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MEDITATIONS Author(s): Wm. R. Walker Source: The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, Vol. 4, No. 1 (1870), pp.

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16 Descartes'


u schichte der Philosophies ideas of the construction says : Parmenides' of the Universe are cither incorrectly handed down, or are unintelli gible-from their peculiarity of expression. They did not prevent him from having, for his time, important astronomical information." This is clear from lines 143-4, which evidently refer to the moon. statement that Eros (Love) 20. This agrees somewhat with Hesiod's was the child of Chaos and Earth. (Theogony, 121.) Compare also and Preller's Griechische note 14, Mythologie, Yol. I., p. 393. We know also fromAristotle that Parmenides made Love one of the prime movers. The other of the two primal causes (airiai), mentioned by was doubtless Hate, as indeed we are told by Cicero. Aristotle, This, us very close to the doctrine of Empedokles, whose two again, brings great physical principles are Friendship (ytXorqs) and Strife QssUoq), or, as we should say in modern times, attraction and repulsion. note on this passage is: "Since there are two 21. Theophrastos's the elements, cognition is according to the one that prevails; for, ac as hot or the cold has the upper hand, the thought will the cording

22. The following Latin version of a passage of Parmenides, proba bly connected with this, but no longer extant, occurs in Coelius Aure lianus De Morb. Chron. IY. 9 :
"Femina Venis, simui veneris quum semina miscent virque informans diverso ex sanguine virtus, servans, bene condita corpora fingit; Temperiem At si virtutes permixto semine pugnent faciant unam, gemino permixto vexabunt in corpore dine semine sexum."




In which are clearly proved theExistence of God, and the real distinction between tlieSoul and Body of Man.
Translated from the French of Descartes, by Wm. R. Walker.


It is not now that I have discovered that, from my earliest as true, and that have I false received many years, opinions so insecure since built on foundations can be what I have but very doubtful and uncertain ; and from that time I have

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Descartes* Meditations.



in the sciences. firm and constant establish anything me to to be very great, I But, this undertaking appearing waited until I should attain an age so mature that I could not

judged itwell that I should seriously undertake, once in my life, to ridmyself of all the opinions I have hitherto received intomy belief, and to begin anew from the foundations if I

hope foranother after it inwhich I should be mere fit to carry out the undertaking; which has made me defer so long that I should hencefoitn believe myself blameworthy if I longer employed in deliberation the time which remains tome for
action. design,

feelingmyself agitated by no passion, and having gained for

an assured repose in a peaceful solitude, I shall apply

with this therefore, this day, in accordance Having of cares, and freed my mind from all manner happily

it will be unnecessary for But, for this purpose, opinions. me to show that they are all false, a process of which per never see the end; I might but since reason haps already me that I ought not less carefully to guard against persuades are not to which credence things entirely certain and giving

myself seriously and freely to destroy generally all my old:


indubitable than to those which manifestly appear to me to for be false, itwill be sufficient me, in order to reject themall,
if I can find in each it will some reason for doubt. to examine be unnecessary for me an which would endless be labor; ticular, of the foundations destruction necessarily to that end one in par because the but, draws with it all each And

my old opinions that I have hitherto received as true and assured I have but I have sometimes learned of the senses or by the senses; are deceptive; and it is prudent that the senses experienced once never to trust ourselves to what has deceived us. entirely senses sometimes the But perhaps, deceive us. although are a in measure that small very concerning things percepti ble and things that are very remote, there are nevertheless others of which we cannot many doubt, notwith reasonably which All the senses my : for example, with dressing-gown, that I am here, seated in my hand,

the rest of the edifice, I shall first attack

were based.

the principles on

standing that we have known them through themedium of

this paper by the fire, in and so forth.

And how is it that I cannot deny that these hands and thia
2 *

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to certain mad compare myself body are mine, unless I would are so men whose brains confused and darkened by atrabili ous vapors, that they constantly affirm thai, they are kings,

when in fact they are very poor; that they are clothed in gold and purple, when in fact they are entirely naked; or who imagine themselves to be pitchers, or to have a glass body ?
But, what! However, these are I have here to consider that I am a man, and con am accustomed to I to that sleep, and to represent sequently or same the in sometimes dreams my things, things myself do in their waking than these madmen hours. less probable

gant were I to be guided by their example.

fools, and

I should

not be



How often has it happened

was in this place, that I was

tome to dream by night that I

that I was near the fire,

It certainly seems tome although I was quite naked in bed! at present that it is not with sleeping eyes that I look at this paper; that this head which I shake is not slumbering; that it is with design and deliberate purpose that I extend this hand and that I feel it: what happens in sleep does not seem
so clear


carefully, I caU tomind that I have often been deceived inmy sleep by similar illusions^ and, in halting at this thought, I by which waking can be clearly distinguished from sleep,
and my astonishment is such that that I am fairly astonished; am I that I might almost be persuaded asleep. and that all these Let us suppose, then, that we are asleep, that we open our eyes, shake our heads, particulars?namely, but false illu stretch out our hands, and similar things?are see so manifestly that there are not here any certain marks

or distinct

as all

this. But,

in considering

this matter

sions ; and let us think that neither our hands nor our whole
are such as we see them. Yet it is necessary, at least,


to avow that the things which are represented to us in sleep are like pictures and paintings, which can be formed only
to something from resemblance these at least, general therefore, and a whole body?are hands, things real and existing. For and that eyes, a head, things?namely, not imaginary things, but even when painters, they en veritable, figures, cannot however give real and

deavor with the greatest skill to represent sirens and satyrs


them formsand natures entirely new, but make only a certain




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Descartes? Meditations.


mixture and composition of themembers of divers animals;

their imagination is extravagant to if, perhaps, enough ever been so new that nothing seen invent something has a it?and that therefore their work represents resembling

thing purely fictitious and absolutely false?the colors, at all

in which And, they paint them must be actual. for the same reason, while these general a a and other such head, hands, body, eyes, things? things?

events, namely,

may he imaginary, yet we must necessarily allow that there

are at least versal which some other things yet more simple and more uni are true and existing, from the mixture of which, as from that of certain actual colors, all these ima and fantastic, are formed.


ges of things which reside in our thought,be they true and Of this kind of things is corporeal nature in general and its extension; togetherwith the figure of things extended, their
real, or fictitious

or size, and their number, as also the place where quantity their duration, and so forth. they are, the time which measures not conclude Hence we might perhaps if we say that amiss and all other sciences which the astronomy, medicine, physics, on the consideration of depend compound things, are very and uncertain; and doubtful but that arithmetic, geometry, to whether simple and general, without much reference certain and indu they are in nature or not, contain something : for, whether or sleep, two and three added I wake bitable make and the square will never have five, together always more and that it does not seem possible than four sides; can be suspected of any falsity truths so clear and apparent very or uncertainty. is a Grod who

the other sciences of that nature which treat only of things

I should have the feeling of all these things,and that all these should not seem tome to exist otherwise than as I see them ? And, verily, as I sometimes judge that others aTe deceived in the thingswhich they think they best know, how do I know but that he has ordained that I should be deceived every time

I have been do everything, and by whom am. I know made and created what I but that Now, how do be no earth, no heaven, no that there should he has ordained no place, and that nevertheless extended body, no magnitude, can

Yet I have long had inmy mind a certain opinion that there

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20 Descartes9


I make the" addition of two and three,or count the sides of a square, or judge of something still more easy, if anything more easy than that can be imagined? But it may be that God has not willed'that I should be thus deceived, for he is called supremely good. Yet if it was contrary to his good ness to have so made me that I should always be deceived, it
would also seem it. does permit that all

times to be deceived, and yet I cannot question but that he

There are, perhaps, persons But here who would other are uncertain. let us not oppose


to his goodness

to permit



rather deny the existence of a God so powerful than believe them for the present, and let us admit in their favor that all that is said here of a God is a fable: still, inwhatever fashion they suppose I attained to the state and being which I pos sess, whether they attribute it to some destiny or fatality, or


To which reasons to answer; I have certainly nothing myself. but after all I am constrained to acknowledge that there is

erful the author is towhom they assign my origin, the more probable will it be that I am so imperfectas always to deceive

refer it to chance, or will have it to be by a continual sequence connection of things, or, finally, in any other manner; since to fail and be deceived the less pow is an imperfection,

believed to be true of which I nothing in all that I formerly

cannot in some fashion doubt; and that not through rashness or levity, but for very rea and considered strong maturely sons ; so that henceforth I must not less carefully guard my self against giving credence thereto than to what is manifestly sciences.

false, if I wish to find anything certain and assured in the But it is not enough to have made these remarks, I must be careful to bear them inmind; for these old and customary opinions still often recur tomy mind, the long and familiar intimacy they have had with me giving them a right to occupy my mind against my will and to make themselves almost masters ofmy belief; and I shall never lose the habit of deferring to them and of having confidence in them so long
consider them such as they really are, namely, in fashion doubtful, as I shall presently and show, yet very so that we have more reason to believe than to deny probable, s^me as I shall

them. This is why I think I shall not do amiss, if,deliber

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Descartes' ately assuming a contrary

Meditations. proposition,

21 / deceive myself, and

nor there is neither danger assured that, nevertheless, error in this way, and that I cannot to-day too much indulge of acting, but only my distrust, since it is not now a question of meditating and knowing. source

so balanced until at last having my old and my imaginary; new prejudices tiiu,t they cannot weigh down my opinion more to one side than to another, my judgment will be hence forth no more mastered by bad habits and turned from the right can conduct it to the knowledge road which of truth. For I am

if I feign for some time that all these opinions are false and


the sovereign cunning

I stall suppose, then,not that God, who is very good and

and of truth, but that a certain evil spirit, not deceitful than powerful, has employed all

his industry to deceive me;

colors, figures, sounds, and all other external things, are noth use to of idle which he but illusions makes aijd fancies, ing snares as shall I consider for not my credulity; myself lay or or or blood?as not eyes, flesh, any having hands, having T shail remain

I shall think that sky, air, earth,

into my belief shall prepare any falsity, and receiving my so well against mind all the wiles of this great deceiver, that, however powerful and cunning he is, he will never be able in me. to any degree impose upon

to this thought; attached and if, obstinately come it is not in my power to to the knowl by these means, at of la least it is to any truth, my power edge suspend my this reason I shall guard For judgment. carefully against

senses, but falsely believing myself to have all these things ;

But this design is painful and laborious, and a kind of idle ness draws me insensibly into the train of my ordinary life ; and just as a slave, who has been in his sleep an enjoying is but

imaginary liberty,when he begins to suspect that his liberty

a dream, fears to awake, and conspires with these

agreeable illusions in order to be a long time deceived by them, even so do I fall back, insensibly tomyself, intomy old
and I fear to awake from this slumbering condition opinions, lest the laborious watchings which would have to succeed the some knowledge in the understanding of the truth, should sufficient to clear away all the darkness of the difficul ties which have just been stirred.


tranquillity of this repose, in place of bringing me some light

not be

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22 Descartes'



My yesterday's meditation has filledmy mind with somany doubts that henceforth it is no more inmy power to forget
them. water, I am the bottom,

solve them; and as if I were suddenly throwninto very deep



I do not see

in what


I can


I shall make the effort, however, and again follow the same which I path yesterday entered on when I withdrew from everything concerning which I could imagine the smallest doubt, just as if I knew that itwas absolutely false; and I shall still continue in thispath until I have encountered some thing certain, or at least, if I can do nothing else, until I have
learned for certain that there in order to draw to transport it to another is nothing certain in the world. the terrestrial globe from its place, asked for noth

so surprised that I can neither secure a footing in nor swim, in order to keep myself above water.

Archimedes, and position

ing but fora point which should be firmand immovable ; so I should have a right to entertain high hopes if I am happy
to find only one thing which is certain and indu

enough bitable,

I think that I have no to me, has never existed; represents I that and believe senses; body, figure, extension, motion, are mind. of but fictions can be What, my then, place,

I suppose, then, that all the things I see are false; I per suade myself that all thatmy memory, filled with illusions,

esteemed real? Perhaps nothing besides

certain in the world.

this, that there is

But how do I know whether there is not some other thing differentfrom those which I have just judged as uncertain, and of which we cannot have the least doubt? Is there not some God or other power which puts these thoughts into my mind? That is not necessary, for perhaps I am of myself capable of producing them. I then, at least, am something, am I not ? But I have already denied that I had any senses
or any body:


that? Am I so dependent on the body and the senses that I cannot exist without them ? But I am persuaded that there is
whatever in the world, no sky, no earth, no minds, no

I nevertheless


for what




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bodies; have I not, then, persuaded myself that I am r >tl Far from it; without doubt I am, whether I persuade myself, or if I have merely thought something. But there is a kind of deceiver, very powerful and very cunning, who uses all his he will, he can never bring it about that I should be nothing so long as I shall think I am something. So that, aftermuch
reflection and must at last conclude tion, I am, I it or conceive who exist, is necessarily it in my mind. that I am; all things, we after having carefully examined that this proposi and hold as constant, true every time I pronounce to deceive me. There industry always but that I am, if he deceives me; and, is not, then, any doubt deceive me as much as

clearness what I am, I But I do not yet know with sufficient

am certain else so that henceforth it will be neces for me, and thus not to be mistaken to be more certain and more to exist before in this

sary forme to guard carefully against imprudently taking

which I assert

anything knowledge consider all

than all that I have hitherto had. For this reason I shall now
anew what I believed


or less can be combatted by the reasons which I so that there shall only remain precisely just advanced, is entirely certain and indubitable. what What, then, did I to ? I believe be heretofore thought I was Manifestly, myself a man. I say he is a reasonable But what is a man ? Shall that more have animal? for it would not; Certainly to discover what an animal afterwards for me necessary is and what reasonable be

these last thoughts ; and from my old opinions I shall cut off



here and consider the thoughts which heretofore sprung up of themselves inmy mind, and which were prompted by my own nature alone when I applied myself to the consideration of
my I considered a face, hands, being. myself first as having all and that machine of bone and flesh such arms, composed see in a corpse, which machine as we I designated by the name of body. I considered besides that I fed, that I walked,

into an infinity of others more difficult and more complicated; not waste the little time and leisure which remain and I would to me in unravelling such difficulties. But I shall rather stop

is, and thus froma single question I should insensibly fall

that I felt,and that I thought,and I referred all these actions to the soul; but I did not stop to consider what this soul was ;

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24 Descartes'



or else, if I did stop, I imagined it was something extremely

and subtile, As to tlie body,

which was

insinuated into and spread through my grosser

I nowise doubted of its nature; but

like a wind,

or a flame,

or a


thin air,


thought I knew it very distinctly, and if I had wished to explain it according to the notions I then had of it, I should have described it thus: By the body, I understand all that can be limited by any form; which can be contained in any place, and fill a space in such sort that every other body shall be excluded from it; which can be felt either by touch, or by sight, or by hearing, or by taste, or by smell; which can be
in several

thing extraneous to itby which it is touched and fromwhich as also of feeling or thinking,was something I did not at all believe to belong to the nature of the body; on the contrary,
I was rather astonished to see that such faculties should meet in any. it receives the impulse: for to have the power of self-motion,



in truth

of itself, but



things which I have just said pertain to the nature of the body ? I stop to consider the matter attentively, I turn all
things over and over in my mind, and I cannot discover I can say is in me. is no need for my stop There that any us to enumerate Let them. then, to the attributes pass, ping of the soul, and see whether there be any one of them in me. these

venture to say so, mali and, if I may extremely ingenious, cious and cunning, who all his power and industry employs to deceive me ? Can I affirm that I have the least of all those

But who am I, now that I suppose there is a certain spirit

The firstare feeding and walking; but if it be true that I have no body, it is also true that I cannot walk or feed myself. Another is feeling; but one cannot feel without a body;? although, indeed, I have imagined that formerly I felt many things during sleep which I knew on awaking I had not really felt. Another is thinking,and I find here that thought is an attribute which belongs tome: it alone cannot be detached me. Iam, I exist; that is certain: but how long? As from long as I think; forperhaps itwould even happen, if I should totally cease to think, that I should at the same time entirely

sarily true; I am, then, speaking inprecise terms,only a thing

to be.

I am now




is not neces

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Descartes' which reason, known. thinks?that



thing? As I have already said: a thing which thinks. And what more ? I will stir up my imagination in order to see
whether of members I am not something which we call more. the human and penetrating air spread through a wind, a breath, a vapor, or anything at all which I can feign or imagine, since I have supposed that all that was nothing, never fail to be certain that I am something. I am not that assemblage I am not a thin body; I am not all its members;

or a is to say, a mind, an understanding, me was terms whose to signification formerly un am a I real but what and Now, thing really existing;

and since, without changing this supposition, I find that I But perhaps it is true that these very things which I sup

now dispute concerning; that, I can give my judgment only on things known tome : I know that I exist and I am trying to findwhat I am, I whom I know to be. Now it is very certain that theknowledge of my being, thus precisely understood,
does not depend me;

to me, are not really pose not to be because they are unknown different from me, whom I do know. I cannot say; I do not


I can by my imagination feign. And even these termsfeign

imagine warn me of my error; for I should really is nothing else than

on things whose to existence is yet unknown on which does those it not of consequently, any depend

feign if I imagined myself to be something, since to imagine

corporeal thing: and that, in a word, but to contemplate the figure or image of a I already that I am, know for certain it may be that all these images, and gen

dreams or chimeras. I see clearly that there was as lit Hence reason in order tle in my saying I will stir up my imagination now am more distinctly to know what I am, as if I said: I awake, and I perceive something real and veritable; but, be

erally all that pertains to the nature of the body, are but

festly kn iw that nothing of all that I can comprehend by means of the imagination pertains to this knowledge w^ch
have of myself, and that it is necessary to recall and one's mind mode of in order this from away conceiving it may know more distinctly its nature. that

to me that my dreams may represent go to sleep on purpose, this matter with more truth and clearness. I mani And yet

cause I do not yet perceive itwith sufficientclearness, I shall


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26 Descartes? Meditations. But what am I then? A thing that thinks. What is a thing that thinks? It is a thing that doubts, that under

that conceives, that affirms, that denies, that wills, stands, that wills not, that also imagines and feels. these Certainly, are not a few if they all pertain to my nature. But why now doubts and alone sires understands everything, who nevertheless asserts and affirms these who certain things, to be true, who denies all others, who wishes and de to know more, who wishes who imag not to be deceived, almost

should not they pertain to it ? Am I not that very person who


inesmany things,even sometimes in spite of himself, and who also feelsmany things, as by themediation of the organs of the body ? Is there anything of all that which is not as real as the certitude that I am, and that I exist eren though I should always be asleep, and though he who has given me my existence should use all his industry to mislead me? Is my thought, or which can be said to be sepa tinguished from rate frommyself? For it is of itself so evident that it is I
I have which there, therefore, any one of these attributes which can be dis


that I should here add anything by way of explanation. And

certainly I also

doubt, who


and desire, to



is no need

might happen
tion does

imagine may not be true, yet this power of imagina to be really in me, but forms part of my not cease am the very thing which In I thinks?that short, is, thought. as the certain which perceives organs of the senses, by things But it may be since in fact I see light, hear sound, feel heat. said that these appearances sound, are false, and feel heat; that I am asleep.

(as I have before supposed)

the power


that the things

for though


Be it so: yet, at least, it is certain that it appears tome that and this is properly what inme is called feeling,which again is precisely thinking. From this I begin to know what I am a littlemore clearly and distinctly than before. But notwithstanding it still seems tome, and I cannot divest myself of the belief, that the corporeal things whose images are formedby thinking, which fall under the senses, and which than this unknown part of me which does not fall under the imagination; although, in truth,it is very strange to say that
the senses themselves examine, are not more distinctly known I see light, hear and that cannot be false,

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I should know arid comprehend more distinctly thingswhose

appears to me doubtful, which are unknown to me, to pertain But I see

am persuaded, which are known to me, and which my proper nature, and, in one word, than myself.

$nd which do not pertain to me, than those of whose truth I

clearly that this is the explanation: my mind is a vagabond who delights to stray, and who oannot yet brook being kept
within the just limits of truth. Let us, then, once more loosen

the bridle, and giving themind everymanner of liberty,per mit it to examine the objects which appear to it outside, in order that, happening hereafter to withdraw it gently and opportunely, and to steadily fix it on the consideration of its being and the things which itfindswithin it, itmay after that
and ?e more easily regulated Let us then now consider conducted.

which we touch and which we see: not, indeed, bodies a little are ordinarily for these general in general, notions more confused; but let us consider one in particular. Let us for been wax: it has this piece of taken take, example, just fresh from the hive, it has not yet lost the sweetness of the bodies odor of the flowers from which its size, are apparent;

esteemed to be themost easily known of all, and which are also believed to be themost distinctly known, namely, the

the things which



honey which it contained, it yet retains something of the

its color, it was gathered; it is hard, cold, pliable, strike it, it will emit a sound. In a word, all things cause a body to be known are found in it. distinctly

its shape, and if you which can mained

But while I am speaking it is brought to the fire: what re

in it of flavor is exhaled, its color the odor evaporates, its it becomes changes, shape is lost, its size enlarged, liquid, it is warm, one can struck is it and touch although it, scarcely it no more emits any sound. still remain the same wax Does

and still the same wax fight, touch, and hearing, are changed, remains. now it was I what that this think, namely, Perhaps wax was not this sweetness odor of honey, or this agreeable

after this change ?We must admit that itdoes; no one doubts of it or judges otherwise. What is it, then,which we knew in this piece of wax with so much distinctness? It certainly cannot be anything of all that I observed by themediation of the senses, since all the things which fell under taste, smell,

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28 Descartes' of flowers, these or this whiteness,or

Meditations. this shape, or this sound; but


me sensible un only a body which a littlebefore appeared to

forms, and which now makes itself felt under others.

But what is it, speaking precisely, that I imagine when I con ceive it in thisway? Let us consider it attentively, and, cut ting offall the things which do not pertain to thewax, let us
see what remains. There

extended, flexible, and changeable. But what is it to be flex ible and changeable ? Is it not that I imagine that this wax,





from the square into a triangular shape?

is not that, since I conceive it capable


is capable

of becoming




tude of such changes; and yet I cannot run through this infinitudeby my imagination, and consequently this concep tion that I have of thewax has not its source in the faculty of imagination. What, now, is this extension ? Is it not also
for it becomes it boils, and not conceive is melting, the wax larger when still larger when the heat increases; to truth what clearly and according

of receiving

Certainly not ; it
an infini

of passing

in the way of exten of receiving more varieties ing is capable It is necessary, sion than I ever imagined. therefore, to ad what the mit that I cannot even comprehend by imagination comprehends regards wax it.

wax is, if I did not think that thiswax which we are consider

larger when and I should

this piece ofwax is, and that it ismy understanding alone that
in particular; for as I say this piece of wax But in general the thing is still more evident.

what is this piece of wax which can be comprehended only by the understanding or themind? Certainly it is the same object which I see, which I touch,which I imagine, and, in a word, what I have always from the beginning believed it to be. But what is here particularly to be remarked, is thatmy
perception never has or a touch, or an imagination, and seemed but it so, only an been, although formerly an which may be im examination examination by the mind, as itwas before, or else clear and distinct perfect and confused as my attention is more or less directed as it now is, according is not a vision,

to the thingswhich are in it and of which it is composed.

Yet I cannot



into error there are in my mind.


express my astonishment and tendency towards


I consider

how car


For while without


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speaking I consider all this within myself, yet the words

me pause, language; same and

common having

is before us, and not that we judge it to be the same from its
the color and the same

I am nearly deceived by the terms of for we say that we see the same wax if it shape: from which I


should almost conclude thatwe know thewax by the sight of the eyes, and not by the sole examination of themind; if by
I observed from a window some men say street, I should, so viewing them, at once cloaks,

just as I say that I see the wax;

this window they but some hats and and are men,

and yet what do I see from

which by might cover arti the sole power

in the passing that I see men,

ficialmachines moved merely by springs? But I judge that

with my eyes. A man who seeks ought to be ashamed

judgment which resides inmy mind what I believed I saw

to raise his knowledge above the common to draw occasions of doubt from the forms

thus I comprehend


if I conceived to consider with more evidence and perfection wax was when I first perceived it and when I believed what this of the external senses, or at least by com I knew it by means mon sense, as it is called?that is to say, by the imaginative now conceive I exam it after faculty?than having carefully

of speech invented by the vulgar: I prefer to go further,and

ined what it is and inwhat fashion it can be known. Itwould

to call this in question. For what was certainly be ridiculous that was distinct? what was there there in this first perception of falling in the same way un which did not appear capable senses of the smallest of animals? der the But when I dis wax and its external the between and forms, when, tinguish from it its dress, I consider it in its just as if I had removed entire some nakedness, error found without in my it is certain,


and distinctness this piece of wax, do I not clearness kno v myself, not only with much more verity and certainty, and clearness ? for if I but also with much more distinctness

But after all, what shall I say of thismind, that is to say, of myself? forhitherto I have not admitted anything in me but mind. What then? I who appear to conceive with so

this way

there may although yet be I that cannot conceive it in judgment, a human mind.

judge that thewax is or exists from the fact that I see it, it 3

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certainly follows more evidently that I am, or that I myself exist from the same fact that I see it: for itmay turn out that what I see is not really wax; itmay also turn out that I when I see, or (I do not distinguish between the two) when I if I judge that thewax exists from the fact that I touch it, the same thing will again follow, namely, that I am; and if I judge it fk>m the fact thatmy imagination, grwhatever other wax may be applied to all other things which are external to
and which are to be cause it may be, persuades And the same conclusion. me what of it, I shall I have here come to always remarked of the think I see, I who think am not something. In the same way, have not even eyes to see anything: but it cannot be that


rendered to me, with how much itmore manifest other causes more evidence, distinctness and clearness must I admit that I now know myself, since all the reasons which enable me to know and conceive the nature of wax, or whatever other body so many to be found, besides, other things in the to the elucidation of its na itself which can contribute on as the these ture, that those which do, are body, depend account! of into taken scarcely worthy being But at last I have insensibly arrived at my destination; for since there is one thing which is now manifest to me, that are not properly known or themselves bodies by the senses there are

and more distinct after not only sight or touch,but also many

if the notion

or perception

found outside of me. And, moreover, to me clearer of the wax seemed

itmay be, prove much better the nature of my mind; and


by the faculty of imagination, but by the understanding

that they are not known from the fact that they alone, and are seen or touched, but from the fact that they are un only

press more

derstood, or else comprehended by the thought, I see clearly that there is nothing which it is easier forme toknow than the nature ofmy own mind. But because it is difficult to get rid thus readily of an opinion towhich one has long been habituated, itwill be well forme to stop fora little at this place, in order that by prolonging my meditation I may im
deeply in my memory this new knowledge.

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