EN BANC

[G.R. No. 148334. January 21, 2004.]

ARTURO M. TOLENTINO and ARTURO C. MOJICA, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS, SENATOR RALPH G. RECTO and SENATOR GREGORIO B.
HONASAN, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J p:
The Case
This is a petition for prohibition to set aside Resolution No. NBC 01-005 dated 5 June 2001
("Resolution No. 01-005") and Resolution No. NBC 01-006 dated 20 July 2001 ("Resolution No.
01-006") of respondent Commission on Elections ("COMELEC"). Resolution No. 01-005
proclaimed the 13 candidates elected as Senators in the 14 May 2001 elections while Resolution
No. 01-006 declared "official and final" the ranking of the 13 Senators proclaimed in Resolution
No. 01-005.
The Facts
Shortly after her succession to the Presidency in January 2001, President Gloria MacapagalArroyo nominated then Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. ("Senator Guingona") as VicePresident. Congress confirmed the nomination of Senator Guingona who took his oath as VicePresident on 9 February 2001.
Following Senator Guingona's confirmation, the Senate on 8 February 2001 passed Resolution
No. 84 ("Resolution No. 84") certifying to the existence of a vacancy in the Senate. Resolution
No. 84 called on COMELEC to fill the vacancy through a special election to be held
simultaneously with the regular elections on 14 May 2001. Twelve Senators, with a 6-year term
each, were due to be elected in that election. 1 Resolution No. 84 further provided that the
"Senatorial candidate garnering the 13th highest number of votes shall serve only for the
unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.," which ends on 30 June 2004. 2
On 5 June 2001, after COMELEC had canvassed the election results from all the provinces but
one (Lanao del Norte), COMELEC issued Resolution No. 01-005 provisionally proclaiming 13
candidates as the elected Senators. Resolution No. 01-005 also provided that "the first twelve
(12) Senators shall serve for a term of six (6) years and the thirteenth (13th) Senator shall serve
the unexpired term of three (3) years of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. who was appointed
Vice-President." 3 Respondents Ralph Recto ("Recto") and Gregorio Honasan ("Honasan")
ranked 12th and 13th, respectively, in Resolution No. 01-005.
On 20 June 2001, petitioners Arturo Tolentino and Arturo Mojica ("petitioners"), as voters and
taxpayers, filed the instant petition for prohibition, impleading only COMELEC as respondent.
Petitioners sought to enjoin COMELEC from proclaiming with finality the candidate for Senator
receiving the 13th highest number of votes as the winner in the special election for a single threeyear term seat. Accordingly, petitioners prayed for the nullification of Resolution No. 01-005 in
so far as it makes a proclamation to such effect.
Petitioners contend that COMELEC issued Resolution No. 01-005 without jurisdiction because:
(1) it failed to notify the electorate of the position to be filled in the special election as required
under Section 2 of Republic Act No. 6645 ("R.A. No. 6645"); 4 (2) it failed to require senatorial

candidates to indicate in their certificates of candidacy whether they seek election under the
special or regular elections as allegedly required under Section 73 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881; 5
and, consequently, (3) it failed to specify in the Voters Information Sheet the candidates seeking
election under the special or regular senatorial elections as purportedly required under Section 4,
paragraph 4 of Republic Act No. 6646 ("R.A. No. 6646"). 6 Petitioners add that because of these
omissions, COMELEC canvassed all the votes cast for the senatorial candidates in the 14 May
2001 elections without distinction such that "there were no two separate Senate elections held
simultaneously but just a single election for thirteen seats, irrespective of term." 7
Stated otherwise, petitioners claim that if held simultaneously, a special and a regular election
must be distinguished in the documentation as well as in the canvassing of their results. To
support their claim, petitioners cite the special elections simultaneously held with the regular
elections of 13 November 1951 and 8 November 1955 to fill the seats vacated by Senators
Fernando Lopez and Carlos P. Garcia, respectively, who became Vice-Presidents during their
tenures in the Senate. 8 Petitioners point out that in those elections, COMELEC separately
canvassed the votes cast for the senatorial candidates running under the regular elections from
the votes cast for the candidates running under the special elections. COMELEC also separately
proclaimed the winners in each of those elections. 9
Petitioners sought the issuance of a temporary restraining order during the pendency of their
petition.
Without issuing any restraining order, we required COMELEC to Comment on the petition.
On 20 July 2001, after COMELEC had canvassed the results from all the provinces, it issued
Resolution No. 01-006 declaring "official and final" the ranking of the 13 Senators proclaimed in
Resolution No. 01-005. The 13 Senators took their oaths of office on 23 July 2001.
In view of the issuance of Resolution No. 01-006, the Court required petitioners to file an
amended petition impleading Recto and Honasan as additional respondents. Petitioners
accordingly filed an amended petition in which they reiterated the contentions raised in their
original petition and, in addition, sought the nullification of Resolution No. 01-006.
In their Comments, COMELEC, Honasan, and Recto all claim that a special election to fill the
seat vacated by Senator Guingona was validly held on 14 May 2001. COMELEC and Honasan
further raise preliminary issues on the mootness of the petition and on petitioners' standing to
litigate. Honasan also claims that the petition, which seeks the nullity of his proclamation as
Senator, is actually a quo warranto petition and the Court should dismiss the same for lack of
jurisdiction. For his part, Recto, as the 12th ranking Senator, contends he is not a proper party to
this case because the petition only involves the validity of the proclamation of the 13th placer in
the 14 May 2001 senatorial elections.
The Issues
The following are the issues presented for resolution:
(1)
Procedurally
(a)
whether the petition is in fact a petition for quo warranto over which the Senate Electoral
Tribunal is the sole judge;
(b)
whether the petition is moot; and
(c)
whether petitioners have standing to litigate.
(2)
On the merits, whether a special election to fill a vacant three-year term Senate seat was
validly held on 14 May 2001.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.

On the Preliminary Matters

The Nature of the Petition and the Court's Jurisdiction
A quo warranto proceeding is, among others, one to determine the right of a public officer in the
exercise of his office and to oust him from its enjoyment if his claim is not well-founded. 10
Under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal is the sole judge
of all contests relating to the qualifications of the members of the Senate.
A perusal of the allegations contained in the instant petition shows, however, that what
petitioners are questioning is the validity of the special election on 14 May 2001 in which
Honasan was elected. Petitioners' various prayers are, namely: (1) a "declaration" that no special
election was held simultaneously with the general elections on 14 May 2001; (2) to enjoin
COMELEC from declaring anyone as having won in the special election; and (3) to annul
Resolution Nos. 01-005 and 01-006 in so far as these Resolutions proclaim Honasan as the
winner in the special election. Petitioners anchor their prayers on COMELEC's alleged failure to
comply with certain requirements pertaining to the conduct of that special election. Clearly then,
the petition does not seek to determine Honasan's right in the exercise of his office as Senator.
Petitioners' prayer for the annulment of Honasan's proclamation and, ultimately, election is
merely incidental to petitioners' cause of action. Consequently, the Court can properly exercise
jurisdiction over the instant petition.
On the Mootness of the Petition
COMELEC contends that its proclamation on 5 June 2001 of the 13 Senators and its subsequent
confirmation on 20 July 2001 of the ranking of the 13 Senators render the instant petition to set
aside Resolutions Nos. 01-005 and 01-006 moot and academic.
Admittedly, the office of the writ of prohibition is to command a tribunal or board to desist from
committing an act threatened to be done without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 11 Consequently, the writ will not lie to enjoin acts
already done. 12 However, as an exception to the rule on mootness, courts will decide a question
otherwise moot if it is capable of repetition yet evading review. 13 Thus, in Alunan III v.
Mirasol, 14 we took cognizance of a petition to set aside an order canceling the general elections
for the Sangguniang Kabataan ("SK") on 4 December 1992 despite that at the time the petition
was filed, the SK election had already taken place. We noted in Alunan that since the question of
the validity of the order sought to be annulled "is likely to arise in every SK elections and yet the
question may not be decided before the date of such elections," the mootness of the petition is no
bar to its resolution. This observation squarely applies to the instant case. The question of the
validity of a special election to fill a vacancy in the Senate in relation to COMELEC's failure to
comply with requirements on the conduct of such special election is likely to arise in every such
election. Such question, however, may not be decided before the date of the election.
On Petitioners' Standing
Honasan questions petitioners' standing to bring the instant petition as taxpayers and voters
because petitioners do not claim that COMELEC illegally disbursed public funds. Neither do
petitioners claim that they sustained personal injury because of the issuance of Resolution Nos.
01-005 and 01-006.
"Legal standing" or locus standi refers to a personal and substantial interest in a case such that
the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury because of the challenged governmental act.
15 The requirement of standing, which necessarily "sharpens the presentation of issues," 16
relates to the constitutional mandate that this Court settle only actual cases or controversies. 17
Thus, generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when (1) he can show that he has

personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of
the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is
likely to be redressed by a favorable action. 18
Applied strictly, the doctrine of standing to litigate will indeed bar the instant petition. In
questioning, in their capacity as voters, the validity of the special election on 14 May 2001,
petitioners assert a harm classified as a "generalized grievance." This generalized grievance is
shared in substantially equal measure by a large class of voters, if not all the voters, who voted in
that election. 19 Neither have petitioners alleged, in their capacity as taxpayers, that the Court
should give due course to the petition because in the special election held on 14 May 2001 "tax
money [was] '. . . extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional protections against
abuses of legislative power' or that there [was] misapplication of such funds by COMELEC or
that public money [was] deflected to any improper purpose." 20
On the other hand, we have relaxed the requirement on standing and exercised our discretion to
give due course to voters' suits involving the right of suffrage. 21 Also, in the recent case of
Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 22 we gave the same liberal treatment to a petition
filed by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines ("IBP"). The IBP questioned the validity of a
Presidential directive deploying elements of the Philippine National Police and the Philippine
Marines in Metro Manila to conduct patrols even though the IBP presented "too general an
interest." We held:
[T]he IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the rule of law
and the Constitution. Apart from this declaration, however, the IBP asserts no other basis in
support of its locus standi. The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law
and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case.
This is too general an interest which is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry . . . .
Having stated the foregoing, this Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does
not satisfy the requirement of legal standing when paramount interest is involved. In not a few
cases, the court has adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner where the
petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people. Thus, when the
issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, the Court may brush aside technicalities
of procedure. In this case, a reading of the petition shows that the IBP has advanced
constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness,
novelty and weight as precedents. Moreover, because peace and order are under constant threat
and lawless violence occurs in increasing tempo, undoubtedly aggravated by the Mindanao
insurgency problem, the legal controversy raised in the petition almost certainly will not go
away. It will stare us in the face again. It, therefore, behooves the Court to relax the rules on
standing and to resolve the issue now, rather than later. 23 (Emphasis supplied)
We accord the same treatment to petitioners in the instant case in their capacity as voters since
they raise important issues involving their right of suffrage, considering that the issue raised in
this petition is likely to arise again.
Whether a Special Election for a Single, Three-Year Term Senatorial Seat was Validly Held on
14 May 2001
Under Section 9, Article VI of the Constitution, a special election may be called to fill any
vacancy in the Senate and the House of Representatives "in the manner prescribed by law," thus:
In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of Representatives, a special election may be
called to fill such vacancy in the manner prescribed by law, but the Senator or Member of the

House of Representatives thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired term. (Emphasis
supplied)
To implement this provision of the Constitution, Congress passed R.A. No. 6645, which provides
in pertinent parts:
SECTION 1. In case a vacancy arises in the Senate at least eighteen (18) months or in the
House of Representatives at least one (1) year before the next regular election for Members of
Congress, the Commission on Elections, upon receipt of a resolution of the Senate or the House
of Representatives, as the case may be, certifying to the existence of such vacancy and calling for
a special election, shall hold a special election to fill such vacancy. If Congress is in recess, an
official communication on the existence of the vacancy and call for a special election by the
President of the Senate or by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, as the case may be,
shall be sufficient for such purpose. The Senator or Member of the House of Representatives
thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired term.
SECTION 2. The Commission on Elections shall fix the date of the special election, which
shall not be earlier than forty-five (45) days nor later than ninety (90) days from the date of such
resolution or communication, stating among other things the office or offices to be voted for:
Provided, however, That if within the said period a general election is scheduled to be held, the
special election shall be held simultaneously with such general election. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7166 subsequently amended Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as
follows:
Postponement, Failure of Election and Special Elections. . . . In case a permanent vacancy
shall occur in the Senate or House of Representatives at least one (1) year before the expiration
of the term, the Commission shall call and hold a special election to fill the vacancy not earlier
than sixty (60) days nor longer than ninety (90) days after the occurrence of the vacancy.
However, in case of such vacancy in the Senate, the special election shall be held simultaneously
with the next succeeding regular election. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, in case a vacancy arises in Congress at least one year before the expiration of the term,
Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended, requires COMELEC: (1) to call a special election by
fixing the date of the special election, which shall not be earlier than sixty (60) days nor later
than ninety (90) after the occurrence of the vacancy but in case of a vacancy in the Senate, the
special election shall be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election; and (2) to
give notice to the voters of, among other things, the office or offices; to be voted for.
Did COMELEC, in conducting the special senatorial election simultaneously with the 14 May
2001 regular elections, comply with the requirements in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645?
A survey of COMELEC's resolutions relating to the conduct of the 14 May 2001 elections
reveals that they contain nothing which would amount to a compliance, either strict or
substantial, with the requirements in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended. Thus, nowhere in
its resolutions 24 or even in its press releases 25 did COMELEC state that it would hold a special
election for a single three-year term Senate seat simultaneously with the regular elections on 14
May 2001. Nor did COMELEC give formal notice that it would proclaim as winner the
senatorial candidate receiving the 13th highest number of votes in the special election.
The controversy thus turns on whether COMELEC's failure, assuming it did fail, to comply with
the requirements in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended, invalidated the conduct of the
special senatorial election on 14 May 2001 and accordingly rendered Honasan's proclamation as
the winner in that special election void. More precisely, the question is whether the special
election is invalid for lack of a "call" for such election and for lack of notice as to the office to be

filled and the manner by which the winner in the special election is to be determined. For reasons
stated below, the Court answers in the negative.
COMELEC's Failure to Give Notice of the Time of the Special Election Did Not Negate the
Calling of such Election
The calling of an election, that is, the giving notice of the time and place of its occurrence,
whether made by the legislature directly or by the body with the duty to give such call, is
indispensable to the election's validity. 26 In a general election, where the law fixes the date of
the election, the election is valid without any call by the body charged to administer the election.
27
In a special election to fill a vacancy, the rule is that a statute that expressly provides that an
election to fill a vacancy shall be held at the next general elections fixes the date at which the
special election is to be held and operates as the call for that election. Consequently, an election
held at the time thus prescribed is not invalidated by the fact that the body charged by law with
the duty of calling the election failed to do so. 28 This is because the right and duty to hold the
election emanate from the statute and not from any call for the election by some authority 29 and
the law thus charges voters with knowledge of the time and place of the election. 30
Conversely, where the law does not fix the time and place for holding a special election but
empowers some authority to fix the time and place after the happening of a condition precedent,
the statutory provision on the giving of notice is considered mandatory, and failure to do so will
render the election a nullity. 31
In the instant case, Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645 itself provides that in case of vacancy in the
Senate, the special election to fill such vacancy shall be held simultaneously with the next
succeeding regular election. Accordingly, the special election to fill the vacancy in the Senate
arising from Senator Guingona's appointment as Vice-President in February 2001 could not be
held at any other time but must be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular elections
on 14 May 2001. The law charges the voters with knowledge of this statutory notice and
COMELEC's failure to give the additional notice did not negate the calling of such special
election, much less invalidate it.
Our conclusion might be different had the present case involved a special election to fill a
vacancy in the House of Representatives. In such a case, the holding of the special election is
subject to a condition precedent, that is, the vacancy should take place at least one year before
the expiration of the term. The time of the election is left to the discretion of COMELEC subject
only to the limitation that it holds the special election within the range of time provided in
Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended. This makes mandatory the requirement in Section 2 of
R.A. No. 6645, as amended, for COMELEC to "call . . . a special election . . . not earlier than 60
days nor longer than 90 days after the occurrence of the vacancy" and give notice of the office to
be filled. The COMELEC's failure to so call and give notice will nullify any attempt to hold a
special election to fill the vacancy. Indeed, it will be well-nigh impossible for the voters in the
congressional district involved to know the time and place of the special election and the office
to be filled unless the COMELEC so notifies them.
No Proof that COMELEC's Failure to Give Notice of the Office to be Filled and the Manner of
Determining the Winner in the Special Election Misled Voters
The test in determining the validity of a special election in relation to the failure to give notice of
the special election is whether the want of notice has resulted in misleading a sufficient number
of voters as would change the result of the special election. If the lack of official notice misled a

substantial number of voters who wrongly believed that there was no special election to fill a
vacancy, a choice by a small percentage of voters would be void. 32
The required notice to the voters in the 14 May 2001 special senatorial election covers two
matters. First, that COMELEC will hold a special election to fill a vacant single three-year term
Senate seat simultaneously with the regular elections scheduled on the same date. Second, that
COMELEC will proclaim as winner the senatorial candidate receiving the 13th highest number
of votes in the special election. Petitioners have neither claimed nor proved that COMELEC's
failure to give this required notice misled a sufficient number of voters as would change the
result of the special senatorial election or led them to believe that there was no such special
election.
Instead, what petitioners did is conclude that since COMELEC failed to give such notice, no
special election took place. This bare assertion carries no value. Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as
amended, charged those who voted in the elections of 14 May 2001 with the knowledge that the
vacancy in the Senate arising from Senator Guingona's appointment as Vice-President in
February 2001 was to be filled in the next succeeding regular election of 14 May 2001.
Similarly, the absence of formal notice from COMELEC does not preclude the possibility that
the voters had actual notice of the special election, the office to be voted in that election, and the
manner by which COMELEC would determine the winner. Such actual notice could come from
many sources, such as media reports of the enactment of R.A. No. 6645 and election propaganda
during the campaign. 33
More than 10 million voters cast their votes in favor of Honasan, the party who stands most
prejudiced by the instant petition. We simply cannot disenfranchise those who voted for
Honasan, in the absence of proof that COMELEC's omission prejudiced voters in the exercise of
their right of suffrage so as to negate the holding of the special election. Indeed, this Court is
loathe to annul elections and will only do so when it is "impossible to distinguish what votes are
lawful and what are unlawful, or to arrive at any certain result whatever, or that the great body of
the voters have been prevented by violence, intimidation, and threats from exercising their
franchise." 34
Otherwise, the consistent rule has been to respect the electorate's will and let the results of the
election stand, despite irregularities that may have attended the conduct of the elections. 35 This
is but to acknowledge the purpose and role of elections in a democratic society such as ours,
which is:
to give the voters a direct participation in the affairs of their government, either in determining
who shall be their public officials or in deciding some question of public interest; and for that
purpose all of the legal voters should be permitted, unhampered and unmolested, to cast their
ballot. When that is done and no frauds have been committed, the ballots should be counted and
the election should not be declared null. Innocent voters should not be deprived of their
participation in the affairs of their government for mere irregularities on the part of the election
officers, for which they are in no way responsible. A different rule would make the manner and
method of performing a public duty of greater importance than the duty itself. 36 (Emphasis in
the original)
Separate Documentation and Canvassing not Required under Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645
Neither is there basis in petitioners' claim that the manner by which COMELEC conducted the
special senatorial election on 14 May 2001 is a nullity because COMELEC failed to document
separately the candidates and to canvass separately the votes cast for the special election. No
such requirements exist in our election laws. What is mandatory under Section 2 of R.A. No.

6645 is that COMELEC "fix the date of the election," if necessary, and "state, among others, the
office or offices to be voted for." Similarly, petitioners' reliance on Section 73 of B.P. Blg. 881
on the filing of certificates of candidacy, and on Section 4(4) of R.A. No. 6646 on the printing of
election returns and tally sheets, to support their claim is misplaced. These provisions govern
elections in general and in no way require separate documentation of candidates or separate
canvass of votes in a jointly held regular and special elections.
Significantly, the method adopted by COMELEC in conducting the special election on 14 May
2001 merely implemented the procedure specified by the Senate in Resolution No. 84. Initially,
the original draft of Resolution No. 84 as introduced by Senator Francisco Tatad ("Senator
Tatad") made no mention of the manner by which the seat vacated by former Senator Guingona
would be filled. However, upon the suggestion of Senator Raul Roco ("Senator Roco"), the
Senate agreed to amend Resolution No. 84 by providing, as it now appears, that "the senatorial
candidate garnering the thirteenth (13th) highest number of votes shall serve only for the
unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr." Senator Roco introduced the
amendment to spare COMELEC and the candidates needless expenditures and the voters further
inconvenience, thus:
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Mr. President, I move that we now consider Proposed Senate
Resolution No. 934 [later converted to Resolution No. 84].
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the motion is
approved.
Consideration of Proposed Senate Resolution No. 934 is now in order. With the permission of
the Body, the Secretary will read only the title and text of the resolution.
T[HE] S[ECRETARY]. Proposed Senate Resolution No. 934 entitled
RESOLUTION CERTIFYING TO THE EXISTENCE OF A VACANCY IN THE SENATE
AND CALLING ON THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC) TO FILL UP SUCH
VACANCY THROUGH ELECTION TO BE HELD SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE
REGULAR ELECTION ON MAY 14, 2001 AND THE SENATOR THUS ELECTED TO
SERVE ONLY FOR THE UNEXPIRED TERM
WHEREAS, the Honorable Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. was elected Senator of the Philippines in
1998 for a term which will expire on June 30, 2004;
WHEREAS, on February 6, 2001, Her Excellency President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
nominated Senator Guingona as Vice-President of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, the nomination of Senator Guingona has been confirmed by a majority vote of all
the members of both House of Congress, voting separately;
WHEREAS, Senator Guingona will take his Oath of Office as Vice-President of the Philippines
on February 9, 2001;
WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 7166 provides that the election for twelve (12) Senators, all
elective Members of the House of Representatives, and all elective provincial city and municipal
officials shall be held on the second Monday and every three years thereafter; Now, therefore, be
it
RESOLVED by the Senate, as it is hereby resolved, to certify, as it hereby certifies, the existence
of a vacancy in the Senate and calling the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to fill up such
vacancy through election to be held simultaneously with the regular election on May 14, 2001
and the Senator thus elected to serve only for the unexpired term.
Adopted,
(Sgd.) FRANCISCO S. TATAD

Senator
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Mr. President, I move for the adoption of this resolution.
S[ENATOR] O[SMEA] (J). Mr. President.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Sen. John H. Osmea is recognized.
S[ENATOR] O[SMEA] (J). Thank you, Mr. President. Will the distinguished Majority Leader,
Chairman of the Committee on Rules, author of this resolution, yield for a few questions?
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. With trepidation, Mr. President. [Laughter]
S[ENATOR] O[SMEA] (J). What a way of flattery. [Laughter]
Mr. President, I think I recall that sometime in 1951 or 1953, there was a special election for a
vacant seat in the Senate. As a matter of fact, the one who was elected in that special election
was then Congressman, later Senator Feli[s]berto Verano.
In that election, Mr. President, the candidates contested the seat. In other words, the electorate
had to cast a vote for a ninth senator because at that time there were only eight to elect a
member or rather, a candidate to that particular seat.
Then I remember, Mr. President, that when we ran after the EDSA revolution, twice there were
24 candidates and the first 12 were elected to a six-year term and the next 12 were elected to a
three-year term.
My question therefore is, how is this going to be done in this election? Is the candidate with the
13th largest number of votes going to be the one to take a three-year term? Or is there going to
be an election for a position of senator for the unexpired term of Sen. Teofisto Guingona?
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Mr. President, in this resolution, we are leaving the mechanics to the
Commission on Elections. But personally, I would like to suggest that probably, the candidate
obtaining the 13th largest number of votes be declared as elected to fill up the unexpired term of
Senator Guingona.
S[ENATOR] O[SMEA] (J). Is there a law that would allow the Comelec to conduct such an
election? Is it not the case that the vacancy is for a specific office? I am really at a loss. I am
rising here because I think it is something that we should consider. I do not know if we can . . .
No, this is not a Concurrent Resolution. aTcIEH
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. May we solicit the legal wisdom of the Senate President.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. May I share this information that under Republic Act No. 6645, what is
needed is a resolution of this Chamber calling attention to the need for the holding of a special
election to fill up the vacancy created, in this particular case, by the appointment of our
colleague, Senator Guingona, as Vice President.
It can be managed in the Commission on Elections so that a slot for the particular candidate to
fill up would be that reserved for Mr. Guingona's unexpired term. In other words, it can be
arranged in such a manner.
xxx
xxx
xxx
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. Mr. President.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Sen. Raul S. Roco is recognized.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. May we suggest, subject to a one-minute caucus, wordings to the effect
that in the simultaneous elections, the 13th placer be therefore deemed to be the special election
for this purpose. So we just nominate 13 and it is good for our colleagues. It is better for the
candidates. It is also less expensive because the ballot will be printed and there will be less
disfranchisement.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. That is right.

S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. If we can just deem it therefore under this resolution to be such a special
election, maybe, we satisfy the requirement of the law.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Yes. In other words, this shall be a guidance for the Comelec.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. Yes.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. to implement.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. Yes. The Comelec will not have the flexibility.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. That is right.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. We will already consider the 13th placer of the forthcoming elections that
will be held simultaneously as a special election under this law as we understand it.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Yes. That will be a good compromise, Senator Roco.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. Yes. So if the sponsor can introduce that later, maybe it will be better,
Mr. President.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. What does the sponsor say?
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Mr. President, that is a most satisfactory proposal because I do not
believe that there will be anyone running specifically
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Correct.
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. to fill up this position for three years and campaigning nationwide.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Actually, I think what is going to happen is the 13th candidate will be
running with specific groups.
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Yes. Whoever gets No. 13.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. I think we can specifically define that as the intent of this resolution.
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Subject to style, we accept that amendment and if there will be no other
amendment, I move for the adoption of this resolution.
xxx
xxx
xxx
ADOPTION OF S. RES. NO. 934
If there are no other proposed amendments, I move that we adopt this resolution.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. There is a motion to adopt this resolution. Is there any objection?
[Silence] There being none, the motion is approved. 37
Evidently, COMELEC, in the exercise of its discretion to use means and methods to conduct the
special election within the confines of R.A. No. 6645, merely chose to adopt the Senate's
proposal, as embodied in Resolution No. 84. This Court has consistently acknowledged and
affirmed COMELEC's wide latitude of discretion in adopting means to carry out its mandate of
ensuring free, orderly, and honest elections subject only to the limitation that the means so
adopted are not illegal or do not constitute grave abuse of discretion. 38 COMELEC's decision to
abandon the means it employed in the 13 November 1951 and 8 November 1955 special
elections and adopt the method embodied in Resolution No. 84 is but a legitimate exercise of its
discretion. Conversely, this Court will not interfere should COMELEC, in subsequent special
senatorial elections, choose to revert to the means it followed in the 13 November 1951 and 8
November 1955 elections. That COMELEC adopts means that are novel or even disagreeable is
no reason to adjudge it liable for grave abuse of discretion. As we have earlier noted:
The Commission on Elections is a constitutional body. It is intended to play a distinct and
important part in our scheme of government. In the discharge of its functions, it should not be
hampered with restrictions that would be fully warranted in the case of a less responsible
organization. The Commission may err, so may this Court also. It should be allowed
considerable latitude in devising means and methods that will insure the accomplishment of the
great objective for which it was created free, orderly and honest elections. We may not agree

fully with its choice of means, but unless these are clearly illegal or constitute gross abuse of
discretion, this court should not interfere. 39
A Word to COMELEC
The calling of a special election, if necessary, and the giving of notice to the electorate of
necessary information regarding a special election, are central to an informed exercise of the
right of suffrage. While the circumstances attendant to the present case have led us to conclude
that COMELEC's failure to so call and give notice did not invalidate the special senatorial
election held on 14 May 2001, COMELEC should not take chances in future elections. We
remind COMELEC to comply strictly with all the requirements under applicable laws relative to
the conduct of regular elections in general and special elections in particular.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio Morales,
Callejo, Sr. and Azcuna, JJ ., concur.
Separate Opinions
PUNO, J., dissenting:
The case at bar transcends the political fortunes of respondent Senator Gregorio B. Honasan. At
issue is the right of the people to elect their representatives on the basis and only on the basis of
an informed judgment. The issue strikes at the heart of democracy and representative
government for without this right, the sovereignty of the people is a mere chimera and the rule of
the majority will be no more than mobocracy. To clarify and sharpen the issue, I shall first unfurl
the facts.
I. Facts
The facts are undisputed. In February 2001, a Senate seat for a term expiring on June 30, 2004
was vacated with the appointment of then Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr. as Vice-President of
the Philippines. The Senate adopted Resolution No. 84 certifying "the existence of a vacancy in
the Senate and calling the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to fill up such vacancy
through election to be held simultaneously with the regular election on May 14, 2001, and the
senatorial candidate garnering the thirteenth (13th) highest number of votes shall serve only for
the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr." In the deliberations of the
Senate on the resolution, the body agreed that the procedure it adopted for determining the
winner in the special election was for the "guidance" and "implementation" of the COMELEC.
The COMELEC had no discretion to alter the procedure.
Nobody filed a certificate of candidacy to fill the position of senator to serve the unexpired threeyear term in the special election. All the senatorial candidates filed the certificates of candidacy
for the twelve regular Senate seats to be vacated on June 30, 2001 with a six-year term expiring
on June 30, 2007. COMELEC distributed nationwide official documents such as the Voter
Information Sheet, List of Candidates and Sample Ballot. The List of Candidates did not indicate
a separate list of candidates for the special election. The Sample Ballot and the official ballots
did not provide two different categories of Senate seats to be voted, namely the twelve regular
six-year term seats and the single three-year term seat. Nor did the ballots provide a separate
space for the candidate to be voted in the special election and instead provided thirteen spaces for
thirteen senatorial seats.
Without any COMELEC resolution or notice on the time, place and manner of conduct of the
special election, the special election for senator was held on the scheduled May 14, 2001 regular
elections. A single canvass of votes for a single list of senatorial candidates was done. On June 5,

2001, respondent COMELEC promulgated COMELEC Resolution No. NBC01-005, the

dispositive portion of which reads, viz:
NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it under the Constitution, Omnibus
Election Code and other election laws, the Commission on Elections sitting En Banc as the
National Board of Canvassers hereby proclaims the above-named thirteen (13) candidates as the
duly elected Senators of the Philippines in the May 14, 2001 elections. Based on the Certificates
of Canvass finally tabulated, the first twelve (12) Senators shall serve for a term of six (6) years
and the thirteenth (13th) Senator shall serve the unexpired term of three (3) years of Senator
Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr., who was appointed Vice-President of the Philippines pursuant to
Section 9, Article VII of the Constitution, in relation to Section 9, Article VI thereof, as
implemented under Republic Act No. 6645. (emphasis supplied)
On June 21, 2001, petitioners filed with the Court their petition for prohibition to stop respondent
COMELEC from proclaiming any senatorial candidate in the May 14, 2001 election as having
been elected for the lone senate seat for a three-year term. Copies of the petition were served on
respondent COMELEC twice, first on June 20, 2001 by registered mail, and second on June 21,
2001, by personal delivery of petitioner Mojica. On June 26, 2001 the Court issued a Resolution
requiring respondent COMELEC to comment within ten days from notice. Even before filing its
comment, respondent COMELEC issued Resolution No. NBC-01-006 on July 20, 2001, the
dispositive portion of which reads, viz:
NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it under the Constitution, Omnibus
Election Code and other election laws, the Commission on Elections sitting as the National
Board of Canvassers hereby DECLARES official and final the above ranking of the proclaimed
13 Senators of the Philippines in relation to NBC Resolution No. 01-005 promulgated June 5,
2001.
Resolution No. NBC-01-006 indicates the following ranking of the 13 Senators with the
corresponding votes they garnered as of June 20, 2001:
1.
De Castro, Noli L.
16,237,386
2.
Flavier, Juan M.
11,735,897
3.
Osmea, Sergio II R. 11,593,389
4.
Drilon, Franklin M. 11,301,700
5.
Arroyo, Joker P.
11,262,402
6.
Magsaysay, Ramon Jr. B.
11,250,677
7.
Villar, Manuel Jr. B. 11,187,375
8.
Pangilinan, Francis N.10,971,896
9.
Angara, Edgardo J. 10,805,177
10.
Lacson, Panfilo M. 10,535,559
11.
Ejercito-Estrada, Luisa P.
10,524,130
12.
Recto, Ralph 10,498,940
13.
Honasan, Gregorio 10,454,527
On the day of its promulgation, respondent COMELEC forwarded Resolution No. NBC-01-006
to the President of the Senate. On July 23, 2001, the thirteen senators, inclusive of respondents
Honasan and Recto, took their oaths of office before the Senate President.
With the turn of events after the filing of the petition on June 20, 2001, the Court ordered
petitioners on March 5, 2002 and September 17, 2002 to amend their petition. In their amended
petition, petitioners assailed the manner by which the special election was conducted citing as

precedents the 1951 and 1955 special senatorial elections for a two-year term which were held
simultaneously with the regular general elections for senators with six year terms, viz:
(a)
A vacancy in the Senate was created by the election of Senator Fernando Lopez as VicePresident in the 1949 elections. A special election was held in November 1951 to elect his
successor to the vacated Senate position for a term to expire on 30 December 1953. Said special
election was held simultaneously with the regular election of 1951. A separate space in the
official ballot was provided for Senatorial candidates for the two year term; moreover, the
candidates for the single Senate term for two years filed certificates of candidacy separate and
distinct from those certificates of candidacy filed by the group of Senatorial candidates for the
six year term.
(. . . the votes for the twenty (20) candidates who filed certificates of candidacy for the eight
Senate seats with six year terms were tallied and canvassed separately from the votes for the five
candidates who filed certificates of candidacy for the single Senate seat with a two year term . . .)
xxx
xxx
xxx
(b)
Again, a vacancy was created in the Senate by the election of then Senator Carlos P.
Garcia to the Vice Presidency in the 1953 presidential elections. A special election was held in
November 1955 to elect his successor to the vacated Senatorial position for a two year term
expiring on 30 December 1957.
Said special election for one senator to fill the vacancy left by the Honorable Carlos Garcia was
held in November 1955 simultaneously with the regular election for eight Senate seats with a six
year term. Here, separate spaces were provided for in the official ballot for the single Senate seat
for the two year term as differentiated from the eight Senate seats with six year terms. The results
as recorded by Senate official files show that votes for the candidates for the Senate seat with a
two-year term were separately tallied from the votes for the candidates for the eight Senate seats
with six-year term . . . 1 (emphases supplied)
Petitioners thus pray that the Court declare the following:
(a)
that no special election was conducted by respondent COMELEC for the single Senate
seat with a three year term in the 14 May 2001 election.
(b)
null and void respondent COMELEC's Resolutions No. NBC01-005 dated 5 June 2001
and NBC01-006 dated 20 July 2001 for having been promulgated without any legal authority at
all insofar as said resolutions proclaim the Senatorial candidate who obtained the thirteenth
highest number of votes canvassed during the 14 May 2001 election as a duly elected Senator. 2
Respondents filed their respective comments averring the following procedural flaws: (1) the
Court has no jurisdiction over the petition for quo warranto; (2) the petition is moot; and (3) the
petitioners have no standing to litigate. On the merits, they all defend the validity of the special
election on the ground that the COMELEC had discretion to determine the manner by which the
special election should be conducted and that the electorate was aware of the method the
COMELEC had adopted. Moreover, they dismiss the deviations from the election laws with
respect to the filing of certificates of candidacy for the special elections and the failure to provide
in the official ballot a space for the special election vote separate from the twelve spaces for the
regular senatorial election votes as inconsequential. They claim that these laws are merely
directory after the election.
II. Issues
The issues for resolution are procedural and substantive. I shall limit my humble opinion to the
substantive issue of whether a special election for the single Senate seat with a three-year term
was validly held simultaneous with the general elections on May 14, 2001.

III. Laws on the Calling of Special Elections

Section 9, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides for the filling of a vacancy in the Senate
and House of Representatives, viz:
Sec. 9. In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of Representatives, a special election
may be called to fill such vacancy in the manner prescribed by law, but the Senator or Member
of the House of Representatives thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired term.
Congress passed R.A. No. 6645, "An Act Prescribing the Manner of Filling a Vacancy in the
Congress of the Philippines," to implement this constitutional provision. The law provides, viz:
SECTION 1. In case a vacancy arises in the Senate at least eighteen (18) months or in the
House of Representatives at least one (1) year before the next regular election for Members of
Congress, the Commission on Elections, upon receipt of a resolution of the Senate or the House
of Representatives, as the case may be, certifying to the existence of such vacancy and calling for
a special election, shall hold a special election to fill such vacancy. If the Congress is in recess,
an official communication on the existence of the vacancy and call for a special election by the
President of the Senate or by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, as the case may be,
shall be sufficient for such purpose. The Senator or Member of the House of Representatives
thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired term.
SECTION 2. The Commission on Elections shall fix the date of the special election, which
shall not be earlier than forty-five (45) days nor later than ninety (90) days from the date of such
resolution or communication, stating among other things, the office or offices to be voted for:
Provided, however, That if within the said period a general election is scheduled to be held, the
special election shall be held simultaneously with such general election.
SECTION 3. The Commission on Elections shall send copies of the resolution, in number
sufficient for due distribution and publication, to the Provincial or City Treasurer of each
province or city concerned, who in turn shall publish it in their respective localities by posting at
least three copies thereof in as many conspicuous places in each of their election precincts, and a
copy in each of the polling places and public markets, and in the municipal buildings. (emphasis
supplied)
R.A. No. 6645 was amended in 1991 by R.A. No. 7166 which provides in Section 4, viz:
SECTION 4. Postponement, Failure of Election and Special Election. The postponement,
declaration of failure of election and the calling of special elections as provided in Sections 5, 6,
and 7 of the Omnibus Election Code shall be decided by the Commission sitting en banc by a
majority vote of its members . . .
In case a permanent vacancy shall occur in the Senate or House of Representatives at least one
(1) year before the expiration of the term, the Commission shall call and hold a special election
to fill the vacancy not earlier than sixty (60) days nor longer than ninety (90) days after the
occurrence of the vacancy. However, in case of such vacancy in the Senate, the special election
shall be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election. (emphases supplied)
IV. Democracy and Republicanism
The shortest distance between two points is a straight line. In this case of first impression,
however, the distance between existing jurisprudence and the resolution of the issue presented to
the Court cannot be negotiated through a straight and direct line of reasoning. Rather, it is
necessary to journey through a meandering path and unearth the root principles of democracy,
republicanism, elections, suffrage, and freedom of information and discourse in an open society.
As a first step in this indispensable journey, we should traverse the democratic and republican
landscape to appreciate the importance of informed judgment in elections.

A. Evolution of Democracy from Plato to Locke to Jefferson and Contemporary United States of
America
In the ancient days, democracy was dismissed by thoughtful thinkers. Plato deprecated
democracy as rule by the masses. He warned that if all the people were allowed to rule, those of
low quality would dominate the state by mere numerical superiority. He feared that the more
numerous masses would govern with meanness and bring about a "tyranny of the majority."
Plato predicted that democracies would be short-lived as the mob would inevitably surrender its
power to a single tyrant, and put an end to popular government. Less jaundiced than Plato was
Aristotle's view towards democracy. Aristotle agreed that under certain conditions, the will of the
many could be equal to or even wiser than the judgment of the few. When the many governed for
the good of all, Aristotle admitted that democracy is a good form of government. But still and all,
Aristotle preferred a rule of the upper class as against the rule of the lower class. He believed that
the upper class could best govern for they represent people of the greatest refinement and quality.
In the Middle Ages, Europe plunged when the Roman Empire perished. Europe re-emerged from
this catastrophe largely through reliance on the scientific method which ultimately ushered the
Industrial Revolution. Material success became the engine which drove the people to search for
solutions to their social, political and economic problems. Using the scythe of science and
reason, the thinkers of the time entertained an exaggerated notion of individualism. They
bannered the idea that all people were equal; no one had a greater right to rule than another.
Dynastical monarchy was taboo. As all were essentially equal, no one enjoyed the moral right to
govern another without the consent of the governed. The people therefore were the source of
legitimate legal and political authority. This theory of popular sovereignty revived an interest in
democracy in the seventeenth century. The refinements of the grant of power by the people to the
government led to the social contract theory: that is, the social contract is the act of people
exercising their sovereignty and creating a government to which they consent. 3
Among the great political philosophers who spurred the evolution of democratic thought was
John Locke (1632-1704). In 1688, the English revolted against the "Catholic tyranny" of James
II, causing him to flee to France. This Glorious Revolution, called such because it was almost
bloodless, put to rest the long struggle between King and Parliament in England. The revolution
reshaped the English government and ultimately brought about democracy in England.
John Locke provided the philosophical phalanx to the Glorious Revolution. For this purpose, he
wrote his Second Treatise of Government, his work with the most political impact. In his
monumental treatise, Locke asserted that the basis of political society is a contract whereby
individuals consent to be bound by the laws of a common authority known as civil government.
The objective of this social contract is the protection of the individual's natural rights to life,
liberty and property which are inviolable and enjoyed by them in the state of nature before the
formation of all social and political arrangements. 4 Locke thus argues that legitimate political
power amounts to a form of trust, a contract among members of society anchored on their own
consent, and seeks to preserve their lives, liberty and property. This trust or social contract makes
government legitimate and clearly defines the functions of government as concerned, above all,
with the preservation of the rights of the governed.
Even then, Locke believed that the people should be governed by a parliament elected by citizens
who owned property. Although he argued that the people were sovereign, he submitted that they
should not rule directly. Members of parliament represent their constituents and should vote as
their constituents wanted. The government's sole reason for being was to serve the individual by
protecting his rights and liberties. Although Locke's ideas were liberal, they fell short of the

ideals of democracy. He spoke of a "middle-class revolution" at a time when the British

government was controlled by the aristocracy. While he claimed that all people were equally
possessed of natural rights, he advocated that political power be devolved only to embrace the
middle class by giving Parliament, which was controlled through the House of Commons, the
right to limit the monarchical power. He denied political power to the poor; they were bereft of
the right to elect members of Parliament.
Locke influenced Thomas Jefferson, the eminent statesman and philosopher of the (American)
revolution and of the first constitutional order which free men were permitted to establish." 5 But
although Jefferson espoused Locke's version of the social contract and natural law, he had
respect for the common people and participatory government. Jefferson believed that the people,
including the ordinary folk, were the only competent guardians of their own liberties, and should
thus control their government. Discussing the role of the people in a republic, Jefferson wrote to
Madison from France in 1787 that "they are the only sure reliance for the preservation of our
liberties." 6
The wave of liberalism from Europe notwithstanding, a much more conservative, less
democratic, and more paternalistic system of government was originally adopted in the United
States. The nation's founders created a government in which power was much more centralized
than it had been under the Articles of Confederation and they severely restricted popular control
over the government. 7 Many of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention of 1787 adhered
to Alexander Hamilton's view that democracy was little more than legitimized mob rule, a
constant threat to personal security, liberty and property. Thus, the framers sought to establish a
constitutional republic, in which public policy would be made by elected representatives but
individual rights were protected from the tyranny of transient majorities. With its several elitist
elements and many limitations on majority rule, the framers' Constitution had undemocratic
strands.
The next two centuries, however, saw the further democratization of the federal Constitution. 8
The Bill of Rights was added to the American Constitution and since its passage, America had
gone through a series of liberalizing eras that slowly relaxed the restraints imposed on the people
by the new political order. The changing social and economic milieu mothered by
industrialization required political democratization. 9 In 1787, property qualifications for voting
existed and suffrage was granted only to white males. At the onset of Jacksonion democracy in
the 1830s, property requirements quickly diminished and virtually became a thing of the past by
the time of the Civil War. In 1870, the Fifteenth Amendment theoretically extended the franchise
to African-Americans, although it took another century of struggle for the Amendment to
become a reality. In 1920, the Nineteenth Amendment removed sex as a qualification for voting.
The Progressive Era also saw the Seventeenth Amendment of the Constitution to provide for
direct election of United States senators 10 and established procedures for initiative, referendum
and recall (otherwise known as direct democracy) in many states. 11 Poll taxes were abolished as
prerequisites for voting in federal elections through the Twenty-Fourth Amendment in 1964.
Finally, the voting age was lowered to eighteen with the ratification of the Twenty-Sixth
Amendment in 1971. 12
B. Constitutional History of Democracy and Republicanism in the Philippines
The Malolos Constitution was promulgated on January 21, 1899 by the short-lived
Revolutionary Government headed by Emilio Aguinaldo after the Declaration of Independence
from Spain on June 12, 1898. Article 4 of the Constitution declared the Philippines a Republic,
viz:

Art. 4. The government of the Republic is popular, representative, alternative, and responsible
and is exercised by three distinct powers, which are denominated legislative, executive and
judicial . . .
Shortly after the promulgation of the Malolos Constitution, the Philippines fell under American
rule. The Americans adopted the policy of gradually increasing the autonomy of the Filipinos
before granting their independence. 13 In 1934, the U.S. Congress passed the Tydings-McDuffie
Law ". . . the last of the constitutional landmarks studding the period of constitutional
development of the Filipino people under the American regime before the final grant of
Philippine independence." 14 Under this law, the American government authorized the Filipino
people to draft a constitution in 1934 with the requirement that the "constitution formulated and
drafted shall be republican in form." In conformity with this requirement, 15 Article II, Section 1
of the 1935 Philippine Constitution was adopted, viz:
Sec. 1. The Philippines is a republican state. Sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them.
The delegates to the Constitutional Convention understood this form of government to be that
defined by James Madison, viz:
We may define a republic to be a government which derives all its power directly or indirectly
from the great body of the people; and is administered by persons holding offices during
pleasure, for a limited period, or during good behavior. It is essential to such a government that it
be derived from the great body of the society, not from an inconsiderable proportion, or a
favored class of it. It is sufficient for such government that the person administering it be
appointed either directly or indirectly, by the people; and that they hold their appointments by
either of the tenures just specified. 16 (emphases supplied)
The 1973 Constitution adopted verbatim Article II, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution. So did the
1987 Constitution. The delegates to the 1986 Constitutional Commission well understood the
meaning of a republican government. They adopted the explanation by Jose P. Laurel in his
book, Bread and Freedom, The Essentials of Popular Government, viz:
When we refer to popular government or republican government or representative government,
we refer to some system of popular representation where the powers of government are entrusted
to those representatives chosen directly or indirectly by the people in their sovereign capacity. 17
(emphasis supplied)
An outstanding feature of the 1987 Constitution is the expansion of the democratic space giving
the people greater power to exercise their sovereignty. Thus, under the 1987 Constitution, the
people can directly exercise their sovereign authority through the following modes, namely: (1)
elections; (2) plebiscite; (3) initiative; (4) recall; and (5) referendum. Through elections, the
people choose the representatives to whom they will entrust the exercise of powers of
government. 18 In a plebiscite, the people ratify any amendment to or revision of the
Constitution and may introduce amendments to the constitution. 19 Indeed, the Constitution
mandates Congress to "provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions
therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any law
or part thereof passed by the Congress or local legislative body. . ." It also directs Congress to
"enact a local government code which shall provide for effective mechanisms of recall, initiative,
and referendum." 20 Pursuant to this mandate, Congress enacted the Local Government Code of
1991 which defines local initiative as the "legal process whereby the registered voters of a local
government unit may directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance through an election called
for the purpose." Recall is a method of removing a local official from office before the expiration

of his term because of loss of confidence. 21 In a referendum, the people can approve or reject a
law or an issue of national importance. 22 Section 126 of the Local Government Code of 1991
defines a local referendum as "the legal process whereby the registered voters of the local
government units may approve, amend or reject any ordinance enacted by the sanggunian."
These Constitutional provisions on recall, initiative, and referendum institutionalized the people's
might made palpable in the 1986 People Power Revolution. 23 To capture the spirit of People
Power and to make it a principle upon which Philippine society may be founded, the
Constitutional Commission enunciated as a first principle in the Declaration of Principles and
State Policies under Section 1, Article II of the 1987 Constitution that the Philippines is not only
a republican but also a democratic state.
The following excerpts from the Records of the Constitutional Commission show the intent of
the Commissioners in emphasizing "democratic" in Section 1, Article II, in light of the
provisions of the Constitution on initiative, recall, referendum and people's organizations:
MR. SUAREZ.
. . . May I call attention to Section 1. I wonder who among the members of
the committee would like to clarify this question regarding the use of the word "democratic" in
addition to the word "republican." Can the honorable members of the committee give us the
reason or reasons for introducing this additional expression? Would the committee not be
satisfied with the use of the word "republican"? What prompted it to include the word
"democratic"?
xxx
xxx
xxx
MR. NOLLEDO.
Madam President, I think as a lawyer, the Commissioner knows that one
of the manifestations of republicanism is the existence of the Bill of Rights and periodic
elections, which already indicates that we are a democratic state. Therefore, the addition of
"democratic" is what we call "pardonable redundancy" the purpose being to emphasize that our
country is republican and democratic at the same time . . . In the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions,
"democratic" does not appear. I hope the Commissioner has no objection to that word.
MR. SUAREZ.
No, I would not die for that. If it is redundant in character but it is for
emphasis of the people's rights, I would have no objection. I am only trying to clarify the matter.
24 (emphasis supplied)
In other portions of the Records, Commissioner Nolledo explains the significance of the word
"democratic", viz.
MR. NOLLEDO.
I am putting the word "democratic" because of the provisions that we are
now adopting which are covering consultations with the people. For example, we have
provisions on recall, initiative, the right of the people even to participate in lawmaking and other
instances that recognize the validity of interference by the people through people's
organizations . . . 25
xxx
xxx
xxx
MR. OPLE. The Committee added the word "democratic" to "republican," and, therefore, the
first sentence states: "The Philippines is a republican and democratic state."
May I know from the committee the reason for adding the word "democratic" to "republican"?
The constitutional framers of the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions were content with "republican."
Was this done merely for the sake of emphasis?
MR. NOLLEDO.
Madam President, that question has been asked several times, but being
the proponent of this amendment, I would like the Commissioner to know that "democratic" was
added because of the need to emphasize people power and the many provisions in the

Constitution that we have approved related to recall, people's organizations, initiative and the
like, which recognize the participation of the people in policy-making in certain circumstances."
MR. OPLE. I thank the Commissioner. That is a very clear answer and I think it does meet a
need . . .
xxx
xxx
xxx
MR. NOLLEDO.
According to Commissioner Rosario Braid, "democracy" here is
understood as participatory democracy. 26 (emphasis supplied)
The following exchange between Commissioners Sarmiento and Azcuna is of the same import:
MR. SARMIENTO. When we speak of republican democratic state, are we referring to
representative democracy?
MR. AZCUNA.
That is right.
MR. SARMIENTO. So, why do we not retain the old formulation under the 1973 and 1935
Constitutions which used the words "republican state" because "republican state" would refer to
a democratic state where people choose their representatives?
MR. AZCUNA.
We wanted to emphasize the participation of the people in government.
MR. SARMIENTO. But even in the concept "republican state," we are stressing the
participation of the people . . . So the word "republican" will suffice to cover popular
representation.
MR. AZCUNA.
Yes, the Commissioner is right. However, the committee felt that in view
of the introduction of the aspects of direct democracy such as initiative, referendum or recall, it
was necessary to emphasize the democratic portion of republicanism, of representative
democracy as well. So, we want to add the word "democratic" to emphasize that in this new
Constitution there are instances where the people would act directly, and not through their
representatives. 27 (emphasis supplied)
V.
Elections and the Right to Vote
A. Theory
The electoral process is one of the linchpins of a democratic and republican framework because
it is through the act of voting that government by consent is secured. 28 Through the ballot,
people express their will on the defining issues of the day and they are able to choose their
leaders 29 in accordance with the fundamental principle of representative democracy that the
people should elect whom they please to govern them. 30 Voting has an important instrumental
value in preserving the viability of constitutional democracy. 31 It has traditionally been taken as
a prime indicator of democratic participation. 32
The right to vote or of suffrage is "an important political right appertaining to citizenship. Each
individual qualified to vote is a particle of popular sovereignty." 33 In People v. Corral, 34 we
held that "(t)he modern conception of suffrage is that voting is a function of government. The
right to vote is not a natural right but it is a right created by law. Suffrage is a privilege granted
by the State to such persons as are most likely to exercise it for the public good." The existence
of the right of suffrage is a threshold for the preservation and enjoyment of all other rights that it
ought to be considered as one of the most sacred parts of the constitution. 35 In Geronimo v.
Ramos, et al., 36 we held that the right is among the most important and sacred of the freedoms
inherent in a democratic society and one which must be most vigilantly guarded if a people
desires to maintain through self-government for themselves and their posterity a genuinely
functioning democracy in which the individual may, in accordance with law, have a voice in the
form of his government and in the choice of the people who will run that government for him. 37
The U.S: Supreme Court recognized in Yick Wo v. Hopkins 38 that voting is a "fundamental

political right, because [it is] preservative of all rights." In Wesberry v. Sanders, 39 the U.S.
Supreme Court held that "no right is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice
in the election of those who make the laws, under which, as good citizens, we must live. Other
rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined." Voting makes
government more responsive to community and individual needs and desires. Especially for
those who feel disempowered and marginalized or that government is not responsive to them,
meaningful access to the ballot box can be one of the few counterbalances in their arsenal. 40
Thus, elections are substantially regulated for them to be fair and honest, for order rather than
chaos to accompany the democratic processes. 41 This Court has consistently ruled from as early
as the oft-cited 1914 case of Gardiner v. Romulo 42 that the purpose of election laws is to
safeguard the will of the people, the purity of elections being one of the most important and
fundamental requisites of popular government. We have consistently made it clear that we frown
upon any interpretation of the law or the rules that would hinder in any way not only the free and
intelligent casting of the votes in an election but also the correct ascertainment of the results. 43
To preserve the purity of elections, comprehensive and sometimes complex election codes are
enacted, each provision of which whether it governs the registration and qualifications of
voters, the selection and eligibility of candidates, or the voting process itself inevitably affects
the individual's right to vote. 44 As the right to vote in a free and unimpaired manner is
preservative of other basic civil and political rights, Chief Justice Warren, speaking for the U.S.
Supreme Court in Reynolds v. Sims, 45 cautioned that any alleged infringement of the right of
citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized. It was to promote free, orderly
and honest elections and to preserve the sanctity of the right to vote that the Commission on
Elections was created. 46 The 1987 Constitution mandates the COMELEC to ensure "free,
orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections." 47
B. History of Suffrage in the Philippines
In primitive times, the choice of who will govern the people was not based on democratic
principles. Even then, birth or strength was not the only basis for choosing the chief of the tribe.
When an old chief has failed his office or committed wrong or has aged and can no longer
function, the members of the tribe could replace him and choose another leader. 48 Among the
Muslims, a council or ruma bechara chooses the sultan. An old sultan may appoint his successor,
but his decision is not absolute. Among the criteria for choosing a sultan were age, blood, wealth,
fidelity to Islamic faith and exemplary character or personality. 49 In times of crises, the
community may choose its leader voluntarily, irrespective of social status. By consensus of the
community, a serf or slave may be voted the chief on account of his ability.
As far back as the Spanish regime, the Filipinos did not have a general right of suffrage. 50 it
was only in the Malolos Constitution of 1899 that the right of suffrage was recognized; 51 it was
a by-product of the Filipinos' struggle against the Spanish colonial government and an offshoot
of Western liberal ideas on civil government and individual rights. 52 The life of the Malolos
Constitution was, however, cut short by the onset of the American regime in the Philippines. But
the right of suffrage was reiterated in the Philippine Bill of 1902. 53 The first general elections
were held in 1907 54 under the first Philippine Election Law, Act No. 1582, which took effect on
January 15, 1907. This law was elitist and discriminatory against women. The right of suffrage
was carried into the Jones Law of 1916. 55 Whereas previously, the right was granted only by
the Philippine Legislature and thus subject to its control, the 1935 Constitution elevated suffrage
to a constitutional right. 56 It also provided for a plebiscite on the issue of whether the right of
suffrage should be extended to women. On April 30, 1937; the plebiscite was held and the people

voted affirmatively. In the 1973 Constitution, 57 suffrage was recognized not only as a right, but
was imposed as a duty to broaden the electoral base and make democracy a reality through
increased popular participation in government. The voting age was lowered, the literacy
requirement abolished, and absentee voting was legalized. 58 The 1987 Constitution likewise
enshrines the right of suffrage in Article V, but unlike the 1973 Constitution, it is now no longer
imposed as a duty. 59 The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 60 and the 1976
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 61 also protect the right of suffrage.
VI. Voter Information:
Prerequisite to a Meaningful Vote in a Genuinely Free, Orderly and Honest Elections in a
Working Democracy
A. Democracy, information and discourse on public matters
1. U.S. jurisdiction
For the right of suffrage to have a value, the electorate must be informed about public matters so
that when they speak through the ballot, the knowledgeable voice and not the ignorant noise of
the majority would prevail. Jefferson admonished Americans to be informed rather than enslaved
by ignorance, saying that "(i)f a nation expects to be ignorant and free in a state of civilization, it
expects what never was and never will be." 62 Jefferson emphasized the importance of discourse
in a democracy, viz:
In every country where man is free to think and to speak, differences of opinion arise from
difference of perception, and the imperfection of reason; but these differences when permitted, as
in this happy country, to purify themselves by discussion, are but as passing clouds
overspreading our land transiently and leaving our horizon more bright and serene. 63
Other noted political philosophers like John Stuart Mill conceived of the "marketplace of ideas"
as a necessary means of testing the validity of ideas, viz:
(N)o one's opinions deserve the name of knowledge, except so far as he has either had forced
upon him by others, or gone through of himself, the same mental process which could have been
required of him in carrying on an active controversy with opponents. 64
In the same vein, political philosopher Alexander Meiklejohn, in his article "Free Speech Is An
Absolute," stressed that, "(s)elf-government can exist only insofar as the voters acquire the
intelligence, integrity, sensitivity, and generous devotion to the general welfare that, in theory,
casting a ballot is assumed to express." 65 To vote intelligently, citizens need information about
their government. 66 Even during the diaper days of U.S. democracy, the Framers of the U.S.
Constitution postulated that self-governing people should be well-informed about the workings
of government to make intelligent political choices. In discussing the First Amendment, James
Madison said: "The right of freely examining public characters and measures, and of free
communication thereon, is the only effectual guardian of every other right . . ." 67 Thus, the
United States, a representative democracy, has generally subscribed to the notion that public
information and participation are requirements for a representative democracy where the
electorate make informed choices. The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which
establishes freedom of the press and speech supports this proposition. The First Amendment's
jealous protection of free expression is largely based on the ideas that free and open debate will
generate truth and that only an informed electorate can create an effective democracy. 68
The First Amendment reflects the Framers' belief that public participation in government is
inherently positive. An informed citizenry is a prerequisite to meaningful participation in
government. Thus, the U.S. Congress embraced this principle more concretely with the passage
of the Freedom of Information Act of 1966 (FOIA). 69 The law enhanced public access to and

understanding of the operation of federal agencies with respect to both the information held by
them and the formulation of public policy. 70 In the leading case on the FOIA, Environmental
Protection Agency v. Mink, 71 Justice Douglas, in his dissent, emphasized that the philosophy of
the statute is the citizens' right to be informed about "what their government is up to." 72 In
Department of Air Force v. Rose, 73 the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged that the basic
purpose of the FOIA is "to open agency action to the light of public scrutiny". These rulings
were reiterated in the 1994 case of Department of Defense, et al. v. Federal Labor Relations
Authority, et al. 74 Be that as it may, the U.S. Supreme Court characterized this freedom of
information as a statutory and not a constitutional right in Houchins v. KQED, Inc., et al., 75 viz:
"there is no constitutional right to have access to particular government information, or to require
openness from the bureaucracy. . . The Constitution itself is neither a Freedom of Information
Act nor an Official Secrets Act." 76 Neither the courts nor Congress has recognized an
affirmative constitutional obligation to disclose information concerning governmental affairs; the
U.S. Constitution itself contains no language from which the duty could be readily inferred. 77
Nevertheless, the U.S. federal government, the fifty states and the District of Columbia have
shown their commitment to public access to government-held information. All have statutes that
allow varying degrees of access to government records. 78
While the right of access to government information or the "right to know" is characterized as a
statutory right, the right to receive information 79 was first identified by the U.S. Supreme Court
as a constitutional right in the 1936 case of Grosjean v. American Press Company. 80 The Court
also stated that the First Amendment protects the natural right of members of an organized
society, united for their common good, to impart and acquire information about their common
interests. Citing Judge Cooley, the Court held that free and general discussion of public matters
is essential to prepare the people for an intelligent exercise of their rights as citizens. 81 The
Court also noted that an informed public opinion is the most potent of all restraints upon
misgovernment. Many consider Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council 82 the seminal "right to receive" case. 83 In this 1976 decision, the Court
struck down a Virginia statute forbidding pharmacists from advertising the prices of prescription
drugs. Writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun held that the free flow of information about
commercial matters was necessary to ensure informed public decision-making. He reasoned that
the protection of the First Amendment extends not only to the speaker, but to the recipient of the
communication. Although the case dealt with commercial speech, the majority opinion made it
clear that the constitutional protection for receipt of information would apply with even more
force when more directly related to self-government and public policy. 84
In 1982, the U.S. Supreme Court highlighted the connection between self-government and the
right to receive information in Board of Education v. Pico. 85 This case involved a school boardordered removal of books from secondary school libraries after the board classified the book as
"anti-American, anti-Christian, anti-Semitic, and just plain filthy". 86 Justice Brennan, writing
for a three-justice plurality, emphasized the First Amendment's role in assuring widespread
dissemination of ideas and information. Citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 87 the Court held that
"(t)he State may not, consistently with the spirit of the First Amendment, contract the spectrum
of available knowledge." The Court noted that "the right to receive ideas is a necessary predicate
to the recipient's meaningful exercise of his own rights of speech, press, and political freedom."
It then cited Madison's admonition that, "(a) popular Government, without popular information,
or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both.

Knowledge will forever govern ignorance: And a people who mean to be their own Governors,
must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives." 88
The U.S. Supreme Court has reiterated, in various contexts, the idea that "the Constitution
protects the right to receive information and ideas." 89 Kleindienst v. Mandel 90 acknowledged a
First Amendment right to receive information but deferring to Congress' plenary power to
exclude aliens. Lamont v. Postmaster General 91 invalidated a statutory requirement that foreign
mailings of "communist political propaganda" be delivered only upon request by the addressee.
Martin v. City of Struthers 92 invalidated a municipal ordinance forbidding door-to-door
distribution of handbills as violative of the First Amendment rights of both the recipients and the
distributors. 93
Whether the "right to know" is based on a statutory right provided by the FOIA or a
constitutional right covered by the First Amendment, the underlying premise is that an informed
people is necessary for a sensible exercise of the freedom of speech, which in turn, is necessary
to a meaningful exercise of the right to vote in a working democracy. In 1927, Justice Louis
Brandeis gave the principle behind the First Amendment its classic formulation, viz:
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the state was to make men free
to develop their faculties, and that in its government the deliberative forces should prevail over
the arbitrary. They valued liberty both as an end and as a means. They believed liberty to be the
secret of happiness and courage to be the secret of liberty. They believed that freedom to think as
you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of
political truth; that without free speech and assembly discussion would be futile; that with them,
discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine;
that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is a political duty;
and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American government. They recognized
the risks to which all human institutions are subject. But they knew that order cannot be secured
merely through fear of punishment for its infraction; that it is hazardous to discourage thought,
hope and imagination; that fear breeds repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces
stable government; that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed
grievances and proposed remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones.
Believing in the power of reason as applied through public discussion, they eschewed silence
coerced by law the argument of force in its worst form. Recognizing the occasional tyrannies
of governing majorities, they amended the Constitution so that free speech and assembly should
be guaranteed. 94
The U.S. Supreme Court also held in Stromberg v. California 95 that the First Amendment
provides "the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that government may be
responsive to the will of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means . . ." 96
The Amendment is "the repository of . . . self-governing powers" 97 as it provides a peaceful
means for political and social change through public discussion. In Mills v. State of Alabama, 98
it ruled that there may be differences about interpretations of the First Amendment, but there is
practically universal agreement that a major purpose of the Amendment was to protect the free
discussion of governmental affairs. This of course includes discussions of candidates, structures
and forms of government, the manner in which government is operated or should be operated, all
such matters relating to political processes. 99 Justice William J. Brennan summarized the
principle succinctly in his opinion for the Court in Garrison v. Louisiana, viz: ". . . speech
concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government.
(emphasis supplied)" 100

2. Philippine jurisdiction
The electorate's right to information on public matters occupies a higher legal tier in the
Philippines compared to the United States. While the right to information in U.S. jurisdiction is
merely a statutory right, it enjoys constitutional status in Philippine jurisdiction. The 1987
Constitution not only enlarged the democratic space with provisions on the electorate's direct
exercise of sovereignty, but also highlighted the right of the people to information on matters of
public interest as a predicate to good governance and a working democracy. The Bill of Rights
sanctifies the right of the people to information under Section 7, Article III of the 1987
Constitution, viz:
Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions,
or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall
be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. (emphasis
supplied)
This provision of the right to information sans the phrase "as well as to government research
data" made its maiden appearance in the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution. The original
draft of the provision presented to the 1971 Constitutional Convention merely said that access to
official records and the right to information "shall be afforded the citizens as may be provided by
law." Delegate De la Serna pointed out, however, that the provision did not grant a selfexecutory right to citizens. He thus proposed the rewording of the provision to grant the right but
subject to statutory limitations. 101 The 1973 Constitution thus provided in Section 6, Article IV,
viz:
Sec. 6. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions,
or decisions, shall be afforded the citizen subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
The change in phraseology was important as in the pre-1973 case of Subido v. Ozaeta, 102 this
Court held that freedom of information or freedom to obtain information for publication is not
guaranteed by the constitution. In that case, the issue before the Court was whether the press and
the public had a constitutional right to demand the examination of the public land records. The
Court ruled in the negative but held that the press had a statutory right to examine the records of
the Register of Deeds because the interest of the press was real and adequate.
As worded in the 1973 and 1987 Constitution, the right to information is self-executory. It is a
public right where the real parties in interest are the people. Thus, every citizen has "standing" to
challenge any violation of the right and may seek its enforcement. 103 The right to information,
free speech and press and of assembly and petition and association which are all enshrined in the
Bill of Rights are cognate rights for they all commonly rest on the premise that ultimately it is an
informed and critical public opinion which alone can protect and uphold the values of democratic
government. 104
In "splendid symmetry" 105 with the right to information in the Bill of Rights are other
provisions of the 1987 Constitution highlighting the principle of transparency in government.
Included among the State Policies under Article II of the 1987 Constitution is the following
provision, viz:
Sec. 28.
Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and
implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
(emphasis supplied)

Related to the above provision is Section 21 of Article XI, National Economy and Patrimony,
which provides, viz:
Sec. 21.
Foreign loans may be incurred in accordance with law and the regulation of the
monetary authority. Information on foreign laws obtained or guaranteed by the Government shall
be made available to the public. (emphasis supplied)
The indispensability of access to information involving public interest and government
transparency in Philippine democracy is clearly recognized in the deliberations of the 1987
Constitutional Commission, viz:
MR. OPLE. Mr. Presiding Officer, this amendment is proposed jointly by Commissioners
Ople, Rama, Treas, Romulo, Regalado and Rosario Braid. It reads as follows: "SECTION 24.
THE STATE SHALL ADOPT AND IMPLEMENT A POLICY OF FULL PUBLIC
DISCLOSURE OF ALL ITS TRANSACTIONS SUBJECT TO REASONABLE
SAFEGUARDS ON NATIONAL INTEREST AS MAY BE PROVIDED BY LAW."
xxx
xxx
xxx
In the United States, President Aquino has made much of the point that the government should
be open and accessible to the public. This amendment is by way of providing an umbrella
statement in the Declaration of Principles for all these safeguards for an open and honest
government distributed all over the draft Constitution. It establishes a concrete, ethical principle
for the conduct of public affairs in a genuinely open democracy, with the people's right to know
as the centerpiece. 106 (emphasis supplied)
Commissioners Bernas and Rama made the following observations on the principle of
government transparency and the public's right to information:
FR. BERNAS.Just one observation, Mr. Presiding Officer. I want to comment that Section 6
(referring to Section 7, Article III on the right to information) talks about the right of the people
to information, and corresponding to every right is a duty. In this particular case, corresponding
to this right of the people is precisely the duty of the State to make available whatever
information there may be needed that is of public concern. Section 6 is very broadly stated so
that it covers anything that is of public concern. It would seem also that the advantage of Section
6 is that it challenges citizens to be active in seeking information rather than being dependent on
whatever the State may release to them.
xxx
xxx
xxx
MR. RAMA. There is a difference between the provisions under the Declaration of Principles
and the provision under the Bill of Rights. The basic difference is that the Bill of Rights
contemplates coalition (sic) (collision?) between the rights of the citizens and the State.
Therefore, it is the right of the citizen to demand information. While under the Declaration of
Principles, the State must have a policy, even without being demanded, by the citizens, without
being sued by the citizen, to disclose information and transactions. So there is a basic difference
here because of the very nature of the Bill of Rights and the nature of the Declaration of
Principles. 107 (emphases supplied)
The importance of information in a democratic framework is also recognized in Section 24,
Article II, viz:
Sec. 24.
The State recognizes the vital role of communication and information in nationbuilding. (emphasis supplied).
Section 10 of Article XVI, General Provisions is a related provision. It states, viz:
Sec. 10.
The State shall provide the policy environment for the full development of
Filipino capability and the emergence of communication structures suitable to the needs and

aspirations of the nation and the balanced flow of information into, out of, and across the
country, in accordance with a policy that respects the freedom of speech and of the press.
(emphasis supplied)
The sponsorship speech of Commissioner Braid expounds on the rationale of these provisions on
information and communication, viz:
MS. ROSARIO BRAID. We cannot talk of the functions of communication unless we have a
philosophy of communication, unless we have a vision of society. Here we have a preferred
vision where opportunities are provided for participation by as many people, where there is unity
even in cultural diversity, for there is freedom to have options in a pluralistic society.
Communication and information provide the leverage for power. They enable the people to act,
to make decisions, to share consciousness in the mobilization of the nation. 108 (emphasis
supplied)
In Valmonte v. Belmonte, 109 the Court had occasion to rule on the right to information of a
lawyer, members of the media and plain citizens who sought from the Government Service
Insurance System a "list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the
UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7
election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos." 110 In
upholding the petitioners' right, the Court explained the rational of the right to information in a
democracy, viz:
This is not the first time that the Court is confronted with a controversy directly involving the
constitutional right to information. In Taada v. Tuvera, G.R. No. 63915, April 24, 1985, 136
SCRA 27 (involving the need for adequate notice to the public of the various laws which are to
regulate the actions and conduct of citizens) and in the recent case of Legaspi v. Civil Service
Commission, G.R. No. 72119, May 29, 1987, 150 SCRA 530 (involving the concern of citizens
to ensure that government positions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only by
persons who are eligibles), the Court upheld the people's constitutional right to be informed of
matters of public interest and ordered the government agencies concerned to act as prayed for by
the petitioners.
xxx
xxx
xxx
An informed citizenry with access to the diverse currents in political, moral and artistic thought
and data relative to them, and the free exchange of ideas and discussion of issues thereon is vital
to the democratic government envisioned under our Constitution. The cornerstone of this
republican system of government is delegation of power by the people to the State. In this
system, governmental agencies and institutions operate within the limits of the authority
conferred by the people. Denied access to information on the inner workings of government, the
citizenry can become prey to the whims and caprices of those to whom the power had been
delegated . . .
xxx
xxx
xxx
. . . The right of access to information ensures that these freedoms are not rendered nugatory by
the government's monopolizing pertinent information. For an essential element of these freedoms
is to keep open a continuing dialogue or process of communication between the government and
the people. It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be
maintained to the end that the government may perceive and be responsive to the people's will.
Yet, this open dialogue can be effective only to the extent that the citizenry is informed and thus
able to formulate its will intelligently. Only when the participants in a discussion are aware of
the issues and have access to information relating thereto can such bear fruit. TSHIDa

The right to information is an essential premise of a meaningful right to speech and expression.
But this is not to say that the right to information is merely an adjunct of and therefore restricted
in application by the exercise of the freedoms of speech and of the press. Far from it. The right to
information goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional policies of full public disclosure (footnote
omitted) and honesty in the public service (footnote omitted). It is meant to enhance the
widening role of the citizenry in governmental decision-making as well as in checking abuse in
government. 111 (emphases supplied)
The Court made a similar ruling in Gonzales v. Narvasa 112 which involved the petitioner's
request addressed to respondent Executive Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora for the "names of the
executive officials holding multiple positions in government, copies of their appointments, and a
list of the recipients of luxury vehicles seized by the Bureau of Customs and turned over to
Malacaang." 113 The respondent was ordered to furnish the petitioner the information
requested. The Court held, viz:
Under both the 1973 (footnote omitted) and 1987 Constitution, this (the right to information) is a
self-executory provision which can be invoked by any citizen before the courts . . .
Elaborating on the significance of the right to information, the Court said in Baldoza v. Dimaano
(71 SCRA 14 [1976] . . .) that "[t]he incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a
recognition of the fundamental role of free exchange of information in a democracy. There can
be no realistic perception by the public of the nation's problems, nor a meaningful democratic
decision-making if they are denied access to information of general interest. Information is
needed to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of the times." 114
(emphases supplied)
The importance of an informed citizenry in a working democracy was again emphasized in
Chavez v. Public Estates Authority and Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation 115 where
we held, viz:
The State policy of full transparency in all transactions involving public interest reinforces the
people's right to information on matters of public concern.
xxx
xxx
xxx
These twin provisions (on right to information under Section 7, Article III and the policy of full
public disclosure under Section 28, Article II) of the Constitution seek to promote transparency
in policy-making and in the operations of the government, as well as provide the people
sufficient information to exercise effectively other constitutional rights. These twin provisions
are essential to the exercise of freedom of expression. If the government does not disclose its
official acts, transactions and decisions to citizens, whatever citizens may say, even if expressed
without any restraint, will be speculative and amount to nothing. These twin provisions are also
essential to hold public officials "at all times . . . accountable to the people," (footnote omitted)
for unless citizens have the proper information, they cannot hold public officials accountable for
anything. Armed with the right information, citizens can participate in public discussions leading
to the formulation of government policies and their effective implementation. An informed
citizenry is essential to the existence and proper functioning of any democracy. 116 (emphases
supplied)
B. Elections and the voters' right to information on the elections
1. U.S. Jurisdiction
An informed citizenry's opinions and preferences have the most impact and are most clearly
expressed in elections which lie at the foundation of a representative democracy. The electorate's
true will, however, can only be intelligently expressed if they are well informed about the time,

place, manner of conduct of the elections and the candidates therein. Without this information,
democracy will be a mere shibboleth for voters will not be able to express their true will through
the ballot.
In Duquette v. Merrill, 117 which the ponencia cites by reference to 26 American Jurisprudence
2d 292, 118 a vacancy in the office of Country Treasurer in York County occurred on July 24,
1944 upon the death of the incumbent Maynard A. Hobbs. The vacancy was filled in accordance
with the law providing that the governor may appoint a resident of the county who shall be
treasurer until the 1st day of January following the next biennial election, at which said election a
treasurer shall be chosen for the remainder of the term, if any. The next biennial election was
held on September 11, 1944. In the June 1944 primary election (prior to the death of Hobbs)
where nominations of candidates for the upcoming biennial elections were made, there was no
nomination for the office of County Treasurer as Hobbes' term was yet to expire on January
1947. Neither was a special primary election ordered by proclamation of the Governor after
Hobbes' death. Nor were other legal modes of nominating candidates such as through nomination
of a political party, convention of delegates or appropriate caucus resorted to. Consequently, in
the official ballot of the September 11, 1944 election, there was no provision made for the
selection of a County Treasurer to fill the vacancy for the unexpired term. The name of the office
did not appear on the ballot. Petitioner Duquette, however, claims that he was elected County
Treasurer in the special election because in the City of Biddeford, the largest city in York
County, 1,309 voters either wrote in the title of the office and his name thereunder, or used a
"sticker" of the same import and voted for him. At the September 11, 1944 biennial election,
there were approximately 22,000 ballots cast, but none included the name of the petitioner except
for the 1,309 in Biddeford. In holding that the special election was void, the Maine Supreme
Judicial Court made the following pronouncements, the first paragraph of which was cited by the
ponencia in the case at bar, viz:
Although there is not unanimity of judicial opinion as to the requirement of official notice; if the
vacancy is to be filled at the time of a general election, yet it appears to be almost universally
held that if the great body of the electors are misled by the want of such notice and are instead
led to believe that no such election is in fact to be held, an attempted choice by a small
percentage of the voters is void. Wilson v. Brown, 109 Ky 229, 139 Ky 397, 58 SW 595;
Wooton v. Wheeler, 149 Ky 62, 147 SW 914; Secord v. Foutch, 44 Mich 89, 6 NW 110; Bolton
v. Good, 41 NJL 296 (other citations omitted).
Notice to the electors that a vacancy exists and that an election is to be held to fill it for the
unexpired term, is essential to give validity to the meeting of an electoral body to discharge that
particular duty, and is also an essential and characteristic element of a popular election. Public
policy requires that it should be given in such form as to reach the body of the electorate. Here
there had been no nominations to fill the vacancy, either by the holding of a special primary
election, or by nomination by county political conventions or party committees. The designation
of the office to be filled was not upon the official ballot. As before noted, except for the vacancy,
it would have no place there, as the term of office of the incumbent, if living, would not expire
until January 1, 1947. 119 (emphases supplied)
As early as the 1897 case of People ex rel. Dix v. Kerwin, 120 the requirement of notice in an
election has been recognized, viz:
. . . We are not prepared to hold that this statute (requiring the giving of notice) is, under all
circumstances and at all times, so far mandatory that a failure to observe its requirements will
defeat an election otherwise regularly holden. There are many cases which hold that elections

regularly held and persons regularly voted for on nominations made where there has been failure
to observe some specific statutory requirement will not thereby be necessarily defeated and the
direction may, because of the excusing circumstances, be held directory rather than mandatory.
We do not believe the circumstances of the present case, as they are now exhibited, bring it all
within this rule. The theory of elections is that there shall be due notice given to the voters, and
that they must be advised either by a direct notice published by the clerk, as provided by statute,
or by proceedings taken by the voters and the people generally in such a way as that it may be
fairly inferred that it was generally and thoroughly well understood that a particular office was to
be filled at the election, so that the voters should act understandingly and intelligently in casting
their ballots.
xxx
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xxx
Since there was no notice published according to the statutes, we may not assume that the
nomination was regularly made, or that the voters were duly notified that the office was to be
filled at that general election, nine days afterwards. It has been generally held that some notice,
regular in its form, and pursuant to the requirements of law, must be given as a safeguard to
popular elections, that the people may be informed for what officers they are to vote. Of course,
it might easily be true, as has already been suggested, that, if nominations had been made for an
office, certificates regularly filed, and tickets regularly printed, even though the clerk had failed
to publish his notice, there would be no presumption that the body of the voters were uninformed
as to their rights and as to the positions which were to be filled. People v. Porter, 6 Cal. 26;
Secord v. Foutch, 44 Mich 89, 6 N.W. 110; Adsit v. Osmun, 84 Mich. 420, 48 N.W. 31; Allen v.
Glynn, 17 Colo. 338, 29 Pac. 670; Stephens v. People, 89 Ill. 337. 121 (emphases supplied)
Similarly, in Griffith v. Mercer County Court, et al., 122 it was held, viz:
There is a clear distinction between the case of a vacancy which is to be filled at a special
election to be held at a time and place to be appointed by some officer or tribunal, authorized by
statute to call it, and a case where the statute itself provides for filling a vacancy at the next
general election after it occurs. In such case nearly all the authorities hold that if the body of
electors do in fact know the vacancy exists, and candidates are regularly nominated by the
various political parties to fill it, and the candidates receive most of the votes cast, such election
is valid, even though no notice thereof was published in a manner provided by the statute. It
would be hypertechnical and unreasonable to hold that a failure to comply literally with the
statute in such case would avoid the election. 123 (emphasis supplied)
In Duquette, Kerwin and Griffith, as in a great majority of cases on the state level, the mere fact
that the election to fill a vacancy occasioned by death, resignation, removal, or the like is held at
the time of a general election in accordance with a constitutional or statutory provision, is not
regarded as sufficient in itself to validate the election if no notice of the election was given; it has
been held that in such a case, it must be shown that a sufficient part of the electors have actual
notice that the vacancy is to be filled. The fact that a great percentage of voters cast their votes
despite the failure of giving proper notice of the elections appears to be the most decisive single
factor to hold that sufficient actual notice was given. 124 These doctrines were reiterated in
Lisle, et al. vs. C.L. Schooler 125 where it was held that mere allegation that "many" voters were
informed that a special election to fill a vacancy was being held was unsatisfactory proof of
sufficient notice.
2.
Philippine jurisdiction
In our jurisdiction, it is also the rule that the exercise of the right of suffrage should be an
enlightened one, hence, based on relevant facts, data and information. It is for this reason that the

choice of representatives in a democracy cannot be based on lottery or any form of chance. The
choice must be based on enlightened judgment for democracy cannot endure the rule and reign
of ignorance. This principle was stressed by the Court in Tolentino v. Commission on Elections.
126 The issue before the Court was whether the Constitutional Convention of 1971 had the
power to call for a plebiscite for the ratification by the people of a partial constitutional
amendment. The amendment was the proposal to lower the voting age to 18 but with the caveat
that "(t)his partial amendment, which refers only to age qualification for the exercise of suffrage
shall be without prejudice to other amendments that will be proposed in the future by the 1971
Constitutional Convention on other portions of the amended Section or in other portions of the
entire Constitution." The Court ruled in the negative, emphasizing the necessity for the voter to
be afforded sufficient time and information to appraise the amendment, viz:
. . . No one knows what changes in the fundamental principles of the constitution the Convention
will be minded to approve. To be more specific, we do not have any means of foreseeing
whether the right to vote would be of any significant value at all. Who can say whether or not
later on the Convention may decide to provide for varying types of voters for each level of the
political units it may divide the country into. The root of the difficulty in other words, lies in that
the Convention is precisely on the verge of introducing substantial changes, if not radical ones,
in almost every part and aspect of the existing social and political order enshrined in the present
Constitution. How can a voter in the proposed plebiscite intelligently determine the effect of the
reduction of the voting age upon the different institutions which the Convention may establish
and of which presently he is not given any idea?
We are certain no one can deny that in order that a plebiscite for the ratification of an amendment
to the Constitution may be validly held, it must provide the voter not only sufficient time but
ample basis for an intelligent appraisal of the nature of the amendment per se as well as its
relation to the other parts of the Constitution with which it has to form a harmonious whole. In
the present state of things, where the Convention has hardly started considering the merits of
hundreds, if not thousands, of proposals to amend the existing Constitution, to present to the
people any single proposal or a few of them cannot comply with this requirement. 127 (emphasis
supplied)
The need for the voter to be informed about matters which have a bearing on his vote was again
emphasized by the Court in UNIDO v. Commission on Elections. 128 This case involved the
amendments to the 1973 Constitution proposed by the Batasang Pambansa in 1981. The Court
reiterated that the more people are adequately informed about the proposed amendments, their
exact meaning, implications and nuances, the better. We held, viz:
To begin with, we cannot agree with the restrictive literal interpretation the Solicitor General
would want to give to the "free, orderly and honest elections" clause of Section 5, Article XII-C
above-quoted. Government Counsel posits that the said clause refers exclusively to the manner in
which the elections are conducted, that is to say, with the manner in which the voters are
supposed to be allowed to vote. Perhaps, such a theory may hold insofar as ordinary elections of
officials are concerned. But the Court views the provision as applicable also to plebiscites,
particularly one relative to constitutional amendments. Be it borne in mind that it has been one of
the most steadfast rulings of this Court in connection with such plebiscites that it is indispensable
that they be properly characterized to be fair submission by which is meant that the voters
must of necessity have had adequate opportunity, in the light of conventional wisdom, to cast
their votes with sufficient understanding of what they are voting on. We are of the firm

conviction that the charter's reference to honest elections connotes fair submission in a plebiscite.
(emphasis supplied).
Similarly, the Court ruled in Sanidad v. COMELEC 129 that plebiscite issues are matters of
public concern and importance. The people's right to be informed and to be able to freely and
intelligently make a decision would be better served by access to an unabridged discussion of the
issues, including the forum.
It cannot be overemphasized that an informed electorate is necessary for a truly free, fair and
intelligent election. The voting age was lowered from 21 years, to 18 years because the youth of
18 to 21 years did not differ in political maturity, 130 implying that political maturity or the
capacity to discern political information is necessary for the exercise of suffrage. It is for this
obvious reason that minors and the insane are not allowed to vote. Likewise, the literacy test for
the right to vote was abolished because as explained by the Committee on Suffrage and Electoral
Reforms of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, "the requirement to read and write was written
into our constitution at a time when the only medium of information was the printed word and
even the public meetings were not as large and successful because of the absence of amplifying
equipment. It is a fact that today the vast majority of the population learn about national matters
much more from the audio-visual media, namely, radio and television, and public meetings have
become much more effective since the advent of amplifying equipment." Again, the necessity of
information relevant to an election is highlighted. Similarly, in the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, Commissioner Bernas, in justifying enfranchisement of the illiterates, spoke of
their access to information relevant to elections, viz:
If we look at . . . the communication situation in the Philippines now, the means of
communication that has the farthest reach is AM radio. People get their information not from
reading newspapers but from AM radio farmers while plowing, and vendors while selling
things listen to the radio. Without knowing how to read and write, they are adequately informed
about many things happening in the country. 131
Several election cases, albeit not involving an issue similar to the case at bar, affirm the necessity
of an informed electorate in holding free, intelligent and clean elections. In Blo Umpar Adiong v.
Commission on Elections 132 where this Court nullified a portion of a COMELEC Resolution
prohibiting the posting of candidates' decals and stickers on "mobile" places and limiting their
location to authorized posting areas, we held, viz:
We have adopted the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide open and that it may well include vehement, caustic and sometimes unpleasantly sharp
attacks on government and public officials. (New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 11
L.Ed. 686 [1964] . . .) Too many restrictions will deny to people the robust, uninhibited, and
wide open debate, the generating of interest essential if our elections will truly be free, clean and
honest.
We have also ruled that the preferred freedom of expression calls all the more for the utmost
respect when what may be curtailed is the dissemination of information to make more
meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage. (Mutuc v. Commission on Elections, 36 SCRA
228 [1970]).
xxx
xxx
xxx
When faced with border line situations where freedom to speak by a candidate or party and
freedom to know on the part of the electorate are invoked against actions intended for
maintaining clean and free elections, the police, local officials and COMELEC should lean in
favor of freedom. For in the ultimate analysis, the freedom of the citizen and the State's power to

regulate are not antagonistic. There can be no free and honest elections if in the efforts to
maintain them, the freedom to speak and the right to know are unduly curtailed.
xxx
xxx
xxx
. . . we have to consider the fact that in the posting of decals and stickers on cars and other
moving vehicles, the candidate needs the consent of the owner of the vehicle. In such a case, the
prohibition would not only deprive the owner who consents to such posting of the decals and
stickers the use of his property but more important, in the process, it would deprive the citizen of
his right to free speech and information:
Freedom to distribute information to every citizen wherever he desires to receive it is so clearly
vital to the preservation of a free society that, putting aside reasonable police and health
regulations of time and manner of distribution, it must be fully preserved. (Martin v. City of
Struthers, Ohio, 319 U.S. 141; 87 L. ed. 1313 [1943]). 133
To facilitate the people's right to information on election matters, this Court, in
Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc., et al. v. COMELEC 134
upheld the validity of COMELEC's procurement of print space and airtime for allocation to
candidates, viz:
With the prohibition on media advertising by candidates themselves, the COMELEC Time and
COMELEC Space are about the only means through which candidates can advertise their
qualifications and programs of government. More than merely depriving candidates of time for
their ads, the failure of broadcast stations to provide airtime unless paid by the government
would clearly deprive the people of their right to know. Art. III, 7 of the Constitution provides
that 'the right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized . . . '
135 (emphasis supplied)
The importance of the people's acquisition of information can be gleaned from several provisions
of the Constitution under Article IX (C), The Commission on Elections. Section 4 provides that
the COMELEC is given the power to "supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all
franchises or permits for the operation of transportation and other public utilities, media of
communication or information, all grants, special privileges or concession granted by the
Government . . . Such supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure equal opportunity, time, and
space and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information
campaigns and forums among candidates in connection with the objective of holding free,
orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections. Section 6 provides that, "(a) free and open party
system shall be allowed to evolve according to the free choice of the people". Section 2(5) of the
same article requires political parties, organizations and coalitions to present their platform or
program of government before these can be registered. In the robust and wide open debate of the
electorate, these programs of government are important matters for discussion.
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission on whether voting of Congressmen should
be by district or province also evince a clear concern for intelligent voting, viz:
SR. TAN.
Mr. Presiding Officer, I think one of the drawbacks of our political system,
especially in the campaign, is that many of us vote by personality rather than by issue. So I am
inclined to believe that in the elections by district, that would be lessened because we get to
know the persons running more intimately. So we know their motivation, their excesses, their
weaknesses and there would be less chance for the people to vote by personality. I was
wondering whether the Commission shares the same observation.

MR. DAVIDE.
Mr. Presiding Officer, if it would be by province, the vote would no longer
be personalities but more on issues, because the relationship is not really very personal. Whereas,
if it would be by district, the vote on personality would be most impressive and dominant.
SR. TAN.
I cannot quite believe that. It would be like a superstar running around.
MR. DAVIDE.
For instance; we have a district consisting of two municipalities. The vote
would be more on personalities. It is a question of attachment; you are the godson or the sponsor
of a baptism, like that. But if you will be voted by province, it's your merit that will be counted
by all others outside your own area. In short, the more capable you are, the more chance you
have of winning provincewide. 136
Several provisions of our election laws also manifest a clear intent to facilitate the voters'
acquisition of information pertaining to elections to the end that their vote would truly reflect
their will. Section 52(j) of Article VII of B.P. Blg. 881 or the Omnibus Election Code gives the
COMELEC the following power and duty:
(j)
Carry out a continuing and systematic campaign through newspapers of general
circulation, radios and other media forms to educate the public and fully inform the electorate
about election laws, procedures, decisions, and other matters relative to the work and duties of
the Commission and the necessity of clean, free, orderly and honest electoral processes. (Sec.
185(k), 1978 EC)
(k)
Enlist non-partisan groups or organizations of citizens from the civic, youth, professional,
educational, business or labor sectors known for their probity, impartiality and integrity . . . Such
groups or organizations . . . shall perform the following specific functions and duties:
A.
Before Election Day:
1.
Undertake an information campaign on salient features of this Code and help in the
dissemination of the orders, decisions and resolutions of the Commission relative to the
forthcoming election. (emphasis supplied)
Section 87 of Article X of B.P. Blg. 881 also provides, viz:
Section 87.
...
Public Forum. The Commission shall encourage non-political, non-partisan private or civic
organizations to initiate and hold in every city and municipality, public for at which all registered
candidates for the same office may simultaneously and personally participate to present, explain,
and/or debate on their campaign platforms and programs and other like issues . . . (emphasis
supplied)
Section 93 of the same Article provides, viz:
Section 93.
Comelec information bulletin. The Commission shall cause the printing, and
supervise the dissemination of bulletins to be known as "Comelec Bulletin" which shall be of
such size as to adequately contain the picture, bio-data and program of government of every
candidate. Said bulletin shall be disseminated to the voters or displayed in such places as to give
due prominence thereto. (emphasis-supplied)
Of the same import is Section 25 of R.A. No. 8436, "An Act Authorizing the Commission on
Elections to Use an Automated Election System in the May 11, 1998 Elections and Subsequent
Electoral Exercises" which provides, viz:
Section 25.
Voters' Education. The Commission together with and in support of accredited
citizens' arms shall carry out a continuing and systematic campaign though newspapers of
general circulation, radio and other media forms, as well as through seminars, symposia, fora and
other non-traditional means to educate the public and fully inform the electorate about the

automated election system and inculcate values on honest, peaceful and orderly elections.
(emphasis supplied)
Similarly, R.A. No. 9006, "An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful
and Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices," approved a few months before the May
2001 elections or on February 12, 2001 provides in Section 6.4, viz:
Sec. 6.4.
...
In all instances, the COMELEC shall supervise the use and employment of press, radio and
television facilities insofar as the placement of political advertisements is concerned to ensure
that candidates are given equal opportunities under equal circumstances to make known their
qualifications and their stand on public issues within the limits set forth in the Omnibus Election
Code and Republic Act No. 7166 on election spending. (emphasis supplied)
The Omnibus Election Code also provides for procedures and requirements that make the
election process clear and orderly to avoid voter confusion. Article IX of the Code provides, viz:
Section 73.
Certificate of candidacy. No person shall be eligible for any elective public
office unless he files a sworn certificate of candidacy within the period fixed herein.
xxx
xxx
xxx
No person shall be eligible for more than one office to be filled in the same election, and if he
files his certificate of candidacy for more than one office, he shall not be eligible for any of
them . . .
xxx
xxx
xxx
Certificates of Candidacy, Certified List of Candidates. . . .
. . . the Commission shall cause to be printed certified lists of candidates containing the names of
all registered candidates for each office to be voted for in each province, city or municipality
immediately followed by the nickname or stage name of each candidate duly registered in his
certificate of candidacy and his political affiliation, if any. Said list shall be posted inside each
voting booth during the voting period.
xxx
xxx
xxx
The names of all registered candidates immediately followed by the nickname or stage name
shall also be printed in the election returns and tally sheets (R.A. No. 6646, Sec. 4)
Section 74.
Contents of certificate of candidacy. The certificate of candidacy shall state that
the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible
for said office; . . .
Article XVI, Section 181 also provides, viz:
Section 181. Official ballots.
xxx
xxx
xxx
"(b) The official ballot shall also contain the names of all the officers to be voted for in the
election, allowing opposite the name of each office, sufficient space or spaces with horizontal
lines where the voter may write the name or names of individual candidates voted for by him.
In the case of special elections, the need for notice and information is unmistakable under
Section 7 of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, as amended by R.A. No. 7166, which
provides, viz:
Sec. 7. Call for special election. In case a permanent vacancy shall occur in the Senate or
House of Representatives at least one (1) year before the expiration of the term, the Commission
shall call and hold a special election to fill the vacancy not earlier than sixty (60) days nor longer
than ninety (90) after the occurrence of the vacancy. However, in case of such vacancy in the

Senate, the special election shall be held simultaneously with the succeeding regular election.
(R.A. No. 7166, Sec. 4).
The postponement, declaration of failure of election and the calling of special elections as
provided in Sections 5, 6, and 7 of the Omnibus Election Code shall be decided by the
Commission sitting en banc by a majority vote of its members. The causes for the declaration of
a failure of election may occur before or after the casting of votes or on the day of the election.
(R.A. No. 7166, Sec. 4)
The Commission shall send sufficient copies of its resolution for the holding of the election to its
provincial election supervisors and election registrars for dissemination, who shall post copies
thereof in at least three conspicuous places preferably where public meetings are held in each
city or municipality affected. (1978 EC, Sec. 8) (emphasis supplied)
In Hassan v. COMELEC, et al., 137 we ruled that constituents could not be charged with notice
of a second special elections held only two days after the failure of the special election. This case
involved the May 8, 1995 regular local elections in Madalum, Lanao del Sur. Due to the threats
of violence and terrorism in the area, there was a failure of election in six out of twenty-four
precincts in Madalum. A special elections was set on May 27, 1995 but the Board of Election
Inspectors failed to report for duty due to the threats of violence. The Monitoring Supervising
Team of the COMELEC reset the special elections to May 29, 1995 in a school 15 kilometers
away from the designated polling places. In ruling that the May 29 special elections was invalid,
the Court ruled, viz:
We cannot agree with the COMELEC that petitioner, his followers or the constituents must be
charged with notice of the special elections to be held because of the failure of the two (2)
previous elections. To require the voters to come to the polls on such short notice was highly
impracticable. In a place marred by violence, it was necessary for the voters to be given
sufficient time to be notified of the changes and prepare themselves for the eventuality.
It is essential to the validity of the election that the voters have notice in some form, either actual
or constructive of the time, place and purpose thereof . (Furste v. Gray, 240 Ky 604, 42 SW 2d
889; State ex. rel. Stipp v. Colliver (MO) 243 SW 2d 344.) The time for holding it must be
authoritatively designated in advance. The requirement of notice even becomes stricter in cases
of special elections where it was called by some authority after the happening of a condition
precedent, or at least there must be a substantial compliance therewith so that it may fairly and
reasonably be said that the purpose of the statute has been carried into effect. (State ex. rel. Stipp
v. Colliver, supra). The sufficiency of notice is determined on whether the voters generally have
knowledge of the time, place and purpose of the elections so as to give them full opportunity to
attend the polls and express their will or on the other hand, whether the omission resulted in
depriving a sufficient number of the qualified electors of the opportunity of exercising their
franchise so as to change the result of the election. (Housing Authority of County of Kings v.
Peden, 212 Cal App 2d 276, 28 Cal Rptr, other citations omitted)
xxx
xxx
xxx
. . . even in highly urbanized areas, the dissemination of notices poses to be a problem. In the
absence of proof that actual notice of the special elections has reached a great number of voters,
we are constrained to consider the May 29 elections as invalid . . . (emphases supplied)
Although this case did not involve a special election held simultaneously with a general election
by mandate of law as in the case at bar, the doctrine that can be derived from this case is that the
electorate must be informed of the special election as proved by official or actual notice.

VII. Application of the Principles of Democracy, Republicanism, Freedom of Information and

Discourse to the Case at Bar
The 1987 Constitution, with its declaration that the Philippines is not only a republican but also a
democratic state, and its various provisions broadening the space for direct democracy
unmistakably show the framers' intent to give the Filipino people a greater say in government.
The heart of democracy lies in the majoritarian rule but the majoritarian rule is not a mere game
of dominant numbers. The majority can rule and rule effectively only if its judgment is an
informed one. With an informed electorate, a healthy collision of ideas is assured that will
generate sparks to fan the flames of democracy. Rule by the ignorant majority is a sham
democracy a mobocracy for in the words of Jefferson, a nation cannot be both free and
ignorant. If there is anything that democracy cannot survive, it is the virus of ignorance.
Elections serve as a crevice in the democratic field where voters, for themselves and the public
good, plant the seeds of their ideals and freedoms. Yick Wo is emphatic that voting is a
fundamental right that preserves and cultivates all other rights. In a republic undergirded by a
social contract, the threshold consent of equal people to form a government that will rule them is
renewed in every election where people exercise their fundamental right to vote to the end that
their chosen representatives will protect their natural rights to life, liberty and property. It is this
sacred contract which makes legitimate the government's exercise of its powers and the chosen
representatives' performance of their duties and functions. The electoral exercise should be
nothing less than a pure moment of informed judgment where the electorate speaks its mind on
the issues of the day and choose the men and women of the hour who are seeking their mandate.
The importance of information and discourse cannot be overemphasized in a democratic and
republican setting. Our constitutional provisions and cases highlighting the people's right to
information and the duty of the State to provide information unmistakably recognize the
indispensable need of properly informing the citizenry so they can genuinely participate in and
contribute to a functioning democracy. As elections lie at the foundation of representative
democracy, there should be no quarrel over the proposition that electoral information should also
be disseminated to the electorate as a predicate to an informed judgment.
The ponencia concedes that a survey of COMELEC's resolutions relating to the conduct of the
May 14, 2001 elections would reveal that they "contain nothing which would amount to a
compliance, either strict or substantial, with the requirements in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as
amended." Nowhere in its resolutions or even its press releases did COMELEC state that it
would hold a special election for a single Senate seat with a three-year term simultaneously with
the regular elections on May 14, 2001. Nor did COMELEC give official notice of the manner by
which the special election would be conducted, i.e., that the senatorial candidate receiving the
13th highest number of votes in the election would be declared winner in the special election.
Still, the ponencia upheld the holding of the May 14, 2001 special election despite "the lack of
'call' for such election and . . . lack of notice as to the office to be filled and the manner by which
the winner in the special election is to be determined."
With all due respect, I cannot subscribe to the ponencia's position for it leaves the purity of
elections and the ascertainment of the will of the electorate to chance, conjecture and
speculation. Considering that elections lie at the heart of the democratic process because it is
through the act of voting that consent to government is secured, I choose to take a position that
would ensure, to the greatest extent possible, an electorate that is informed, a vote that is not
devalued by ignorance and an election where the consent of the governed is clear and
unequivocal.

The ponencia justifies its position on the lack of call or notice of the time and place of the special
election by holding that the law charges voters with knowledge of R.A. No. 7166 which provides
that in case of a vacancy in the Senate, the special election to fill such vacancy shall be held
simultaneously with the next succeeding election, that is, the May 14, 2001 election. The
ponencia's argument is that the provisions of R.A. No. 7166 stating that the special election
would be held simultaneously with the regular election operated as a call for the election so that
the absence of a call by the COMELEC did not taint the validity of the special election. With due
respect, this is not the intention of R.A. No. 7166 for despite its paragraph 1, Section 7 that "in
case of such vacancy in the Senate, the special election shall be held simultaneously with the
succeeding regular election", the law nevertheless required in paragraph 3 of the same section
that "(t)he Commission shall send sufficient copies of its resolution for the holding of the
election to its provincial election supervisors and election registrars for dissemination, who shall
post copies thereof in at least three conspicuous places preferably where public meetings are held
in each city or municipality affected."
The Duquette case cited by the ponencia does not lend support to its thesis that statutory notice
suffices. In Duquette, it was held that in the absence of an official notice of the special election
mandated by law to be held simultaneously with the general election, there should be actual
notice of the electorate. Actual notice may be proved by the voting of a significant percentage of
the electorate for the position in the special election or by other acts which manifest awareness of
the holding of a special election such as nomination of candidates. In the case at bar, however,
the number of votes cast for the special election cannot be determined as the ballot did not
indicate separately the votes for the special election. In fact, whether or not the electorate had
notice of the special election, a candidate would just the same fall as the 13th placer because
more than twelve candidates ran for the regular senatorial elections. Nobody was nominated to
vie specifically for the senatorial seat in the special election nor was there a certificate of
candidacy filed for that position. In the absence of official notice of the time, place and manner
of conduct of the special election, actual notice is a matter of proof. Respondents and the
ponencia cannot point to any proof of actual notice.
With respect to the lack of notice of the manner by which the special election would be
conducted, i.e., that the 13th placer would be declared winner in the special election, there can be
no debate that statutory notice will not operate as notice to the electorate as there is no law
providing that a special election held simultaneously with a general election could be conducted
in the manner adopted by the Senate and the COMELEC. Instead, the ponencia buttresses its
holding by stating that the petitioner has not claimed nor proved that the failure of notice misled
a sufficient number of voters as would change the result of the special senatorial election. It
relies on "actual notice from many sources, such as media reports of the enactment of R.A. No.
6645 and election propaganda during the campaign" but without even identifying these media
reports and election propaganda. Suffice to state that before the ponencia can require proof that a
sufficient number of voters was misled during the May 14, 2001 elections, it must first be shown
that in the absence of official notice of the procedure for the special election, there was
nevertheless actual notice of the electorate so that the special election could be presumed to be
valid. Only then will the duty arise to show proof that a sufficient number of voters was misled
to rebut the presumption of validity.
I respectfully submit that the electorate should have been informed of the time, place and manner
of conduct of the May 14, 2001 special election for the single senatorial seat for the unexpired
term of former Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr. Tolentino, UNIDO, Blo Umpar Adiong and

Hassan all deepened the doctrine that a meaningful exercise of the right of suffrage in a
genuinely free; orderly and honest election is predicated upon an electorate informed on the
issues of the day, the programs of government laid out before them, the candidates running in the
election and the time, place and manner of conduct of the election. It is for this reason that the
Omnibus Election Code is studded with processes; procedures and requirements that ensure voter
information.
Bince and Benito further teach us that free and intelligent vote is not enough; correct
ascertainment of the will of the people is equally necessary. The procedure adopted in the case at
bar for holding the May 14, 2001 special senatorial election utterly failed to ascertain the
people's choice in the special election. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7166 provides that the "special
election shall be held simultaneously with such general election." It does not contemplate,
however, the integration of the special senatorial election into the regular senatorial election
whereby candidates who filed certificates of candidacy for the regular elections also
automatically stand as candidates in the special election. The Omnibus Election Code is crystal
clear that a candidate can run for only one position in an election. Consequently; there were no
candidates in the special election to vote for. Separate sets of candidates for the special election
and the regular elections are decisive of the election results. Each independent-minded voter
could have a variety of reasons for choosing a candidate to serve for only the unexpired term of
three years instead of the regular term of six years or not choosing a candidate at all. A voter
might choose a neophyte to serve the three-year term as a shorter trial period. Another might be
minded to choose an old-timer to compel him to hasten the completion of his projects in a shorter
period of three years. Still another might want to afford a second termer who has not performed
too satisfactorily a second chance to prove himself but not for too long a period of six years. In
not allowing the voter to separately indicate the candidate he voted for the three-year senatorial
term, the voter was deprived of his right to make an informed judgment based on his own
reasons and valuations. Consequently, his true will in the special election was not ascertained. As
a particle of sovereignty, it is the thinking voter who must determine who should win in the
special election and not the unthinking machine that will mechanically ascertain the 13th placer
in the general election by mathematical computations.
The models to follow in the conduct of special elections mandated by law to be held
simultaneously with a general elections are the special elections of November 13, 1951 and
November 8, 1955 to fill the seats vacated by then Senators Fernando Lopez and Carlos P.
Garcia, respectively. In these special senatorial elections, election activities prior (i.e., filing of
certificate of candidacies), during (i.e., the act of voting for a special election candidate distinct
from the candidates for the regular election) and after the election (i.e., tallying and canvassing
of results) were conducted simultaneously with, but distinctly from the regular senatorial
elections. This procedure minimized voter confusion and allowed the voter to freely and
accurately speak his mind and have his will truly ascertained. Regrettably, this objective appears
to have been lost in the calling of the May 14, 2001 special election as can be gleaned from the
Senate deliberations on the resolution calling for that election, viz:
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD)
Mr. President, in this resolution, we are leaving the mechanics to
the Commission on Elections. But personally, I would like to suggest that probably, the
candidate obtaining the 13th largest number of votes be declared as elected to fill up the
unexpired term of Senator Guingona.

S[ENATOR] O[SMEA]. (J).

Is there a law that would allow the Comelec to conduct
such an election? Is it not the case that the vacancy is for a specific office? I am really at a loss. I
am rising here because I think it is something that we should consider. I do not know if we can . .
. No, this is not a Concurrent Resolution.
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD].
May we solicit the legal wisdom of the Senate President.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT].
May I share this information that under Republic Act No. 6645,
what is needed is a resolution of this Chamber calling attention to the need for the holding of a
special election to fill up the vacancy created, in this particular case, by the appointment of our
colleague, Senator Guingona, as Vice President.
It can be managed in the Commission on Elections so that a slot for the particular candidate to
fill up would be that reserved for Mr. Guingona's unexpired term. In other words, it can be
arranged in such a manner.
xxx
xxx
xxx
S[ENATOR] R[OCO].
Mr. President.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT].
Sen. Raul S. Roco is recognized.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO].
May we suggest, subject to a one-minute caucus, wordings to the
effect that in the simultaneous elections, the 13th placer be therefore deemed to be the special
election for this purpose. So we just nominate 13 and it is good for our colleagues. It is better for
the candidates. It is also less expensive because the ballot will be printed and there will be less
disenfranchisement.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT].
That is right.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO].
If we can just deem it therefore under this resolution to be such a
special election, maybe, we satisfy the requirement of the law.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT].
Yes. In other words, this shall be a guidance for the Comelec.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO].
Yes.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT].
to implement.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO].
Yes. The Comelec will not have the flexibility.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT].
That is right.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO].
We will already consider the 13th placer of the forthcoming
elections that will be held simultaneously as a special election under this law as we understand it.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT].
Yes. That will be a good compromise, Senator Roco.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO].
Yes. So if the sponsor can introduce that later, maybe it will be
better, Mr. President.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT].
What does the sponsor say?
S[ENATOR] [T]ATAD.
Mr. President, that is a most satisfactory proposal because I do not
believe that there will be anyone running specifically
T[HE] P[RESIDENT].
Correct.
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD].
to fill up this position for three years and campaigning
nationwide.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT].
Actually, I think what is going to happen is the 13th candidate will
be running with specific groups.
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD].
Yes. Whoever gets No. 13.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT].
I think we can specifically define that as the intent of this
resolution.
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD].
Subject to style, we accept that amendment and if there will be no
other amendment, I move for the adoption of this resolution.

ADOPTION OF S. RES. NO. 934

If there are not other proposed amendments, I move that we adopt this resolution.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT].
There is a motion to adopt this resolution. Is there any objection?
[Silence] There being none, the motion is approved. 138 (emphases supplied)
The Senate's observation that the procedure for the special election that it adopted would be less
costly for the government as the ballots need not be printed again to separately indicate the
candidate voted for the special election does not also lend justification for the manner of conduct
of the May 14, 2001 special election. We cannot bargain the electorate's fundamental right to
vote intelligently with the coin of convenience. Even with the Senate stance, the regular ballot
had to be modified to include a thirteenth space in the list of senatorial seats to be voted for. At
any rate, reliance on R.A. No. 6645 is erroneous. This law provides that when a vacancy arises in
the Senate, the Senate, by resolution, certifies to the existence of the vacancy and calls for a
special election. Upon receipt of the resolution, the COMELEC holds the special election. R.A.
No. 6645 was amended in 1991 by R.A. No. 7166. The latter law provides that when a
permanent vacancy occurs in the Senate at least one year before the expiration of the term, "the
Commission (on Elections) shall call and hold a special election to fill the vacancy . . ." Since
under R.A. No. 7166, it is the power and duty of the COMELEC, and not the Senate, to call and
hold the election, the Senate cannot, by mere resolution, impose upon the COMELEC the
procedure for the special election that it intended such that "Comelec will not have the
flexibility" to deviate therefrom. As a constitutional body created to ensure "free, orderly, honest,
peaceful, and credible elections", it was the duty of the COMELEC to give to the electorate
notice of the time, place and manner of conduct of the special elections and to adopt only those
mechanisms and procedures that would ascertain the true will of the people.
In sum, I submit that the ruling of the ponencia would result not just to a step back in an age of
information, but would constitute a fall in the nation's rise to democracy begun as early as the
Malolos Constitution and begun anew in the 1987 Constitution after the 1986 People Power
Revolution. Informing the electorate on the issues and conduct of an election is a prerequisite to
a "free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections." Free elections does not only mean that
the voter is not physically restrained from going to the polling booth, but also that the voter is
unrestrained by the bondage of ignorance. We should be resolute in affirming the right of the
electorate to proper information. The Court should not forfeit its role as gatekeeper of our
democratic government run by an informed majority. Let us not open the door to ignorance.
I vote to grant the petition.
Davide, Jr., C .J ., Vitug, Ynares-Santiago and Tinga, JJ ., concur.
Footnotes
1.
As provided under Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7166, as amended.
2.
Resolution No. 84 reads:
WHEREAS, the Honorable Teofisto Guingona, Jr. was elected Senator of the
Philippines in 1998 for a term which will expire on June 30, 2004;
WHEREAS, on February 6, 2001, Her Excellency President Gloria MacapagalArroyo nominated Senator Guingona as Vice-President of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, the nomination of Senator Guingona has been conferred by a
majority vote of all the members of both Houses of Congress, voting separately;

WHEREAS, Senator Guingona will take his Oath of Office as Vice-President of

the Philippines on February 9, 2001;
WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 7166 provides that the election for twelve (12)
Senators, all elective Members of the House of Representatives, and all elective provincial, city
and municipal officials shall be held on the second Monday of May and every three years
thereafter. Now, therefore be it Resolved by the Senate, as it is hereby resolved to certify as it
hereby certifies, the existence of a vacancy in the Senate and calling the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) to fill up said vacancy through election to be held simultaneously with
the regular election on May 14, 2001 and the senatorial candidate garnering the thirteenth (13th)
highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto T.
Guingona, Jr. (Emphasis supplied)
3.

Resolution No. 01-005 reads:

WHEREAS, the Commission on Elections, sitting [E]n [B]anc as the National
Board of Canvassers for the election of Senators of the Philippines, officially canvassed in open
and public proceedings the certificates of canvass of votes cast nationwide for senators in the
national and local elections conducted on May 14, 2001.
Based on the canvass of the Certificates of Canvass submitted by seventy-eight
(78) out of seventy-nine (79) Provincial Boards of Canvassers, twenty (20) City Boards of
Canvassers of cities comprising one (1) or more legislative districts, two (2) District Boards of
Canvassers of Metro Manila, and one (1) Absentee Voting, and the remaining uncanvassed
certificate of canvass which will not anymore affect the results, the Commission on Elections
sitting En Banc as the National Board of Canvassers finds that the following candidates for
senators in said elections obtained as of June 04, 2001 the following number of votes as
indicated opposite their names:
Name Votes Garnered
(as of 4 June 2001)
NOLI DE CASTRO 16,157,811
JUAN M. FLAVIER 11,676,129
SERGIO R. OSMEA, III 11,531,427
FRANKLIN M. DRILON
11,223,020
RAMON B. MAGSAYSAY, JR.
11,187,447
JOKER P. ARROYO 11,163,801
MANUEL B. VILLAR, JR. 11,084,884
FRANCIS N. PANGILINAN 10,877,989
EDGARDO J. ANGARA
10,746,843
PANFILO M. LACSON
10,481,755
LUISA P. EJERCITO ESTRADA 10,456,674
RALPH G. RECTO 10,387,108
GREGORIO G. HONASAN 10,364,272
NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it under the Constitution,
the Omnibus Election Code and other election laws, the Commission on Elections sitting En
Banc as the National Board of Canvassers hereby PROCLAIMS the above-named thirteen (13)
candidates as the duly elected Senators of the Philippines in the May 14, 2001 elections. Based
on the certificates of canvass finally tabulated, the first twelve (12) Senators shall serve for a
term of six (6) years and the thirteenth (13th) Senator shall serve the unexpired term of three (3)

years of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. who was appointed Vice-President of the Philippines
pursuant to Section 9, Article VII of the Constitution, in relation to Section 9, Article VI thereof,
as implemented under Republic Act No. 6645. (Emphasis supplied)
4.
This provision states: "The Commission on Elections shall fix the date of the special
election, which shall not be earlier than forty-five (45) days nor later than ninety (90) days from
the date of such resolution or communication, stating among other things the office or offices to
be voted for: Provided, however, That if within the said period a general election is scheduled to
be held, the special election shall be held simultaneously with such general election."
5.
This provision reads: "Certificate of candidacy. No person shall be eligible for any
elective public office unless he files a sworn certificate of candidacy within the period fixed
herein.
A person who has filed a certificate of candidacy may, prior to the election,
withdraw the same by submitting to the office concerned a written declaration under oath.
No person shall be eligible for more than one office to be filled in the same
election, and if he files his certificate of candidacy for more than one office, he shall not be
eligible for any of them. However, before the expiration of the period for the filing of certificates
of candidacy, the person who has filed more than one certificate of candidacy may declare under
oath the office for which he desires to be eligible and cancel the certificate of candidacy for the
other office or offices.
The filing or withdrawal of a certificate of candidacy shall not affect whatever
civil, criminal or administrative liabilities which a candidate may have incurred."
6.
This provision reads: "Certificates of Candidacy; Certified List of Candidates. . . . The
names of all registered candidates immediately followed by the nickname or stage name shall
also be printed in the election returns and tally sheets."
7.
Rollo, pp. 5-7, 12-14.
8.
Senator Roseller T. Lim was elected in the special election of 13 November 1951 while
Senator Felisberto Verano was elected in the special election of 8 November 1955.
9.
Rollo, pp. 8-12.
10.
Castro v. Del Rosario, 25 Phil. 611 (1967); Section 1(a), Rule 66, THE 1997 RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE.
11.
Sections 1-2, Rule 65, THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
12.
Gil v. Benipayo, G.R. No. 148179, 26 June 2001 (minute resolution).
13.
Acop v. Guingona, G.R. No. 134856, 2 July 2002, 383 SCRA 577; Viola v. Hon. Alunan
III, 343 Phil. 184 (1997); Alunan III v. Mirasol, 342 Phil. 467 (1997).
14.
342 Phil. 467 (1997).
15.
Joya v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 96541, 24 August
1993, 225 SCRA 568.
16.
Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Morato, 316 Phil. 652 (1995).
17.
CONST., art. VIII, secs. 1 and 5(2).
18.
Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. v. Commission on
Elections, 352 Phil. 153 (1998).
19.
See Warth v. Seldin, 442 U.S. 490, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975).
20.
Dumlao v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-52245, 22 January 1980, 95 SCRA 392 (internal
citations omitted).

21.
De Guia v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 104712, 6 May 1992, 208 SCRA 420; Gonzales v.
COMELEC, 129 Phil. 7 (1967). See also Telecom. & Broadcast Attys. of the Phils., Inc. v.
COMELEC, 352 Phil. 153 (1998).
22.
G.R. No. 141284, 15 August 2000, 338 SCRA 81.
23.
Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284, 15 August 2000, 338
SCRA 81.
24.
E.g. Resolution No. 3258, dated 28 September 2000 (providing for the calendar of
activities and periods of prohibited acts in connection with the 14 May 2001 elections as
amended by Resolution Nos. 3322, dated 5 October 2000; 3284, dated 20 October 2000; 3306,
dated 7 November 2000; 3426, dated 22 December 2000; and 3359, dated 6 February 2001);
Resolution No. 3632, dated 1 March 2001 (canceling the certificates of candidacy of nuisance
senatorial candidates); and Resolution No. 3743, dated 12 March 2001 (providing for the general
instructions to the Boards of Election Inspectors on the casting and counting of votes).
25.
E.g. undated COMELEC pamphlet entitled "Frequently Asked Questions on the May 14,
2001 Elections."
26.
26 AM. JUR. 2d Elections 281 (1996); 29 C.J.S. Elections 70 (1965).
27.
Ibid; ibid.
28.
26 AM. JUR. 2d Elections 282 (1996).
29.
Ibid.
30.
McCoy v. Fisher, 67 S.E. 2d 543 (1951).
31.
26 AM. JUR. 2d Elections 281 (1996); 29 C.J.S. Elections 70 (1965).
32.
See 26 AM. JUR. 2d Elections 292 (1996); 29 C.J.S. Elections 72 (1965).
33.
Indeed, the fact that 13 senators were due to be elected in the 14 May 2001 elections and
that the senator elected to the 13th place will serve the remaining term of Senator Guingona was
published in news reports (see Philippine Star, 9 February 2001, pp. 1, 6 and Daily Tribune, 9
February 2001, pp. 1, 8; Philippine Daily Inquirer, 12 February 2001, pp. 1, 10; 14 February
2001, pp. 1, A20; Today, 8 February 2001, p. 10; Manila Bulletin, 9 February 2001, pp. 3, 8).
Furthermore, the fact that the administration and opposition coalitions each fielded 13 senatorial
candidates (and not only 12) was similarly given extensive coverage by news publications (see
Philippine Daily Inquirer, 12 February 2001, pp. 1, 10; 13 February 2001, pp. 1, A14; 14
February 2001, pp. 1, A20; Philippine Star, 13 February 2001, pp. 1, 4; 14 February 2001, pp. 1,
6; Today, 9 February 2001, pp. 1, 4; 12 February 2001, pp. 1, 10; 13 February 2001, pp. 1, 10;
Manila Standard, 13 February 2001, pp. 1, 2; Malaya, 13 February 2001, pp. 1, 6; 14 February
2001, pp. 1, 4; Daily Tribune 14 February 2001, pp. 1, 6; Manila Times, 14 February 2001, pp. 1,
2A; Philippine Star Ngayon, 13 February 2001, pp. 1, 4).
34.
Florendo, Sr. vs. Buyser, 129 Phil. 353 (1967); Capalla v. Tabiana, 63 Phil. 95 (1936);
Kiamzon v. Pugeda, 54 Phil. 755 (1930); Cailles v. Gomez, 42 Phil. 852 (1924). Batas Pambansa
Blg. 881, as amended, (Omnibus Election Code), on failure of elections (resulting to the
annulment of elections), provides: "SEC. 6. Failure of election. If, on account of force
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes the election in any polling place
had not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the
closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the
election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and
in any of such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the election,
the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by an interested party and after due
notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election not held, suspended or

which resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the election not held,
suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation
of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect".
35.
Alcala v. Commission on Elections, 218 Phil. 322 (1984); Villareal v. Fornier, 84 Phil.
756 (1949); Lucero v. De Guzman, 45 Phil. 852 (1924).
36.
Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez, 39 Phil. 208 (1918).
37.
Transcript of Session Proceedings of the Philippine Senate, 8 February 2001, pp. 49-54.
(Emphasis supplied)
38.
E.g. Cauton v. COMELEC, 126 Phil. 291 (1967).
39.
Pungutan v. Abubakar, 150 Phil. 1 (1972) citing Sumulong v. Commission on Elections,
73 Phil. 237 (1941).
PUNO, J., dissenting:
1.
Rollo, pp. 93-96; Amended Petition, pp. 8-11.
2.
Rollo, pp. 100-101; Amended Petition, pp. 15-16.
3.
Baradat, L. Political Ideologies: Their Origins and Impact (Sixth Ed., 1997), pp. 65-67.
4.
Jones, T., Modern Political Thinkers and Ideas (2002), p. 23.
5.
Patterson, C., The Constitutional Principles of Thomas Jefferson (1953), pp. 27 and 49.
6.
Baradat, L. Political Ideologies: Their Origins and Impact (Sixth Ed., 1997), pp. 101-104.
7.
Id., pp. 101-104.
8.
Stephens, O. and Scheb, J. II, American Constitutional Law, 2nd ed. (1999), p. 817.
9.
Baradat, L., supra, pp. 101-104.
10.
Stephens, O. and Scheb, J. II, supra, p. 817.
11.
Baradat, L., supra, pp. 101-104.
12.
Stephens, O. and Scheb, J. II, supra, p. 817.
13.
Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution (1949), p. 1.
14.
Id., p. 7.
15.
Bernas, J., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary
(2003), p. 57.
16.
Aruego, supra, p. 132.
17.
4 Records of the Constitutional Commission, pp. 580-581.
18.
Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations, vol. II (1927), p. 1350.
19.
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides in relevant part, viz:
Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered
voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the
registered voters therein.
20.
Section 3, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides, viz:
Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for
a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among
the different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for
the qualifications, elections, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and
duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the
local units.
21.
Section 69 of the Local Government Code of 1991 provides, viz:

Section 69.
By Whom Exercised. The power of recall for loss of confidence
shall be exercised by the registered voters of a local government unit to which the local elective
official subject to recall belongs.
22.
Section 25, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution provides, viz:
After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the
Philippines and the United States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases,
troops, of facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in
by the Senate and, when Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the
people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting state.
23.
Garcia v. COMELEC, et al., 227 SCRA 100 (1993).
24.
4 Records of the Constitutional Commission, p. 680.
25.
Id.. p. 735.
26.
Id., p. 752.
27.
Id., p. 769.
28.
Bogdanor, V. and Butler, D., Democracy and Elections: Electoral Systems and their
Political Consequences (1983), p. 1. See also Dissenting Opinion of Justice Bernardo Pardo in
Akbayan-Youth, et al. v. COMELEC, 355 SCRA 318 (2001), p. 359.
29.
Baradat, L., supra, p. 134.
30.
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
31.
Stephens, O. and Scheb, J. II, supra, p. 816.
32.
Beetham, ed., Defining and Measuring Democracy (1994), p. 48.
33.
Santos v. Paredes, et al. (1937).
34.
62 Phil. 945, 948 (1972).
35.
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
36.
136 SCRA 435 (1985).
37.
Id., p. 446 (1985).
38.
118 U.S. 356 (1886).
39.
376 U.S. 1 (1964).
40.
Rodriguez, V., "Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 After Boerne: The Beginning
of the End of Preclearance?", California Law Review (May 2003) 769, 824.
41.
Anderson, et al. v. Celebrezze, Jr., 460 U.S. 780 (1983), 788, citing Storer v. Brown, 415
U.S. 724 (1974).
42.
26 Phil. 521 (1914).
43.
Rodriguez v. Commission on Elections, et al., 119 SCRA 465 (1982). See also Benito v.
Comelec, G.R. No. 106053, August 17, 1994; Bince, Jr. v. COMELEC, et al., 242 SCRA 273.
44.
Anderson v. Celebrezze, Jr., supra, p. 788.
45.
377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).
46.
Cauton v. COMELEC, 19 SCRA 911 (1967).
47.
Section 2(4), Article IX of the 1987 Constitution.
48.
Quisumbing, L., "Elections and Suffrage: From Ritual Regicide to Human Rights?" 58
Philippine Law Journal 28 (1983), citing Jocano, Phil. Prehistory (1975). ch. 8, "Community
Organization." Cf. Merriam, Political Power (1934), ch. 3, "Law among the Outlaws."
49.
Quisumbing, L., supra, citing Interview with J. Kiram, Boulevardier, Jan. 1983 issue.
50.
Bernas, J., supra, p. 631.
51.
The Malolos Constitution provides in relevant part, viz:

Art. 4. The government of the Republic is popular, representative, alternative, and

responsible and is exercised by three distinct powers, which are denominated legislative,
executive and judicial . . .
xxx
xxx
xxx
Art. 33.
The legislative power shall be exercised by an Assembly of
representatives of the nation . . .
Art. 34.
The members of the Assembly shall represent the entire nation,
and not exclusively those who elect them . . .
Art. 35.
No representative shall be subjected to any imperative mandate of
his electors.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Art. 58.
The President of the Republic shall be elected by an absolute
majority of votes by the Assembly and the representatives specially meeting in a constitutive
assembly.
52.
Pangilinan, M.F., "The Changing Meaning of Suffrage", 57 Philippine Law Journal 136
(1982).
53.
The Philippine Bill of 1902, entitled "An Act to Temporarily Provide for the
Administration of the Affairs of Civil Government of the Philippine Islands and for Other
Purposes," provides in sections 6 and 7 for the taking of census of all inhabitants when general
insurrection has ceased, and, two years from the date of the census, the calling of general
elections for the members of the Philippine Assembly.
54.
Bernas, J., supra, p. 631.
55.
The Jones Law provides in section 8 that general legislative power except as otherwise
provided, is granted to the Philippine Legislature. Section 15 provided for the qualification of
electors in the elections of the senators and representatives to the Philippine Legislature.
56.
Section 1, Article V of the 1935 Constitution provides in relevant part, viz:
Section 1.
Suffrage may be exercised by male citizens of the Philippines not
otherwise disqualified by law. . .
57.
Section 4, Article V of the 1973 Constitution provides, viz:
Section 4.
It shall be the obligation of every citizen qualified to vote to
register and cast his vote.
Section 1, Article V of the 1973 Constitution provides, viz:
Section 1.
Suffrage shall be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not
otherwise disqualified by law . . .
58.
Bernas. J., supra, p. 631.
59.
Section 1, article V of the 1987 Constitution provides in relevant part, viz:
Section 1.
Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not
otherwise disqualified by law. . .
60.
Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides, viz:
1.
Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country,
directly or through freely chosen representatives;
2.
Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country;
3.
The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government;
this shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal
suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.
61.
Article 25 of the Covenant of Civil and Political Rights provides, viz:

Every citizen shall have the right and opportunity without any of the distinctions
mentioned in Art. 2 (race, color, sex, language, religion, opinion, property, birth, etc.) and
without reasonable restrictions:
(a)
To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely
chosen representatives;
(b)
To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be
universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression
of the will of the electors;
(c)
to have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his
country.
62.
Levinson, J., "An Informed Electorate: Requiring Broadcasters to Provide Free Airtime
to Candidates for Public Office." Boston University Law Review (January 1992), p. 143, citing
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Colonel Charles Yancey (Jan. 6, 1816), in 10 The Writings of
Thomas Jefferson 4 (Paul L. Ford ed., 1899), cited in Library of Congress, Respectfully Quoted
97 (Suzy Platt ed., 1989).
63.
Gatewood, C., "Click Here: Web Links, Trademarks and the First Amendment," 5
Richmond Journal of Law and Technology 12 (Spring 1999), pp. 9-10, citing Thomas Jefferson,
Letter to Benjamin Waring, 1801, in 10 The Writing of Thomas Jefferson, Memorial Edition 235
(1904).
64.
Id., p. 11, citing John Stuart Mill, On Liberty 82 (Legal Classics Library ed., Legal
Classics 1992) (1859).
65.
Id., p. 13, citing Alexander Meiklejohn, Free Speech Is An Absolute, 1961 Sup. Ct. Rev.
245, 255.
66.
Bunker, M., Splichal, S., Chamberlin, B., Perry, L., supra, p. 548, citing Meiklejohn, A.,
Free Speech and its Relation to Self-Government 6 (1948).
67.
Id., p. 545, citing Writings of James Madison 398 (1806), reprinted in Note, Access to
Official Information: A Neglected Constitutional Right, 27 Ind. L.J. 209, 212 (1952).
68.
Gatewood, C., supra, p. 9.
69.
Wilcox. W., "Access to Environmental Information in the United States and the United
Kingdom," 23 Loyola of Los Angeles International & Comparative Law Review (March 2001)
121, 124-125.
70.
Ducat, C., Constitutional Interpretation: Rights of the Individual, vol. II (2000), p. 1030.
71.
410 U.S. 73 (1973).
72.
Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749
(1989), 772-773.
73.
425 U.S. 352, 372 (1976).
74.
127 L. Ed. 2d 325 (1994).
75.
438 U.S. 1 (1978).
76.
438 U.S. 1 (1978), 14, citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974) and Stewart, "Or of
the Press;" 26 Hastings LJ 631, 636 (1975).
77.
Note, "The Rights of the Public and the Press to Gather Information," 87 Harvard Law
Review 1505 (May, 1974), 1512.
78.
Bunker, M., Splichal, S., Chamberlin, B., Perry, L., supra, p. 543.
79.
Id., p. 548.
80.
297 U.S. 233 (1935).
81.
297 U.S. 233 (1935), 249, citing 2 Cooley, Const. Lim, 8th ed. p. 886.

82.
425 U.S. 748 (1976).
83.
Bunker, M., Splichal, S., Chamberlin, B., Perry, L., supra, p. 549.
84.
425 U.S. 748, 765, p. 19 (1976).
85.
457 U.S. 853 (1982).
86.
Id., p. 857.
87.
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
88.
457 U.S. 853, 867 (1982), citing 9 Writings of James Madison 103 (G. Hunt ed. 1910).
89.
Bunker, M., Splichal, S., Chamberlin, B., Perry, L., supra, p. 549.
90.
408 U.S. 753, 762-45 (1972).
91.
381 U.S. 301 (1965).
92.
319 U.S. 141 (1943).
93.
Information is vital not only in the area of political participation in a democracy, but also
in the field of economic participation. It is often said that the American economy has been
shifting from one based on industrial development to one based on the creation and
dissemination of information. (Sunstein, C., "Informational Regulation and Informational
Standing: Akins and Beyond," 147 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [January 1999], 613,
citing David Osborne & Ted Gaebler, Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit
Is Transforming the Public Sector 15-16 [1992] [describing the failure of government
bureaucracy to adjust to the new "knowledge-based economy"]). In the last forty years, statutes
have been designed to ensure disclosure of information and this mandatory disclosure has
increasingly become a pervasive and important regulatory tool. Informational regulation such as
requiring companies to disclose information about toxic releases, contents of food and drinks and
workplace injuries has become one of the most striking developments in the last generation of
American law. The government also attempts to control its own agents through compulsory
production and disclosure of information such as through the National Environmental Policy Act
of 1969, the Freedom of Information Act and the Federal Election Campaign Act which enhance
public monitoring of government decisions, with special attention being given to particular
issues such as insufficient environmental concern, unlawful behavior during campaigns, and
official corruption. (Sunstein, C., Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins
and Beyond, 147 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [January 1999]. 613, 614).
94.
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
95.
283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931).
96.
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931).
97.
Bunker, M., Splichal, S., Chamberlin, B., Perry, L., supra, p. 546, citing Brennan, W., Jr.,
"The Supreme Court and the Mieklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment", 79 Hard. L.
Rev. 1, 11 (1965).
98.
384 U.S. 214 (1966).
99.
Id., pp. 218-219.
100. 379 U.S. 64 (1964), 74-75.
101. Bernas, J., supra, p. 370
102. 80 Phil. 383 (1948).
103. Bernas, J., supra, p. 371.
104. Id., p. 376.
105. Commissioner Blas Ople, 5 Records of the Constitutional Commission, p. 26.
106. 5 Records of the Constitutional Commission, p. 24.
107. Id., p. 26.

108. Id., p. 83.

109. 170 SCRA 256 (1989).
110. Id.
111. 170 SCRA 256, 264-266 (1989).
112. 337 SCRA 733 (2000).
113. Id., p. 745 (2000).
114. Id., pp. 746-747 (2000).
115. G.R. No. 133250, July 9, 2002.
116. Id., p. 15.
117. 158 ALR 1181 (1945).
118. Footnote 32 of the ponencia.
119. 158 ALR 1183-84 (1945). See also Wilson v. Brown, 58 S.W. 595 (1900) and State ex
rel. Bryant v. Maxwell, 189 Tenn. 187, 224 S.W.2d 833 (1949).
120. 10 Colo App. 472, 51 P 530 (1897).
121. Id., pp. 531-532 (1897).
122. 80 W Va 410, 92 SE 676 (1917).
123. Id., p. 679.
124. Annotation, Notice of election to fill vacancy in office at general election, 158 ALR
1189-91 (1945)
125. 288 S.W. 2d 652 (1956).
126. 41 SCRA 702 (1971).
127. Tolentino v. Commission on Elections, et al., 41 SCRA 702 (1971).
128. 104 SCRA 17 (1981).
129. 181 SCRA 529 (1990).
130. Bernas, J., supra, p. 636.
131. 2 Records of the Constitutional Commission, p. 16.
132. 207 SCRA 712 (1992).
133. 207 SCRA 712, 716-717, 721 (1992). See also ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v.
COMELEC, 323 SCRA 811 (2000).
134. 289 SCRA 337 (1998).
135. Id., pp. 361-362.
136. 5 Records of the Constitutional Commission, p. 675.
137. 264 SCRA 125 (1996).
138. Transcript of Session Proceedings of the Philippine Senate, February 8, 2001, pp. 51-54.
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