The Recognition of Israel

Harry Truman's Recognition of Israel Author(s): Michael Ottolenghi Source: The Historical Journal, Vol. 47, No. 4 (Dec.
, 2004), pp. 963-988 Published by: Cambridge University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4091664 . Accessed: 11/03/2014 18:47
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Cambridge University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Historical Journal.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded from 201.234.181.53 on Tue, 11 Mar 2014 18:47:22 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
TheHistoricalJoumrnal, 47, 4 (2004), pp. 963-988 ? 2004 CambridgeUniversityPress DOI: Io.ioi7/Sooi8246Xo4004o66 Printedin the United Kingdom
HARRY TRUMAN'S RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL*

MICHAEL OTTOLENGHI Schoolof Law FordhamUniversity
accounts placedundue of Israelhave Historiographical of Hary Truman'srecognition in the onthisapparently hasnotbeen sudden acton14May 1948. US Palestine importance placed policy in theearly correct historical context in Washington As a' ColdWar consensus' oftheColdWar. developed Tier'of Palestine concern thatwasthe'Northern as a secondary tothemajor issue post-war period, emerged theattainment andIran.TheUSwasguided inPalestine: butclear Greece, ofa objectives Turkey, bybroad to the Soviets. a desire not to implicate US troops, and the denialof the region solution, peaceful these broad within all expressed between theWhite were HouseandtheState Disagreements Department in Israeli the sources their absence have been of historiography existing policyobjectives. by significant were victories These sources reveal in Palestine, that of recognition. diplomatic for the Jewishcommunity andthe tothe a Washington From both achievement perspective, secondaS importance practical ofstatehood. US recognition issue at thetime. wasnotregarded as a crucial It wasa decision Palestine, perspectivefrom the taken withinthecontext it did not broad US in and Palestine, of the of influence decision objectives to declare statehood. Yishuv
ABSTRACT.
In a 1966 speech, Eliahu Elath (ne Epstein), then president of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, affirmed that Harry Truman's recognition of Israel would remain forever inscribed 'in golden letters in the four thousand years' history' of the Jewish people.1 This was one example of the lavish praise bestowed upon Truman by Israeli officials, who came to see US recognition as a symbol of the United States's special affinity towards the State of Israel. In 1949, for example, the chief rabbi of Israel told Truman that God had put him in his mother's womb so that he could be the instrument 'to bring about the rebirth of Israel after two thousand years'. Historiographical accounts that deal with Truman's recognition have also placed great importance on Truman's apparently sudden act, a mere eleven * I would liketo thank theBritish andtheCambridge Council, Trinity Hall,Cambridge, European and fortheirgenerous Trust in Independence, andthestaff at theTruman Missouri, Library funding, the Central to Prof.A.J. Zionist Thanks Archives inJerusalem to my research. fortheirassistance Dr S. P. Martland, aswellasto myparents andProf.J. fortheir Badger, helpful suggestions, Steinberg
for their support throughout.
and the S. Truman moral President andR. Kirschener, eds.,On 1 Citedin G. C. Grossman grounds: Harry birth State Ca. 1998), ofthe ofIsrael (Los Angeles, p. i8. Plain S. Truman 2 MerleMiller, anoral p. 218. (NewYork,1973), speaking: biography ofHarry
963
964
MICHAEL
OTTOLENGHI
minutes after the birth of Israel.3 But it is far from clear that the importance given to Truman's act of recognition is at all justified from a historical perspective. One of the main problems with the historiography of recognition is the peculiar place it occupies at the intersection of various historical 'sub-fields'. Truman scholars analysing recognition have tended to focus on the direct personal motivations ol the president, while diplomatic historians have approached the issue of recognition by following the paper trail pointing to the feuds between the State Department and the White House on Palestine policy.4 This article attempts to reconcile the different historiographies of US recognition of Israel by adopting a methodological approach that has emerged in studies of diplomatic history. As a result, the prevailing view that recognition was a crucial event will be challenged. What Michael Hogan and others have called the 'realist' approach to the history of foreign policy has been subjected to numerous critiques. These critiques point out that realist diplomatic history relies excessively on official US documents, which results in the adoption of the 'view from Washington' and the exaggeration of the influence of the United States in the world.5 Christopher Thorne, for example, described 'realist' diplomatic history as plagued by 'national, cultural and disciplinary parochialism'.6 The critics of realist diplomatic history called for multiarchival research and a greater emphasis on the domestic sphere, and how this influenced foreign policy. These criticisms are relevant to the historiography of the recognition of Israel. This article will focus on the most significant charge that could be levelled against the existing accounts of recognition: the disregard for the Israeli perspective. Some historians have recently used some Israeli source material, but only tc reinforce their points on the importance of recognition.' This article will seek tc apply a multiarchival approach to Truman's recognition of Israel, reconciling the different historiographies involved by using Israeli sources alongside American ones. Recognition will emerge as a minor point in US policy towards Palestine, and an event of minimal importance to the Jews in Palestine. The first section will place Palestine in the proper strategic and regional context of the post-war period (until the UN partition resolution of November 1947), as seen from a Washington perspective. This contextualization will reconcile the historiography of recognition with the broader historiography of the Cold War,
' See, for example, David McCullough, Truman (New York, 1992),p. 619; ZacharyKarabell, Th7 lastcampaign: how in themine wonthe1948 election Hary Truman (NewYork,2000), p. 94; PeterGrose,Israel ofAmerica (New York, 1983),pp. 288-95. S. Truman: a life(Columbia, 4 For an account by a Truman scholar,see Robert Ferrell,Harry MS. and London, 1994);for a diplomatichistoryperspective,see Ritchie Ovendale,Britain, theUnited States, andtheendof thePalestine Mandate, I942-1948 (Woodbridge,1989). 5 Michael Hogan and Robert Paterson, 'Introduction',in Michael Hogan and Robert Paterson, the relations eds., Explaining ofAmerican (Cambridge,1991), pp. I-9. foreign history'The 6 Robert McMahon, study of American foreign relations:national history or international
history?', in Hogan and Paterson, eds., Explainingthehistoiy,p. 12. founding of Israel (Westport, CT, 1997), pp. I64-7I7 Michael Benson, Hary S. Trumanand the
TRUMAN'S RECOGNITION
OF ISRAEL
965
which is often lacking in accounts of recognition.8 While important differences existed between the State Department and the White House over Palestine, by 1947 a strong 'Cold War consensus' had emerged on domestic and foreign policy, according to a leading historian of the era.9 The differences between the White House and the State Department were being formulated within a series of broad strategic objectives for Palestine, and ultimately contrasting views were the result of tactical differences over how best to achieve the strategic objectives for Palestine. The second section will address the same time period from the perspective of the Yishuv (the Jewish Community in Palestine), by using documents from the Central Zionist Archives in Jerusalem. Regardless of the Washingtonian policy debates, the Yishuv was committed to declaring statehood. The events of the post-war period, until the partition resolution of 29 November 1947, were all considered within the prospect of statehood. After the partition resolution, the Yishuv stepped up its preparations for statehood, with little concern for diplomatic niceties such as recognition. The third section will combine the 'view from Washington' with the perspective from Palestine, to analyse the chronological developments in Palestine from the partition resolution of November 1947 through to recognition in May 1948. The multiarchival approach will show how recognition was not regarded as a crucial issue. In Washington, recognition was a decision taken within the context of the broad objectives of policy towards Palestine, whereas for the Yishuv recognition was of secondary importance compared to the desire to obtain a suspension of the American embargo on arms to Palestine. I While the importance of the Cold War 'geopolitical code' in US foreign policy has been the focus of a rich historiography, it has been surprisingly underemphasized in the historiography of United States foreign policy towards Palestine.1o Historians seem to have focused more on the immediate interaction between the United States and the Jewish and Arab sides than on the broader framework within which US foreign policy was formulated." The emphasis of certain studies on clashes between the State Department and the White House on Palestine misses the important point made by the historiography of the early Cold War about the emergence of a foreign policy consensus by 1947.12Furthermore, andIsrael since Palestine DonaldNeff, Fallen U.S.policy towards 1945 pillars: 8 See, for example, and the theUnited DC, i995); Ovendale, Britain, Benson,Truman States; founding ofIsrael. (Washington, and the Cold War Apreponderance administration P. Leffler, theTruman national ofpower: security, 9 Melvyn CA, 1992),pp. 138-40. (Stanford, national American a critical security Gaddis, Strategies ofcontainment: policy appraisal ofpostwar 10JohnLewis (Oxford, 1982),p. ix. States. theUnited Ovendale, Britain, Neff,Fallen pillars; 11 See,forexample, 12 Foran emphasis on StateDepartment-White Houseclashes Benson,Truman see,forexample,
andthe for the Cold War 'consensus' see Leffler,Preponderance ofIsrael; ofpower, pp. I38-40. founding
966
MICHAEL
OTTOLENGHI
the fact that this consensus was elaborated by the same State Department and administration officials who would later clash bitterly over Palestine calls for a less simplistic understanding of the relationship between the White House and the State Department. The relationship between Harry Truman and the State Department was mostly a close one. This can be seen by the handling of the USSR, which was largely based on the vision of the American charge d'affaires in Moscow, George
Kennan, in his 'long telegram' of 22 February 1946.13 InJuly 1946, Truman asked
Clark Clifford, his special counsel, and his assistant, George Elsey, to write a report analysing the Kremlin's motivations and recent actions, and suggest directions for American policy. Clifford and Elsey solicited the help of the State, War, and Navy departments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and others.14Such an interdepartmental effort highlights the emergence of a common position towards the USSR.15
Indeed, the report adopted Kennan's view of the Soviet Union as seeking world domination, and prescribed a detailed course of action for the United States. The report advocated that the United States mobilize its economic and militarypower to 'assistall democraticcountrieswhich are in any ways menaced by the USSR', and emphasizedthe importanceof Western Europe, the Middle These are the same areas highlightedby Kennan throughout East, andJapan.16 'an as and irreducibleminimum of national security'.1 This stemmed 1946 1947 from conviction as much as from necessity, as the limited resourcesavailableto pursue this policy of containmentrequiredthat spendingfocus on areas essential to national security, or 'strongpoints'.1s This extended the global objectives of containment practically into different regional spheres, including the Middle East, althoughnot to Palestine,which was never seriouslyregardedas a locus of
containment of Soviet power. The similarities between the Clifford-Elsey report and Kennan's views on Soviet power indicate that there was a 'Cold War consensus' developing by late 1946, regardless of the validity of its assumptions on Soviet motivations."1 Both the Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine for Greece and Turkey should be understood in the light of this emerging Cold War consensus, which focused on
1925-1950 ofpower, la Leffler,Preponderance pp. 26-7; long telegramin George F. Kennan, Memoirs, (London, 1968), pp. 557-9. The relationshipbetween Kennan's writingsand the Truman administration'spolicieshas been termed 'inherentlycomplex' by Gaddisin Strategies ofcontainment, pp. 26, 54. on thefiring line(New 14 Cliffordto Truman, September 1946, in ArthurKrock, Memoirs: sixtyyears York, 1968),p. 419. 15 For examplesof the stance of the State Department,see State DepartmentIntelligenceReview, (20 vols., Bethesda, of theTruman presidency March/April 1946,in Dennis Merrill,ed., Documentary histogy Md., 1996),vii, pp. 117-21. For theJoint Chiefsof Staff,see Leahy to Truman, 26July 1946,in Merrill, ed., Documentary of theTruman presidency, histoly vn, pp. 184-97. 16 'American relations with the Soviet Union': a report to the president, in Krock, Memoirs, p. 30. of containment, 17 Gaddis, Strategies PP. 479-80. 19 Ibid., p. 138. s18 Leffler, Preponderance ofpower, p. 147.
TRUMAN'S
RECOGNITION
OF ISRAEL
967
resisting the spread of Soviet influence by shoring up regimes favourable to US interests militarily and economically, and focusing on essential regions. The Middle East was one such strongpoint region to be defended.20 This particular region was under immediate threat from the Soviet Union along its 'Northern Tier' of Greece, Turkey, and Iran. The policies of the Truman administration in this region reflected the shift from diplomatic negotiations to containment, as the Soviet Union failed to live up to its guarantees in Iran, and was accused of continuing to subvert the political stability of Greece and Turkey. It was in the Northern Tier that the Truman administration learnt the effectiveness of taking a firm stand against the USSR, first in Iran, and then by enacting the Truman Doctrine.21 It is within this context that the issue of Palestine should be seen, although Palestine itself was not considered a vital region. Additionally, there was the complication of the incoherent policy inherited from Franklin D. Roosevelt, who had managed to commit his support for a 'Jewish Commonwealth' as well as a promise not to change the basic situation in Palestine without 'full consultation' with the Arab states.22 The complexity of the situation, and the lack of a direct Soviet threat, enabled the proponents of different solutions to the Palestine problem to anchor their diverging arguments in the rhetoric of a defence against the unknown intentions of the USSR. This is precisely the issue which has been surprisingly overlooked by the historiography of the Truman administration's relations with Palestine. Indeed, rather than looking at Palestine from the perspective of the Cold War, historians have argued about the true motivations of the Truman administration's stance toward Palestine, making arguments for humanitarian, political, and 'moral' motivations.23 These accounts note the important differences between the president's sympathy with the cause of the Jewish people and the reluctance of State Department specialists to alienate the Arab states. However, while both State Department and White House documents do reveal important differences over the handling of specific issues, there also emerges a consensus on the fundamental objectives of US policy in Palestine. These were a refusal to implicate US troops in Palestine, and an emphasis on denying the country to the Soviets while working towards a peaceful resolution of the conflict. Bearing these broader concerns in mind is useful, for they clearly stem from the economic and geographical atthe inthe State Present creation: 1969), (London, Department my years 20 DeanAcheson, p. 219.
andGreece Turkey (Princeton,NJ, 1980),p. 303.
21Bruce inIran, and War inthe East: The Kuniholm, Near origins oftheCold great power conflict diplomacy
22 Support forJewish Commonwealth see, Roosevelt to Wagner, 15 Oct. 1944, Foreign Relations of
the United States(FRUS) 1944,vol. v, pp. 615-16; assuranceto Arab statessee, for example,Roosevelt to IbnSaud,5 Apr.1945,FRUS1945, vol.viii,p. 698. The man seeJonathan (NewYork,1950), Daniels, ofindependence perspective 2' Forthehumanitarian
seetheearliest forthepolitical andChristopher toIsrael Crossroads argument (NewYork,1965); Sykes, the vote and the creation account CA,'974),andZvi ofJohnSnetsinger, Truman, Jewish ofIsrael (Stanford,
Ganin, Truman,American Jewry and Israel, 1945-1948 Benson, Trumanand the founding of Israel. (New York, 1979); for the 'moral' argument, see
968
MICHAEL OTTOLENGHI
constrictions imposed by containment. Because Palestine and the Arab world were not seen as central to Cold War concerns, differences of opinion between the State Department and the White House were possible, as they did not jeopardize fundamental US interests.24 The first point of contact between the Truman administration and Palestine was the issue of the Jewish displaced persons (DPs) in Europe in 1945. The issue was defined by the report of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, headed by Earl G. Harrison. The report, presented on 24 August 1945, was highly critical of the conditions in which these Jewish DPs lived, and noted that the treatment of the Jews by the Allies was little different than what they knew under the Nazis, 'except we do not exterminate them'."2 Since many of the DPs wanted to go to Palestine and not remain in Europe, the report recommended 'the quick evacuation of all non-repatriable Jews in Germany and Austria, who wish it, to Palestine '.26 It is clear that Truman was moved by the report, which prompted him to send a copy to the British prime minister, Clement Attlee, with a request for the easing of restrictions on Jewish immigration to Palestine.27 This correspondence led to the creation, in December 1945, of an Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry into the Palestine question, with the stated aim of examining the 'political, economic and social conditions in Palestine as they bear upon the problem of Jewish immigration'.28 Importantly, and as noted by those historians who focus on State Department-White House friction, the Near East and African Affairs Division (NEA) of the State Department, headed by Loy Henderson, was not enthusiastic about the recommendations of the Harrison report.29Henderson, a self-professed 'hard-liner' on Soviet affairs, feared developments in Palestine would cause upheaval in the Arab world which the USSR might capitalize on.30 The NEA's recommendation was that the government ' should not favor mass or unrestricted Jewish immigration into Palestine' before a definite settlement was reached.31 Its arguments were based on the volatility of the region, and were repeated by
24 Steven The other toReagan America's Middle Truman Spiegel, Arab-Israeli conflict: making from Eastpolicy, Ben-Gurion and hiscritics birth Heller,The (Chicago, 1985), P. 19;Joseph (Gainseville, of srael, 1945-i949: 2000), pp. 22-3. Partin, Reel 33, Roosevelt 25Harrison Report,HarryS. TrumanOfficeFile (HSTOF), Study Centre The Netherlands. (RSC) Middleburg, Reel33,RSC. HSTOF,PartIII, Report, 26Harrison 27 Eban Ayers, saidin a regular Truman's accounts assistant howTruman press secretary, morning thatthereport had'madehimsick',in Robert intheiWhite House: the Ferrell, ed., Truman meeting diary A.Ayers in calledthereport Truman MS, 1991), ofEban (Columbia, 'moving', p. 72;andin hisdiary, trial and Truman to Truman, Attlee, of hope: (London, 1956), p. 146; Aug. 1946-1953 1945, 31 Years FRUS1945, vol.viii,pp. 737-9. 28 Statement Reel34, RSC. by thepresident, io Dec. 1945, HSTOF,PartIII, 29 Neff,Fallen pillars, pp. 31-2.
s0 Oral HistoryInterviewwith Loy W. Henderson, Harry S. Truman Library(HSTL).
31 Immigration into Palestine Previous to a Final Decision with regard to the Future Status of Palestine, 29 Aug. 1945, HSTOF, Part III, Reel 34, RSC.
OF ISRAEL
969
Secretary of State Byrnes in a memo to Truman regarding the impact of Palestine policy on Saudi Arabia.32 But although Truman focused on the DP issue and proceeded to create the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, he was far from ignorant of developments in the Arab world with which the State Department was concerned. As early as May 1945, Acting Secretary of State Grew informed Truman of President Roosevelt's letter to Ibn Saud assuring him that 'there should be no decision altering the basic situation in Palestine without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews '.33 This knowledge was incorporated into Truman's basic position on the Palestine issue. At a press conference on his return from Potsdam on 16 August 1945, the official statement released by the White House noted that the Presidentsaid the United States'sview was that we wanted to let as many of theJews into Palestineas possible and still maintain civil peace ... it would have to be worked out with the Britishand the Arabs for a Jewish State. He said there was no idea in mind of sending a ... militaryforce of, say 500,0oo to keep peace in Palestine.34 The president was acknowledging that he was going to continue Roosevelt's policy of consultation with the Arab states, and he continued to have close contacts with King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia.35 Truman was here laying out his basic objectives for Palestine. While the refugee issue was noted as important, it was considered within the context of a peaceful solution in Palestine, and to the desire not to implicate US forces. These were objectives that would underlie US policy in Palestine until 1948 and beyond, with different degrees of success. Furthermore, they were objectives that were shared by the State Department and other government departments. A 19 September 1945 memorandum from the War Department to the State Department, for example, pointed out that the commitment of US troops to Palestine would have to be large and would probably lead to more deployments in the region, a serious concern in a period of demobilization.36 And a recommendation by a joint State-War-Treasury Committee on Palestine in the summer of 1946 reaffirmed this point in the most basic way: 'Is the U.S. willing to employ military forces? No.'37 These were objectives in line with the strategy of containment, as a firmer stance was being taken in the Northern Tier, indicating the regional priorities of the United States.
32 Byrnes Reel34,RSC. to Truman, 3 Nov. 1945, HSTOF,PartIII, 33Grewto Truman, Reel34,RSC. I May1945,HSTOF,PartIII,
on Palestine, 16Aug.1945, HSTOF,PartiIi,Reel34,RSC. 34 Statement Confidential to Ibn Saud,13Sept.1945, of HarryS. Truman, File,State Papers 35 See Truman Department 1945-6,HSTL. Correspondence of State,19Sept.1945,FRUS1945, from to theDepartment theWarDepartment 36 Memorandum
vol. vIII, pp. 742-3-
37 Matters re Palestine to be Considered before London Conference, in Papers of Harry S. Truman, President's Subject File (PSF), Subject File Cabinet Committee- London Conference, HSTL.
970
MICHAEL
OTTOLENGHI
Agreement on these broad principles notwithstanding, differences were apparent between the State Department and the White House on the handling of specific issues. This was notably the case once the report of the Anglo-American Committee was released on 20 April 1946. The report called for the entry into Palestine of Ioo,ooo Jewish refugees, and for a UN trusteeship that would lead to a binational state, rather than separate states.38 Anxious for results on the DP issue, Truman singled out only the immigration issue for immediate action.39 The State Department, however, felt that the report should be considered as a whole, and continued to worry about possible repercussions in the Arab world, where reactions to the report, and the president's response to it, were unfavourable.40 The extent of these repercussions were thought to be even more dangerous because of the unwillingness to introduce US troops to maintain a settlement. This unwillingness was reiterated by a Joint Chiefs of Staff report on 21 June 1946 urging that 'no U.S. troops be involved in carrying out the Committee's recommendations'.41 The British were particularly concerned that US pressure for Jewish immigration would not be backed up by military commitments in the region, leaving them to deal with the political and military consequences.42 Truman remained committed to the question ofJewish DPs, even as the British bought themselves more time with the creation of a commission to study the issue, culminating in the London Conference in late 1946. This attachment to the fate of the refugees, however, should not be seen simply through the lens of the 'humanitarian' or 'moral' argument. Indeed, while revisionist historians of the i970os undoubtedly went too far in seeing a political motive in every action on Palestine, political considerations were important to the president in addition to his genuine concern for the plight ofJewish refugees. On 4 October 1946, the eve of the Jewish Day of Atonement, Truman issued a statement favourable to the Jewish position in Palestine, agreeing with a Jewish Agency proposal for a 'viable Jewish State ... in an adequate area of Palestine instead of in the whole of Palestine'.43 Truman was under political pressure to issue this statement, less than a month away from congressional elections, notably from his administrative assistant for minority affairs, David Niles, a New Dealer with close links to both the Democratic Party and the AmericanJewish community.44 In the days preceding Truman's statement of 4 October, for example, Niles knew that the Republican governor of New York, Thomas Dewey, was going to
39 Statement by thepresident, Reel35,RSC. 30 Apr.1945, HSTOF,Part III, 40 See,forexample, Wadsworth to secretary vol.vII, ofstate, 9 May1946,FRUS1946, pp.599-601. 21June 1946, HSTOF,Partiii, Reel34,RSC. 42 Attlee to Truman, FRUSI946,vol.vii, pp. 623-4. IoJune1946,
43 New YorkTimes, 5 Oct. 1946. 1959), p. 6. Harvard, 41 Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the State-War-Navy
38 Michael Cohen, Trumanand Israel (Oxford, 1990), p. 127.
Coordinating Committee,
44DavidB. Sachar,'DavidK. Niles and UnitedStatespolicytowards Palestine' (MAthesis,
OF ISRAEL
971
make a strong statement in favour ofJewish immigration on 6 October, and urged Truman to pre-empt Dewey, as the New York vote would be crucial in the upcoming elections.45 There was also lobbying from within the cabinet and the Democratic Party. On I October 1946, Robert Hannegan, the postmastergeneral, advised Truman to pressure the British government for greater Jewish immigration into Palestine, in order to 'clear the atmosphere' with American Jewry.46 These political factors were certainly important to the issuance of the 4 October statement, but perhaps more important was the effect of this politicization on relations with the State Department. State Department officials felt that the timing of this statement went against the ongoing negotiations at the London Conference. Predictably, the statement infuriated the Arab world, and the State Department was placed in a difficult position in this regard. A memorandum on Middle East policy written by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs noted that 'our policy ... is disliked and feared by the Arabs; it already handicaps and may eventually jeopardize our political and other interests in the Arab world'.47 Loy Henderson attested to his uneasiness at the fact that 'we have practically been forced by political pressure and sentiment in the US in direction of a "viable Jewish state " '.48 The State Department did not appreciate the president's apparent disregard for US commitments in the Arab world. But the problem appeared to be one of different perceptions of the situation. Truman may not have been receiving the indignant telegrams of consular officials, but he did receive, in mid-October, a letter from King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia who expressed his 'astonishment' at the 4 October statement and its apparent contradiction of previous US assurances to him.49 In his response of 25 October, Truman informed the king of his outlook on the situation: 'I do not consider that my urging of the admittance of a considerable number of displaced Jews into Palestine or my statements with regard to the solution of the problem of Palestine in any sense represent an action hostile to the Arab people.'50 Truman believed that supporting immigration did not necessarily represent a basic change in the situation. His vision of a peaceful solution to the Palestine issue may have been naive given the information presented to him by the State Department, but the president, juggling political and humanitarian concerns, knew that Saudi Arabia, with its important oil reserves, was intricately tied to the United States economically.51 This consideration was repeated in memoranda
45
46 Hannegan to Truman, I Oct. 1946, HSTOF, Part III,Reel 34, RSC.
David Sachar, p. 44. K.Niles,
Henderson to Acheson in FRUS1946, vol.vii, p. 732n. 49IbnSaudto Truman, FRUS1946, vol.vii, pp. 708-9. 50 Truman to IbnSaud,25 Oct.1946,FRUS1946, vol.vii, pp. 716-17.
for security:SaudiArabianoil andAmericanforeign policy, 1939-1949 51 Aaron Miller, Search
NC,
1980),
47 Merriam to Henderson, 27 Dec. 1946, FRUS 1946, vol. vii, p. 733. 48
(Chapel Hill,
p. I89.
972
MICHAEL
OTTOLENGHI
from the American charge d'affaires in Saudi Arabia who indicated that US policy towards Palestine would not affect Ibn Saud's relations with the US.52 Indeed, according to a 1948 memorandum from the files of Clark Clifford, Ibn Saud was demanding a stronger US guarantee against Soviet hostility to Saudi Arabia because of Saudi support of American policies in the Middle East.53Truman and his White House advisers were considering Palestine as a regional matter and within the context of Saudi oil, albeit not in the same manner as the NEA. Despite these differences between the White House and the State Department, further evidence of the agreement on broad principles is found in a more detailed study of the reaction to Truman's October statement endorsement of the idea of partition, which was not met with the complete hostility some historians have alleged.54 The memorandum written by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, mentioned above, seemed to at least accept the possibility of partition advocated by the Jewish Agency and endorsed by Truman's October statement, by referring to a settlement in Palestine as comprising a 'political entity or entities'." Another NEA memorandum, in January 1947, mentioned the possibility that a 'workable partition of Palestine' into an Arab state and a Jewish state 'could be supported by the United States', with the acquiescence of 'all Arab states to whatever solution' would eventually be endorsed." State Department resentment was nonetheless present, due to the Department's low regard for the politicization of the Palestine issue by White House advisers such as David Niles and Clark Clifford, who dealt with both the political and foreign policy aspects of Palestine.57 Partition at this point took centre stage in Washington policy debates as the British handed over the Palestine matter to the United Nations in February 1947. The United Nations formed a special committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) to find a solution for the problem. On 31 August, the UNSCOP majority report was released, recommending that the British end their mandate immediately and that the country be partitioned into separate Arab andJewish states.58 Here again, while disagreements were voiced, the fundamental objectives of policy prevailed in Truman's stance, as he steered a middle course between the conflicting advice given to him. He continued to hope, rather naively, that the UNSCOP majority plan could avert bloodshed and avoid the implication of US troops in the region.
Kenneth R. Bain,The March and toZion: United States policy 1979), thefounding (Texas, ofIsrael P. 152. to secretary Political of state,Io Nov. 1948,Clifford File,Box20,HSTL. Papers, 3 Childs Truman and the ofIsrael, 54 Benson, founding pp. 78-81. to Henderson, vol.vii, pp. 732-5. 27Dec. 1946,FRUS1946, 55Merriam vol.v, pp. Ioo4-5. FRUS1947, Wilkins by Fraser (NEA), 14 Jan. 1947, 56Memorandum some of Niles,expressed a memorandum in whichthepresident, at theurging 57 See,forexample, to advise theUS to thenaming andGeorge of twoNEAofficials, Henderson Wadsworth, opposition Reel 34, to the UN, president of state,6 Aug. 947,HSTOF,PartIII, to undersecretary delegation
52
RSC.
58 UNSCOP Report, 31 Aug. 2947,HSTOF, PartIII,Reel 34, RSC.
TRUMAN'S
RECOGNITION
OF ISRAEL
973
Loy Henderson and the NEA were opposed to the majority report. Their major problemswere that supportingpartitionwould inevitablyrequire sending US troops to enforce it, as any such plan would be 'unworkable',and also that supporting partition would 'be certain to undermine our relations with the Arab ... world'."5 This view was partlyadoptedby Secretaryof State Marshallat a meeting of the US delegationto the GeneralAssemblyin September1947.Marshallhighlighted that 'adoption of the majorityreport ... would mean very violent Arab reaction', and that the United States should avoid actively arousingthe Arabs by coming out in favour of partition at this early stage as this may precipitatetheir 'rapprochement with the Soviet Union'.60 The Soviet threat was perceptible, and there was also the question of enforcement,which would have created a departure from previouspolicy. Indeed, at this same meeting, Marshallnoted that the proposed adoption of the partitionplan would mean that the United States 'will have to be ready to put troops into Palestine'.61 While Marshall supportedthe reportand thoughtthat US troops could be sent to the region, theJoint Chiefs of Staffhad explicitlyrejectedthe majorityreport,preciselyout of fear that it would implicate US troops in Palestine and beyond, creating a possible new area of confrontationwith the USSR.62 The course of action eventually adopted by the administration was a compromisebetween these positions: supportingthe report,but refusingto send troopsto Palestine.While Marshallhad apparentlyacceptedthat troopsmight be needed to enforce partition,Truman himself continued to refuse an implication of US forces in Palestine. Two days before instructingthe US delegation to support the majority plan, Truman informed the US delegation that 'we are not going to pick up ... responsibilityfor the maintenance of law and order in This Palestine', but only, possibly,within the context of a UN-led police force."6 for a UN force was to be as neither of destined stillborn, vague proposal clearly the great powers would allow each other to introducetroops to the region. On II October 1947,Truman instructedthe delegationto supportthe majority of report,and two days later the Sovietsalso backedpartition,to the mystification the State Department.64 This altered the strategicsituationin Palestine, as previous fears that hostile Arab states would turn to the USSR for help seemed to have, at least temporarily, disappeared.65 AgainstState Departmentindicationsof Arab intent, Truman continued to pin his hopes of a peaceful settlementon the
Hendersonto secretaryof state, 22 Sept. 1947,FRUS 1947, vol. v, pp. 1153-9. 61 Ibid. Position on Palestine,15 Sept. 1947, FRUS 1947, vol. v, p. 1147. 62 JCS 1684/5, in Benson, Truman andthe founding of Israel, p. 10o4. 63 Hilldringto Marshall,9 Oct. 1947,FRUS 1947,vol. v, pp. 1177-8. 64 Memorandumof Conversation,15 Oct. 1947,FRUS 1947,vol. v, pp. 1181-3. in Washington,after 65 This point was made by Eliahu Epstein, theJewish Agency representative initialindicationsof USSR supportfor partition,in Epsteinto SumnerWelles, 29 May 1947,S25-483, CentralZionistArchives(CZA).
59
60
974
MICHAEL
OTTOLENGHI
possibility that both sides would accept partition, as it was a solution backed by the two great powers and an independent UN report. Support for the UN, through the validation of a report by one of its commissions, was here the unifying force between Truman's position and that of the Department. A State Department position paper, for example, concurred in Truman's support for the UN over partition.66 Truman also highlighted this factor in a letter to Ibn Saud after the United States had formally adopted the partition plan on ii October 1947. Truman told the king that 'One of the important factors influencing the decision of the United States government to support the majority plan ... was the fact that it represented the majority view of a committee appointed by the United Nations to consider the question.'67 Furthermore, Truman resisted the tremendous political pressure he received in this period to intervene more forcefully in the matter, specifically with other delegations at the UN. He refused, for instance, to discuss the matter with his old friend Eddie Jacobson, tellingJacobson that he did not think 'it would be right or proper for me to intervene at this stage'.68 It was only after the matter had been settled on 29 November, with the adoption of partition in the General Assembly, that Truman wrote to Chaim Weizmann, the elder statesman of the Zionist movement, complaining that he had 'never had as much pressure and propaganda unnecessarily aimed at the White House'.69 Truman saw partition as both a test for the United Nations as an organization, and as a resolution of the long-standing issue of refugees. Furthermore, he stood to his beliefs that US troops would not have to be introduced to the region. This may have been a naive view of the Arab reaction to partition, but the crucial interest of Saudi Arabian oil was safe, and the threat of Soviet infiltration of the Arab world was considerably lessened by Soviet backing for partition. Recognizing rather tardily the explosion of violence that partition had caused, Truman imposed an arms embargo on the region with the consent of the State Department, in the hope that this would lessen the violence."7 Even when his vision was bloodily proved wrong by the Arab rejection of partition, Truman reacted by supporting the arms embargo, and continued to reject the involvement of US troops throughout 1948 and beyond, as the third section will show. II But the 'view from Washington' is not everything, as critics of diplomatic history have pointed out.71 The American perspective on events in Palestine cannot be
66 Memorandum prepared in the Department of State, 30 Sept. 1947, FRUS 1947, vol. v, pp. 1166-70. 6 Truman to Ibn Saud, 21 Nov. 1947, FRUS 1947, vol. v, pp. 1277-8. 6' Truman to Jacobson, 3 Oct. 1947, Jacobson Papers, Correspondence File -White House 1946-52, HSTL. 69 Truman to Weizmann, I Dec. 1947, HSTOF, Part III,Reel 34, RSC. 70 Shlomo Slonim, 'The 1948 American embargo on arms to Palestine', Political ScienceQuarterly, 94 (1979), P. 498.
71 See, for example, McMahon, 'The study of American foreign relations', p. 12.
OF ISRAEL
975
seen in isolation of the perspective of the Jewish community in Palestine (the Yishuv). The Yishuv had its own clear objectives in Palestine, sometimes framed within the context and rhetoric of US aims, but which were ultimately driven by the desire for statehood in Palestine. For the Yishuv leadership, the post-war period was the opportunity to attain the ideological objective of Zionism: aJewish state. All other issues were considered in this context. The Yishuv came to be represented during the Mandate by the Jewish Agency for Palestine, a body created by Article 4 of the League of Nations Mandate in 1922. During the Mandate period, the Agency became a powerful force on the ground in Palestine. An effective local government, it operated various departments, directed urban and agricultural settlement, negotiated with the Mandatory power, wielded its considerable economic resources, and organized Jewish immigration. As the British Peel Commission Report of 1937 noted, the Jewish Agency had 'created a complete administrative apparatus. This powerful and efficient organisation amounts, in fact, to a Government existing side by side with the Mandatory government.'72 The most influential figure in the Agency leadership was the chairman of its Executive Committee from 1935 to 1948, David Ben-Gurion, a Russian-born immigrant and deft political operator who had become the uncontested leader of the Yishuv after the Second World War.73 For the Jewish Agency, the end of the Second World War was a time of despair over the tragedy that had befallen European Jewry, but also of hope about the political effect this could have on the future of Palestine. Immigration of the Jewish DPs was one major issue for the Yishuv leadership, as was defence in the face of the surrounding Arab threat. But all these issues were considered within the ideological context of the demand for aJewish State. This goal was not shared by the United States until the UNSCOP report was discussed in the General Assembly. Relations between the Yishuv and Washington before then focused on specific issues, especially immigration, although the US saw this as a humanitarian issue whereas the Yishuv viewed it as a necessary step towards the creation of the Jewish state. In order to understand the overriding objective that was the establishment of a Jewish state, it is essential to understand that the ideological underpinning of the Yishuv was a classic nineteenth-century European national movement: Zionism. Its major tenets were the unity of the Jewish people as a nation, and the creation of an appropriate nation-state to host them. These aims had been reaffirmed most recently by the Biltmore Conference of May 1942, called by American Zionist leaders in the presence of veteran Zionists like Ben-Gurion, Chaim Weizmann, and Moshe Shertok (later Sharett). The Conference called for the establishment of a 'Jewish Commonwealth' in all of Palestine and increased Jewish immigration into Palestine.74 Immigration, however, was but one of the necessary powers
72 Geoffrey Wigoder, ed., New encyclopedia of Zionismand Israel (New York, 1994), p. 751.
Israel: a history 7 Martin Gilbert, (London, 1998), pp.46-7.
74 Walter Laqueur, A historyof Zionism(New York, 1972), p. 546.
976
MICHAEL
OTTOLENGHI
which the Yishuv wanted in the context of statehood. As Ben-Gurion noted in his diary in November 1945, 'the Zionist role is not to rescue the survivors in Europe, but to rescue Eretz Israel [the Land of Israel] for the Jewish people'.75 It is within this ideology that the policies of the Jewish Agency should be understood. The survivors were seen as a useful political tool to obtain immediate immigration rights by capitalizing on international sympathy, and edging closer to statehood. Furthermore, immigration was also seen as a way to consolidate the power of the Yishuv, politically by increasing the numbers of the 6oo,ooo strong Jewish minority in Palestine (as against the I-2 million Arabs), and militarily by filling the ranks of the Jewish military organizations. The Jewish Agency lifted its wartime ban on attacks against the Mandatory power in 1945, as a protest against the strict limits on immigration enshrined in the British White Paper of 1939, and still followed by the British after the war.76 Security issues were crucial in the Yishuv, in the immediate struggle with the British, but mostly in the perspective of an imminent showdown with Arab forces. In October 1945, for example, the United Resistance Movement was formed, bringing the right-wing Irgun Zvai Leumi (IZL) and Lehi groups into an alliance with the Jewish Agency's defensive arm, the Haganah.77 The Mandate was disintegrating, and the Yishuv was effectively shoring up its power, with the ideological goal of statehood being pursued through the practical means of immigration and defence. The fundamental ideological objective that was statehood can be seen, for example, in the two ways the case for immigration was made to the world by the Jewish Agency, which show that immigration was not being thought of as a humanitarian issue. First, the Jewish Agency issued a series of papers on the 'immediate prospects of absorption' of immigrants into Palestine, which were given to the Anglo-US Committee of Inquiry.78 The papers made a point about the economic necessity for immigration into Palestine, building on the British concept that immigration depended on 'economic absorptive capacity'."7 The end of the war had produced a labour shortage in Palestine, and these papers outlined the manpower needs of most sectors of agriculture and industry, with details of existing and planned housing capacities.80 These papers highlight that in June 1945 theJewish Agency was considering statehood from an economic perspective, and planning accordingly.81 The second way the Jewish Agency case for immigration was made was in a more purely ideological way, through the testimonies of Zionist leaders to the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry in March 1946. Ben-Gurion, for example, birth ofIsrael, p. 27. 5 Heller,The
76 Gilbert, Israel, p. 121.
of Israel, pp. I16-I7. 7" Heller, The birth 78 See, for example, Note on Immediate Prospects of Absorption, June 1945, S25-650I, CZA. "7 Gilbert, Israel, p. 48. 80 The Immediate Prospects for the Absorption of 120,000 Immigrants, Feb. 1946, S25-8045, CZA; Supplementary Note on Immediate Prospects of Absorption - Mar. 1946, S25-650I, CZA. S' Note on Immediate Prospects of Absorption,June 1945, S25-650I, CZA.
TRUMAN'S
RECOGNITION
OF ISRAEL
977
emphasizedthat theJews were a nationjust as any other, and that they deserved a state. He was asked whether, if a Jewish majority in Palestine had not been secured, and Palestine was shown to be unable to accommodate more immigrants,theJewishAgency would halt immigration.Ben-Gurionrespondedthat the goal of immigrationwas not to secureaJewish majorityin Palestine,and that economic absorptivecapacitywas not a primaryconcern, but ratherthat immigrationwas drivenby other considerations:
The other reason [for bringingimmigrantsinto Palestine] is that these people have reasons ... for wantingto be here. They want to be here; they have the rightto be here; and a place for them can be created here and not at the expense of others. That is the other reason and that is the test.82
Immigrationwas clearlyseen throughan ideologicallens, not a simple economic one, as the immigrantshad a 'right' to be in Palestine.Moshe Sharett'stestimony equallyemphasizedthe inalienableright ofJews to immigrateto Palestine,as did Chaim Weizmann's.83 All these Zionist leadersfurthermorecalled for the establishment of a state to guarantee these inalienable rights, which included the 'security' ofJews world-wide.84 This ideological stand, which placed immigrationwithin the context of statehood, was differentfrom the initial humanitarianperspectiveof the US administration,and bore few results.The reportof the Anglo-US Committeeof Inquiry had recommendedthat Ioo,oooJewish DPs be allowed to emigrateto Palestine, but not within the context of a Jewish state, which was rejected in favour of a UN trusteeship.The Jewish Agency's immediate reaction to this reportwas disthattheirgoal was not immediateimmigration appointment,and the reaffirmation for Ioo,oooJews, but statehood.As the officialJewishAgency reaction paper to the reportput it, '[t]he Jews are a nation like unto all the other nations and have the same right to live their nationallife in their land, which is Palestine'.85 The reportalso contributedto the resumptionof militaryactionsby the United ResistanceMovement, which in turn led the Britishto launch a massivecounteroperation on 29 June, 'Black Sabbath', which imprisoned most of the Yishuv Under leaders, with the notable exception of Ben-Gurion who was in Paris.86 these critical circumstances,Ben-Gurion and the remaining members of the Jewish Agency Executive agreed to accept any plan that would grant the Yishuv in an 'adequatepart of Palestine'.87 This autonomy(withcontrolof immigration) was a significantdeparturefrom the Biltmoreresolution,which had called for a
82 David Ben-Gurion,Testimony to the Anglo-AmericanCommittee of Inquiry,S25-3276,CZA. 83 Chaim
Weizmann, Testimony to the Anglo-AmericanCommittee of Inquiry, S25-3276,CZA; Moshe Sharett,Testimony to the Anglo-AmericanCommittee of Inquiry,S25-3276,CZA. 84 David Ben-Gurion,Testimony to the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry,S25-3276, CZA. 85Jewish Agency reaction to report of the Anglo-AmericanCommittee of Inquiry,5 May 1946, S25-6442,CZA. 86 Yoram Hazony, The Jewishstate: thestrugglefor Israel's soul(New York, 2000), p. 254. 87 Heller, Thebirth of Israel, pp. 31-2.
978
MICHAEL
OTTOLENGHI
Jewish Commonwealth in all of Palestine. It was a policy born of necessity, designed to attract wider international support, and it influenced the stand of the Truman administration, as seen by the 4 October 1946 statement. A further crucial consideration here is that Truman's statement increased the drive towards an 'American orientation' of Yishuv policies, at a time when most Yishuv leaders were imprisoned by the British. This American orientation was actively pursued by the Jewish Agency, especially after the British had handed the matter over to the United Nations in February 1947. Sharett, for example, was eager to counter any claims of communist involvement in Palestine, acknowledging the framework within which US policy was being made. At a meeting with Dean Acheson, then under secretary of state, on 28 May 1947, Sharett stressed that 'Palestine Jewry and the Zionist movement are wholeheartedly and irrevocably democratic ... the economic structure of the PalestineJewish community is based on free enterprise', and that communism was not an option.88 The Jewish Agency's acceptance of partition made it easier for the United States to back the UNSCOP majority report. But partition for the Yishuv was not a departure from the ideological goal of statehood with immigration into Palestine, merely a tactic to achieve this. This continued attachment to statehood can be seen in the realm of defence, where it is clear that although international politics were seen as important, statehood was always the overriding concern. The issue of security for the Yishuv stemmed from the knowledge that statehood would be viewed with hostility by both the Arabs of Palestine and the newly independent Arab states. As Sharett pointed out, 'the focal point of the conflict is aliyah [Jewish immigration], but an Arab-Jewish agreement is feasible only with very limited aliyah'.89 And since it was impossible for the Yishuv to renounce its ideological attachment to immigration, a confrontation was seen as inevitable. This led to intense preparations for the imminent conflict. Ben-Gurion, who held the defence portfolio in the Yishuv, noted in a defence committee meeting a month before the UNSCOP majority report was passed that 'the defence issue is the major issue now'.90 He called for a greater mobilization of Yishuv resources, and also for military equipment and training facilities. These considerations were made within the context of approaching statehood, for the Yishuv was clearly preparing to step into the vacuum left in Palestine after the Mandate was to be terminated on 15 May 1948. The Jewish Agency created a 'technical plan' for the transfer of power, which stated that, 'the transfer of power should be, to the extent that it is possible, without resort to force '.91 The main emphasis was on how best to secure the institutions of power in Palestine, and all the administrative offices of the Mandatory power were listed in order of importance in case the
88
Sharett to Meyerson, 24 Apr. 1947, S25-3965, CZA. birth ofIsrael, p. 76. 89 Heller,The 9o Minutes of Defence Committee Meeting, 19 Oct. 1947, S25-9342, CZA. 91 Technical Plan for the Transfer of Power, 19 Oct. 1947, S25-3735, CZA.
OF ISRAEL
979
transfer of power would be effectuated by stages.92 It is significant that this plan was issued on 17 October 1947, more than a month before the partition plan passed the UN General Assembly, for it indicates the heightened preparations for statehood at the local level.
III
The United States's recognition of Israel remains a key moment in the rhetoric of a 'special relationship' between Israel and the United States."9 The enduring glorification of Truman's recognition of Israel seems to have seeped through to the historiography of the Truman administration's Palestine policy, which mostly sees recognition as a crucial moment both for the administration and for Palestine. Indeed, while significant historiographical differences exist in accounts of Truman's Palestine policy, almost all place undue importance on the issue of recognition, seeing it either as a departure from previous policies or as a momentous decision in itself.94Yet neither the White House nor the Yishuv placed great strategic importance on the issue of recognition at the time. In terms of the broader objectives of US policy in the area, recognition changed little, especially not the arms embargo which the Yishuv found so constraining. Furthermore, recognition did not mark a change from the support of the United States for the partition resolution at the United Nations in November 1947, and therefore of a Jewish State. For the Yishuv, the diplomatic struggle had been won with the partition resolution, and the Jewish leadership in Palestine focused on creating the organs of statehood and organising its defence, not on recognition.95 Following the partition resolution, civil war raged in Palestine, and the Mandatory government made it abundantly clear that it would in no way assist in the enforcement of partition.96 The rise of violence and the need to have an acceptable solution by 15 May, the date set by the British for the end of the Mandate, led both the State Department and the White House to re-examine the situation in Palestine, in the context of broader US objectives in the area. Within the State Department, various divisions seized on the growing violence in Palestine to repudiate partition. George Kennan, director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, noted in a memorandum to Secretary of State Marshall that partition had become unworkable, and since the US should not send any troops to the region, he recommended returning the matter to the
92 Technical Plan for the Transfer of Power, 17 Oct. 1947, S25-3735, CZA.
Times takenoutin theNewYork recent illustration is the one pageadvertisement by 93A relatively a menorah the America-Israel a picture of HarryTruman receiving League, featuring Friendship froma conviction Israel fromDavidBen-Gurion, andfocusing on the factthatTruman recognized thatthecausewas'just',in NewYork Times, 3 Sept.i991. 94 See, for example, andthe pp. 64-5; Benson,Truman pillars, founding ofIsrael, p. 188;Neff,Fallen birth Israel mind inthe ofIsrael, Grose, p. 36. ofAmerica, pp. 288-92. 95Heller,The
96 Off the Record Background Press Conference with Sir Alan Cunningham, 30 Dec. 1947, S25Arab-Israeli conflict, 9215, CZA; Spiegel, The other p. 30.
980
MICHAEL
OTTOLENGHI
UN.97 This feeling was shared by the NEA, with various proposals for a transitional trusteeship being considered.98 Despite this opposition to partition, these alternative proposals were framed within the traditional US objectives for Palestine."9 These objectives were shared by Truman and his White House advisers. At a Press Conference on I5January 1948, Truman clearly reaffirmed that he had no intention of sending US troops to Palestine.100His advisers, the most prominent of whom was special counsel Clark Clifford, were also thinking within the boundaries of US objectives in Palestine, although their tactical approach was different from that of the State Department.xlo Clifford concluded that the best tactic was to continue to support partition and lift the arms embargo so as to render effective Jewish self-defence in Palestine, and consequently avoid having to send US troops there.102The State Department, on the other hand, recommended that if the UN Security Council found the partition resolution to be unworkable, 'some form of United Nations trusteeship for an additional period of time will be necessary'.103 Truman's own position on the issue was essentially a compromise. He gave Marshall his approval to trusteeship 'in principle', while pointing out that 'nothing should be presented to Security Council that could be interpreted as a recession on our part' from partition.104Truman did not consider trusteeship to be a repudiation of partition; he would have accepted a trusteeship only if partition was found to be unworkable by the UN, against the advice of Clifford. This position was not a repudiation of US objectives in Palestine, but rather an acceptance of the State Department's tactics on how best to achieve these objectives. The important point of the trusteeship issue was the usual concern of all sides for the fundamental US objectives in Palestine. The existing historiographical focus on whether Truman knew of the speech seemingly proposing a trusteeship delivered to the Security Council by Warren Austin, the US representative, and its timing, completely misses this point and serves merely to reinforce accepted versions of White House-State Department tensions.105 Truman was certainly
vol.v, pp. 546-54. to secretary of state,2oJan.1948, FRUS1948, by Kennan 97Memorandum 98 See,forexample, vol.v, pp.563-5. FRUS1948, Memorandum by NEA,27Jan.1948, to avoidcommitting US troops to Lovett, seeMemorandum by Rusk 3 Feb.1948, 9' Forthedesire FRUS1948, vol.v, p. 588,forthe concern see Report of Sovietinvolvement by the PolicyPlanning vol.v, pp. 655-7. Staff,24 Feb.1948,FRUS1948, PublicPapers of the Presidents of the UnitedStates:HarryS. Truman,1948(Washington, 100 1964),p. ioi. vol.v, p. 687,in whichClifford 6 Mar.1948, FRUS1948, by Clifford, 101 SeeMemorandum argues thattheongoing civilwarin Palestine mustbe dealtwithforfearof Sovietintervention. vol.v, pp.688-9. 6 Mar.1948, FRUS1948, 102 Memorandum by Clifford, of Stateto President FRUS1948, vol.v, p. 640. 21Feb.1948, Truman, 103 Department
104 President Truman to the secretary of state, 22 Feb. 1948, FRUS 1948, vol. v, p. 645.
See, for example, Benson, Truman and thefounding of Israel, pp. 136-7; Clark M. Clifford, 'Recognizing Israel', American Heritage,28 (1977), No. 3, p. 4; Margaret Truman, Harry S. Truman(New York, 1973), p. 387; Snetsinger, Truman,theJewish vote,pp. O103-6.
105
TRUMAN'S
RECOGNITION
OF ISRAEL
981
annoyed with his State Department, but this resentment was not about the policy itself, which Truman had approved, but about timing.106 Truman felt he should have been informed of the wording and timing of Austin's statements.107 Ultimately, trusteeship had been approved by Truman because he felt it was in line with the broad objectives of US policy in Palestine, specifically pacification of the area. But trusteeship was not to be. Events on the ground proved diplomatic solutions to be largely irrelevant. As the tide of war started to turn in its favour, the Jewish Agency rejected trusteeship outright, for fear of delaying a declaration of independence.x0s It also became apparent that trusteeship would not be able to secure the support of two-thirds of the General Assembly delegations necessary for its adoption.'09 British withdrawal grew nearer and nothing had been achieved to reduce the fighting in Palestine, or impose a new political settlement. Truce negotiations floundered, and on i i May, the US delegation at the United Nations had submitted a new plan, which Truman approved, for the appointment of a UN Commissioner for Palestine to mediate a cease-fire."11 But these attempts at finding a diplomatic solution did not confront the reality of the situation on the ground, where partition was 'coming spontaneously to life'."' The Yishuv had secured the territory given to it by the partition declaration, and was moving toward statehood. It was in this context that recognition arose as an issue for the United States in early May of 1948, and the decision to recognize Israel was taken, once again, within the traditional boundaries of United States policy in Palestine. The historiography of recognition itself does not consider Truman's act as a simple acceptance of the facts on the ground, but rather sees recognition as either a political act or a backroom deal between Truman and Chaim Weizmann, the But while Jewish Agency leader who was shortly to become president of Israel.112 political considerations were important, arguments in favour of recognition were clearly framed within the context of US objectives in the region, and it is also clear that Truman did not make his decision until sometime between 12 and 14 May, a period of time in which he did not have any contact with Weizmann at all. Furthermore, recognition was but one of the demands made by American Zionists, and it did not reduce the political pressure for other objectives such as the lifting of the arms embargo.
106 Truman famously remarked in his diary that the State Department had 'pulled the rug' from under him by announcing trusteeship, in Robert Ferrell, ed., Offthe record:theprivatepapers of Harry S.
PDD,pp. 643-6. Apr.1948, Marshall to Austin, 12May1948,FRUS1948, vol.v, p. 979. 110 Abba Eban: anautobiography (London, 11 AbbaEban, p. 105. 1978), 112 See Snetsinger, the Truman, Jewish toIsrael, Crossroads vote, p. 133;Sykes, p. 360;M. W. Weisgal
and Joel Carmichael, eds., Chaim Weizmann: a biographyby several hands (New York, 1967); Vera takeslonger:the memoirs Weizmann, The impossible of VeraWeizmann(New York, 1967), pp. 231-2.
107 Ferrell,Harry Truman S. Truman: a (New York, I980), p. 127. life,p. 309. 108Meeting andLovett, 26 Mar.1948,PDD,pp.509-20. between Shertok, Marshall, Epstein, 109See,forexample, Shertok to Ben-Gurion, 16 S25-i704, CZA;andFahyto Lovett, II Apr. 1948,
982
MICHAEL
OTTOLENGHI
Political considerations were important to Clark Clifford. He was the president's most influential political adviser, and had been partly responsible for the drafting of the famous memorandum on the 'Politics of 1948', which dealt with Palestine only superficially.113On the question of recognition, although Clifford was clearly influenced by political factors, his stance was framed within a vision of US objectives in Palestine. At a famous 12 May meeting at the White House, Clifford, at Truman's request, presented the pro-recognition case.14 The fact that Truman called this meeting indicates that that he wanted to sound out State Department advice on recognition, even though recognition is a presidential prerogative power and Truman could have taken the decision by himself.115 Although Clifford was influenced by the lobbying of American Zionists, he was also thinking within the framework of United States objectives in Palestine, and framed his position accordingly.116 In his preparations for his statement at the 12 May meeting, Clifford selected clippings from articles relating to Palestine, and underlined key passages, which are useful in pointing out his thinking on recognition. On 2 May Clifford underlined passages in a New York Times article which pointed out that the Arab armies were 'incapable of preventing the establishment of a Jewish state in On the following day, Clifford underlined another New York Times Palestine'."'17 article which mentioned indications that 'the Soviets plan to give further impetus to defacto partition by recognizing the Jews'.118 At the 12 May meeting itself, Clifford did not mention political considerations at all. He argued that in accordance with the desire to prevent bloodshed in Palestine, in line with the United States's support of the partition resolution, and in order to pre-empt the Soviets, Truman should accept the reality on the ground in Palestine. The Jewish State was going to be declared on 15 May and Truman should announce his intention to recognize Israel at his press conference the next day, 13 May.119 Both Under Secretary of State Lovett and Marshall were opposed to Clifford's stance. Lovett pointed out that premature recognition would compromise truce negotiations, appear as a transparent political move, and it was like 'buying a pig in a poke', in the sense that the nature of the Jewish State was
Memorandum to the president, 19 Nov. 1947, Papers of Clark Clifford, Political File, 1947, HSTL; letter from Elsey to the author, 12 Apr. 2002. FDRtoClinton 114William House theWhite the Oval 1999), p. 62. (London, tapesfrom Office: Doyle,Inside 116 See, for example, to Rabinowitz William
113
Pious,The (Boston, 1996), pp. 34, 83-5. presidency 11' Richard
of HarryS. Truman, Clifford, 3 May 1948,Papers

Palestine, Press
OfficialFile-204, HSTL.
117New YorkTimes, 5 May 1948, in Papers of Clark Clifford, Subject File 1945-54,
Clippings,HSTL.
118 New YorkTimes, 6 May 1948, in Papers of Clark Clifford, Subject File 1945-54, Palestine, Press Clippings, HSTL. 19 Statement by Clifford at the White House Meeting of 52 May 1948, FRUS 1948, vol. v, pp. 977-8; Memorandumof Conversationby Marshall,12 May 1948, FRUS 1948, vol. v, p. 974-
TRUMAN'S
RECOGNITION
OF ISRAEL
983
unknown.120 Marshall's opposition to Clifford was more vehement, as he questioned Clifford's mere presence at the meeting, since his considerations were 'based on domestic political considerations'. The meeting ended without apparent resolution. The fact that Truman had called the meeting on 12 May is a strong indication that his decision about recognition had not yet been made. Furthermore, the position he took was a pragmatic one, clearly influenced by some of Lovett's arguments. The president did not, for example, announce recognition on 13 May.121But further indications from the US delegation at the UN that the USSR was intent on recognizing Israel emphasized the risk of losing ground to the Soviets.122Truman seems to have made up his mind on 14 May, when the reality of the potential vacuum of power that would follow the end of the mandate became apparent. On 14 May, Clifford and Lovett spoke numerous times, with Clifford emphasizing that 'at six o'clock there would be no government or authority of any kind in Palestine', and that Truman was intent on averting such a situation.123 Clifford eventually secured Lovett's guarantee that Marshall would not oppose Truman's position.124 Lovett also helped Clifford to obtain a proper demand for recognition from the Jewish Agency representative in Washington, Eliahu Epstein.125This document arrived at the White House on 14 May, and allowed Truman officially to extend recognition to the 'provisional government as the de facto authority of the new state of Israel' only eleven minutes after the State of Israel had come into being.126 The fact that the recognition was defacto rather than a full dejure recognition indicates a further concession to Lovett's 'pig in a poke' argument. Truman evidently did not see recognition as antithetical to truce efforts then current in the United Nations, and did not inform the US delegation about his decision to recognize Israel. While this development surprised the US delegation, who later railed about the unfortunate timing of recognition, it did not prevent the resolution for the appointment of an international mediator in Palestine from passing in the General Assembly that same day.127Furthermore, Truman did not lift the US embargo on arms to Palestine, a further indication of the essential
120 Memorandum of Conversation by Marshall, 12 May 1948, FRUS 1948, vol. v, p. 975. 121Public S. Truman, of theUnitedStates: of the Presidents Papers 1948, p. 253. Harry
122Eleanor S. Truman, ii May1948,Papers of Harry Roosevelt to Truman, File, PSF,Personal Roosevelt Folder Eleanor, 2, HSTL. 123 Memorandumof Conversations, by Lovett, 17May 1948, FRUS 1948, vol. v, p. 0oo5. 124 Papersof Harry S. Truman,White House TelegraphOffice, 1948, HSTL; Clifford, by Lovett, 17 May 1948,FRUS 1948,vol. 'RecognizingIsrael',p. Ii; Memorandumof Conversations,
v, pp. o005-7-
125Epstein to Truman,Papersof HarryS. Truman,OfficeFile 204-D,JewishState,1948-9, The other Arab-Israeli HSTL;Spiegel, conflict, p. 37.
126Statementby the President,HSTOF, Part ii, Reel 34, RSC. 127 Philip C.Jessup, The birth ofnations (NewYork,1974),p. 289; United Nations General Assembly
1948,
resolution 186, FRUS
vol. v, pp. 994-5.
984
MICHAEL
OTTOLENGHI
continuity of US policy. This is also an indication that Truman's motivation was not solely political, for American Jewish groups had lobbied not only for recognition, but for the lifting of the embargo also. Recognition did not reduce this political pressure, as letters poured in to urge the extension of full dejure recognition, as well as a lifting of the arms embargo.128As Arthur Krock wrote in the New York Times on 20 May 1948, defactorecognition of Israel 'simply testified to the facts that Israel exists, that its regime is accepted by the inhabitants of the area and that there is no evidence this regime cannot take care of its immediate obligations '.129 Following the partition resolution of 29 November 1947, the Jewish Agency proceeded with its preparations for statehood in Palestine, which incorporated both military and political manoeuvres. From a military perspective, the aims of the Jewish Agency were to gain effective control over both the territory allotted to them by the United Nations and to secure communications with the remaining Jewish settlements which fell outside the proposed boundaries of the Jewish State.'30 As the British proceeded with evacuation plans, Jewish Agency forces were ready to assume military control over these areas, but their efforts were partly frustrated by the steadfast opposition of the British to aid in the implementation of partition.131 Ben-Gurion protested to the high commissioner on 8 December 1947, for example, that 'the [Mandatory] Government's refusal to provide the Jewish Civil Guard with arms, while at the same time distributing arms to the Arab Civil Guard [was] utterly unjustified and ... fraught with grave danger'.132 The initial phase of the conflict went badly for the Yishuv. By March 1948 the Arabs had cut off from the coast the entire Negev desert, included in the Jewish State by the UN partition plan, and isolatedJerusalem. It was these developments that led the State Department to conclude that partition was 'unworkable' and that trusteeship would be a preferable option.133The course of the conflict turned, however, towards the end of March 1948, when an Arab attempt to cut off the strategically important port of Haifa failed, and Jewish forces launched a successful counter-offensive, opening up the road to Jerusalem, as well as capturing Haifa and Tiberias by late April.134On I6 April Ben-Gurion informed Shertok in New York that 'from day to day our conquests are expanding'.135
128
DavidGinsburg to Niles,21 July1948, Papers of DavidNiles,HSTL;SolBloomto Truman, 3 Aug.

Reel 35; 1948, HSTOF, PartIII,Reel 35; EmmanuelCellerto Truman,4 Aug. 1948, HSTOF, PartIII, Bartley Crum to Clark Clifford,3 Oct. 1948, Papers of Clark Clifford,CorrespondenceFile, 1948, 129 130 Gilbert,Israel, p. 166. 20 May 1948. HSTL. Times, New York 131 See, for example, Ben-Gurion to Shertok, 27 Dec. 1947, S25-I700, CZA. 132 Ben-Gurionto Sir Alan Cunningham,8 Dec. 1947, S25-5583,CZA. 133 See, for example, Memorandum by the Policy Planning Staff, 11 Feb. 1948, FRUS 1948, vol. v,
pp. 619-25.
135
See, for example: Max Levin to Truman, 21May 1948,PapersofJ. Howard McGrath, HSTL;
134The counter-offensive was called OperationNachschon. Bregman,Israel's wars,p. 12. Ben-Gurionto Shertok,16 Apr. 1948, PDD, p. 648.
OF ISRAEL
985
The military campaign was broadly connected to political developments aimed at securing the organs of statehood. From December 1947 onwards, the Jewish Agency concentrated not only on military matters, but also on progressing towards statehood politically, by securing administrative control of the areas it ruled, in anticipation of statehood. Thus Shertok declared to the UN Palestine Commission on 15 January 1948, that 'we [the Yishuv] already have a kind of Jewish national authority operating as a security authority'.136 A few days after his address to the Commission, Shertok approved a plan for the creation of a Foreign Ministry, which he was to head, based on the model of the British Foreign Office.137 On 23 March, Ben-Gurion communicated to Shertok that the Jewish State would be declared on 'May I6'.138 On 25 March, Shertok forwarded a memorandum to the Palestine Commission indicating the creation in Israel of a Provisional Council of Government for the Jewish State, complete with the names of the members of the Council.139Significantly, this was the same day that Truman, at a press conference, indicated that the trusteeship proposal was not meant as a repudiation of partition. Shertok's communication to the Palestine Commission showed that such diplomatic niceties were not relevant to developments on the ground in Palestine.140 Shortly afterwards, the Jewish Agency set up a separate police force with a clear view to expanding it for internal security in the new state.141 As these preparations were underway, Shertok was involved in continuing diplomatic negotiations in Washington, DC, and New York. The negotiations Shertok took part in were twofold. As the effective foreign minister of the Yishuv, he was summoned to negotiate US proposals for obtaining trusteeship and a truce in Palestine. But his role was not merely a reactive one, and Shertok also spent these months lobbying for the lifting of the arms embargo on Palestine. The position of the Jewish Agency regarding the trusteeship and truce proposals was unambiguous. Although the course of the military conflict in Palestine influenced the acceptability of a truce, the Jewish Agency refused any proposal that would delay statehood. This steadfast attitude first applied to trusteeship, which the Jewish Agency rejected unconditionally, as Shertok told Marshall he would oppose a measure that promoted 'a denial of independence'.142 The same opposition to any postponement of statehood applied to truce proposals. As Shertok informed Ben-Gurion, the line he was following in Washington with regard to truce negotiations was that the Agency's conditions
136 Shertokaddressto the UN PalestineCommission, i5Jan. 1948, PDD, p. 167.
137Eytanto Shertok, Sharett: Moshe ofa Sheffer, biography 19Jan. 1948,PDD, pp. 194-6;Gabriel moderate political (Oxford, 1996), pp. 281-2.
138
Ben-Gurion to Shertok, 23 Mar. 1948, S25-17o3, CZA.
Shertok to UN Palestine Commission, 25Mar.1948,PDD,pp.506-7. 139 Papersof HarryS. Truman,Historical 140 ConfidentialPressand Radio Conference,25 Mar. 1948, File,'Truman File,HSTL. Papers'
14' Minutes of Defence Committee Meeting, I Apr. 1948, S25-9348, CZA.
142Meeting between Shertok,Epstein-Marshall,Lovett, 26 Mar. 1948, PDD, p. 515.
986
MICHAEL
OTTOLENGHI
for a truce were military, not political, and that the Agency would 'resist political conditions put by others'.143 The military conditions Shertok was referring to were essentially the withdrawal of all Arab irregulars from neighbouring states, The political conditions were a reference and the prevention of new infiltration.144 to any scheme which may postpone statehood. On 8 May, Shertok reiterated to Marshall that 'the main point of the truce proposal was that we should forego proclaiming aJewish state immediately', and that this demand was 'tantamount to asking us to renounce our most fundamental right'.145 While these negotiations occupied much of his time, Shertok was also constantly being pressed from the Yishuv to lobby for the lifting of the arms embargo, which the Jewish Agency saw as extremely harmful to its cause.146As early as 24 December 1947, for example, Shertok pleaded with Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr, a leader of the Americans for Democratic Action, to 'obtain military equipment, in part immediately and in part after the withdrawal of British forces'.147 In a 6 January 1948 meeting betweenJewish Agency and State Department officials, the issue of military equipment was high on the agenda. One of the Jewish Agency officials, Abba Eban, remarked that the Haganah was 'adequately manned but poorly equipped' and that 'it was essential that supplies be obtained'. He hoped that the arms embargo would be lifted, as this 'would indicate American determination [to implement partition] and would thus have a stabilising effect on the situation in Palestine'.148 This issue remained at the forefront of Jewish Agency concerns, and was raised at nearly every meeting between Agency officials and the State Department, to no avail. While military procurements were important, diplomatic niceties such as recognition were relegated to a lesser sphere. The only time recognition was brought up at an official meeting between State Department and Jewish Agency representatives, on 8 May, Shertok revealed that he had not given the issue much thought. Shertok was on his way back to Israel, to be present at the birth of the State, and he spent most of the meeting making it clear that the Jewish State was to be declared imminently, and rejecting truce proposals. When the issue of recognition came up, brought up by Lovett, Shertok answered that 'we were not a movement given to hunting after formal shibboleths; ... Recognition can only apply to something which effectively exists. It would not be our first step to rush headlong into the quest for recognition.'149
143Shertokto Ben-Gurion, ii Apr. 1948, S25-1704,CZA. 144 American Section ofJewish Agency to Ben-Gurion, 15 Mar. 1948, PDD, pp. 462-3.
145 Secret Report of Discussion between Sherok and State Department Representatives, 8 May 1948, Z6-59, CZA.
146 See Slonim, 'The 1948American on armsto Palestine', p. 499. embargo 147 Shertok toRoosevelt, 24 Dec. 1947,PDD,p. 102. 148Memorandum EbanandStateDepartment of Conversation between Epstein, (NEA,Officeof
Special Political Affairs), 6Jan. 1948, FRUS 1948, vol. v, p. 538. 149 Secret Report of Discussion between Sherok and State Department Representatives, 8 May 1948, Z6-59, CZA.
TRUMAN'S
RECOGNITION
OF ISRAEL
987
Shertok clearly did not consider recognition to be a matter of great importance, and had not given it much thought, otherwise he would certainly have raised the issue of a possible defacto recognition as opposed to the dejure one he seems to have had in mind. The conversation proceeded, and recognition remained a highly peripheral issue for the Jewish Agency. On 14 May, Shertok cabled Epstein from Jerusalem telling him that State Department policy for recognition required the submission of a 'specific request for recognition by State claiming it' and that no evidence was yet available whether the request 'would be complied with if submitted'.150 That Shertok was cabling Epstein about recognition only on the day that the State was being proclaimed, and not before, indicates that he was not particularly concerned with obtaining this recognition, as he realized the nascent State of Israel had more important, military, struggles on its hands. The multiarchival perspective used in this article points to an important re-evaluation of the historiography of the United States's recognition of Israel. The analysis of the 'Washington perspective' has shown that in order fully to comprehend this perspective, Palestine policy has to be viewed in its correct historical context of the Cold War, because Palestine policy, as indeed all foreign policy at the time, was viewed through a Cold War perspective. Previous historiography has somehow missed this crucial consideration, and has therefore failed to see that US policy towards Palestine was framed within a clear set of Cold War objectives, which both the White House and the State Department followed from late 1946 onwards. Recognition itself was not the momentous event it has been billed as. This is true from both the 'Washington perspective' and the 'Yishuv perspective', which has not yet been seriously addressed in accounts of US Palestine policy. As seen from Washington, recognition was ultimately a decision to accept the reality on the ground in Palestine without altering any of the fundamental objectives in Palestine, and without lifting the arms embargo which was hurting the Yishuv militarily. For the Yishuv, recognition was clearly a secondary concern, as the ideological goal of statehood had been pursued practically at least since 1945, and was now becoming reality through military and administrative advances. Diplomatic efforts focused on procuring arms and lifting the embargo, not on recognition, which seems to have come almost as an afterthought. Because most of the existing historiography of recognition sees the event itself as a turning point of great magnitude from a US foreign policy perspective, the reassessment presented in this article has important consequences. Probably the most important of these is the question of the existence or not of a 'special relationship' between the US and Israel. Indeed, if recognition did not mark a watershed in US policy that led to such a 'special relationship', as the evidence
150 Shertok to Epstein, 14 May 1948, S25-I553, CZA.
988
MICHAEL
OTTOLENGHI
presented in this article indicates, then the origin of such a relationship needs to be questioned. While some historians have looked at this issue recently, they have not properly analysed the alleged starting point of such a relationship: US recognition."51 The reassessment of recognition presented here therefore provides a useful addition to the historiographical debate about the US-Israeli special relationship.
151 Bar-Siman-Tov, 'The United States and Israel since 1948: a "special relationship"?' DiplomaticHistory, 22(1998) No. 2, p. 231.
in

The Recognition of Israel

Transféré par

Informations du document

Description originale:

Copyright

Formats disponibles

Partager ce document

Partager ou intégrer le document

Options de partage

Avez-vous trouvé ce document utile ?

Ce contenu est-il inapproprié ?

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

The Recognition of Israel

Transféré par

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

Harry Truman's Recognition of Israel Author(s): Michael Ottolenghi Source: The Historical Journal, Vol. 47, No. 4 (Dec.

HARRY TRUMAN'S RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL*

s0 Oral HistoryInterviewwith Loy W. Henderson, Harry S. Truman Library(HSTL).

38 Michael Cohen, Trumanand Israel (Oxford, 1990), p. 127.

44DavidB. Sachar,'DavidK. Niles and UnitedStatespolicytowards Palestine' (MAthesis,

46 Hannegan to Truman, I Oct. 1946, HSTOF, Part III,Reel 34, RSC.

David Sachar, p. 44. K.Niles,

47 Merriam to Henderson, 27 Dec. 1946, FRUS 1946, vol. vii, p. 733. 48

58 UNSCOP Report, 31 Aug. 2947,HSTOF, PartIII,Reel 34, RSC.

Israel: a history 7 Martin Gilbert, (London, 1998), pp.46-7.

74 Walter Laqueur, A historyof Zionism(New York, 1972), p. 546.

Pious,The (Boston, 1996), pp. 34, 83-5. presidency 11' Richard

of HarryS. Truman, Clifford, 3 May 1948,Papers

resolution 186, FRUS

vol. v, pp. 994-5.

DavidGinsburg to Niles,21 July1948, Papers of DavidNiles,HSTL;SolBloomto Truman, 3 Aug.

Ben-Gurion to Shertok, 23 Mar. 1948, S25-17o3, CZA.

142Meeting between Shertok,Epstein-Marshall,Lovett, 26 Mar. 1948, PDD, p. 515.

Vous aimerez peut-être aussi