A glance to nationalism: some reflections and solutions in Balkans

1. Introduction. 2. State and Nation. 3. Nationalism. 3.1. Class-centered-theories. 3.2. Uneven development. 3.3. State-Centered approach. 3.4. Modernization theories of nationalism. 3. . !thnonational theories. 3.". #ost-modernist. 4. $he %irth of Nationalism in &estern !uropa. . Nation%uildin' in Central( Southern( and !astern !urope. ". Nationalism in %al)an and *ormer +u'oslavia. ,. #erspectives on the %al)an. -. #roposed Solutions. -.1. Supportin' the Status-.uo. -.2. Creation of Nation States. -.3. Coolin' the conflict and /ait. 0. Conclusions. 11. %i2lio'raph3.

1. Introduction In the last decades, with the Fall of Berlins Wall and the thawing of the bipolar system, nationalism has begun to reappear and spread around Europe. Old ethnic and geopolitical tensions are back, unconstrained by the military and political confrontation between systems. he competition among ethnical groups, for hundreds years fighting each other, pre!iously controlled by the communist regime, appeared in succession" first, the pacific di!ision of #$echoslo!akia, then the !iolent broke out of %ugosla!ia and the independence of &oso!o. Ethnic cleansing and !iolence on ci!ilian, death and destruction, that belonged to Europes past emerged, highlighting the limits of European 'nion and the difficulties of the integration process, he ethnic, religious and linguistic plot added to the strength of history and past images, all mi(ed, pa!e the way to contrasting iconographies, which fuelled balkanian nationalism, always acti!e and dangerous. he borders defined by past peace agreements ha!e mi(ed the populations, causing artificial ma)ority and minority. In this situation the European dream about integration of different states seems to loose his appeal with obstacles in its path. he *++,s !erdict of the -erman #onstitutional #ourt, in the !aluation of .isbon treaty /, highlighted a demand for constitutional power against the European #ommission *.

http011www.bundes!erfassungsgericht.de1entscheidungen1es*++,+23+4*b!e+++*+5en.html" accession //.+5.*++,. 6ossi .ucia 7erena, Integrazione europea al capolinea?, in Affari Internazionali, July **, *++,, online at0 http011www.affarinterna$ionali.it1articolo.asp8I9:/*+2" the !erdict of -erman #onstitutional #ourt about the .isbon reat, fundamentally a negati!e opinion, follow the French political refuse in the referendum for the appro!al of the same treaty in *++;. his fact highlights the difficulty of European 'nion in her political integration.

7lo!enia3 and -reek< ha!e been currently blocking the admission of #roatia and =acedonia >F%6O=?, not because of a lack of @ualifications, rather than internal political reasons and nationalistic agenda;. he economic and political crisis that is afflicting Europe could destabili$e the unification process, gi!ing more chances of success to nationalistic mo!ements and separatist applications, !ery dangerous for Europe, especially in the Balkans. With the present paper we try to analyse the nationalistic phenomenon, after gi!ing a glance to the different theory on nationalism and, in succession, we consider the birth of Aationalism in Western Europe, as a first step for the e!aluation of AationBBuilding in #entral, 7outhern, and Eastern Europe. his e(am will allow us to estimate the nationalistic phenomenon in the Balkans and particularly in Former %ugosla!ia. Cfter a brief e!aluation of different perspecti!es on the Balkans, we will try to offer !ision about some proposed solutions to the nationalistic problem of that region. One hundred years after the Balkans Wars finally took the region out from under the Ottomans, the region remains unsettled. BosniaBDer$ego!ina >BiD? remains a work in progress and &oso!os status is undefined. he E' reportedly is losing patience with the inability of Bosnias entities to mo!e toward a more perfect union. 7erbia is trying desperately to find a way to get past the &oso!o issue so it can enter the E' and impro!e its economic prospects. 2. State and ation It appears useful, as a first step, to e(press some definition of 7tate, Aation, 6egionalism, and Ethnic group, terms normally used in the analysis of nationalism. he State is the institution that maintains the monopoly on the use of coerci!e force within a society. Behind this definition, ob!iously, there is the Hobbesian notion of the social contract by which the population depri!e, !oluntarily, herself of the right to use force" this right is gi!en to the 7tate with the spoken >constitution? or unspoken >social con!ention? understanding that, the 7tate, will act on behalf of the interests of the population within its territory.

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here are se!eral issues of contention between #roatia and 7lo!enia" first of all, the Eiran bay @uestion, about the definition of the border and maritime boundary. Cnother dispute is connected to .)ubl)anska Banka problem related to a credit of <++ million euro boasted by #roatian sa!ers. Dedl 9rago, Berlino scettica sull'adesione della Croazia all'UE, in FOsser!atorio Balcani e #aucasoG, October *;, *+/*" Online article at0 www.balcanicaucaso.org" =attone 7imona, Macedonia: Grecia e Bulgaria si oppongono alladesione allUnione Europea , in FEast HournalG, 9ecember 3+, *+/*" online article at0 www.east)ournal.net" Stock Wolfgang, Ho !ill Europe protect itsel" #gainst t$e %ationalist &irus? Online article at0 $ttp:'' (atlantic)co**unit+(org'inde,, accession /*.+5.*++,

he state, as an agent for the people, allowed to retain the use of force, must be organi$ed along institutional lines that facilitate some degree of efficiency. Following =a( Weber, Heff -oodwin offers a description of the state when he obser!es that it consists of0 Ft$ose core ad*inistrati-e. policing. and *ilitar+ organizations. *ore or less coordinated b+ an e,ecuti-e aut$orit+. t$at e,tract resources "ro* and ad*inister and rule /t$roug$ -iolence i" necessar+0 a territoriall+ de"ined national societ+G2. he nation differs from the state because state refers to the institutions of go!ernment while nation is about the people who comprise the state, in all the significant factors, such as, common language, common culture, and a common history. Aationalism is a process by which people seek to define who they are in terms of a national identity. his demarcation between the nation and the state is e(tremely helpful in that it highlights the two key aspects of the nationBstate. It points to the idea that the, state, in other words, is primarily a politicalBlegal concept, whereas nation is primarily psychoBcultural 7tates may e(ist when there is no nation" con!ersely, a nation may e(ist where no state doesI. On this point, Ernest -ellner claims0 Fnationalis* is pri*aril+ a political principle. $ic$ $olds t$at t$e political and t$e national unit s$ould be congruentG5. he nationBstate then is the ideal form of a political organi$ation, when the political boundaries >the state? are congruent with the ethnographic or linguistic frontiers >nation?. Ethnic group is a small part of an e(isting nation that li!es in subordination to another state power. Regionalism is a term used to describe a group of people within a broader nation. 6egionalism describes a group of people with some or many of the characteristics of the nation, in which it is enclosed. 6egionalist mo!ements do not usually seek to form their own national states, but their demands range from a cultural autonomy to the federalist restructuring of an e(isting state in the e(treme cases,. 3. ationalism/+

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-oodwin Heff, %o 1t$er !a+ 1ut: States and 2e-olutionar+ Mo-e*ents , #ambridge 'ni!ersity Eress, *++/, p.//. Ealestine for e(ample. -ellner Ernest. %azioni e nazionalis*i. Editori 6iuniti, 6oma, /,52, p./. ibid. p. ;B//. C !ery useful and interesting site can be found at http011www.nationalismpro)ect.org1.

his is one of the most ambiguous concepts in the presentBday !ocabulary of political and analytical thought.// It is !ery hard to find a generally acceptable definition for FnationalismG, FnationG, and FnationalityG e!en among the academic world/*. he same difficulty e(ists in the determination of some other relati!e concepts like FethnicityG, Fethnic groupG and FregionalismG. %ationalis* is a system of ideas, !alues and norms, an image of the world and society, which makes a large social group aware of where it belongs and in!ests this sense of belonging with a particular !alueG/3" therefore, nationalism is both an ideology and a political mo!ement C typology of nationalism is the one presented by Eeter Clter" according to this author, we can classify nationalism into two main groups or basic types0 Risorgimento nationalism and Integral nationalism14. 6isorgimento nationalism was a political mo!ement, which sustains the principle of solidarity of the oppressed citi$ens1people against the oppressors. 6isorgimento nationalism supported the European mo!ements for national liberation and it had e!en se!eral distinguished categories >i.e. liberal, reformist, political, cultural, linguistic and religious nationalism?. Cll these !arious forms of nationalism were interdependent. Cround /55+, French writer #harles =aurras/; used the term Integral nationalism, as opposed to the 6isorgimento nationalism >which uphold the idea of the e@uality of all nations and national mo!ements?, defining the nation as the absolute. he philosophical foundation of Integral nationalism is 9arwins theory of natural selection, it asserts the interests of the one nation at the e(pense of others, and e!erything can be )ustified as ethical and moral if it ser!es the nation and its power. Because of this distincti!e characteristic of the FIntegral nationalismG, there ha!e been many ad)ecti!es attached to this term, like radical, e(treme, militant aggressi!eBe(pansionist, right wing, reactionary, or e(cessi!e/2" today nationalism is considered, normally, in the form of integral nationalism.

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Clter Eeter, %ationalis*, 7econd Edition /,,< by C6AO.9 a =ember of the Dodder Deadline -roup, .ondonB Aew %orkB7ydneyBCuckland, /,,<, p. 3. ibid. p. < -ellner Ernest. %azioni e nazionalis*i. Editori 6iuniti, 6oma, /,52, p. <. he classification gi!en by Clter, howe!er, has mainly an historical !alue. =aurras #harlesB=arieBEhotius >*+ Cpril /525 J /2 Ao!ember /,;*? was a French author, poet, and critic. De was a leader and principal thinker of #ction 3ran4aise, a monarchist political mo!ement, antiBparliamentary, and counterBre!olutionary, and is the main intellectual influence of Aational #atholicism and integral nationalism. 7ource0 www.Wikipedia.eng" Clter Eeter, %ationalis*, p. *2B*I

Cccording to -reenfeld0 F%ationalis*. in s$ort. is t$e *odern culture( It is t$e s+*bolic blueprint o" *odern realit+. t$e a+ e see. and t$ereb+ construct. t$e orld around us. t$e speci"icall+ *odern consciousnessG./I Aationalism is both an ideology, whose central !alues are the nation and the so!ereign nation state, and a political mo!ement that aims to mobili$e the political will of the people in order to achie!e a common goal. It is important to mention other distincti!e !iewpoints" indeed, any approaches to ethnicity, nationalism and other cultural identities, howe!er differentiated from each other, can be di!ided into two basic categories0 primordialist, and constructionist/5. he first category is based on the assumption that people who share a culture also share a common identity and sentiments that are the basis for their groups interests and claims. he second category sees national or ethnic consciousness as an entirely situational matter, being a response to certain practical circumstances. here are many other definitions of nationalism in the literature, and as Hohn Breuilly reminds us, new one elicits the least agreement/,. Cs suggested by .ucas*+, a complete classification of e(isting theories is offered by Hames -oodmans fi!e categories classification of nationalism, useful for focusing on contemporary debates. -oodman discriminates the following approaches*/0 /. !lass"centered theories, which relate class relations and the impact of industrial capitalism on nationalist mo!ements, main author are #ric $o%s%a&m, Samir Amin, and Jim Blaut' *. (ne)en de)elo*ment theories, which focus on the wider international and transnational setting in which nationalism is reproduced and which integrate a broad range of economic, cultural, and political relationships within and between societies. .eading e(ponents are Benedict Anderson, !+arles ,illy, -irosla) $roc+, and ,om airn" 3. State"centered theories that link nationalism to the state system and international relations, represented by Jo+n Breuilly"

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-reenfeld .iah, %ationalis* and t$e Mind, in FAations and AationalismG. Kol. //, Eart <, Huly *++;, p. 3*2. &aufmann Eric, 5ri*ordialists and Constructionists: # t+polog+ o" t$eories o" religion , in F6eligion, Brain and Beha!iorG. Issue *, =ay <, *+/*" article online at0 http011www.sneps.net1wpBcontent1uploads1*+//1+,1/B&aufmannB article/.pdf" Breuilly Hohn, 2e"lections on %ationalis*, in Woolf 7tuart, %ationalis* in Europe. 6768 to t$e 5resent , 6outledge, .ondon and Aew %ork, /,,2, p. /3I. .ucas =ichael 6., %ationalis*. So-ereignt+. and Supranational 1rganizations, Deft //<, he Institute for Eeace 6esearch and 7ecurity Eolicy, 'ni!ersity of Damburg, Damburg, Cpril /,,,, p *,. -oodman Hames, %ationalis* and 9ransnationalis*. 9$e %ational Con"lict in Ireland and European Union Integration. C!ebury, Cldershot, /,,2, pp. /3B33.

<. -odernization theories, which emphasi$e the role of socioBeconomic factors in the emergence of national identity, with particular emphasis on industriali$ation" .arl /eutsc+ and #rnest 0ellner are considered e(ponents of the modernist school, e!en though the latter could be considered more a postmodernist, and as such we briefly consider after his position" ;. #t+no"national theories that stress the ethnic components of nationalism and attempt to e(plain the affecti!e, sub)ecti!e power of nationalism whose leading author is Ant+ony Smit+" 2. 1ost"-odernist theories that try to o!ercome the problem gi!en by the assessment placed from =odernist and EthnoBnational. 2.1. !lass"centered t+eories For the historian Eric Dobsbawm, nationalism is a historically changing entity, but belongs Fto a particular, and historically recent, period and is related to a certain kind of modern territorial state, the nation)state**. Dobsbawm argues that the type of the recent selfBdetermination nationalism is built on what he calls the FWilsonianB.eninist notionG that triumphed with the World War*3. Dobsbawm argues that nationalism as an ideology dates back to the /5th and /,th century liberalism that witnessed the formation of liberal bourgeois nationalist mo!ements in the large modern nationB states. his formation often in!ol!ed the assimilation or suppression of minority groups, along religious, linguistic and ethnic lines. De distinguishes between the classic nation-building nationalism of the period /53+B/5I+ and the nationalism between /5I+ and /,/<. In the earlier period, =a$$ini and other leading representati!es of nationalist mo!ements applied the principle of nationality to wouldBbe nations of a certain si$e ( his Lthreshold principle was based on the economic ad!antages of large, national units >a ma)or )ustification for the formation of liberal states in the first place?. 7maller nationalities, which otherwise were not @ualified as potential nations, would ha!e included 7icilians, Bretons, Welsh and e!en the Irish. he large nationBstates en!isioned would ha!e been comprised of different nationalities and were thus concei!ed as LmultiBnational*<. Building nations was also !iewed, at that time, as a process of e(pansion and unification based on the idea that social e!olution Fe(panded the scale of human reaty of Kersailles, at the end of First

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.ucas =ichael 6., %ationalis*. So-ereignt+. and Supranational 1rganizations, p 3/. In the treaty, there is the notion that independent statehood was a rightful claim of peoples demanding selfB determination. his is a conse@uence of one of 3ourteen 5oints, a statement of principles contained in a speech gi!en by 'nited 7tates Eresident Woodrow Wilson to a )oint session of #ongress on Hanuary 5, /,/5. .ucas =ichael 6., %ationalis*. So-ereignt+. and Supranational 1rganizations, p. 3*.

social units from family and tribe to county and canton, from the local to the regional, the national and e!entually the globalF*;. On this model, not only would all -reeks or Italians or -ermans melt together in one state but also 7erbs would merge with #roats into a single %ugosla!ia and #$echs with 7lo!aks. =ultiBethnic, multilingual, and multinational forms of interaction were identified as characteristics of these nation states and the oldest Western European nationBstates, such as Britain, France, and 7pain. In addition to the territorial Lthreshold principle, there were, according to Dobsbawm, three criteria, which allowed people to be classified as a state. he first was their $istoric association it$ a current state or one with a lengthy and recent past. he second was the e,istence o" long establis$ed cultural elite possessing a written national literary and administrati!e !ernacular. he third criterion was a pro-en capacit+ "or con:uest. Dobsbawm uses his historical sur!ey of the classical period of liberal bourgeois nationalism and the formation of the liberal state to critici$e the notion of pure nationBstates. Cccording to this notion, ethnically homogenous dominant group is coBe(tensi!e with the national territory. While this notion defines theoretically, what the nationBstate is supposed to be, it has e(isted in practice !ery rarely.*2 De argues that ethnically homogenous states did not really e(ist in the /,th century, and ethnically pure states are not possible today, despite the efforts towards different forms of Lethnic cleansing and unmi(ing of peoples. By citing urbani$ation and industriali$ation, the massi!e mo!ements and transfers of people across borders and continents, he reiterates the point that such forces undermine Fthe basic nationalist assumption of a territory inhabited essentially by an ethnically, culturally and linguistically homogeneous populationG*I. 2.2. (ne)en de)elo*ment 3$roc+4s +istorical analysis5 In his discussion of the origins of postBcold war mo!ements for selfBdetermination, =irosla! Droch is circumspect about calling these mo!ements FnationalistG because such mo!ements in the /,th century did not aim at independent statehood >while so many ethnoBnationalist mo!ements today pose statehood as their primary demand?. *5 De defines nationalism as Fthat state of mind which gi!es an absolute priority to the !alues of ones own nation o!er and abo!e all other !alues and interest groupsG*,.
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ibid., 33 ibid. ibid., p. 3<. Droch, =irosla!, %ational Sel");eter*ination "ro* a Historical 5erspecti-e , in Eeriwal 7ukumar >ed.?, %otions o" %ationalis*, #entral European 'ni!ersity Eress, Budapest and Aew %ork, /,,;, pp. 2;B22.. ibid., p. 2;

he established nationBstates of Europe, whose de!elopment goes back to the =iddle Cges England, France, 7pain, 7weden, 9enmark, Eortugal, and the Aetherlands, were ruled by homogenous elites and wellBde!eloped social strata that included the aristocracy and the emerging industrial and commercial bourgeoisie. hey had a highly de!eloped national culture and language. In contrast to those states, more than twenty nonBdominant ethnic groups were spread throughout the European continent in /5++, including the relati!ely homogenous nationBstates. hese groups had Le(ogenous ruling classes and Foccupied a compact territoryG but lacked their Lown >that is, belonging to their own ethnic group? ruling class and continuous cultural tradition in their own literary languageG3+ . Ct a certain point, some members of the ethnic group began to focus on their own ethnicity and to see their group as a potential nation. hey asked for the impro!ement of their national culture, focusing on language, the creation of a Fcomplete social structure,F including their own educated elites, and the achie!ement of e@ual ci!il rights and political selfBdetermination. Aational mo!ements in both Western and Eastern Europe de!eloped, according to Droch, in three structural phases. In 1+ase A, acti!ists researched the linguistic, historical, and cultural attributes of their ethnic group. In 1+ase B, a group of patriots emerged o!er members of the ethnic group, planning to form a nation. In 1+ase !, the national idea spreads, and a mass mo!ement takes shape. Cn important difference between Western and Eastern Europe lay in the fact that Western national mo!ements started their Ehase B under constitutional regime. Ehase B in Eastern mo!ements, in contrast, was carried out within the late absolutist regimes, the Dapsburg Empire, the Ottoman Empire, sarist 6ussia, Erussia and 9enmark. Droch argues that different types of national mo!ements, whether they e!entually achie!ed nationB statehood or merely one form of autonomous status, depend on a number of factors. hese factors include the political system under which the national mo!ement proceeded during Ehase B and Ehase #, and the social structure of the nonBdominant ethnic group. C third factor is the groups historical de!elopment. Droch distinguishes three le!els or stages of national political programs that describe different types of demands for selfBdetermination3/. he first is substitution. an elementary le!el of political programs, in which only Fpartial elements of politics entered into the national programmeG3*.
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ibid., p. 22 .ucas =ichael 6., %ationalis*. So-ereignt+. and Supranational 1rganizations, p. 32. Droch, =irosla!, %ational Sel");eter*ination "ro* a Historical 5erspecti-e , p. I+.

here are attempts to maintain the unity of the ethnic territory and thus to culti!ate the image of Fthe fatherlandG. Drochs point here is that linguistic and cultural demands, sometimes, only temporarily replaced some functions of e(plicit political aims. he second le!el consists in demands for participation, for e(ample, in local >municipal? administration, in elected bodies at different le!els of go!ernment. he third le!el or type of selfBdetermination mo!ements was secession based on the aim of the leaders of the national mo!ement to achie!e greater autonomy in what they considered Ltheir territory. With this historical e!idence, theories of nationalism that define national goals e(clusi!ely as the effort for independence are not empirically well grounded. Clthough a great part of national mo!ements in #entral and Eastern Europe achie!ed independent statehood, this goal was not in their national programs, which aimed at less ambitious goals. E(ternal factors, namely, World War I and the 6ussian 6e!olution in /,/I, were responsible for the shift of direction and later goals of these mo!ements. Once independence was achie!ed, only then it became the political bottom line for these new independent states. 'nder fascism and later under 7o!iet dominance >for what it concerns #entral and Eastern European states? independence was lost, but remained the core demand that would reBemerge with the end of the #old War. Droch also points out that some mo!ements did not achie!e full independence in the interBwar period, like 7lo!enes, 7lo!aks, #roatians, 'krainians, =acedonians and Byelorussians" they became independent only with the end of 7o!iet communism. In the new international setting, in which the traditional multinational, multiBethnic empires disappeared and the nationBstate was the primary and most powerful actor in the international system, the demand for statehood, by selfBdetermination mo!ements, became much more widespread. 2.2. ,+e state"centered a**roac+ For authors supporting the stateBcentered theory, nationalism is linked to the emergence of the modern state and its interaction with the international system of states.33 Breuilly >one of the leading e(ponents of this approach? considers wrong to relate F nationalis* to particular class interests or to t$e pursuit o" large scale social and econo*ic c$angeG.

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.ucas =ichael 6., %ationalis*. So-ereignt+. and Supranational 1rganizations, p. 3,.

On the other hand, Fre"erence to t$e role o" t$is or t$at class. or to t$e atte*pt to create a *odern econo*+. s$ould not be *ade central to an understanding o" nationalis* generall+G3<( For this author Fto focus upon culture, ideology, class or modernisation is to neglect the fundamental point that nationalism is, abo!e and beyond all else, about politics and politics is about power. 1o&er, in the modern world, is primarily about control of t+e state. he central @uestion, therefore, should be the relation between nationalism and the purpose of obtaining and using the state power.3; Aationalism is a form of politics, generated by acti!ities of the state, and has no particular class feature. De claims that classes are often di!ided by national disputes and that di!erse class elements come together to form national constituencies. he e(isting state apparatus and the Fsystem of competing territorial statesG determine nationalist mo!ements that aim at reforming the state, separating from it, or assimilating into it32 Breuilly also argues that this type of nationalism is an anachronism of the /, th century. In todays interBconnected world, the state is not as independent in its acti!ities and policymaking from other forces and actors in the international system, as it was before. 2.6. -odernization t+eories of nationalism &arl 9eutsch e(plains the de!elopment as a distincti!e modern phenomenon that originates from the mass mobili$ation of precommercial, preindustrial peasant peoples and their transition to industrial economiesG3I. De links nationalism with the historical, economic and political progress made possible by science and its application to politics and social life in general.35 7ocial communication lies at the core of 9eutschs theory of so!ereignty, power, community and the nation. he nature of political power is dependent on the highly une!en distribution of F social co**unication "acilitiesG3,. 'nder Fsocial communication facilitiesF he includes a socially standardized system of sym%ols, including language and other codes, such as alphabets, systems of writing, calculating, in short, all channels and also infrastructures for storing, recalling, and recom%ining information.<+
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Breuilly Hohn, 2e"lections on %ationalis*, p. /3I., Breuilly Hohn, %ationalis* and t$e State. 7t. =artins Eress, Aew %ork, /,5*, p. /+. .ucas =ichael 6., %ationalis*. So-ereignt+. and Supranational 1rganizations, p. <+. 9eutsch &arl, %ationalis* and Social Co**unication. =assachusetts Institute of echnology Eress, Boston, /,22. .ucas =ichael 6., %ationalis*. So-ereignt+. and Supranational 1rganizations, p. 32. 9eutsch &arl, %ationalis* and Social Co**unication. p. I;. .ucas =ichael 6., %ationalis*. So-ereignt+. and Supranational 1rganizations, p. 32.

De defines people in terms of communication, as a group of indi!iduals linked by specific Fcomplementary habits and facilities of communicationG</. he de!elopment of the national culture of nationBstates is a function of the @uantitati!e increase in communication >for e(ample, through transport, radio, and telecommunications?. 9eutsch !iews nationalism through the lens of moderni$ation, he sees the effects on traditional social ties, and the sense of security and belonging destroyed by industrialism and the progress of market relations. he nationBstate has the role of helping to create a new community and culture to replace what industrialism destroys. Aationality is achie!ed through ad!ancing means of communication, that is, by creating Fa community of complementary habits and facilities of communicationG. he nationBstate, nationality, the increasing efficiency and functionality of infrastructures of communication are for 9eutsch motors of moderni$ation and progress, which are scientifically measurable. De was optimistic about nationalism as a force of moderni$ation. De claims that in the midB/,2+s the Fmobili$ation of precommercial, preindustrial peasant peoples and their transition to an industrial economy should be substantially completed within the ne(t two generationsG<*. Dis theory !iews the world and e!erything in it, including nationBstates, and by implication supranational organi$ations, through the prism of measurable data and communication >or in his terms, cybernetic? logic. De considers the end of the #old War and the contemporary re!olution in computer, communication and other technologies, and their application at the state and supranational le!el, as a reali$ation of his theory<3. 2.7. #t+no"national t+eories =oderni$ation theories of nationalism and the nationBstate ha!e fuelled a number of highly contro!ersial debates among theorists of nationalism. Earticularly, Cnthony 7mith has critici$ed some statement of the moderni$ation theories, based on communication theory. De considers the process of modernisation as following an ine!itable progression with its own momentum, modelled on the pattern of Western e!olution of nationBstate<<. 7mith elaborates his criti@ue by arguing that the dyadic conception of Lmoderni$ation and nationalism, which is Western in origin, is both ethnocentric and Fcrudely deterministG<;

</ <* <3 << <;

9eutsch, &arl, %ationalis* and Social Co**unication. p. ,2. ibid. /,+. .ucas =ichael 6., %ationalis*. So-ereignt+. and Supranational 1rganizations, p. Ibid. p. <*. 7mith Cnthony, 9$e M+t$ o" t$e Modern %ation and t$e M+t$s o" %ations, Ethnic and 6acial 7tudies, n. //, /, /,55, pp. *B;.

7miths own theory of nationalism assumes and demonstrates much greater continuity between modernity and preBmodern past. he crucial shortcoming of moderni$ation theory is its lack of historical specificity, in that F t$ere $a-e been i*portant breaks in $istorical de-elop*ent and t$at one o" t$e* can be located in earl+ *odern Europe it$ t$e ad-ent o" t$e rational state capitalis* and industrialis*G<2 . 7mith does not re)ect the importance of some basic types of nationalism resulting from the process of moderni$ation, such as industriali$ation and the de!elopment of social communication, but he insists that the emphasis on the moderni$ation does not take into account the importance of ethnic roots in the past.<I E!en though 7mith is well known for his approach to nationalism linked to its ethnic origins, he tried to combine preBmodern and modern elements in his definition of the nation. De defines nation as Fna*ed $u*an populations clai*ing a co**on ancestr+. a de*otic solidarit+. co**on custo*s and -ernaculars. and a co**on nati-e $istor+G<5 hose ethnic categories infuse nationalism and e(plain its premodern ethnic core" ethnic community, or et$nie. is defined by 7mith as Fa named human population possessing a myth of common descent, common historical memories, elements of shared culture, an association with a particular territory, and a sense of solidarityG<,. #ombining both the abo!e preBmodern and modern characteristics, 7mith defines the nation as Fa named human population sharing a myth of common descent, historical memories and a mass culture, and possessing a demarcated territory, common economy and common legal rights and dutiesG;+ Following the end of the #old War, the e(Bcommunist societies that ha!e not undergone the traditional Western process of Fmoderni$ation, Fha!e been particularly prone to e(treme forms of ethnic mobili$ation. hese forms included ethnoBnationalist wars and interBethnic genocides, as the one that took place in BosniaBDer$ego!ina and in other parts of the former %ugosla!ia since the early /,,+s. he ma)or powers underestimated ethnic factors in the Balkans and elsewhere and the e(tent to which e(treme nationalist leaders could mobili$e popular fears linked to preBmodern ethnic myths of community and identity and past interBethnic conflict and war.

<2 <I

<5
<,

;+

ibid., p. **" .ucas =ichael 6., %ationalis*. So-ereignt+. and Supranational 1rganizations, p. <3. 7mith Cnthony, 9$e M+t$ o" t$e Modern %ation and t$e M+t$s o" %ations, pp. ,B/+. Isiksal Duseyin, 9 o 5erspecti-es on t$e 2elations$ip o" Et$nicit+ to %ationalis*: Co*paring Gellner and S*it$, in FClternati!es0 urkish Hournal of International 6elationsG, Kol./, Ao./, spring *++*, p.3. 7mith Cnthony, %ational Identit+, Eenguine Books, .ondon, /,,/, p. /<.

he ma)ority of the nationalist mo!ements in the Balkans ha!e long histories that preBdate their resurgence in late /,5+s and /,,+s. 7ome of these mo!ements are traceable back to the /,th century and in a few cases much earlier. 2.8. 1ost"modernist he FpostBmodernist Fapproach to nationalism would necessarily ha!e to integrate both the ethnoB nationalist approach and the modernist school. Ernest -ellner pro!ides a postBmodernist synthesis, focusing on economic, social, and cultural elements of industrial moderni$ation, which include the notion of a profound historicalBcultural di!ision between agrarian and industrial society. ;/ In feudal and agrarian societies, a gi!en social structure predetermined the indi!iduals social identity, social position, and life path;*" indi!idual e(istence was fi(ed and static. In industrial society, in contrast, with its need for an educated work force and labour mobility, citi$ens assume different roles in their lifetime;3. he indi!idual must ad)ust to a condition of FsubstitutableG within the workforce" Cd)ustments are a constant of the social and working life. In this situation, culture and nationalism become more important for the indi!iduals identity, for his identification with the Fimagined communityG of the nation, and for the reproduction of a socially coherent, industrially functioning society. he state with its control o!er education and other infrastructures tries to create a nationally homogeni$ed culture capable of assimilating different cultures and groups, reducing social tensions between rulers and ruled, and integrating nationalist and other oppositions. #ulture is also the tool used by the indi!idual to identify himself with the different roles and identities he will assume in his lifetime. he society tries to pro!ide a structure to assimilate different groups and oppositional nationalist mo!ements. Cs long as this situation is not reali$ed1does not happen, the personal and cultural aspects of identity become more needed and pronounced. he state compensates for the depersonali$ing forces of moderni$ation by reBsociali$ing the indi!idual into the Fimagined community Fof its national culture. he current postBmodern, multicultural and multinational trends are more pronounced in ad!anced liberal, constitutional democracies and ci!il societies in Aorth Cmerica and Europe, but they are also an e(ample of une!enly e!ol!ing trend throughout the world
;/

;*
;3

.ucas =ichael 6., %ationalis*. So-ereignt+. and Supranational 1rganizations, p. <2. -ellner Ernest, %ationalis*. Aew %ork 'ni!ersity Eress, Aew %ork, /,,I, p. *+. ibid., p. *<

In the domesticBglobal cultural en!ironment of the late *+th century, the appeal of @uasiBmonoculture national narrati!es imposed by established elites has become less fascinating, legitimate, or politically unifying and selfBsustaining. 7uch dominant national narrati!e has gi!en way to a political space into nationBstates and created homogeneous national cultures.;< In the last half of the /;th century when 7pain emphasi$ed religious unity as a central foundation for the constitution of itself as a modern state, Hews and =oslems were among the e(cluded and the nation states first refugees. 7pain is an e(ample of how moderni$ing nationalism entailed a process of minority e(pulsion that was wo!en into the founding fabric of the European nationBstate. Besides the Hews and =oslems, there were also the Erotestants of the .ow #ountries and the Euritans and Muakers in England. here were also the French Duguenots and the more contemporary cases of stateless groups resulting from the dissolution of colonial empires in Cfrica and Csia and their reconfiguration as nationBstates. In conclusion, the moderni$ation theories of nationalism help us to understand the re!olutionary socioB economic conse@uences of past and present phases of capitalism and technological re!olution, but notwithstanding the central place of economic and scientific progress, the latter cannot delete the ethnic components of traditional and new forms of nationalism. 6. ,+e Birt+ of ationalism in 9estern #uro*e he political map of Europe was transformed during the /5th and /,th century with the dissolution of empires and the emergence of many new nationBstates. his state formation was based mainly on nationalism, which usually implied an ethnic homeland or a sense of belonging to a common people. he boundaries of Europe were redrawn many times in the past to gi!e to many nations their own state" this policy was legitimated by the ideology of national selfBdetermination of the people. Aationalism as an ideology, which supports the right of selfBdetermination and e@uality of people, supplied the demand for independent states and awoke enthusiasm, hopes and e(pectations for the people. In Europe, two spheres of ci!ili$ation emerged and de!eloped after the di!ision of the continent into a Western and Eastern 6oman Empire. he Western cultural sphere was marked by the early di!orce of the secular from the spiritual authorities, and by a process of intellectual seculari$ation featuring concepts like the 6enaissance and Enlightenment and, because of such mo!ements, so!ereignty of people and democracy.
;<

ibid., p. <5.

In the eastern part of Europe, in -reek By$antine and 6ussian Orthodo( East, state and church were the same" the emperor was a holy figure standing o!er the heads of the patriarchs as -ods !icar, and he was able to mobili$e the forces of religion in the ser!ice of the state;;. he empires were used to create a political roof o!er a large multiBethnic population and often to promote the mi(ing of peoples" therefore, much of the worlds ethnic heterogeneity can be traced to mo!ement of people under imperial regimes. In this en!ironment >multiBethnic and culturally mi(ed?, the ideology of nation building was born in -reat Britain in the beginning of the /5th century, e!en if until the second half of the nineteenth century concepts like nation and ethnicity were domains of aristocratic circles and had nothing to do with the common people, who were e(cluded from politics;2. In the eighteenth century, an Fin!entedG British identity was de!eloped" FbritishnessG was forged by war, since war with France brought Britons into confrontation with a palpable enemy and encouraged them to define themsel!es collecti!ely against it.;I hey identified themsel!es as British because of !ery powerful e(isting elements, such as Erotestantism and hostility to #atholic Europe, and thanks to these elements, -reat Britain achie!ed its emotional and cultural force, despite their peoples many cultural di!ergences. Erotestantism allowed the 7cottish, the English and the Welsh to fuse together and to remain so, despite their many cultural di!ergences" it moreo!er helped them to o!ercome the ancient antagonism between England and 7cotland and to subsume both 7cottish and English nationalisms. Cs Erotestantism lies at the core of British national identity, religion was the most unifying force in most nations within Europe. he formation and establishment of nation and state in France lasted for a much longer period. Eugen Weber argues0 F3ort+ kings orked $ard at t$e task. but it as t$e 2e-olution t$at "inis$ed t$e ork in t$e endG;5. he French 6e!olution completed the nation, which became one and indi!isible > one people. one countr+. one go-ern*ent. one nation. one "at$erland?;,. he French national unity is percei!ed as the e(pression of the general will of the French to be French, and the nation must be considered as a cultural unit.

;;
;2 ;I

;5
;,

7chul$e Dagen, States. %ations. and %ationalis*, Blackwell Eublishers Inc., #ambridge =a, /,,2, p. (iii. ibid. ibid. Weber Eugen, 5easants into 3renc$*en, 7tanford 'ni!ersity Eress, 7tanford #alifornia, /,I2, p. ,;" Ibid. p. ,2,

he French elite belie!ed that using the schools and the army as !ehicles would dismiss the e(istence of any different ethnic group within the French nation and would finally lead to the French nationB state formation. Cs the French had no uniform conception of patriotism at the time of the 6e!olution or at any other time, the patriotic feeling on the national le!el had to be learned, at different speeds in different places, mostly through the later part of the nineteenth century. Finally, the -erman e(perience under different historical and geographical conditions formed a different nationBstate. 'sing the conception of the imagined community of the nation, not as a nation of citi$ens, but as a FKolk nationG bound together by ties of blood, descent and culture, -ermans built another type of nationBstate. he -erman understanding of nationhood re!ol!ed around an ethno cultural community of descent, which was and it still is e(tremely resilient to the assimilation of new members. he result was a conception of the nation, not as a nation of citi$ens, but as a Kolk nation, bound together not by shared citi$enship rights within the state, but by ties of blood and culture. his conception of the nation was also spread around in the neighbouring countries and in #entral, Eastern and 7outhern Europe, affecting the creation of nation there.2+ 7. ation"Building in !entral, Sout+ern, and #astern #uro*e

he Dabsburg, Ottoman and 6omano! Empires occupied the region of #entral, Eastern and 7outhern Europe in the nineteenth century" those Empires were polyethnic, polyreligious and polylinguistic and were disappro!ed as *ultinational by the more compact, consolidated and integrated states of Aorthern and Western Europe. Cs was mentioned abo!e, there were differences in nation building and in state building between the Western Europe and #entral, Eastern and 7outhern Europe. hese differences mainly occurred due to two basic reasons0 the difference in relations between state and church in the East and the absence of the Enlightenment ideas in this area. In Western Europe, it was the state that created the nation >in France, the =onarchy built the Frenchman?, while in #entral Europe the nation created the state >the -ermans belonging to different 7tates created a unified -erman 7tate?. -eography played a critical role in these differences. Erior to the nineteenth century, geography usually determined the international borders, which were only appro(imately known.
2+

=a$ower =ark, <e o*bre dell'Europa( ;e*ocrazie e totalitaris*i nel == secolo , -ar$anti, =ilano, *++;, pp. ;3B;<.

he principle of selfBdetermination of nations became linked with so!ereignty, and created disputes and fights o!er territorial claims, especially where historical places or territories rich in natural sources were in!ol!ed. In the nineteenth century, these multinational Empires reorgani$ed themself along apparently national lines, beginning with the gradual erosion of Ottoman rule in the Balkans. 7ince /5/2, 7erbia had gained rights of internal selfBgo!ernment, but not a fully autonomous regime. he -reek case was actually the first in line of state building in the Balkans. Cfter many unsuccessful attempts in the past, finally -reek became partly independent after a long and bloody independence war, which started in /5*/.2/ 7imilarly, hundred years after the -reek emancipation a whole belt of east European states, from Finland, through the Baltic 7tates, Eoland, #$echoslo!akia, 6omania, Bulgaria, Clbania and 7erbia came into e(istence by secession from the great Empires. =emories of heroic eras were used in all these countries to bolster national consciousness and the boundary between scholarship and national mythology became fluid2* In spite of all these efforts, national states with a homogeneous population were hard to find in EastB #entral Europe and the Balkans, where nationalities o!erlap until today. 8. ationalism in Balkans And :ormer ;ugosla)ia

he period after WWI, could be considered the peak of nationalism and the demonstration of its huge potential and its limitations, especially in Balkans. 9uring the period between /,/5 and /,<;, nationalism became synonymous with intolerance, inhumanity and !iolence, with the !iolent e(pulsion of people from their lands and the campaigns of territorial con@uest. he !ictory of nationalism, after the end of WWI, was the result of two different de!elopments" the fall down of the great multinational empires of #entral and Eastern Europe >the Dabsburg, the 6ussian and the Ottoman? and the emergence in their place of a number of so!ereign states, which were often hostile each others. -i!en the distribution of peoples in Europe, and specially the mi(ed Balkans populations, most of the new states were in fact multinational, smaller and with the presence of ethnic groups in them, regarded as minorities and often oppressed. he political and economic de!elopments were influenced by this new ethnoBterritorial reorgani$ation. Irredentist disputes among the new states, e(istence of minorities, ethnic tensions in
2/

2*

=a$ower =ark, 9$e Balkans)# S$ort Histor+, C =odern .ibrary #hronicles Book, Aew %ork, *+++, p. //2 Clter Eeter, %ationalis*, 7econd Edition /,,< by C6AO.9 a =ember of the Dodder Deadline -roup, .ondonB Aew %orkB7ydneyBCuckland, /,,<, p. <;.

most of them, united to the pressures from the -reat Eowers, all led to the failing of nation building and internal solidarity. =oreo!er, in the Balkans, there were additional factors that complicated the situation" first of all the Balkan Eeninsula was the border between the former empires and was often a place of competing influences. he dispositions of the reaty of Kersailles were not satisfactory" abo!e all, the artificial creation of %ugosla!ia caused the formation of a new problematical state, made up by the largest and most di!erse number of preB/,/5 units.23 he real challenge was to unite in a single nation all the different ethnic and religious groups" groups of di!ergent cultures, se!eral different languages, different legal systems, di!erse e(periences in state and political affairs, and mutual historical hostility . For this reason, the most important factor shaping the future de!elopment of the newly comprised state was 7erbian domination in its political life, administrati!e and legal procedures and organi$ation. his domination was based on four important arguments2<0 /. 7erbia was an independent kingdom before WWI , with an army, dynasty and bureaucracy" *. 7erbias go!ernment considered the 7outhern 7la!ic state, that might emerge from the war, as a geographic e(pansion of old 7erbia" 3. 7erbs felt entitled to hold the leadership of the country because of the huge human losses >oneB fifth of the population had perished? and the large wealth loss during the war <. 7erbia, alone, could contribute to the new state political elite capable of ruling, through a comprehensi!e go!ernment apparatus, e(perienced military ser!ice and a nati!e dynasty. he reactions of the other ethnic groups to this status @uo, promptly, happened in 9ecember /,/5, when street clashes e(ploded in the #roatian capital Nagreb. By the end of =ay /,/,, more than /;+,+++ signatures were collected and an appeal was made to the Western powers to authori$e the reco!ery of #roatias independence2;. he #roats were suspicious about 7erbian policy and, in fact, the political history of interwar %ugosla!ia was largely a Fhistory of mutual mystification and frustration of these two peoples.G22

23

2< 2; 22

=arino!a J Nuber Boriana, 9$e 2ebirt$ o" %ationalis* in t$e Balkans in t$e 6>>?s: Causes. Conse:uences and 5ossible Solutions, International 6elations and 7ecurity Aetwork, Nurich, *++I, p.2. Ibid., p.I. Ibid. Ibid.

In Italy and -ermany, for e(ample, nationalism was integrati!e" it united the same peoples li!ing in different states and principalities, by contrast, in Eastern Europe and %ugosla!ia >particularly?, nationalism was separatist. 9uring the communism, the nationalist ideology did not disappear o!erall, being only suppressed by the ruling elites. %ugosla!ias narration, on its part, was dominated by clashes between the wealthy 7lo!enes and #roats, who struggled for more autonomy within the federation, and the 7erbs who were economically less ad!anced but greater in number and were stri!ing towards increased centralism in the state. he collapse of #ommunism, with the re!olutions of /,5,, howe!er, brought about a number of changes in the region and thus se!eral factors appeared to ha!e a simultaneous catalytic influence on the reBemergence of nationalism. he diminishing 7o!iet influence and its deterrent role, the destabili$ing political effect of mass media, with freedom of e(pression and nationwide audience >due to political liberali$ation?, the search for a new ideology with populist politicians employing nationalism to fill the !oid. In %ugosla!ia there were, also, two other e(tremely important factors such as the e(istence of historical grie!ances and the presence of strong ethnic stereotypes. Internal nationalism was certainly the most important political factor throughout the e(istence of %ugosla!ia. he pre!ious regimes identification with the 7erb people and its attempts to manipulate the ethnic mi( in parts of the country had also contributed to the e(acerbation of ethnic grie!ances. he ethnic ties across state borders and the support that the 7erbs in #roatia and Bosnia recei!ed from =ilose!ics go!ernment, united to the e(treme positions of the leaders of all the ethnic groups >and their unwillingness of to agree on compromises? were certainly a ma)or reason for the conflicts to escalate and become so de!astating. he 7erbs saw the reBemerging identities of the other republics as security threats for the e(istence of the federation and conse@uently 7erbias domination within it. In the first phase of the conflict, against 7lo!enia and #roatia the go!ernment of Belgrade used, as a tool, the iconography of the e(istence of a FfederalG %ugosla!ia, as 7erbians dri!e to rule the other 7outh 7la!ic, and this was the ma)or cause of the countrys break up. Cnother iconography, that also pro!ed to be decisi!e, was the ethnic ties between 7erbs across state borders and the support that they recei!ed in #roatia and Bosnia from =ilose!ics go!ernment, in the name of 7erbian unity. he fact that the federal troops demonstrated their loyalty to 7erbian leadership, when 7lo!enia and #roatia chose the independence, also had a great impact.

Dowe!er, it can be argued that the first and foremost reason for the %ugosla! crisis was the fact that ethnic grie!ances were not addressed at all. In the name of 7erbian iconography, instead of accepting the proposal of 7lo!enia and #roatia to restructure %ugosla!ia as confederation, which would ha!e pro!ided more autonomy for them, =ilose!ic resorted to direct military inter!ention using the federal army to keep control of both republics by force. he deepBseated conflicts between ethnic communities emerge primarily from ri!al >and sometimes incompatible? myths, symbols and memories that define the tradition and !alue systems of those communities, different iconographies come out, especially when there are une@ual relations. 'ne@ual relationships will not lead to an ethnic conflict unless there is a sense of ethnic difference, and similarly, ri!al myths will not bring two communities into a conflict if the two communities ha!e not entered into competiti!e relationship2I. he une@ual footing of the republics in the %ugosla! Federation, and abo!e all 7erbian pretensions for domination were the dri!ing forces behind the rise of ethnic conflicts. Barry Eosen has presented an interesting theoretical !iewpoint on the emergence of ethnic conflicts that draws on international relations theory. 25 Employing the concept of the security dilemma, he applies it to the special conditions that arise after the disintegration of multinational states like former 7o!iet 'nion and former %ugosla!ia. o the une@ual relationships between pro(imate groups proposed by 7mith, Eosen adds the idea that these Fgroups o" people suddenl+ "ind t$e*sel-es ne l+ responsible "or t$eir o n securit+.G heir security dilemma affects relations among these groups, )ust as it affects relations among states, and so it becomes the dri!ing force behind their conflicts. he essence of the security dilemma is that F $at one does to en$ance ones o n securit+ causes reactions t$at. in t$e end. can *ake one less secureG.2, If we adopt this !iew, we could partially e(plain the military conflicts between 7erbs and 7lo!enes and between 7erbs and #roats. In both cases the slower progress in the formation of state structures and the lesser power of the new republics, created opportunities for the 7erbs to use force against the 7lo!enes and the #roats. he strength of their offensi!e capacities encouraged a preBempti!e first strike, while they still en)oyed their superiority.

2I

25 2,

7mith Cnthony 9, 9$e Et$nic Sources o" %ationalis*. in =ichael E. Brown >ed.?, Et$nic Con"lict and International Securit+, Erinceton 'ni!ersity Eress, Erinceton /,,3, pp. *5B*, Eosen Barry. 9$e Securit+ ;ile**a and Et$nic Con"lict, in F7ur!i!alG, !ol. 3;, no. /, spring /,,3, pp. *IB<I. ibid. p. 3*.

he federal premier =arko!ic, in Hune /,,/, right after 7lo!enias declaration of independence, hastily authori$ed the use of force against 7lo!enia, the Federal armys inter!ention was poorly planned and badly e(ecuted and the short war ended with the defeat of the Federal army. In the case of #roatia, the offensi!e started a month later, and was preceded by a number of hostile acti!ities on both parts signalling their intention to fight, 7erbias withdrawal of all hea!y weapons stored in #roatia >used for the territorial defence forces?, and the #roats acceleration of military preparations. he war of aggression of 7erbia against #roatia, howe!er, was based on the calculation that the illB e@uipped #roatian defence forces would @uickly collapse when faced with the superior firepower of the federal army and 7erbian FirregularsG, and on the belief in the seemingly wide window of opportunity for 7erbian success. <. 1ers*ecti)es =n ,+e Balkans What solutions can be found and what actually can be done to contain nationalism and ethnic conflicts8 In theory, there are a number of possible solutions to alle!iate nationalistic tensions such as cultural autonomy, creating new identities, federalism, the secession or partition of the state, use of force, outside inter!ention, economic integration and political solutions. he le!erages that go!ernments and political elites ha!e and the possibilities for outside inter!ention by neighbouring countries or the international community are largely dependent on the specific conditions and the ethnic stereotypes that e(ist. We will focus our attention on those solutions that ha!e been best suited or largely employed in the effort to resol!e the ethnic problems in the Balkans, but we must erase, before, the e(isting clichO, referring to this geographical area as the Fpowder keg of EuropeGI+. 7ome obser!ers consider that it the e(traordinarily !iolent nature of the Balkan peoples caused the conflict in the region. For someone the term FBalkani$ationG denotes the di!ision of Flarge and !iable political units, but has also become a synonym for a re!ersion to the tribal, the backward, the primiti!e, the barbarianG, an e(plosi!e mi( of ethnic ri!alries and ancient hatreds. here are no e!idences for an e(ceptional Balkan bloodthirstiness or for the statement that Balkan states are more ruthless than any other is. Aational conflicts in!ol!ing national mo!ements and stateBbuilding was a destabili$ing factor in the rest of Europe, as it is substantiated by the Western EuropePs bloody e(perience with national ri!alry in the past, and todayI/, which ha!e certainly been !iolent.
I+

I/

.arrabee 7tephen F., >ed.?, 9$e &olatile 5o der @eg) Balkan Securit+ #"ter t$e Cold !ar , 6CA9 7tudy, he Cmerican 'ni!ersity Eress, Washington 9.#., /,,<. Aorth Ireland and Bas@ue conflict, for e(ample.

It was only after the horror of the two World Wars and the #old War period that Western Europe has come to en)oy the longest period of peace in its history. he !iolence and hatred in the area, where!er it e(ists, is not something inherent to Balkan peoples, but fre@uently the product of the inter!ention of the -reat Eowers, which ha!e been continuously in!ol!ed in Balkan affairs in their effort to support their interests in the strategic region. he Balkan nationalistic dreams for resurrecting ancient empires like a -reater Clbania, Bulgaria, -reece or 7erbia, are in the minds of only few people li!ing in the area. Cs for the solution, one option could be the cultural legitimation of the historic heritages of the different ethnic communities, so that a condition of dialogue and mutual respect could be brought about. his implies the reciprocal recognition of different iconography, but it is essential a long time and a peaceful en!ironment. Cnother solution is the creation and dissemination of an o!erarching unifying symbolism and ideology. his is e(tremely difficult to achie!e in practice. It could be argued that this is what the former state of %ugosla!ia had tried to produce, but the total failure to create an ideology unifying all ethnic groups is demonstrated by the fact that once authoritarian rule, which kept the country together through the state and the army, ended, the country began to disintegrate. #reating a new and o!erreaching iconography is !ery difficult and re@uires great care, time and energy because of the local and ethnical iconographies, deeply rooted. C possible answer is also a federal system di!iding the realm of FcultureG from politics. he go!ernments are particularly reluctant to allow this, as many belie!e >with some )ustification? that federalism could be a first step to future secessionism. he de!elopment of the relations between 7erbia and =ontenegro is a good e(ample. When all other former republics of Federal %ugosla!ia ha!e succeeded in one way or another, many analysts predicted that the loose confederation and the uneasy stateBunion of 7erbia and =ontenegro would not sur!i!e for too long, despite being partially fostered by and ad!ocated by the E' and other international organi$ations. Indeed, ac@uiring more rights for selfBdetermination >including the acceptance of the Euro as an official currency, the introduction of internal tariffs in the economic system and the establishment of pro!isions for regional go!ernment and parliament? meant that =ontenegro was embarking on a separate path of states and economic de!elopment. Clthough a federal president, parliament, one army and a number of common offices and ser!ices ha!e kept the federati!e formation together o!er /3 years, it was no surprisingly that the authorities in =ontenegro declared they wanted full independence and conducted a referendum to obtain it. 9espite the e(istence of proB7erbian forces, the people of =ontenegro !oted, though with a small

margin, in fa!our of the countrys full independence, which was officially declared on 3 Hune *++2. Clthough this de!elopment was not fa!oured by 7erbian authorities, it was the only logical outcome. It was also clear that they could no longer hold a country that has been an independent kingdom since the late middle Cges, an internationally recogni$ed country from /5I5 until /,/5 I*, and whose people ha!e chosen again their independence, in a legal and democratic way. he )oint economic progress of the region, leading to better social conditions, is regarded by both politicians and researchers as the best means for both taming the e(isting remnants of nationalistic grie!ances and for mo!ing the region further along on the way to the E' integration. he E' BBalkans summit in hessalonica, in Hune *++3, clearly stated that the future of the Balkans would be in the E'. Dowe!er, we still need to see how effecti!e the E' strategy will pro!e to be and whether the success stories of the countries of East #entral Europe can be replicated in the much more comple( conditions of the West Balkans. >. 1ro*osed Solutions he crisis in the former %ugosla!ia showed how difficult it was to apply theories, fa!ouring the formation of multiBethnic and multicultural states, in areas where national integration has not been completed. War, ethnic cleansing and armed conflicts were the outcome in #roatia, Bosnia, &oso!o and lately in F%6O=. he principles of maintaining the status @uo and the in!iolability of borders along with the formation of multiBethnic and multicultural states comprise one of the proposed solutions for stability in the Balkans. his solution is the most fa!oured in the West, and the supporters of this solution argue that any changes to the e(isting Balkan map would be akin to opening EandoraPs Bo(. Others, like .ord 9a!id Owen, belie!e that this fear is greatly e(aggerated and they support the idea of read)usting the international boundaries in the Balkans. hey belie!e that this solution is the best hope for securing a lasting peace in the regionI3. hey also state that more than a decade of AC O and E' political and military in!ol!ement in the former %ugosla!ia has failed to contribute to stable and longBterm peace in the area. Only the Bosnian case took a great deal of time, money, and military muscle to put the fire out and bring the

I*

I3

=ontenegro at www.wikipedia.it" Owen 9a!id, 9o Secure Balkan 5eace. 2edra t$e Map. in FWall 7treet HournalG, =ar /3, *++/, p. *2 >.ord 9a!id Owen has ser!ed as BritainPs Foreign 7ecretary and as the European 'nionPs peace en!oy to %ugosla!ia?.

present fragile stability to the country, which cost about a @uarter of a million li!es and a dramatic displacement of people. he last solution could be defined as Fcooling the conflict and waitG, since it tries to limit the conflict between ethnic groups, finding new ideas and solution to a!oid partition of territory, redrawing the map and mo!ement of people. he central issue is relate to different claim of so!ereignty and to conflicting iconographies" the point is to de!ise a legal framework that permits to reach positi!e agreement between the parts, a!oiding the $ero sum game of so!ereignty claim, waiting for impro!ement and better time . >.1. Su**orting t+e Status ?uo 3-ulti"#t+nic States5 his solution re@uires the formation of a new iconography that allows o!ercoming the single ethnic and national one. In this case, the European supranational iconography, as aim to achie!e, is functional to circulation. he solution to be discussed is the preser!ation of the status @uo and the in!iolability of the international borders" it is the most popular among obser!ers and analysts. he -reat Eowers and the leaders of the in!ol!ed states also fa!our this solution, because in general, they disappro!e any changes to a!oid the risk of losing their interests or their power respecti!ely. hose opposed to this solution argue that the status @uo is a myth and a photographic moment of reality, and accordingly they ask what the status @uo that we must support is. Focusing on the Balkans, the borders there ha!e been changed many times throughout their long history of wars. 9uring the *+ th century and before the /,,+s, the rearrangements of the borders had been agreed upon after the Balkan Wars >/,/*B/,/3?, after the First World War >/,/IB/,/,?, after the -recoB urkish War >/,*3? and after the 7econd World War >/,<;?. Cll these rearrangements did not follow ethnic lines, but were in accordance with war gains and the interests of the -reat Eowers. Cs a result, in almost e!ery Balkan country, one or more smaller or larger ethnic minorities e(isted. =any types of assimilation, from e(treme force to apparent peace, had been pursued in the Balkans during the *+th century, in order to create nationBstates, as there was the widespread belief that assimilation of the minority to the ma)ority was supposed to lead to a homogeni$ation of the population in the endI<. In the countries where the ethnic minorities had the same religion as the dominant group, usually Orthodo(y, minorities ha!e been assimilated !ery easily. In many cases people who belonged to national minorities, but had the same religion of the dominant group, became willing to assimilate, and especially during the #old War period.
I<

=a$ower =ark, <e o*bre dell'Europa( ;e*ocrazie e totalitaris*i nel == secolo , p. 23.

Where religious differences or the absence of a dominant ethnic group e(isted, assimilation was significantly harder, as in %ugosla!ia. he problem in %ugosla!ia and in other states in the Balkans was and still is the borders between communities within the internationally recogni$ed borders, because of the peoples mobili$ation, !oluntary or not, and the distinct demographic growth of the !arious ethnic groups. he most recent e(periment to create and support an independent, multiBethnic and multiBreligious state in the Balkans >BosniaBDer$ego!ina? with a mi(ed population of Bosnian =uslims, #roats and 7erbs, has been unsuccessful after almost fifteen years. he people who belong to ethnic groups with a national FhomelandG are not so willing to cooperate with the new state and they usually aspire to the unification with their coBethnics. In BosniaBDer$ego!ina, #roats and 7erbs would prefer that their pro!inces secede, and be united with #roatia and 7erbia respecti!ely. It is important to keep in mind that some of these ethnic tensions are Finherent to newly democrati$ing and multiBethnic societies where political, economic, and social institutions are still weak and ci!il society is not yet fully de!elopedI;G. here are se!eral prere@uisites for a multiBethnic and multiBcultural country to increase cooperation among ethnic groups and to create a !iable state. First, a strong central go!ernment is needed as well as a charismatic leader, as it was %ugosla!ia under ito, to unite the people and to promote loyalty towards the state and its institutions rather than to onePs own group. hen, a longBterm process must be set in motion in order to create trust among the !arious ethnic groups with guarantees for political power sharing, mutual respect for languages, religion and culture. In the case of %ugosla!ia, the predominance of the 7erbia and the imposed 7erbian iconographies did not function at all. Old and new resentments o!erlap each other" the 7erbs remembered the atrocities committed by #roatian 'stasha under the go!ernment of Cnte Ea!elic, during the 7econd World War, #roatian and 7lo!enian feared of renewed 7erbian centralist go!ernmentI2. In &oso!o appeared old iconographies like the myth of &oso!o Eol)e battle against the urksII. In this process, the Western de!eloped countries and the international organi$ations could help with a military presence or with their ability to impose sanctions. Furthermore, the principle of nonB discrimination and e@ual treatment of all under the law, and legislation regulating employment in
I; I2 II

ibid. ibid. he Battle of &oso!o Eol)e is seen as a symbol of 7erbian patriotism and desire for independence in the /,th century rise of nationalism under Ottoman rule, and its significance for 7erbian nationalism returned to prominence during the breakBup of %ugosla!ia and the &oso!o War when 7lobodan =ilose!ic in!oked it during an important speech. 7ource0 www.Wikipedia.eng

public administration and the proportional representation of all groups in the )udicial system must be supported, in order to cancel ethnical resentments. hen, ci!ic and human rights of the minorities ha!e to be protected by the central go!ernment. Finally, the imposition or application of a supraBnational identity, >the European one today?, could make people inclined towards the idea of multiB identity and make them willing to belong to a wider group of peopleI5. #reate a new European iconography is not a simple task, but it appears the only possible and !iable solution, if we assume that the borders are untouchable. o sum up, the future of the multiBethnic states in the Balkans has a long way to go mainly because the re!i!ed nationalism in the Balkans has created fear among the people of the different ethnic groups. he best way to achie!e regional stability, sa!ing at the same time the status @uo, is to support and acti!ely promote the European orientation of the Balkan countries. he degree, to which the European integration process e(tends to the region, and the achie!ement of the longBterm goals of economic and political rapprochement with the European institutions, will probably ha!e the most crucial effect on the fortunes of nationalism in the Balkans and on peace in the area. >.2. !reation of ation"States he second proposed solution is the creation of nationBstates by redrawing the borders. he radical solution that probably demands a smaller or larger mobili$ation of people is the least fa!oured in the West, but hypothetically could bring a longBpeace to the Balkans. In this case, it would be necessary to strengthen the nationalistic and ethnic iconographies in order to o!ercome the problem of people redistribution. Clthough the idea of redrawing the borders is confronted with fear from the West, it also has se!eral supporters, such as .ord 9a!id Owen, who supports the idea of read)usting the international boundaries in the BalkansI,. 7ocieties in the Balkans are formed along ethnic lines, which is e(plainable in historical terms. he lack of ci!ic society and tolerance for other points of !iew holds true for all the states in the region and accordingly this proposed solution appears to ha!e a significant hold today. Cccording to the political culture of the Balkan states, the concepts of nationhood and state coincide because of the wars of independence in the /,th century and their irredentist !iewpoints, which created the nationalism and the separation between the ethnic groups.

I5

I,

he multiBethnic identities of the past such as %ugosla!ism, Ottomanism or Dasburgism had failed because they had been imposed by force. If Europeanism will be implemented in peace then it will be the first successful supra national identity for the Balkans. Owen, 9a!id, 9o Secure Balkan 5eace. 2edra t$e Map, p. *2"

herefore, all other groups pose potential threats to the homogeneity of the state and, by e(tension, to its so!ereignty and territorial integrity. In the past, all the attempts at unifying people under a multiBethnic and multicultural regime were unsuccessful. Ottomanism, Dabsburgism or #ommunism has not been pro!ed powerful enough to hold the competing nationalisms in check and create a !iable multiBethnic state. he support of nationBstate building in the area, and a possible rearrangement of the borders after negotiations between the Balkan states is the only lasting solution. Finally, the creation of a homogenous nation state, e!en if it happened in a radical and bitter way, was pro!en successful in the case of -reece. Distorically, the series of Balkan population shifts, which had begun before the Balkan Wars and in!ol!ed a mass migration of the population, continued after the end of the 7econd Balkan War in /,/<, as many people found themsel!es on the wrong side of the newly created frontiers. Cfter the First World War, a !oluntary e(change of -reek and Bulgarian minorities took place, as ;3,+++ Bulgarians emigrated from -reece and 3+,+++ -reeks left Bulgaria. C compulsory e(change of the -reek and urkish population, according to the .ausanne reaty, in!ol!ed some <++,+++ urks and /,<++,+++ -reeks.5+ he population transfers did reduce the minority problems in the Balkans and thereby remo!ed a leading source of friction. =inorities in all the Balkan countries ha!e been seen as threats for the territorial integrity of the state, and their repression sparked conflicts, and hindered the de!elopment of the state. Bearing in mind that the e(change of population can produce !iable states, as in the case of -reece, and that in the Balkans minorities had and still ha!e difficulties en)oying peace and the protection of their ci!ic and human rights in the ethnic states, then the proposal to redraw the borders according to ethnic lines seems a possible alternati!e. he ma)or problem in the implementation of this solution is the dispersion of the ethnic minorities and conse@uently the necessary mobili$ation of some people in order to achie!e the homogeneity of the state. =oreo!er, if this rearrangement of the borders and the necessary e(change of population are achie!ed peacefully after negotiations, the result will be more successful for all sides. he opposition to the idea that stability in the Balkans can be achie!ed by building nation states says that ethnic differences, Fper seG, are neither positi!e nor negati!e. Ethnicity becomes harmful only when leaders manipulate ethnic tensions for political gain.

5+

9uroselle Hean Baptiste, Storia diplo*atica dal 6>6> al 6>A?, .E9 Edi$ioni 'ni!ersitarie, =ilano, /,,5, p.<5.

Finally, the critics to this solution argue that any changes to the e(isting Balkan map would be akin to opening EandoraPs bo(, because a re!i!ed nationalism in some Balkan states will ha!e a domino effect in the nationalistic uphea!al in the whole region and possibly elsewhere. he critics of this idea belie!e that it is !ery costly and hard to be implemented and that any changes to the e(isting borders could result in chain reaction in other countries as well. >.2. !ooling t+e conflict and &ait 7ideBstepping the so!ereignty issue and a!oiding partition could be the third applicable solution to Balkan problems. Aormally, so!ereignty is indi!isible, a $ero sum game between different and opposite ethnic group, claiming control and power on the same land. 7o!ereignty is the @uality of ha!ing supreme, independent authority o!er a territory, it can be found in a power to rule and make law o!er a place that has as its basis the assertion of that claim5/. he &oso!o status is a not sol!able problem, 7erbian and Clbanian, want to rule the same territory, but they cant get what they want. he core issue is so!ereignty, and the possible solution could be seen in sidestepping the so!ereignty issue and a!oid partition" with increased autonomy for the 7erbs north of the Ibar and a role for 7erbia concerning the southern 7erbs and the #hurch. For the north, links to Eristina would probably ha!e to be kept minimal while in the south, where the 7erbs must li!e in the midst of independent &oso!o, such links would ha!e to be somewhat more organic. he role of Belgrade would be a mirror image of this. In the north, local institutions would function in practice as part of 7erbia while in the south" Belgrade would ha!e defined access and the ability to support local 7erb communities but no role in go!erning them. O!ersight of the #hurch >and #hurch land? might be done simply as a matter of the recogni$ed authority of the 7erbian Orthodo( #hurch. Cll of this would re@uire agreed and clear rules of the road J and the de!il is always in the details J and close monitoring and super!ision by the internationals. Cutonomy itself is not the problem, its a way of a!oiding creation of autonomous ethnic regions, such as was done in BosniaBDer$ego!ina, that ha!e led to continuing problems. Increased autonomy, within the boundaries of &oso!o, where both Belgrade and Eristina agree that its boundaries are not in @uestion and both continue to re)ect partition, could offer real grounds for compromise.

5/

www.wikipedia.en"

Belgrade could continue to claim that all of &oso!o remains part of 7erbia but limit itself to e(ercising some form of control o!er the north and only access in the south" Eristina could maintain that its borders and independence are in!iolate. 7erbia would not ha!e to recogni$e &oso!o independence >nor would the E' insist? but Eristina would presumably also get 7erbias @uiet ac@uiescence to &oso!o being further incorporated into the international system >including the 'A?. Cn agreement along these lines is certainly concei!able and could be achie!ed if the parties both understood that they were e(pected to reach a mutually acceptable solution in which neither would necessarily recei!e all they want. Both sides could see the issue of so!ereignty o!er &oso!o in their own way and be left to do so. 7erbia could continue to claim so!ereignty o!er all of &oso!o, as could the go!ernment in Eristina. he 7erbs would ha!e a high degree of local selfBrule within what e!eryone recogni$ed as &oso!o. he Clbanians would be able to take comfort in the fact that 7erbia would not formally rule any part of &oso!o. With both sides getting the international support, re@uired to make this complicated formula work, and o!er time, perhaps the issue of &oso!o status could be subsumed within membership in the E'. Eerhaps some will still say that this would only Ffree$eG the &oso!o conflict and not resol!e it. But this misses the point that the conflict between 7erbs and Clbanians o!er &oso!o remains at this time irresol!able, e(cept perhaps through using force to dri!e one or the other side off the field. C detailed and practical agreement to disagree on so!ereignty may be the best outcome for now. he conflict between 7erbs and Clbanians in &oso!o was and remain tribal0 groups differing in language, religion, history and culture, unwilling to li!e with each other and wishing the other would disappear. he problem lies in the fact that Western Europeans seemed not to understand this, treating the Balkans as a chess game and misplayed the breakBup of %ugosla!ia from the start. %ugosla!ias chaotic and bloody end resulted from a collision between three worlds and three iconographies0 the preBmodern, multiBethnic empires >Ottoman, CustroBDungarian and %ugosla!ia itself?" the FmodernG rise of nation states" and the Western European elites dream of a postBmodern Europe mo!ing away from nation states. he last /++ years of Balkans history saw ethnic communities formerly li!ing within the confines of imperial order coming to terms with issues of e(istence and stability within the international state system. he empires had allowed great mi(ing of peoples within their borders. #ommunities nestled within and ne(t to each other. Cs the Ottoman imperial peace dissipated, competing nationalisms helped ignite World War One. Cfter the war, the Western creation of

%ugosla!ia sought to preser!e imperial order by throwing the se!eral tribes into an oldBfashioned monarchy. World War wo cut off its possible e!olution into a stable multiBethnic state. itos approach of playingBoff and payingBoff the constituent groups largely e(hausted itself by the time he left the scene. Cnimosities between the Balkans tribes, old e!en when they didnt lead to !iolence under imperial rule, made breakup after ito almost ine!itable. Western Europe misplayed the end badly, allowing e!ents to be carried forward in the hands of the first wa!e of tribal politicians. Western countries supporting &oso!o sought to settle the issue by entrusting succession there to the Clbanians. he Clbanians saw this as their opening to grab it all. he other Balkans tribes now ha!e their own states" they!e become Fnations.G But in Bosnia Der$ego!ina, neither 7erbs, #roats nor Bosnians want to gi!e power to a center they do not control. In &oso!o south of the Ibar J with E'.EQ and I#O help J Eristina pushed the remaining >and surrounded? 7erb encla!es to accept coming under its rule. But the Aorth resisted its local 7erbian institutions and links to Belgrade ne!er challenged by AC O. It would ha!e taken force to try and the Muint pressure to ne!ertheless impose Eristinas rule in the north led to the =itro!ica courthouse debacle of =arch *++5 and repeated efforts since to bully the northerners into submission, and failed. #hange cannot be forced. he preBmodern politics that still define the Balkans adaptation to the end of empire cannot simply be pushed aside by !isions of postBnational Europe. It will take time, patience and real compromise. ime and patience for people to become comfortable with )ust li!ing ne(t to each other in peace rather than being forced to share one bed" a compromise that does not seek to gi!e the ma)ority e!erything. @. !onclusions 9ue to its strategic position during the long history of the Balkan Eeninsula, many con@uerors passed through the area for a shorter or longer period. 'nder the multinational 6oman, By$antine, and Ottoman Empires, which were multireligious and multilinguistic, the Balkan population became intermi(ed in most areas of the region. he ethnic wars for independence from the Ottoman Empire in the /,th century and the conse@uential disputes o!er territorial claims among the different ethnic groups in the region, determined the recent history of repeated wars and ethnic conflicts. In the Balkan Eeninsula, the seeds of nationalism and the creation of nation states were sown with the 7erbian and the -reek Wars for Independence in the beginning of the /,th century.

Clthough nationalism and indeed national cultures were artificially created, mostly in the /, th and *+th centuries, nationalism has been pro!en a powerful ideology and force o!er the last two centuries in the Balkans. he nationBbuilding process has pro!en to be a long and laborious procedure for the people, especially when the interests of the -reat Eowers in the region were. Cs a result, the problems related to the e(istence of minorities became a central issue in most Balkan countries. =oreo!er, national minorities became the main source of instability in the Balkans mainly because of the lack of trust between the host country and the national minority concerning national security issues. Cssimilation, e(pulsion or li@uidation, in accordance with the principle of nationality, were the strategies to sol!e the minority problem in the Balkans during the end of the /, th and the *+th centuries, and caused the con!ersions, assimilations, mass e(ecutions and the flight of tens of thousands of refugees from the Balkan countries. oday the Balkan nationalistic dreams of resurrecting ancient empires are in the minds of a !ery small percentage of the Balkan people. In contrast, the ma)ority of the people in the area is seeking peace, stability, democracy and economic prosperity, and is trying to eliminate the integral nationalistic ideas from the past. We belie!ed that two alternati!e solutions might eliminate nationalism, and pro!ide stability in the area0 7upport the status @uo >=ultiB Ethnic 7tates?. 6edraw the borders >#reation of AationB7tates? Free$e the so!ereignty issue. he first solution, the support of the status @uo, is relati!ely difficult to implement in the Balkans today, e!en if the West is fa!ourably disposed towards it. Cfter the dissolution of %ugosla!ia and the recent problems of BosniaBDer$ego!ina to sur!i!e as a multiBethnic state, the future of multiBethnic states in the Balkans seems more distant, mainly because re!i!ed nationalism has created fear among those of the different ethnic groups, and the treatment of minorities became a key issue. he best way to achie!e regional stability, while at the same time maintaining the status @uo, is to support and acti!ely promote the European orientation of the Balkan countries. If the European identity is applied on top of national identities, it is possible to weaken nationalism.

he degree to which the European integration process e(tends to the region, and the achie!ement of the longBterm goals of economic and political rapprochement with the Western institutions, will probably ha!e the most crucial effect on the fortunes of nationalism in the Balkans and on peace in the area. he second solution is redrawing the borders and creating homogenous nation states. he failure of all the supranational ideas in the Balkans >Ottomanism, Dabsburgism, and #ommunism? and the recent difficulties in the e(periment in BosniaBDer$ego!ina, which aims at creating a multiBethnic state in the Balkans, make this solution possible e!en if it is difficult to implement. he ma)or problem in putting into effect this solution is the dispersion of the ethnic minorities and conse@uently the necessary mobili$ation of people in order to achie!e the homogeneity of the state. For the peaceful implementation of this solution, the borders should be ad)usted by consent" agreements must be made between go!ernments and communities, and !iolence must be a!oided at all costs. he attempt to create traditional, so!ereign, nationBstates will potentially decrease much of the !iolence in Balkan politics and will further normali$e the interBethnic relations in the region. Cs 9a!id Owen belie!es, Fthe international boundary read)ustment is the best hope of securing a lasting peace in the regionG.5* he critics of this idea, howe!er, belie!e that this potential solution is !ery costly and hard to implement and also that any changes to the e(isting borders in the area would be akin to opening EandoraPs bo( and could ha!e a domino effect in the nationalistic conflict in the region. he role of the international community will be crucial, in order to reali$e these solutions and to help build stability in the region, which can be achie!ed mainly by weakening nationalism, and impro!ing the treatment of minorities and democratic and economic de!elopment of the countries. he last solution suggested is about a temporary free$e of the issues in!ol!ed in ethnic claim. In this case, the aim is to achie!e more time to create a friendly en!ironment, allowing different ethnic groups to li!e in the claimed territory, hoping for a supranational solution like E' admission, capable of dilute ethnic tension, with new iconographies to attenuate the old ones. -aining time could be a good solution, to create closer links and full membership in the Western organi$ations, such as AC O and the E', to reduce the security dilemma of the Balkan countries and secure peace in the region. he stability of these organi$ations guarantees democracy, the protection of human rights and of ethnic minorities, and the de!elopment of the rule of law. Economic de!elopment is considered !ital
5*

Owen 9a!id, 9o Secure Balkan 5eace. 2edra t$e Map, p. *2"

for the sur!i!al and prosperity of the Balkans, as it will create the societal de!elopment needed to transition to democracy. he problem, howe!er, is about iconographies" it is necessary to find, alternati!ely, an iconography that could replace the nationalistic with a supranational European one. Otherwise, it would be re@uired to strengthen the national iconographies in order to o!ercome the ethnic demands, with population e(change between different states, to reach an ethnical homogeneity. he two hypothetical resolutions, in any case, are a concrete and deep challenge to European integration, especially during time of political and economic crisis. herefore, free$ing the conflict and waiting for better time could be the only solution 1A. Bi%liogra*+y Clter Eeter, %ationalis*, 7econd Edition /,,< by C6AO.9 a =ember of the Dodder Deadline -roup, .ondonBAew %orkB7ydneyBCuckland, /,,<. Cnderson Benedict, Co*unitB i**aginate( 1rigini e di""usione dei nazionalis*i , =anifestolibri, 6oma, /,,2. Barnett =ichael, %ation Building's %e 3ace, Foreign Eolicy, Ao!B9ec *++*. Berger =ark . 3ro* %ation Building to State Building: 9$e Geopolitics o" ;e-elop*ent. t$e %ation)State S+ste* and t$e C$anging Global 1rder R in From Aation Building to 7tate Building, edited by =ark . Berger. Aew %ork0 6outledge, *++5. Bogdan Denry, Storia dei paesi dellEst, 7EI 7ocietS Editrice Interna$ionale, orino, *++*. Breuilly Hohn, %ationalis* and t$e State, 7t. =artins Eress, Aew %ork, /,5*. Breuilly Hohn, 2e"lections on %ationalis*, in Woolf, 7tuart. Aationalism in Europe, /5/; to the Eresent, 6outledge, .ondon and Aew %ork. /,,2. 9a!ies Aorman, Europe C # Histor+, O(ford 'ni!ersity Eress, O(ford, Aew %ork, /,,2. 9eutsch &arl, %ationalis* and its #lternati-es, Clfred &nopf, Aew %ork, /,2,. 9eutsch &arl, %ationalis* and Social Co**unication, 7econd Edition, =assachusetts Institute of echnology Eress, Boston, /,22. 9uroselle Hean Baptiste, Storia diplo*atica dal 6>6> al 6>A?, .E9 Edi$ioni 'ni!ersitarie, =ilano, /,,5. -ellner Ernest, %ationalis*, Aew %ork 'ni!ersity Eress, Aew %ork, /,,I. -ellner Ernest. %azioni e nazionalis*i, Editori 6iuniti, 6oma, /,52. -ellner Ernest, Culture. Identit+ and 5olitics, #ambridge 'ni!ersity Eress, #ambridge, /,5I. -oodman Hames. %ationalis* and 9ransnationalis*. t$e %ational Con"lict in Ireland and European Union Integration, C!ebury, Cldershot, /,,2. -oodwin Heff, %o 1t$er !a+ 1ut: States and 2e-olutionar+ Mo-e*ents. #ambridge 'ni!ersity Eress, *++/.

-reenfeld .iah, %ationalis*. 3i-e 2oads to Modernit+, =assachusetts0 Dar!ard 'ni!ersity Eress, #ambridge, /,,*. Dastings Cdrian. 9$e Construction o" %ation$ood: Et$nicit+. 2eligion. and %ationalis*. #ambridge0 he Eress 7yndicate of the 'ni!ersity of #ambridge, /,,I. Dobsbawm Eric H., %azioni e nazionalis*i dal 6A7?: 5rogra**a. *ito. realtB , Einaudi, /,,+. orino,

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=arino!a J Nuber Boriana, 9$e 2ebirt$ o" %ationalis* in t$e Balkans in t$e 6>>?s: Causes. Conse:uences and 5ossible Solutions, International 6elations and 7ecurity Aetwork, Nurich, *++I. =a$ower =ark, 9$e Balkans)# S$ort Histor+, C =odern .ibrary #hronicles Book, Aew %ork, *+++. =a$ower =ark, <e o*bre dell'Europa( ;e*ocrazie e totalitaris*i nel == secolo, -ar$anti, =ilano, *++;. =iller Ben)amin, States. %ations. and t$e Great 5o ers: 9$e Sources o" 2egional !ar and 5eace , #ambridge 'ni!ersity Eress, Aew %ork, *++I. =inaham Hames, %ations it$out States. a Historical ;ictionar+ o" Conte*porar+ %ational Mo-e*ents, -reenwood Eress, Westport and .ondon, /,,2. Owen 9a!id, 9o Secure Balkan 5eace. 2edra t$e Map, Crticle in Wall 7treet Hournal" Aew %ork, A.%., =ar /3, *++/. Aairn om, 9$e Break)up o" Britain, Aew .eft Books, .ondon, /,II. Eeriwal 7ukumar, %otions o" %ationalis*, #entral European 'ni!ersity Eress, Budapest and Aew %ork, /,,;. Eosen Barry. 9$e Securit+ ;ile**a and Et$nic Con"lict, 7ur!i!al, !ol. 3;, no. /, spring /,,3, pp. *IB<I.

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