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This similarity in sources of influence may not be surprising, but it, too, may be important in an evolutionary sense.

Adaptations, whether physical or psychological, are equipped to function only in response to particular environmental triggers. As I will suggest in subsequent chapters, affectionate behavior can serve ones motivations for viability and fertility motivations, but only if it is enacted in such a way that elicits favor from others. That is, affection expressed in a manner that causes negative reactions on the part of the receiver is not likely be of benefit to the sender (or to the receiver, for that matter). It is strategically useful, therefore, for individuals to be sensitive to the interpersonal and contextual variables that influence receivers reactions to affectionate behavior. It is thus rather efficient that those variables are so similar to the ones that influence individuals affectionate behavior in the first place. Thus far, this chapter has examined receivers cognitive responses in detail. Of course, as pointed out in the first chapter, people do not always behave in ways that are consonant with their thoughts or emotions. Let us therefore turn our attention to behavioral responses. Responding Behaviorally to Affectionate Expressions Receivers of affectionate expressions have three principal options for their behavioral responses. The first option is to reciprocate the expression. This can take the form of direct reciprocity, wherein the receiver displays the same behavior as was directed to him or her (e.g., hearing I love you and saying I love you, too in return). This might also take the form of indirect reciprocity, wherein the receiver replies with a similar, but not the same, behavior (e.g., hearing I love you and then hugging or kissing the sender). Of course, as mentioned earlier, one of the primary risks of expressing affection is that the gesture will not be reciprocated. In the case of indirect reciprocity, however, mere reciprocation is not necessarily sufficient. Rather, one tends to desire a behavioral response that is of approximately the same intensity as the original expression. Hearing Im in love with you and saying I really like you a lot in reply qualifies as indirect reciprocity, but the sentiment implied in the response is clearly of a lesser intensity than that implied in the first expression. Likewise, one may not desire a response that implies a greater intensity, either. Therefore, although reciprocity is generally the most preferred behavioral response to an affectionate expression, its positivity is likely to be moderated by the extent to which the response matches the intensity level of the original expression. A second option is to compensate for the expression. This consists of responding to the affectionate expression with negatively valenced behaviors. An extreme example would be hearing the words I love you and saying Well, I hate you in reply. A more common example would involve a sender acting increasingly affectionate toward a receiver who becomes increasingly withdrawn and disengaged from the conversation in response. Behavioral compensation was a key component of Argyle and Deans (1965) equilibrium theory, which posits that increases in affiliative behavior (such as eye gaze or proximity) induce the receiver to compensate by reducing the level of affiliation. As with reciprocity, compensation can be done directly, by changing the same behaviors that were changed behavior (e.g., taking a step back in response to a partners step forward), or indirectly, by changing other behaviors that have a similar effect on the interaction (e.g., frowning or crossing ones arms in response to partners step forward). Empirical research has largely failed to support the primacy of compensatory adaptation that equilibrium theory predicts. However, it would be reasonable to hypothesize that compensation for expressions of affection is a likely response in cases when the expressions are particularly threatening to the receiver and when the receiver wants to be clear that the affectionate sentiment is not shared.

Finally, a third option is to fail to respond to the expression. In this case the affectionate expression is simply ignored, at least behaviorally. This may be a common response when the receiver finds the expression to be somehow threatening but does not wish to hurt or embarrass the sender. For example, suppose that Sarah sends a note to her friend Jake in which she conveys a romantic interest in him. Jake likes Sarah as a friend but is not interested in her romantically.Hedoes not wish to compensate for her affectionate expression, because he fears that would hurt her, but neither does he wish to reciprocate her expression, because he does not share her feelings. Of course, he could reciprocate indirectly with a behavior of lesser intensity, but he fears that would embarrass her. So, he decides that his best course of action is to ignore the expression, at least initially. He hopes that Sarah will take the hint by his failure to respond, allowing her to save face and allowing their friendship to continue as though the romantic overture were never made. In this example, the failure to respond is used strategically for the purpose of steering the outcome of the interaction. In other cases, receivers may fail to respond simply because they are uncertain about how to respond. Receivers might be unsure how to respond because they havent yet ascertained the meaning of the affectionate expression or perhaps because they are uncertain whether they share the senders affectionate sentiments. Certainly, there is a good deal of variation within each of these three types of behavioral responses. However, if we accept these as constituting the three principal options for responding behaviorally to affectionate expressions, then we can turn our energies toward identifying the variables that predict when each type of response is likely to be observed. Thus far, three experiments have addressed this question. These studies used different theories and therefore examined different types of variables as potential predictors of behavioral responses, but taken together, their results begin to answer the question. The first of the experiments was that conducted by Floyd and Voloudakis (1999a), which examined affectionate behavior in adult platonic friendships and tested hypotheses drawn from expectancy violations theory (EVT). EVT provides reason for expecting that behaviors that constitute a positive expectancy violation ought to be reciprocated, whereas behaviors that constitute a negative expectancy violation ought to be compensated for, or at least, ignored. In the experiment, pairs of friends reported to a laboratory where they were told that they would be engaging in two short conversations with each other. The first conversation served as a baseline, with no behaviors manipulated. In between the conversations, one friend from each pair was made a confederate and was induced either to increase or decrease his or her affectionate behaviors toward the partner during the second conversation. The conversations were videotaped and were subsequently coded for the participants and confederates behaviors. Floyd and Voloudakis reasoned that, because their participants were friends (which is generally a rewarding relationship), participants should judge increases in their friends affectionate behavior positively, and should judge decreases in their friends affectionate behavior negatively. Using EVT, Floyd and Voloudakis predicted behavioral reciprocity (in the form of increased immediacy, expressiveness, and positive affect) in the former condition and behavioral compensation in the latter condition. Importantly, both predictions call for the same behavioral display from the participants; that is, in both conditions, participants were expected to become more affectionate. The hypothesis received little support. Due to their intercorrelation, the behaviors of immediacy, expressiveness, and positive affect were analyzed together in a MANOVA that

produced a significant multivariate effect for time (the difference between the first and second conversations). At the univariate level, only the effect for positive affect was significant, and an examination of the means revealed that participants actually decreased their positive affect from the first conversation to the second one. A post hoc analysis revealed, however, that the effect was attributable only to participants who received decreased affection. They decreased their positive affect in response (a reciprocal response), whereas participants who received increased affection had nearly identical levels of positive affect in both conversations. The analyses also produced a significant effect for the interaction between time and confederate behavior. Follow-up tests showed that participants who received decreased affection increased their expressivity from the first conversation to the second (a compensatory response). Participants who received increased affection had nearly identical levels of expressivity in both conversations. There were no significant effects for immediacy. Clearly, these were not the expected behavioral responses. There are a number of reasons why the predictions may have failed. Perhaps not all participants judged increases in affectionate behavior positively, and decreases negatively. Perhaps EVT is incorrect in its reasoning or perhaps Floyd and Voloudakis reasoned from it improperly to arrive at the hypotheses advanced. Two features of the method are particularly suspect, however. First, confederates were not instructed as to the particular behaviors they should modify to manipulate their affection levels. Rather, they were asked to increase or decrease their levels of affection using whatever behaviors seemed most appropriate to them. This feature of the method did allow Floyd and Voloudakis to examine what behaviors confederates enacted in order to convey affection; however, it virtually guaranteed variance in those behaviors, such that participants in each of the two conditions were not always responding to the same behavioral changes. Second, the coders in the study rated participants behaviors only once for the first conversation and once for the second conversation. This was done so that the behavioral data would match participants self-report data (which was elicited once for each conversation) in terms of the size of the data window. However, the conversations both averaged approximately four minutes in length, and levels of immediacy, expressivity, and positive affect can fluctuate considerably in that period of time. Given that likely variation, requiring coders to aggregate in their minds all of the behaviors they witnessed during a four-minute period was likely an unwise strategy.

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