negative Defenses and Compulsory Counterclaims8 on July 26, 2007. Respondent opposed petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.9 In the meantime, she filed a Motion to Render Judgment10 on August 24, 2007, on the ground that petitioner failed to file his answer within the time prescribed by the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. On September 7, 2007, the MeTC issued an Order11 ruling that in view of the fact that the amount being claimed by respondent exceeds P200,000.00, the case shall be governed by the "Rules on Regular Procedure." In the same Order, the MeTC denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration and directed him to file his Comment/Opposition to respondent's Motion to Render Judgment. Petitioner filed his Opposition12 on September 14, 2007. On October 23, 2007, the MeTC issued an Order13 denying respondent's Motion to Render Judgment reiterating its ruling that the case does not fall under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure.

15
On November 14, 2007, respondent filed a Motion to Declare Defendant (herein petitioner) Hector Hernandez in Default and to Render Judgment.14 Petitioner opposed contending that he has already filed his Answer prior to respondent's Motion to declare him in default and that he had actively participated in the case by filing various pleadings.15 On December 4, 2007, the MeTC issued an Order16 declaring petitioner in default and directing respondent to present evidence ex parte. Petitioner filed a Motion to Set Aside Order of Default,17 but the MeTC denied it in its Order18 dated February 8, 2008. After respondent's evidence ex parte was presented, the MeTC rendered its Decision19 dated August 6, 2008, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff Susan San Pedro Agoncillo and against the defendant Hector Hernandez, ordering him, a) To pay the plaintiff the amount of One Hundred Thirty-Two Thousand Three Hundred Two Pesos and 53/100 (Php 132,302.53) for the actual damages for the repair of the car and the towing fee; b) Attorney's fees in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (Php 10,000.00) c) And costs. The case as against defendant Fredie Apawan Verwin is dismissed without prejudice as summons was not validly served upon him. SO ORDERED.20 The MeTC held that respondent was able to sufficiently establish her cause of action against petitioner in accordance with the provisions of Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Petitioner appealed to the RTC which, however, denied the same in its Decision dated February 18, 2009. The RTC affirmed the findings and conclusions of the MeTC. As to the procedural aspect, the RTC ruled that the MeTC correctly denied due course to petitioner's Answer as the Motion for Extension to file the same was filed out of time and that the said Answer was, in fact, filed beyond the extended period requested in the Motion for Extension. Petitioner then filed a petition for review with the CA. On April 29, 2010, the CA rendered its assailed Decision denying the petition for lack of merit. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the CA denied it in its Resolution dated October 12, 2010. Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari raising a sole issue, to wit: WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION IS IN ACCORD WITH APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT, SPECIFICALLY THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT'S RULING IN SABLAS vs. SABLAS (526 SCRA 292 2007).21 Petitioner's basic contention is that, pursuant to this Court's ruling in Sablas v. Sablas,22 the MeTC should have admitted his Answer as his pleading was filed before he was declared in default. The petition is without merit. It is true that this Court held in Sablas that where the Answer is filed beyond the reglementary period but before the defendant is declared in default and there is no showing that defendant intends to delay the case and no prejudice is caused to the plaintiff, the Answer should be admitted.23 It must be emphasized, however, that it is not mandatory on the part of the trial court to admit an Answer which is belatedly filed where the defendant is not yet declared in default. Settled is the rule that it is within the discretion of the trial court to permit the filing of an answer even beyond the reglementary period, provided that there is justification for the belated action and there is no showing that the defendant intended to delay the case.24 In the instant case, the MeTC found it proper not to admit petitioner's Answer and to subsequently declare him in default, because petitioner's Ex Parte Motion for Extension of Time to File His Answer was filed out of time; that petitioner filed his Answer beyond the period requested in the Motion for Extension; and that petitioner failed to appear during the scheduled hearing on respondent's Motion to declare him in default. The Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the above ruling of the MeTC, as affirmed by the RTC and the CA. Sablas differs from the instant case on two aspects, to wit: first, in Sablas, the petitioners' motion for extension to file their answer was seasonably filed while in the present case, petitioner's Motion for Extension to File His Answer was filed beyond the 15-day period allowed by the Rules of Court; second, in Sablas, since the trial court admitted the petitioners' Answer, this Court held that the trial court was correct in denying the subsequent motion of the respondent to declare the petitioners in default while, in the instant case, the MeTC denied due course to petitioner's Answer on the ground that the Motion for Extension was not seasonably filed and that the Answer was filed beyond the period requested in the Motion for Extension, thus, justifying the order of default. Thus, the principle enunciated in Sablas is not applicable in the present case. In this respect, the Court agrees with the CA in its ruling that procedural rules are not to be ignored or disdained at will to suit the convenience of a party.

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Procedural rules are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases.25 Courts and litigants alike are enjoined to abide strictly by the rules.26 While in certain instances, the Court allows a relaxation in the application of the rules, there is no intention to forge a weapon for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity.27 The liberal interpretation and application of rules apply only in proper cases of demonstrable merit and under justifiable causes and circumstances.28 While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to ensure an orderly and speedy administration of justice.29 Party litigants and their counsel are well advised to abide by rather than flaunt procedural rules for these rules illumine the path of the law and rationalize the pursuit of justice.30 Moreover, while the Court frowns upon default judgments, it does not condone gross transgressions of the rules.31 The Court is duty-bound to observe its rules and procedures and uphold the noble purpose behind their i ssuance. Rules are laid down for the benefit of all and should not be made dependent upon a suitors sweet time and own bidding.32 Petitioner's negligence in the present case is inexcusable, because aside from the belated filing of his Motion for Extension to File His Answer, he also failed to file his Answer within the period requested in his Motion without offering any justifiable excuse. Moreover, as observed by the MeTC in its Order dated February 8, 2008, petitioner also failed to appear during the scheduled hearing on respondent's Motion to Declare Him in Default. Furthermore, petitioner did not deny respondent's allegation that he also failed to appear during his requested date of hearing of his Motion to Set Aside the Order of Default. From these circumstances, the Court finds no compelling ground to depart from the findings of the CA that petitioner is guilty of deliberately employing delay in the prosecution of the civil case against him. Aside from petitioner's abovementioned breach of procedural rules, the Court notes that petitioner and his counsel once again committed another violation when they failed to comply with this Court's Resolution dated March 16, 2011 requiring petitioner to file his Reply to respondent's Comment-Opposition to the present petition. It is true that this Court set aside its Resolution dated July 27, 2011 which dismissed the instant petition on the basis of this infraction committed by petitioner. However, it cannot be denied that this infringement affirms petitioner's propensity to ignore at will not only the rules of procedure but also the lawful order of the Court. The Court agrees with respondent's observation that in his Memorandum filed with the RTC, petitioner reasoned out that his failure to seasonably file his Answer was due to the inadvertence and pressure of work on the part of his counsel. In their Motion for Reconsideration of this Court's July 27, 2011 Resolution, petitioner, through his counsel, again used as excuse for their failure to file the required pleading the allegation that the counsel had voluminous workload. However, petitioner's counsel cannot hide from this pretense as he himself claimed that they, in fact, had no intention to file a Reply. Instead, they intended to simply file a Manifestation indicating their desire to waive their right to reply and that they are adopting the arguments in their Petition as their Reply to respondent's Comment. If that, indeed, was the case, then the preparation of the intended manifestation could have taken just a few minutes. In fact, a perusal of petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration with Manifestation shows that it is a mere recapitulation of his arguments raised in his petition.33 Yet, petitioner failed to file his Manifestation on time, which is within a period of ten (10) days from his receipt of the Resolution requiring his reply. Indeed, petitioner's counsel admitted that they received the Resolution requiring petitioner to file his Reply on April 26, 2011. However, petitioner ignored this Resolution and it was only on September 16, 2011, or almost five months after, that petitioner filed his Motion for Reconsideration with Manifestation. Notably, the said Motion for Reconsideration with Manifestation was filed only when this Court issued another Resolution dismissing the instant petition for petitioner's failure to comply with the order of this Court directing him to file his reply. This only indicates that were it not for the dismissal of his petition, petitioner and his counsel would have continued to ignore this Court's lawful order. Truly, the conduct of petitioner and his counsel can never be a case of excusable neglect. On the contrary, it smacks of a blatant disregard of the rules and lawful directives of the court. Thus, giving in to petitioner's maneuvering is tantamount to putting premium on a litigant's naked indolence and sanctioning a scheme of prolonging litigation. It bears stressing that a lawyer has the responsibility of monitoring and keeping track of the period of time left to file pleadings, and to see to it that said pleadings are filed before the lapse of the period.34 If he fails to do so, his client is bound by his conduct, negligence and mistakes.35 In the present case, petitioner and his counsel knew and should have known of the periods within which they are to file their pleadings. In fact, with respect to their Answer, they should be aware that they had only until July 21, 2007 to file the same because they were the ones who requested for an extension of time to file the said Ans wer. It was incumbent on petitioners counsel to arrange his workload and attend to important and pressing matters such that pleadings are filed within the prescribed period therefor.36 If the failure of the petitioners counsel to cope with his heavy workload should be considered a valid justification to sidestep the reglementary period, there would be no end to litigations so long as counsel had not been sufficiently diligent or experienced.37 Time and again, this Court has cautioned lawyers to handle only as many cases as they can efficiently handle.38 The zeal and fidelity demanded of a lawyer to his clients cause require that not only should he be qualified to handle a legal matter, he must also prepare adequately and giv e appropriate attention to his legal work.39 Since a client is, as a rule, bound by the acts of his counsel, a lawyer, once he agrees to take a case, should undertake the task with dedication and care.40 This Court frowns upon a lawyers practice of repeatedly seeking extensions of tim e to file pleadings and thereafter simply letting the period lapse without submitting any pleading or even any explanation or manifestation for his omission.41 Failure of a lawyer to seasonably file a pleading constitutes inexcusable negligence on his part. On the other hand, it would not also be amiss to remind petitioner of the settled rule that litigants, represented by counsel, should not expect that all they need to do is sit back, relax and await the outcome of their case.42 Instead, they should give the necessary assistance to their counsel and exercise due diligence to monitor the status of the case for what is at stake is their interest in the case.43 This petitioner failed to do. In any case, respondent was. granted favorable relief only after the MeTC has ascertained that such relief is warranted by the evidence presented and the facts proven by the respondent. The Court agrees with the CA in holding that even if he was declared in default, petitioner was not deprived of his right to appeal. In fact, he appealed his case to the RTC, which ruled squarely on the merits of respondent's complaint and found sufficient evidence to sustain the ruling of the MeTC in respondent's favor.

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WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The April 29, 2010 Decision and the October 12, 2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. RULE 9 Effect of Failure to Plead Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim. (2a) Section 2. Compulsory counterclaim, or cross-claim, not set up barred. A compulsory counterclaim, or a cross-claim, not set up shall be barred. (4a) Section 3. Default; declaration of. If the defending party fails to answer within the time allowed therefor, the court shall, upon motion of the claiming party with notice to the defending party, and proof of such failure, declare the defending party in default. Thereupon, the court shall proceed to render judgment granting the claimant such relief as his pleading may warrant, unless the court in its discretion requires the claimant to submit evidence. Such reception of evidence may be delegated to the clerk of court. (1a, R18) (a) Effect of order of default. A party in default shall be entitled to notice of subsequent proceedings but not to take part in the trial. (2a, R18)

(b) Relief from order of default. A party declared in default may at any time after notice thereof and before judgment file a motion under oath to set aside the order of default upon proper showing that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence and that he has a meritorious defense. In such case, the order of default may be set aside on such terms and conditions as the judge may impose in the interest of justice. (3a, R18) (c) Effect of partial default. When a pleading asserting a claim states a common cause of action against several defending parties, some of whom answer and the others fail to do so, the court shall try the case against all upon the answers thus filed and render judgment upon the evidence presented. (4a, R18). (d) Extent of relief to be awarded. A judgment rendered against a party in default shall not exceed the amount or be different in kind from that prayed for nor award unliquidated damages. (5a, R18). (e) Where no defaults allowed. If the defending party in an action for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated. (6a, R18) RULE 11 When to File Responsive Pleadings Section 1. Answer to the complaint. The defendant shall file his answer to the complaint within fifteen (15) days after service of summons, unless a different period is fixed by the court. (la) Section 2. Answer of a defendant foreign private juridical entity. Where the defendant is a foreign private juridical entity and service of summons is made on the government official designated by law to receive the same, the answer shall be filed within thirty (30) days after receipt of summons by such entity. (2a) Section 3. Answer to amended complaint. When the plaintiff files an amended complaint as a matter of right, the defendant shall answer the same within fifteen (15) days after being served with a copy thereof. Where its filing is not a matter of right, the defendant shall answer the amended complaint within ten (l0) days from notice of the order admitting the same. An answer earlier filed may serve as the answer to the amended complaint if no new answer is filed. This Rule shall apply to the answer to an amended counterclaim, amended cross-claim, amended third (fourth, etc.)party complaint, and amended complaint-inintervention. (3a) Section 4. Answer to counterclaim or cross-claim. A counterclaim or cross-claim must be answered within ten (10) days from service. (4) Section 5. Answer to third (fourth, etc.)-party complaint. The time to answer a third (fourth, etc.)party complaint shall be governed by the same rule as the answer to the complaint. (5a) Section 6. Reply. A reply may be filed within ten (10) days from service of the pleading responded to. (6) Section 7. Answer to supplemental complain. A supplemental complaint may be answered within ten (10) days from notice of the order admitting the same, unless a different period is fixed by the court. The answer to the complaint shall serve as the answer to the supplemental complaint if no new or supplemental answer is filed. (n) Section 8. Existing counterclaim or cross-claim. A compulsory counterclaim or a cross-claim that a defending party has at the time he files his answer shall be contained therein. (8a, R6)

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Section 9. Counterclaim or cross-claim arising after answer. A counterclaim or a cross-claim which either matured or was acquired by a party after serving his pleading may, with the permission of the court, be presented as a counterclaim or a cross-claim by supplemental pleading before judgment. (9, R6) Section 10.Omitted counterclaim or cross-claim. When a pleader fails to set up a counterclaim or a cross-claim through oversight, inadvertence, or excusable neglect, or when justice requires, he may, by leave of court, set up the counterclaim or cross-claim by amendment before judgment. (3, R9) Section 11.Extension of time to plead. Upon motion and on such terms as may be just, the court may extend the time to plead provided in these Rules. The court may also, upon like terms, allow an answer or other pleading to be filed after the time fixed by these Rules. (7) Sec. 8 (2), Special Rule of Procedure on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriage Sec. 8 (2), Special Rule of Procedure on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriage Sec. 8. Answer. - (1) The respondent shall file his answer within fifteen days from service of summons, or within thirty days from the last issue of publication in case of service of summons by publication. The answer must be verified by the respondent himself and not by counsel or attorney-in-fact. (2) If the respondent fails to file an answer, the court shall not declare him or her in default. (3) Where no answer is filed or if the answer does not tender an issue, the court shall order the public prosecutor to investigate whether collusion exists between the parties. Sec. 5 (b) and (c), Special Rule of Procedure in Legal Separation Sec. 5. Answer. - (a) The respondent shall file his answer within fifteen days from receipt of summons, or within thirty days from the last issue of publication in case of service of summons by publication. The answer must be verified by respondent himself and not by counsel or attorney-in-fact. (b) If the respondent fails to file an answer, the court shall not declare him in default. (c) Where no answer is filed/or if the answer does not tender an issue the court shall order the public prosecutor to investigate whether collusion exists between the parties.